TCR_Public/110717.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 17, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 196

                            Headlines

1888 FUND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
ACA ABS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 3 Classes of ACA ABS 2002-1
ACLC BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades and Reviews Loan Securitizations
AIRLIE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of 61 Tranches From 14 CSOs
AMMC CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC-'

ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
ARES IIR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 2 CLO Notes From 'B1'
ARES IIR: Moody's Ups Ratings of Class D-1 & D-2 Notes From 'B1'
ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
ARTUS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

ASSET SECURITIZATION: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 1997-D5 Certs.
ATRIUM V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Seven Classes of CLO Notes
AVERY POINT: Moody's Ups Rating of $9MM Class E Notes From 'Ba2'
BABSON CLO: Moody's Ups Rating of $12.5MM Class E Notes From Junk
BABSON CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

BABSON CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Deferrable Notes
BABSON CLO: S&P Withdraws 'CCC- Ratings on Class E & Sr. Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades BACM 2004-6
BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Acts on $258 Mil. RMBS
BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of $121.7 Mil. RMBS

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Upgrades BSCM Series 2000-WF2
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms 20 CMBS Classes of BSCMS 2006-TOP22
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades $237.7 Mil. Resecuritized RMBS
BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Nine CLO Notes Classes
BLACKROCK SENIOR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'

BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: S&P Rates Class E Deferrable Notes 'BB'
BOMBARIDER CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M-1 Certs. to 'D'
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Ups Class D-1 & D-2 Note Ratings From Junk
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
CLARENVILLE CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of EUR 138.1m CLO Notes

COMM 2011-THL: Fitch Issues Presale on Certificates
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms CMAC 1998-C2
COUNTRYWIDE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 16 CMBS Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Actions on CSFB 2006-TFL2
CRIIMI MAE: S&P Affirms Rating on Clas e Notes at 'CCC-'

DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades 2 Classes of DLJ 2000-CF1
ENTERPRISE FLEET: Moody's Assigns Ratings to Fleet Lease ABS
FIRST UNION: Fitch Cuts Rating of 1 Class of Series 1999-C4
FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'BB'

FREMONT HOME: Moodys's Reviews Six Subprime RMBS for Downgrade
GALAXY XI: Moody's Assigns Provisional Ratings to Two Classes
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades GE Capital Series 2000-1
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Various Actions on GECCMC 2002-1
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Lowers Three and Affirms 14 CMBS Classes

GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Class D Notes
GREEN TREE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Certificates to 'D'
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on GCCFC 2004-GG1
GREYROCK CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Nine CLO Notes Classes
GROSVENOR PLACE: Moody's Upgrades EUR161 Mil. CLO Notes

GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms 23 CMBS Classes of GSMS 2007-GG10
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
GTP ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Secured Tower Revenue Notes
GTP ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Tower Notes
GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Four CLO Notes Classes

GULF STREAM: Moody's Ups Rating of US$20MM Class D Notes From Junk
GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes From 'Ba1'
HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Four CLO Notes
IBIS RE: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 2010-1 Class B Notes to 'B'
JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings of Series 2007-FL1

JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades One Class of JPMCC 2004-C3
JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Downgrades JPMorgan Series 2001-A
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class SP-3 Certificate to 'D'
JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 10-A6 to 'D'
JUNIPER CBO 1999-1: Fitch Affirms, Withdraws Ratings

JUNIPER CBO 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 2 Classes of Notes
KATONAH V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings of Series 2003-C5 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'

LBUBS 2001-C2: Fitch Downgrades Class J to 'Csf/RR3'
LCM I LIMITED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings Three CLO Notes Classes
LCM IV LTD: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Three Classes of Notes
MAC CAPITAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes at 'B+'

MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Downgrades Class P Rating to 'D'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: DBRS Confirms Class D Rating at 'BB'
MONTANA RE: AM Best Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'b' From 'bb'
MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Downgrades Class E Rating to 'BB'
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 1999-CAM1 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 2003-HQ2 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-HF2 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings of Series 1999-LIFE1 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades Five and Affirms One CMBS Classes

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'CCC-'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certs. to 'CCC'
N-45 FIRST: Fitch Upgrades Classes of N-45, Series 2003-3
NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes From Junk
NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

NEPTUNE CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades 6, Withdraws Ratings
NORANDA OPERATING: DBRS Downgrades Issuer Rating to 'BB'
OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
PPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on Class A and B Certs.

PPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms Ratings on Class A and B Certs. at 'BB-'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $31-Mil. Certs.
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $125.87MM Certs.
PROTECTIVE LIFE: Fitch Affirms Protective Life 2007-PL
RACE POINT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

SANDELMAN PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B+'
SATURN VENTURES: Fitch Affirms 3 Classes of Notes
SMART HOME: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SHRL 2005-2
TABS 2005-2: DBRS Confirms Ratings of 3 Classes of Notes at 'C'
TCW GLOBAL: Fitch Affirms 2 Senior Classes of Notes

UNITED INDEPENDENT: Moody's Gives 'Aa2' To Tax Refunding Bonds
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Upgrades Wachovia 2003-C4
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms 24 CMBS Classes of WBCMT 2007-C33
WAMU COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades WaMu 2006-SL1
WELLS FARGO: Fitch Issues Presale on 2011-C4 Certificates

WHITNEY CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
WIND RIVER: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Seven Classes of CLO Notes

* Fitch Downgrades 26 Bonds in 17 U.S. CMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 25 Classes of Certs. on Interest Shortfalls
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 69 Classes; Affirms Ratings on 190 Classes
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 487 Classes & Affirms Ratings on 985 Classes
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 327 Classes of U.S. RMBS Transactions

* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 80 North American ABS Transactions

                            *********

1888 FUND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by 1888 Fund Ltd.:

US$10,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$47,000,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $165 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.0% (implying a WARF of 3920), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47%, and a diversity score of 33.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

1888 Fund Ltd. issued on December 20, 2002, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


ACA ABS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 3 Classes of ACA ABS 2002-1
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of notes issued by ACA
ABS 2002-1, Limited/ L.L.C. (ACA ABS 2002-1):

   -- $27,781,814 class A notes at 'BBBsf/LS4', Outlook revised to
      Negative from Stable;

   -- $64,000,000 class B notes at 'Csf';

   -- $17,836,036 class C notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis
to conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in August 2010, the credit
quality of the underlying collateral has declined further, with
approximately 28.8% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average
of 4.8 notches. Currently, 53.1% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 34% has a rating in the
'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 49.1% and 32.3%,
respectively, at last review.

The affirmation of the class A notes is due to amortization of the
capital structure offsetting the deterioration of the underlying
portfolio. Principal amortizations and excess interest proceeds
have been used to redeem the class A notes' balance due to the
failing class A/B overcollateralization test. The class A notes
have received $6.6 million, or 19.1% of the prior review balance,
since the last review. The cash flow model indicates a range of
passing ratings for the class A notes across different interest
rate and default timing scenarios. In general, the model results
are consistent with the class A current rating. The lower passing
ratings in Fitch's 'up' interest rate scenarios demonstrate the
notes sensitivity to interest rates. This reflects the fact that
approximately 75.3% of the portfolio earns a fixed rate coupon
while all notes are floating rate and the interest rate swap steps
down by August 2012. In Fitch's opinion, 'BBBsf', Outlook
Negative, appropriately reflects the notes' exposure to the risk
described.

The Loss Severity (LS) rating of 'LS4' for the class A notes
indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating. Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks
to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

For the class B and C notes Fitch compared the credit enhancement
level to the expected losses from the distressed and defaulted
assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This comparison
indicates that default continues to appear inevitable for the
class B and C notes at or prior to maturity.

ACA ABS 2002-1 is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on July 29, 2002 and is managed by
Solidus Capital, LLC. As of the May 2011 trustee report, the
portfolio is primarily comprised of residential mortgage backed
securities (42.3%), consumer and commercial asset backed
securities (32.2%), commercial mortgage backed securities (16.6%)
and SF CDOs (8.9%) from 1998 through 2005 vintage transactions.


ACLC BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades and Reviews Loan Securitizations
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed Class B from AMRESCO
Commercial Finance Inc.'s 2002-1 franchise loan securitization on
review for possible downgrade, and downgraded Class C from
AMRESCO's 1998-2 securitization from Ca to C. The notes are backed
by franchise loans made to fast-food restaurants, and quick
service convenience stores. The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 1998-2

Class C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2005
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACLC Business Loan Receivables Trust 2002-1

Class B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 1, 2005 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on Class B from AMRESCO's 2002-1 securitization
is the result of a high percentage of accelerated loans and
significant obligor concentrations risks. As of June 15th payment
date, 93% of the current pool balance is accelerated. The largest
obligor, Cool River Restaurant, comprises 50% of the current pool
balance, and the top 5 obligors comprise 81% of the current pool
balance.

During the review period, Moody's will estimate the recovery rates
of foreclosed properties and assess any future stresses on the
rest of the collateral pool. Moody's will also qualitatively
assess the business challenges currently faced by the largest
borrowers in the pool.

Moody's has also downgraded Class C from AMRESCO's 1998-2
securitization, as a result of the outstanding note balance being
completely written down from pool losses.

Principal Methodology:

In order to estimate losses on the collateral pool, Moody's
calculates the expected loss given default of the obligors that
have become nonperforming, and also estimates future losses on
performing portion of the pool, all as a percentage of the
outstanding pool. In evaluating the nonperforming loans, key
factors include collateral valuations and expected recovery rates,
volatility around those recovery rates, historical obligor
performance, time until recovery or liquidation on defaulted
obligors, concessions due to restructuring which may negatively
impact the overall cash flow of the trust and/or the collateral,
and future industry expectations. Net losses are then evaluated
against the available credit enhancement provided by
overcollateralization, subordination, and excess spread.
Sufficiency of coverage is considered in light of remaining
borrower concentrations and concepts, remaining bond maturities,
and economic outlook.

The primary source of uncertainty in the performance of these
transactions are the successfulness of workout strategies for
loans requiring special servicing , as well as the current
macroeconomic environment and its impact on fast food restaurants
and convenience stores.

Regulatory Disclosures

For ratings issued on series of debt, this announcement provides
relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a
subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or
category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the
ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in
accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a
support provider, this announcement provides relevant regulatory
disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support
provider and in relation to each particular rating action for
securities that derive their credit ratings from the support
provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this
announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a
definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final
issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure
and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the
definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating.


AIRLIE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of 61 Tranches From 14 CSOs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded or confirmed the ratings
of 61 tranches from 14 collateralized synthetic obligation
transactions (the "CSOs") and one SF CDO listed below, which have
exposure to Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. ("LBSFI").

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the actions are primarily based on the fact
that no material progress has been made towards the resolution of
the pending litigations since the last rating action, and payments
due to the affected tranches continue to be significantly delayed
with no clear indication of when and if they will resume. Moody's
placed the tranches under review for possible downgrade in March
2010. Since the watchlist action, all the rated CSO tranches
continued to be subject to interest payment default or deferred
interest payments. Interest on the funded notes payments and
commitment fees on the contingent funding notes (the unfunded
tranches) continue to accrue without a definite date of repayment,
pending a resolution of the litigation affecting these
transactions. Given the high uncertainty around the payment of
both unfunded and funded notes by their respective maturity date
and the possibility of a loss of these payments, Moody's believes
that the risk on these tranches is consistent with a Caa1 rating
on the unfunded tranches and a Caa3 on the funded tranches.
Moody's also confirmed its ratings on certain junior tranches in
these deals that were previously rated Ca on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's explained that LBSFI acts as a credit default swap
counterparty in the transactions and that its obligations as such
are guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. ("LBHI"). Both
LBHI and LBSFI filed for bankruptcy protection in 2008. These
transactions are secured by either shares of the Lehman Brothers
ABS Enhanced Libor Fund or shares of Milestone Offshore Funds
Daily Dollar Portfolio as collateral (the "Collateral").

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

The ratings also reflect the rating implementation guidelines
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on the various
potential outcome of the litigations and the scenario of a
liquidation of the collateral to repay the deals liabilities.

Moody's did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one assuming a liquidation of the collateral to repay the
CSOs liabilities.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage. The
performance of these CSOs are also dependent on on-going decisions
made by one or several parties, including the note holders and the
Trustee. Anticipating the quality of these decisions necessarily
introduces some level of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.

The rating actions are:

Issuer: Airlie CDO I, Ltd.

US$306,000,000 Class A Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$17,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$19,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$18,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Airlie LCDO I (AVIV LCDO 2006-3), Ltd.

US$20.5M $20,500,000 Class B-1 Contingent Funding Notes Due 2011
Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

$50,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$14,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 Notes, Confirmed
at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Airlie LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1), Ltd.

US$64,000,000 Class B Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$16,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Aviv LCDO 2006-1, Limited

$55,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 Notes, Confirmed
at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

$9,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 Notes, Confirmed
at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

$9,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AVIV LCDO 2006-2, Limited

$92,000,000 Class B Contingent Funding Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$15,000,000 Class C Contingent Funding Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Exum Ridge 2006-5

US$225M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$7M Class B-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$5M Class B-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$7M Class C-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$5M Class C-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$12M Class D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$12M Class E Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2,
2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Exum Ridge 2007-1

US$223.25M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$16M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar
2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$14.25M Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$13.5M Class D Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2,
2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Exum Ridge CBO 2007-2, Ltd.

US$226,250,000 Class A Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$16,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$14,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

US$13,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Exum Ridge CDO 2006-4

US$225M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$12M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$13.5M Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$9.25M Class D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$12.5M Class E Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2,
2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Pebble Creek LCDO 2006-1, Ltd.

US$64M Class B Notes Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$16M Class C Notes Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

US$16M Class D Notes Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Pebble Creek LCDO 2007-3, Ltd.

US$65,500,000 Class B Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$12,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$8,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2014
Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SGS HY Credit Fund I (Exum Ridge CBO 2006-3), Ltd.

$225,000,000 Class A Contingent Funding Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$650,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 Notes, Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$12,000,000 Class B Contingent Funding Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$9,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$3,000,000 Class E-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011
Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

$9,000,000 Class E-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2011
Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: White Marlin CDO 2007-1 Class E CDS

US$24M Rated Tranche Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 2, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: White Marlin CDO 2007-1, Ltd.

US$1,014,000,000 Class A Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$50,000,000 Class B-1 Contingent Funding Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$44,800,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$8,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes, Confirmed
at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

US$18,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

US$24,000,000 Class E Contingent Funding Deferrable Notes Due 2014
Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited

US$17,000,000 Class S Senior Secured Notes Due 2014 Notes,
Confirmed at Caa3(sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3(sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

US$56,250,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2047 Notes, Confirmed at Caa3(sf); previously on Jul 2, 2008
Downgraded to Caa3(sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade


AMMC CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A, B revolving, C, and D notes from AMMC CLO III Ltd., a
U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by American Money Management Corp. "At the same time, we
removed our rating on the class A notes from CreditWatch
negative," S&P said.

"We placed our rating on the class A notes on CreditWatch negative
on Jan. 18, 2011, in connection with the implementation of our
revised counterparty criteria (see 'Ratings On 950 North America
Structured Finance Tranches On Watch Neg After Counterparty
Criteria Update,' published Jan. 18, 2011). The affirmations and
CreditWatch removal take into account both the updated
counterparty criteria and our criteria for rating corporate CDO
transactions (see 'Update To Global Methodologies And Assumptions
For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17,
2009)," S&P noted.

"In our review, we stressed the cash flow analysis to assess the
credit support available to the class A notes without giving
benefit to the existence of the counterparty, which is the
transaction's class B revolving notes. The transaction is allowed
to fund the class B revolving notes to cover losses from defaults
and trades. In our view, there was no impact to the rating
assigned to the class A notes under these stresses in our cash
flow analysis, leading us to affirm the current rating and remove
it from CreditWatch negative," S&P said.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the class B revolving, C, and
D notes reflect the credit support available at the current rating
levels," S&P added.

Rating And Creditwatch Action

AMMC CLO III Ltd.
                     Rating
Class            To           From
A                AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

AMMC CLO III Ltd.
Class                    Rating
B revolving              BB+ (sf)
C                        B+ (sf)
D                        CCC- (sf)


ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy II, Ltd.:

US$30,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable
Funding Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of
$28,617,950.31), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$285,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2020 (current outstanding balance of $271,870,527.95), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$25,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Fixed
Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$3,500,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Fixed
Rate Notes 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The
primary changes to the modeling assumptions include (1) a removal
of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented
in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET liability stress
factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $393.6 million,
defaulted par of $0.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.9% (implying a WARF of 2710), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.1%, and a diversity score of 53.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy II, Ltd., issued in January
2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans and high yield bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score.


ARES IIR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 2 CLO Notes From 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Ares IIR CLO Ltd.:

US$176,250,000 Class A Bloating Rate Notes Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $107,435,798), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$13,125,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,125,000 Class C Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes since the rating action in November 2010. Moody's notes that
the Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately 30% or
$47.35 million since the rating action in November 2010. As a
result of the delevering, the senior overcollateralization ratio
has increased since the rating action in November 2010. Based on
the latest trustee report dated June 3, 2011, the senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 147.72%, versus
November 2010 level of 131.73%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $179.96 million,
defaulted par of $1.83 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.16% (implying a WARF of 2816 ), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.38%, and a diversity
score of 42. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares IIR CLO Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


ARES IIR: Moody's Ups Ratings of Class D-1 & D-2 Notes From 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Ares IIR CLO Ltd.:

US$176,250,000 Class A Bloating Rate Notes Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $107,435,798), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$13,125,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,125,000 Class C Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes since the rating action in November 2010. Moody's notes that
the Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately 30% or
$47.35 million since the rating action in November 2010. As a
result of the delevering, the senior overcollateralization ratio
has increased since the rating action in November 2010. Based on
the latest trustee report dated June 3, 2011, the senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 147.72%, versus
November 2010 level of 131.73%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $179.96 million,
defaulted par of $1.83 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.16% (implying a WARF of 2816 ), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.38%, and a diversity
score of 42. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ares IIR CLO Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd.:

US$30,300,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due 2016
(current outstanding balance of $29,642,812), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed under review for
possible upgrade;

US$36,360,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
$35,571,375), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2
(sf) Placed under review for possible upgrade;

US$18,180,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
$17,785,688), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed under review for possible upgrade;

US$18,180,000 Class F Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
$17,785,688), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1
(sf) Placed under review for possible upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The rating actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the
senior notes since the rating action in April 2011. Moody's notes
that the Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately 50% or
$35.3 million since the rating action in April 2011. As a result
of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated May 31, 2010, the Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 155.92%, 131.84%,
122.38%, and 114.2%, respectively, versus February 2011 levels of
149.12%, 129.15%, 121.05%, and 113.9%, respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the May 2011 trustee report,
reference securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 19.41% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $311 million,
defaulted par of $14 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.39% (implying a WARF of 3054), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 52%, and a diversity score
of 37. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd. issued on March 19, 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


ARTUS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Artus Loan Fund 2007-I, Ltd.:

US$780,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf) (current outstanding balance of $ 362,411,963.61);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$42,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$52,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$35,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade; and

US$28,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf) (current outstanding balance of $ 27,490,494.6);
previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily due to delevering of the senior notes since the rating
action in June 2010. Moody's notes that the Class A-1L Notes have
been paid down by approximately 39.5% or $237 million since the
rating action in June 2010. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 3, 2011, the
Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L
Overcollateralization Ratios are reported at 146.2%, 129.6%,
120.3%, and 111.6%, respectively, versus June 2010 levels of
126.4%, 116.9%, 111.3% and 104.7%, respectively.

The actions also result from application of Moody's revised CLO
assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The
primary changes to the modeling assumptions include (1) a removal
of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented
in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET liability stress
factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $591.6 million,
defaulted par of $3.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.82% (implying a WARF of 3200), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.88%, and a diversity
score of 59. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Artus Loan Fund 2007-I, Ltd. issued in November 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.


ASSET SECURITIZATION: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 1997-D5 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms eight classes of Asset Securitization
Corporation commercial mortgage pass through certificates, series
1997-D5.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement after
consideration for both defeased loans and expected losses from the
specially serviced loan. As of the June 2011 distribution date,
the pool's certificate balance has paid down 79.7% to $363 million
from $1.79 billion at issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 1.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool are 6.2%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the losses associated with
the specially serviced loans to be absorbed by class B-2.

There are 44 remaining loans from the original 155 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, 14 loans (28.4%) have defeased.
Additionally, 15 loans (18.1%) are fully amortizing and 23 loans
(80.9%) are ARD loans.

The Bellaire loan is currently the only loan (0.60%) in special
servicing. The loan is secured by an 85 unit independent senior
living apartment building located in Riverview, MI. The property
sustained significant fire damage in late 2008 and has been
undergoing restoration and renovation of the property. The
insurance payment for damages has been received and will be used
to fund improvement costs along with bringing debt service
payments current.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $45.4 million class A-1E at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $87.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $26.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $39.5 million class A-5 at 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $43.9 million class A-6 at 'BBB+sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21.9 million class A-7 at 'BB+sf/LS3'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $39.5 million class B-1 at 'Bsf/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate classes B-7, B-7H and A-8Z. Classes A-1A, A-
1B, A-1C, A-1D and interest only class A-CS1 have paid in full.
Fitch maintains the rating of 'Dsf/RR5' on Class B-2.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the rating of classes B-3, B-4,
B-5 and B-6. Fitch also has withdrawn the rating of the interest
only class PS-1.


ATRIUM V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Seven Classes of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Atrium V:

US$110,000,000 Class A-1 Notes (current outstanding balance of
$109,670,405), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011,
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$83,000,000 Class A-2b Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$16,000,000 Class A-3b Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$41,000,000 Class A-4 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$51,500,000 Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$32,500,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
and

US$19,330,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $895.8 million,
defaulted par of $9.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 23.2% (implying a WARF of 2852), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47.05%, and a diversity score of 85.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium V, issued in July 2006, is a collateralized loan obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread and coupon levels higher than the
   covenant levels due to the large difference between the
   reported and covenant levels.


AVERY POINT: Moody's Ups Rating of $9MM Class E Notes From 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Avery Point CLO, Limited:

US$22,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$3,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2015, Upgraded to A1(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2015, Upgraded to Baa1(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes since the rating action in June 2011. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately
28% or $44 million since the rating action in June 2011. As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the rating action in June 2011. Based on the
latest trustee report dated June 7, 2011 and the Note Valuation
Report dated June 16, 2011, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E overcollateralization ratios are currently at 170.40%,
141.40%, 125.90%, and 120.80%, respectively, versus May 2011
levels of 154.90%, 133.50%, 121.50%, 117.30%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $264.17 million,
defaulted par of $3.23 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.98% (implying a WARF of 2739), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.58%, and a diversity
score of 47. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Avery Point CLO, Limited, issued in December 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


BABSON CLO: Moody's Ups Rating of $12.5MM Class E Notes From Junk
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2008-II:

US$307,000,000 (Current Balance $299,805,805) Class A- 1 Senior
Notes due 2018-1 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

US$12,500,000 Class B Senior Notes due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2
(sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

US$20,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2018 Notes,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$11,500,0000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2018 Notes,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$12,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes due 2018 Notes,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The key changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in September
2009. Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Based on the latest trustee report from June 2011, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2512 compared to 2893 in the
August 2009 report. The overcollateralization ratios of the rated
notes have also improved since the rating action in September
2009. The Senior, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 127.5%, 119.9%, 116%
and 112%, respectively, versus August 2009 levels of 120.6%,
113.5%, 109.8% and 106.1%, respectively and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. Moody's
also notes that the Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest
and that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $409.2 million,
defaulted par of $2.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.6% (implying a WARF of 3000), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.3%, and a diversity score of 56.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Babson CLO Ltd. 2008-II, issued in June 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the reported value
of 2347 for the weighted average rating factor. As part of the
base case, Moody's considered coupon levels higher than the
covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported
and covenant levels.


BABSON CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2004-I:

US$17,000,000 Class B Senior Notes, Due 2016 Notes, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

US$23,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Due 2016
Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$4,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Due 2016 Notes,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$25,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Due 2016 Notes,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

US$20,000,000 Class Z Combination Securities Notes (current
balance US$7,326,957.09), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes since the rating action in May 2011. Moody's notes that the
Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately 20.4% or
$46.5 million since the rating action in May 2011.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the June 2011 trustee report,
reference securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 17.3% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $283.3 million,
defaulted par of $3.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.4% (implying a WARF of 3217), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.7%, and a diversity score of 57.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Babson CLO Ltd. 2004-I, issued in June 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

A secondary methodology used was "Using the Structured Note
Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


BABSON CLO: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class D Deferrable Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Babson CLO Ltd. 2011-I/Babson CLO 2011-I LLC's
$461 million floating-rate notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 7,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation criteria, (see 'Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.3352% to 13.8391%," S&P related.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Class                   Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)                 342
A-2                     AA (sf)                   37
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                    42
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                  22
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                   18
Subordinated notes      NR                      50.8

NR -- Not rated.


BABSON CLO: S&P Withdraws 'CCC- Ratings on Class E & Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, B, C, D, E, and the senior preferred shares
notes from Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Babson Capital Management
LLC.

The rating actions follow the optional redemption of the rated
notes on the June 15, 2011, distribution date.

Ratings Withdrawn

Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         NR          AAA (sf)
A-2A        NR          AAA (sf)
A-2B        NR          AAA (sf)
B           NR          AAA (sf)
C           NR          A+ (sf)
D           NR          BB+ (sf)
E           NR          CCC- (sf)
SPref shrs  NR          CCC- (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades BACM 2004-6
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine and affirmed 10 classes of Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2004-6 (BACM 2004-6).

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch-modeled losses. Fitch
modeled losses of 6.8% of the remaining pool; modeled losses of
the original pool are at 6.9%, including losses already incurred
to date. The increase in Fitch expected losses is attributed to a
recent modification of the largest specially serviced loan (6.1%).

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 20% (to $766.16 million from $956.59
million), of which 19.9% were due to paydowns and 0.1% were due to
realized losses. Four loans, representing 8% of the pool, have
been defeased.

Fitch has designated 25 loans (36.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially serviced loans (10.6%).

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (6.1%) secured by 496,895 square feet of a regional
mall located in Springfield, OH. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2010 due to imminent default and was
subsequently modified. Terms of the modification bifurcated the
loan into an A-note and a B-note and extended the loan's maturity.
Fitch views the B-note portion of the loan as a hope note and
modeled higher losses. Losses associated with the hope note
contributed to an increase in the overall deal losses. The loan is
expected to be returned to the master servicer after three
consecutive timely payments received pursuant to the modified
terms.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a loan
(3.4%) secured by a 171,365 square foot office property located in
Los Angeles, CA. The year-end debt service coverage ratio was 0.75
times, on a net-operating income basis. The property was 85.6%
occupied as of the March 2011 rent roll. The lease of the second
largest tenant at the property (16% of net rentable area [NRA]
expires at the end of 2011.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises Rating Outlooks,
Recovery Ratings (RR), and Loss Severity (LS) rating:

   -- $14.3 million class F to 'BBB-sf/LS5' from 'BBB+sf/LS4';
      Outlook to Negative from Stable;

   -- $9.6 million class G to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $13.2 million class H to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $6 million class J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $4.8 million class K to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $4.8 million class L to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $3.6 million class M to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $3.6 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR3';

   -- $4.8 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR3'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises LS ratings:

   -- $60.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $220.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $237.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $56.2 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $19.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.6 million class C at 'AA-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.9 million class D at 'Asf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.6 million class E at 'A-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes X-C
and X-P.

Class A-1 has been paid in full. Fitch does not rate class P.


BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Acts on $258 Mil. RMBS
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 34
tranches from five deals issued by Bayview Financial Mortgage
Pass-Through Trusts in 2004 and 2005. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
"scratch and dent" residential mortgages as well as small business
commercial loans.

Scratch and Dent deals are classified outside of Moody's primary
categorizations (Prime Jumbo, Subprime, Option ARMs and Alt-A) for
a number of reasons. The pools may include mortgages that have
been originated outside an originator's program guidelines in some
way, or mortgages where borrowers missed payments in the past.
These pools may also include loans with document defects at
origination that were since rectified. Due to the varied content
of Scratch and Dent mortgage pools, which can range from seasoned
prime-like loans to non-prime loans that were seriously delinquent
at the time of securitization, credit quality of these pools
varies considerably.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Scratch
and Dent pools under stressed housing and macroeconomic
conditions. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on Scratch and Dent pools and performance deterioration of small
balance commercial loans in these transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology for Scratch and Dent" published in May
2011, which accounts for the deteriorating performance and
outlook.

In addition, the loss projection for the small business commercial
loans backing these deals is based on this methodology:

Because typical small business loan securitizations have either a
long-dated or no hard charge-off policy, they may build up
significant delinquency pipelines. Currently, the average
delinquency pipeline on the small business pools backing these
deals ranges from 9% to 32%. In projecting expected losses for the
current rating actions, Moody's used representative delinquency
roll rates and an assumed loss severity of 75% for a period of
economic stress assumed to be 12 months and 40% thereafter.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current levels of credit
enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level loss
expectations. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors. For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier. RMBS securities
wrapped by Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC) are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of FGIC's
guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that time frame. Additional
sources of assumption uncertainty specific to small business
commercial loans are commercial property values and the ability of
small businesses to recover from the recession.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series
2004-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2004
Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2004
Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2008
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-D

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2008 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2005
Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2005
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-B

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C

Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2005
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D

Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 18,
2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)


BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Rating of $121.7 Mil. RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by Bayview Financial Asset Trust 2007-SSR1.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectations on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the "Surveillance Approach for Resecuritized transactions" section
in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in February 2011.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans backing the underlying certificates and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in determining the underlying
ratings is described in the Monitoring and Performance Review
section in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities" published in December 2008. For other
methodologies used for estimating losses on 2005-2008 vintage Alt-
A/Option Arm, Subprime, and Prime Jumbo pools, refer to the
methodology publication " Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010", " Subprime RMBS Loss Projection Update: February
2010", and "Prime Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update: January
2010", available on Moodys.com .

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Asset Trust 2007-SSR1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2009
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2009
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Upgrades BSCM Series 2000-WF2
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certficates, series 2000-WF2.

The rating upgrade is a result of increased credit enhancement due
to pay down since Fitch's last rating action, minimal Fitch
expected losses, and defeasance. As of the June 2011 distribution
date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down 91.9% to $67.6
million from $838.5 million at issuance. Six loans (27.1%) are
fully defeased. Interest shortfalls totaling $2,344,513 are
currently affecting classes I through N.

Of the original 148 loans, 30 loans remain outstanding. Fitch has
identified eight loans (40.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes three specially-serviced loans (22.8%). Of the three
loans in special servicing, one loan (4.95%) is in foreclosure,
one asset (15.1%) is real estate owned (REO), and one loan (2.7%)
is past maturity and performing. Fitch modeled losses of 10.7%
from loans currently in special servicing that are expected to
deplete classes M through L and impact class K significantly.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially serviced
(15.1%) REO 452,209 square foot (sf) industrial property located
in Webster, NY. The REO asset was acquired via foreclosure on June
30, 2010 and is currently listed for sale. The servicer reported
occupancy as of April 2011 was 35%.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a self storage
facility (4.95%) with 1,025 units located in Boynton Beach, FL.
The loan was transferred to Special Servicing in November 2009 due
to imminent payment default. The paid through date on this loan is
April 2010 and foreclosure has been filed.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal year-end (YE) net operating
income, and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and
11.00% to determine value.

All the loans also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Of the 30 remaining loans 26 are considered to
pay off at maturity and could refinance to a DSCR above 1.25x. The
current weighted average DSCR is 1.15x.

Fitch has upgraded and revised Loss Severity (LS) Ratings:

   -- $23.1 million class E to 'AAA/LS3' from 'A+/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised LS ratings:

   -- $1.5 million class D at 'AAA'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.3 million class F at 'A-'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.2 million class L at 'C/RR6'.

The $1.1 Million Class M remains at 'D/RR6'. Class N, which is not
rated by Fitch has been reduced to zero from $8.4 million at
issuance due to realized losses. Classes A-1, A-2, B, and C have
paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only class X.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms 20 CMBS Classes of BSCMS 2006-TOP22
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 20
classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-TOP22:

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J Certificate, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9,
2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F Certificate, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. H Certificate, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. J Certificate, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K Certificate, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L Certificate, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M Certificate, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. N Certificate, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. O Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.5%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
14.0% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 82 compared to 74 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the June 13, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to
$1.38 billion from $1.70 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 205 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten
non-defeased loans representing 28% of the pool. Three loans,
representing 1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities. The pool contains nine loans with
investment grade credit estimates, representing 12% of the pool.

Fifty-one loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $1.9 million (18% loss severity). Currently five
loans, representing 2% of the pool, are in special servicing. The
largest specially serviced loan is the Lake View US GSA Center
Loan ($14.5 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
110,007 square foot (SF) office building located in Suffolk,
Virginia. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2011 due to a maturity default. The property is 100%
leased to the United States Government until May 2014. The loan is
current and property performance has remained stable with the debt
service coverage ratio for 2010 at 2.31X. The borrower has
requested a maturity date extension.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.1 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (27% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eleven poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $14.9 million loss (21% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 operating results for 78%
of the pool's non-defeased loans. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 97% compared to
92% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.16X, respectively, compared to
1.63X and 1.17X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the
Chesterbrook/Glenhardie Portfolio Loan ($120 million -- 8.7% of
the pool), which is secured by 17 office buildings in two office
parks located in Wayne, Pennsylvania. The portfolio totals
1.3 million SF. The portfolio is also encumbered by a $55 million
B-note that is held outside the trust. As of September 2010, the
portfolio was 89% leased, compared to 92% in December 2009 and 82%
at securitization. The loan is interest-only for the entire term.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
1.55X, the same as at last review.

The remaining eight loans with credit estimates are secured by
manufactured housing communities and cooperative housing
properties. The Oak Ridge Estates Loan ($11.0 million -- 0.7%
of the pool) and Rudgate Silver Springs Mobile Home Loan
($8.9 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which are both located in
Michigan and secured by manufactured housing communities, each
have a Moody's credit estimate of A3, the same as at last review.
The remaining six loans with credit estimates ($21.7 million --
1.6% of the pool) are secured by New York City area co-op
apartment loans with credit estimates of Aaa, the same as last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 9% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Mervyns -- Roll-up (II) Loan ($52.6 million --
3.8% of the pool), which represents a 49% pari-passu interest in a
$107.4 million first mortgage. The portfolio is secured by 23
retail properties formerly occupied by Mervyn's, the liquidated
West Coast retailer. The portfolio originally consisted of 25
properties but two were released from the portfolio but remain the
pool. Performance has improved since last review due to increased
leasing activity which improved occupancy to 48%, an increase from
33% at last review and 24% at year-end 2009. The loan sponsor is
Inland REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 206% and 0.53X,
respectively, compared to 224% and 0.43X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Olympic Plaza Loan ($37.0 million -
- 2.7% of the pool) which is secured by a 244,448 SF office
building located in Los Angeles, California. The building was 92%
leased as of March 2011, the same as at last review and down
slightly from 96% at securitization. Performance has been stable
as loan amortization has mostly offset a decline in base rent due
to lower renewal and new tenants lease rates. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 71% and
1.37X at last full review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 234 West 48th Street Loan
($30.0 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by the fee
interest in the land currently occupied by the 334 room Best
Western Plus President Hotel located near Times Square in New York
City. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.80X,
respectively, compared to 143% and 0.57X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades $237.7 Mil. Resecuritized RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 10
tranches issued by five RMBS resecuritization transactions.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectations on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the "Surveillance Approach for Resecuritized transactions" section
in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in February 2011.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans backing the underlying certificates and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in determining the underlying
ratings is described in the Monitoring and Performance Review
section in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities" published in December 2008 . For other
methodologies used for estimating losses on 2005-2008 vintage Alt-
A/Option Arm, Subprime, and Prime Jumbo pools, refer to the
methodology publication " Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010", " Subprime RMBS Loss Projection Update: February
2010", and "Prime Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update: January
2010", available on Moodys.com . For other methodologies used for
estimating losses on pre-2005 vintage RMBS pools, refer to the
methodology publication "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011, available on Moodys.com.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating pursuant
to published credit rating methodologies that allow for the
withdrawal of the credit rating if the size of the pool
outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen below a
specified level.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. NIM Trust 2004-15

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2000-1

Cl. 1-C, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2009 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-D, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2009 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2000 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

Cl. 4-A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS ABS, LLC 1997-1

Class A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2009 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: GSR Pass-Through Trust 2004-1R

Cl. B1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004
Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004
Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: Housing Securities, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1995-AMB1

A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to B1
(sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization TRUST 2004-2

5.25% Mortgage Resec Notes, Series 2004-2, Downgraded to Caa2
(sf); previously on Sep 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Mellon Re-Remic Pass-Through Trust 2004-TBC1

Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-4, Ltd

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)


BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Nine CLO Notes Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Black Diamond CLO 2005-2:

US$681,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$75,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$70,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$67,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$31,000,000 Class E-1 Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$4,000,000 Class E-2 Fixed Rate Notes due January 2018, Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$45,000,000 Class I Combination Notes due January 2018 (current
rated balance of $14,395,682), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class II Combination Notes due January 2018 (current
rated balance of $3,461,107), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class III Combination Notes due January 2018 (current
rated balance of $3,290,819), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in September 2009. Based on the May 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2841 compared to
3126 in July 2009.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the May 2011 trustee report,
reference securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 10.9% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $955.4 million,
defaulted par of $49.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.8% (implying a WARF of 2900), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.65%, and a diversity score of 52.
Moody's generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for all
collateral quality tests. However, in this case given the limited
time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements, as seen
in the actual collateral quality measurements. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Black Diamond CLO 2005-2, issued in October of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. A secondary methodology used was "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February
2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread/coupon/diversity levels higher than
   the covenant levels due to the large difference between the
   reported and covenant levels.


BLACKROCK SENIOR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
C notes from BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC, a market-
value collateralized debt obligation (CDO), to 'CC (sf)'. "At the
same time, we affirmed our 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class D and
E notes from the same transaction," S&P stated.

"We downgraded class C to 'CC (sf)' after reviewing the assets in
the collateral pool and the O/C ratios. According to the May 26,
2011, trustee report, the transaction had an asset market value of
$12.58 million; however, $7.84 million of the market value
represents ineligible assets under our criteria. The market value
of the eligible assets in the portfolio is $4.78 million, with an
advance amount of $3.93 million under our criteria. The
outstanding balance of the class C notes is $4.99 million.
According to the May 26, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio is 78.85%, down from 93.15%
based on the May 28, 2010, trustee report, when the class B notes
paid down in full," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Lowered

BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC
               Rating
Class     To             From
C         CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC
Class     Rating
D         CC (sf)
E         CC (sf)


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: S&P Rates Class E Deferrable Notes 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 Ltd./ BlueMountain CLO 2011-1
LLC's $322.0 million floating-rate notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 8,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, (see 'Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.16%-13.80%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
    failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
    interest proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
    administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge and
    synthetic security termination payments, portfolio manager
    incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
    proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
    during the reinvestment period.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2011-1 LLC

Class               Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)                228.0
B                   AA (sf)                  34.0
C (deferrable)      A (sf)                   28.0
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)                 17.0
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)                  15.0
Subordinated notes  NR                       39.0

NR -- Not rated.


BOMBARIDER CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M-1 Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-1 certificates from Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization
Corp.'s series 1998-C to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The lowered rating reflects a payment default following an
interest shortfall to the class M-1 certificates on the June 2011
distribution date. The class M-1 certificates experienced their
first principal write-down on the May 2011 distribution date.
According to the transaction documents, interest on the written-
down portion of the class M-1 balance is paid subordinate to
regular senior principal payments and any principal shortfalls for
the senior class. "The class A certificates currently have an
aggregate unpaid principal shortfall of more than $34 million. As
a result, a nonpayment of full interest occurred on the June 2011
distribution date, and we believe that the interest shortfall will
likely persist into the future," S&P related.

The collateral pool for this transaction consists of installment
sales contracts and mortgage loans secured by real estate and
affixed manufactured homes originated by Bombardier Capital Inc.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the other outstanding
ratings associated with this transaction.


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Ups Class D-1 & D-2 Note Ratings From Junk
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners VII, Ltd.:

US$206,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding
balance of $201,205,593), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$87,000,000 Class A-2-A Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding
balance of $84,672,618), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$14,800,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$21,200,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes, Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$16,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes (current
outstanding balance of $14,382,331), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes (current
outstanding balance of $7,191,165), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $372.39 million,
defaulted par of $5.48 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.58% (implying a WARF of 2631, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.59%, and a diversity score of 63.
Moody's generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for all
collateral quality tests. However, in this case given the limited
time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements. The
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Carlyle High Yield Partners VII, Ltd., issued in September 2005,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
   prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
   the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners IX, Ltd.:

US$167,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due August 1, 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$41,250,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due August 1, 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due August 1, 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due August 1,
2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$32,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due August 1,
2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $499 million,
defaulted par of $7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.84% (implying a WARF of 2535), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.72%, and a diversity
score of 62. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Carlyle High Yield Partners IX, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread and diversity levels higher than the
   covenant levels due to the large difference between the
   reported and covenant levels.


CLARENVILLE CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of EUR 138.1m CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Clarenville CDO S.A:

Issuer: Clarenville CDO S.A.

   -- EUR145M Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- US$55.5M Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- GBP25M Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR13M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2016, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Clarenville CDO S.A., issued in February 2004, is a multi-currency
cash-flow collateralised loan obligation ("CLO") managed by PIMCO.
The transaction has been in amortization phase since March 2009.
The underlying pool in this transaction amounts to approximately
EUR 187.3 million with 80% exposure to European borrowers and 90%
to senior secured debt. The collateral assets and liabilities are
denominated in EUR, GBP and USD.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of the substantial cash balance which is expected to
be used to further deleverage the transaction by payments to the
senior notes.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors, as well as (3) change to fixed recovery
rate assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral amortization
profile and (2) changing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at
addressing time lags in receiving information required for credit
estimate updates.

Compared to the last rating action the OC ratios of all classes
have remained nearly unchanged , for class A from 137.5% in April
2011 to 137.6% in June 2011 (as per investor reports). All OC
tests are still passing and none of the notes have deferred any
interest. Moody's notes that the transaction documentation does
not define OC test haircuts for assets rated Caa and below.
Moody's notes that the class A notes are expected to pay down
substantially on the next payment date in September 2011, based on
the large cash balance of approximately EUR 26 million reported in
June 2011 while no cash was reported in April 2011. As a result of
the expected deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios are
expected to increase further compared to the current levels.


The amortization of the portfolio has affected the characteristics
of the remaining portfolio. A slight deterioration in the credit
quality is observed through a slightly worse average credit rating
of the portfolio (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor "WARF") and a slight increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. In particular, as of
the latest trustee report for June 2011, the WARF is currently
2,994 compared to 2,722 in the April 2011 report, and securities
rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11.91% of the underlying
portfolio in June 2011 versus 10.49% in April 2011. The diversity
score reported by the trustee has decreased from 39.9 to 35.9 over
the same period.

The transaction was structured with the aim of partially matching
the liabilities and assets in each currency ("natural hedge").
However, USD and GBP assets are currently exceeding USD and GBP
liabilities, while EUR denominated liabilities are under covered
by EUR denominated assets. To mitigate a portion of this
imbalance, the transaction features amortizing cross currency
swaps maturing in 2014.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR
183.9 million compared to EUR 187.1 million at last rating action,
a defaulted par of EUR 3.4 million compared to zero at last rating
action, an adjusted WARF of 3,372 compared to 3,066 at last rating
action, a weighted average ultimate recovery rate upon default of
51.4% compared to 50.7% at last rating action, a diversity score
of 33.5 compared to 38.9 at last rating action, and a weighted
average spread of 3.25% compared to 3.22% at last rating action.

The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool and the target rating of the rated class of
liabilities.

The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that the
part of the portfolio exposed to senior secured assets would
recover 50% immediately upon default, while the remainder of the
assets would recover 10% immediately upon default, in each case
accrued by 7% over 1.5 years.

In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
strategy and behaviour, 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio
   includes a number of investments in securities that mature
   after the maturity date of the notes. Based on the June 2011
   trustee report, reference securities that mature after the
   maturity date of the notes currently make up approximately 9.3%
   of the underlying collateral portfolio. These investments
   exposes the deal to liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's
   assumes an asset's terminal value upon liquidation at maturity
   to be equal to an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
   extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
   liabilities).

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to participate in amend-
   to-extend offerings.

5) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
   assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a
   direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to
   the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
   tranches. The foreign exchange risk is mitigated by part of the
   senior notes being denominated in the respective currencies of
   the assets which provide a partial natural hedge.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's also notes that around 44% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates.


COMM 2011-THL: Fitch Issues Presale on Certificates
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on COMM 2011-THL
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign ratings and
Rating Outlooks:

   -- $350,000000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $75,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $55,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,000,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $50,000,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $110,000,000 class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 30, 2011.

All classes are privately placed pursuant to rule 144A of the
Securities Act of 1933. The certificates in this transaction
represent the beneficial interests in a trust that holds a
$685 million mortgage loan secured by 168 hotel properties located
in 33 states across the United States.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms CMAC 1998-C2
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms three classes of Commercial Mortgage
Acceptance Corp. commercial mortgage pass through certificates,
series 1998-C2.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement after
consideration for both defeased loans and expected losses from the
specially serviced loans. As of the June 2011 distribution date,
the pool's certificate balance has paid down 91.5% to $246 million
from $2.89 billion at issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 7.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool are 3.3%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the losses associated with
the specially serviced loans to be absorbed by Class K.

There are 88 remaining loans from the original 512 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, eleven loans (18.3%) have
defeased and 33 loans (18.3%) are fully amortizing.

Fitch has identified 15 loans (20.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes two specially serviced loans (5.7%).

The largest contributor to losses is the IRS District Headquarters
loan which is collateralized by a 128,845 sf office building in
Phoenix, AZ. The property remains unoccupied after the IRS vacated
the building at lease expiration in mid-2009. The loan is
anticipated to be resolved via a discounted payoff in conjunction
with a sale of the property to a third party buyer.

The second largest contributor to losses is the ARS Office
building loan which is collateralized by a 72,720 sf office
building in Indianapolis, IN. The property is 73% occupied by
American Residential Services of Indiana. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2010 due to monetary default and the
special servicer is proceeding with foreclosure

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $21.7 million class G at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $36.1 million class H at 'AA-sf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $65 million class J at 'CCCsf/RR2'.

Fitch does not rate classes F and M. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C,
D and E have paid in full. Fitch maintains the rating of 'Dsf/RR5'
on class K and 'Dsf/RR6' on class L. Fitch has withdrawn the
rating of the interest only class X.


COUNTRYWIDE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 16 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 16
classes of Countrywide Commercial Mortgage Pass -Through
Certificates, Series 2007-MF1:

Cl. A, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.1% of the current balance compared to 8.2% at last review.
Moody's stressed scenario loss is 25.3% of the current balance.
Moody's provides a current list of base and stress scenario losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. Due to the high level of credit subordination
and defeasance, it is unlikely that investment grade classes would
be downgraded even if losses are higher than Moody's expected
base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The primary methodology used was "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating
U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000.

Moody's also considered in its analysis "Moody's Approach to Small
Commercial Real Estate Loans" published in September 1999.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and the CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the individual
loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a
measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool
level diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.
Other concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit
enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan credit
enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the loan which
corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion
credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 65 compared to 78 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 27, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $558.6
million from $639.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 214 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 28%
of the pool.

Fifty-four loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $1.8 million loss (55%
loss severity on average). Currently 19 loans, representing 13% of
the pool, are in special servicing. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $28.1 million appraisal reduction for 13
of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $34.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans (51%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 19 poorly
performing loans representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$7.9 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

The pool has experienced significant interest shortfalls. Based on
the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through T have
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.36 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 90% and 63% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 106%, essentially the same as at
last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 8.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.11X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
1.15X and 0.91X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Actions on CSFB 2006-TFL2
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed the remaining
classes from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
series 2006-TFL2, reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of
5.7% for the pooled classes. The remaining non-pooled junior
component certificates were also affirmed, reflecting Fitch's
generally stable loss expectations and stable performance of the
underlying assets. Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines. The revised Rating Outlooks reflect the
increases in credit enhancement as the result of the pay
off/disposition of four loans since Fitch's last review.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 94.7% of the pool is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 10.5% from generally year-end 2010 financials. To
determine a sustainable Fitch cash flow and stressed value, Fitch
analyzed servicer-reported operating statements and rent rolls,
updated property valuations, and recent sales comparisons. Fitch
estimates the average recoveries on the pooled loans will be
approximately 94% in the base case.

The transaction is collateralized by five loans, four of which are
secured by hotels (98.4%), and one by a multifamily/condominium
project (1.6%). The transaction faces near-term maturity risk,
with three loans (90.9%) having a final maturity date in 2011,
including the Kerzner Portfolio (55.9%), which represents a
majority of the collateral. The remaining two loans have been
extended, with maturity dates ranging from 2012 to 2014.

With respect to the pooled classes, two loans were modeled to
incur a loss in the base case: Beverly Hilton (23.3%) and NH
Krystals Hotel Portfolio (7.5%). There is one performing specially
serviced loan, the JW Marriott Starr Pass (11.7%).

The Beverly Hilton consists of a 569-room upscale hotel located at
the corner of Wilshire Blvd and Santa Monica Blvd in Beverly
Hills, CA. The hotel underwent an $80 million ($140,598/key)
renovation from 2003-2006. The renovation upgraded and enlarged
the guestrooms and added nine luxury suites and seven luxury king
guestrooms. Performance is below expectations from issuance,
largely due to the impacts of the weak economy on the hospitality
sector. As of year-end 2010, occupancy, average daily rate (ADR),
and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 60.3%, $203.50, and
$122.74, respectively, compared with 57.1%, $209.92, and $119.77
in 2009. At issuance, the loan was underwritten on an issuer basis
to an occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR of 73.9%, $345.32, and $255.19.
The borrower is currently in discussions with the servicer
regarding refinance options, including a loan payoff and an
extension. The loan matures next month on Aug. 8, 2011.

The JW Marriott Starr Pass consists of a 575-room full service
hotel and a 27-hole Arnold Palmer-designed championship golf
course, located in Tucson, AZ. The hotel opened in 2005 and is one
of the newest hotels in the Tucson market. The subject offers
88,000 square feet (sf) of meeting space including a 20,000 sf
ballroom. The hotel is managed by Marriott Hotel Services. The
property is part of a 1,356-acre master planned community named
Starr Pass. In April 2010, the loan transferred to special
servicing for imminent default. Performance remains below
expectations from issuance; however, an updated property valuation
was received in April, which indicates strong recovery prospects.
As a result, losses are not expected at this time.

The largest loan in the pool, Kerzner Portfolio (56%), is secured
by a diverse portfolio of real estate. The main collateral
interests consist of: 3,023-key Atlantis Resort and casino,
Paradise Island; 600-room all-suite hotel tower, 495-unit
condominium hotel; 40-acres of new water attractions; 106-key One
& Only Ocean Club and 18-hole Ocean Club Golf Course; water
treatment and desalinization facility; 63-slip Marina at Atlantis
and associated retail at Marina Village. Additional collateral
interests consist of sales proceeds from the sale of condominium
units, timeshare units, and land parcels.

As of year-end 2010, the Atlantis Resort's occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR were 62.2%, $313, and $195, respectively, compared with
60.3%, $313, and $189 in 2009. At origination, the issuer
anticipated a stabilized occupancy, ADR and RevPAR of 81%, $323,
and $262, respectively. The loan reaches its final maturity in
September 2011, and given the significant size of the total
collateral and the associated leverage, the loan may default on
its repayment obligations. However, no losses are currently
expected in Fitch's base case. The borrower is currently
discussing refinance options with the special servicer.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $411.5 million class A-2 to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AA+/LS2';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks:

   -- $41 million class B at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $41 million class C at 'Asf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $33 million class D at 'BBBsf/LS4' from LS5; Outlook Stable;

   -- $25 million class E at 'BBBsf/LS4' from LS5; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $19 million class F at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $19 million class G at 'CCCsf/RR2';

   -- $19 million class H at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $20 million class J at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $22 million class K at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $16.1 million class L at 'Dsf/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these non-pooled junior component
classes and revises Outlooks:

   -- $59.8 million class KER-A at 'A-sf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $42.6 million class KER-B at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $37.3 million class KER-C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $46 million class KER-D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $46.3 million class KER-E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $61.6 million class KER-F at 'CCCsf/RR4';

   -- $3 million class MW-A at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $1.8 million class MW-B at 'Bsf; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $11 million class BEV-A at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $4 million class NHK-A at 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Furthermore, these classes are affirmed by Fitch, and are non-
pooled components of the trust:

   -- $375.7 million class SV-A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $126 million class SV-A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61 million class SV-B at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31 million class SV-C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31 million class SV-D at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $30 million class SV-E at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31 million class SV-F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $30 million class SV-G at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $54 million class SV-H at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $34 million class SV-J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $39 million class SV-K at 'BBsf';' Outlook Negative.


CRIIMI MAE: S&P Affirms Rating on Clas e Notes at 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on the class E commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-
through notes from CRIIMI Mae Trust I's series 1996-C1, a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction.

"The rating affirmation follows our periodic review of the
transaction in which we assessed the credit quality of the
underlying collateral, as well as credit enhancement available to
the rated tranche," S&P related.

According to the June 30, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
current assets included five classes ($33.8 million, 100%) of
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-through
certificates from four distinct transactions issued in either 1995
or 1996. The current assets are from these transactions:

    Asset Securitization Corp.'s series 1995-D1 ($20.3 million,
    60%);

    Asset Securitization Corp.'s series 1996-D2 ($9.7 million,
    29%);

    LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust's series 1995-C2
    ($3.2 million, 9%); and

    Fannie Mae Aces' series 1996-M1 ($0.6 million, 2%).

Standard & Poor's has outstanding ratings on four of the five
assets ranging from 'CCC- (sf)' to 'D (sf)', including one asset
that it rated 'D (sf)' before withdrawing its rating.

"The affirmation reflects our view that adequate credit
enhancement exists in the form of subordination ($4 million,
12.5%) to maintain the current rating level. The notes are
currently receiving interest and principal payments and have not
experienced any payment shortfall to date. Standard & Poor's
analyzed the transaction and its underlying collateral assets in
accordance with its current criteria. Our analysis is consistent
with the affirmed rating," S&P related.

Rating Affirmed

CRIIMI Mae Trust I 1996-C1

Class     Rating
E         CCC- (sf)


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades 2 Classes of DLJ 2000-CF1
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2000-CF1.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 90% to $90.7 million from $886.2 million at
issuance. The transaction has only seven loans remaining. Four of
the remaining seven assets are in special servicing, 28% of the
pool, the largest of which is an office property in Largo, FL,
which transferred in May 2010 for maturity default. Fitch expects
losses of approximately 17% of the remaining pool balance from the
assets in special servicing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the three non specially serviced
loans by applying a 5% reduction to 2010 fiscal year end net
operating income and applying a stressed cap rate of 10% to
determine value. The derived value for all of these assets are in
excess of the debt; although Fitch remains concerned with one
loan, a retail center in Scottsdale, which was formally specially
serviced and is performing under modified terms.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises Outlooks and Recovery
Ratings (RRs):

   -- $2.2 million class B-5 to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $6.6 million class B-6 to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'CCC/RR1';

   -- $8.9 million class B-7 to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CC/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks and
Loss Severity (LS) ratings:


   -- $18.1 million class B-1 at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.1 million class B-2 at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31 million class B-3 at 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;

   -- $8.9 million class B-4 at 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $3.9 million class B-8 remains at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes S.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3 and A-4 have been paid in full. Fitch
does not rate classes C and D.


ENTERPRISE FLEET: Moody's Assigns Ratings to Fleet Lease ABS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
the Series 2011-2 Fixed Rate Asset-Backed Notes (the Notes)
issued by Enterprise Fleet Financing, LLC, (the Issuer). The
Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity wholly owned
by Enterprise Fleet Management, Inc. (EFM), currently a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (EHI, Baa1), which
is a major rental car company. EFM, which will be the servicer for
this transaction, provides fleet leasing and management services
primarily small and medium-sized businesses throughout the United
States. The Notes are ultimately collateralized by a static pool
of fixed rate leases and the related vehicles.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Enterprise Fleet Financing, LLC

$179,000,000, Series 2011-2 fixed rate asset-backed notes, Class
A-1, rated P-1 (sf)

$337,000,000, Series 2011-2 fixed rate asset-backed notes, Class
A-2, rated Aaa (sf)

$81,500,000, Series 2011-2 fixed rate asset-backed notes, Class A-
3, rated Aaa (sf)

The ratings assigned are based on an assessment of the quality of
the collateral, available credit enhancement and the structural
features of the transaction. The principal methodology used in
rating the transaction is summarized below. Other methodologies
and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issue can also be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-
directory on Moody's website.

The Notes will be ultimately backed by a special unit of
beneficial interest (SUBI) in a pool of leases and the related
vehicles. The leases were originated in the name of Enterprise FM
Trust (Titling Trust) by EFM. Slightly less than 96% of the leases
in the pool are open-end leases. The rest are closed-end leases.
EFM's portfolio is very granular compared with the portfolios of
other fleet lease ABS sponsors. The top lessee currently accounts
for 0.62% of the pool by securitization value and the top ten
lessees account for 4.1% of the pool by securitization value.

The pool balance is the aggregate of the securitization value of
each lease. The securitization value is calculated by discounting
each lease at a rate which is the greater of 3.5% and the implicit
finance rate of the lease. There is sizable amount of excess
spread estimated to be approximately 5% p.a. including management
fees at closing in the transaction as the leases have a relatively
high yield compared with other fleet lease portfolios. Excess
spread constitutes an important part of the total available credit
enhancement.

A performance guarantee is provided by EFM's parent, EHI. The
transaction allows The Crawford Group, Inc. (Crawford), the parent
of EHI and not rated by Moody's, to replace EHI as the guarantor
in the future under certain conditions. The performance guarantee
may fall off if EFM obtains an investment grade rating from
Moody's and another rating agency in the future. The rating on the
Notes incorporates these possibilities. We conducted an internal
assessment of Crawford and determined that servicer disruption
risk is consistent with investment grade risk.

Key credit metrics on the lease pool include the weighted average
rating of the lessees, the diversity score (a measure of the
diversity of the pool of lessees) and the break-even recovery rate
on liquidated collateral in the event of a lessee default. We
assume a probability of default consistent with a B2 rating for
the lessees in the pool. The diversity score for the pool is 128,
meaning the pool of lessees will have a similar default profile as
a pool of 128 independent and equal-sized lessees with the same
rating as the weighted average rating of the pool. The diversity
score is significantly higher, i.e. better than other fleet lease
ABS transactions. The estimated break-even recovery rate for the
Notes is approximately 60% to 65%.

V-Score And Parameter Sensitivity

Moody's V Score: The V Score for this transaction is Medium, the
same as that for the fleet leasing sector. The V Score indicates
"Medium" uncertainty about critical assumptions.

The Medium or average score for this transaction is driven by the
Medium score for historical sector performance, the Medium score
for sponsor/originator historical performance, the Medium score
for complexity and market value sensitivity, and the Medium score
for the governance . The score for transaction complexity is
Medium, reflecting the use of discounting in calculating the
securitization value which adds slightly more complexity to the
transaction than other fleet lease transactions. The score for
market value sensitivity is Medium, higher than other fleet lease
transaction due to the inclusion of closed-end leases and the
higher credit risk of the lessees in the pool which are small to
medium-sized businesses. The Medium score for governance is
largely driven by the Medium score assigned to transaction
parties, particularly the servicer, as EFM is a relatively new
sponsor of such transactions. The Low/Medium score assigned to the
backup servicing arrangement is the same as that for PHH-sponsored
transactions but higher that for ARI-sponsored transaction due to
the transaction structure which allows Crawford to be the
performance guarantor in the future. The Low/Medium score assigned
to alignment of interest is higher than that for other fleet lease
transactions due to the relative lack of diversity in its funding
sources at this stage as this is EFM's first term fleet lease ABS
program. All the other subcomponent scores for this transaction
are the same as for the fleet leasing sector.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: For this exercise, we analyzed
stress scenarios assessing the potential model-indicated ratings
impact if (a) the assumed weighted average rating of the lessees
were to immediately decline from B2 to B3, Caa1 and Caa2 and (b)
the assumed recovery rates were to decrease from 75% to 70%, 65%
and 60%. These descriptions provide a summary of the results.

Using such assumptions, the Aaa (sf) initial rating for the Notes
might change as follows based purely on the model results: (a) If
the assumed weighted average rating of lessees is B2, there will
be no change in rating as recovery rate decreases to 65%, but the
rating would decrease by one notch to Aa1 as recovery rate
decreases to 60%; (b) If the weighted average rating of lessees is
B3, the maximum change will be three notches to Aa3 as recovery
rate decreases to 60%; (c) If the weighted average rating of
lessees is Caa1, the maximum change will be six notches to A3 as
recovery rate decreases to 60%; and (d) If the weighted average
rating of lessees is Caa2, the maximum change will be ten notches
to Ba1 as recovery decreases to 60%.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Principal Methodology

The majority of the underlying collateral consists of a pool of
open-end leases in which the lessees are responsible for any
residual value losses. Therefore, the potential credit loss is
driven primarily by the default likelihood of the lessees, the
recovery rate when a lessee defaults, and the diversity of the
pool of lessees. The credit risk of the corporate lessees is the
primary credit concern in fleet lease ABS. As long as the lessees
are able and willing to maintain their lease payments, the
transaction will not be subject to residual value losses on
defaulted leases. Aside from the quality of the lessees
themselves, the strength of the pool will also depend in part on
its diversity. Residual value risk generally comes into play only
if a lessee defaults on the lease because the lessee is generally
responsible for shortfalls in residual value. This is in contrast
to consumer auto lease ABS backed by closed-end leases, where
investors are usually exposed to the risk of residual value loss
at lease expiration.

Moody's uses two modeling approaches to quantify these risks in
this transaction. The first applies the Binomial Expansion
Technique (BET), in which we construct a hypothetical lease pool
with characteristics similar to the one in the subject
transaction. These characteristics are 1) a diversity score that
indicates the hypothetical number of independent lessees in the
pool by accounting for the pool's lessee and industry
concentrations, 2) a default distribution derived from the average
ratings of the lessees in the pool and the diversity score, and 3)
a recovery rate on defaulted leases.

Recoveries can come from the disposition of a defaulted lessee's
fleet or from amounts received from a defaulted lessee in a case
in which the lease is affirmed in bankruptcy court. We use the
pool's diversity score and average implied default rate to
generate a pool binomial default distribution. We then calculate
the weighted average present value of losses on the proposed
securities under the various assumed lease recovery rates using a
cashflow model depicting the rated bonds' payment priorities. The
weights used are the probabilities associated with each lessee
default scenario. The probability weighted average loss of each
security, i.e., its expected loss, at a given recovery rate on the
collateral, is then compared with Moody's Idealized Cumulative
Expected Loss Rates table to determine its rating. A security will
be able to achieve its target rating if the breakeven recovery
rate on the collateral, which is the minimum recovery rate needed
to arrive at that rating, is below our benchmark recovery rate
established by the committee for that particular rating level.

The second modeling approach is the Hybrid CDOROM approach, which
does not rely on a proxy pool. This method has two steps. In step
one, we use Moody's CDOROM simulation model to generate a default
distribution based on the probability of default of each lessee
(represented by its Moody's rating or an estimate thereof) and the
relative sizes of the lessee concentrations in the pool, their
industry classifications, and the correlation among the lessees
and industries. In the second step, we apply the probability of
default distribution generated by the model to the cashflow model
used in the BET method, with all other assumptions and inputs
remaining the same.

Moody's also gave credit to excess spread in our analysis as our
cashflow model takes into account the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement to the notes.

Moody's Investors Service does not take into account third party
due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the rating of this transaction.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Cuts Rating of 1 Class of Series 1999-C4
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of First Union National
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1999-C4.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has paid down 95.04 % to $43.95 million from
$885.74 million at issuance. There are 13 of the original 156
loans remaining in the transaction, seven (42.22% of pool balance)
of which are defeased. Interest shortfalls are affecting classes M
and N.

The downgrade is a result of an increase in Fitch expected losses
on the specially serviced loans as well as increasing loan
concentrations with only six non-defeased loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 10.14% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are at 2.48%, including losses
realized to date. Of the six non-defeased loans, Fitch has
identified five as Loans of Concern (53.7% of pool balance), which
include three loans currently in special servicing (25.78%). Fitch
expects that the unrated class N will eventually be fully depleted
from losses associated with the specially serviced loans, with
additional incurred losses absorbed by class M.

The largest loan in special servicing (17.12%) is secured by a 190
unit multifamily complex in Jonesboro, GA. The servicer reported
occupancy as of July 2011 at 86% and debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) at 0.92 times (x) for year to date (YTD) September 2009.
The loan had transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due
to maturity default. A receiver was appointed in May 2010, and the
property was foreclosed on in July 2010. The special servicer is
working to stabilize and market the property.

The second largest loan in special servicing (4.91%) is secured by
an 80 unit multifamily, low income housing tax credit property in
Hurricane, WV. The property has performed below a 1.0x DSCR for
the past five years, reporting most recently at 0.66x and 0.75x
for year end (YE) 2010 and YE 2009, respectively. Occupancy
reported at 93% and 84% for December 2010 and December 2009,
respectively. The loan had transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 for monetary default. The servicer is currently
negotiating with the borrower to cure the default.

The largest loan in the pool (25.15%), which Fitch has also
identified as a Loan of Concern, is secured by a 215,860 square
foot (sf) retail center in Ashwaubenon, WI. The property is
located approximately two miles north of Lambeau Field, stadium
for the Green Bay Packers. The property has experienced cash flow
issues due to occupancy declines including a 46,000 sf (21.02% net
rentable area [NRA]) vacant anchor space. The servicer reported
first quarter 2011 occupancy at 63%, compared to 93% at issuance.
The servicer reported DSCR for YE 2010 at 0.85x. The subject loan
had recently returned from special servicing under forebearance in
March 2011 after receiving a modification which included a
maturity date extension to September 2011 from September 2009.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-specially serviced loans
by applying a minimum 5% reduction to most recent fiscal year end
2010 net operating income, and applying an adjusted market cap
rate between 8% and 11% to determine value.

Fitch applied a refinance test to the non-specially serviced loans
applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. Based on this refinance
methodology, one of the non-specially serviced loans (25.15%)
would not pay off at maturity, and could not refinance to a DSCR
above 1.25x. Of the 13 remaining loans in the pool, one (25.15%)
is scheduled to mature in 2011, two (7.67%) in 2014, seven
(36.31%) in 2016, and one (9.99%) in 2019.

Fitch downgrades this class and assigns Recovery Ratings (RR):

   -- $8.9 million class L to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS4'.

Fitch affirms these classes and RR Ratings, and revises Outlooks
and Loss Severity (LS) ratings:

   -- $6.1 million class G at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.1 million class H at 'A/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $2.2 million class J at 'A-'; loss severity to 'LS4' from
      'LS5'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $6.6 million class K at 'BBB'; loss severity to 'LS3' from
      'LS4'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $8.9 million class M at 'C/RR3';

Class N is not rated by Fitch. Due to realized losses, class N has
been reduced to $211,744 from $17.7 million at issuance. Classes
A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and F have paid in full.

In addition, Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class
IO.


FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd.:

US$70,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
(current outstanding balance of $53,118,993), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
(current outstanding balance of $53,118,993), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$88,750,000 Class A-3 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
(current outstanding balance of $67,347,295), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$16,250,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,250,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2017, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,750,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2017, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes and credit improvement of the underlying portfolio since the
rating action in July 2009. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes
have been paid down by approximately 24% or $54.1 million since
the rating action in July 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in July 2009. Based on the latest trustee report dated June
16, 2011, the Senior and Mezzanine overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 118.36% and 104.25%, respectively, versus June
2009 levels of 115.98% and 102.16%, respectively. Moody's also
notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action in
July 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2097 compared to 2637 in June
2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $230.5 million,
defaulted par of $3.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 11.48% (implying a WARF of 2177), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.03.%, and a diversity
score of 43. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd., issued in February 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Fraser
Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V Corp.'s $350.6 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of June 8, 2011.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.

On the closing date, the collateral manager typically covenants to
purchase the remaining collateral within the guidelines specified
in the transaction documents to reach the target level of
portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO transaction documents
specify a date by which the targeted level of portfolio collateral
must be reached. The "effective date" for a CLO transaction is
usually the earlier of the date on which the transaction acquires
the target level of portfolio collateral, or the date defined in
the transaction documents. Most transaction documents contain
provisions directing the trustee to request the rating agencies
that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm the ratings issued
on the closing date after reviewing the effective date portfolio
(typically referred to as an "effective date rating
affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P related.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period." Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P stated.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P said.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P stated.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P stated.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

Ratings Affirmed
Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V Corp.

Class                Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1                  AAA (sf)             273.00
A-2                  AA (sf)               13.50
B (deferrable)       A (sf)                30.10
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)              15.00
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)               19.00
E                    NR                     6.80
F                    NR                    13.20
EF                   NR                    30.00

NR -- Not rated.


FREMONT HOME: Moodys's Reviews Six Subprime RMBS for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed 5 tranches from three
subprime RMBS transactions on review for possible downgrade. These
tranches may be affected by cash flow disruptions in the coming
months post a servicing transfer to Ocwen Financial Corp from
Litton Loan Servicing LP. In addition, Moody's has downgraded one
tranche from GSAMP 2007-H1. This tranche is being placed on review
for further downgrade due to the servicing transfer. The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages

Ratings Rationale

Three tranches affected by the actions are short cash flow
tranches where full receipt of principal is dependent on the
timing of losses and principal payments in the related
transactions. The short cash flow tranches currently are first in
line to receive all principal allocation from their related
collateral groups. However, once their supporting mezzanine
tranches are fully written down due to collateral losses, the
short cash flow tranches will pay pro rata with other outstanding
senior tranches in their respective deals. Therefore, if the short
cash flow tranches are not paid off by the time of mezzanine write
down, they will likely experience principal losses.

The purchase could temporarily disrupt RMBS cash flows because
Ocwen may pursue both more loan modifications and tighter advances
on delinquent loans than Litton has. A tighter advancing policy in
this case means that Ocwen may deem as non-recoverable the
advances made in the past by Litton and will seek to reimburse
itself with funds from the top of the transaction waterfall. Any
collections that go toward reimbursing advances delay payments to
bondholders.

An increase in modifications, in addition to delaying the
collection of liquidation proceeds to a later date, would itself
increase the reimbursement of advances because the servicer will
begin to recoup advances upon modification. Ocwen over the past
several years has pursued modifications more rapidly than Litton
has, indicating that a decrease in liquidations of Litton's loans
would follow the acquisition.

Three other tranches issued by Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
and currently rated Aaa(sf) are being placed on review due to
potential interest shortfalls if cash flows are disrupted.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the rate of
realized losses reducing the balance of the mezzanine
certificates, and the cash flow disruptions affecting the amount
of principal that would normally be used to pay off the principal
balance of these short cash flow tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other factors used in these ratings are described
in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. II-A-2, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Apr 29, 2010 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE3

Cl. A-2B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 21, 2010 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2007-H1

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 17, 2010 Confirmed at A2
(sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 5, 2010 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2A2, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 5, 2010 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 5, 2010 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)


GALAXY XI: Moody's Assigns Provisional Ratings to Two Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional rating to
notes issued by Galaxy XI CLO, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Galaxy XI"):

US$192,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned (P) Aaa (sf); and

US$12,900,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (the "Class E Notes" and, together with the Class A Notes,
the "Notes"), Assigned (P) B1 (sf).

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional rating of the Notes addresses the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The provisional rating reflects the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Galaxy XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The transaction is
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments, up to
10% may be senior secured notes, up to 10% of the portfolio may
consist of second-lien loans and senior unsecured notes, and no
more than 5% may consist of high yield bonds. At closing, the
portfolio is expected to be 30% to 50% ramped up and is expected
to be fully ramped within 5 months thereafter. The transaction
size may be increased proportionally to $400 million from
$300 million at closing. This would result in an increase in the
Class A notional amount to $256 million and an increase in the
Class E notional amount to $17.2 million. Since this increase in
size would be proportional across all tranches, it would not
change the outcome of Moody's credit analysis.

PineBridge Investments LLC ("PineBridge") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer. PineBridge may engage in trading activity during the
transaction's four-year reinvestment period, including
discretionary trading. Thereafter, sales of securities that are
equity, defaulted, credit improved, or credit risk are allowed and
purchases of additional collateral obligations are permitted,
subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
six other tranches, including two tranches of subordinated notes.
The transaction incorporates coverage tests, both par and
interest, which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the rated notes in order of seniority.

Solely for the purpose of the WARF calculation, Moody's analysis
treats ratings of the underlying collateral securities on "review
for possible downgrade" as if they were two notches lower and
those with a "negative outlook" as if they were one notch lower.
For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Diversity of 65

WARF of 2850

Weighted Average Spread of 3.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 47.00%

Weighted Average Life of 9 years.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis which was an important
component in determining the rating assigned to the Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

This is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown
in terms of the number of notch difference versus the current
model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's WARF + 15% (3278)

Class A Notes: -1

Class E Notes 0

Moody's WARF +30% (3705)

Class A Notes: -3

Class E Notes -3

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
June 2011.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades GE Capital Series 2000-1
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed four classes
of GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corporation's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-1.

The downgrade reflects an increase in Fitch expected losses. Fitch
modeled losses of 12.46% of the remaining pool; expected losses
based on the original pool size are 5.63%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 91.21% (to $62.2 million from $707.3
million), of which 86.67% were due to paydowns and 4.54% were due
to realized losses.

Fitch has designated five loans in the pool as Fitch Loans of
Concern, all of which are specially serviced loans (46.94%). Fitch
expects the losses associated with the specially-serviced loans to
impact classes H and I.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (15.95%) is a
specially-serviced loan secured by 153,074 square foot (sf) office
building located in Denver, CO. The loan transferred to special
servicing on March 16, 2010 and was scheduled to mature in
November 2010. The special servicer foreclosed on the property in
January 2011 and has listed it for sale with CBRE.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (7.92%) is
a specially-serviced loan secured by 98,520 square foot community
shopping center located in Dinuba, CA. The loan was transferred to
special servicing on Jan. 3, 2011 due to maturity default. A 12-
month modification was recently approved and executed.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (6.91%) is a
specially-serviced loan secured by 74,121 square foot retail
center located in Neenah, WI. The loan transferred to special
servicing on October 18, 2010 due to monetary default; the anchor
tenant at the property vacated on September 30, 2010. The special
servicer has begun the foreclosure process.

Fitch downgrades this class:

   -- $23.9 million class G to 'Csf/RR1' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and Outlook and revises
the Recovery Ratings (RR) and Loss Severity (LS):

   -- $20 million class E at 'Asf', loss severity to 'LS3' from
      'LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.8 million class F at 'BBB-sf', loss severity to 'LS3'
      from 'LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $6.2 million class H at 'Csf', recovery rating to 'RR5' from
      'RR3'.

   -- $3.3 million class I at 'D/RR6'.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through D have repaid in full. Classes J
through M have been reduced to zero due to realized losses. Fitch
does not rate class M.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Various Actions on GECCMC 2002-1
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one rating, affirmed 13 ratings, and
revised Rating Outlooks on classes of GE Capital Commercial
Mortgage Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2002-1 (GECCMC 2002-1).

The downgrade to class N reflects an increase in Fitch-modeled
losses. Fitch modeled losses of 3.9% of the remaining pool;
modeled losses of the original pool are at 4.8%, including losses
already incurred to date. The Positive Outlook on classes G and H
reflects the likelihood of upgrades if the loans in the pool
continue to pay off and amortize, thus providing an increase in
credit enhancement. The Negative Outlook on classes L and M
reflect upcoming loan maturities over the next two years.
Approximately 25.6% of the pool matures in 2011 and 69% in 2012.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 30% (to $727.29 million from
$1.04 billion), of which 29.4% were due to paydowns and 0.6%
were due to realized losses. Thirty-six loans, representing 35.9%
of the pool, have been defeased.

Fitch has designated 23 loans (19.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes four specially serviced loans (7.4%). Fitch expects
the losses associated with the specially-serviced loans to impact
classes N through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (2.3%) secured by a 415-unit multifamily complex
located in Lithonia, GA. The loan transferred to special servicing
in November 2009 due to monetary default. The loan is currently
real-estate owned (REO). A recent appraisal value is below the
outstanding loan balance.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a
specially-serviced loan (2.7%) secured by a 130,142 square foot
(sf) office building located in Boston, MA. The loan transferred
to special servicing in April 2010 due to imminent default.
Discussions between the special servicer and the borrower remain
ongoing regarding available workout and recovery options.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a
specially-serviced loan (0.6%) secured by a 34,300 sf retail
property located in San Antonio, TX. The loan transferred to
special servicing in September 2010 due to monetary default. The
loan is REO. The special servicer is preparing to market the
property for sale.

Fitch downgrades this class:

   -- $10.4 million class N to 'C/RR3' from 'CCC/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating
Outlooks, Recovery Ratings (RR), and Loss Severity (LS) ratings:

   -- $525.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $36.5 million class B at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.1 million class C at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $16.9 million class D at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.4 million class E at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $13 million class F at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.2 million class G at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $10.4 million class H at 'A+sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $18.2 million class J at 'A-sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $16.9 million class K at 'BBBsf'; LSto 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $6.5 million class L at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class M at 'Bsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $5.2 million class O at 'Csf'; RR to 'RR6' from 'RR3'.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes X-1.

Classes A-1, A-2, and X-2 have been paid in full. Fitch does not
rate class P.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Lowers Three and Affirms 14 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the ratings of
three classes and affirmed 14 classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Series 2002-C3 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2006 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2006 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2006 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. O-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans, interest shortfalls and concerns
about refinance risk associated with loans approaching maturity.
Seventy loans, representing 68% of the pool, mature within the
next 36 months. Eighteen of these loans, representing 20% of the
pool, mature within the next 24 months and have a Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.1% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.1%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.2% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions", published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated December 2, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the June 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $569.3
million from $777.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 31%
of the pool. Twenty-two loans, representing 31% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-three loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.4 million (56% loss severity
overall). At last review the pool had experienced an aggregate
realized loss of $11.2 million. Six loans, representing 7% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $7.8 million appraisal reduction for two
of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $13.8 million loss (42% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$3.5 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the pool has experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.14 million and
affecting Classes P through J. Moody's anticipates that the pool
will continue to experience interest shortfalls caused by
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the master
servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability. The
master servicer has made a determination of non-recoverability for
the Wakefield Forest Apartments Loan ($3.9 million) and is no
longing advancing for this loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and full year 2010
operating results for 91% and 87% of the pool's non-defeased and
non-specially serviced loans, respectively. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 81%
compared to 84% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.36X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.31X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 38 compared to 42 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing loans represent 12% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Clifton Commons Loan ($30.7 million -- 5.4% of
the pool), which is secured by a 173,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located in Clifton, New Jersey. Major tenants include a 16-
screen AMC Theatre (36% of the gross leasable area (GLA); lease
expiration in May 2019), The Sports Authority (25% of the GLA;
lease expiration in March 2014) and Barnes & Noble (20% of the
GLA; lease expiration in May 2014). As of March 2011, the property
was 100% leased, the same as at last review. Performance is
stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.20X,
respectively, essentially the same at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at River Park Loan ($24.7
million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 134,000 SF
retail center located in Fresno, California. Major tenants include
Borders Book (18% of the GLA; lease expiration in May 2013) and
Cost Plus World Market (13% of the GLA; lease expiration in
January 2012). As of April 2011, the property was 90% leased
compared to 95% as of December 2009. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 74% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.28X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Sea Aire Apartments Loan
($12.6 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by 336-unit
multifamily property located in Somers Point, New Jersey. As of
March 2011, occupancy was 86% compared to 95% at securitization.
Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91%
and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 99% and 0.96X, at last
review.

Regulatory Disclosures

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in
relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of
the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program
for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing
ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings
issued on a support provider, this announcement provides relevant
regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the
support provider and in relation to each particular rating action
for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support
provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this
announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a
definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final
issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure
and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the
definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating.

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are: parties
involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the ratings,
public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors
Service information, and confidential and proprietary Moody's
Analytics' information.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's considers the quality of information available on the
rated entity, obligation or credit satisfactory for the purposes
of issuing a rating.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a rating is of sufficient quality and from
sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, Moody's is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.

The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a
time before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data
may not be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that
it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the
information that is available to it.


GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Granite Ventures I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Stone
Tower Debt Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow the optional redemption of the rated
notes on the May 24, 2011, distribution date.

Ratings Withdrawn

Granite Ventures I Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         NR          AAA (sf)
A-2         NR          AA+ (sf)
B           NR          A+ (sf)
C           NR          BB+ (sf)
D           NR          CCC+ (sf)

NR -- Not rated.


GREEN TREE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Certificates to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B certificates from Green Tree Recreational, Equipment, & Consumer
Trust 1996-B to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The lowered rating reflects the current interest payment shortfall
for the class B certificates as of the June 2011 distribution date
due to insufficient collections. "Losses have significantly
exceeded our expectations, performing worse than our initial 'A-'
stress scenario for the class B certificates, and available credit
support has been depleted. In addition, the class B certificates
have a remaining principal balance of $1.97 million, and the
collateral balance is only $131,918, leaving a principal shortfall
of $1.83 million. While interest is due on the full $1.97 million
balance of the class B certificates, interest income is only being
generated on the remaining collateral balance. The transaction
documents allow for the borrowing of 10 days worth of collections
from the upcoming month, and this additional liquidity has been
sufficient to cover interest shortfalls in previous months. If
this additional liquidity is sufficient to make up the existing
interest shortfall in the upcoming months, our rating will likely
remain at 'D' because we expect that additional shortfalls may
take place in future months and that the class B certificates will
ultimately default at final maturity due to nonpayment of ultimate
principal," S&P related.

Green Tree Recreational, Equipment, & Consumer Trust 1996-B is
backed by retail installment sales contracts and promissory notes
for the purchase of a variety of consumer products and equipment
originated by Green Tree Finance Corp.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the ratings associated
with this transaction.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on GCCFC 2004-GG1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes, upgraded three classes,
and affirmed 11 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp. (GCCFC), series 2004-GG1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades are a result of an increase in expected losses
across the pool (representing 1.2% of the initial pool balance)
relative to the previous Fitch rating action. Fitch modeled losses
of 4.6% of the remaining pool balance; expected losses as a
percentage of the original pool are at 3.3%, including losses
realized to date (0.8%). Fitch has identified 32 loans (29.2% of
the current pooled balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern, including
the six loans in special servicing (2.9%). Fitch expects that the
unrated class P will absorb expected losses associated with the
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls totaling
$1.2 million are affecting class P.

The upgrades and Positive Outlooks are primarily a result of the
defeasance of the 111 Eighth Avenue loan (9.5% of the current
pooled balance) subsequent to the previous Fitch rating action.
(Note: The class OEA-B1 and OEA-B2 certificates previously
represented an interest in a subordinate note secured by the
property; and that note was included in the defeasance.) In total,
11 loans (29.1% of the current pooled balance) have been defeased.
As of the July 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 44% to
$1.5 billion from $2.6 billion at issuance, due to a combination
of paydown (43.2%) and realized losses (0.8%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (7.3% of the
current pooled balance) secured by a 633,650-square foot (sf)
office with garage located in the Louisville, KY, central business
district. The 35-story, class A property is currently
approximately 94% leased and had a servicer-reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.50 times (x) as of year-end (YE) 2010
on a net operating income (NOI) basis. However, the largest tenant
(comprising 39.1% of the net rentable area [NRA]) has publicly
stated that it intends to vacate the bulk of its space (30% of the
NRA) that expires in 2012.

According to various media reports, the office building's
projected vacancy of nearly 200,000 sf will represent the largest
block of space available in Louisville and is expected to roughly
double the market vacancy rate. Cash flow is currently being swept
and a reserve is expected to build to $17.50 per sf of vacant
space. In its modeling of the loan, Fitch applied a downward
adjustment to NOI commensurate with the anticipated decline in
revenues associated with the expiring space.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.4%
of the current pooled balance) secured by a roughly 62,000-sf
anchored retail property with garage located in Chicago. Occupancy
at the property dropped to 44% following the vacancy of two
tenants, prior to rebounding to 60% with recent lease-up. The
property benefits from a strong location, and the borrower is
reportedly in discussions with various tenants potentially
interested in the remaining vacant space. Collected reserves for
leasing costs are limited. The loan remains current.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (0.9% of
the current pooled balance) secured by a mineral springs spa and
resort with 74 rooms. The loan was previously specially serviced,
but was reinstated with the master servicer as a corrected loan.
Though the hotel outperforms its competitive set, expenses remain
elevated due to damages likely caused by soil compaction at the
property, and it is unclear if long-term repairs have been made.
With a servicer-reported DSCR of 1.15x as of YE 2010, Fitch
anticipates that the loan could default at maturity.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and assigned or revised
Recovery Ratings (RRs):

   -- $13 million class L to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BB-sf/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9.8 million class M to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'B+sf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $9.8 million class N to 'CCCsf/RR5' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $6.5 million class O to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch has upgraded these classes and revised a Loss Severity (LS)
rating:

   -- $32.5 million class E to 'AAAsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.7 million class OEA-B1 to 'AAAsf/LS1' from 'BBB-sf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $13.4 million class OEA-B2 to 'AAAsf/LS1' from 'BBB-sf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised LS
ratings and Outlooks:

   -- $0.6 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $100 million class A-6 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1 billion class A-7 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61.8 million class B at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $26 million class C at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $52 million class D at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $32.5 million class F at 'A+sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $26 million class G at 'A-sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $39 million class H at 'BBBsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.5 million class J at 'BB+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13 million class K at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 have repaid in full. Fitch does not
rate the $22.7 million class P.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes XP and
XC.


GREYROCK CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Nine CLO Notes Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Greyrock CDO Ltd.:

US$229,700,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2017
(current balance US$226,346,535), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$19,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2017,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$2,000,000 Class B-1F 6.5210% Notes Due November 2017, Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,750,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2017,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$6,000,000 Class B-2F 9.4130% Notes Due November 2017 (current
balance US$5,467,473), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June
22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due November 2017
(current balance US$7,289,964), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class C-1A Combination Notes Due November 2017
(current rated balance US$3,329,592), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$12,000,000 Class C-1B Combination Notes Due November 2017
(current rated balance US$3,819,614), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in September
2009. Based on the latest trustee report from June 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2827 compared to 3104
in the August 2009 report.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $ 305.8 million,
defaulted par of $10.5, a weighted average default probability of
20.84% (implying a WARF of 3022), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.00%, and a diversity score of 81. Moody's
generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by assuming
the worse of reported and covenanted values for all collateral
quality tests. However, in this case given the limited time
remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements, as seen
in the actual collateral quality measurements. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Greyrock CDO Ltd., issued in September 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

The rating of the combo notes has relied on "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February
2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor. As part of the base case, Moody's considered
   spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large
   difference between the reported and covenant levels.


GROSVENOR PLACE: Moody's Upgrades EUR161 Mil. CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Grosvenor Place CLO III B.V.

Issuer: Grosvenor Place CLO III B.V.

   -- EUR62M Class A-3 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR36.5M Class B Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR20M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR28.5M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR14M Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Grosvenor Place CLO III, issued in August 2007, is a multi-
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield US and European loans of
approximately EUR 416.85 million. The portfolio is managed by CQS
Cayman Limited Partnership. This transaction is in its
reinvestment period until 28 October 2013. The portfolio is
exposed to European and US senior secured loans (86.48%) and
second lien and mezzanine loans (13.52%). The transaction
currently complies with its major criteria: Diversity Score,
Weighted Average Spread, Weighted Average Rating Factor and
Overcollateralisation Tests.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio,
an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios, and
delevering of the senior notes since the rating action in October
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors and increased recovery rate assumptions
as well as (3) a change in the recovery rate framework to fixed
recovery rates assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A1 and Class A2 notes have been paid
down by approximately 2.69% or EUR 6.5 million since the rating
action in October 2009.

Moody's also notes the deal has benefitted from an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios and improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action
in October 2009. In Moody's view, these positive developments
coincide with reinvestment of sale proceeds (including higher than
previously anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted
securities) into substitute assets with higher par amounts or
higher ratings.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009. The class A, class B,
class C, class D and class E overcollateralization ratios have
increased, in absolute terms, by 7.92%, 6.85%, 6.36%, 5.78% and
5.70% respectively from the numbers reported in the September
2009's Trustee report.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating of the portfolio (as
measured by the weighted average rating factor "WARF"), a decrease
in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below,
and a decrease of defaulted obligations. In particular, as of the
latest trustee report dated May 2011, securities rated Caa or
lower make up approximately 4.92% of the underlying portfolio
versus 11.87% in the September 2009 report, and default
obligations bucket is reduced to 0 compared to EUR 11.52m in
September 2009.

The reported WARF has remained relatively stable. As of the latest
trustee report dated May 2011, the WARF is currently 2706 compared
to 2698 in September 2009. However, the reported WARF understates
the actual improvement in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on September 1, 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and seniority distribution in the asset
pool, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In
its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR 422.36 million, a weighted average default probability of
21.26% (implying a WARF of 3073), and a diversity score of 27.

The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's
assumed that 86.30% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured
corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the
remaining corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors. These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, and diversity score. However,
   as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread level
   higher than the covenant levels due to the large difference
   between the reported and covenant level.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's also notes that around 61.86% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms 23 CMBS Classes of GSMS 2007-GG10
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 23
classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-GG10:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.1% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 15.7%. The decline in base expected loss is
due to recent loan modifications, stabilizing loan performance and
the liquidation of several specially serviced loans since last
review. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 22.2% of the current
balance compared to 29.8% at last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated
for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 5, 2010.

Deal Performance

As of the June 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2.7% to $7.36
billion from $7.56 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 198 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
31% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with credit estimates.

Fifty-four loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $79.0 million loss (29%
loss severity on average). At last review the pool had experienced
an aggregate realized loss of $12.6 million.

Currently, 36 loans, representing 34% of the pool, are in special
servicing. Two of the specially serviced loans, representing 14%
of the pool, are secured by properties for which Maguire
Properties L.P. (Maguire) is the sponsor. The Wells Fargo Tower
Loan ($550 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is the largest
specially serviced loan, is secured by a 1.4 million square foot
(SF) Class A, 53-story office building located in downtown Los
Angeles. The loan was transferred to special servicing in April
2011 due to imminent monetary default. The special servicer has
indicated that this loan recently returned to performing status in
June 2011. Two California Plaza ($470 million -- 6.4% of the pool)
is secured by a 1.3 million SF, 54-story Class A office building
located in downtown Los Angeles. This loan was transferred to
special servicing in December 2010 due to imminent monetary
default. Negotiations are underway between the borrower and the
special servicer regarding a potential loan modification.

There are two other specially serviced loans originally affiliated
with McGuire: 550 South Hope and the Maguire Anaheim Portfolio.
The 550 South Hope Loan ($118 million -- 2.0% of the pool) is
secured by a 566,000 SF Class A office building located in
downtown Los Angeles. The property was acquired by Leyton-Belling
and Associates earlier this year and the outstanding principal
balance was reduced from $165 million to $118 million. Another
large specially serviced loan formerly affiliated with Maguire is
The Maguire Anaheim Portfolio Loan ($103.5 million -- 1% of the
pool), which is secured by two office properties located in Orange
County, California which total 333,500 SF. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 for imminent
default and a receiver was appointed February 4, 2011.

The remaining 32 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types and are either 30 to 90+ days delinquent, real
estate owned (REO) or in the foreclosure process. The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $562 million appraisal
reduction. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $591 million loss
(25% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 43 poorly
performing loans representing 24% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $129.4 million loss (8% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans. In aggregate,
Moody's forecast total losses of $720.4 million (18% expected
loss) for specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and full year 2010
operating results for 91% and 87% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 122% compared to 124% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.0%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.84X, respectively compared to
1.23X and 0.80X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 35 compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Shorenstein Portland Portfolio Loan
($697.2 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by 16
office properties located in Portland, Oregon. The portfolio
totals 3.8 million SF. As of March 2010, the portfolio's was 80%
leased, the same as at last review versus 94% at securitization.
Performance had been stable through 2008, however, operating
income declined in 2009 and again in 2010 due to lower occupancy
and increased expenses. Net operating income (NOI) for full year
2009 was approximately 6% lower than in 2008 and reported 2010
total portfolio income was 7% lower than in 2009. The loan is
interest-only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 137% and 0.71X compared to 135% and 0.72X, respectively, at
last review.

The second largest loan is the TIAA RexCorp New Jersey Portfolio
Loan ($270.4 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by six
separate Class A office buildings totaling 1.0 million SF located
in Madison, Short Hills and Morristown, New Jersey. As of December
2010, the portfolio was 87% leased compared to 85% at last review.
The loan is interest-only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR 135% and 0.72X compared to 136% and 0.72X,
respectively, at last review.

The third largest loan is the 400 Atlantic Street Loan
($265.0 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by
a 527,424 SF class A office building located in Stamford,
Connecticut. As of December 2010, the property was 99% leased,
the same as last review, compared to 97% at securitization. The
loan is interest-only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.76X compared to 136% and 0.72X,
respectively, at last review.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC4's $1.48 billion
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by 70 loans that are secured by 130
properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 12,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the credit support provided by the
subordinate classes of certificates; the liquidity provided by the
trustee; and the underlying loans' economics, geographic
diversity, and property type diversity. "In our analysis, we
determined that, on a weighted average basis, the pool has a debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.25x based on a weighted average
Standard & Poor's loan constant of 8.31%, a DSCR of 1.54x based on
the weighted average in-place loan constant of 6.75%, a beginning
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 86.8%, and an ending LTV ratio of
75.6%," S&P related.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC4

Class        Rating             Amount ($)
A-1          AAA (sf)           85,249,000
A-2          AAA (sf)          332,497,000
A-3          AAA (sf)           90,651,000
A-4          AAA (sf)          753,667,000
X-A(i)       AAA (sf)    1,262,064,000(ii)
X-B(i)       NR            214,034,883(ii)
B            AA-(sf)            60,889,000
C            A- (sf)            62,734,000
D            BBB(sf)            35,058,000
E            BB(sf)             23,986,000
F            B (sf)             16,606,000
G            NR                 14,761,883

(i)Interest-only class. (ii)Notional amount.

NR -- Not rated.


GTP ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Secured Tower Revenue Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings on GTP Acquisition
Partners I, LLC Secured Tower Revenue Notes, Global Tower series
2011-2:

   -- $490,000,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $155,000,000 class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


GTP ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Tower Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has assigned definitive
ratings to the Class C and Class F Secured Tower Revenue Notes,
Series 2011-2 (the Offered Notes), issued by GTP Acquisition
Partners I, LLC (Issuer). The Issuer is an indirect wholly owned
subsidiary of Global Tower Holdings, LLC (GTP) a leading
independent (non-carrier) owner/operator of wireless towers in the
U.S., which in turn is controlled by affiliated funds of The
Macquarie Group. Moody's also stated that its ratings on the
existing series of notes previously issued by the Issuer are not
being downgraded or withdrawn solely as a result of this issuance.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer Entity: GTP Acquisition Partners I, LLC

$490,000,000 Class C Secured Tower Revenue Notes, Global Tower
Series 2011-2, rated A2 (sf)

$155,000,000 Class F Secured Tower Revenue Notes, Global Tower
Series 2011-2, rated Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer has the ability to issue multiple series of notes. A
portion of the proceeds of the Offered Notes have been applied to
repay the previously issued $480,250,000 Series 2007-1 Notes. The
Issuer has also issued its $70,000,000 Class C Series 2011-1
(together with the Offered Notes, the Notes). The Class C Offered
Notes rank pari passu with the Class C Series 2011-1 Notes. The
Offered Notes have an anticipated repayment date (ARD) of June
2016.

Ratings Rationale

The provisional ratings of the Offered Notes are derived from an
assessment of the present value of the net cash flow that the
tower pool is anticipated to generate from space licenses (leases)
on the towers, compared to the cumulative debt being issued at
each rating category.

In connection with the issuance, the Issuer has added
approximately 533 tower sites to the pool. Thus, the collateral
for the Notes consists of 2,472 wireless communications sites
(towers) that are mostly owned or leased by the Issuer or one of
its subsidiaries. Space on the towers is in turn leased to a
variety of users, primarily major wireless telephony carriers. As
of June 2011, this tower pool had an annualized run rate net cash
flow of approximately $89 million. Moody's assessed value for the
tower pool was approximately $924 million. Pro forma for the
issuance of the Offered Notes and repayment of the 2007-1 notes,
the Class C Notes will have a cumulative-loan-to-value (CLTV)
ratio of approximately 60.6%, while the Class F Notes will have a
CLTV of approximately 77.3% . The CLTV ratio reflects the CLTV
ratio of the combined amounts of the Offered Notes and the 2011-1
Notes; the CLTV of a given class reflects the combined outstanding
balance of that class and all more senior classes. See Principal
Methodology below for details on the assumptions applied to arrive
at Moody's assessed value.

The primary risks for the value of the tower pool are wireless
technology risk and tower re-leasing risk. Technology risk relates
primarily to the potential emergence of competing technologies
that could obviate the need for wireless towers and adversely
affect future lease revenues. Moody's is not aware of competing
technologies which could materially displace towers and believe
that the tower infrastructure is becoming increasingly entrenched
as demand for wireless applications grows. There are few viable
displacement technologies on the horizon such as Distributed
Antenna System (DAS) and Alcatel-Lucent's recently announced
lightRadios. Moody's views these technologies as complimentary to
the current tower based wireless networks as these technologies
are primarily effective in densely packed urban areas where the
portfolios of the wireless tower companies have limited presence.

Re-leasing risk refers to the potential for lease rates to
fluctuate downward upon renewal, since the transaction is subject
to renewals. This could occur due to overbuilding or due to
pressure from wireless carriers should their own businesses
experience significant margin compression. Due to zoning
restrictions and public pressure Moody's does not view
overbuilding as a present risk. This also provides some insulation
against price risk by limiting the alternatives that a wireless
carrier has.

In addition, in recent months Sprint-Nextel has announced plans to
shut down the Nextel iDen network over the next three years, and
the carrier said it will decommission up to 20,000 cell sites.
Additionally, the pending AT&T acquisition of T-Mobile creates
uncertainty over the T-Mobile cell sites. For the pool to be
securitized, approximately 7.3% of the revenue is generated from
Sprint-Nextel iDEN leases and approximately 4.8% of revenues comes
from T-Mobile sites that are collocated on the same towers as
AT&T. While the termination of some of those lease will have
negative impact on the transaction's revenue, Moody's believes
this revenue loss will be managed over the many years remaining on
the tower leases and favorable long-term wireless-data trends call
for more cell-site capacity down the road. In all, these
decommissions will instigate slower growth rate compared to the
expectations preceding these announcements.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction is
summarized below. Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating the Notes can be found on
www.moodys.com in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory.

Finally, it should be noted that Moody's ratings address only the
credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit
risks, such as those associated with repayment on the ARD, the
timing of any principal prepayments, the payment of prepayment
penalties and the payment of Post-ARD Additional Interest have not
been addressed and may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

Ratings of Outstanding Series Unaffected

The Offered Notes and the Series 2011-1 Notes will be supported by
the same tower pool. The Class C Offered Notes will rank pari
passu with the Class C Series 2011-1 Notes. Moody's concluded that
the issuance of the Offered Notes, in and of itself, will not
result in a reduction, qualification or withdrawal of the ratings
currently assigned to the Series 2011-1 Notes at this time.
However, Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated
with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have significant effect on yield and/or other
payments to investors. This press release should not be taken to
imply that there will be no adverse consequence for investors
since in some cases such consequences will not impact the rating.

Moody's V-Score And Parameter Sensitivities

V Score - The V Score for this transaction is Medium or Average.
The V Score indicates "Average" structure complexity and
uncertainty about critical assumptions. The Medium or average
score for this transaction is driven by the Medium score for
historical sector and issuer performance and data and Medium
transaction governance. The Medium for historical performance and
data for the sector is attributed to the fact that the data dates
back only fifteen years or so, while securitization data go back
only about five years. The Medium for the Issuer's historical
performance and data is derived from Moody's view that even though
GTP is relatively young and has existed for less than ten years,
Moody's thinks that historical performance is a good indicator for
future performance due to the nature of the assets and the sector.
Finally, the Medium for transaction governance is mainly because
of the limited experience of GTP in securitizations having done
only three such transactions since 2007 and the fact that GTP is
an unrated and relatively small company compared to the other
publicly traded cell tower operators.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities -- In the ratings analysis Moody's
uses various assumptions to assess the present value of the net
cash flow that the tower pool is anticipated to generate. Based on
these cash flows, the quality of the collateral and the
transaction's structure, the total amount of debt that can be
issued at a given rating level is determined. Hence, a material
change in the assessed net present value could result in a change
in the ratings. Therefore Moody's focuses on the sensitivity to
this variable in the parameter sensitivity analysis. Specifically,
if the net cash flows that the tower pool is anticipated to
generate is reduced by 5%, 10% and 15% compared to the Base Case
net cash flows used in determining the initial rating. The
potential model-indicated ratings for the Class C Offered Notes
rated (P) A2 (sf) would change as follow: Base Case A2 (0), A3
(1), Baa1 (2) and Baa3 (4) respectively; and the potential model-
indicated ratings for the Class F Offered Notes rated (P) Ba3 (sf)
would change as follow: Base Case Ba3 (0), B1 (1), B2 (2) and (3+) respectively.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the transaction has
not aged. Furthermore, parameter Sensitivities only reflects the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating the GTP transaction was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Wireless Towers-Backed
Securitizations: A Path to Clear Reception in the ABS Market",
published in September 2005 and amended on February 3, 2011 to
reflect the change in discount rates and available on
www.moodys.com in the Rating Methodologies subdirectory under the
Research & Ratings tab. Other methodologies and factors that may
have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also
be found in the Rating methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

Moody's derives an asset value for the collateral which in turn is
compared to the proposed bond issuance amounts. In deriving the
value of the assets, Moody's viewed the historical operating
performance of the Issuer, the historical performance of the
securitized pool, evaluated and analyzed comparable public company
data and market information from various third party sources.

These are the key assumptions used in the quantitative analysis:
(i) Revenue Growth -- for wireless voice/data two sources of
revenue growth were assumed: first, lease escalators which were
based on the tenants' contractual obligations were assumed to be
fixed at 3.25% for the first 20 years; this reflects the weighted
average remaining lease terms including extensions, which were
approximately 20 years. From year 21 on, Moody's assumed the lease
escalators to be 2%; second, organic growth that resulted in the
addition of approximately 0.44 tenant per tower in total over a
period of four years; on the other hand, Moody's also assumed the
termination of some leases and the decommission of equipment.
These are due to Sprint-Nextel's plan to shut off its iDEN and
AT&T announced acquisition of T-Mobile. Sprint-Nextel is planning
to shut down all of its IDEN sites starting in 2013. Based,
primarily, on the location of the iDEN sites compared to competing
sites, Moody's assumed that approximately 40% (or ~ 3% of the
total revenue) of the 7.3% of total revenue generated by the iDEN
leases is eliminated in 2013 and 2014. As for AT&T, if the planned
acquisition of T-Mobile is completed, Moody's expects that in the
medium to long term AT&T will choose not renew some of the T-
Mobile leases. Moody's assumed that approximately half of T-
Mobile's leases, which account for approximately 5% of the
revenue, will not be renewed between 2013 and 2017 in 1% increment
per annum. Finally, revenues from broadcasting were assumed to
decline on a continuous basis over a 15 year period to a third of
current levels, and data/other revenues were assumed to decline to
zero based on a triangular distribution ranging from five to ten
years. (ii) Operating Expenses -- were assumed to vary such that
net tower cash flow margins ranged from 65% to 80% based on a
triangular distribution. (iii) Maintenance Capital Expenditures --
were assumed to be $725 per tower per annum, and to increase by 2%
to 4% every year. (iv) Tenants' Probability of Default (wireless
voice/data tenants) - Moody's "Idealized" default rate table was
applied, using the actual ratings of the Tenants who were rated
and assuming near-default ratings for others; (v) Recovery Upon
Wireless Tenant Default -- were assumed to be zero the year
following the default and recover to 80% for large carriers and to
50% or 60% for small carriers of pre-default revenues over the
next two years; (vi) Discount Rate - the discount rate applied to
the net cash flow was assumed to vary between 8.5% and 13.00%;
(vii) Finally, adjustments were made to the total amount of debt
that can be issued at the requested rating levels. This is mainly
because the Class C of the Offered Notes and the Class C of 2011-1
Notes as well as the Class F of the Offered Notes account for a
larger percentage of the total debt outstanding compared to most
similarly rated classes in the prior transactions; therefore these
classes have lower severity of loss risk.


GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Four CLO Notes Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-I, Ltd.:

US$12,700,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,950,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinated
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$11,850,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Subordinated Notes Due
2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Subordinated Notes Due
2015, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $133.3 million,
defaulted par of $1.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.45% (implying a WARF of 2733), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.15%, and a diversity
score of 45. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-I, Ltd., issued in August 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


GULF STREAM: Moody's Ups Rating of US$20MM Class D Notes From Junk
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1, Ltd.:

US$320,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2016 (current
outstanding balance of $108,051,646.48), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$34,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2016, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2016
(current outstanding balance of $20,594,593.69), Upgraded to B1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the
notes are primarily a result of applying Moody's revised
CLO assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011.
The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in
the transaction's overcollateralization ratio and delevering
of the senior notes since the rating action in August 2010.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 43% or $80.5 million since the rating action in
August 2010. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in August 2010. Based on the latest trustee report dated
June 6, 2011, the Class A/B overcollateralization ratio is
reported at 156.3%, versus July 2010 levels of 125.7%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $174.4 million
defaulted par of $2.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.66% (implying a WARF of 3078), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.77%, and a diversity
score of 56. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1, Ltd., issued in August of 2004,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes From 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2005-1, Ltd.:

US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) on Placed on Watch
for Possible Upgrade;

US$27,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf), previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) on
Placed on Watch for Possible Upgrade;

US$32,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2017,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) on
Placed on Watch for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratio and delevering of the
senior notes since the rating action in May 2011. Moody's notes
that the Class A-1 Notes and the Class A-2 Notes have been paid
down by approximately 24% or $54.5 million and $5.49 million
respectively since the rating action in May 2011. As a result of
the delevering, the senior overcollateralization ratio has
increased since the rating action in May 2011. Based on the latest
trustee report dated June 3, 2011, the Senior
Overcollateralization Ratio is reported at 138.9% versus April
2011 level of 130.0%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $297.9 million,
defaulted par of $3.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.06% (implying a WARF of 2876), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.57%, and a diversity
score of 62. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2005-1, Ltd., issued on May 11, 2005, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.


HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Four CLO Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short
Unsecured CLO 2006-1 Ltd.:

US$28,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$28,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$16,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2018, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in September
2009. Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in September 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2809 compared to
3007 in August 2009. The overcollateralization ratios of the rated
notes have also improved since the rating action in September
2009. The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 136.72%, 126.95%,
116.37% and 111.08%, respectively, versus August 2009 levels of
128.38%, 119.25%, 109.36% and 104.41%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $391 million, a
weighted average default probability of 20.40% (implying a WARF of
2931), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.55%,
and a diversity score of 49. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. Moody's
generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by assuming
the worse of reported and covenanted values for all collateral
quality tests. However, in this case given the limited time
remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements, as seen
in the actual collateral quality measurements.The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
CLO 2006-1 Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest and
   the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral
   quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels.
   Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of reported
   and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
   weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
   score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered
   spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large
   difference between the reported and covenant levels.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


IBIS RE: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 2010-1 Class B Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services removed its ratings on 10
natural peril catastrophe bonds from CreditWatch with negative
implications. "At the same time, we lowered our ratings on six of
the bonds and affirmed our ratings on four," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on 16 catastrophe bonds on
CreditWatch negative on April 18. "We took this action because of
the impact of the update to Risk Management Solutions' (RMS')
RiskLink V11 U.S. hurricane model. These bonds had been modeled
with an earlier version of the RMS model. Since then, we have
received the updated probability of attachment for 10 of the 16
bonds based on RMS' updated model. In addition, we have received
the probability of attachment based on AIR Worldwide Corp.'s (AIR)
model CLASIC/2 V12.5 (warm sea surface temperature catalog) for
each of the bonds," S&P stated.

"The rating actions were based on the results of these models.
Regarding the Montana Re 2010-1 Class C notes, if there are no
covered events between now and the next reset, we would expect to
raise the rating on the notes to 'B(sf)' since the transaction
requires each reset to use the latest commercially available
version of RMS' model. The Longpoint Re notes have a similar
requirement to use the latest commercially available RMS model,"
S&P said.

"We had placed our ratings on the 16 bonds on CreditWatch negative
to reflect the impact that the update to RMS' model had on the
modeled probability of attachment. Although modeling companies
periodically update their models, the impact on the probability of
attachment from such update is typically minimal. However, in this
instance, the probability of attachment increased significantly,"
S&P noted.

"We intend to resolve the CreditWatch status of the remaining six
bonds within the next two weeks," S&P added.

Ratings List

                                   To           From
Ibis Re Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes        BB(sf)       BB(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2009-1 Class B notes        B+(sf)       BB-(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2010-1 Class A notes        BB-(sf)      BB(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2010-1 Class B notes        B(sf)        B+(sf)/Watch Neg

Montana Re Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes        B(sf)        BB-(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2009-1 Class B notes        CCC+(sf)     B-(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2010-1 Class C notes        CCC+(sf)     B(sf)/Watch Neg

Longpoint Re II Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes        BB+(sf)      BB+(sf)/Watch Neg
Series 2009-1 Class B notes        BB+(sf)      BB+(sf)/Watch Neg

Calabash Re III Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class B notes        BB+(sf)      BB+/Watch Neg


JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings of Series 2007-FL1
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes from the pooled portion of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series
2007-FL1 reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 8.2%.
The non-pooled junior component certificates were also affirmed
based on Fitch's loss expectations on the Resorts International
loan. Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate values and cash flow
declines. The Negative Rating Outlooks for the more junior classes
reflect the possibility of further negative credit migration of
the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, approximately 47.1% of the pooled
loans, and all of the non-pooled components, are modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress. Fitch estimates that average recoveries on the pooled
loans will be approximately 82.6% in the base case. In this
scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline is 9.4% from
generally year-end (YE) 2010 servicer-reported financial data. In
its review, Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating statements,
STR reports and rent rolls, updated property valuations, and
recent lease and sales comparisons.

The transaction is collateralized by 17 loans, 11 of which are
secured by hotels (61.7%), two by retail (23%), one by casino
(9.1%), one by office (2.9%), one by multifamily (1.9%) and one by
industrial (1.3%). The final maturity dates, including all
extension options for the non-specially serviced loans, are in
2011 (5.5%) and 2012 for the remaining loans.

Fitch identified seven Loans of Concern within the pool (37.5%),
six of which are specially serviced (28.3%). Fitch's analysis
resulted in loss expectations for 10 A-notes, and each of the B-
note non-pooled components in the 'B' stress scenario. The three
largest pooled contributors to losses in the 'B' stress scenario
are: Resorts International (9.1%), PHOV Portfolio (13%) and 321
Ellis Street (1.3%).

Resorts International was originally collateralized by four
casino/hotel properties located in Atlantic City, NJ, East
Chicago, IN, Robinsonville, MS and Tunica, MS. The Resorts East
Chicago property was released from the portfolio in September
2007, paying down the senior trust component by approximately 47%.
The loan secures two additional non-trust pari passu A notes of
$32.4 million each and an $87.7 million non-pooled senior
participation included in the transaction and $233 million junior
participation held outside the trust. The loan transferred to
special servicing on July 23, 2009 due to monetary default as a
result of a significant cash flow decline from the prior year. The
borrower reported EBITDA for trailing 12 months (TTM) March 2011
was approximately $9.7 million for the portfolio, compared to
approximately $56 million for YE 2007. The special servicer
obtained appraisals which indicated losses are likely on the loan.

The PHOV Portfolio loan is secured by 11 full-service hotels
(following the previous release of the Hilton Rockville), located
in FL, CA, SC, IL and NJ. Flags include Hilton, Doubletree,
Courtyard by Marriott, Sheraton and two non-flagged hotels. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2010 for imminent
default. The sponsor brought the loan current and exercised the
final extension option. The loan was returned to the master
servicer without modification. Four of the 11 properties were
severely impacted by Hurricane Katrina and Wilma in 2005, with the
hotels coming back on line in late 2006 and mid 2007. While YE
2010 net operating income has improved over YE 2009, it remains
significantly below issuance expectations. For YE 2010 the revenue
per available room (RevPAR) was $74.30 compared to $67.58 as of YE
2009 and $87.58 at issuance.

The 321 Ellis Street loan is secured by a 650,000 square foot (sf)
industrial-flex building located in New Britain, CT. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in February 2010. The property
has been in receivership since December 2010. The special servicer
has requested note sale approval. Fitch modeled the loan as a term
default with a substantial loss in the base case.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $720.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $243.1 million class A-2 at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $48.7 million class B at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $34.8 million class C at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $33.1 million class D at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $40 million class E at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $27.8 million class F at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $27.8 million class G at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $38.3 million class H at 'CC/RR4';

   -- $34.8 million class J at 'C/RR6';

   -- $31.3 million class K at 'C/RR6';

   -- $34.8 million class L at 'D/RR6';

   -- $11.9 million class RS-1 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $12.8 million class RS-2 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $15.6 million class RS-3 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $11.1 million class RS-4 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $15.4 million class RS-5 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $13.2 million class RS-6 at 'C/RR6';

   -- $7.6 million class RS-7 at 'C/RR6'.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades One Class of JPMCC 2004-C3
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 19 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMCC),
series 2004-C3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrade is a result of a slight increase in expected losses
across the pool (representing 0.7% of the initial pool balance)
relative to the previous Fitch rating action. Fitch modeled losses
of 5.6% of the remaining pool balance; expected losses as a
percentage of the original pool are at 5.7%, including losses
realized to date (0.9%). Fitch has identified 36 loans (26%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, including the 14 loans in special
servicing (11.2%). Fitch expects that classes L through NR could
eventually be fully depleted from losses associated with the
specially serviced loans.

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch expected losses, which is attributable to repayments and
scheduled amortization subsequent to the previous rating action
(5.6% of the original pool balance). Nine loans (11.5% of the
pool) have been defeased. As of the June 2011 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
approximately 14.6% to $1.3 billion from $1.52 billion at
issuance, due to a combination of paydown (13.7%) and realized
losses (0.9%). Interest shortfalls totaling $4 million are
affecting classes K through NR.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially serviced
loan (4.4% of the pool) secured by a portfolio of eight
industrial/flex properties located in the greater Boston
metropolitan statistical area. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 due to imminent default and went into
maturity default in January 2010. The special servicer appointed a
receiver, and a new property manager is working to lease up and
stabilize the portfolio. Fitch calculated current occupancy at
roughly 70% based on recent advertised listings, which remains
lower than the 88% portfoliowide occupancy at issuance.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (4.7%
of the pool) secured by an anchored shopping center in White
Plains, NY. As of the January 2011 rent roll, occupancy at the
property was approximately 95%. However, recent online lease
listings indicate availabilities of approximately 18% of the
property's net rentable area (NRA). The parent company of tenant
A&P Supermarket (12.3% of the space) recently filed for bankruptcy
protection. That tenant's lease is among several expirations
scheduled to occur in 2012, which correspond to roughly 55% of the
center's NRA. Due to the foregoing, the loan is a Fitch Loan of
Concern.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses (2.1% of the pool)
is secured by a multifamily property located in Tampa, FL. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in December 2009. The
special servicer reportedly remains in negotiations with the
borrower for a modification that could include conversion of
payments to interest only and cash management.

Fitch has downgraded this class and assigned a Recovery Rating
(RR):

   -- $20.9 million class J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised RRs, Outlooks, and
Loss Severity (LS) ratings:

   -- $150.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $235.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $166.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $421.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $87.3 million class A-J at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $43.6 million class B at 'Asf/LS4' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- $13.3 million class C at 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $13.3 million class D at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $15.2 million class E at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $15.2 million class F at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $19 million class G at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $15.2 million class H at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $7.6 million class K at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $5.7 million class L at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $9.5 million class M at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $3.8 million class N at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $5.7 million class P at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $5.7 million class Q at 'Csf/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate the $8.9 million class NR. Class A-1 has
repaid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes X-1
and X-2.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Downgrades JPMorgan Series 2001-A
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMC) series 2001-A
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's two remaining
loans are specially serviced and in foreclosure due to maturity
default and continued poor performance.

The largest specially serviced loan (68.6%) is collateralized by a
795,500 square foot(sf) retail-anchored strip center in Maple
Heights, OH, a suburb of Cleveland. The property has suffered from
poor performance and the most recent servicer reported occupancy
is 61%.

The second specially serviced loan (31.4%) is collateralized by a
399,839 sf suburban enclosed mall in Woodland, CA, which is near
Sacramento. The loan was transferred to special servicing in Oct.
2009 due to an imminent default and the borrower subsequently
became delinquent. The property is currently 53% occupied with
only two out of four anchors in place. The two anchor tenants are
Burlington Coat Factory (31.9%) and J.C. Penny (19%).

Fitch modeled losses of 45.8% based on Fitch adjustments to recent
property valuations obtained by the special servicer for the
remaining properties.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns Recovery Ratings (RR):

   -- $3.4 million class E to 'C/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $5.1 million class F to 'C/RR4' from 'CC/RR6';

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Loss Severity ratings and
Outlook:

   -- $10.8 million class D at 'BB'; loss severity to 'LS1' from
      'LS4'; Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class G at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class NR.

Classes A-1, A-2, B and C have paid in full.

Fitch has already withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class
X.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class SP-3 Certificate to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class SP-3 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificate from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2002-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrade to 'D (sf)' follows a principal loss to the class
SP-3 certificate, which was detailed in the June 13, 2011, trustee
remittance report. Class SP-3 has experienced a total principal
loss of $119,145 due to special servicing fees from the Simon
Portfolio II loan, $26,324 of which was reflected in the June 2011
trustee remittance report.

The Simon Portfolio II loan has a whole loan balance of
$122.1 million that is split into two components: a $104.9 million
senior pooled component and a $17.2 million subordinate nonpooled
component that provides 100% of the cash flow to the 'SP' raked
certificates. The loan was transferred to the special servicer, C-
III Asset Management LLC, on Jan. 13, 2011, because the borrower
requested a loan restructuring. The June 2011 trustee remittance
report shows the payment status of the loan as current. The class
SP-3 certificate is currently subordinate to the remaining
components of the loan. "Consequently, the special servicing fees,
which we expect will continue, caused a principal loss to the SP-3
class, which prompted us to lower our rating to a 'D (sf)'," S&P
related.


JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 10-A6 to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 62
classes from Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R5, a
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction. "At the
same time, we removed our ratings on five of those classes from
CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, we affirmed
our ratings on 65 classes from the same transaction. This
transaction pays interest pro rata within each of its groups," S&P
related.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on five classes from the
transaction within this review on CreditWatch negative, along with
ratings from a group of other RMBS re-REMIC securities.
Additionally, on April 1, 2011, we provided an update on the
CreditWatch placements and provided clarification regarding our
analysis of interest payment amounts within re-REMIC transactions
(see 'Standard & Poor's Provides An Update On Outstanding RMBS Re-
REMIC CreditWatch Placements And Outlines Their Resolution')," S&P
related.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address the
timely payment of interest and the full payment of principal. We
reviewed the interest and principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed through to the applicable re-
REMIC classes. When performing this analysis, we applied our loss
projections, incorporating, where applicable, our recently revised
loss assumptions to the underlying collateral to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories to
assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the stressed
losses associated with their ratings while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal consistent with our criteria,"
S&P stated.

"In applying our loss projections we incorporated, where
applicable, our recently revised loss assumptions as outlined in
'Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime, Subprime, And Alt-A
U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,' published on March 25, 2011, into
our review. Such updates pertain to the 2005-2007 vintage prime,
subprime, and Alternative-A (Alt-A) transactions; some of which
are associated with the re-REMICs we reviewed (see tables 1 and 2
for the overall prior and revised vintage- and product-specific
lifetime loss projections as percentages of the original structure
balance)," S&P stated.

Table 1
Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Table 2
Lifetime Loss Projections For Alternative-A RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
                            Fixed/
          Aggregate       long-reset
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.75  11.25    12.75   9.60
2006      29.50  26.25    25.25  25.00
2007      36.00  31.25    31.75  26.25
         Short-reset
            hybrid        Option ARM
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.25  14.75    15.50  13.25
2006      30.00  30.50    34.75  26.75
2007      41.00  40.75    43.50  37.50

"As a result of this review, we lowered our ratings on certain
classes based on our assessment as to whether there were principal
and/or interest shortfalls from the underlying securities that
would impair the re-REMIC classes at the applicable rating
stresses. The affirmations reflect our assessment of the
likelihood that the re-REMIC classes will receive timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal under the applicable
stressed assumptions," S&P said.

"We based our downgrades on our projections of principal loss
amounts and interest shortfalls, allocated to the relevant re-
REMIC classes under the applicable ratings stress scenarios," S&P
related.

Rating Actions

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R5
Series 2009-R5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
7-A4       47232DBL5   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A3      47232DDB5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
10-A4      47232DCD2   B- (sf)              BB (sf)
2-A4       47232DAJ1   B- (sf)              BB (sf)
5-A4       47232DAZ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
11-A6      47232DCM2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
14-A1      47232DCZ3   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)
1-A3       47232DAC6   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)
4-A2       47232DAU6   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
15-A3      47232DDE9   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)
6-A2       47232DBD3   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
23-A3      47232DFD9   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
10-A6      47232DCF7   D (sf)               CCC (sf)
15-A4      47232DDF6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
24-A1      47232DFF4   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A2       47232DAB8   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
20-A5      47232DEL2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
20-A2      47232DEH1   A- (sf)              A (sf)
3-A6       47232DAS1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
20-A4      47232DEK4   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
8-A4       47232DBS0   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
2-A5       47232DAK8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
9-A4       47232DBY7   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
11-A2      47232DCH3   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
13-A4      47232DCX8   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
7-A3       47232DBK7   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
9-A3       47232DBX9   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
5-A1       47232DAW2   CC (sf)              BB (sf)
16-A3      47232DDL3   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
14-A2      47232DDA7   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
16-A1B     47232DDJ8   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
2-A3       47232DAH5   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
6-A4       47232DBF8   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
16-A2      47232DDK5   BB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)
24-A3      47232DFH0   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
19-A6      47232DFM9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
9-A5       47232DBZ4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
11-A5      47232DCL4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
16-A5      47232DDN9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
8-A3       47232DBR2   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
10-A3      47232DCC4   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
8-A2       47232DBQ4   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
8-A6       47232DBU5   D (sf)               CC (sf)
5-A3       47232DAY8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
16-A1      47232DDG4   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
21-A4      47232DES7   B- (sf)              BB (sf)
11-A4      47232DCK6   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
1-A1       47232DAA0   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)
24-A2      47232DFG2   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
11-A1      47232DCG5   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
6-A3       47232DBE1   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
5-A2       47232DAX0   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
21-A5      47232DET5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
15-A1      47232DDC3   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)
19-A5      47232DEF5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
9-A2       47232DBW1   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
15-A2      47232DDD1   BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
23-A4      47232DFE7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
20-A3      47232DEJ7   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
22-A5      47232DEY4   D (sf)               CC (sf)
11-A3      47232DCJ9   B+ (sf)              BBB (sf)
5-A5       47232DBA9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)


Ratings Affirmed

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R5
Series 2009-R5

Class      CUSIP       Rating
19-A2      47232DEC2   A (sf)
18-A5      47232DDZ2   B (sf)
21-A1A     47232DEN8   AAA (sf)
12-A5      47232DCS9   B- (sf)
12-A2      47232DCP5   A (sf)
18-A3      47232DDX7   BBB (sf)
22-A3      47232DEW8   B (sf)
3-A4       47232DAQ5   BB (sf)
7-A5       47232DBM3   CCC (sf)
19-A4      47232DEE8   BB (sf)
18-A1A     47232DDU3   AAA (sf)
13-A3      47232DCW0   BBB (sf)
6-A1       47232DBC5   AAA (sf)
7-A1       47232DBH4   AAA (sf)
1-A4       47232DAD4   CCC (sf)
18-A4      47232DDY5   BB (sf)
8-A5       47232DBT8   CCC (sf)
23-A1B     47232DFB3   AAA (sf)
13-A5      47232DCY6   CC (sf)
1-A5       47232DAE2   CCC (sf)
16-A1A     47232DDH2   AA+ (sf)
12-A4      47232DCR1   BB (sf)
19-A3      47232DED0   BBB (sf)
21-A3      47232DER9   BBB (sf)
17-A2      47232DDQ2   A (sf)
22-A4      47232DEX6   CCC (sf)
8-A1       47232DBP6   AAA (sf)
22-A2      47232DEV0   BB (sf)
7-A2       47232DBJ0   A (sf)
16-A4      47232DDM1   CCC (sf)
12-A3      47232DCQ3   BBB (sf)
18-A6      47232DEA6   CC (sf)
2-A1       47232DAF9   AAA (sf)
18-A1      47232DDT6   AAA (sf)
23-A2      47232DFC1   A (sf)
9-A1       47232DBV3   AAA (sf)
4-A1       47232DAT9   AAA (sf)
24-A4      47232DFJ6   CCC (sf)
21-A1B     47232DEP3   AAA (sf)
18-A2      47232DDW9   A (sf)
3-A3       47232DAP7   BBB (sf)
22-A1      47232DEU2   A (sf)
24-A5      47232DFK3   CCC (sf)
10-A5      47232DCE0   CCC (sf)
13-A2      47232DCV2   A (sf)
10-A2      47232DCB6   A (sf)
17-A4      47232DDS8   CCC (sf)
20-A1      47232DEG3   AAA (sf)
3-A2       47232DAN2   A (sf)
17-A1      47232DDP4   AAA (sf)
10-A1      47232DCA8   AAA (sf)
23-A1      47232DEZ1   AAA (sf)
6-A5       47232DBG6   CC (sf)
23-A1A     47232DFA5   AAA (sf)
2-A2       47232DAG7   A (sf)
21-A1      47232DEM0   AAA (sf)
17-A3      47232DDR0   BBB (sf)
12-A1      47232DCN0   AAA (sf)
3-A1       47232DAM4   AAA (sf)
13-A1      47232DCU4   AAA (sf)
21-A2      47232DEQ1   A (sf)
18-A1B     47232DDV1   AAA (sf)
19-A1      47232DEB4   AAA (sf)
4-A3       47232DAV4   CCC (sf)
3-A5       47232DAR3   CCC (sf)


JUNIPER CBO 1999-1: Fitch Affirms, Withdraws Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn the ratings on two
classes of Juniper CBO 1999-1, Ltd./Corp. (Juniper CBO 1999-1):

   -- $14,601,744 class A-3A notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $9,734,496 class A-3B notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn.

The rating actions are the result of the transaction's inability
to pay the full amount of interest and principal due on the
maturity date of April 15, 2011. The notes were previously
downgraded to 'Dsf' in April 2010 due to the failure to pay timely
interest to the class A-3A and class A-3B (collectively, the class
A-3 notes) on their scheduled payment date.

Currently, three defaulted bonds totaling approximately
$4.8 million in par and $580,000 cash remain in the portfolio. In
addition, there are equity securities in the portfolio, to which
Fitch assigns no recoveries in its analysis.

Juniper CBO 1999-1 was a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) that closed on March 23, 1999. The portfolio of Juniper CBO
1999-1 was originally selected and monitored by Wellington
Management Company, LLP.


JUNIPER CBO 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 2 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on two classes of Juniper
CBO 2000-1, Ltd./Corp. (Juniper CBO 2000-1). In addition, Fitch
has revised the Recovery Ratings on each class of notes. The
rating actions are:

   -- $14,885,650 class A-4L notes to 'Csf/RR2' from 'Csf/RR4';

   -- $19,847,534 class A-4 notes to 'Csf/RR2' from 'Csf/RR4'.

The rating actions reflect Fitch's expectation that available
proceeds from the current portfolio will remain insufficient to
redeem the class A-4L and the class A-4 notes (collectively, the
class A notes) at the stated maturity date in April 2012.
According to the trustee report dated June 2, 2011, there are
$12.2 million in cash and 11 senior unsecured bonds, totaling
approximately $25 million in par, remaining in the portfolio.
However, the portfolio balance includes five defaulted securities
with a balance of $9.8 million. There are also equity holdings in
the portfolio, but Fitch does not assign any recoveries to equity
in its analysis. In addition, principal proceeds have also been
used to cover interest shortfalls on the class A notes, which will
impact the proceeds available to redeem the rated notes.

Fitch's analysis assigned an expected loss assumption for each
asset, and compared the resulting expected return of the
portfolio, along with the current principal cash balance, to the
outstanding balances of the notes to determine the notes' long-
term credit ratings. The class A note balance of $34.7 million
compared to $27.4 million of performing securities and principal
cash, indicates that default appears inevitable for the these
notes. This review did not utilize Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model
(PCM) or Global Cash Flow model, which incorporates interest rate
stresses and default timings, given the ten months remaining until
maturity and the high obligor concentration of the portfolio.

Fitch expects the rated notes to recover 70% to 90% of their
current principal balances, consistent with an 'RR2' on Fitch's
Recovery Rating scale. Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities. Distressed securities are
defined as bonds that face a real possibility of default at or
prior to maturity and by definition are rated 'CCC' or below. For
further detail on Recovery Ratings, see Fitch's report 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

Juniper CBO 2000-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) that closed on April 4, 2000. The portfolio of Juniper CBO
2000-1was originally selected and monitored by Wellington
Management Company, LLP. The transaction's stated maturity date is
April 15, 2012.


KATONAH V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Katonah V, Ltd.:

$14,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes, Upgraded
to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes, Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $80.5 million, defaulted par of $3.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 18.70% (implying a WARF
of 3226), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.53%,
and a diversity score of 40. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Katonah V, Ltd., issued in May 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3. Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings of Series 2003-C5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes of LB-UBS commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C5.

The upgrades are a result of increased credit enhancement due to
pay down, minimal Fitch expected losses, and defeasance. As of the
June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has
paid down 57.8% to $593.1 million from $1.4 billion at issuance.
Twelve loans (14.8%) are fully defeased. Interest shortfalls
totaling $297,668 are currently affecting classes N through T.

Of the original 80 loans, 55 remain outstanding. Fitch has
identified 10 loans (12.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes four specially serviced loans (8.15%). Of the four
specially serviced loans, three loans (7.45%) are 90 days or more
delinquent, and one asset (.7%) is real estate owned (REO). Fitch
modeled losses are 3.69% of the remaining pool; modeled losses of
the original pool are at 1.23%, including losses already incurred
to date.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a 568,657 square foot
(sf) mall located Scranton, PA. A modification agreement was
recently executed and is being implemented.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a 38,942 sf
office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The asset became
real estate owned (REO) in December 2010. The special servicer is
working to dispose of the asset.

Fitch has upgraded these classes and revised Rating Outlooks:

   -- $17.6 million class G to 'AAA/LS5' from 'AA/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $15.8 million class H to 'AA/LS5' from 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook to
      Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating Outlooks:

   -- $59.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $328.1 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS5';Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.6 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15.8 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.8 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.5 million class J at 'A/LS5'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $14 million class K at 'BBB-/LS5; Outlook Stable;

   -- $12.3 million class L at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.3 million class M at 'B-'/LS5; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $3.5 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate classes P, Q, S, and T and classes A-1, A-2
and X-CP have paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-CL.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C6, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "Concurrently, we affirmed
our ratings on eight other classes from the same transaction," S&P
said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
using our U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria. The downgrades
also reflect credit support erosion that we anticipate will
occur upon the resolution of nine ($77.9 million, 9.7%) of the 11
($104.3 million, 12.9%) loans that are with the special servicer,
as well as four additional loans ($8.4 million, 1.0%) that we
determined to be credit-impaired. We also considered the monthly
interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust. We lowered our
ratings to 'D (sf)' on the class N and P certificates because we
believe the accumulated interest shortfalls will remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all the remaining loans in the pool. Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.67x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 74.2%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted-average DSC of 1.29x and an LTV ratio of
94.3%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 41.1% and 30.0%. The DSC and LTV calculations
exclude nine ($77.9 million, 9.7%) of the transaction's 11
($104.3 million, 12.9%) specially serviced loans and four
($8.4 million, 1.0%) loans that we determined to be credit-
impaired. We separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced loans and credit-impaired loans and included
them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures," S&P related.

As of the June 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $103,155 related
to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
totaling $81,935 and special servicing fees of $21,220. The total
interest shortfalls were offset during this period by ASER
recoveries of $56,300. "Class N and all classes subordinate to it
reflected accumulated interest shortfalls this period. Classes N
and P have reflected accumulated interest shortfalls for the past
six consecutive months, and we expect these shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. Consequently, we
downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P stated.

"The rating affirmations on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support levels
that we consider to be consistent with our outstanding ratings on
these classes. We affirmed our ratings on the class X-CL and X-CP
interest-only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria,"
S&P added.

                    Credit Considerations

As of the June 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, 11 loans
($104.3 million, 12.9%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).

The reported payment status of the specially serviced loans
is: seven are in foreclosure ($38.7 million, 4.8%); one is
90-plus days delinquent ($3.9 million, 0.5%); one is 60 days
delinquent ($35.3 million, 4.4%); one is a matured balloon loan
($11.6 million, 1.4%); and one is late, but less than 30 days
delinquent ($14.8 million, 1.8%). Appraisal reduction amounts
(ARAs) totaling $16.3 million are in effect against five of the
specially serviced loans ($39.0 million, 4.8%). Details on the
three largest loans with special servicer, which are also top 10
loans, are:

The Northridge Business Park loan ($35.3 million, 4.4%) is the
largest specially serviced loan and the third-largest real estate
loan in the pool. The loan was transferred to special servicing on
Nov. 30, 2009, because various tenants vacated, which led to a
subsequent payment default. The loan's current payment status is
60 days delinquent. The loan is secured by a 471,034-sq.-ft.
industrial/business park in Atlanta, Ga. Coca Cola, representing
38% of the net rentable area (NRA), moved out in February 2011.
"As a result, we estimate that the property now has a negative
cash flow and occupancy of approximately 45%. According to LNR,
it is pursuing a workout while proceeding with processing a
foreclosure. Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss
upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P related.

The Stockdale Tower loan ($21.8 million, 2.7%) is the second-
largest specially serviced loan and the sixth-largest real estate
loan in the pool. The loan was transferred to special servicing on
Dec. 28, 2009, due to imminent default, and the foreclosure
process is proceeding. The loan is secured by a 176,144-sq.-ft.
office building in Bakersfield, Ca., that was built in 1982.
Recent financial information is not available for this loan. An
ARA of $8.1 million is in effect against this loan. According to
LNR, the foreclosure sale has been postponed in order to review a
discounted payoff offer from the borrower. Standard & Poor's
anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this loan.

The 1200 Corporate Place loan ($14.8 million, 1.8%) is the third-
largest specially serviced loan and the ninth-largest real estate
loan in the pool. The loan was transferred to special servicing on
April 15, 2010, due to imminent default. The loan's payment
status, as of the June remittance, was reported as late, but less
than 30 days delinquent. As of December 2009, the property
reported negative cash flow and occupancy of 56%. The loan is
secured by a 128,959-sq.-ft. office building in Boca Raton, Fla.,
that was built in 1984. LNR indicated that the loan has been
assumed and will be returned to the master servicer.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans have individual
balances that represent less than 1.5% of the total pool balance.
ARAs totaling $8.1 million were in effect against four of the
remaining eight specially serviced loans. Standard & Poor's
estimated losses for seven of the remaining eight specially
serviced loans, representing a weighted-average loss severity of
44.0%. The remaining loan was recently transferred to LNR due to a
maturity default.

"In addition to the specially serviced loans, we determined four
other loans in the pool to be credit-impaired ($8.4 million,
1.0%). The largest of these is the Tuscan Bend Apartments loan.
The loan is secured by a 94-unit multifamily rental complex in
Gainesville, Fla. The loan has a $3.2 million balance that
represents 0.4% of the total pool balance. The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a decline in DSC. As of
December 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.44x and
76.6%, respectively. Given the reported poor performance, we
consider this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss," S&P said.

"The second-largest loan we determined to be credit-impaired is
the Fort Knox Self Storage loan ($2.7 million, 0.3%), which is
secured by a 102,655-sq.-ft. self-storage facility in Baltimore,
Md. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist for low
reported DSC. As of year-end 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy
were 0.48x and 31.0%, respectively. As a result of this reported
poor performance, we consider this loan to be at an increased risk
of default and loss," S&P related.

"The remaining two loans we deemed to be credit-impaired have
individual balances that represent less than 0.2% of the pool
balance. While both loans were reported as being current in their
payments, reported DSC for both loans exhibited steep declines
since issuance," S&P said.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $807.0 million, which is 59.9% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 77 loans, down from 94 loans at
issuance. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), provided financial information for 92.9% of the loan
balance, 81.9% of which was interim- or full-year 2010 data, and
the remainder reflected interim- or full-year 2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.64x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio were 1.67x and 74.2%. Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude nine of the transaction's 11 specially serviced
loans and four loans that we determined to be credit-impaired.
Recent financial reporting information was available for six of
the excluded loans, which reflected a weighted average DSC of
0.95x. The transaction has experienced $5.9 million in principal
losses to date. Thirteen loans ($66.3 million, 8.2%) in the pool
are on the master servicer's watchlist, including the fourth-
largest loan in the pool ($28.1 million, 3.5%), which is discussed
below. Fourteen loans ($115.6 million, 14.3%) have reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, eight of which ($42.0 million, 5.2%) have
reported DSC below 1.00x," S&P related.

        Summary of The Top 10 Loans Secured By Real Estate

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $432.6 million (53.6%). "Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.70x
for the top 10 loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top
10 loans were 1.74x and 68.4%. Our adjusted figures exclude two
of the three top 10 loans with the special servicer. Recent
financial reporting information was available for one of the two
excluded loans, which reflected a September 2009 DSC of 1.04x.
One ($28.1 million, 3.5%) of the top 10 loans is on the master
servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

The Northshore Mall loan ($196.5 million, 24.4%) is the largest
loan in the pool. The loan is secured by 808,380 sq. ft. of a
1,692,223-sq.-ft. super regional retail mall in Peabody, Ma.,
approximately 15 miles north of Boston. Wells Fargo reported a DSC
of 2.20x and occupancy of 90.5% as of December 2010 and September
2010.

The University Park Tech III/IV and Westchase Commons loan
($28.1 million, 3.5%), the fourth-largest real estate loan in the
pool, is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a drop in
occupancy at the Westchase Commons location. The loan is secured
by two flex space type properties: the University Park Tech III/IV
property was built in 2001 and consists of two buildings in San
Antonio, Texas; and the Westchase Commons property was built in
2000 and is located in Houston, Texas. As of December 2010, the
reported consolidated DSC and occupancy rate were 1.36x and 80.2%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with its rating actions.

Ratings Lowered

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C6

               Rating
Class      To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
D          A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)                     13.24
E          A (sf)      A+ (sf)                      11.57
F          BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)                        9.69
G          BBB- (sf)   A- (sf)                       8.23
H          BB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                     6.77
J          B- (sf)     BBB (sf)                      5.73
K          CCC (sf)    BBB- (sf)                     3.64
L          CCC (sf)    BB+ (sf)                      3.44
M          CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)                       2.60
N          D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)                     1.98
P          D (sf)      CCC- (sf)                     1.56

Ratings Affirmed

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C6

Class       Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-4         AAA (sf)                             19.70
A-5         AAA (sf)                             19.70
A-6         AAA (sf)                             19.70
A-1A        AAA (sf)                             19.70
B           AA+ (sf)                             18.04
C           AA  (sf)                             15.12
X-CL        AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-CP        AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C1. "In addition, we
affirmed our ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades also reflect
credit support erosion that we anticipate will occur upon the
eventual resolution of the six specially serviced assets
($80.8 million, 6.9%). In addition, we lowered our ratings on
classes J, K, and L to 'D (sf)' because we expect interest
shortfalls to continue, and we believe the accumulated interest
shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future,"
S&P stated.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.72x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 82.3% for the loans in the pool. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.18x and an LTV ratio of 102.2%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
53.3% and 28.4%, respectively. We separately estimated losses for
the six specially serviced assets, which we included in our 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P said.

"As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $223,812
primarily related to: appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) amounts totaling $203,948; $17,751 in special servicing and
workout fees; and $2,112 in interest paid to the servicer on
outstanding advances. The interest shortfalls
have affected all classes subordinate to and including class J.
Classes J, K, and L experienced cumulative interest shortfalls for
two months, and we expect these classes to experience recurring
interest shortfalls in the near term. Consequently, we downgraded
these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P stated.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is consistent with
the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the
XCL and XCP interest-only (IO) certificates based on our current
criteria," S&P related.

                   Credit Considerations

As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, six assets
($80.8 million; 6.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). The reported payment
status of these assets is: two are real estate owned (REO)
($19.1 million; 1.6%); three are in foreclosure ($55.7 million;
4.8%); and one is 90-plus-days delinquent ($5.9 million; 0.5%).
Four assets ($72.8 million, 6.2%) have appraisal reduction amounts
(ARAs) in effect totaling $43.5 million. One of the top 10 loans
is with the special servicer.

The Atlantic Building is the 10th-largest asset in the pool and
the largest asset with the special servicer ($27.8 million, 2.4%).
The property is a 315,993-sq.-ft. office building in Philadelphia,
Pa. The loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 22,
2010, due to imminent monetary default and is currently in
foreclosure. A $17.9 million ARA is in effect for this asset. The
reported DSC as of Sept. 30, 2009, was 1.24x and the reported
occupancy was 56.5% as of Jan. 31, 2011. Standard & Poor's expects
a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Great Neck Roslyn Portfolio is the second-largest asset with
the special servicer ($25.7 million, 2.2%). The property consists
of two office buildings: one building is 152,577 sq. ft. in Roslyn
Heights, N.Y., and the other is 91,405 sq. ft. in Great Neck, N.Y.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 21, 2010,
due to imminent monetary default. The loan matured on Feb. 11,
2010, and CWCapital indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure. A
$13.7 million ARA is in effect for this asset. According to
CWCapital, no current financial information is available for this
asset. Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Livonia Industrial Properties is the third-largest asset with
the special servicer ($14.7 million, 1.3%). The property consists
of four industrial buildings totaling 389,170 sq. ft. in Livonia,
Mich. The asset was transferred to the special servicer on Dec.
15, 2009, for monetary default and became REO on June 16, 2010. An
$11.9 million ARA is in effect for this asset. According to
CWCapital, no current financial information is available for this
asset. Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The remaining three assets with the special servicer
($12.4 million, 1.1%) have individual balances of less than
$15.0 million and individually represent less than 1.06% of the
total pool balance. A $78,928 ARA is in effect for one of the
three remaining assets. "We estimated losses for these three
assets ($12.4 million, 1.1%) at a weighted-average loss severity
of 28.9%," S&P stated.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the transaction
had an aggregate trust balance of $1.17 billion (70 loans and two
REO assets), compared with $1.52 billion (89 loans) at issuance.
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the master servicer, provided financial
information for 94.2% of the pool (by balance), which was
primarily full-year 2010 information. "We calculated a weighted-
average DSC of 1.79x for the loans in the pool based on the
reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.72x and 82.3%,
which exclude all six ($80.8 million; 6.9%) of the transaction's
specially serviced assets. The trust has experienced five
principal losses to date totaling $6.9 million. Nineteen loans
($177.2 million, 15.2%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including one of the top 10 loans. Nine loans ($81.9 million,
7.0%) have reported DSCs between 1.00x and 1.10x, and
six loans ($27.5 million, 2.4%) have reported DSCs of less than
1.00x," S&P related.

                    Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$768.6 million (65.8%). "Using servicer-reported information, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.97x. "Our adjusted DSC and
LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.89x and 76.4%. The
adjusted figures exclude the Atlantic Building asset, which is
with the special servicer," S&P said. One of the top 10 loans is
on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Crown Center loan ($30.9 million; 2.6%), the largest loan on
Wells Fargo's watchlist and the ninth-largest loan in the pool, is
secured by a 353,214-sq.-ft. office property in Fort Lauderdale,
Fla. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because Bank
of America's lease expires on March 31, 2012. Bank of America is
the largest tenant (106,218 sq. ft., 30% of gross leasable area)
at the property. Wells Fargo stated that Bank of America has
not given any indication as to whether or not it intends to renew
its lease. As of Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.70x and 84.8%. Based on current financial data, if Bank of
America vacates the space, occupancy would decrease to
approximately 54.7% and the DSC would fall to approximately 1.05x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria and the resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class     To        From          Credit enhancement (%)
C         A (sf)    A+ (sf)                        13.28
D         A- (sf)   A (sf)                         11.65
E         BBB+ (sf) A- (sf)                         9.53
F         BBB- (sf) BBB+ (sf)                       8.22
G         B+ (sf)   BB- (sf)                        6.75
H         CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)                       5.28
J         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                       3.33
K         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                       2.84
L         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                       2.18

Ratings Affirmed

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-2       AAA (sf)                  25.50
A-3       AAA (sf)                  25.50
A-AB      AAA (sf)                  25.50
A-4       AAA (sf)                  25.50
A-1A      AAA (sf)                  25.50
A-J       AAA (sf)                  16.71
B         AA- (sf)                  15.57
XCL       AAA (sf)                    N/A
XCP       AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


LBUBS 2001-C2: Fitch Downgrades Class J to 'Csf/RR3'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and revises the recovery rating of one
class of LBUBS 2001-C2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2001-C2:

   -- $14.8 million class J to 'Csf/RR3' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks:

   -- $14.2 million class C at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $16.5 million class D at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13.2 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19.8 million class F at 'AA-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $16.5 million class G at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $23.1 million class H at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms this class and revises the Recovery Rating:

   -- $4.9 million class K from 'Dsf/RR3' to 'Dsf/RR6'.

Classes L, M, N and P remain at 'Dsf/RR6' and have been fully
depleted due to losses. Fitch does not rate classes X and Q, and
classes A-1, A-2, and B have all paid in full.

The downgrade is the result of Fitch expected losses from
specially serviced assets. Fitch modeled losses of 8.9% of the
remaining pool.

As of the June 2011 remittance report, the transaction has paid
down 90.7% to $122.9 million from $1.3 billion at issuance.
Fourteen loans remain in the transaction, of which 12 (40.6%) are
in special servicing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to the most recent fiscal year-end net operating
income, and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and
9.5% to determine value. All the loans also underwent a refinance
test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization
schedule based on the stressed cash flow. All of the loans are
modeled to pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a debt-
service coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is secured by
three office buildings that total 197,000 square feet (sf) located
15 miles north of Atlanta, GA. The loan transferred to special
servicing on Feb. 2, 2010 for imminent default, and was foreclosed
on Sept. 7, 2010. The special servicer is marketing the property
for sale and working to maintain occupancy.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
106,000 sf office property in Carrolton, TX. A receiver has been
appointed following the disappearance of the loan sponsor. The
special servicer foreclosed on the property in June 2011 and is
working to stabilize the asset.


LCM I LIMITED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings Three CLO Notes Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by LCM I Limited Partnership:

US$11,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due June 15,
2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf), previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf),
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
June 15, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf), previously on June 22, 2011
B1 (sf), Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due June 15,
2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf), previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf),
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 34% or $32.8 million since the rating action in May
2011. After applying the payment of principal on the June 15, 2011
payment date, the proforma Class A/B, C, and D
overcollateralization ratios are 165.2%, 144.8%, and 109.5%,
respectively, versus April 2011 reported levels of 146.5%, 133.1%,
and 107.5%, respectively.

While the transaction continues to benefit from delevering,
Moody's notes that the number of investments in securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes has grown as a result
of the deal's decision to participate in amend to extend
activities. As of the June 2011 trustee report, reference
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 18.1% of the underlying reference
portfolio. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $134.7 million
following the June 15, 2011 payment date, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 9.63% (implying a WARF of
2120), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.67%,
and a diversity score of 34. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

LCM I Limited Partnership, issued on June 5, 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in "Using the
Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in
February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


LCM IV LTD: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by LCM IV Ltd.:

US$9,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,700,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due
2017, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$18,400,000 Class D Floating Rate deferrable Interest Notes Due
2017, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, reference
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 10.22% of the underlying reference
portfolio. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $301 million, a
weighted average default probability of 16.76% (implying a WARF of
2538), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.68%,
and a diversity score of 58. Moody's generally analyzes deals in
their reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements, as seen in the actual
collateral quality measurements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

LCM IV Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Lightpoint CLO III, Ltd.:

US$411,700,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
Placed on Review For Possible Upgrade;

US$16,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2017, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa2 (sf) Placed on Review For Possible Upgrade;

US$35,750,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed
on Review For Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in August 2009.
Based on the May 2011 trustee report, the weighted average rating
factor is 2496 compared to 2764 in June 2009, and securities rated
Caa1 and below make up approximately 4.2% of the underlying
portfolio versus 13.6% in June 2009. The deal also experienced a
decrease in defaults. In particular, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to about $5.0 million from
approximately $27.3 million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $446 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.6% (implying a WARF of 2664), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.6%, and a diversity score of 61.
Moody's generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for all
collateral quality tests. However, in this case given the limited
time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements, as seen
in the actual collateral quality measurements. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Lightpoint CLO III, Ltd., issued in July 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace after the deal enters the
   amortization phase. Delevering may accelerate due to high
   prepayment levels in the market and/or collateral sales by the
   manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


MAC CAPITAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes at 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the 10
classes of notes issued by MAC Capital Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Crescent Capital
Group L.P. "At the same time, we removed our ratings on the class
X, A-1L, and A-1LV notes from CreditWatch negative," S&P stated.

"We placed our ratings on the class X, A-1L, and A-1LV notes on
CreditWatch negative on Jan. 18, 2011, in connection with the
implementation of our revised counterparty criteria (see 'Ratings
On 950 North America Structured Finance Tranches On Watch Neg
After Counterparty Criteria Update,' published Jan. 18, 2011). The
affirmations and CreditWatch removals take into account both the
updated counterparty criteria and our criteria for rating
corporate CDO transactions (see 'Update To Global Methodologies
And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs,'
published Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P related.

"In our review, we generated cash flow analysis to assess the
credit support available to the class X, A-1L, and A-1LV notes
without giving benefit to the interest rate hedge and cap
agreement that the transaction has entered into with a
counterparty, stressing the CLO under various interest rate
scenarios in the absence of an interest rate hedge and cap. In our
view, the cash flow analysis of the transaction showed that there
was no impact to the ratings assigned to these notes under these
stresses, which led to our affirmation of the ratings and the
removal of the ratings from CreditWatch negative," S&P stated.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class P-1, A-2L, A-3L, B-
1F, B-1L, B-2F, and B-2L classes reflect the availability of
credit support at the current rating levels.

"We will perform similar analyses for other CDO transactions with
ratings placed on CreditWatch negative in connection with the
implementation of our updated counterparty criteria. Generally, if
we find in our analysis that the assumed absence of the hedge
agreement would not affect the current ratings assigned to the
notes, we will affirm them and remove them from CreditWatch
negative. However, if there is an impact, we will review the
counterparty-related documents in the transaction for compliance
with our updated counterparty criteria and take actions on the
ratings as we deem appropriate," S&P added.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

MAC Capital Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To           From
X                AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1L             AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LV            AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

MAC Capital Ltd.
Class                    Rating
P-1                      AAA (sf)
A-2L                     A+ (sf)
A-3L                     A- (sf)
B-1F                     BBB- (sf)
B-1L                     BBB- (sf)
B-2F                     B+ (sf)
B-2L                     B+ (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Downgrades Class P Rating to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded this class of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
2005-CIP1:

  -- Class P to D (sf) from C (sf)

The downgrade follows realized losses incurred on the trust which
resulted from one loan being liquidated out of the trust and one loan
being modified in June 2011.

University Village (Prospectus ID#12, 1.75% of the current pool
balance) was transferred to the special servicer after the borrower
requested a return to interest-only (IO) debt-service payments because
of cash flow difficulties at the property. The lender and borrower have
reportedly finalized a modification of the loan terms, which includes
an A/B note split of the original loan and an extension of the IO
period.  A realized loss of $634,441 was applied to the trust as part
of the June 13, 2011 remittance report.  The loan is still delinquent
and remains in special servicing.  Collateral for the loan is an
anchored retail property built in 1997 in Riverside, California.  Total
advances outstanding on this loan exceed $3 million, which is greater
than one year's debt service.  DBRS anticipates additional losses as
the special servicer fees and recoveries are collected in the coming
months.

Alano Plaza (Prospectus ID#97) was transferred to the special servicer
in February 2011 due to imminent default.  The loan was secured by a
small, unanchored retail property in Las Vegas.  At YE2009, the
property was 85% occupied and operating at a 0.92x DSCR, compared with
92% occupancy and a DSCR of 1.38x at issuance.  Cash flow fell into
further decline throughout 2010 as a result of decreasing rents,
increased vacancy, and deterioration of the Las Vegas retail market.
The DSCR at YE2010 was reported to be 0.66x. According to the special
servicer, a note sale was pursued over foreclosure in order to maximize
recovery to the trust.  The June 2011 liquidation of this loan incurred
a realized loss of $2.5 million to the trust.

Additional expenses associated with one previously liquidated loan,
Kintetsu World Express (Prospectus ID#66), have also contributed to the
realized loss included in the June 2011 remittance report.

The largest loss to the trust to date is attributable to Holiday Inn
Mission Bay Sea World (Prospectus ID#13) which was resolved in a real
estate-owned (REO) sale and caused a realized loss to the trust of
$19.6 million at the time of the September 2010 remittance report.  The
disposition of this loan resulted in a 76% reduction to the principal
balance of the unrated Class Q certificate.  The loans discussed above
have contributed to the elimination of the remainder of Class Q as well
as the $1.2 million loss experienced by Class P.

Since the time of the last review of this transaction in January 2011,
six loans have transferred to special servicing: Coco Centre
(Prospectus ID#65), Park Forest (Prospectus ID#113), Sunrise Plaza
(Prospectus ID#89), Hampton Inn Newton (Prospectus ID#35), Hampton Inn
Great Valley (Prospectus ID#58), and Kirkwood Bend Office (Prospectus
ID#30).  These loans cumulatively comprise 3.09% of the pool balance,
as of the June 13, 2011 remittance report.  As part of the continued
surveillance on this transaction, these loans and the other loans
currently in special servicing will be monitored for further
developments.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: DBRS Confirms Class D Rating at 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed all classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Series 2006-1:

Classes A-1A, A2, A3, A-3B, A-3FL, A-4, A-SB, AM and X, at AAA (sf)
Classes AN-FL and AJ at A (high) (sf)
Class B at BBB (sf)
Class C at BBB (low) (sf)
Class D at BB (sf)
Class E at B (sf)
Classes F and G at CCC (sf)
Classes H, J, K, L, M, N, and P at C (sf)

In addition, DBRS recognizes that Classes G through P having Interest
in Arrears. All trends are Stable.  DBRS also confirmed the shadow-
rating for Southern California Ground Lease Portfolio (Prospectus
ID#42, 0.66% of the current pool balance) at 'A'.

Three specially serviced loans continue to remain points of concern
regarding projected loss to the trust.

Inglewood Park (Prospectus ID#11, 1.75% of the pool) is the
third largest loan in special servicing.  Collateral for this loan
consists of six office/flex buildings located in Largo, Maryland,
approximately ten miles east of Washington, D.C.  The property's
performance has been weak since issuance and an April 2011 rent roll
indicated the property to be 50% occupied.  The loan was structured
with a $5.2 million holdback that was to be released upon achievement
of certain performance hurdles.  These hurdles were never met, and the
loan balance was paid down by the amount of the hold back in early
2010.  In addition, the lender approved the December 2010 sale of one
of the original seven buildings securing the loan at issuance.  The
$5.3 million in proceeds resulting from this sale went to pay down the
loan's outstanding balance.  A receiver is in place at the property to
handle management, leasing, property improvement, and possibly position
the asset for sale.  DBRS anticipates significant losses associated
with this loan, especially given the fact that total advances
outstanding exceed $7.9 million.

Colonial Mall Glynn Place (Prospectus ID#18, 1.17% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a regional mall located in coastal Georgia in
the city of Brunswick.  The property featured a Steve & Barry's store
at issuance that served as collateral for the loan and contributed more
than 10% of the total property income.  Steve & Barry's closed the
store at the subject property when the company liquidated, and the
space remains vacant.  As of June 2010, the asset was 51% occupied.
The loan was scheduled to mature in November 2010, and is now
considered non-performing matured balloon.  A receiver was appointed
in October 2010 with the intent to sell the property.  DBRS will
continue to monitor this loan.

U Stor It Self Storage Portfolio (Prospectus ID#20, 1.16% of the
current pool balance) is collateralized by four self-storage properties
located in the Chicago area.  This loan was transferred to the special
servicer after the borrower indicated that the properties were
operating on negative cash flow.  At issuance, an up-front reserve was
held because of the low occupancy of two of the properties.  It appears
that $1.6 million of this reserve is still held by the lender and could
ultimately be used to pay down the balance of the loan; however, the
total outstanding advances to the loan exceed $3 million, which is more
than one year's debt service.  The special servicer is reportedly
pursuing a note sale.  DBRS will continue to follow the resolution of
this loan.

Since the last review in June 2010, two of the top ten loans, based on
current balance, Prince Georges Center II (Prospectus ID#10, 2.31% of
the current pool balance) and East Thunderbird Square (Prospectus
ID#12, 1.91% of the current pool balance), have transferred to the
special servicer.

Prince Georges Center is secured by an office property in Hyattsville,
Maryland.  The building is 100% occupied by a government tenant.
Payment to reserve funds was due to increase when the borrower failed
to secure the tenant's renewal by December 2010, and the loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2011 when the reserve was not
adequately funded by the borrower.  The borrower continues to pay
monthly debt service; however, the cash is being held while the
borrower negotiates a lease renewal with the existing tenant, whose
lease is scheduled to expire in September 2012.

East Thunderbird Square is secured by an unanchored retail property in
Scottsdale, Arizona.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
in April 2011 for payment default.  The borrower has been able to
increase occupancy at the property from 47% at YE2010 to 64% as of May
2011.  A $5.6 million letter of credit has been cashed and is being
held by the Master Servicer.  Leverage at the property, on a per square
foot basis, is considered reasonable at $205.

The remaining top-ten loans are performing well with a weighted-average
DSCR of 1.62x. Some of these loans have experienced significant
improvement to cash flow since issuance.  Two crossed-collateralized
loans secured by hotels, Ashford Hotel Portfolio 2 (Prospectus ID#4,
6.55% of the current pool balance) and Ashford Hotel Portfolio 3
(Prospectus ID#5, 5.43% of the current pool balance), are exhibiting
stable performance.  These two top-ten loans are performing with a
weighted-average YE2010 DSCR of 1.50x, up from 1.40x at YE2009, which
is considered very strong given the recent economic instability of the
hospitality industry in the current market.  The transaction's
remaining shadow-rated loan, Southern California Ground Lease Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#42, 0.66% of the current pool balance) has experienced a
40% increase to cash flow since issuance.

As a part of its review, DBRS analyzed the servicer's watchlist, the
specially serviced loans, the top fifteen loans and one shadow rated
loan.  Combined, these loans represent approximately 67% of the pool
balance.


MONTANA RE: AM Best Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'b' From 'bb'
------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the debt ratings to "b" from "bb-"
on $100 million series 2009-1 Class A and to "ccc" from "b" on
$75 million series 2009-1 Class B principal-at-risk variable rate
notes (collectively, the notes) both due December 7, 2012, issued
by Montana Re Ltd. (Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands).  Both ratings
have been removed from under review with negative implications and
assigned a stable outlook.

The rating actions are in response to A.M. Best's receipt of new
attachment probabilities using the RiskLink Version 11 U.S.
Hurricane Model (RiskLink Version 11) from Risk Management
Solutions Inc. (RMS), the calculation agent and modeling firm
involved in the transaction.  The updated attachment probabilities
using the RiskLink Version 11 showed a significant increase when
compared to the attachment probabilities previously calculated
with the archived model, which was used in the initial modeling of
the transaction.

The notes provide Flagstone Reassurance Suisse S.A. with the
following protection: Class A notes -- $100 million protection
against U.S. hurricanes and Class B notes -- $75 million
protection against U.S. hurricanes and earthquakes.  The
protections are based on a modified property claim services
index trigger on a per occurrence basis covering a three-year
period (November 30, 2009 to November 30, 2012).


MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Downgrades Class E Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded 14 classes of the Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust,
Series 2005-HQ6 transaction:

Class AJ from AA (low) to A (low)
Class B from A (high) to BBB (high)
Class C from A to BBB
Class D from A (low) to BBB (low)
Class E from BBB to BB (high)
Class F from BBB to BB (low)
Class G from BBB (low) to B

The trends for the above classes are Stable.

Class H from BB (high) to CCC
Class J from BB (low) to CCC
Class K from B (low) to C
Class L from CCC to C
Class N from CCC to C
Class M from CCC to C
Class O from CCC to C

DBRS has also confirmed 11 other classes in the transaction with Stable
trends:

Class A-1A at AAA
Class A-2A at AAA
Class A-2B at AAA
Class A-3 at AAA
Class A-4A at AAA
Class A-4B at AAA
Class A-AB at AAA
Class P at C
Class Q at C
Class X-1 at AAA
Class X-1 at AAA

DBRS also notes that these classes have interest in arrears as of the
June 2011 remittance report:

Class K
Class L
Class M
Class N
Class O
Class P
Class Q

The unrated Class S also has interest in arrears as of the June 2011
remittance report.

This rating action is primarily due to the outlook for the largest
loans currently in special servicing in the pool, with particular
concern for Prospectus ID#13, Oviedo Marketplace.  This loan currently
represents 2.13% of the outstanding pool balance, as of the June 2011
remittance report.  The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2009, because of the bankruptcy of the parent company of the borrower,
General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP).  Since the loan's transfer, GGP
has signed a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, with the servicer taking
title in November 2010.

The collateral for this loan consists of 557,000 sf of in-line and
cinema space in a regional mall located 13 miles northeast of Orlando.
The cinema space is occupied by Regal Cinemas, on a lease that expires
in 2018; the other three anchors are Macy's, Dillard's, and Sears.
Those three tenants own their own parcels and operate on Reciprocal
Easement Agreements (REAs), which expire in 2019.  The Q3 2009 DSCR of
0.93x reflected a 15% drop from the 2008 levels for the in-line
occupancy to 70% for that period.  In addition to lower occupancy,
there was substantial rollover in 2008, with leases representing 44% of
issuance EGI expiring.  This was the result of the property having been
completed in 1998 and the predominance of ten-year leases.  While many
of these expiring leases were renewed, the renewal rental rates were
often at least 25% lower than the previous rate.  Also, there are many
tenants that now pay percentage rent in lieu of base rent, which is
often an indication of poor sales levels.  The most recent in-line
occupancy reported by the servicer in May 2011 was 40.15%, excluding
temporary tenants; for the same period, the overall mall occupancy was
63.66%, also excluding temporary tenants.  The mall faces competition
from another regional mall located 15 miles to the west, Alamonte Mall,
which has the same three anchors plus a JC Penney and a movie theater
operated by AMC.

The special servicer reported plans for upgrades to the exterior
lighting and signage in the near term; the mall is also being renamed
"Oviedo Mall".  Although the current vacancy at the property is being
heavily marketed, there have been no permanent leases signed outside
of the renewals in recent months.  The special servicer also reports
the property is in the process of being prepared to be marketed for
sale.  DBRS anticipates interest in the mall will be minimal due to
the mall's poor sales performance in the past two years.  Furthermore,
the most recent appraisal, from August 2010, valued the property at
$16.1 million, indicating a significant decline from issuance, when the
property was valued at $92.1 million.  That value is supported by the
May 2011 NOI figure for the property, as provided by the special
servicer.  As such, DBRS foresees a significant loss will be taken on
this loan, which currently has a balance of $49.8 million, all of which
is held by the trust.

The second largest loan in special servicing is Prospectus ID#23,
County Line Commerce Center, which represented 1.03% of the outstanding
pool balance, as of the June 2011 remittance report.  This loan was
transferred to the special servicer in March 2009, because of imminent
default, and the property became REO in September 2010.  The collateral
consists of five industrial and office buildings, with a total of
400,000 sf located north of Philadelphia.  As of the June 2011
remittance report, the property was 73% occupied.  Although the most
recent occupancy is a decline from 81% at Q3 2009, the most recent NOI
figure projected by the servicer, as of June 2011, is indicative of a
35% decline from the underwritten figure, with the property 74%
occupied at issuance.  The subject is located in the Bucks County
submarket, which had a Q1 2011 availability rate for office of 19.8%,
according to Reis.

An appraisal from June 2010 valued the property at $20.5 million,
suggesting a loss to the trust would be significant given the loan's
current balance of $24.1 million and outstanding advances in excess
of $1 million as of the June 2011 remittance report.  Furthermore,
based on the most recent projected annual NOI figures provided by the
special servicer, DBRS determined an approximate value of $22.8
million, indicating that an updated appraisal could find the property
value has declined even further from issuance when it was valued at
$37.5 million.  The special servicer reports that the property is not
currently being marketed for sale; DBRS will continue to monitor this
loan closely for developments in the disposal strategy for this loan.

There are five loans in the top fifteen loans on the servicer's
watchlist.  Combined, those loans represent 34.88% of the pool balance,
as of the June 2011 remittance report.  The three largest of those
loans are detailed below.

Prospectus ID#1, Lincoln Square Retail, is collateralized by a 503,178
square foot retail center comprised of four separate buildings in
Manhattan's Upper West Side on Broadway between 66th Street and 68th
Street.  The loan represents 14.26% of the pool balance, as of the
June 2011 remittance report, and is on the servicer's watchlist because
of a low DSCR.  At YE2010, the DSCR had fallen to 1.07x from 1.36x at
issuance.  Although some of the decline can be attributed to a drop in
occupancy from 98% in 2008 and 2009 to 87 % at YE2010, after the loss
of Barnes & Noble, it also appears that revenue from one tenant is
significantly understated because of a form of percentage rent not
being reported.  The subject is well-located in a highly desirable
shopping district and benefits from an experienced sponsor with
significant exposure and experience with large-market retail.  DBRS
will continue to monitor this loan closely.

Prospectus ID#2, 1500 Broadway, is on the servicer's watchlist because
the largest tenant, with 19% of the NRA, vacated at the end of its
lease term in September 2009.  The subject property is a 513,563 sf 33-
story Class A office building located on Broadway between 43rd Street
and 44th Street in New York City.  In addition to office space, the NRA
includes a five-story vertical space that the borrower developed and
leased to a subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company.  This, in part,
serves as the studio for ABC's Good Morning America.  Occupancy fell to
72% as of Q3 2010 when the tenant Daniel J. Edelman (19% of the NRA)
vacated its space upon lease expiry in September 2009.  The DSCR at Q2
2010 was still relatively healthy at 1.07x.  There is a leasing reserve
with a current balance of $5.6 million.  This reserve amounts to $57
psf on the vacated block of space, which would help cover a significant
portion of the total leasing costs associated with that space.  In
addition, even though CoStar's Class A Times Square submarket rental
rate has decreased more than $20 psf from its peak to $68 psf, it is
still significantly higher than Daniel J. Edelman's total rent
(including expense recoveries) of $51 psf.  DBRS does not anticipate
the borrower having trouble making debt service payments in the near
future.

Prospectus ID#10, Coronado Centre, comprises 5.03% of the outstanding
pool balance as of the June 2011 remittance report and is on the
servicer's watchlist for monitoring after a return from the special
servicer in March 2010.  This loan was transferred to the special
servicer when the borrower filed for bankruptcy protection in
conjunction with the bankruptcy filing of its parent company, General
Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP).  The collateral for the loan is
approximately 527,000 square feet of a 1.1 million square foot regional
mall in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  The loan was extended past its
original maturity date of June 2010 to December 6, 2016.  The property
was previously on the watchlist because of the bankruptcy of Mervyn's
(21% of the NRA).  Mervyn's contributed only 6.6% of the annual base
rent and it was known at issuance that it would be vacating the
property.  Other anchor tenants at the property include JC Penney,
Macy's, Foley's and Sears.  In Q1 2010, a 15-screen movie theater took
the former Mervyn's space with occupancy reported at 85.5%, as of
YE2010. The whole-loan DSCR at YE2010 was 1.14x, according to the
servicer.  There is approximately $35 million of subordinate debt
outside the trust, bringing the whole loan per square foot to $308.
DBRS will monitor this loan closely as the property continues to
stabilize.

As of the June 2011 remittance report, the trust has experienced
realized losses in excess of $34 million due to the liquidation of 14
loans between April 2009 and June 2011.  The weighted-average loss
severity is in excess of 50% for those loans, which is in-line with the
DBRS anticipated losses on the remaining 20 loans that remain with the
special servicer as of the June 2011 remittance report.

As part of the review, DBRS analyzed the servicer's watchlist, the
delinquent loans, the specially serviced loans, and the top fifteen
loans in the pool.  Combined, these loans represent 80.54% of the
outstanding pool balance as of the June 2011 remittance report.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 1999-CAM1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on eight classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1999-CAM1. The Rating Outlook remains Stable.

The affirmations reflect stable portfolio performance and
significant portfolio amortization. As of the June 2011
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has been reduced
by 92.77% (to $58.3 million from $806.5 million), of which 91.62%
were due to paydowns and 1.15% were due to realized losses.
Interest shortfalls are affecting classes M through O. There are
currently no delinquent, specially serviced, or defeased loans
remaining in the transaction.

The largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 74,186 square foot
(sf) retail center located in Westlake Village, CA and has a final
maturity date of February 2014. As of December 2010, the servicer-
reported occupancy was 98% and the year end 2010 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 2.04 times (x).

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by a 191,159 square
foot (sf) retail center located in St. Louis, MO and has a final
maturity date of September 2013. As of December 2010, the
servicer-reported occupancy was 90%.

Fitch affirms and revises Loss Severity (LS) ratings and Recovery
Ratings (RRs) for these classes:

   -- $3.1 million class F affirmed at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.1 million class G affirmed at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.1 million class H affirmed at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6 million class J affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.1 million class K affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6 million class L affirmed at 'BB-sf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6 million class M affirmed at 'CCsf'; RR to 'RR2' from
      'RR1';

   -- $0.8 million class N at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class O. Classes A-1 through A-4 and B through
E have paid in full.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 2003-HQ2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Inc., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2003-HQ2 (MSDW 2003-HQ2).

The affirmations reflect stable pool performance. Fitch
modeled losses of 2% of the remaining pool; modeled losses of
the original pool are at 2.9%, including losses already incurred
to date. As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has been reduced by 17.7% (to $767.04 million
from $931.56 million), of which 17% were due to paydowns and 0.7%
were due to realized losses. Fifteen loans, representing 22.8% of
the pool, have been defeased.

Fitch has designated 12 loans (13.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.
There are currently no specially serviced loans.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a loan (1.1%)
secured by a 57,600 square foot (sf) retail property located in
Miami, FL. The property was 79% occupied by five tenants as of the
March 2011 rent roll. The year-end debt service coverage ratio was
0.59 times (x), on a net-operating income (NOI) basis.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a loan
(0.4%) secured by a 40,248 sf retail property located in Lake
Worth, TX. The loan was rehabilitated at the end of 2010 through
an assumption and modification which included principal
curtailment and a maturity date extension.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Loss Severity (LS) rating:

   -- $90.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $522.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $39.6 million class B at 'AAA'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $41.9 million class C at 'AA-'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.3 million class D at 'A'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS2'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9.3 million class E at 'A-'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS2';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.5 million class F at 'BBB'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS2';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.2 million class G at 'BBB-'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $14 million class H at 'BB+'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS2';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.
(For additional information on the withdrawal of the rating on the
interest-only class, see 'Fitch Revises Practice for Rating IO &
Pre-Payment Related Structured Finance Securities', dated June 23,
2010.)

Class X-2 has been paid in full. Fitch does not rate classes J
through O.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 and affirmed six classes issued by
Morgan Stanley Capital I 2005-RR6 (MSCI 2005-RR6) as a result of
significant negative credit migration and increased principal
losses on the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2010, 21.2% of the
portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, 38.5% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 23% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 28.4%
and 6.7%, respectively, at last review. As of the June 24, 2011
trustee report, the underlying collateral has experienced $8.8
million in losses since issuance. In addition, the class A-2 notes
have received $81.2 million in paydowns since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The Rating Loss Rates (RLR)
were then compared to the credit enhancement of the classes. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis
to conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

For the classes A-2, A-3, and A-J notes, the rating loss rates in
the PCM model are generally consistent with the rating assigned
below. The Negative Outlook on the class A-2 and A-3 notes
reflects the possibility of further negative credit migration on
the underlying collateral.

Classes B through N do not pass the 'CCC' hurdle under the PCM
model. As such, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the high
probability of default of the underlying assets and the expected
limited recovery prospects upon default, the class B notes have
been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating that default appears
probable. Similarly, classes C through G have been downgraded and
classes H though N affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default
appears inevitable.

The Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates a tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches. Fitch does not assign LS
ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

MSCI 2005-RR6 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
that closed on Oct. 15, 2005. The current portfolio consists of 65
bonds from 43 CMBS transactions of which 91.5% were issued in 2002
and earlier and 8.5% were issued between 2003 and 2005.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $38,168,669 class A-2FL notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS3'
      from 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $35,713,375 class A-2FX notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS3'
      from 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $60,000,000 class A-3-FL notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS3'
      from 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $110,551,000 class A-3-FX notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS3'
      from 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $50,061,000 class A-J notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
      'BBsf/LS4';

   -- $27,498,000 class B notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $14,102,000 class C notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $2,115,000 class D notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $8,461,000 class E notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $4,231,000 class F notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $6,346,000 class G notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $7,050,000 class H notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $2,821,000 class J notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $2,820,000 class K notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $1,410,000 class L notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $2,116,000 class M notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $1,410,000 class N notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-HF2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and upgraded one class of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-HF2. In addition, Fitch has revised Loss
Severity (LS) Ratings and Recovery Ratings as applicable.

The downgrade reflects Fitch expected losses across the pool.
Fitch modeled losses of 5.02% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 1.98%, reflecting
losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated two loans
(13.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which consist of the two
specially-serviced loans in the pool.

The upgrade reflects reductions to the pools principal balance
resulting in increased credit enhancement to the senior classes.
As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 92.54% (including 1.61% of
realized losses) to $78.9 million from $1 billion at issuance.
Six loans in the pool (24.24%) are currently defeased. Interest
shortfalls are affecting classes M and N.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (12.88%) is
secured by seven parcels of land with six office buildings and one
vacant lot within a corporate campus located in Glen Ellyn, IL.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
monetary default and the collateral property is scheduled for a
foreclosure sale in July 2011.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (1.06%) is
secured by two parcels of land with office buildings which are
adjacent to the property in the aforementioned paragraph. Although
the collateral for both loans is operated as one property, the
loans are not cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted. The loan
also transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
monetary default and is scheduled for a foreclosure sale in July
2011.

Fitch downgrades this class:

   -- $15.9 million class L to 'Csf/RR2' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $16.5 million class G to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAsf/LS4';
      Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Loss
Severity (LS) ratings:

   -- $10.6 million class H to 'Asf/LS3' from 'Asf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $21.2 million class J to 'BBB-sf/LS2' from 'BBB-sf/LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.6 million class K to 'BBsf/LS3' from 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $4.2 million class M at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through F have repaid in full. Class N has
been reduced to zero due to realized losses. Fitch does not rate
class N.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings of Series 1999-LIFE1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1999-LIFE1.

The upgrade reflects reductions to the pool's principal balance
resulting in increased credit enhancement to the senior classes.
As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.75% (including 2.8% of
realized losses) to $37.1 million from $594 million at issuance.
Interest shortfalls are affecting classes K through N and class P.
The pool is extremely concentrated with only six loans remaining.

The largest loan in the pool (63.98%) is secured by a 221,645
square foot (sf) office building located on Madison Avenue in
Manhattan. The property has a servicer-reported occupancy of 93%
and the 2010 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.95 times
(x). The loan matures on Sept. 1, 2013.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (12.98%) is
secured by 85,322 square foot (sf) office building located in
Appleton, WI. The loan transferred to special servicing due to
maturity default following the June 1, 2009 maturity of the loan.
The special servicer has foreclosed on the property and it is
currently being marketed for sale by Grubb & Ellis.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (4.42%) is
secured by 28,171 square foot (sf) office building located in
Indianapolis, IN. The loan transferred to special servicing due to
maturity default following the July 1, 2009 maturity of the loan.
The special servicer has foreclosed on the property and it is
currently being marketed for sale.

Fitch upgrades these classes and revises the Loss Severity (LS)
ratings:

   -- $0.3 million class E to 'AAAsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $7.4 million class F to 'AAAsf/LS3' from 'A+sf/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and Outlooks and revises
the LS ratings and Recovery Ratings (RR):

   -- $1.5 million class G at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.4 million class H at 'BBsf'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $7.4 million class J at 'CCsf/RR2';

   -- $4.5 million class K at 'Csf'; RR to 'RR2' from 'RR6'.

   -- $5.6 million class L at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class P. Classes A-1, A-2, and B through D
have paid in full.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades Five and Affirms One CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the ratings of five
classes and affirmed one class of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-IQ:

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2001 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2001
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased subordination due to loan
amortization and payoffs, overall stable pool performance and
decreased expected losses. Four loans have paid off since Moody's
last review, resulting in a 52% decline in the outstanding pool
balance. The affirmation of the interest-only class is due to its
priority in the interest waterfall.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance compared to 6.6% at last review.
Moody's stressed scenario loss is 10.8% of the current balance.
Moody's provides a current list of base and stress scenario losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The primary methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. Moody's also considered in its analysis, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions",
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of seven compared to ten at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated January 13, 2011.

Deal Performance

As of the June 20, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to
$23.8 million from $713.0 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in
size from 3% to 22% of the pool, with the top three loans
representing 52% of the pool balance.

Three loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$3.7 million loss (5% loss severity on average). No loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2009 operating
results for 72% and 80% for the pool. Excluding specially serviced
and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 52% compared
to 53% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 20% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.21X and 3.18X, respectively, compared to
2.50X and 2.62X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-TOP17. "In addition, we
affirmed our ratings on six other classes from the same
transaction," S&P stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. In addition, the downgrades
reflect credit support erosion we anticipate will occur upon the
resolution of the specially serviced loans. The largest of these
loans, the Coventry Mall loan ($71.8 million, 8.3%), was
transferred to the special servicer for imminent default.
According to the special servicer, the workout strategy for this
loan is uncertain at this time. The rating actions reflect this
uncertainty. If the loan is liquidated in the near term rather
than modified and returned to the master servicer, Standard &
Poor's would expect a significant loss upon its resolution. If
that occurs, we may take further rating actions as necessary," S&P
stated.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 2.03x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 84.3% for the loans in the pool. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted-average DSC of 1.30x and a LTV ratio of 110.9%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
55.5% and 29.4%. The DSC and LTV calculations we noted exclude the
five specially serviced loans ($116.7 million, 13.6%) and five
defeased loans ($77.4 million; 9.0%). We separately estimated
losses for the five specially serviced loans, which we included in
our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P
related.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity that is consistent with the
outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the
class X-1 and X-2 interest-only (IO) certificates based on our
current criteria," S&P said.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the June 13, 2011 remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $860.8 million (102 loans), compared
with $980.8 million (110 loans) at issuance. Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., the master servicer, provided financial information for
98.7% of the pool (by balance), of which 70.1% was partial- or
full-year 2010 information, with the remainder reflecting partial-
or full-year 2009 data. We calculated a weighted-average DSC of
2.06x for the loans in the pool based on the reported figures. Our
adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 2.03x and 84.3%. Our adjusted
figures exclude the five specially serviced loans ($116.7 million,
13.6%) and five defeased loans ($77.4 million; 9.0%). The trust
has experienced one principal loss to date totaling $777,012.
Twenty-eight loans ($162.9 million; 18.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including one of the top 10 loans. There are
no loans with a reported DSC between 1.00x and 1.10x, and 16 loans
($87.7 million, 10.2%) have reported DSCs of less than 1.00x," S&P
stated.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the June 13, 2011 remittance report, five loans
($116.7 million; 13.6%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III). Four of these
loans were reported as 90-plus-days delinquent ($45.0 million;
5.2%) and one was reported as late, but less than 30 days
delinquent ($71.8 million; 8.3%). Three loans ($11.0 million;
1.3%) have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$4.9 million.

The Coventry Mall loan ($71.8 million; 8.3%) is the third-largest
loan in the pool and the largest loan with the special servicer.
The loan is secured by a 803,898-sq.-ft. mall built in 1966 and
renovated in 1992 in Pottstown, Pa., approximately 40 miles east
of Philadelphia. The loan was transferred to special servicing on
Feb. 18, 2011, due to imminent default. The reported payment
status of the loan is late but less than 30 days delinquent. For
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.99x and 97.0%. The special servicer reports that
the workout strategy is uncertain at this time. Standard & Poor's
anticipates a significant loss upon the resolution of this loan if
it is liquidated in the near term.

The Travis Tower loan ($34.0 million; 3.9%) is the fifth-largest
loan in the pool and the second-largest loan with the special
servicer. The loan is secured by a 507,247-sq.-ft. suburban office
property in Houston, Texas, built in 1955 and renovated in 1999.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on July 22, 2010,
due to imminent default. The current payment status of the
loan is 90-plus-days delinquent. C-III reports that a receiver is
marketing the property for sale. Standard & Poor's anticipates a
minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The remaining three loans with the special servicer ($11.0
million; 1.3%) individually represent less than 0.7% of the total
pool balance. These three loans have ARAs in effect totaling $4.9
million. "We estimated losses for all three loans resulting in a
weighted-average loss severity of 47.8%," S&P related.

        Summary of Top 10 Loans Secuerd by Real Estate

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $403.7 million (46.9%). "Using
servicer-reported information, we calculated a weighted-average
DSC of 2.24x for these loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures for
these loans were 2.30x and 82.5%, respectively. The adjusted
figures exclude two of the top 10 loans that are with the special
servicer. The weighted-average reported DSC for these two loans
was 0.76x," S&P stated.

The fourth-largest loan in the pool, the Towers Crescent loan
($35.1 million, 4.1%) is on the master servicer's watchlist. The
loan is secured by two adjacent office buildings in Vienna, Va.,
containing 288,248 sq. ft. The loan was placed on the master
servicer's watchlist due to significant tenant rollover. IBM
(90,259 sq. ft.; 31.3% of net rentable area [NRA]) vacated 50%
of its space on April 30, 2011, and intends to vacate the other
50% on July 31, 2011. Genesys Conferencing Inc. (21,259 sq. ft.;
7.4% of NRA) vacated before its July 31, 2011, lease maturity. "We
estimate occupancy to be approximately 52% by July 31, 2011.
Consequently, we expect significant DSC deterioration from the
reported year-end 2010 DSC of 2.61x," S&P noted.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P lowered and affirmed
ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-TOP17
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TOP17

Class     To          From     Credit enhancement (%)
A-J       AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)                  10.59
B         A- (sf)     A+ (sf)                    8.17
C         BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)                     7.32
D         BBB- (sf)   A- (sf)                    6.03
E         BB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                  4.89
F         BB (sf)     BBB (sf)                   4.18
G         BB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)                   3.33
H         B (sf)      BB- (sf)                   2.47
J         B- (sf)     B+ (sf)                    2.19
K         CCC (sf)    B (sf)                     1.76
L         CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)                  1.33
M         CCC- (sf)   CCC (sf)                   1.19

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-TOP17
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TOP17

Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
A-4       AAA (sf)                     19.28
A-AB      AAA (sf)                     19.28
A-5       AAA (sf)                     19.28
N         CCC- (sf)                     1.05
X-1       AAA (sf)                       N/A
X-2       AAA (sf)                       N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certs. to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
"Concurrently, we lowered our ratings on two other classes and
affirmed our ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction," S&P related.

"Our rating actions reflect our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust," S&P continued.

"The upgrades on three classes primarily reflect increased
credit enhancement levels due to deleveraging of the pool,
the seasoning of the remaining assets in the pool, our low
adjusted loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 65.2%, and our adjusted
debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.56x. In addition, the upgrades
reflect our expectation that many of the loans that have near-
term maturities will pay off as scheduled. Excluding the
specially serviced assets ($10.5 million, 2.3%) and defeased
loans ($146.5 million, 32.6%), 47 loans ($270.1 million, 60.1%)
have maturities between June 2011 and November 2011," S&P stated.

According to the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
(Wells Fargo), five ($12.4 million, 2.8%) of the six loans
($27.0 million, 6.0%) scheduled to mature in June and July 2011
paid in full subsequent to the June 2011 trustee remittance
report. The maturity on the remaining loan (one of the top 10
real estate loans) was extended to August 2011.

"We lowered our ratings on two certificate classes due to credit
support erosion that we anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the four specially serviced assets. We also
considered the potential for these classes to experience interest
shortfalls in the future relating to the specially serviced
assets," S&P related.

"The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our rating on
the class X-1 interest-only certificate based on our current
criteria," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted DSC of 1.56x and a LTV ratio of 65.2%. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.31x and an LTV ratio of 86.4%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
20.9% and 26.1%. The DSC and LTV calculations noted above exclude
19 partially and fully defeased loans ($146.5 million, 32.6%),
four specially serviced assets ($10.5 million, 2.4%), and one loan
that we determined to be credit-impaired ($1.0 million, 0.2%). We
separately estimated losses for these specially serviced and
credit-impaired assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures," S&P noted.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the June 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $449.2 million, which is 43.1% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 75 loans and one real estate owned
(REO) asset, down from 143 loans at issuance. Wells Fargo provided
financial information for 99.0% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, 88.2% of which was partial or full-year 2010 data, and the
remainder was full-year 2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.58x for the loans
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our
adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.56x and 65.2%. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV figures excluded 19 partially and fully defeased
loans ($146.5 million, 32.6%), four specially serviced assets
($10.5 million, 2.3%), and one loan that we determined to be
credit-impaired ($1.0 million, 0.2%). We separately estimated
losses for the specially serviced and credit-impaired assets
and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures. The transaction has experienced $563,569 in
principal losses to date. Thirty-two loans ($145.1 million, 32.3%)
in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist, including four
of the top 10 real estate loans, which we discuss below. Fourteen
loans ($86.8 million, 19.3%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, 11
of which ($72.9 million, 16.2%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x," S&P stated.

                     Credit Considerations

"As of the June 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, four assets
($10.5 million, 2.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia). The reported payment
status of the specially serviced loans is: one is REO ($1.3
million, 0.3%), one is 90-plus days delinquent ($1.8 million,
0.4%), one is in foreclosure ($5.4 million, 1.2%), and one is
current ($2.0 million, 0.4%). Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs)
totaling $1.5 million are in effect against two assets," S&P
related.

The Village Square Shopping Center loan ($5.4 million, 1.2%), the
largest asset with Berkadia, is secured by a 38,979-sq.-ft. shadow
anchored retail center in Hoffman Estates, Ill. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 27, 2010, due to a
payment default. Berkadia indicated that it is currently pursuing
foreclosure. The reported occupancy was 75.0% as of April 2011,
and reported DSC was 0.95x as of year-end 2009. An updated
appraisal valued the property at $5.0 million as of October 2010.
"We expect a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
loan," S&P stated.

The 315-321 Castro Street loan ($2.0 million, 0.4%) is secured by
an 18,595-sq.-ft. mixed-use (retail/office) property in Mountain
View, Calif.

The loan was transferred to Berkadia on Dec. 16, 2010, due to a
nonmonetary default. Berkadia stated that it is working with the
borrower to possibly payoff the loan within the next few months.
The reported occupancy was 100% as of April 2011 and reported DSC
was 1.36x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010. "We expect a
minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan," S&P
stated.

The Ramsey Square loan ($1.8 million, 0.4%) is secured by a
42,000-sq.-ft. mixed-use building in Ramsey, Minn. The loan was
transferred to Berkadia on Aug. 19, 2009, due to payment default.
Berkadia informed us that it is pursuing foreclosure. The property
is currently 89.0% occupied. An ARA of $799,318 is in effect
against the loan. "We expect a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P noted.

The Fountain Hills asset ($1.3 million, 0.3%), a 31,361-sq.-ft.
flex industrial property in Prior Lake, Minn., is the smallest
asset with the special servicer. The asset was transferred to
Berkadia on Aug. 24, 2009, due to payment default and became REO
on April 15, 2010. Berkadia indicated that it is currently
evaluating sale offers on the 100% vacant property. "Berkadia
also informed us that it is in the process of working with the
master servicer on a possible nonrecoverability determination for
this asset because offers are coming in below the Sept. 15, 2010,
appraisal value of $1.1 million. An ARA of $689,866 is in effect
against the total exposure of $1.8 million. We expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset,"
according to S&P.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined the
Auburn Commercial Park loan ($1.0 million, 0.2%) to be credit-
impaired. The loan, secured by a 60,020-sq.-ft. office/industrial
property in Sacramento, has a low reported DSC of 0.47x and
reported occupancy was 90.4% for year-end 2010. As a result, we
view this loan to be at an increased risk of default and loss,"
S&P said.

               Summary Of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $165.2 million (36.8%). "Using servicer-
reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.52x
for the top 10 real estate loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio
for the top 10 real estate loans are 1.46x and 70.7%. Four of the
top 10 real estate loans ($72.6 million, 16.2%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist," S&P said.

The Great America Technical Center loan ($30.6 million, 6.8%) is
the largest nondefeased loan in the pool and the largest loan on
the master servicer's watchlist. The loan is secured by two
office/research and development buildings totaling 236,980 sq. ft.
in Santa Clara, Calif. The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due
to a low reported DSC of 0.95x for year-end 2010, and occupancy
was 100% according to the Feb. 1, 2011, rent roll. The low DSC is
primarily attributable to tenant Broadcom Corp. (57.7% of the net
rentable area) receiving three months of free rent and paying
lower base rent.

The Gwinnett Pavilion & Town Point Business Park loan, the fifth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is comprised of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans totaling $16.5 million
(3.7%). The loan, secured by two industrial warehouse properties
totaling 556,660 sq. ft. in Norcross and Kennesaw, Ga., is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC
of 0.83x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, and overall
occupancy was 72.2% according to the Feb. 1, 2011, rent roll.

The Garrison Forest Plaza loan ($14.6 million, 3.3%), the sixth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 149,519-sq.-
ft. retail center in Owings Mills, Md. The loan is on Wells
Fargo's watchlist due to its July 1, 2011, maturity. According to
Wells Fargo, the maturity was extended to Aug. 1, 2011. The
reported occupancy was 100% as of November 2010, and DSC was 1.55x
for year-end 2010.

The Impath Building loan ($10.9 million, 2.4%), the seventh-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 68,788-sq.-
ft. suburban office building in Marina Del Rey, Calif. The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist due to the July 31, 2010, lease
expiration of its sole tenant. According to the March 31, 2011,
rent roll, the property is 100% leased to Genzyme Genetics until
July 31, 2015. The reported DSC was 1.57x for year-end 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with its rating actions.

Ratings Raised

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
C          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)                     21.33
D          AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)                      19.01
E          A+ (sf)      A (sf)                       14.37

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
L          B- (sf)      B (sf)                       2.77
M          CCC (sf)     B- (sf)                      2.19

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)                             34.67
B        AAA (sf)                             27.71
F        BBB+ (sf)                            11.47
G        BBB- (sf)                             9.15
H        BB+ (sf)                              6.83
J        BB (sf)                               5.09
K        BB- (sf)                              3.93
X-1      AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


N-45 FIRST: Fitch Upgrades Classes of N-45, Series 2003-3
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed three classes
of N-45 First CMBS Issuer Corporation, series 2003-3 commercial
mortgage pay-through bonds.

The upgrades come as a result of additional principal paydown from
amortization, as well as continued stable occupancy, improved cash
flow performance, and positive leasing developments for the
properties securing the pool's two remaining loans -- Place Bell
(50.4%) and Fifth Avenue Place (49.6%). The Stable Outlooks
reflect the likely direction of any changes to the ratings over
the next one to two years.

Place Bell, located in Ottawa, Canada, consists of a one million-
square foot (sf) class A office building built in 1971 and
renovated in the late 1990s. The Place Bell loan is full recourse
to the sponsor. The largest tenant, Bell Canada (rated investment
grade), is Canada's largest telephone and telecommunications
company. The tenant represents approximately 47.8% of the net
rentable area (NRA) and is on a long-term lease until 2022. Other
major tenants include Public Works and Government Services Canada,
which leases 22.4% of the space through 2017, and Gowlings, which
leases 14.2% of the space through 2016.

As of May 2011, Place Bell remained 99% occupied. There are
limited lease expirations through the loan's Dec. 1, 2012 maturity
date. The next significant rollover concentration, representing
approximately 18% of the space, occurs in 2016.

As of year end (YE) 2010, the Fitch adjusted debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) for the Place Bell loan was 1.55 times (x), compared
with 1.54x at the previous review and 1.36x at issuance. The DSCR
was calculated based on a Fitch adjusted net cash flow (reflective
of an additional vacancy factor and deductions for stabilized
capital expenditures and leasing costs) and a stressed debt
service amount calculated using a hypothetical mortgage constant.

Fifth Avenue Place consists of two 34-story, class A office towers
totaling 1.5 million sf that are located in downtown Calgary.
Approximately 47,000 sf of the property's net rentable area (NRA)
consists of retail space. The tenant base is concentrated in the
oil and gas industry. The three largest tenants include: Devon
Estates, which is owned by lease guarantor Imperial Oil Limited
(rated investment grade) and comprises 44.0% of the NRA on a lease
through 2016; Enbridge Inc. (rated investment grade), which
occupies 20.3% of the NRA on a lease through 2028; and Westcoast
Energy, Inc. (rated investment grade), which occupies 6.9% of the
space on a lease through 2022.

As of April 2011, the property remained over 99% occupied, in line
with issuance. The YE 2010 Fitch adjusted DSCR improved to 2.94x
from 2.65x at the previous review and 1.49x at issuance due to a
combination of rent bumps and new leases signed at higher rates
than at the time of origination.

The Fifth Avenue Place loan matures Aug. 5, 2011. Fitch was
previously concerned about scheduled lease expirations totaling
47% of the space during the loan's terminal year. However, the
borrower was successful in its efforts to renew the leases; and
there are no significant lease expirations at the property until
2016 (when 49% of the space will roll). The master servicer
reportedly has not discussed with the borrower its plans with
respect to repayment of the loan at its maturity date, but the
loan appears to be a strong candidate for refinance based on its
Fitch stressed loan-to-value ratio of 33% and its 7.59% interest
rate.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has paid down approximately 42.3% to
C$266.8 million from C$462.4 million at issuance.

Fitch has upgraded these classes:

   -- C$31.4 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- C$31.4 million class D to 'BBBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- C$152.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$47.6 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$3.7 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has repaid in full.
Fitch has withdrawn the rating of the interest-only class IO.


NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class D Notes From Junk
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Navigator CDO 2003, Ltd.:

US$26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Subordinate Notes Due
2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed on Watch for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Subordinate Notes Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $16,965,262.88), Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed on Watch for
Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Subordinate Notes Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $7,983653.12), Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed on Watch for
Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Junior Subordinate Notes Due
2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf)
Placed on Watch for Possible Upgrade;

US$4,000,000 Class Q-3 Notes Due 2015 (current Stated Principal of
$1,106,713.69), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
B1 (sf) Placed on Watch for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
are primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO
assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011.
The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios due to delevering
of the senior notes since the rating action in August 2010.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid in full and
the Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 81% or
$50.3 million since the rating action in August 2010. As a result
of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the rating action in August 2010. Based on the latest
trustee report dated June 3, 2011, the Class A, Class B, Class C
and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 259.38%,
170.28%, 128.06% and 111.45%, respectively, versus July 2010
levels of 173.87%, 139.41%, 117.09% and 111.45%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $128.8 million,
defaulted par of $500,000, a weighted average default probability
of 12.4% (implying a WARF of 2617), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 51.81%, and a diversity score of 35. The
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Navigator CDO 2003, Ltd., issued in December 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in assigning these ratings was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in June 2011. The rating of the combo notes has relied
on "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Navigator CDO 2006, Ltd.:

US$40,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Revolving Notes
Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $32,663,125), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$265,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Term Notes Due
2020 (current outstanding balance of $216,393,205), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Secured Deferrable Term
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$7,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Secured Deferrable Term Notes
Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable Term Notes
Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$12,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Secured Deferrable Term Notes
Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $10,437,972), Upgraded to
B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class 1 Combination Notes Due 2020 (current
rated balance of $7,019,798), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $319.8 million,
defaulted par of $7.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.60% (implying a WARF of 2950), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.37%, and a diversity
score of 65. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Navigator CDO 2006, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

A secondary methodology used was "Using the Structured Note
Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


NEPTUNE CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class S, B, and C notes from Neptune CDO III Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed primarily
by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) managed by Chotin
Fund Management Corp. "In addition, we affirmed our rating on the
class A-1 notes," S&P related.

"We lowered our rating on the class S notes due to the nonpayment
of the full principal balance due to the class S notes on June 6,
2011, the class' legal final maturity date. Prior to the June
payment date, the class S notes had an outstanding balance of
$2.348 million. On the June 6 payment date, the transaction paid
down $0.001 million to the notes, leaving a $2.347 million
outstanding principal balance," S&P noted.

"The downgrades of the class B and C notes reflect our opinion
that the transaction has insufficient collateral to return the
rated principal amount currently due on these notes," S&P said.

"We based our opinion regarding the transaction's insufficient
collateral on the overcollateralization (O/C) available to support
the rated notes," S&P related. The trustee reported these ratios
in its monthly report dated May 27, 2011:

    The class B principal coverage O/C ratio test was 1.75%,
    failing to meet the minimum requirement of 106.50%; and

    The class C principal coverage O/C ratio test was 1.64%,
    failing to meet the minimum requirement of 103.00%.

In addition, as of the May 27, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction held $145.36 million in total assets and had
$354.50 million in rated liabilities. The May 27, 2011 trustee
report listed $135.54 million of the total assets as defaulted,
noting that these assets had a combined current market value of
zero.

"The affirmation of the class A-1 notes reflects our belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating level," S&P said.

Rating Actions

Neptune CDO III Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
S                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
B                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
C                  D (sf)       CC (sf)

Rating Affirmed

Neptune CDO III Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1                CC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Neptune CDO III Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-2                D (sf)
A-3                D (sf)


NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades 6, Withdraws Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes to 'Dsf' and affirmed one
class at 'Dsf' and withdrawn the ratings on the notes issued by
Newcastle CDO VII, Limited (Newcastle VII).

On Dec. 3, 2009, the trustee notified noteholders of an event of
default (EOD) due to the Class I Par Value Ratio falling below the
103% threshold. On April 21, 2011, the holders of the majority of
the controlling class directed to accelerate the notes and the
trustee was directed to sell and liquidate the collateral. On June
24, 2011 all liquidation proceeds were distributed according to
the transaction documents. The class I-A notes received 51.5% of
their outstanding balance. The remaining classes have been
completely written off due to insufficient liquidation proceeds.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $0 Class I-A notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class I-B notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class II notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class III notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class IV-FL notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class IV-FX notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn;

   -- $0 Class V notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
      withdrawn.


NORANDA OPERATING: DBRS Downgrades Issuer Rating to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded the Issuer Rating of Noranda Operating Trust (the
Trust) from BBB Under Review with Developing Implications to BB (high)
with a Stable trend following the Trust's recent announcements
regarding its refinancing efforts (see DBRS news release, "DBRS
Maintains Noranda UR-Dev on Revolving Credit Facility Announcement",
June 10, 2011).  Although the Trust's zinc concentrate processing
operations have been running at close to capacity levels and generating
solid earnings and cash flows since October 2009, it continues to face
delays in renewing its long-term financing structure.  These delays
arise in the light of competing interests of the unitholders of its
parent, the Noranda Income Fund (the Fund), that seek restoration of
the Fund's distributions and the need to reduce long-term debt levels
in advance of the potential expiry (or significant change in terms) in
May 2017 of the Trust's concentrate supply and processing agreement
(Supply and Processing Agreement) with Xstrata Canada Limited (Xstrata
Canada) that is the foundation of the Trust's earnings and cash flow,
adding to the financial uncertainty related to the Trust.

The Trust is currently being financed under the auspices of an interim
$220 million bridge credit facility maturing on December 2, 2011
following the full repayment of its Senior Secured Notes and senior
secured revolving credit facilities, which matured in December 2010.
The Trust has indicated that it has executed a commitment letter for
and is pursuing a five-year, asset-based secured revolving credit
facility for up to $150 million that requires the Trust to concurrently
arrange term debt financing having proceeds of at least $90 million
(the March 31, 2011 indebtedness of the Trust totaled $157 million).

DBRS expects the Trust to be successful in arranging new long-term
financing essentially in the form anticipated but DBRS remains vigilant
in terms of the implications any financing arranged will have to the
pre- and post- May 2017 end of the initial term of the Supply and
Processing Agreement.

A reduction in concentrate processing for about seven months in 2009
led to a suspension of distributions by the Trust and its parent, the
Fund, in July 2009.  The suspension of distributions has continued
during a protracted period in which the Trust's long-term debt (which
matured and was repaid in December 2010) and its short-term borrowing
agreements were refinanced with various short-term arrangements.  The
suspension of distributions and normal operations allowed a $34 million
reduction of the Trust's $191 million in total debt at the end of June
2009 to $157 million by March 31, 2011.  Consequently, the Trust's
financial metrics, which had weakened in 2009, returned to historical
levels in 2010 and have added strength in early 2011.  Debt as a
percentage of total capitalization (45% at March 31, 2011) dropped to
under 50% in 2010 for the first time since 2005; cash flow-to-total
debt was 39% and EBITDA gross interest coverage was 12.8 times in Q1
2011.

The Trust's refinancing efforts have been complicated by a number of
factors including the expiry date of the initial term of the Supply and
Processing Agreement on May 2, 2017.  Under the Supply and Processing
Agreement, the Trust has been able to process zinc concentrates
supplied by Xstrata Canada and generate earnings and cash flow to fund
all of its operating and capital expenditure needs, plus provide
sufficient cash to support the Fund's distribution of $51 million per
year to its unitholders in each of the five years prior to and
including 2008.  Going forward, the Trust will face an added income tax
burden due to changes in the Canadian taxation of income trusts.  Over
the longer term, DBRS believes that the cost of processing zinc
concentrates under the Supply and Processing Agreement is high compared
with current market rates for toll zinc refining and should these
difficult market conditions prevail that it is unlikely that the Supply
and Processing Agreement will be extended beyond May 2017 under current
terms, leading to the expectation of a significant drop in earnings and
cash flow for the Trust after that date.  In addition, the bulk of zinc
concentrate supplied by Xstrata Canada is from its Canadian operations
and beyond 2017, the availability of concentrates from those operations
is expected to be greatly reduced.

DBRS believes that the value of the Trust's zinc refining facilities to
Xstrata Canada, in terms of bringing its Canadian zinc production to
markets in North America and around the world, would likely result in
Xstrata Canada providing financial assistance in the event that the
Trust had difficulties in meeting its financial obligations in the
short term.  Nonetheless, once the initial term of the Supply and
Processing Agreement expires, its terms are likely to be renegotiated
or it may not be extended.  In either case, the Trust's ability to
generate earnings and cash flow would be significantly reduced and
potentially eliminated as would its ability to support the servicing of
long-term debt not related to working capital needs.


OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners II, Limited:

US$32,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,500,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$2,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,500,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class D-3 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 27% or $24.8 million since the rating action in
April 2011. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last rating
action. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 1, 2011, the
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 204.38%, 156.96%, 128.15%, and 119.32%,
respectively, versus March 2011 levels of 184.32%, 148.08%,
124.39%, and 116.85%, respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the June 2011 trustee report,
reference securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 39.2% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $217 million,
defaulted par of $0.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.07% (implying a WARF of 2520), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51%, and a diversity score
of 33. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Oak Hill Credit Partners II, Limited, issued in February 2003, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


PPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on Class A and B Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' ratings on
PPLUS Trust Series LMG-4's $35 million class A and B certificates
and revised the CreditWatch on these classes to positive from
developing, where S&P placed them on July 1, 2010.

"Our ratings on the certificates are dependent on our rating on
the underlying security, Liberty Media Corp.'s 8.25% senior
unsecured debentures due Feb. 1, 2030 ('BB-/Watch Pos')," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow our July 6, 2011, CreditWatch revision
on its 'BB-' rating on the underlying security to positive from
developing implications. We may take subsequent rating actions on
the certificates due to changes in our rating assigned to the
underlying security," S&P said.


PPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms Ratings on Class A and B Certs. at 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' ratings on
PPLUS Trust Series LMG-3's $30.55 million class A and B
certificates and revised the CreditWatch on these classes to
positive from developing, where it placed them on July 1, 2010.

"Our ratings on the certificates are dependent on our rating on
the underlying security, Liberty Media Corp.'s 8.25% senior
unsecured debentures due Feb. 1, 2030 ('BB-/Watch Pos')," S&P
related.

"The rating actions follow our July 6, 2011, CreditWatch revision
on its 'BB-' rating on the underlying security to positive from
developing implications. We may take subsequent rating actions on
the certificates due to changes in our rating assigned to the
underlying security," S&P said.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $31-Mil. Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series LMG-2's $31 million certificates and
revised the CreditWatch on this class to positive from developing,
where S&P placed it on July 1, 2010.

"Our rating on the certificates is dependent on our rating on the
underlying security, Liberty Media Corp.'s 8.5% senior unsecured
notes due July 15, 2029 ('BB-/Watch Pos')," S&P stated.

"The rating action follows our July 6, 2011, CreditWatch revision
on its 'BB-' rating on the underlying security to positive from
developing implications. We may take subsequent rating actions on
the certificates due to changes in our rating assigned to the
underlying security," S&P added.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $125.87MM Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series LMG-1's $125.875 million certificates
and revised its CreditWatch implications to positive from
developing. "We originally placed our rating on CreditWatch
developing on July 1, 2010," S&P related.

"Our rating on the certificates is dependent on our rating on the
underlying security, Liberty Media Corp.'s 8.25% senior unsecured
debentures due Feb. 1, 2030 ('BB-/Watch Pos')," S&P said.

"The rating action follows our July 6, 2011, CreditWatch revision
on the 'BB-' rating on the underlying security to positive from
developing implications. We may take subsequent rating actions on
the certificates due to changes in our rating assigned to the
underlying security," S&P said.


PROTECTIVE LIFE: Fitch Affirms Protective Life 2007-PL
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and revises Rating Outlooks on Protective
Life 2007-PL, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance. As of
the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's collateral balance has
paid down 19.3% to $819.8 million from $1.02 billion at issuance.
There are 182 loans remaining from 199 at issuance. As of June
2011, there is currently one loan (0.4%) in special servicing.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.5% of the remaining pool. There have
been no realized losses to date. Fitch expects the losses
associated with the specially serviced loan to be absorbed by the
non-rated class S.

The largest contributor to loss is a 45,500 square foot (sf)
retail property located in Naples, FL which is currently 100%
vacant. The loan remains current.

The second largest contributor to loss is a 53,921 sf retail
property located in Clio, MI. The loan transferred into special
servicing in August 2010 due to imminent default. The property is
currently dark as a result of A&P filing bankruptcy and rejecting
Farmer Jack's lease which was owned by A&P. The property is
currently real estate owned (REO). Per the special servicer, there
has been interest in the property and they are currently marketing
the asset.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to the most recent fiscal year end net
operating income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between
8% and 10% to determine value.

Fitch affirms and revises Outlooks for these classes:

   -- $42.7 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $152.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $113.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $132.9 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $74.0 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $101.6 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $102.9 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.1 million class B at 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.9 million class C at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.4 million class D at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.6 million class E at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $6.4 million class F at 'A/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $8.9 million class G at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.6 million class H at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.6 million class J at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $8.9 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $5.1 million class L at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $2.5 million class M at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $2.5 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $2.5 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $3.8 million class P at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2.5 million class Q at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $13.9 million class S. Fitch withdraws the
interest-only class IO class.


RACE POINT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Race Point IV CLO, Ltd.:

US$72,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$33,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$39,900,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratio since the rating action
in June 2009. Based on the latest trustee report dated June 13,
2011, the senior overcollateralization ratio that covers the Class
A Notes and Class B Notes is reported at 128.5%, versus the May
2009 level of 121%.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in June 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2668 compared to 3366
in May 2009. Additionally, the Class D Notes are no longer
deferring interest and all previously deferred interest has been
paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $557.3 million,
defaulted par of $5.3 million, a weighted average default
probability of 27.4% (implying a WARF of 3366), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49.13%, and a diversity score of 63.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Race Point IV CLO Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and diversity levels higher than the covenant
   levels and weighted average rating factor lower than the
   covenant level due to the large difference between the reported
   and covenant levels.


SANDELMAN PARTNERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I Ltd. (Sandelman CRE CDO
I), a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction.

The downgrades primarily reflect the transaction's exposure to
downgraded underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
collateral ($34.2 million, 7.8% of the total asset balance). "The
downgrades also reflect our assessment of increased risks and
credit stability considerations regarding subordinate note
cancellations that occurred prior to their repayment through
the transaction's payment waterfall. Classes C, D, E, G and H have
all had partial or full note cancellations without repayment (see
table)," S&P related.

Notes Cancelled Without Payments
             Original par amount of
Class           cancelled notes ($)
C                        10,000,000
D                         3,870,000
E                         3,000,000
G                         5,040,000
H                         9,249,000

"Our analysis of the transaction follows our rating actions on the
underlying CMBS collateral. Standard & Poor's has downgraded six
securities from six transactions totaling $34.2 million (7.8% of
the total asset balance)," S&P noted. Sandelman CRE CDO I has
exposure to these securities that Standard & Poor's has
downgraded:

    Merrill Lynch Floating Trust's series 2006-1(class M;
    $15.7 million, 3.6%);

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding's series 2006-GG7 (class
    J; $5.0 million, 1.1%);

    JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's series
    2006-CIBC16 (class F; $4.7 million, 1.1%);

    JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's series
    2007-LDP11 (class A-M; $3.0 million, 0.7%);\

    Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-5 (class G;
    $3.0 million, 0.7%); and

    Banc of America Large Loan Trust 2007-BMB1 (class RDI-1;
    $2.9 million, 0.6%).

"In our assessment of the transaction and downgraded underlying
CMBS collateral, we also analyzed the transaction for increased
risks and credit stability considerations due to the subordinate
note cancellations," S&P related. To assess these risks, S&P
applied these stresses it deemed appropriate:

    "We generated a cash flow analysis using two scenarios. The
    first scenario utilized the current balances of the notes,
    including any note cancellations, when modeling the interest
    or principal diversion mechanisms. The second scenario
    recognized only the balance of the senior notes in the
    calculation of any interest or principal diversion
    mechanisms," S&P related.

    "Using the two scenarios, we then applied the lower of the
    rating levels as the starting point for our rating analysis
    for each class of notes," S&P said.

    "Finally, we reviewed the level of cushion relative to our
    credit stability criteria and made further adjustments to the
    ratings that we believed were appropriate," S&P said.

According to the June 20, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
current assets included 35 classes ($179.7 million, 41.0%) of CMBS
pass-through certificates from 23 distinct transactions issued
between 2005 and 2007. The current assets also include eight CRE
loans ($258.4 million, 59.0%). The aggregate principal balance of
the assets totaled $438.0 million, while the transaction
liabilities totaled $397.2 million. The trustee report noted three
defaulted loans ($92.3 million, 21.1%) in the pool and nine
defaulted securities ($44.8 million, 10.2%). Standard & Poor's
estimated specific recovery rates for the defaulted loans to range
from 0% to 57.7%. "We based the recovery rates on information from
the collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party data
providers," S&P related. The defaulted loan assets are:

    Marriott Sawgrass' mortgage loan ($42.3 million, 9.7%);

    Spanish Peaks Holdings LLC's senior note ($24.4 million,
    5.6%); and

    Spanish Peaks Holdings LLC's subordinate note ($25.6 million,
    5.8%).

According to the trustee report, the deal is failing all three par
value tests, but passing the interest coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria. S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A-1       BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)
A-2       BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
B         B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)


SATURN VENTURES: Fitch Affirms 3 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
notes issued by Saturn Ventures I, Inc. (Saturn I):

   -- $38,218,393 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $44,611,659 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS3' from
      'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $23,198,063 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $20,024,878 class B notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels given the current underlying portfolio. These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO, given various default timing
and interest rate scenarios, as described in the report, 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Based on this analysis,
the breakeven levels for the class A-1 and A-2 notes are
consistent with the ratings assigned.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2010, 29.4% of the
portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of three notches
and 7.2% upgraded a weighted average of one notch. Currently,
41.6% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 23.8% rated in the 'CCC' category or lower. This
compares to 28.6% of the portfolio rated below investment grade
and 18.2% rated in the 'CCC' category or lower at last review. As
the senior-most class, the class A-1 notes have benefited from a
total of $16.4 million of paydowns since the last review, funded
primarily by principal amortizations. These paydowns offset the
negative migration by increasing the notes' credit enhancement
levels, which also support the affirmation of the ratings for this
class.

For the class A-2 notes, however, the paydowns that increased the
notes' credit enhancement levels were not sufficient to offset the
additional negative portfolio migration. There is additional risk
to the class A-2 notes due to the likelihood of an interest
shortfall from a potential Event of Default (EOD) which may be
triggered if the A-2 overcollateralization ratio falls below 102%.
As of the last Trustee report in May 2011, the OC ratio stood at
103.7%. If an EOD occurs, the class A-2 notes may be cut off from
future distributions until the class A-1 notes are paid in full.

The Negative Outlook on the class A-1 and A-2 notes reflects the
sensitivity of these classes to interest rate movements. The lower
passing ratings for these notes in Fitch's 'up' interest rate
scenarios in the cash flow model reflect the notes' sensitivity to
interest rates, with 70% of the portfolio paying a fixed coupon
while all the CDO liabilities are floating rate, and the interest
rate hedge stepping down by November 2013.

Class A-1 and A-2 notes are assigned Loss Severity (LS) ratings of
'LS3'. The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches.

For the class A-3 and B notes, the breakeven levels for these
notes were well below PCM's 'CCC' default level, which is the
lowest level of defaults projected by the model. Losses expected
from distressed and defaulted assets (assets rated 'CC' and below)
exceed the credit enhancement levels for the notes. Default
continues to appear inevitable for the class A-3 and B notes.

Saturn I is a static structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed in October 2003. The portfolio is
monitored by Church Tavern Advisors, LLC. The current portfolio is
comprised of CMBS (62.7%), RMBS (18.3%), SF CDOs (9%), REITs
(4.5%), consumer ABS (2.7%) and corporate CDOs (2.7%) from 2002
and 2003 vintages.


SMART HOME: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SHRL 2005-2
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on Smart Home Reinsurance
Limited 2005-2, a U.S. RMBS synthetic transaction consisting of
exposure to the risk of residential mortgage loan losses covered
by private mortgage insurance.

The transaction provides reinsurance to Radian Guaranty Inc.
(Radian) on a group of first lien, fixed and floating residential
mortgage loans. The loans were originated and are serviced by
numerous entities. At issuance, the insured loans had a weighted-
average original-loan-to-value (LTV) of approximately 88%. The
mortgage loans have coverage percentages ranging from 5% -- 45%,
with 72% of the loans falling the 25% -- 40% range. In general,
loans with higher LTVs have higher coverage percentages.

The notes will mature in November 2012, on which date the holders
of each note will be entitled to receive 100% of the remaining
principal amount. While the noteholders will also be entitled to
recover any impaired amounts and carryover interest on the
maturity date, Fitch does not expect there to be sufficient assets
with which to pay such sums.

To project interest and principal recovery on the remaining class
balances, Fitch estimated the timing of liquidation and losses on
the insured portion of the insured loans. Given the relatively
short amount of time until the maturity date, the analysis focused
solely on the loans which are currently delinquent. Fitch used its
published criteria for the liquidation timing of delinquent loans
in its analysis.

Fitch's rating actions are:

   -- Class M-3 (83169WAB8) affirmed at 'AA-'; Loss Severity
      Rating revised to 'LS3' from 'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class M-3A (83169WAK8) affirmed at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- Class M-4 (83169WAC6) affirmed at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class M-4A (83169WAL6) affirmed at 'A+'; Loss Severity
      Rating revised to 'LS3' from 'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class M-5 (83169WAD4) affirmed at 'A'; Loss Severity Rating
      revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class M-5A (83169WAM4) affirmed at 'A'; Loss Severity Rating
      revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class M-6 (83169WAE2) affirmed at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- Class M-6A (83169WAN2) affirmed at 'BBB'; Loss Severity
      Rating revised to 'LS3' from 'LS5'; Outlook revised to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- Class M-7 (83169WAF9) affirmed at 'B'; Loss Severity Rating
      revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'; Outlook revised to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- Class M-7A (83169WAP7) affirmed at 'B'; Loss Severity Rating
      revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'; Outlook revised to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- Class M-8 (83169WAG7) affirmed at 'CCC'; Recovery Rating
      revised to 'RR2' from 'RR4';

   -- Class M-8A (83169WAQ5) affirmed at 'CCC'; Recovery Rating
      revised to 'RR2' from 'RR4';

   -- Class M-9 (83169WAH5) affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating
      revised to 'RR5' from 'RR6';

   -- Class M-9A (83169WAR3) affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating
      revised to 'RR5' from 'RR6'.

These actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch analysts.


TABS 2005-2: DBRS Confirms Ratings of 3 Classes of Notes at 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the ratings of various notes issued by TABS 2005-2
Oakville Limited (TABS or the Transaction).  The Class A-1 Notes, Class
A-2 Notes and Class B Notes (collectively, the Notes) issued by TABS
have each been confirmed at C (sf).

The Transaction is a managed cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) of asset-backed securities (ABS) that consists primarily of U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  All of the underlying
ABS were originally investment grade, with most being rated BBB or BBB
(low).

As a result of poor performance of the Transaction's underlying
securities, the Notes were previously downgraded to C (sf).  DBRS
expects that the Class A-1 Notes will suffer a partial loss of
principal, and it is expected that the Class A-2 Notes and Class B
Notes will not receive any return of initial principal over the
remaining term of the Transaction.


TCW GLOBAL: Fitch Affirms 2 Senior Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on TCW's Global
Project Fund II:

   -- $330 million revolving senior notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $70 million class A-1 floating-rate notes affirmed at
      'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $64 million class A-2-A floating-rate notes downgraded to
      'Asf/LS3' from 'AAsf/LS-3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $6 million class A-2-B fixed-rate notes downgraded to
      'Asf/LS3' from 'AAsf/LS-3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $61 million class B-1 floating-rate notes downgraded to
      'BBsf/LS3' from 'BBBsf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $14 million class B-2 fixed-rate notes downgraded to
      'BBsf/LS3' from 'BBBsf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $33 million class C floating-rate notes downgraded to
      'CCCsf/LS4' from 'Bsf/LS4'

   -- $17 million class D floating-rate notes downgraded to
      'CCsf/LS5' from 'CCCsf/LS5'

These rating actions reflect deterioration in the credit quality
of the portfolio of assets in the transaction. With the exception
of the revolving senior notes and A-1 notes, the notes are
sensitive to the liquidation value at transaction final maturity
of asset balances that mature beyond June 2016 when combined to
the default stresses associated with specific rating categories.

Amortizations on the revolving senior notes have benefited from
prepayments of certain assets. Enhancement levels to the revolving
senior notes and A-1 notes continue to increase and support high
break-even default rates and asset coverage levels consistent with
the 'AAAsf' rating.

The downgrades to the ratings assigned to the B, C, and D notes
are a direct result of lower ability to absorb further losses and
increased concentration of lower rated assets. The transaction's
cash flow waterfall, which allocates cash collections to more
senior notes in case certain coverage tests are breached,
increases such exposure.


UNITED INDEPENDENT: Moody's Gives 'Aa2' To Tax Refunding Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Aa2 underlying rating to
United Independent School District's (TX) $34.4 million Unlimited
Tax Refunding Bonds, Series 2011. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed the Aa2 rating on the district's outstanding parity debt
affecting $215.2 million net of the current refunding. In
addition, Moody's has assigned a Aaa enhanced rating to the
current sale provided by a guarantee of the Texas Permanent School
Fund (PSF). The rating also takes into consideration $30.5 million
in limited tax obligations. Proceeds from the sale of the bonds
will be used to refund certain maturities of the district's Series
1993A, 2000, 2001 and 2004 bonds for an expected net present value
savings of 6.2% and no extension of final maturity.

Summary Ratings Rationale - Underlying

The bonds are secured by an annual ad valorem tax, levied against
all taxable property in the district without legal limitation as
to rate or amount. The rating reflects the district's sizable tax
base that continues to grow although at a more moderated rate, a
trend of historically satisfactory fiscal practices that have
bolstered reserve levels, although levels are expected to be
reduced in the near term due to various capital and construction
needs, and a moderate debt burden.

Summary Ratings Rationale - Enhanced

The Aaa rating reflects Moody's assessment of the PSF's ability to
make payments on the guarantee relative to the substantial value
of the fund corpus. Additional credit considerations include: the
PSF's constitutionally protected corpus, the general obligation
credit quality of the Texas school district guaranteed by the
fund, an investment portfolio that provides satisfactory coverage
and liquidity given Moody's estimated probability of calls on the
guarantee, and strong legal mechanics that facilitate timely
reimbursement to the PSF should guarantee payments occur. The
enhanced rating also reflects an expected increase in PSF leverage
to no more than 3.5 times PSF cost value. For additional
information on the PSF program, see Moody's High Profile Ratings
Update "Texas Permanent School Fund (PSF)" dated April 2010.

Strengths:

Sizable tax base

Satisfactory financial reserves

Weaknesses:

Below median socio-economic indicators

Pressured financial environment due to expected state aid cuts

Taxable Value Growth Continues Although At Moderated Pace

Located in Webb County (general obligation bonds rated Aa3), the
district serves the areas outside of the City of Laredo (general
obligation bonds rated Aa2), situated midway between San Antonio
(general obligation bonds rated Aaa/stable outlook) in Texas, and
Monterrey (long term rating Ba1/stable outlook) in Mexico.
Significant population growth has spurred residential and
corresponding commercial construction within the district. Per
estimates in 2011, population within the district is 162,758, an
increase of 67.7% over the 97,049 reported by the 2000 U. S.
Census. Currently, single family residences account for 40.1% of
the base, with commercial values accounting for 20.3%, and mineral
values accounting for 9.6%. Over the past five years, in line with
growth, taxable values have increased an annual average of 8.5%.
Following the much higher annual average of 13.5% reported between
fiscal years 2004 and 2009, taxable values grew 2.2% in fiscal
year 2010, followed by much smaller growth of 0.9% to $9.4 billion
in fiscal year 2011. Officials attribute the growth to an increase
in mineral values as the median home value within the district has
reduced considerably. In fiscal year 2011, the reported median
home value was $151,000, a 4.4% decrease from the $158,000
reported for fiscal year 2010. The district's tax base exhibits
moderate concentration with the top ten taxpayers accounting for
9% of total values in fiscal year 2011. The district continues to
benefit from the oil and gas industry as preliminary values
received by the appraisal district for fiscal year 2012 indicates
an increase of 6.3% to $10 billion with the addition of 250 oil
wells. Over the near term, officials expect similar growth
patterns to continue as additional wells associated with the Eagle
Ford Shale are slated to come online.

Enrollment levels continue to exhibit positive growth trends with
a five year annual average of 3.5% reported in 2010. In fiscal
year 2011, estimates indicate a 3% increase to 41,600 students.
Officials expect similar trends in the near term with an average
growth rate of 1.5% to 2% annually. Socio-economic indicators
within the district are below the median with a 1999 per capita
income of $12,416 which was 63.3% of the state and 57.5% of the
nation. The 1999 median family income of $35,453 was also below
the median as it represented 77.3% of the state, and 70.8% of the
nation. Although unemployment is not captured for the district,
the April 2011 unemployment rate of 8% in Webb County, was higher
than the state's 7.7%, and lower than the nation's 8.7% reported
during the same time period.

Total General Fund Balance Expected to Decrease In Line With
Appropriation of Designations And Reservations For Various
Projects; Pressured Financial Environment Due to Expected State
Aid Cuts

Moody's expects the district's history of satisfactory financial
performance to continue, maintaining and improving available
reserves over the intermediate to long term. Historical financial
management has increased reserve levels resulting in a total
General Fund balance of $82.6 million (a favorable 27% of General
Fund revenues) at fiscal year end 2009. The unreserved
undesignated portion was $51 million (a satisfactory 16.7% of
General Fund revenues), which was well above the district's one
month reserve policy or $25.4 million. The district ended fiscal
year 2010 with an $8.1 million draw as designated monies, which
were expended on prior year projects. However the total General
Fund balance increased to $96.6 million (31.7% of General Fund
revenues) due to an influx of construction bonds, which remain
designated for capital projects. The available reserves of the
district captured by the unreserved undesignated portion remained
essentially flat over the prior year at $50 million. In fiscal
year 2011, officials report that the budget is faring better than
original assumptions, and expect an increase of $10 million in the
available reserves, increasing the unreserved undesignated portion
of the fund balance to $60 million (19.7% of 2010 General Fund
revenues), although it is expected that the total General Fund
balance will decrease to $88 million (28.9% of 2010 General Fund
revenues) as the district continues with its capital projects.
Over the near to intermediate term, it is expected that a
significant portion of the designations and reservations will be
expended due to construction needs, many of which are already
underway.

Over the next biennium (fiscal years 2012 - 2013), the district
faces a funding shortfall due to budgetary challenges at the state
level. Based on the current legislation, the district expects to
receive a reduction of 6% (approximately $12 million) in fiscal
year 2012, with a range between 5% and 8% in fiscal year 2013. In
response, the district has implemented several budget reduction
measures including eliminating 200 positions largely through
attrition, reducing department budgets, re-negotiating and
managing contracts, etc. For fiscal year 2012, officials have
reduced the budget by approximately $13 million with cuts that
will be carried over to fiscal year 2013. Officials also express a
commitment to making additional cuts for fiscal year 2013, as
needed, as final numbers are obtained. Moody's believes the
district's willingness and ability to reduce the budget to absorb
the shortfall from the state reflects the continued solid
financial management.

The district received majority of its fiscal year 2010 revenues
from state sources (66.2%), and local sources (32.9%). In fiscal
year 2011, the district's maintenance and operations (M & O) levy
was $10.40 per $1,000, the maximum without voter approval. With
voter approval, the district can levy up to a maximum of $11.70
per $1,000 of assessed values. Officials have expressed no desire
for additional taxing authority. Also in fiscal year 2011, the
district's debt service levy was $1.55 per $1,000 of assessed
values, which remains flat from fiscal year 2007. Although the
district has taken on additional debt in that time frame,
officials report the levy has been flat to manage the monies
available in the debt service fund. The district's goal is a
minimum of 10% of the net year's payment, excluding state funding.
As of fiscal year end 2010, the Debt Service Fund balance was
$4.6 million, or 17.7% of fiscal year 2012's full debt service
requirement. Officials will continue to manage the debt service
levy sufficient to fulfill the district's debt obligations.

Moderate Debt Burdens

All of the district's debt is fixed rate and the district is not
party to any derivative agreements. Including the refunding, the
district's direct debt burden is a moderate 2.3% (5.1% overall)
net of state aid support for debt service, on a fiscal year 2011
valuation. Currently, the district has $74 dollars in remaining
authorized but unissued bonds. Officials do not have any near term
debt issuance plans. Payout is average with 52.2% of principal
retired in 10 years. Moody's believes long term growth pressures
may increase debt needs but expects management will continue to
prudently manage any challenges that may arise.

What Could Make the Rating Go Up

Continued economic activity; strengthened socioeconomic profile

Continued solid financial performance yielding improved reserve
levels

What Could Make the Rating Go Down

Erosion of current available reserves

Significant taxable value decline

Key Statistics:

2011 Full Valuation: $9.4 billion

2011 Full Value Per Capita: $36,531

1999 Per Capita Income (as % of TX and US): $12,416 (63.3% and
57.5%)

1999 Median Family Income (as % of TX and US): $35,453 (77.3% and
70.8%)

Direct Debt Burden (net of state aid): 2.3%

Overall Debt Burden (net of state aid): 5.1%

Payout of principal: 52.2%

2010 General Fund balance: $96.6 million (31.7% of General Fund
revenues)

General Obligation Limited Tax (GOLT) Debt Outstanding:
$30.5 Million

General Obligation Unlimited Tax (GOULT) Debt Outstanding:
$249.6 Million

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was General
Obligation Bonds Issued by U.S. Local Governments, published in
October 2009.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Upgrades Wachovia 2003-C4
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's (WBCMT) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2003-C4.

The rating upgrades are a result of increased credit enhancement
due to pay down, minimal Fitch expected losses, and defeasance. As
of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate balance
has paid down 36.9% to $562.6 million from $891.8 million at
issuance. Nine loans (9.25%) are fully defeased. Interest
shortfalls totaling $164,081 are currently affecting class P.

Of the original 140 loans, 114 remain outstanding. Fitch has
identified 23 loans (13.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes one specially-serviced loan (.62%). The special servicing
loan did not pay off at maturity and is not performing.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a 130 unit apartment
complex (.56%) built in 1980, located in Macon, GA. The servicer
reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of year end (YE)
2010 was .47 times (x) and the occupancy was 74%, which dropped
from 81% in YE 2009.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a 187,523
square foot (sf) anchored retail center (3.94%) located in
Flowood, MS, in the Jackson metropolitan statistical area (MSA).
The servicer reported occupancy as of December 2010 was 98%.

Fitch has upgraded and revised Loss Severity (LS) ratings:

   -- $12.3 million class G to 'AAA/LS4' from 'AA/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $12.3 million class H to 'AA/LS4' from 'A+/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $20.1 million class J at 'A/LS3' from 'A-/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised LS ratings:

   -- $181.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $199.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $34.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.3 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $12.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $12.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.9 million class K at 'BBB+/LS4'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.7 million class L at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.7 million class M at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.1 million class N at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.5 million class O at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $17 million class P certificates and class
A-1 and X-P has paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-C.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms 24 CMBS Classes of WBCMT 2007-C33
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 24
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C33:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.5% of the current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's
stressed scenario loss is 27.3% of the current balance. The pool
has realized $12 million or 0.3% of the original balance in losses
from liquidated loans compared to $4.6 million or 0.1% at the last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base and stress
scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at:

    http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was: "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published on
April 19, 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling,
or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 28, the same as at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated November 18, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the June 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1.4% to
$3.55 billion from $3.60 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 162 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten
non-defeased loans representing 52% of the pool. Two loans,
representing 1.1% of the pool, have investment grade credit
estimates. There are currently no defeased loans in the pool.

Forty-two loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $11.8 million (46% loss severity).
Currently twenty-three loans, representing 23% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 666
Fifth Avenue Loan ($285.5 million - 8.0% of the pool). This loan
is secured by a 1.5 million square foot Class A office building in
Manhattan. This loan represents a 23.5% pari-passu interest in a
$1.215 billion first mortgage loan. The property was transferred
to special servicing in March 2010 for imminent default. The loan
remains current but has recently exhausted its $100 million
reserve. The borrower and special servicer are discussing a loan
modification.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Three Borough
Pool Loan ($133.0 million -- 3.7% of the pool) which is secured by
42 multifamily properties located in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the
Bronx in New York. The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2010 due to imminent default. The borrower currently has
$1.6 million in liens filed against the collateral properties
along with outstanding water and sewer charges. Counsel has been
engaged for these defaults. The portfolio was appraised for $136
million in March 2011. Moody's did not assume a loss on this loan
and it is evaluated as part of the conduit pool.

The remaining specially serviced loans are represented by a mix of
property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $209 million
loss (30% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 12% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $93.2 million loss (22% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2011
operating results for 98% and 54% of the performing conduit loans,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 126% compared to 123% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 0.85X, respectively, compared to
1.30X and 0.96X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the High Bluff Ridge at
Del Mar Loan ($32.9 million -- 0.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 157,567 square foot suburban office building located in San
Diego, California. The loan is interest-only. Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.42X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Lawndale Estates
Loan ($7.4 million -- 0.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
673-unit mobile home community located in Saginaw, Michigan. The
property was 83% leased as of March 2011 compared to 84% at last
review. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A2
and 2.04X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.82X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the ING Hospitality pool Loan ($283.9
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 46 asset
portfolio of Residence Inns and Homewood Suites located across 19
states. This loan represents a pari-passu interest in an $567.7
million first mortgage loan. Performance has improved since the
prior review due to strong occupancy growth and savings in
property taxes. The loan is interest only throughout the term and
matures in June 2012. Moody's considers this a troubled loan due
to its poor performance and near-term maturity date. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 163% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to
176% and 0.71X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Sawgrass Mills Loan ($265.3
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 2.0 million
square foot regional mall located in Sunrise, Florida. This loan
represents a pari-passu interest in an $820.0 million first
mortgage loan. The loan is sponsored by Simon Property Group.
Performance has steadily improved since securitization due to rent
bumps from existing tenants along with a sharp increase in
percentage rents due to strong sales. The loan is interest only
throughout the term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and
0.95X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Ashford Hospitality Pool 6
Loan ($261.0 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of three cross defaulted and cross collateralized full
service Marriott (2) and Renaissance (1) Hotels located in
Florida, Texas, and Washington. The portfolio was 68% loccupied
for the twelve-month period ending December 2010 compared to 74%
for the twelve-month prior prior to securitization. The loan is
interest only for 60 months (with 10 months remaining) and
amortizes for the remaining five year term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 160% and .75X, respectively, compared to 174%
and 0.68X at last review.


WAMU COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades WaMu 2006-SL1
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades five classes of WaMu Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2006-SL1, small balance commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 8.4% of
the current transaction balance. Fitch has designated over 131
loans (31%) of the pool as Fitch loans of concern, which includes
30 specially serviced loans (7.3%). Fitch expects classes H, J, K,
and L may be fully depleted from losses associated with the
specially serviced assets and class G to also be affected.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 17.2% to $423.4 million from $511.4 million
at issuance. There are 395 of the original 443 loans remaining in
the transaction. There are currently 30 specially serviced loans
(7.3%) in the deal. The average loan size for the transaction is
$1.1 million. To date, the transaction has incurred $11.1 million
in losses, representing 2.2% of the original transaction.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to the most recent fiscal year-end net operating
income, and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.10% and
10% to determine value. All the loans also underwent a refinance
test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization
schedule based on the stressed cash flow.

The largest contributor to loss (0.8%) is secured by a multifamily
property located in West Palm Beach, FL which is currently 90 days
delinquent. The loan transferred to special servicing in February
2010 due to imminent default. The borrower and guarantors executed
a settlement agreement. The collateral is expected to be
liquidated via a short sale/receiver sale.

Fitch downgrades, assigns, and revises recovery ratings to these
classes:

   -- $10.2 million class D to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $7 million class E to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $3.8 million class F to 'CC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $7.7 million class G to 'CC/RR2' from 'CCC/RR1';

   -- $2.6 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR5'.

Fitch also affirms and revises Outlooks on these classes:

   -- $61 million class A at 'A/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $300.6 million class A-1A at 'A/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.3 million class B at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $14.7 million class C at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2.6 million class J at 'C/RR6';

   -- $1.9 million class K at 'C/RR6'.

Classes L and M remain at 'D/RR6' as a result of principal losses
incurred. Class N is not rated by Fitch. Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest-only class X.


WELLS FARGO: Fitch Issues Presale on 2011-C4 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C4 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Loss Severity
(LS) ratings and Outlooks:

   -- $93,159,000 class A-1 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $201,377,000 class A-2 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $62,389,000 class A-3 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $100,000,000# class A-FL 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $671,432,000 class A-4 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $102,472,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1,230,829,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $42,570,000 class B 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $42,570,000 class C 'A+sf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $33,316,000 class D 'A-sf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $51,824,000 class E 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $20,360,000 class F 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18,508,000 class G 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only
#Floating Rate

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 11, 2011. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$249,868,059 interest-only class X-B, or the $40,720,059 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 76 loans secured by 132 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.48 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were originated by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and General
Electric Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.2% of the pool and asset
summary reviews of 72.2% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.33 times (x), a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of
89.3%, and a Fitch debt yield of 10.8%. Fitch's aggregate net cash
flow represents a variance of 5% to issuer cash flows.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Wells Fargo and
Midland Loan Services, Inc., rated 'CMS2' and 'CSS1',
respectively, by Fitch.


WHITNEY CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Whitney CLO I, Ltd.

US$141,500,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2017
(current balance $$135,597,875), Upgraded to Aaa(sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Aa2(sf) on watch for possible upgrade;

US$36,500,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due March 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3(sf) on watch
for possible upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2017,
Upgraded to Aa2(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1(sf) on watch
for possible upgrade;

US$19,750,000 Class A-2F 5.190% Fixed Rate Notes Due March 2017,
Upgraded to Aa2(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1(sf) on watch
for possible upgrade;

US$25,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2017,
Upgraded to A2(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba2(sf)on watch
for possible upgrade;

US$23,500,000 Class B-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due March 2017,
Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2(sf) on
watch for possible upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The primary changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) a removal of the temporary 30%
default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as
well as (2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased
recovery rate assumptions.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio, an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in August 2009. Moody's notes that the
Class A-1L and Class A-1LA Notes have been paid down by
approximately $53 million (18%) since the rating action. As a
result of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last action date. Based on the latest trustee
report dated June 22, 2011, the Senior Class A
Overcollateralization Ratio Test is 127.489%, the Class A
Overcollateralization Ratio Test is 117.855%, the Class B-1LA
Overcollateralization Ratio Test is 110.039% and the Class B-1LB A
Overcollateralization Ratio Test is 105.75%.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action. Based on the most current available trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2284 compared to 2935
in June 2009 report.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $428million,
defaulted par of $3million, a weighted average default probability
of 14% (implying a WARF of 2285), a weighted average recovery rate
of 47% and a diversity score of 64. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Whitney CLO I, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds will
continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may accelerate due to high
prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
ratings.


WIND RIVER: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Seven Classes of CLO Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Wind River CLO II -- Tate Investors, Ltd.:

US$397,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$32,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2017, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$24,250,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2017, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes,
Due 2017, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$29,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$12,250,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Due 2017, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; and

US$4,250,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Due
2017, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in October
2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009. The Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported in
June 2011 at 126.48%, 117.2%, 110.3%, 106.72%, respectively,
versus August 2009 levels of 121.16%, 112.27%, 105.66%, 102.24%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance. Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since
the rating action in October 2009 due to a decrease in the
percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook."

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, reference
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 7.1% of the underlying reference
portfolio. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $546.99 million,
defaulted par of $3.66 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.44% (implying a WARF of 3011), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 45.68%, and a diversity
score of 55. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements, as seen in the actual
collateral quality measurements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Wind River CLO II -- Tate Investors, Ltd., issued in September
2005, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace at the end of the reinvestment period.
   Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
   loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
   have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.


* Fitch Downgrades 26 Bonds in 17 U.S. CMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 26 bonds in 17 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were all
previously rated 'CC', or 'C', which indicates that Fitch expected
a default.

The rating action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.
The remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed
as part of this review. Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of
the ongoing surveillance process and will continue to monitor
these transactions for additional defaults.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions is available on Fitch's website at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for: 'Fitch
Downgrades 26 Bonds in 17 U.S. CMBS Transactions'.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's Recovery Ratings (RRs)
assigned to the transactions. The RR scale is based upon the
expected relative recovery characteristics of an obligation. For
structured finance, RRs are designed to estimate recoveries on a
forward-looking basis while taking into account the time value of
money.


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 25 Classes of Certs. on Interest Shortfalls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 54
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from 10
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
"We lowered our ratings on 25 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. Of the 25 classes that we
downgraded to 'D (sf)', 24 have had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for two or more months," S&P related. The
recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are
primarily due to one or more of these factors:

    Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts in
    effect for specially serviced loans;

    The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
    has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    Special servicing fees; and

    Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
     modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals. "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P related.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each transaction's terms. Typically, these terms
call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of
the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe. "We primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)' because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the
MAI appraisals," S&P stated.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CK6

"We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2001-CK6. We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on the
class K, L, M, and N certificates to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding between two and 11 months, resulting from
ASER amounts related to nine ($60.3 million, 12.1%) of the 13
assets ($74.6 million, 15.0%) that are currently with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services (Midland), as well as special
servicing fees and nonrecoverable determinations. We lowered our
ratings on classes H and J due to reduced liquidity support
available to these classes and the potential for these classes to
experience interest shortfalls in the future relating to the
specially serviced assets, in particular, the Summer Trace
Apartments loan. The master servicer, also Midland, has advanced
over 100% of the April 2011 appraisal value on this loan. As of
the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $25.1
million were in effect for nine assets and the total reported
monthly ASER amount on these assets was $160,351. Midland made
a nonrecoverability determination on two other specially serviced
assets," S&P stated.

This resulted in Midland not advancing interest totaling $37,979
according to the June 2011 trustee remittance report. The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $208,165 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class K.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CKN5

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2001-CKN5. We lowered our ratings on classes K, L,
and M to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between 10 and 11 months, resulting from ASER
amounts related to four ($91.5 million, 27.1%) of the seven
($101.7 million, 30.2%) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital), as well as
special servicing fees. We downgraded classes H and J due to the
potential for these classes to experience interest shortfalls in
the future relating to the specially serviced assets. We
downgraded the class G certificate due to reduced liquidity
support available to this class as a result of the continued
interest shortfalls. As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $47.8 million were in effect for four assets
and the total reported monthly ASER amount on these assets was
$140,452. The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$166,397 and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class K," S&P noted.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CP4

"We lowered our ratings on the class F, G, and H certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CP4. We lowered our rating on class H to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 12 months,
resulting from ASER amounts related to seven ($65.4 million,
38.4%) of the 19 ($103.6 million, 60.9%) assets that are currently
with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), as well as
special servicing fees. We downgraded class G due to the potential
for this class to experience interest shortfalls in the future
relating to the specially serviced assets.  We lowered the rating
on class F because of reduced liquidity support available to this
class, resulting from the continued interest shortfalls. As of the
June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $21.4
million were in effect for seven assets and the total reported
monthly ASER amount on these assets was $114,213. The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $135,993 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class H," according to
S&P.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CKS4

"We lowered our ratings on the class E, F, G, H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2002-CKS4. We lowered our ratings on classes J, K,
L, and M to 'D (sf)' and classes G and H to 'CCC- (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between one and 14
months, resulting from ASER amounts related to 10 ($99.2 million,
11.1%) of the 17 ($120.0 million, 13.4%) assets that are currently
with the special servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.
We downgraded classes E and F due to reduced liquidity support
available to these classes, resulting from the continued interest
shortfalls related to the specially serviced assets. As of the
June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $50.5
million were in effect for 10 assets and the total reported
monthly ASER amount on these assets was $297,675. The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $340,121 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class G," S&P stated.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CP5

"We lowered our ratings on the class J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2002-CP5. We lowered our rating on class N to
'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for 12 months, resulting from ASER amounts related to four
($14.4 million, 1.7%) of the nine ($37.5 million, 4.4%) assets
that are currently with the special servicer, CWCapital, as well
as special servicing fees. We downgraded classes J, K, L, and M
due to reduced liquidity support available to these classes, and
the potential for these classes to experience interest shortfalls
in the future relating to the specially serviced assets. As of
the June 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$3.9 million were in effect for four assets and the total reported
monthly ASER amount on these assets, excluding ASER recovery of
$181,153 for an asset that liquidated this period, was $25,587.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls, excluding the
ASER recovery this period, totaled $41,175," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2003-C3

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class O certificate
from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
series 2003-C3 to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for eight months, resulting from ASER amounts related
to four ($32.1 million, 2.7%) of the six ($41.6 million, 3.5%)
assets that are currently with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC, as well as special servicing fees. As of the June
17, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $15.1 million
were in effect for five assets and the total reported monthly ASER
amount on these assets, excluding ASER recovery of $104,996 on a
specially serviced asset this period, was $55,773. The reported
monthly interest shortfalls, excluding the ASER recovery
this period, totaled $75,868," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C1

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2004-C1. We lowered our ratings on classes K, L,
and M to 'D (sf)' and classes H and J to 'CCC- (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between one and six
months, resulting from ASER amounts related to nine ($40.4
million, 3.5%) of the 11 ($49.6 million, 4.4%) assets that are
currently with the special servicer, CWCapital, as well as special
servicing fees. We downgraded class G due to reduced liquidity
support available to this class resulting from the continued
interest shortfalls related to the specially serviced assets. As
of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$19.4 million were in effect for nine assets and the total
reported monthly ASER amount on these assets was $98,466. The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $229,631 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class H,"
S&P related.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C2

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2004-C2. We lowered our ratings on classes M, N,
and O to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for two months, resulting from ASER amounts related to
two ($14.8 million, 2.0%) of the five ($29.1 million, 3.9%) assets
that are currently with the special servicer, LNR, as well as
special servicing fees. We downgraded classes J, K, and L due to
the potential for these classes to experience interest shortfalls
in the future relating to the specially serviced assets. We also
downgraded classes G and H due to reduced liquidity support
available to these classes, resulting from the continued interest
shortfalls. In addition, classes H, J, K, and L have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for two months (as of
the June 2011 trustee remittance report) resulting from a workout
fee of $232,136 for the ParkCrest At The Lakes loan, which
liquidated in May 2011, as reflected in the May 17, 2011, trustee
remittance report. As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $4.3 million were in effect for two assets
and the total reported monthly ASER amount on these assets was
$21,458. The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $35,939
and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class J," S&P stated.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C4

"We lowered our ratings on the class D, E, F, G, H, and J
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2004-C4. We lowered our ratings on classes G, H,
and J to 'D (sf)' and classes E and F to 'CCC (sf)' and 'CCC-
(sf)', respectively, to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for two months, resulting from ASER amounts related to
two ($39.4 million, 5.2%) of the four ($57.3 million, 7.5%) assets
that are currently with the special servicer, J.E. Robert Co.
Inc., as well as special servicing fees and interest rate
modification ($47,784) for the specially serviced Oak Grove
Apartments loan. We downgraded class D due to reduced liquidity
support available to this class resulting from the continued
interest shortfalls. As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $14.9 million were in effect for two assets
and the total reported monthly ASER amount on these assets was
$51,197. The reported monthly interest shortfalls, including the
master servicer's advance recovery of $112,892 this period,
totaled $212,016, and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class E," S&P related.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C6

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, J, K, and L
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2005-C6. We lowered our ratings on classes K and L
to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
between nine and 12 months, resulting from ASER amounts related to
10 ($85.9 million, 4.3%) of the 14 ($124.9 million, 6.3%) assets
that are currently with the special servicer, Torchlight Investors
LLC, as well as special servicing fees and nonrecoverability
determination. We downgraded classes G, H, and J due to reduced
liquidity support available to these classes, and the potential
for these classes to experience interest shortfalls in the future
relating to the specially serviced assets. As of the June 17,
2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $37.3 million were
in effect for 10 assets and the total reported monthly ASER amount
on these assets, excluding ASER recovery of $240,222 on an asset
that liquidated this period, was $172,361. The master servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), made a nonrecoverability
determination on one other specially serviced asset, which
resulted in KeyBank not advancing interest totaling $35,628 on
this asset. The reported monthly interest shortfalls, excluding
ASER and expense recoveries of $421,712 this period, totaled
$262,868, and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class L," S&P related.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CK6

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
H      BB (sf)   BBB- (sf)   14.04           0            0
J      CCC+ (sf) BB- (sf)    10.82           0            0
K      D (sf)    B (sf)       7.07      30,198      124,352
L      D (sf)    B- (sf)      5.67      35,310       70,619
M      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     4.27      35,310       70,619
N      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.86      35,310      226,552

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CKN5

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
G      BB (sf)   BBB (sf)    22.27           0            0
H      CCC+ (sf) BB+ (sf)    18.69           0            0
J      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)   14.32           0            0
K      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    8.35      31,840      233,988
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    6.76      23,226      251,598
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.79      58,065      638,718

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CP4

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
F      BBB (sf)  A (sf)      27.70           0            0
G      CCC- (sf) BBB- (sf)   20.78           0            0
H      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     7.80      51,972    1,018,927

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
E      BBB (sf)  AA- (sf)    12.03           0            0
F      B+ (sf)   A (sf)       9.79           0            0
G      CCC- (sf) BBB+ (sf)    8.06      21,431       21,431
H      CCC- (sf) BBB- (sf)    6.50      72,577       72,577
J      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)    3.57     111,281      322,416
K      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     2.36      45,822      274,931
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.49      32,732      196,390
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    0.11      52,365      398,713

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
J      B+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    3.78           0            0
K      CCC+ (sf)  BB- (sf)    3.08           0            0
L      CCC (sf)   B- (sf)     2.03     (25,923)           0
M      CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)    1.15     (39,809)           0
N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   0.63    (112,635)     101,281

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
O      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    0.59     (10,607)      65,420

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
G      BB- (sf)  BBB (sf)     5.28           0            0
H      CCC- (sf) BB+ (sf)     3.67      54,041       54,041
J      CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)      2.96      34,063       34,063
K      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)    2.25      34,059       34,059
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.71      25,546      135,147
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    0.82      42,580      255,478

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C2

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
G      BB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)     5.66     (45,480)           0
H      BB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)    4.21     (35,020)      16,142
J      B (sf)    BB+ (sf)     3.40      27,002       54,004
K      B- (sf)   BB (sf)      2.91      16,198       32,395
L      CCC+ (sf) BB- (sf)     2.43      16,202       32,404
M      D (sf)    B+ (sf)      1.62      27,002       54,004
N      D (sf)    B (sf)       1.30      10,800       21,600
O      D (sf)    B- (sf)      1.13       5,398       10,796

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C4

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
D      BB-(sf)   BBB- (sf)    8.15           0            0
E      CCC (sf)  BB- (sf)     6.46       9,570       64,360
F      CCC- (sf) B (sf)       5.34      37,227       74,454
G      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    3.46      66,815      133,630
H      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    3.09      10,638       21,276
J      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.53      15,959       31,918

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C6

                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
G      CCC+ (sf) B+ (sf)      6.22           0            0
H      CCC (sf)  B (sf)       4.96     (10,128)           0
J      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)    3.55    (131,706)           0
K      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     2.92    (279,877)     132,995
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.29      51,626      511,494


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 69 Classes; Affirms Ratings on 190 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 69
classes from two residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions issued in 2009-2010, and removed nine of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. "In addition, we affirmed
our ratings on 190 classes from two of the downgraded
transactions, as well as one other transaction, and removed 20 of
them from CreditWatch negative. We also withdrew our ratings on
one class that has been paid in full. All of these transactions
had a pro rata interest payment structure in at least one of
their loan groups," S&P related.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on 29 classes from these
three transactions on CreditWatch negative, along with ratings
from other RMBS re-REMIC securities. Additionally, on April 1,
2011, we provided an update on the CreditWatch placements and
provided clarification regarding our analysis of interest payment
amounts within re-REMIC transactions (see 'Standard & Poor's
Provides An Update On Outstanding RMBS Re-REMIC CreditWatch
Placements And Outlines Their Resolution,' published April 1,
2011)," S&P continued.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address the
timely payment of interest and the full payment of principal. We
reviewed the interest and principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed through to the applicable re-
REMIC classes. When performing this analysis, we applied our loss
projections, incorporating, where applicable, our recently revised
loss assumptions to the underlying collateral to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories to
assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the stressed
losses associated with their ratings while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal consistent with our criteria,"
S&P related.

"In applying our loss projections we incorporated, where
applicable, our recently revised loss assumptions into our review
(see 'Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime, Subprime, And
Alt-A U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,' published March 25, 2011).
These updates pertain to the 2005-2007 vintage prime, subprime,
and Alternative-A (Alt-A) transactions, some of which are
associated with the re-REMICs we reviewed (see tables 1 and 2),"
S&P said.

Table 1
Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(% of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Table 2
Lifetime Loss Projections For Alt-A RMBS
(% of original balance)
                            Fixed/
          Aggregate       long-reset
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.75  11.25    12.75   9.60
2006      29.50  26.25    25.25  25.00
2007      36.00  31.25    31.75  26.25
         Short-reset
            hybrid        Option ARM
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.25  14.75    15.50  13.25
2006      30.00  30.50    34.75  26.75
2007      41.00  40.75    43.50  37.50
ARM--Adjustable-rated mortgage.

"As a result of this review, we lowered our ratings on certain
classes based on our assessment as to whether there were principal
and/or interest shortfalls from the underlying securities that
would impair the re-REMIC classes at the applicable rating
stresses. The affirmations reflect our assessment of the
likelihood that the re-REMIC classes will receive timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal under the applicable
stressed assumptions," S&P noted.

Rating Actions

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R8
Series 2009-R8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
21-A2      47233BFV2   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
21-A3      47233BFW0   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
21-A4      47233BFX8   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
22-A4      47233BGF6   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
23-A1      47233BGK5   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
23-A2      47233BGL3   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
23-A4      47233BGN9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
23-A3      47233BGM1   B (sf)               BB (sf)
23-AZ      47233BGS8   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
26-AZ      47233BHR9   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
26-A1      47233BHJ7   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
31-A3      47233BJX4   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
31-AZ      47233BKC8   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
31-A1      47233BJV8   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
31-A4      47233BJY2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
31-A2      47233BJW6   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
33-A2      47233BKN4   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
33-A3      47233BKP9   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
33-A1      47233BKM6   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
33-A4      47233BKQ7   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
33-AZ      47233BKT1   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
34-A4      47233BKX2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
36-A2      47233BLL7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
37-AZ      47233BLW3   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
37-A2      47233BLR4   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
37-A1      47233BLQ6   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
37-AX      47233BLU7   BB (sf)              A (sf)
37-AY      47233BLV5   BB (sf)              A (sf)
38-AZ      47233BMD4   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
38-A1      47233BLX1   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
38-A2      47233BLY9   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
39-A4      47233BMH5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
40-A1      47233BMN2   B (sf)               B+ (sf)
40-AZ      47233BMR3   B (sf)               B+ (sf)
40-AX      47233BMP7   NR                   A (sf)
41-AZ      47233BMV4   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
41-A1      47233BMS1   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
42-A4      47233BMZ5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
43-A3      47233BNG6   B (sf)               BB (sf)
43-A2      47233BNF8   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
44-A3      47233BNP6   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
48-A2      47233BPS8   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
48-A3      47233BPT6   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
48-AZ      47233BPX7   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
48-A1      47233BPR0   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
49-AZ      47233BQC2   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
49-A2      47233BPZ2   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)
49-A1      47233BPY5   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
51-A2      47233BQN8   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
51-A4      47233BQQ1   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
51-A3      47233BQP3   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
53-AZ      47233BRC1   BB (sf)              A (sf)
53-A1      47233BQY4   BB (sf)              A (sf)
54-A2      47233BRE7   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
54-AZ      47233BRK3   B (sf)               A (sf)
54-A3      47233BRF4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
54-A1      47233BRD9   B (sf)               A (sf)
55-A3      47233BRN7   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
55-AZ      47233BRS6   BB (sf)              A (sf)
55-A2      47233BRM9   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
55-A1      47233BRL1   BB (sf)              A (sf)
56-A2      47233BRU1   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)


Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2010-R4
Series 2010-R4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       61759FAB7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A        61759FAA9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A2       61759FAC5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-B        61759FAD3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A1       61759FAG6   BB- (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A3       61759FAW1   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A        61759FAF8   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A2       61759FAH4   CCC (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A4       61759FAT8   B+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A2       61759FAR2   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A        61759FAP6   B+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A3       61759FAS0   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A1       61759FAQ4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2010-R6
Series 2010-R6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A2       61759NAC8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A        61759NAA2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A1       61759NAB0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A        61759NAD6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A2       61759NAF1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A3       61759NAG9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A4       61759NAH7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A1       61759NAE4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A5       61759NAJ3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A1       61759NAL8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A2       61759NAM6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A        61759NAK0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A1       61759NAP9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A        61759NAN4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A2       61759NAQ7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R8
Series 2009-R8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
21-A1      47233BFU4   A (sf)
21-AZ      47233BGB5   A (sf)
21-AY      47233BGA7   A (sf)
21-AX      47233BFZ3   A (sf)
22-AX      47233BGG4   A (sf)
22-A2      47233BGD1   BBB (sf)
22-AZ      47233BGJ8   A (sf)
22-AY      47233BGH2   A (sf)
22-A1      47233BGC3   A (sf)
22-A3      47233BGE9   BB (sf)
23-AY      47233BGR0   A (sf)
23-AX      47233BGQ2   A (sf)
24-AZ      47233BHA6   A (sf)
24-AX      47233BGY5   A (sf)
24-AY      47233BGZ2   A (sf)
24-A3      47233BGV1   BB (sf)
24-A4      47233BGW9   B (sf)
24-A2      47233BGU3   BBB (sf)
24-A1      47233BGT6   A (sf)
25-AX      47233BHF5   A (sf)
25-A1      47233BHB4   A (sf)
25-A4      47233BHE8   CCC (sf)
25-A2      47233BHC2   BBB (sf)
25-AY      47233BHG3   A (sf)
25-A3      47233BHD0   BB (sf)
25-AZ      47233BHH1   A (sf)
26-A3      47233BHL2   CCC (sf)
26-AY      47233BHQ1   A (sf)
26-AX      47233BHP3   A (sf)
26-A2      47233BHK4   B (sf)
26-A4      47233BHM0   CCC (sf)
27-A1      47233BHS7   A (sf)
27-A2      47233BHT5   BBB (sf)
27-A4      47233BHV0   CCC (sf)
27-AY      47233BHX6   A (sf)
27-AX      47233BHW8   A (sf)
27-AZ      47233BHY4   A (sf)
27-A3      47233BHU2   BB (sf)
28-AX      47233BJB2   A (sf)
28-AY      47233BJC0   A (sf)
28-A2      47233BJA4   CCC (sf)
28-AZ      47233BJD8   A (sf)
28-A1      47233BHZ1   A (sf)
29-AZ      47233BJL0   A (sf)
29-AX      47233BJJ5   A (sf)
29-A1      47233BJE6   A (sf)
29-AY      47233BJK2   A (sf)
29-A2      47233BJF3   BBB (sf)
29-A4      47233BJH9   CCC (sf)
29-A3      47233BJG1   BB (sf)
30-AY      47233BJT3   A (sf)
30-A3      47233BJP1   B (sf)
30-A4      47233BJQ9   CCC (sf)
30-A1      47233BJM8   A (sf)
30-AZ      47233BJU0   A (sf)
30-A2      47233BJN6   BBB (sf)
30-AX      47233BJS5   A (sf)
31-AY      47233BKB0   A (sf)
31-AX      47233BKA2   A (sf)
32-A4      47233BKG9   CCC (sf)
32-AZ      47233BKL8   A (sf)
32-A2      47233BKE4   BBB (sf)
32-AY      47233BKK0   A (sf)
32-A3      47233BKF1   B (sf)
32-AX      47233BKJ3   A (sf)
32-A1      47233BKD6   A (sf)
33-AY      47233BKS3   A (sf)
33-AX      47233BKR5   A (sf)
34-A2      47233BKV6   BBB (sf)
34-AY      47233BLA1   A (sf)
34-AZ      47233BLB9   A (sf)
34-A1      47233BKU8   A (sf)
34-AX      47233BKZ7   A (sf)
34-A3      47233BKW4   BB (sf)
35-A4      47233BLF0   CCC (sf)
35-A3      47233BLE3   BB (sf)
35-A2      47233BLD5   BBB (sf)
35-AY      47233BLH6   A (sf)
35-A1      47233BLC7   A (sf)
35-AX      47233BLG8   A (sf)
35-AZ      47233BLJ2   A (sf)
36-AX      47233BLM5   AAA (sf)
36-AZ      47233BLP8   AAA (sf)
36-A1      47233BLK9   AAA (sf)
36-AY      47233BLN3   AAA (sf)
37-A4      47233BLT0   CCC (sf)
37-A3      47233BLS2   CCC (sf)
38-A4      47233BMA0   CCC (sf)
38-AY      47233BMC6   A (sf)
38-A3      47233BLZ6   CCC (sf)
38-AX      47233BMB8   A (sf)
39-A3      47233BMG7   BB (sf)
39-AY      47233BML6   A (sf)
39-AZ      47233BMM4   A (sf)
39-A1      47233BME2   A (sf)
39-AX      47233BMK8   A (sf)
39-A2      47233BMF9   BBB (sf)
40-AY      47233BMQ5   A (sf)
41-AY      47233BMU6   A (sf)
41-AX      47233BMT9   A (sf)
42-A1      47233BMW2   A (sf)
42-AY      47233BNC5   A (sf)
42-AZ      47233BND3   A (sf)
42-A2      47233BMX0   BBB (sf)
42-AX      47233BNB7   A (sf)
42-A3      47233BMY8   BB (sf)
43-AY      47233BNK7   A (sf)
43-AZ      47233BNL5   A (sf)
43-A4      47233BNH4   CCC (sf)
43-A1      47233BNE1   A (sf)
43-AX      47233BNJ0   A (sf)
44-AY      47233BNR2   A (sf)
44-AX      47233BNQ4   A (sf)
44-AZ      47233BNS0   A (sf)
44-A1      47233BNM3   A (sf)
44-A2      47233BNN1   BBB (sf)
45-AX      47233BNY7   A (sf)
45-A4      47233BNW1   B (sf)
45-AY      47233BNZ4   A (sf)
45-A1      47233BNT8   A (sf)
45-AZ      47233BPA7   A (sf)
45-A3      47233BNV3   BB (sf)
45-A2      47233BNU5   BBB (sf)
46-AY      47233BPH2   A (sf)
46-A2      47233BPC3   BBB (sf)
46-AX      47233BPG4   A (sf)
46-A1      47233BPB5   A (sf)
46-A3      47233BPD1   BB (sf)
46-AZ      47233BPJ8   A (sf)
46-A4      47233BPE9   B (sf)
47-A2      47233BPL3   BBB (sf)
47-AZ      47233BPQ2   A (sf)
47-AY      47233BPP4   A (sf)
47-A1      47233BPK5   A (sf)
47-AX      47233BPN9   A (sf)
47-A3      47233BPM1   CCC (sf)
48-A4      47233BPU3   CCC (sf)
48-AY      47233BPW9   A (sf)
48-AX      47233BPV1   A (sf)
49-AX      47233BQA6   AAA (sf)
49-AY      47233BQB4   AAA (sf)
50-A2      47233BQE8   BBB (sf)
50-AZ      47233BQL2   A (sf)
50-A1      47233BQD0   A (sf)
50-AY      47233BQK4   A (sf)
50-A4      47233BQG3   CCC (sf)
50-AX      47233BQJ7   A (sf)
50-A3      47233BQF5   BB (sf)
51-AX      47233BQS7   A (sf)
51-AZ      47233BQU2   A (sf)
51-A1      47233BQM0   A (sf)
51-AY      47233BQT5   A (sf)
52-AY      47233BSB2   A (sf)
52-AX      47233BQW8   A (sf)
52-A1      47233BQV0   CCC (sf)
52-AZ      47233BQX6   CCC (sf)
53-AX      47233BRA5   A (sf)
53-A2      47233BQZ1   CCC (sf)
53-AY      47233BRB3   A (sf)
54-AY      47233BRJ6   A (sf)
54-AX      47233BRH0   A (sf)
55-AY      47233BRR8   A (sf)
55-AX      47233BRQ0   A (sf)
56-AX      47233BRV9   AAA (sf)
56-AZ      47233BRX5   AAA (sf)
56-A1      47233BRT4   AAA (sf)
56-AY      47233BRW7   AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2010-R4
Series 2010-R4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
3-A        61759FAK7   AA (sf)
3-A1       61759FAL5   AAA (sf)
3-A2       61759FAM3   AA (sf)


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 487 Classes & Affirms Ratings on 985 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 487
classes from 62 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions backed by prime jumbo mortgage loans issued in 2003-
2004. "In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 985 classes from
these transactions and two additional transactions. We also
withdrew our ratings on 14 interest-only (IO) classes and 12
additional classes from 15 transactions," S&P related.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain
the previous ratings, given our current projected losses," S&P
said.

"The affirmations reflect our belief that the amount of projected
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover projected losses associated with these rating levels," S&P
noted.

"We withdrew our ratings on 14 IO classes based on our IO criteria
for IO classes, which states that we will withdraw a rating on an
IO class due to the referenced class being lowered below the
applicable rating threshold. We withdrew our ratings on 12
additional classes because they have been paid in full," S&P
noted.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the effect that projected losses will have on
each class. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we
assess whether the class can withstand the additional base-case
loss assumptions we use in our analysis. To maintain a 'AAA'
rating, we assess whether the class can withstand approximately
235% of our additional base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors applied to specific
transactions. To maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the
base case) and 'AAA', we assess whether the class can withstand
losses exceeding the additional base-case assumption at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for a
'AAA' rating. For example, we would assess whether one class could
withstand approximately 130% of our base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while we would assess whether a different
class could withstand approximately 155% of our base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating," S&P related.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying collateral for these deals comprises
fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans secured
by first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

A list of the U.S. RMBS Classes affected by the July 12, 2011
Rating Actions is available for free at:

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBS_RA_71211.pdf


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 327 Classes of U.S. RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 327
classes from 90 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions backed by prime jumbo mortgage loans issued in 2000-
2004. "In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 1,306 classes from
89 transactions with downgraded classes and eight additional
transactions. We also withdrew our ratings on 88 classes from 25
transactions with downgraded and/or affirmed ratings and four
additional transactions. Of these 88 classes, we withdrew 34 due
to our interest-only criteria, and we withdrew 54 additional
classes because they have been paid in full," S&P related

"In our review of these transactions, we applied the assumptions
we discussed in 'Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Issued
Before 2005,' published on March 12, 2009, on RatingsDirect on the
Global Credit Portal, at www.globalcreditportal.com," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given our current projected losses, due to increased
delinquencies," according to S&P.

"The rating affirmations reflect our belief that the amount of
projected credit enhancement available for these classes is
sufficient to cover projected losses associated with these rating
levels," S&P related.

"We withdrew our ratings on 34 interest-only classes based on our
current criteria, which can be found in 'Global Methodology For
Rating Interest-Only Securities,' published on April 15, 2010. We
also withdrew our ratings on an additional 54 classes because they
have been paid in full," S&P stated.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the effect that projected losses will have on
each class. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we
assess whether the class can withstand the additional base-case
loss assumptions we use in our analysis. To maintain an 'AAA'
rating, we assess whether the class can withstand approximately
235% of our additional base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors applied to specific
transactions. To maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the
base case) and 'AAA', we assess whether the class can withstand
losses exceeding the additional base-case assumption at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for a
'AAA' rating. For example, we would assess whether one class could
withstand approximately 130% of our base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while we would assess whether a different
class could withstand approximately 155% of our base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating," S&P continued.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

Rating Actions

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
Series      2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-4        000780BU9   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
Series      2003-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          000780LL8   BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
B-1        000780LM6   B- (sf)              BB (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-25     05946XEE9   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-26     05946XEF6   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-27     05946XEG4   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-28     05946XEH2   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-29     05946XEJ8   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-30     05946XEK5   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-31     05946XEL3   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-44     05946XEZ2   NR                   AAA (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-2 Trust
Series      2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-5      05948XAE1   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      05948XAH4   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-14     05948XAP6   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XAS0   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XAT8   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XAU5   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XAV3   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XAW1   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XAX9   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XAY7   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      05948XAZ4   NR                   AA+ (sf)
1-B-2      05948XBA8   NR                   AA- (sf)
1-B-3      05948XBB6   NR                   A- (sf)
1-B-4      05948XBG5   NR                   BBB- (sf)
1-B-5      05948XBH3   NR                   B+ (sf)
2-B-1      05948XBC4   NR                   AA+ (sf)
2-B-2      05948XBD2   NR                   AA+ (sf)
2-B-3      05948XBE0   NR                   A+ (sf)
2-B-4      05948XBK6   NR                   BBB (sf)
2-B-5      05948XBL4   NR                   BB- (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-B-3      05948XDK4   BB- (sf)             A- (sf)
1-B-4      05948XDQ1   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)
1-B-5      05948XDR9   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-4 Trust
Series      2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-B-2      05948XHX2   A- (sf)              A (sf)
1-B-3      05948XHY0   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
1-B-4      05948XJD4   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
1-B-5      05948XJE2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-5 Trust
Series      2003-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-B-2      05948XNQ0   BB- (sf)             A (sf)
1-B-3      05948XNR8   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
1-B-4      05948XNZ0   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
2-B-2      05948XNT4   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
2-B-3      05948XNU1   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
2-B-4      05948XPC9   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)
3-B-2      05948XNW7   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
3-B-3      05948XNX5   B- (sf)              A (sf)
3-B-4      05948XPF2   CC (sf)              B (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-6 Trust
Series      2003-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-B-2      05948XSC6   BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
1-B-3      05948XSD4   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
1-B-4      05948XSJ1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-8 Trust
Series      2003-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-B-2      05948XXF3   A (sf)               A+ (sf)
2-B-3      05948XXG1   B (sf)               B+ (sf)
2-B-4      05948XXQ9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
3-B-1      05948XXH9   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
3-B-2      05948XXJ5   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
3-B-3      05948XXK2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-11
Series      2002-11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-1      07384MSN3   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)
I-B-2      07384MSP8   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
I-B-3      07384MSQ6   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
I-B-4      07384MRV6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-3
Series      2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-X-A-1    07384MUH3   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-X-A-1   07384MUZ3   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-X-A-2   07384MUN0   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-A-X-4   07384MVB5   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-X-A-2  07384MVE9   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-X-A-3  07384MVD1   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-3        07384MUY6   B+ (sf)              A (sf)
B-4        07384MVF6   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)
B-5        07384MVG4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-X-A-3   07384MUQ3   NR                   AAA (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5
Series      2003-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-B-1     07384MWP3   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
II-B-2     07384MWQ1   B- (sf)              B (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-6
Series      2003-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-B-1     07384MXJ6   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
II-B-2     07384MXK3   B+ (sf)              A+ (sf)
II-B-3     07384MXL1   CC (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
II-B-4     07384MYD8   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-1-A-1    07384MF80   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-1-A-2    07384MF98   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-1-A-3    07384MG22   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-2-A-1    07384MG48   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-2-A-2    07384MG55   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
1-2-A-3    07384MG63   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-2-A-4M   07384MG89   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-2-A-5    07384MG97   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
1-3-A-1    07384MH39   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-3-A-2    07384MH47   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-3-A-3    07384MH54   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-4-A-1    07384MH70   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-4-A-2    07384MH88   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-5-A-1    07384MJ29   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-5-A-2    07384MJ37   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-5-A-3    07384MJ45   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
I-6-A-1    07384MJ60   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
I-7-A-1    07384MJ86   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
II-1-A-1   07384MK27   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
II-1-X     07384ML75   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-2-A-1   07384MK35   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
II-3-A-1   07384MK43   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
I-B-1      07384MK92   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
II-B-1     07384ML42   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
II-B-2     07384ML59   CC (sf)              B (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S10
Series      2003-S10
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          16162WAR0   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
B-1        16162WAS8   B (sf)               A (sf)
B-2        16162WAT6   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
B-3        16162WAV1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-4        16162WAW9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S11
Series      2003-S11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IIA-3      16162WBB4   NR                   AAA (sf)
M          16162WBP3   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
B-1        16162WBQ1   B- (sf)              A (sf)
B-2        16162WBR9   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-3        16162WBS7   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S9
Series      2003-S9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        16162WAG4   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
B-3        16162WAH2   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)
B-4        16162WAJ8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-35
Series      2002-35
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669DTN8   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)
B-1        12669DTP3   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
B-2        12669DTQ1   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-20
Series      2003-20
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669EPC4   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
B-1        12669EPD2   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
B-2        12669EPE0   CC (sf)              B (sf)
B-3        12669EMN3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37
Series      2003-37
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      12669EYQ3   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
2-A-1      12669EYS9   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
2-A-2      12669EE51   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)
M          12669EYV2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42
Series      2003-42
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      12669EH33   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
2-A-4      12669EH74   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
M          12669EJ49   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-43
Series      2003-43
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669EL61   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
B-1        12669EL79   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-46
Series      2003-46
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669EWF9   A- (sf)              A (sf)
B-1        12669EWG7   B (sf)               B+ (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-53
Series      2003-53
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12669E5R3   BBB+ (sf)            A+ (sf)
M          12669E5S1   B- (sf)              BB (sf)
B-1        12669E5T9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-54
Series      2003-54
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12669E2W5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
M          12669E2X3   BB- (sf)             A+ (sf)
B-1        12669E2Y1   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3
Series      2003-HYB3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669ETL0   BB+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)
B-1        12669EQM1   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J2
Series      2003-J2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-17       12669DV62   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-2        12669DX78   A (sf)               AA (sf)
B-3        12669DX86   B+ (sf)              A (sf)
B-4        12669DX94   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J4
Series      2003-J4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669EGV2   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
B-1        12669EGW0   B- (sf)              A (sf)
B-2        12669EGX8   CC (sf)              BBB- (sf)
B-3        12669EEA0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-3        172973QY8   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
B-4        172973QZ5   CC (sf)              BB (sf)
B-5        172973RA9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-19       172973SW0   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-3        172973TG4   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
B-4        172973TH2   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-5        172973TJ8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-4        172973YN3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2002-18
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-B-1     22540V3F7   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2002-29
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-2      22541NPU7   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)
I-B-3      22541NPV5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-B-2     22541NPX1   B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-10
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
C-B-1      22541N6X2   BB+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
C-B-2      22541N6Y0   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
C-B-3      22541N6Z7   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
C-B-4      22541N7E3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
D-B-1      22541N7A1   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
D-B-2      22541N7B9   BB- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
D-B-3      22541N7C7   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
D-B-4      22541N7H6   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-17
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        22541QJN3   A- (sf)              A (sf)
B-3        22541QJP8   B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)
C-B-1      22541QJQ6   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)
C-B-2      22541QJR4   B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)
D-B-2      22541QJU7   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
B-4        22541QJX1   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-23
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-20     22541QVY5   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-A-12   22541QWW8   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      22541QXP2   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
D-B-1      22541QXS6   BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
D-B-2      22541QXT4   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
C-B-2      22541QXQ0   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
D-B-3      22541QXU1   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
D-B-4      22541QXV9   CC (sf)              B (sf)
C-B-3      22541QXR8   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)
C-B-4      22541QXY3   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2003-1
Series      2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
D-B-2      2254W0GK5   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
III-B-3    2254W0GH2   BB- (sf)             AA (sf)
III-B-4    2254W0GN9   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-9
Series      2002-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-3      32051DSE3   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DSG8   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DSH6   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-2        32051DSJ2   NR                   AA+ (sf)
B-3        32051DSK9   NR                   A+ (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-2
Series      2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-4      32051DUC4   NR                   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      32051DUD2   NR                   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      32051DUE0   NR                   AAA (sf)
I-A-12     32051DUL4   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DUP5   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     32051DUQ3   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DUR1   NR                   AA+ (sf)
B-2        32051DUS9   NR                   AA (sf)
B-3        32051DUT7   NR                   BBB- (sf)
B-4        32051DTW2   NR                   CCC (sf)
B-5        32051DTX0   NR                   CC (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-7      32051DWS7   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DXC1   CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
B-2        32051DXD9   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
B-3        32051DXE7   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)
B-4        32051DXF4   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-8
Series      2003-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        32051DL75   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)
B-3        32051DL83   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-9
Series      2003-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        32051DP55   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
B-3        32051DP63   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-4        32051DP71   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-AR2
Series      2003-AR2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      32051DXJ6   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DXK3   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-A-1    32051DXM9   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DXN7   NR                   AA+ (sf)
B-2        32051DXP2   NR                   AA- (sf)
B-3        32051DXQ0   NR                   B+ (sf)
B-4        32051DXR8   NR                   CCC (sf)
B-5        32051DXS6   NR                   CC (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-AR3
Series      2003-AR3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        32051DD74   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
B-3        32051DD82   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-4        32051DD90   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J4
Series      2003-J4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        36185NYP9   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
M-2        36185NYQ7   B- (sf)              A (sf)
M-3        36185NYR5   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J6
Series      2003-J6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-7        36185NA42   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-3        36185NB25   B (sf)               B+ (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J7
Series      2003-J7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        36185ND23   NR                   AAA (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-9
Series      2003-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         36228FWU6   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
B2         36228FWV4   B- (sf)              A- (sf)
B3         36228FWW2   CC (sf)              B (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6F
Series      2004-6F
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IIIA-2     36228F2P0   NR                   AAA (sf)
B2         36228F2Z8   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
B3         36228F3A2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
B4         36228F3V6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
Series      2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-3        41161PCF8   BB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)
B-4        41161PCG6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-3        41161PDF7   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-4        41161PDG5   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5
Series      2004-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        41161PER0   A- (sf)              A+ (sf)
2-A-6      41161PEX7   A- (sf)              A (sf)
3-A        41161PEZ2   A- (sf)              A+ (sf)
B1         41161PFC2   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
B2         41161PFD0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A3
Series      2004-A3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-1      466247DF7   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)
I-B-2      466247DG5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
S-B-3      466247DL4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-14     55265KQJ1   NR                   AAA (sf)
15-B-3     55265KRG6   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
15-B-4     55265KPN3   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
30-B-5     55265KPS2   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-2
Series      2003-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
15-B-2     55265KSV2   BB- (sf)             AA- (sf)
15-B-3     55265KSW0   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
15-B-4     55265KTA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-3
Series      2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A-4      55265KTQ2   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-2        55265KUQ0   A (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-3        55265KUR8   B- (sf)              A (sf)
B-4        55265KUS6   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
B-5        55265KUT4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
6-A-1      55265KVL0   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-2        55265KWS4   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
B-3        55265KWT2   BB (sf)              A (sf)
6-B-2      55265KWV7   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
6-B-3      55265KWW5   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
B-4        55265KWX3   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-5        55265KWY1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
6-B-4      55265KXA2   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)
6-B-5      55265KXB0   CC (sf)              B (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-6
Series      2003-6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
6-A-4      55265KYS2   NR                   AAA (sf)
15-B-1     55265KZN2   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
15-B-2     55265KZP7   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
15-B-3     55265KZQ5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
30-B-1     55265KZR3   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
30-B-2     55265KZS1   B- (sf)              A- (sf)
30-B-3     55265KZT9   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-7
Series      2003-7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        55265KJ42   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
B-3        55265KJ59   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-4        55265KJ67   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        55265WAT0   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
B-3        55265WAU7   BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
B-4        55265WAA1   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)
B-5        55265WAB9   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Series      2003-A2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-M-1      589929N79   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
I-M-2      589929N87   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
II-M-3     589929P77   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
II-B-1     589929P85   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-A
Series      2003-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
X-1B       589929G77   NR                   AA (sf)
X-2B       589929H84   NR                   AA (sf)
X-3B       589929H92   NR                   AA (sf)
B-1        589929G93   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
B-2        589929H27   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
B-3A       589929H35   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-C
Series      MLCC 2003C
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-4        589929T32   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-F
Series      2003-F
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-3        5899292V9   BB (sf)              A (sf)
B-4        5899293J5   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
B-5        5899293K2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Prime Mortgage Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        74160MFG2   BB (sf)              BBB- (sf)
B-3        74160MFJ6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-4        743873AE1   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-5        743873AF8   B- (sf)              BB (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S11 Trust
Series      2003-S11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-8        76111J6U3   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-1        76111J6Z2   AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
M-2        76111J7A6   BB (sf)              AA- (sf)
M-3        76111J7B4   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S17 Trust
Series      2003-S17
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        76111XBZ5   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
M-2        76111XCA9   B (sf)               BBB- (sf)
M-3        76111XCB7   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust
Series      2003-S18
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        76111XDM2   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-1        76111XDN0   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2        76111XDP5   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S19 Trust
Series      2003-S19
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-11       76111XCR2   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-2        76111XCY7   A- (sf)              A (sf)
M-3        76111XCZ4   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-1        76111XDA8   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2        76111XDB6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S7 Trust
Series      2003-S7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-18       76111J3L6   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-27       76111J3V4   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-3        76111J4D3   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-1        76111J4E1   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2        76111J4F8   CC (sf)              B (sf)

RFSC Series 2003-RM2 Trust
Series      2003-RM2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-I-2      760985UW9   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-2        760985VU2   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
B-1        760985VZ1   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
M-3        760985VV0   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series      2003-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        79549AYP8   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        79549AYQ6   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
PO         79549AYT0   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        79549AYU7   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-B-2      81743PBR6   A (sf)               AA- (sf)
1-B-3      81743PBS4   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
1-B-4      81743PBT2   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
1-B-5      81743PBU9   CC (sf)              B (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-3
Series      2004-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        81744FBA4   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-19
Series      2004-19
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A1       863579JG4   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
2-A2       863579JH2   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
B1         863579JK5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
Series      2004-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A        86359BFZ9   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-AX       86359BGA3   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1-I       86359BGS4   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
B2-I       86359BGU9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B2-II      86359BGY1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
6-AX       86359BGR6   NR                   AAA (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-8
Series      2004-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86359BWS6   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
B2         86359BWU1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-CL1
Series      2003-CL1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B1       86358HTA7   AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
II-B2      86358HTE9   A- (sf)              A (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B2         86359APJ6   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
B3         86359APK3   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-20
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-AP       86359AE82   NR                   AAA (sf)
B1         86359AF24   A (sf)               AA (sf)
B2         86359AF32   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-26A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1-II      86359AU84   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
B2-1       86359AU68   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B2-II      86359AU92   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-29
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1B1        86359AY31   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-30
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86359A4Q3   BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
B2         86359A4R1   B- (sf)              BB (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-32
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86359A7B3   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
B2         86359A7C1   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B3         86359A7D9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR9 Trust
Series      2002-AR9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-1      9393357Q2   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
I-B-2      9393357R0   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)
I-B-3      9393357S8   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
II-B-2     9393357V1   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
II-B-3     9393357W9   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-S8 Trust
Series      2002-S8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-1      929227C87   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
I-B-2      929227C95   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)
I-B-3      929227D29   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
II-B-3     929227D52   BBB (sf)             A+ (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S5 Trust
Series      2003-S5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-17     9292272V7   NR                   AAA (sf)
I-A-29     9292273H7   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      9292273N4   AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
C-B-2      9292273P9   BB (sf)              A+ (sf)
C-B-3      9292273Q7   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
II-B-2     9292273S3   A (sf)               AA- (sf)
II-B-3     9292273T1   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
C-B-4      9292273X2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S8 Trust
Series      2003-S8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        92922FDN5   A- (sf)              A (sf)
B-3        92922FDP0   B+ (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-4        92922FDR6   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S9 Trust
Series      2003-S9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-2        92922FFC7   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-3        92922FFD5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-S2 Trust
Series      2004-S2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        92922FQT8   BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
B-2        92922FQU5   B- (sf)              B (sf)
B-3        92922FQV3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2003-MS6

Trust
Series      2003-MS6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
III-A-2    939336ZF3   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    939336ZG1   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-3      939336ZU0   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)
C-B-4      939336YW7   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
III-B-1    939336ZV8   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
III-B-2    939336ZW6   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
III-B-3    939336ZX4   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)
III-B-4    939336YZ0   CC (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
III-B-5    939336ZA4   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-RA4

Trust
Series      2004-RA4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        939336U27   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
II-A       939336U35   A (sf)               AAA (sf)
III-A      939336U43   A (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-X        939336V83   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
I-P        939336U76   A (sf)               AAA (sf)
A-P        939336U84   A (sf)               AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-B-2      949774BF9   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
I-B-3      949774BG7   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
I-B-4      949774BP7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-9 Trust
Series      2003-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-2      949760AB8   NR                   AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-H Trust
Series      2003-H
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        94979XAC1   A+ (sf)              AA (sf)
B-2        94979XAD9   B+ (sf)              A (sf)
B-3        94979XAE7   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-4        94979XAF4   CC (sf)              BB (sf)
B-5        94979XAG2   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust
Series      2003-J
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        949808BD0   A (sf)               AA (sf)
B-2        949808BE8   B+ (sf)              A (sf)
B-3        949808BF5   CC (sf)              BBB- (sf)
B-4        949808BG3   CC (sf)              B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
Series      2003-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
IA-1       000780BF2   AAA (sf)
IA-2       000780BG0   AAA (sf)
IA-3       000780BH8   AAA (sf)
IA-4       000780BJ4   AAA (sf)
IIA-1      000780BK1   AAA (sf)
IIA-2      000780BL9   AAA (sf)
A-P        000780BM7   AAA (sf)
A-X        000780BN5   AAA (sf)
M          000780BP0   AA+ (sf)
B-1        000780BQ8   AA (sf)
B-2        000780BR6   A- (sf)
B-3        000780BT2   BBB+ (sf)

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
Series      2003-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        000780LC8   AAA (sf)
A-2        000780LD6   AAA (sf)
A-3        000780LE4   AAA (sf)
A-4        000780LF1   AAA (sf)
A-5        000780LG9   AAA (sf)
A-6        000780LH7   AAA (sf)
A-P        000780LJ3   AAA (sf)
A-X        000780LK0   AAA (sf)
B-2        000780LN4   CC (sf)
B-3        000780LQ7   CC (sf)
B-4        000780LS3   CC (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-4      05946XDH3   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      05946XDJ9   AAA (sf)
1-A-6      05946XDK6   AAA (sf)
1-A-7      05946XDL4   AAA (sf)
1-A-32     05946XEM1   AAA (sf)
1-A-34     05946XEP4   AAA (sf)
1-A-35     05946XEQ2   AAA (sf)
1-A-38     05946XET6   AAA (sf)
1-A-39     05946XEU3   AAA (sf)
1-A-40     05946XEV1   AAA (sf)
1-A-41     05946XEW9   AAA (sf)
1-A-42     05946XEX7   AAA (sf)
1-A-43     05946XEY5   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05946XFD0   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05946XFE8   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05946XFF5   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05946XFG3   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05946XFH1   AAA (sf)
B-1        05946XFJ7   AA (sf)
B-2        05946XFK4   A (sf)
B-3        05946XFL2   BBB (sf)
B-4        05946XFP3   BB (sf)
B-5        05946XFQ1   CCC (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-3      05948XCL3   AAA (sf)
1-A-6      05948XCP4   AAA (sf)
1-A-7      05948XCQ2   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      05948XCR0   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XDA6   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XDB4   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XDC2   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XDD0   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XDE8   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XDF5   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XDG3   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      05948XDH1   AA+ (sf)
1-B-2      05948XDJ7   AA- (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-4 Trust
Series      2003-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-44     05948XGK1   AAA (sf)
1-A-45     05948XGL9   AAA (sf)
1-A-46     05948XGM7   AAA (sf)
1-A-47     05948XGN5   AAA (sf)
1-A-48     05948XGP0   AAA (sf)
1-A-49     05948XGQ8   AAA (sf)
1-A-53     05948XGU9   AAA (sf)
1-A-54     05948XGV7   AAA (sf)
1-A-56     05948XGX3   AAA (sf)
1-A-57     05948XGY1   AAA (sf)
1-A-58     05948XGZ8   AAA (sf)
1-A-59     05948XHA2   AAA (sf)
1-A-64     05948XHF1   AAA (sf)
1-A-65     05948XHG9   AAA (sf)
1-A-66     05948XHH7   AAA (sf)
1-A-67     05948XHJ3   AAA (sf)
1-A-68     05948XHK0   AAA (sf)
1-A-69     05948XHL8   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XHM6   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XHQ7   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XHR5   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XHS3   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XHT1   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XHU8   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XHV6   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      05948XHW4   AA (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-5 Trust
Series      2003-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      05948XLH2   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      05948XLJ8   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      05948XLK5   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      05948XLL3   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      05948XLQ2   AAA (sf)
1-A-9      05948XLR0   AAA (sf)
1-A-13     05948XLV1   AAA (sf)
1-A-14     05948XLW9   AAA (sf)
1-A-19     05948XMB4   AAA (sf)
1-A-33     05948XMR9   AAA (sf)
1-A-34     05948XMS7   AAA (sf)
1-A-36     05948XMU2   AAA (sf)
1-A-37     05948XMV0   AAA (sf)
1-A-38     05948XMW8   AAA (sf)
1-A-39     05948XMX6   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XNA5   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XNB3   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XNC1   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XND9   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XNE7   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      05948XNF4   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      05948XNG2   AAA (sf)
2-A-7      05948XNH0   AAA (sf)
2-A-8      05948XNJ6   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XNK3   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      05948XNL1   AAA (sf)
3-A-WIO    05948XNM9   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XNN7   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      05948XNP2   AA (sf)
1-B-5      05948XPA3   CC (sf)
2-B-1      05948XNS6   AA (sf)
2-B-5      05948XPD7   CC (sf)
3-B-1      05948XNV9   AAA (sf)
3-B-5      05948XPG0   CC (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-6 Trust
Series      2003-6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      05948XPZ8   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      05948XQB0   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      05948XQD6   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      05948XQG9   AAA (sf)
1-A-9      05948XQH7   AAA (sf)
1-A-14     05948XQN4   AAA (sf)
1-A-15     05948XQP9   AAA (sf)
1-A-19     05948XQT1   AAA (sf)
1-A-20     05948XQU8   AAA (sf)
1-A-23     05948XQX2   AAA (sf)
1-A-24     05948XQY0   AAA (sf)
1-A-31     05948XRF0   AAA (sf)
1-A-32     05948XRG8   AAA (sf)
1-A-33     05948XRH6   AAA (sf)
1-A-34     05948XRJ2   AAA (sf)
1-A-35     05948XRK9   AAA (sf)
1-A-37     05948XRM5   AAA (sf)
1-A-38     05948XRN3   AAA (sf)
1-A-39     05948XRP8   AAA (sf)
1-A-40     05948XRQ6   AAA (sf)
1-A-41     05948XRR4   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XSA0   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XRU7   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XRV5   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XRW3   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XRX1   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XRY9   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XRZ6   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      05948XSB8   AA (sf)
1-B-5      05948XSK8   CC (sf)
2-B-1      05948XSE2   AA+ (sf)
2-B-2      05948XSF9   A- (sf)
2-B-3      05948XSG7   B- (sf)
2-B-4      05948XSM4   CC (sf)
2-B-5      05948XSN2   CC (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-8 Trust
Series      2003-8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-2      05948XVS7   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      05948XVT5   AAA (sf)
1-A-6      05948XVW8   AAA (sf)
1-A-7      05948XVX6   AAA (sf)
1-A-11     05948XWB3   AAA (sf)
1-A-12     05948XWC1   AAA (sf)
1-A-13     05948XWD9   AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05948XWE7   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948XWG2   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      05948XWH0   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      05948XWJ6   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      05948XWK3   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      05948XWL1   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      05948XWM9   AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05948XWN7   AAA (sf)
3-A-4      05948XWS6   AAA (sf)
3-A-5      05948XWT4   AAA (sf)
3-A-6      05948XWU1   AAA (sf)
3-A-7      05948XWV9   AAA (sf)
3-A-8      05948XWW7   AAA (sf)
3-A-9      05948XWX5   AAA (sf)
3-A-10     05948XWY3   AAA (sf)
3-A-WIO    05948XWZ0   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05948XXA4   AAA (sf)
2-B-1      05948XXE6   AA (sf)
2-B-5      05948XXR7   CC (sf)
3-B-4      05948XXT3   CC (sf)
3-B-5      05948XXU0   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-11
Series      2002-11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      07384MSH6   AAA (sf)
I-A-2      07384MSJ2   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      07384MSK9   AAA (sf)
I-M-1      07384MSM5   AAA (sf)
I-B-5      07384MRW4   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-3
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A-1     07384MUL4   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     07384MUM2   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     07384MUK6   AAA (sf)
II-A-4     07384MVA7   AAA (sf)
III-A-1    07384MUP5   AAA (sf)
III-A-2    07384MUR1   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    07384MVC3   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     07384MUS9   AAA (sf)
B-1        07384MUW0   AAA (sf)
B-2        07384MUX8   AA+ (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5
Series      2003-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      07384MWF5   AAA (sf)
I-A-2      07384MWG3   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      07384MWH1   AAA (sf)
I-X        07384MWJ7   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     07384MWN8   AAA (sf)
II-X       07384MXM9   AAA (sf)
I-B-1      07384MWK4   AA+ (sf)
I-B-2      07384MWL2   BB (sf)
I-B-3      07384MWM0   CC (sf)
I-B-4      07384MXN7   CC (sf)
II-B-3     07384MWR9   CC (sf)
II-B-4     07384MXR8   CC (sf)
II-B-5     07384MXS6   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-6
Series      2003-6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      07384MWW8   AAA (sf)
I-A-2      07384MWX6   AAA (sf)
I-X-2      07384MWY4   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      07384MWZ1   AAA (sf)
I-X-3      07384MXA5   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     07384MXB3   AAA (sf)
I-B-1      07384MXF4   A (sf)
I-B-2      07384MXG2   B (sf)
I-B-3      07384MXH0   CC (sf)
I-B-4      07384MYA4   CC (sf)
II-B-5     07384MYE6   CC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-2-A-4A   07384MG71   A+ (sf)
I-B-2      07384ML26   CC (sf)
I-B-3      07384ML34   CC (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S10
Series      2003-S10
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        16162WAL3   AAA (sf)
A-2        16162WAM1   AAA (sf)
A-3        16162WAN9   AAA (sf)
A-P        16162WAP4   AAA (sf)
A-X        16162WAU3   AAA (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S11
Series      2003-S11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
IA-1       16162WAY5   AAA (sf)
IIA-4      16162WBC2   AAA (sf)
IIA-5      16162WBD0   AAA (sf)
IIA-6      16162WBE8   AAA (sf)
IIA-7      16162WBF5   AAA (sf)
IIA-9      16162WBH1   AAA (sf)
IIA-10     16162WBJ7   AAA (sf)
IIIA-1     16162WBK4   AAA (sf)
A-X        16162WBL2   AAA (sf)
A-P        16162WBM0   AAA (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2003-S9
Series      2003-S9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        16162WAA7   AAA (sf)
A-X        16162WAB5   AAA (sf)
A-P        16162WAC3   AAA (sf)
M          16162WAE9   AA (sf)
B-1        16162WAF6   A (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-35
Series      2002-35
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-2      12669DSH2   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      12669DSJ8   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      12669DSK5   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      12669DSL3   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      12669DSP4   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669DSQ2   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      12669DST6   AAA (sf)
2-A-13     12669DTC2   AAA (sf)
2-A-14     12669DTD0   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669DTE8   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      12669DTF5   AAA (sf)
4-A-2      12669DTG3   AAA (sf)
4-A-3      12669DTH1   AAA (sf)
4-A-4      12669DTJ7   AAA (sf)
4-A-5      12669DTK4   AAA (sf)
PO         12669DTL2   AAA (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-20
Series      2003-20
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669EMR4   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      12669EMS2   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      12669EMT0   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      12669EMU7   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      12669EMV5   AAA (sf)
1-A-8      12669EMY9   AAA (sf)
1-A-9      12669EMZ6   AAA (sf)
1-A-10     12669ENA0   AAA (sf)
1-A-11     12669ENB8   AAA (sf)
1-A-13     12669END4   AAA (sf)
1-A-14     12669EPJ9   AAA (sf)
1-A-15     12669EPK6   AAA (sf)
1-A-16     12669EPL4   AAA (sf)
1-A-17     12669EPM2   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669ENE2   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      12669ENF9   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      12669ENG7   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      12669ENH5   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      12669ENJ1   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      12669ENK8   AAA (sf)
2-A-7      12669ENL6   AAA (sf)
2-A-9      12669ENN2   AAA (sf)
2-A-10     12669ENP7   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669ENQ5   AAA (sf)
3-A-3      12669ENS1   AAA (sf)
3-A-4      12669ENT9   AAA (sf)
3-A-6      12669ENV4   AAA (sf)
3-A-7      12669ENW2   AAA (sf)
3-A-8      12669ENX0   AAA (sf)
3-A-9      12669ENY8   AAA (sf)
3-A-10     12669ENZ5   AAA (sf)
PO         12669EPA8   AAA (sf)
B-4        12669EMP8   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-26
Series      2003-26
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669ERD0   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      12669ERE8   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      12669ERF5   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      12669ERG3   AAA (sf)
1-A-6      12669ERJ7   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669ERK4   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      12669ERL2   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      12669ERM0   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      12669EUM6   AAA (sf)
PO         12669ERN8   AAA (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37
Series      2003-37
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-1        12669EYW0   CC (sf)
B-2        12669EYX8   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42
Series      2003-42
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-1        12669EJ56   CC (sf)
B-2        12669EJ64   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-43
Series      2003-43
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        12669EL46   AAA (sf)
B-2        12669EL87   CC (sf)
B-3        12669EU46   CC (sf)
B-4        12669EU53   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-46
Series      2003-46
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669EWA0   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      12669EWB8   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      12669EWC6   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669EWD4   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669EWE2   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      12669EG67   AAA (sf)
4-A-2      12669E3D6   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      12669E3E4   AAA (sf)
6-A-1      12669E3F1   AAA (sf)
7-A-1      12669E3G9   AAA (sf)
B-2        12669EWH5   CCC (sf)
B-3        12669EWJ1   CC (sf)
B-4        12669EWK8   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-54
Series      2003-54
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        12669E2Z8   CC (sf)
B-3        12669E3A2   CC (sf)
B-4        12669E3B0   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3
Series      2003-HYB3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669EQD1   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669EQE9   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669EQF6   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      12669EQG4   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      12669EQH2   AAA (sf)
6-A-1      12669EQJ8   AAA (sf)
7-A-1      12669EQK5   AAA (sf)
8-A-1      12669ETM8   AAA (sf)
1-X        12669EQL3   AAA (sf)
B-2        12669EQN9   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J2
Series      2003-J2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-27       12669DW87   AAA (sf)
X          12669DX29   AAA (sf)
PO         12669DX37   AAA (sf)
M          12669DX52   AAA (sf)
B-1        12669DX60   AA+ (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J4
Series      2003-J4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669EFX9   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      12669EFY7   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      12669EFZ4   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      12669EGA8   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      12669EGB6   AAA (sf)
1-A-6      12669EGC4   AAA (sf)
1-A-7      12669EGD2   AAA (sf)
1-A-13     12669EGK6   AAA (sf)
1-A-14     12669EGL4   AAA (sf)
1-A-15     12669EGM2   AAA (sf)
1-A-17     12669EGP5   AAA (sf)
1-A-18     12669EHH2   AAA (sf)
1-A-19     12669EHJ8   AAA (sf)
1-X        12669EGQ3   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669EGR1   AAA (sf)
2-X        12669EGS9   AAA (sf)
PO         12669EGT7   AAA (sf)
B-4        12669EEB8   CC (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        172973QU6   AAA (sf)
A-PO       172973QV4   AAA (sf)
A-IO       1729739V5   AAA (sf)
B-1        172973QW2   AA (sf)
B-2        172973QX0   A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2003-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        172973SC4   AAA (sf)
A-4        172973SF7   AAA (sf)
A-5        172973SG5   AAA (sf)
A-6        172973SH3   AAA (sf)
A-7        172973SJ9   AAA (sf)
A-8        172973SK6   AAA (sf)
A-9        172973SL4   AAA (sf)
A-10       172973SM2   AAA (sf)
A-11       172973SN0   AAA (sf)
A-12       172973SP5   AAA (sf)
A-16       172973ST7   AAA (sf)
A-17       172973SU4   AAA (sf)
A-21       172973SY6   AAA (sf)
A-22       172973SZ3   AAA (sf)
A-23       172973TA7   AAA (sf)
A-24       172973TB5   AAA (sf)
A-PO       172973TC3   AAA (sf)
A-IO       172973TD1   AAA (sf)
B-1        172973TE9   AA (sf)
B-2        172973TF6   A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        172973WX3   AAA (sf)
A-4        172973WY1   AAA (sf)
A-5        172973WZ8   AAA (sf)
A-6        172973XA2   AAA (sf)
A-7        172973XB0   AAA (sf)
A-10       172973XE4   AAA (sf)
A-11       172973XF1   AAA (sf)
A-12       172973XG9   AAA (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
IA-2       172973YS2   AAA (sf)
IA-3       172973YT0   AAA (sf)
IA-4       172973YU7   AAA (sf)
IA-5       172973YV5   AAA (sf)
IA-6       172973YW3   AAA (sf)
IA-8       172973YY9   AAA (sf)
IA-9       172973YZ6   AAA (sf)
IA-10      172973ZA0   AAA (sf)
IA-11      172973ZB8   AAA (sf)
IA-15      172973ZF9   AAA (sf)
IA-16      172973ZG7   AAA (sf)
IA-17      172973ZH5   AAA (sf)
IA-18      172973ZJ1   AAA (sf)
IA-19      172973ZK8   AAA (sf)
IA-20      172973ZL6   AAA (sf)
IA-21      172973ZM4   AAA (sf)
IA-22      172973ZN2   AAA (sf)
IA-23      172973ZP7   AAA (sf)
IA-24      172973ZQ5   AAA (sf)
IA-25      172973ZR3   AAA (sf)
IA-26      172973ZS1   AAA (sf)
IA-27      172973ZT9   AAA (sf)
IA-28      172973ZU6   AAA (sf)
IA-29      172973ZV4   AAA (sf)
IA-30      172973ZW2   AAA (sf)
IA-31      172973ZX0   AAA (sf)
IA-PO      172973ZY8   AAA (sf)
IIA-1      172973ZZ5   AAA (sf)
IIA-2      172973A25   AAA (sf)
IIA-3      172973A33   AAA (sf)
IIA-4      172973A41   AAA (sf)
IIA-5      172973A58   AAA (sf)
IIA-6      172973A66   AAA (sf)
IIA-PO     172973A74   AAA (sf)
IIIA-1     172973A82   AAA (sf)
IVA-1      172973A90   AAA (sf)
IVA-2      172973B24   AAA (sf)
IVA-3      172973B32   AAA (sf)
IVA-PO     172973B40   AAA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2002-18
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-M-1      22540V3C4   AA (sf)
II-A-1     22540V2X9   AAA (sf)
II-X       22540V2Y7   AAA (sf)
II-PP      22540V3B6   AAA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2002-29
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      22541NPK9   AAA (sf)
I-P        22541NPR4   AAA (sf)
I-B-1      22541NPT0   AA- (sf)
A-X        22541NPQ6   AAA (sf)
II-P       22541NPS2   AAA (sf)
II-B-1     22541NPW3   AA+ (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-10
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-2      22541N5Q8   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      22541N5R6   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      22541N5S4   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     22541N5Z8   AAA (sf)
I-X        22541N6Q7   AAA (sf)
II-X       22541N6R5   AAA (sf)
I-P        22541N6U8   AAA (sf)
A-P        22541N6W4   AAA (sf)
III-A-7    22541N6G9   AAA (sf)
III-A-8    22541N6H7   AAA (sf)
III-A-9    22541N6J3   AAA (sf)
III-A-10   22541N6K0   AAA (sf)
III-A-11   22541N6L8   AAA (sf)
III-A-12   22541N6M6   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     22541N6P9   AAA (sf)
III-X      22541N6S3   AAA (sf)
IV-X       22541N6T1   AAA (sf)
III-P      22541N6V6   AAA (sf)
C-B-5      22541N7F0   CC (sf)
D-B-5      22541N7J2   CC (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-17
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-2      22541QFT4   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      22541QFU1   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      22541QFV9   AAA (sf)
I-A-24     22541QGR7   AAA (sf)
I-A-25     22541QGS5   AAA (sf)
I-A-28     22541QGV8   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     22541QGZ9   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     22541QHA3   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     22541QHB1   AAA (sf)
II-A-4     22541QHC9   AAA (sf)
II-A-6     22541QHE5   AAA (sf)
II-A-7     22541QHF2   AAA (sf)
II-A-11    22541QHK1   AAA (sf)
II-A-12    22541QHL9   AAA (sf)
III-A-2    22541QHP0   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    22541QHQ8   AAA (sf)
III-A-4    22541QHR6   AAA (sf)
III-A-5    22541QHS4   AAA (sf)
III-A-7    22541QHU9   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     22541QHV7   AAA (sf)
V-A-1      22541QHW5   AAA (sf)
VI-A-1     22541QHX3   AAA (sf)
VII-A-1    22541QHY1   AAA (sf)
I-X        22541QHZ8   AAA (sf)
II-X       22541QJA1   AAA (sf)
III-X      22541QJB9   AAA (sf)
IV-X       22541QJC7   AAA (sf)
V-X        22541QJD5   AAA (sf)
VI-X       22541QJE3   AAA (sf)
VII-X      22541QJF0   AAA (sf)
I-P        22541QJG8   AAA (sf)
III-P      22541QJH6   AAA (sf)
IV-P       22541QJJ2   AAA (sf)
V-P        22541QJK9   AAA (sf)
A-P        22541QJL7   AAA (sf)
B-1        22541QJM5   A+ (sf)
C-B-3      22541QJS2   CC (sf)
D-B-1      22541QJT0   AA (sf)
B-5        22541QJY9   CC (sf)
C-B-4      22541QKA9   CC (sf)
C-B-5      22541QKB7   CC (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series      2003-23
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-3      22541QVF6   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      22541QVG4   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      22541QVH2   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      22541QVJ8   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      22541QVK5   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     22541QVP4   AAA (sf)
I-A-15     22541QVT6   AAA (sf)
I-A-16     22541QVU3   AAA (sf)
I-A-17     22541QVV1   AAA (sf)
I-A-18     22541QVW9   AAA (sf)
I-A-19     22541QVX7   AAA (sf)
I-A-21     22541QVZ2   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     22541QWB4   AAA (sf)
II-A-5     22541QWF5   AAA (sf)
II-A-6     22541QWG3   AAA (sf)
II-A-8     22541QWJ7   AAA (sf)
I-X        22541QXD9   AAA (sf)
II-X       22541QXE7   AAA (sf)
IP         22541QXK3   AAA (sf)
A-P        22541QXM9   AAA (sf)
III-A-2    22541QWL2   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    22541QWM0   AAA (sf)
III-A-4    22541QWN8   AAA (sf)
III-A-5    22541QWP3   AAA (sf)
III-A-6    22541QWQ1   AAA (sf)
III-A-8    22541QWS7   AAA (sf)
III-A-9    22541QWT5   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     22541QWY4   AAA (sf)
V-A-1      22541QWZ1   AAA (sf)
VI-A-1     22541QXA5   AAA (sf)
VII-A-1    22541QXB3   AAA (sf)
VIII-A-1   22541QXC1   AAA (sf)
VII-X      22541QXG2   AAA (sf)
VIII-X     22541QXH0   AAA (sf)
III-X      22541QXF4   AAA (sf)
D-X        22541QXJ6   AAA (sf)
III-P      22541QXL1   AAA (sf)
D-P        22541QXN7   AAA (sf)
D-B-5      22541QYB2   CC (sf)
C-B-5      22541QXZ0   CC (sf)

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2002-34
Series      2002-34
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      2254W0BZ7   AAA (sf)
I-X        2254W0EN1   AAA (sf)
I-P        2254W0ER2   AAA (sf)
II-P       2254W0ES0   AAA (sf)
D-B-1      2254W0EY7   AAA (sf)
D-B-2      2254W0EZ4   BBB (sf)
D-B-3      2254W0FA8   CC (sf)
III-A-4    2254W0CJ2   AAA (sf)
III-A-8    2254W0CN3   AAA (sf)
III-A-9    2254W0CP8   AAA (sf)
III-A-14   2254W0CU7   AAA (sf)
III-P      2254W0ET8   AAA (sf)
IV-X       2254W0EQ4   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     2254W0EM3   AAA (sf)
IV-P       2254W0EU5   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      2254W0EV3   AAA (sf)
C-B-2      2254W0EW1   AAA (sf)
C-B-3      2254W0EX9   AA+ (sf)
C-B-4      2254W0FC4   AA- (sf)
C-B-5      2254W0FD2   BBB (sf)

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2003-1
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      2254W0FJ9   AAA (sf)
I-X        2254W0GA7   AAA (sf)
I-P        2254W0GC3   AAA (sf)
II-P       2254W0GD1   AAA (sf)
D-B-1      2254W0GJ8   AAA (sf)
III-A-4    2254W0FT7   AAA (sf)
III-A-7    2254W0FW0   AAA (sf)
A-X        2254W0GB5   AAA (sf)
III-P      2254W0GE9   AAA (sf)
III-B-1    2254W0GF6   AAA (sf)
III-B-2    2254W0GG4   AAA (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-10     32051DWV0   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     32051DWW8   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DWZ1   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     32051DXA5   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     32051DXB3   AAA (sf)
B-5        32051DXG2   CC (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-8
Series      2003-8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-2      32051DE57   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      32051DE65   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      32051DE73   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      32051DE99   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      32051DF23   AAA (sf)
I-A-8      32051DF31   AAA (sf)
I-A-10     32051DF56   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     32051DF64   AAA (sf)
I-A-12     32051DF72   AAA (sf)
I-A-17     32051DG48   AAA (sf)
I-A-18     32051DG55   AAA (sf)
I-A-19     32051DG63   AAA (sf)
I-A-20     32051DG71   AAA (sf)
I-A-34     32051DJ52   AAA (sf)
I-A-35     32051DJ60   AAA (sf)
I-A-36     32051DJ78   AAA (sf)
I-A-37     32051DJ86   AAA (sf)
I-A-38     32051DJ94   AAA (sf)
I-A-39     32051DK27   AAA (sf)
I-A-40     32051DK35   AAA (sf)
I-A-41     32051DK43   AAA (sf)
I-A-42     32051DK50   AAA (sf)
I-A-43     32051DK68   AAA (sf)
I-A-46     32051DK92   AAA (sf)
I-A-47     32051DL26   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DL34   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DL67   AA (sf)
B-4        32051DL91   CC (sf)
B-5        32051DM25   CC (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-9
Series      2003-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-4      32051DM74   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      32051DM82   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      32051DM90   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      32051DN24   AAA (sf)
I-A-10     32051DN57   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     32051DN65   AAA (sf)
I-A-12     32051DN73   AAA (sf)
I-A-PO     32051DN81   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     32051DP30   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DP48   AA (sf)
B-5        32051DP89   CC (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-AR3
Series      2003-AR3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A-1     32051DD33   AAA (sf)
III-A-1    32051DD58   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DD66   AA (sf)
B-5        32051DE24   CC (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J4
Series      2003-J4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      36185NYH7   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      36185NYJ3   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      36185NYK0   AAA (sf)
IO         36185NYL8   AAA (sf)
B-1        36185NYS3   CC (sf)
B-2        36185NYT1   CC (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J6
Series      2003-J6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        36185NZX1   AAA (sf)
A-3        36185NZY9   AAA (sf)
A-4        36185NZZ6   AAA (sf)
A-5        36185NA26   AAA (sf)
A-6        36185NA34   AAA (sf)
A-9        36185NB58   AAA (sf)
PO         36185NA59   AAA (sf)
IO         36185NB33   AAA (sf)
M-1        36185NA83   AA (sf)
M-2        36185NA91   A (sf)
B-1        36185NB66   CCC (sf)
B-2        36185NB74   CC (sf)

GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J7
Series      2003-J7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        36185NC73   AAA (sf)
A-6        36185ND49   AAA (sf)
A-7        36185ND56   AAA (sf)
A-8        36185ND64   AAA (sf)
A-9        36185ND72   AAA (sf)
A-10       36185ND80   AAA (sf)
PO         36185ND98   AAA (sf)
IO         36185NE22   AAA (sf)
M-1        36185NE55   AA (sf)
M-2        36185NE63   BBB- (sf)
M-3        36185NE71   CCC (sf)
B-1        36185NE89   CC (sf)
B-2        36185NE97   CC (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-9
Series      2003-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        36228FWR3   AAA (sf)
A-2        36228FWS1   AAA (sf)
A3         36228FWT9   AAA (sf)
X1         36228FWX0   AAA (sf)
X2         36228FWY8   AAA (sf)
X3         36228FWZ5   AAA (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6F
Series      2004-6F
Class      CUSIP       Rating
IA-1       36228F2D7   AAA (sf)
IA-2       36228F2E5   AAA (sf)
IA-3       36228F2F2   AAA (sf)
IIA-3      36228F2J4   AAA (sf)
IIA-4      36228F2K1   AAA (sf)
IIA-5      36228F2L9   AAA (sf)
IIA-6      36228F2M7   AAA (sf)
IIIA-3     36228F2Q8   AAA (sf)
IIIA-4     36228F2R6   AAA (sf)
IVA-1      36228F2U9   AAA (sf)
VA-1       36228F2V7   AAA (sf)
A-P        36228F2W5   AAA (sf)
A-X        36228F2X3   AAA (sf)
B1         36228F2Y1   AA (sf)
B5         36228F3W4   CC (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
Series      2003-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        41161PBV4   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      41161PBX0   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      41161PBY8   AAA (sf)
3-A        41161PCB7   AAA (sf)
B-1        41161PCD3   AA (sf)
B-2        41161PCE1   A (sf)
B-5        41161PCH4   CC (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        41161PCX9   AAA (sf)
2-A        41161PCY7   AAA (sf)
3-A        41161PCZ4   AAA (sf)
4-A        41161PDA8   AAA (sf)
X          41161PDB6   AAA (sf)
B-1        41161PDD2   AA (sf)
B-2        41161PDE0   A (sf)

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5
Series      2004-5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B3         41161PFE8   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A3
Series      2004-A3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      466247CV3   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      466247CW1   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      466247CY7   AAA (sf)
3-A-3      466247CZ4   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      466247DA8   AAA (sf)
4-A-2      466247DT7   AAA (sf)
S-F-1      466247DB6   AAA (sf)
S-F-2      466247DC4   AAA (sf)
S-F-3      466247DD2   AAA (sf)
S-B-1      466247DJ9   BBB (sf)
S-B-2      466247DK6   B- (sf)
I-B-3      466247DH3   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55265KPU7   AAA (sf)
2-A-13     55265KQH5   AAA (sf)
2-A-15     55265KQK8   AAA (sf)
2-A-16     55265KQL6   AAA (sf)
2-A-17     55265KQM4   AAA (sf)
2-A-18     55265KQN2   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      55265KQT9   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      55265KQU6   AAA (sf)
3-A-4      55265KQW2   AAA (sf)
3-A-5      55265KQX0   AAA (sf)
3-A-6      55265KQY8   AAA (sf)
3-A-7      55265KQZ5   AAA (sf)
PO         55265KRA9   AAA (sf)
15-A-X     55265KRB7   AAA (sf)
30-A-X     55265KRC5   AAA (sf)
15-B-1     55265KRE1   AAA (sf)
15-B-2     55265KRF8   AA+ (sf)
30-B-1     55265KRH4   AAA (sf)
30-B-2     55265KRJ0   AA+ (sf)
30-B-3     55265KRK7   AA- (sf)
15-B-5     55265KPP8   CC (sf)
30-B-4     55265KPR4   A- (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-2
Series      2003-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55265KRL5   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      55265KRN1   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      55265KRQ4   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      55265KRT8   AAA (sf)
2-A-7      55265KRU5   AAA (sf)
2-A-10     55265KRX9   AAA (sf)
15-A-X     55265KSB6   AAA (sf)
PO         55265KST7   AAA (sf)
15-B-1     55265KSU4   AAA (sf)
15-B-5     55265KTB5   CC (sf)
3-A-5      55265KSG5   AAA (sf)
3-A-11     55265KSN0   AAA (sf)
3-A-13     55265KSQ3   AAA (sf)
3-A-14     55265KSR1   AAA (sf)
30-A-X     55265KSS9   AAA (sf)
30-B-1     55265KSX8   AAA (sf)
30-B-2     55265KSY6   AA+ (sf)
30-B-3     55265KSZ3   AA (sf)
30-B-4     55265KTD1   A (sf)
30-B-5     55265KTE9   BB (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-3
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55265KTG4   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      55265KTH2   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      55265KTK5   AAA (sf)
3-A-5      55265KTR0   AAA (sf)
3-A-6      55265KTS8   AAA (sf)
3-A-7      55265KTT6   AAA (sf)
3-A-8      55265KTU3   AAA (sf)
3-A-17     55265KUD9   AAA (sf)
3-A-18     55265KUE7   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      55265KUG2   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      55265KUH0   AAA (sf)
PO-1       55265KUK3   AAA (sf)
PO-2       55265KUJ6   AAA (sf)
A-X-1      55265KUM9   AAA (sf)
A-X-2      55265KUV9   AAA (sf)
A-X-3      55265KUL1   AAA (sf)
A-X-4      55265KUW7   AAA (sf)
B-1        55265KUP2   AAA (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55265KUX5   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      55265KUY3   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      55265KVA4   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      55265KVB2   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      55265KVC0   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      55265KVD8   AAA (sf)
2-A-7      55265KXD6   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      55265KVE6   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      55265KVF3   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      55265KVG1   AAA (sf)
4-A-2      55265KVH9   AAA (sf)
4-A-3      55265KVJ5   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      55265KVK2   AAA (sf)
6-A-2      55265KVM8   AAA (sf)
6-A-3      55265KVN6   AAA (sf)
6-A-5      55265KVQ9   AAA (sf)
6-A-6      55265KVR7   AAA (sf)
6-A-7      55265KVS5   AAA (sf)
6-A-9      55265KVU0   AAA (sf)
6-A-10     55265KVV8   AAA (sf)
6-A-11     55265KVW6   AAA (sf)
6-A-16     55265KWB1   AAA (sf)
6-A-17     55265KWC9   AAA (sf)
7-A-2      55265KWE5   AAA (sf)
8-A-1      55265KWF2   AAA (sf)
8-A-3      55265KWH8   AAA (sf)
8-A-4      55265KWJ4   AAA (sf)
C-A-1      55265KWK1   AAA (sf)
C-A-2      55265KWL9   AAA (sf)
PO         55265KWM7   AAA (sf)
15-A-X     55265KWN5   AAA (sf)
30-A-X     55265KWP0   AAA (sf)
B-1        55265KWR6   AA+ (sf)
6-B-1      55265KWU9   AA+ (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-6
Series      2003-6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      55265KYE3   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      55265KYF0   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      55265KYG8   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      55265KYH6   AAA (sf)
3-A-3      55265KYJ2   AAA (sf)
3-A-5      55265KYL7   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      55265KYM5   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      55265KYN3   AAA (sf)
6-A-1      55265KYP8   AAA (sf)
6-A-5      55265KYT0   AAA (sf)
6-A-6      55265KYU7   AAA (sf)
6-A-7      55265KYV5   AAA (sf)
6-A-8      55265KYW3   AAA (sf)
6-A-9      55265KYX1   AAA (sf)
7-A-1      55265KYY9   AAA (sf)
8-A-1      55265KYZ6   AAA (sf)
9-A-1      55265KZA0   AAA (sf)
9-A-2      55265KZB8   AAA (sf)
9-A-3      55265KZC6   AAA (sf)
9-A-4      55265KZD4   AAA (sf)
9-A-5      55265KZE2   AAA (sf)
9-A-6      55265KZF9   AAA (sf)
9-A-7      55265KZG7   AAA (sf)
PO         55265KZH5   AAA (sf)
PP-A-X     55265KZJ1   AAA (sf)
15-A-X     55265KZK8   AAA (sf)
30-A-X     55265KZL6   AAA (sf)
15-B-4     55265KZU6   CC (sf)
15-B-5     55265KZV4   CC (sf)
30-B-4     55265KZX0   CC (sf)
30-B-5     55265KZY8   CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-7
Series      2003-7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      55265KA25   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      55265KA33   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      55265KA41   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      55265KA58   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      55265KA66   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      55265KA74   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      55265KA82   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      55265KA90   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      55265KB24   AAA (sf)
2-A-7      55265KB32   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      55265KB40   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      55265KB57   AAA (sf)
4-A-1      55265KB65   AAA (sf)
4-A-2      55265KB73   AAA (sf)
4-A-3      55265KB81   AAA (sf)
4-A-4      55265KB99   AAA (sf)
4-A-7      55265KC49   AAA (sf)
4-A-8      55265KC56   AAA (sf)
4-A-18     55265KD71   AAA (sf)
4-A-19     55265KD89   AAA (sf)
4-A-21     55265KE21   AAA (sf)
4-A-22     55265KE39   AAA (sf)
4-A-24     55265KE54   AAA (sf)
4-A-32     55265KF53   AAA (sf)
4-A-33     55265KF61   AAA (sf)
4-A-34     55265KF79   AAA (sf)
4-A-36     55265KF95   AAA (sf)
4-A-37     55265KG29   AAA (sf)
4-A-38     55265KG37   AAA (sf)
4-A-41     55265KG60   AAA (sf)
4-A-42     55265KG78   AAA (sf)
4-A-44     55265KG94   AAA (sf)
4-A-45     55265KH28   AAA (sf)
4-A-46     55265KH36   AAA (sf)
5-A-1      55265KH44   AAA (sf)
15-PO      55265KH51   AAA (sf)
30-PO      55265KH69   AAA (sf)
PP-A-X     55265KH77   AAA (sf)
15-A-X     55265KH85   AAA (sf)
30-A-X     55265KH93   AAA (sf)
B-1        55265KJ34   AA (sf)
B-5        55265KJ75   CC (sf)

MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-1      55265WAE3   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      55265WAF0   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      55265WAG8   AAA (sf)
3-A-3      55265WAH6   AAA (sf)
PO         55265WAP8   AAA (sf)
A-X        55265WAQ6   AAA (sf)
B-1        55265WAS2   AAA (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Series      2003-A2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      589929M70   AAA (sf)
I-A-1-IO   589929M88   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     589929M96   AAA (sf)
II-A-2-IO  589929N20   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     589929N38   AAA (sf)
II-A-3-IO  589929N46   AAA (sf)
II-A-4     589929N53   AAA (sf)
II-A-4-IO  589929N61   AAA (sf)
I-M-3      589929N95   CCC (sf)
II-M-1     589929P51   AA+ (sf)
II-M-2     589929P69   AA- (sf)
I-B-1      589929P28   CC (sf)
I-B-2      589929P36   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-A
Series      2003-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1A         589929F94   AAA (sf)
2A-1       589929G28   AAA (sf)
2A-2       589929G36   AAA (sf)
X-1A       589929T65   AAA (sf)
X-2A1      589929G51   AAA (sf)
X-2A2      589929G69   AAA (sf)
B-3B       589929H43   CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-C
Series      MLCC 2003C
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        589929S41   AAA (sf)
A-2        589929T73   AAA (sf)
X-A-1      589929S58   AAA (sf)
X-A-3      589929T99   AAA (sf)
X-B        589929S66   AAA (sf)
B-1        589929S82   AAA (sf)
B-2        589929S90   AA- (sf)
B-3        589929T24   BBB+ (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-F
Series      2003-F
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        5899292M9   AAA (sf)
A-2        5899292N7   AAA (sf)
A-3        5899292W7   AAA (sf)
X-A-2      5899292Q0   AAA (sf)
X-B        5899292R8   AAA (sf)
B-1        5899292T4   AAA (sf)
B-2        5899292U1   AA (sf)

PNCMT Trust Series 2000-1
Series      2000-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A-1     23321P5P9   AAA (sf)
II-X       23321P5U8   AAA (sf)
V-P        23321P5Y0   AAA (sf)

Prime Mortgage Trust 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      74160MEP3   AAA (sf)
I-A-2      74160MEQ1   AAA (sf)
I-A-3      74160MER9   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      74160MES7   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      74160MET5   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      74160MEU2   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      74160MEV0   AAA (sf)
I-A-8      74160MEW8   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     74160MEY4   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     74160MEZ1   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     74160MFA5   AAA (sf)
II-PO      74160MFB3   AAA (sf)
II-X-1     74160MFC1   AAA (sf)
B-2        74160MFH0   CCC (sf)
B-4        74160MFK3   CC (sf)

Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          743873AA9   AAA (sf)
B-1        743873AB7   AAA (sf)
B-2        743873AC5   AA (sf)
B-3        743873AD3   A- (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S11 Trust
Series      2003-S11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        76111J6N9   AAA (sf)
A-3        76111J6P4   AAA (sf)
A-4        76111J6Q2   AAA (sf)
A-5        76111J6R0   AAA (sf)
A-P        76111J6V1   AAA (sf)
A-V        76111J6W9   AAA (sf)
B-1        76111J7C2   CC (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S17 Trust
Series      2003-S17
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        76111XBR3   AAA (sf)
A-3        76111XBS1   AAA (sf)
A-4        76111XBT9   AAA (sf)
A-5        76111XBU6   AAA (sf)
A-6        76111XBV4   AAA (sf)
A-P        76111XBW2   AAA (sf)
A-V        76111XBX0   AAA (sf)
B-1        76111XCC5   CC (sf)
B-2        76111XCD3   CC (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust
Series      2003-S18
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        76111XDD2   AAA (sf)
A-2        76111XDE0   AAA (sf)
A-3        76111XDF7   AAA (sf)
A-P        76111XDG5   AAA (sf)
A-V        76111XDH3   AAA (sf)
M-1        76111XDK6   AA (sf)
M-2        76111XDL4   A (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S19 Trust
Series      2003-S19
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        76111XCJ0   AAA (sf)
A-7        76111XCM3   AAA (sf)
A-8        76111XCN1   AAA (sf)
A-9        76111XCP6   AAA (sf)
A-10       76111XCQ4   AAA (sf)
A-12       76111XCS0   AAA (sf)
A-P        76111XCT8   AAA (sf)
A-V        76111XCU5   AAA (sf)
M-1        76111XCX9   AA (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S7 Trust
Series      2003-S7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        76111J2U7   AAA (sf)
A-3        76111J2V5   AAA (sf)
A-4        76111J2W3   AAA (sf)
A-5        76111J2X1   AAA (sf)
A-6        76111J2Y9   AAA (sf)
A-7        76111J2Z6   AAA (sf)
A-7A       76111J5T7   AAA (sf)
A-9        76111J3B8   AAA (sf)
A-10       76111J3C6   AAA (sf)
A-11       76111J3D4   AAA (sf)
A-12       76111J3E2   AAA (sf)
A-15       76111J3H5   AAA (sf)
A-28       76111J3W2   AAA (sf)
A-P        76111J3X0   AAA (sf)
A-V        76111J3Y8   AAA (sf)
M-1        76111J4B7   AA (sf)
M-2        76111J4C5   A (sf)

RFSC Series 2003-RM2 Trust
Series      2003-RM2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-I-3      760985UX7   AAA (sf)
A-I-4      760985UY5   AAA (sf)
A-I-5      760985UZ2   AAA (sf)
A-I-6      760985VA6   AAA (sf)
AP-I       760985VF5   AAA (sf)
AV-I       760985VG3   AAA (sf)
A-II       760985VH1   AAA (sf)
AP-II      760985VJ7   AAA (sf)
AV-II      760985VK4   AAA (sf)
A-III      760985VL2   AAA (sf)
AP-III     760985VM0   AAA (sf)
AV-III     760985VN8   AAA (sf)
M-1        760985VT5   AA (sf)
M-III-1    760985VW8   AA+ (sf)
M-III-2    760985VX6   A+ (sf)
M-III-3    760985VY4   BBB+ (sf)
B-2        760985WA5   CC (sf)
B-III-1    760985WC1   BBB (sf)
B-III-2    760985WD9   BB (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series      2003-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
S          79549AYR4   AAA (sf)
IO         79549AYS2   AAA (sf)

Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-NBC1
Series      2003-NBC1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AV-1       79549ASB6   AAA (sf)
AV-2       79549ASC4   AAA (sf)
AV-3       79549ASD2   AAA (sf)
AV-4       79549ASE0   AAA (sf)
AF         79549ASF7   AAA (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4
Series      2003-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      81743PBH8   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      81743PBJ4   AAA (sf)
1-X-1A     81743PBM7   AAA (sf)
1-X-1B     81743PBN5   AAA (sf)
1-B-1      81743PBK1   AA+ (sf)
2-A-1      81743PBW5   AAA (sf)
2-X-1      81743PCA2   AAA (sf)
2-X-M      81743PCB0   AA+ (sf)
2-X-B      81743PCC8   AA (sf)
2-M-1      81743PBX3   AA+ (sf)
2-B-1      81743PBY1   AA (sf)
2-B-2      81743PCD6   A+ (sf)
2-B-3      81743PCE4   BBB+ (sf)
2-B-4      81743PCF1   BB (sf)
2-B-5      81743PCG9   B (sf)
1-X-2      81743PBP0   AAA (sf)
1-X-B      81743PBQ8   AA+ (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-3
Series      2004-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        81744FAZ0   AAA (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-19
Series      2004-19
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       863579JD1   AAA (sf)
1-A2       863579JE9   AAA (sf)
1-A2X      863579JF6   AAA (sf)
B2         863579JL3   CCC (sf)
B3         863579JM1   CC (sf)
B4         863579JN9   CC (sf)
B5         863579JP4   CC (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
Series      2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        86359BFY2   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359BGB1   AAA (sf)
3-A2       86359BGC9   AAA (sf)
3-A3       86359BGD7   AAA (sf)
4-A1       86359BGF2   AAA (sf)
4-A2       86359BGG0   AAA (sf)
4-A3       86359BGH8   AAA (sf)
4-A5       86359BGK1   AAA (sf)
5-A        86359BGN5   AAA (sf)
6-A        86359BGQ8   AAA (sf)
B1-II      86359BGW5   CCC (sf)
B3         86359BHA2   CC (sf)
4-A4       86359BGJ4   AAA (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-8
Series      2004-8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86359BWB3   AAA (sf)
1-A2       86359BWC1   AAA (sf)
1-A3       86359BWD9   AAA (sf)
2-A1       86359BWE7   AAA (sf)
2-A2       86359BWF4   AAA (sf)
3-A        86359BWG2   AAA (sf)
4-A        86359BWJ6   AAA (sf)
5-A4       86359BWP2   AAA (sf)
5-A4B      86359BXB2   AAA (sf)
5-A5       86359BWQ0   AAA (sf)
5-A5B      86359BXC0   AAA (sf)
5-A6       86359BWR8   AAA (sf)
5-A6B      86359BXD8   AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-CL1
Series      2003-CL1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-F1       86358HSS9   AAA (sf)
I-S1       86358HST7   AAA (sf)
I-S2       86358HSV2   AAA (sf)
I-F2       86358HSU4   AAA (sf)
I-I1       86358HSW0   AAA (sf)
I-I2       86358HSX8   AA+ (sf)
I-PO       86358HSY6   AAA (sf)
II-A1      86358HSZ3   AAA (sf)
II-B1      86358HTD1   AA (sf)
I-B2       86358HTB5   B (sf)
I-B3       86358HTC3   CC (sf)
II-B3      86358HTF6   CC (sf)
I-B4       86358HTL3   CC (sf)
II-B4      86358HTP4   CC (sf)
II-B5      86358HTQ2   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         86359ANX7   AAA (sf)
A2         86359ANY5   AAA (sf)
A3         86359ANZ2   AAA (sf)
A4         86359APA5   AAA (sf)
A5         86359APB3   AAA (sf)
A6         86359APC1   AAA (sf)
A7         86359APD9   AAA (sf)
A8         86359AQE6   AAA (sf)
AP         86359APE7   AAA (sf)
AX         86359APF4   AAA (sf)
PAX        86359APG2   AAA (sf)
B1         86359APH0   AA+ (sf)
B4         86359APM9   CCC (sf)
B5         86359APN7   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-20
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86359AD75   AAA (sf)
1-AX       86359AD83   AAA (sf)
1-PAX      86359AD91   AAA (sf)
1-AP       86359AE25   AAA (sf)
2-A1       86359AE33   AAA (sf)
2-A2       86359AE41   AAA (sf)
2-A3       86359AE58   AAA (sf)
2-A4       86359AE66   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359AF81   AAA (sf)
3-PAX      86359AF99   AAA (sf)
3-AP       86359AG23   AAA (sf)
A-X        86359AE90   AAA (sf)
2B1        86359AF40   AA (sf)
2B2        86359AF57   A (sf)
B3         86359AF65   CCC (sf)
B4         86359AB36   CC (sf)
2B4        86359AB69   CCC (sf)
B5         86359AB44   CC (sf)
2B5        86359AB77   CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-26A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1A         86359AS20   AAA (sf)
2-A        86359AS46   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359AS53   AAA (sf)
3-A5       86359AS95   AAA (sf)
4-A        86359AT52   AAA (sf)
5-A        86359AT78   AAA (sf)
6-A        86359AT86   AAA (sf)
7-A        86359AU35   AAA (sf)
B1-I       86359AU43   CCC (sf)
B3         86359AV26   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-29
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86359AV83   BBB (sf)
1-AP       86359AW25   BBB (sf)
2-A1       86359AW33   AAA (sf)
2-AX       86359AW41   AAA (sf)
2-AP       86359AW58   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359AW66   AAA (sf)
4-A1       86359AW74   AAA (sf)
4-A2       86359AW82   AAA (sf)
4-A3       86359AW90   AAA (sf)
4-A4       86359AX24   AAA (sf)
4-A5       86359AX32   AAA (sf)
4-AX       86359AX40   AAA (sf)
4-PAX      86359AX57   AAA (sf)
5-A1       86359AX65   AAA (sf)
5-A2       86359AX73   AAA (sf)
5-A3       86359AX81   AAA (sf)
5-A4       86359AX99   AAA (sf)
5-AX       86359AY23   AAA (sf)
1B2        86359AY49   CCC (sf)
B1         86359AY56   B+ (sf)
B2         86359AY64   CCC (sf)
B3         86359AY72   CC (sf)
1B4        86359AY98   CC (sf)
1B5        86359AZ22   CC (sf)
B4         86359AZ48   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-30
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86359A3X9   AAA (sf)
1-A3       86359A3Z4   AAA (sf)
1-A4       86359A4A8   AAA (sf)
1-A5       86359A4B6   AAA (sf)
1-AP       86359A4C4   AAA (sf)
2-A1       86359A4D2   AAA (sf)
2-A2       86359A4E0   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359A4F7   AAA (sf)
3-A2       86359A4G5   AAA (sf)
3-A3       86359A4H3   AAA (sf)
3-A4       86359A4J9   AAA (sf)
3-A5       86359A4K6   AAA (sf)
3-A6       86359A4L4   AAA (sf)
3-AP       86359A4M2   AAA (sf)
AX         86359A4N0   AAA (sf)
PAX        86359A4P5   AAA (sf)
B3         86359A4S9   CC (sf)
B4         86359A3U5   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series      2003-32
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86359A6T5   AAA (sf)
2-A1       86359A6U2   AAA (sf)
2-AP       86359A6V0   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86359A6W8   AAA (sf)
4-A1       86359A6X6   AAA (sf)
5-A1       86359A6Y4   AAA (sf)
AX         86359A6Z1   AAA (sf)
PAX        86359A7A5   AAA (sf)
B4         86359A7F4   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR9 Trust
Series      2002-AR9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A        9393357P4   AAA (sf)
II-A       9393357T6   AAA (sf)
II-B-1     9393357U3   AAA (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-S8 Trust
Series      2002-S8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-6      929227B62   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      929227E51   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     929227B88   AAA (sf)
II-A-7     929227C53   AAA (sf)
I-P        929227C61   AAA (sf)
II-P       929227C79   AAA (sf)
II-B-1     929227D37   AAA (sf)
II-B-2     929227D45   AA+ (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S5 Trust
Series      2003-S5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-4      9292272G0   AAA (sf)
I-A-8      9292272L9   AAA (sf)
I-A-9      9292272M7   AAA (sf)
I-A-10     9292272N5   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     9292272P0   AAA (sf)
I-A-12     9292272Q8   AAA (sf)
I-A-13     9292272R6   AAA (sf)
I-A-14     9292272S4   AAA (sf)
I-A-15     9292272T2   AAA (sf)
I-A-16     9292272U9   AAA (sf)
I-A-19     9292272X3   AAA (sf)
I-A-23     9292273B0   AAA (sf)
I-A-24     9292273C8   AAA (sf)
I-A-25     9292273D6   AAA (sf)
I-A-26     9292273E4   AAA (sf)
II-A       9292273J3   AAA (sf)
III-A      9292273K0   AAA (sf)
C-X        9292273V6   AAA (sf)
II-X       9292273W4   AAA (sf)
C-P        9292273L8   AAA (sf)
II-P       9292273M6   AAA (sf)
II-B-1     9292273R5   AA+ (sf)
C-B-5      9292273Y0   CC (sf)
II-B-4     9292274A1   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S8 Trust
Series      2003-S8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        92922FDD7   AAA (sf)
A-2        92922FDE5   AAA (sf)
A-3        92922FDF2   AAA (sf)
A-4        92922FDG0   AAA (sf)
A-5        92922FDH8   AAA (sf)
A-6        92922FDJ4   AAA (sf)
X          92922FDK1   AAA (sf)
P          92922FDL9   AAA (sf)
B-1        92922FDM7   AA (sf)
B-5        92922FDS4   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S9 Trust
Series      2003-S9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        92922FEN4   AAA (sf)
A-2        92922FEP9   AAA (sf)
A-3        92922FEQ7   AAA (sf)
A-4        92922FER5   AAA (sf)
A-5        92922FES3   AAA (sf)
A-6        92922FET1   AAA (sf)
A-8        92922FEV6   AAA (sf)
A-9        92922FEW4   AAA (sf)
A-10       92922FEX2   AAA (sf)
A-11       92922FEY0   AAA (sf)
X          92922FEZ7   AAA (sf)
P          92922FFA1   AAA (sf)
B-1        92922FFB9   AA (sf)
B-4        92922FEK0   CC (sf)
B-5        92922FEL8   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-S2 Trust
Series      2004-S2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      92922FQB7   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      92922FQC5   AAA (sf)
1-A-3      92922FQD3   AAA (sf)
1-A-4      92922FQE1   AAA (sf)
1-A-5      92922FQF8   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      92922FQG6   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      92922FQH4   AAA (sf)
2-A-3      92922FQJ0   AAA (sf)
2-A-4      92922FQK7   AAA (sf)
2-A-5      92922FQL5   AAA (sf)
2-A-6      92922FQM3   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      92922FQN1   AAA (sf)
3-A-2      92922FQP6   AAA (sf)
3-A-3      92922FQQ4   AAA (sf)
P          92922FQS0   AAA (sf)
B-4        92922FQX9   CC (sf)
B-5        92922FQY7   CC (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2003-MS6

Trust
Series      2003-MS6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A        939336ZC0   AAA (sf)
II-A       939336ZD8   AAA (sf)
III-A-6    939336ZK2   AAA (sf)
III-A-8    939336ZM8   AAA (sf)
C-X        939336ZN6   AAA (sf)
III-X      939336ZP1   AAA (sf)
C-P        939336ZQ9   AAA (sf)
III-P      939336ZR7   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      939336ZS5   AAA (sf)
C-B-2      939336ZT3   AA+ (sf)
C-B-5      939336YX5   CC (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-RA4

Trust
Series      2004-RA4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
C-B-1      939336U92   CC (sf)
C-B-2      939336V26   CC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-3 Trust
Series      2003-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-1      949774AA1   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      949774AD5   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      949774AE3   AAA (sf)
I-A-6      949774AF0   AAA (sf)
I-A-13     949774AN3   AAA (sf)
I-B-1      949774BE2   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     949774BC6   AAA (sf)
II-B-1     949774BH5   AAA (sf)
II-B-2     949774BJ1   AA+ (sf)
II-B-3     949774BK8   A+ (sf)
II-B-4     949774BS1   BBB (sf)
II-B-5     949774BT9   B (sf)
A-PO       949774BD4   AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-9 Trust
Series      2003-9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-3      949760AC6   AAA (sf)
I-A-4      949760AD4   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      949760AE2   AAA (sf)
I-A-7      949760AG7   AAA (sf)
I-A-8      949760AH5   AAA (sf)
I-A-10     949760AK8   AAA (sf)
I-A-11     949760AL6   AAA (sf)
I-A-13     949760AN2   AAA (sf)
I-A-14     949760AP7   AAA (sf)
I-A-15     949760AQ5   AAA (sf)
I-A-16     949760AR3   AAA (sf)
A-PO       949760AV4   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     949760AU6   AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-H Trust
Series      2003-H
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        94979XAA5   AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust
Series      2003-J
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-4      949808AD1   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      949808AE9   AAA (sf)
I-A-9      949808AJ8   AAA (sf)
I-A-10     949808AK5   AAA (sf)
I-A-12     949808AM1   AAA (sf)
II-A-1     949808AP4   AAA (sf)
II-A-2     949808AQ2   AAA (sf)
II-A-3     949808AR0   AAA (sf)
II-A-5     949808AT6   AAA (sf)
II-A-6     949808AU3   AAA (sf)
II-A-7     949808AV1   AAA (sf)
III-A-1    949808AW9   AAA (sf)
III-A-2    949808AX7   AAA (sf)
III-A-3    949808AY5   AAA (sf)
IV-A-1     949808AZ2   AAA (sf)
IV-A-2     949808BA6   AAA (sf)
IV-A-3     949808BB4   AAA (sf)
V-A-1      949808BC2   AAA (sf)
B-5        949808BH1   CC (sf)


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 80 North American ABS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services initiated a series of
CreditWatch placements after reviewing 240 classes from 54 asset-
backed securities (ABS) transactions from 11 issuers. "Our review
follows the Jan. 18, 2011, release of our updated criteria for
assessing counterparty risk (see 'Counterparty And Supporting
Obligations Methodology And Assumptions,' published Dec. 6,
2010)," S&P related. The CreditWatch actions include:

    S&P placed its ratings on 80 classes on CreditWatch negative:
    the issuers for 49 of the classes continue to work toward
    supporting them and the issuers for the other 31 classes are
    unlikely to support them.

    S&P determined that its ratings on 160 classes are not
    affected by itsupdated counterparty criteria: 97 classes have
    an appropriately rated counterparty, 30 classes were analyzed
    assuming counterparty nonperformance, and 33 classes are
    senior to affected tranche(s).

A complete list of public ratings affected by the rating actions
is available for free at:

   http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_ABSClassesAffectedBy71111.pdf

"Following the publication of our updated counterparty criteria,
14 North American issuers of asset-backed securities (ABS)
submitted written action plans outlining their intent to amend
transaction documents to comply with the updated counterparty
criteria. Based on our review of the action plans they submitted
at that time, we did not place our ratings on the issuers' related
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications (see '14
North American ABS Issuers Provided Action Plans For 61
Transactions To Address Revised Counterparty Criteria,' published
Feb. 2, 2011)," S&P related.

"Since January, we removed transactions from four issuers from the
issuer support list that we published Feb. 2, 2011, after the
issuers addressed the transaction's counterparty exposure, or in
our view, the existing counterparty documentation for the
transactions was compliant with our updated criteria," S&P
continued.

"The update summarizes our review of each of the remaining issuers
and their respective transactions including the resolution of
transactions that we have deemed unaffected by the revised
counterparty criteria," S&P said.

"We will continue our review of all the transaction ratings
related to counterparty criteria placed on CreditWatch negative as
we approach the criteria transition date of July 18, 2011," S&P
added.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G.
Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***