TCR_Public/110710.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 10, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 189

                            Headlines

1776 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
ACCESS GROUP: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2 Notes at 'BB'
ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds Ratings on Liquidity Facilities
AMMC CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
ANSONIA CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Certificates to 'D'

ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 7 Classes
ARGENT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades $413 Mil. Subprime RMBS Rating
BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms BACM 2003-1 Ratings
BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: Moody's Ups Ratings of Nine 2006-CAD1 Tranches

BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: Moody's Ups Ratings of Nine 2007-CAD1 Tranches
BEAR STERNS: DBRS Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Series 2007-TOP26
CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Final Rating to Class D
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Rates Credit Card Master Note Trust 2011-II
CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to 'BB-'
CARLYLE GLOBAL: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 5 CMBS Transactions
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M-2 Certs. to 'D'
CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'D'

CENTRAL PARK: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class F Deferrable Notes
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
CLYDESDALE CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC-'
COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: Moody's Upgrades 2007-1 CLO Notes Ratings
COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: Moody's Upgrades 2007-1 CLO Notes Ratings

COMM 2000-C1: Fitch Downgrades COMM 2000-C1 Ratings
COMM 2004-RS1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 5 Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms CSFB Series 1997-C1 Ratings
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on CSFB 1998-C1
CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Affirms Ratings on 5 Classes at 'CCC-'

CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B+'
DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Finalizes Rating of Class E at 'BB'
DRYDEN IX: S&P Affirms Ratings on Dollar Fund & Euro Fund at 'BB'
DUANE STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-
EDUCATIONAL LOAN: Fitch Affirms Rating on Sr. Subordinate Notes

EM FALCON: Fitch Upgrades EM Series 2008-1 Ratings
ESSEX PARK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
ESSEX PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
FIRST UNION: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of FUNBC 2000-C1
FORD AUTO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2010-R1, Class D

FORD AUTO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2010-R2, Class D
G-FORCE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Certificates to 'D'
GALLTIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
GEMSTONE CDO: S&P Affirms Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes at 'CC'
GENESIS FUNDING: Moody's Sees No Negative Ratings Impact Lease

GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B+'
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms GS Mortgage Series 1998-C1 Ratings
HARCH CLO: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Upgrades the Ratings of CLO Notes
HUDSON STRAITS: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'

JP MORGAN: DBRS Rating on Downgrades Class C to 'BB'
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Class H Rating to 'Dsf/RR6'
JP MORGAN: S&P Revises Rating on Class 3-A-4 Certs. to 'CCC'
KINGSLAND I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
LACERTA ABS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes of Notes to 'D'

LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B to 'CCC+'
LNR CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
LNR CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'CC'
LONE STAR FUNDS: Fitch Assigns Class E 'BBsf/LS5' Rating
MARQUETTE PARK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Series 2001-IQ Ratings
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Cuts Class J Rating to 'Csf/RR5'
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Class L Rating to 'Csf/RR3'
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Morgan 2002-TOP7 Ratings

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Rating on Class J Certs. at 'CCC'
MORTGAGE CAPITAL: Fitch Upgrades MCF Series 1998-MC2 Ratings
N-STAR REAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K From 'B+' to 'B'
NANTUCKET CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: S&P Ups Ratings on 5 Classes of Notes to 'BB+'

NOVASTAR ABS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'D'
NYLIM STRATFORD: Moody's Upgrades SF CDO Notes Ratings
OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes
PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings

PALISADES CDO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 7 Classes of Notes
PARTS STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Senior Note Rating
PERITUS I: S&P Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCC-'
PPM AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Class C Notes Rating at 'Csf'
REALT 2007-1: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'

REVELSTOKE CDO: DBRS Confirms Ratings on Various Notes at CC & C
ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
SANTANDER DRIVE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Final Rating to Class E
SANTANDER DRIVE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms Individual 'C' Rating

SOUTH STREET: Fitch Affirms Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
SOUTHFORK CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
STACK 2007-2: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
STANFIELD CARRERA: Moody's Upgrades $85MM of CLO Notes Ratings
STANFIELD VANTAGE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes

STATIC RESIDENTIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
US AIRWAYS: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class C Certificates

                            *********

1776 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by 1776 CLO I, Ltd.:

US$27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Baa1 (sf) Placed under review for possible upgrade;

US$35,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf)
Placed under review for possible upgrade;

US$16,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed under review for possible upgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

US$33,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed
under review for possible upgrade;

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $492 million, a
weighted average default probability of 18.9% (implying a WARF of
2603), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.25%,
and a diversity score of 35. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

1776 CLO I, Ltd. issued on April 26, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

A source of additional performance uncertainties is:

   -- Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
      reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
      collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
      covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
      worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
      rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
      coupon, and diversity score.


ACCESS GROUP: S&P Affirms Rating on Class B-2 Notes at 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on six
classes of notes issued from Access Group Inc.'s series 2005-A and
2005-B. Both securitizations are backed by private student loans.

"We originally placed our ratings on the notes from series 2005-A
and 2005-B on CreditWatch with negative implications on Sept. 22,
2008, due to each series' exposure to Lehman Brothers, which was a
named derivative counterparty. On July 1, 2010, we downgraded the
senior and subordinated notes to reflect our view of the
deteriorating collateral performance in the collateral pools and
maintained the CreditWatch negative placements pending the
proposed resolution of the counterparty exposure," S&P said.

"The rating affirmations reflect our view that the transactions
have sufficient credit enhancement levels to support the related
classes at their current rating levels. Our cash flow analysis and
ratings do not incorporate any benefit to the trusts from the
interest rate swaps. The trusts cash flows, stressed for the
requisite rating category of the senior and subordinate notes, are
sufficient to support the payment of interest and principal on the
notes while subjecting them to our interest rate paths," S&P
stated.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
student loan receivables backing these transactions relative to
its current cumulative default expectations and credit enhancement
available to each class.

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed floating-rate notes series 2005-
A
                 Rating
Class       To            From
A-2         AA (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3         AA (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes series 2005-B
                 Rating
Class       To            From
A-2         AA (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3         AA (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2         BB (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Neg


ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds Ratings on Liquidity Facilities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) (sf) for the Commercial
Paper (CP) issued by Alpine Securitization Corp. (Alpine), an asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) vehicle administered by Credit Suisse,
New York branch.  In addition, DBRS has confirmed the ratings and
revised the tranche sizes of the aggregate liquidity facilities (the
Liquidity) provided to Alpine by Credit Suisse.

The $8,202,914,897 aggregate liquidity facilities are tranched as:

  -- $7,870,750,163 rated AAA (sf)
  -- $66,978,441 rated AA (sf)
  -- $45,522,076 rated A (sf)
  -- $67,697,836 rated BBB (sf)
  -- $58,869,859 rated BB (sf)
  -- $25,525,256 rated B (sf)
  -- $67,571,266 unrated (sf)

The ratings are based on February 28, 2011 data.

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio.  The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is based
on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-wide credit
enhancement (PWCE).  The rationale for the CP rating is based on the
updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as DBRS' prior and
ongoing review of legal, operational and liquidity risks associated
with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality of
Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses each
transaction to a term standard.  The tranching of the Liquidity
reflects the credit risk of the portfolio at each rating level.  The
tranche sizes are expected to vary each month based on changes in
portfolio composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS' simulation
methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse ABCP conduit
portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS CDO Toolbox simulation model,
with adjustments to reflect the unique structure of an ABCP conduit and
its underlying assets.  DBRS determines attachment points for risk
based on an analysis of the portfolio and models the portfolio based on
key inputs such as asset ratings, asset tenors and recovery rates.  The
attachment points determine the portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA,
A through B as well as unrated.

DBRS models the portfolio on an ongoing basis to reflect changes in
Alpine's portfolio composition and credit quality.  The rating results
are updated and posted on the DBRS website.


AMMC CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by AMMC CLO VI, Limited:

US$63,250,000 Class A-1-B Notes due 2018, upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed on Watch for Upgrade;

US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed on Watch for Upgrade;

US$17,500,000 Class B Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed on Watch for Upgrade;

US$28,750,000 Class C Notes due 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed on Watch for Upgrade;

US$35,000,000 Class D Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed on Watch for Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $475 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18% (implying a WARF of 2825), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 49%, and a diversity score of 83.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

AMMC CLO VI, Limited, issued in June 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

A sources of additional performance uncertainties is:

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.


ANSONIA CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Certificates to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on class A-2 from Ansonia CDO 2007-1 Ltd., a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on 13 other classes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"The downgrade and affirmations reflect our analysis of the
interest shortfalls affecting the transaction as well as the
transaction's susceptibility to a future liquidation. Class A-2
and all of the classes subordinate to it did not receive full
interest according to the June 21, 2011, remittance report. The
interest shortfalls to the nondeferrable class A-2 certificates
prompted us to downgrade the class to 'D (sf)'. We previously
lowered our ratings on the nondeferrable class B, C, and D
certificates to 'D (sf)' following their interest payment
interruptions. The interest shortfalls to the nondeferrable
classes previously triggered an event of default under the
indenture based on an April 26, 2011, notice from the trustee,
U.S. Bank N.A. We affirmed our ratings on the class E certificates
and on those classes below it at 'CCC- (sf)', and all of these
certificates are deferrable," S&P related.

"Our understanding is that interest shortfalls resulted due to the
allocation of interest proceeds to principal proceeds. According
to the transaction's June remittance report, the trust allocated
$396,004 of interest proceeds from defaulted as principal
proceeds," S&P said.

According to the June remittance report, the collateral for
Ansonia 2007-1 consists of credit default swaps (CDS) referencing
53 CMBS, CRE CDO, and re-REMIC classes ($450 million, 90%) from 51
distinct transactions issued between 2004 and 2007. The collateral
also consists of seven CMBS and CRE CDO ($50 million, 10%) classes
from seven distinct transactions issued between 2005 and 2006.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Ansonia 2007-1 Ltd. according to its
current criteria. "Our analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Rating Lowered

Ansonia CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
A-2      D (sf)               CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Ansonia CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations

Class    Rating
A-1      CCC- (sf)
E        CCC- (sf)
F        CCC- (sf)
G        CCC- (sf)
H        CCC- (sf)
J        CCC- (sf)
K        CCC- (sf)
L        CCC- (sf)
M        CCC- (sf)
N        CCC- (sf)
O        CCC- (sf)
P        CCC- (sf)
Q        CCC- (sf)


ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 7 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven and affirmed two classes issued
by Anthracite CDO II Ltd./Corp. (Anthracite CDO II) as a result of
significant negative credit migration.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2010, 23.4% of the
portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, 48% of the portfolio has
a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 33.7% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 38.4%
and 19.3%, respectively, at last review. The class A notes have
received $9.5 million in paydowns since the last review, slightly
de-levering the transaction.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'. Based on this analysis,
the classes A through F notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For the class G notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class G
notes have been affirmed at 'CCCsf', indicating that default is
possible.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects adequate cushion
in the modeling results and the ability of the notes to withstand
future deterioration. The Negative Outlook on the class B through
E notes reflects that the real estate investment trusts (REIT)
bonds in the portfolio may be tendered next year which would
result in increased concentration risk. This increase may outweigh
the positive effect of further de-levering. The Loss Severity (LS)
rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches. Fitch does not assign LS
ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

Anthracite CDO II is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) that closed on Dec. 10, 2002. Currently, the
portfolio is composed of 84.9% commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS), 12.6% REIT debt, and 2.5% commercial real
estate loans (CREL).

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $60,273,997 class A notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable; to 'LS4' from 'LS3';

   -- $12,979,000 class B notes downgraded to 'AAsf/LS4' from
      'AAAsf/LS4; Outlook Negative;

   -- $31,000,000 class B-FL notes downgraded to 'AAsf/LS4' from
      'AAAsf/LS4; Outlook Negative;

   -- $42,978,000 class C notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS4' from
      'Asf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $5,000,000 class C-FL notes downgraded to 'BBB-sf/LS4' from
      'Asf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $19,991,000 class D notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS5' from
      'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $10,000,000 class E notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS5' from
      'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $12,850,000 class F notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
      'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $10,000,000 class G affirmed at 'CCCsf'.


ARGENT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades $413 Mil. Subprime RMBS Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches issued by Argent Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-W1. The
collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien
adjustable-rate and fixed-rate subprime residential mortgages.

Issuer: Argent Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-W1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Ratings Rationale

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" published in
November 2009.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the future
possible benefit of a mortgage pool insurance policy issued by
Radian Guaranty. The policy has a detachment point of 7.65% of
original balance, and if all potential claims were accepted could
provide a lifetime benefit of up to $191,250,016 (including all
claims paid to date). Additionally, overcollateralization and
excess spread serve as deductibles that must be exhausted in each
period before claims can be considered. If the pool policy
provider rejects claims, and overcollateralization and excess
spread are depleted, the tranches will experience losses. The
ratings of these two tranches would not be changed by a 10%
increase in collateral expected loss.

Pool insurance policies are intended to offer protection to
investors by reducing the amount of losses borne by a
securitization trust. Typically these policies work by reimbursing
losses from approved claims otherwise borne by the securitization
between fixed attachment and detachment points. The attachment
point (or deductible), is the amount of losses the securitization
trust bears before the insurance policy kicks in. The insurer is
expected to cover losses from approved claims up to the detachment
point (a pre-specified cap) at which time the securitization,
again, bears all losses. Claims may be contractually rejected by
pool insurance providers in several ways. The most prevalent is
rescission, typically occurring when the insurer deems that a loan
does not comply with the originator's established underwriting
guidelines. Denials (or "claims without payment"), represent a
relatively small portion of overall rejected claims, and,
according to insurers, typically result from incomplete/inadequate
documentation provided by the servicer to the insurer.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier. The tranches are wrapped by
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Rating Withdrawn). RMBS
securities wrapped by Financial Guaranty Insurance Company are
rated at their underlying rating without consideration of the
respective guaranties.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
report had a neutral impact on the rating.


BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Ballyrock CLO II, Ltd.:

US$290,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf) (current balance of $85,132,441); previously
on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2015
Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2015
Notes (current balance of $17,505,589), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; and

US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes
(current balance of $8,752,794), Upgraded to A3 (sf) ; previously
on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily due to delevering of the senior notes since the rating
action in August 2010. The actions also result from application of
Moody's revised CLO assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 52.5% or $94 million since the rating action in
August 2010. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action. Based on the latest trustee report dated June, 2010, the
Class A/B, Class C, and Class D Par Value Ratios are reported at
158.2%, 138.6%, and 119.2%, respectively, versus June 2010 levels
of 139.4%, 126.6% and 112.90%, respectively.

The actions also reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as
(2) increased BET liability stress factors and increased recovery
rate assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $225.9 million,
defaulted par of $427,274, a weighted average default probability
of 17.35% (implying a WARF of 3,146), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 48.78%, and a diversity score of 39. These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Ballyrock CLO II, Ltd. issued in November 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms BACM 2003-1 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 28 classes of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc. commercial mortgage pass through certificates,
series 2003-1.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement
after consideration for both defeased loans and expected losses
on the specially serviced loans. As of the June 2011 distribution
date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down 29.6% to
$727.1 million from $1 billion at issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool are 2.3%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the losses associated with
the specially serviced loans to be absorbed by the non-rated class
P.

There are 88 remaining loans from the original 112 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, 21 loans (36.1%) have defeased.

There are six specially serviced loans (3.4%) in the pool. Of the
six loans, one loan (0.8%) is in foreclosure, four loans (2.1%)
are real estate owned (REO) and one loan (0.5%) has a forbearance
period expiring at the end of June.

The largest contributor to losses is the Regal Springs asset which
is an apartment complex located in Dallas, TX. The property was
foreclosed upon in February 2009 and the receiver stabilized the
property for sale. The marketing process is complete and contract
negotiations are being finalized.

The second largest contributor to losses is the Ashby Crossing
Loan which is a student housing complex located in Harrisonburg,
VA. Performance for the property has declined as a result of a
surplus in student housing in the market coupled with stagnant
student enrollment due to a cut in funding to nearby James Madison
University. Occupancy declined to 41% at year-end (YE) 2010 from
56% at YE 2009. The loan was modified in May 2011 with an interest
only period from March 2011 to September 2012 and unpaid principal
and interest payments from 2010 and 2011 capitalized in a B-Note.

The Emerald Square Mall is the largest loan in the pool. As of
June 2010, the Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
for the A-note increased to 2.14 times (x) from 1.69x at issuance.
The Fitch stressed DSCR for the whole loan increased to 1.54x from
1.21x at issuance. The DSCR has increased as a result of ongoing
amortization payments which have reduced the balance of the whole
loan by $19.4 million (13.4%). The mall was 93% occupied as of
June 2010 and continues to perform in line with occupancy at
issuance.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Outlooks:

   -- $38.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $506.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $34.9 million class B at 'AAAsf'/LS3; Outlook Stable;

   -- $12.9 million class C at 'AAAsf'/LS5; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.5 million class D at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class F at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class G at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $10.3 million class H at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $21.9 million class J at 'BBB-sf/LS5; Outlook Negative;

   -- $7.7 million class K at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $6.5 million class L at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $6.5 million class M at'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative

   -- $5.2 million class N at 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $3.9 million class O at 'CCsf/RR1';

   -- $5.2 million class ES-A at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.8 million class ES-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.1 million class ES-C at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.3 million class ES-D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3 million class ES-E at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3 million class ES-F at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3 million class ES-G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.1 million class ES-H at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.1 million class SB-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.2 million class SB-B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.6 million class SB-C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.9 million class SB-D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.5 million class SB-E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes P, WB-A, WB-B, WB-C and WB-D. Fitch
has withdrawn the ratings of the interest only classes XP-1, XP-2
and XC.

The SB certificates represent an interest in a subordinate note
secured by the Sotheby's Building which is now fully defeased. The
ES certificates represent an interest in a subordinate note
secured by the Emerald Square Mall.


BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: Moody's Ups Ratings of Nine 2006-CAD1 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded nine tranches in BayView
Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1, and confirmed nine tranches in
Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1. Bayview Loan Servicing
is the servicer, and Interbay Loan Servicing Corp. is the special
servicer. The loans are secured by small commercial real estate
properties in Canada owned by small businesses and investors.
Almost all of the loans make small principal payments on a monthly
basis followed by a balloon payment at loan maturity. The majority
of loans will mature in 2012 through 2014.

Rating Rationale

The upgrade actions were prompted by a build-up in credit
enhancement from a non-declining overcollateralization target that
increases as a percent of the current pool balance in combination
with relatively stable collateral performance.

Over the past 12 months, delinquencies 60 days or more past due
have decreased to 7.9% from 9.4% and to 13.9% from 19.8% of the
current pool balances for the 2006 and 2007 deals, respectively,
as of the May 2011 distribution date. Cumulative net losses for
the 2007 deal increased more than the 2006 deal over the past 12
months. For the 2006 deal, cumulative net losses increased to 2.8%
from 1.9%, and for the 2007 deal, cumulative net losses increased
to 4.4% from 1.5% of the original pool balance.

The methodology used in these rating actions included projections
of expected losses and analysis of available credit enhancement.
For the 2006 deal, the projected lifetime net loss is 7.25% of the
original pool balance. In projecting the expected loss for this
deal, Moody's used representative delinquency roll rates and an
assumed loss severity of 60% for a period of economic stress and
50-30% thereafter. Additional loss was determined by assuming a
redefault rate of 25% on loans that have been modified to date and
are not delinquent. Moody's also assumed that 70% of the loans
will refinance when the balloon payment is due, and the remaining
loans will either default or may be extended and eventually
refinanced. Specific stress runs were also examined in the light
of these upgrade rating actions.

For the 2007 securitization, the projected lifetime net loss is
15% of the original pool balance. The assumptions used in
projecting the expected loss are similar to those of the 2006
deal. However, if loans are modified, the Private Placement
Memorandum states that the maturity dates may not be extended past
that of the loan with the longest maturity date as of closing (in
this case December 2014). As a result, Moody's assumed that all
loans that cannot be refinanced at their balloon maturity dates
will be a loss to the pool with 25% severity.

The Aaa volatility proxies are 40% and 55% for the 2006 and 2007
securitizations, respectively. Determining factors for the Aaa
volatility proxies were the credit quality of the collateral pool,
the historical variability in losses experienced by the issuer,
assessed servicer quality as well as industrial, geographical and
obligor concentrations.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession. If the lifetime expected
losses used in determining the ratings were increased by 50% the
model-implied results indicate that Class A-1 would not incur a
downgrade.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's website. Further information on Moody's analysis of this
transaction is available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction, and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BayView Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade


BAYVIEW COMMERCIAL: Moody's Ups Ratings of Nine 2007-CAD1 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded nine tranches in BayView
Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1, and confirmed nine tranches in
Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1. Bayview Loan Servicing
is the servicer, and Interbay Loan Servicing Corp. is the special
servicer. The loans are secured by small commercial real estate
properties in Canada owned by small businesses and investors.
Almost all of the loans make small principal payments on a monthly
basis followed by a balloon payment at loan maturity. The majority
of loans will mature in 2012 through 2014.

Rating Rationale

The upgrade actions were prompted by a build-up in credit
enhancement from a non-declining overcollateralization target that
increases as a percent of the current pool balance in combination
with relatively stable collateral performance.

Over the past 12 months, delinquencies 60 days or more past due
have decreased to 7.9% from 9.4% and to 13.9% from 19.8% of the
current pool balances for the 2006 and 2007 deals, respectively,
as of the May 2011 distribution date. Cumulative net losses for
the 2007 deal increased more than the 2006 deal over the past 12
months. For the 2006 deal, cumulative net losses increased to 2.8%
from 1.9%, and for the 2007 deal, cumulative net losses increased
to 4.4% from 1.5% of the original pool balance.

The methodology used in these rating actions included projections
of expected losses and analysis of available credit enhancement.
For the 2006 deal, the projected lifetime net loss is 7.25% of the
original pool balance. In projecting the expected loss for this
deal, Moody's used representative delinquency roll rates and an
assumed loss severity of 60% for a period of economic stress and
50-30% thereafter. Additional loss was determined by assuming a
redefault rate of 25% on loans that have been modified to date and
are not delinquent. Moody's also assumed that 70% of the loans
will refinance when the balloon payment is due, and the remaining
loans will either default or may be extended and eventually
refinanced. Specific stress runs were also examined in the light
of these upgrade rating actions.

For the 2007 securitization, the projected lifetime net loss is
15% of the original pool balance. The assumptions used in
projecting the expected loss are similar to those of the 2006
deal. However, if loans are modified, the Private Placement
Memorandum states that the maturity dates may not be extended past
that of the loan with the longest maturity date as of closing (in
this case December 2014). As a result, Moody's assumed that all
loans that cannot be refinanced at their balloon maturity dates
will be a loss to the pool with 25% severity.

The Aaa volatility proxies are 40% and 55% for the 2006 and 2007
securitizations, respectively. Determining factors for the Aaa
volatility proxies were the credit quality of the collateral pool,
the historical variability in losses experienced by the issuer,
assessed servicer quality as well as industrial, geographical and
obligor concentrations.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession. If the lifetime expected
losses used in determining the ratings were increased by 50% the
model-implied results indicate that Class A-1 would not incur a
downgrade.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's website. Further information on Moody's analysis of this
transaction is available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction, and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BayView Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-5, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade


BEAR STERNS: DBRS Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Series 2007-TOP26
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has downgraded these classes of the Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-Top26 transaction
and removed the Interest in Arrears:

Class O from C to D
Class N from C to D
Class M from C to D

DBRS has also confirmed five other classes in the transaction and
removed the Interest in Arrears on four of those classes:

Class G at C
Class H at C
Class J at C
Class K at C
Class L at C with Interest in Arrears

The downgrade is the result of realized losses that resulted from
one loan that was liquidated out of the trust and one loan that was
modified in June 2011.

Prospectus ID#6, Viad Corporate Center, is secured by a 476,528 sf
Class A office property located in the Uptown submarket in Phoenix,
just north of McDowell Road on Central Avenue.  The 24-story high-rise
was constructed in 1991, originally serving as the national
headquarters for the Dial Corporation.  The property includes several
retail units, auditorium and conference facilities, a fitness center,
and a performing arts theater.  The subject is located across the
street from the Phoenix Art Museum and is a prominent fixture in the
Central Avenue business district.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in March 2009 when the 95% managing member in the borrowing
entity cited difficulty making the scheduled interest payments on the
loan and refused to contribute further equity into the property given
the perceived value loss of approximately $60 million since issuance
when the property was valued at $105.6 million.  The May 2010 appraisal
obtained by the special servicer valued the property at $43 million (a
figure which represented an as-is value; the same firm concluded a
stabilized value of $57.3 million for the subject property in May
2010), indicating the concern over value decline was substantiated.
The property's performance has remained relatively stable since
issuance.  The YE2008 occupancy was at 93% and the DSCR was reportedly
1.25x, according to the special servicer.  At YE2009, occupancy had
fallen to 82% but the DSCR remained relatively healthy at 1.19x.
Occupancy has remained near 80% throughout 2010 and into Q1 2011 when
it was reported at 79%; the DSCR for Q1 2011 was reported by the
special servicer at 1.12x.  In May 2011, the special servicer processed
a sale of the property and loan assumption that resulted in a $9
million principal write down of the outstanding $65 million balance on
the loan.  As part of the transaction, the new borrower is to establish
a capital reserve in the amount of $8 million to fund tenant
improvements, leasing commissions, and capital repairs.

The realized loss of $9 million as part of the loan assumption and
modification was applied to the trust as part of the June 13, 2011
remittance report.  DBRS anticipates additional losses as the special
servicer fees and recoveries are collected in the coming months and
added to the loss on this loan; the cumulative loss amount on this loan
is estimated to be approximately $11.75 million, according to the
special servicer.  As such, the remaining loss figure should be
contained to the Class M and L certificates, which had a respective
balance of $231,383 and $5,265,000, as of the June 13, 2011 remittance
report.  These developments are in line with projections for this loan
at the time of the December 2010 review of this transaction by DBRS,
when Classes M and L were downgraded to C as part of a downgrade of 14
total classes in the transaction.  As the full loss amount is realized
for this loan, DBRS will review any affected classes for downgrades and
trend changes.

The remainder of the realized loss applied to the certificates as part
of the June 13, 2011 remittance report is due to the liquidation of
Prospectus ID#167, Boulevard Walk, at a loss of $764,354 to the trust.
This loan was secured by a 32,000 sf retail property in Tucker,
Georgia, a suburb located approximately 20 miles northeast of Atlanta.
The loan transferred to the special servicer in January 2010 for
payment default resulting from an occupancy decline at the property to
53% in Q4 2009.  The loan was liquidated in May 2011 as part of a note
sale by the special servicer after negotiations with the borrower for a
discounted payoff were not successful.

The unrated Class P certificates experienced a loss of $9.2 million as
part of the liquidation of Prospectus ID#31 at the time of the January
2011 remittance report.  The remaining balance of that class, as of the
June 2011 remittance report, was eliminated as a part of the realized
losses applied for the two loans previously discussed.

Since the time of the last review of this transaction in December 2010,
three loans have transferred to special servicing: Prospectus ID#95,
Fidelity National Title; Prospectus ID#127, High Pointe Center; and
Prospectus ID#206, Freeport Henry. These loans cumulatively comprise
0.53% of the pool balance, as of the June 13, 2011 remittance report.
As part of the continued surveillance on this transaction by DBRS,
these loans and the other loans currently in special servicing will be
monitored for developments.


CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Final Rating to Class D
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to these classes issued by
Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2011-II:

-Series 2011-II Notes, Class A-1 rated AAA (sf)
-Series 2011-II Notes, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
-Series 2011-II Notes, Class B rated A (high) (sf)
-Series 2011-II Notes, Class C rated BBB (sf)
-Series 2011-II Notes, Class D rated BB (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed all its outstanding ratings for the
Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust.


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Rates Credit Card Master Note Trust 2011-II
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings to Cabela's Credit Card Master
Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2011-II:

   -- $155,000,000 class A-1 fixed-rate 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $100,000,000 class A-2 floating-rate 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $24,000,000 class B fixed-rate 'A+sf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $12,750,000 class C fixed-rate 'BBB+sf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8,250,000 class D fixed-rate 'BB+sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's ratings are based on the underlying receivables pool,
available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's underwriting
and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's legal and cash
flow structures, which employ early redemption triggers.


CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI, Ltd.:

US$25,000,000 Class A-1D Delayed Draw Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021 (current balance of $23,819,109.56), Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$279,000,000 Class A-1T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current balance of $265,821,262.68), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $381 million,
defaulted par of $2.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 22.03% (implying a WARF of 2850), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.95%, and a diversity
score of 65. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd., issued in September 2007,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score.


CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the
class B-2 notes from Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I Ltd., a
collateralized bond obligation (CBO) transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management, to 'BB- (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf).' "Concurrently, we removed the rating on the class B-2 notes
from CreditWatch, where we placed it with positive implications on
March 30, 2011. At the same time, we affirmed our 'CC (sf)' rating
on the class C notes," S&P said.

"The upgrade mainly reflects an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the class
B-2 notes due to paydowns to the class A-2, A-3 and B-2 notes,
since May 7, 2010, when we downgraded the notes following the
application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria. Since then, the class A-2 and A-3 notes
have been paid in full. Additionally, since that time, the class
B-2 notes have been paid down by approximately $7.7 million, which
has reduced the notes' outstanding balance to 68.58% of their
original issuance. As a result of these paydowns, the support
available to the class B-2 notes has benefited from an increase in
O/C," S&P related. The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the
May 20, 2011 monthly report:

    The class B O/C ratio was 144.53%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 99.76% in March 2010; and

    The class C O/C ratio was 68.50%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 88.48% in March 2010.

"The upgrade also reflects the improvement in the credit
performance of the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since
we lowered the ratings on May 7, 2010. As of the May 2011 trustee
report, the transaction had $1.2 million of defaulted assets. This
was down from $7.7 million of defaulted assets noted in the March
2010 trustee report, which we referenced for our May 2010 rating
actions," S&P related.

"The affirmation of our rating on the class C notes reflects the
availability of credit support at the current rating level," S&P
said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To           From
B-2       BB- (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Affirmed Rating

Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I Ltd.
Class              Rating
C                  CC (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:             Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I, Ltd.
Coissuer:           Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I Corp.
Collateral manager: GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management
Underwriter:        CIBC World Markets Corp.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CBO


CARLYLE GLOBAL: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2011-1
Ltd./Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2011-1 Corp.'s
$471.0 million floating-rate notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 30,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, (see 'Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured term
    loans.

    The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.30%-12.35%," S&P related.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

    The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
    failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
    interest proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
    administrative expenses and fees; subordinated hedge
    termination payments; portfolio manager incentive fees; and
    subordinated note payments to principal proceeds for the
    purchase of additional collateral assets during the
    reinvestment period and to reduce the balance of the rated
    notes outstanding, sequentially, after the reinvestment
    period.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2011-1 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market
Strategies CLO 2011-1 Corp.

Class               Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)                333.0
B                   AA (sf)                  27.0
C (deferrable)      A (sf)                   49.0
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)                 26.0
E (deferrable)      BB(sf)                   25.5
F (deferrable)      B (sf)                   10.5
Subordinated notes  NR                       36.0

NR -- Not rated.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 5 CMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch takes various actions on CBA Commercial Assets, LLC, small
balance commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2004-1, 2005-1, 2006-1, 2006-2, and 2007-1.

The transactions are collateralized by small balance commercial
loans secured by multifamily, retail, office, industrial, and
mixed use properties. The transactions have experienced higher
than average delinquencies and realized losses to date. The
downgrades are the result of losses incurred and future
expectations for loss.

Fitch's current loan delinquency index is tracking at 8.81%.
Current delinquencies for the five transactions are:

   -- CBA 2004-1: 24.6% delinquent

   -- CBA 2005-1: 24.6% delinquent

   -- CBA 2006-1: 19.9% delinquent

   -- CBA 2006-2: 29.0% delinquent

   -- CBA 2007-1: 39.4% delinquent

Fitch assumed a 60% loss for those loans already delinquent; in
this scenario all rated classes in three of the five transactions
are expected to suffer a loss. Due to the significant losses
expected, Fitch did not model any additional losses.

CBA 2004-1:

Fitch downgrades, assigns, and revises Recovery Ratings to these
classes:

   -- $15.4 million class A-1 to 'BB/LS3' from BBB/LS3; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $6.7 million class A-2 to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $3.6 million class A-3 to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $2.9 million class M-1 to'C/RR1'; from 'BB/LS3';

   -- $3.6 million class M-2 to'C/RR1' from 'B-/LS4';

   -- $3.7 million class M-3 to 'C/RR6' from CCC/RR1.

Class M-5 remains at 'D/RR6'. Classes M-4, M-6, M-7, and M-8 were
not rated by Fitch at issuance. Fitch withdraws the rating of the
interest-only class I/O.

CBA 2005-1:
Fitch downgrades and revises Recovery Ratings:

   -- $63.7 million class A to 'C/RR1' from CCC/RR1';

   -- $7.5 million class M-1 to 'C/RR6' from CCC/RR1';

   -- $5.6 million Class M-2 to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Classes M-3, M-4, and M-5 remain at 'D/RR6' due to principal
losses incurred.

Classes M-6, M-7, M-8, and M-9 were not rated by Fitch at
issuance. The X-1 class is paid in full. Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest-only class X-2.

CBA 2006-1:

Fitch downgrades and revises Recovery Ratings on this class:

   -- $80.6 million class A to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR2'.

Fitch also affirms and revises Recovery Ratings on these classes:

   -- $4.6 million class M-1 at 'C'; Recovery Rating to 'RR6' from
      'RR2'.

   -- $4.6 million class M-2 at 'C/RR6'.

Classes M-3, M-4, and M-5 remain at 'D/RR6'. Classes M-6, M-7, and
M-8 were not rated by Fitch at issuance. Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest-only class X-1.

CBA 2006-2:

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $75.3 million class A at 'C/RR4';

   -- $3.7 million class M-1 at 'C/RR6'.

Classes M-2, M-3, M-4, and M-5 remain at 'D/RR6'. Classes M-6, M-
7, and M-8 were not rated by Fitch at issuance. Fitch withdraws
the rating of the interest-only class X-1.

CBA 2007-1:

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $85.3 million class A at 'C/RR4';

   -- $3.5 million class M-1 at 'C/RR6'.

Classes M-2, M-3, M-4, M-5, and M-6 remain at 'D/RR6'. Classes M-7
and M-8 were not rated by Fitch at issuance. Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest-only class X-1.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M-2 Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CBA
Commercial Assets LLC's series 2006-1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

"We lowered our ratings on the class A and M-1 certificates due to
continued poor collateral performance and credit support erosion.
The downgrade of the class M-2 certificate to 'D (sf)' reflects a
$406,285 principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of
the security. The current outstanding principal balance for the M-
2 class as of the June 27, 2011, remittance report is $4,180,715.
In addition, the class M-3 certificate has experienced a $139,536
principal loss. The current outstanding principal balance of class
M-3 has been reduced to zero. We had previously lowered our rating
on class M-3 to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

As of the June 27, 2011, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 161 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$89.0 million, down from 316 assets totaling $166.8 million at
issuance. Thirty-nine assets totaling $13.9 million (15.6%) are
with the special servicer. To date, the trust has experienced
losses totaling $17.8 million from 41 assets.

Ratings Lowered

CBA Commercial Assets LLC
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1
               Ratings
Class       To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
A           CCC+ (sf)   BB (sf)                       9.85
M-1         CCC- (sf)   B (sf)                        4.70
M-2         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)                     0.00


CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D
(sf)' from 'CC (sf)' on classes H and J from Centerline 2007-1
Resecuritization Trust (Centerline 2007-1), a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction. "At
the same time, we affirmed six 'CC (sf)' ratings from the same
transaction," S&P said.

The downgrades reflect principal losses of $87.5 million as
detailed in the June 22, 2011, remittance report. As a result of
the principal losses, the principal balance of class H was reduced
to $13.5 million from $29.6 million at issuance. Class J lost 100%
of its issuance balances ($34.5 million) according to the June
remittance report.

"We affirmed our 'CC (sf)' ratings on classes B through G to
reflect our expectations that the interest payments on these
classes will be deferred for an extended period of time due to a
termination payment owed to the hedge counterparty," S&P related.

According to the most recent trustee report, the principal
loss was due to losses on the underlying commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) collateral. Nine distinct transactions
experienced aggregate principal losses in the amount of
$87.5 million. These CMBS classes experienced significant
principal losses in the current trustee report:

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2007-PWR15
    (classes J though N; $38.3 million loss);

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2007-TOP26
    (classes M through P; $12.1 million loss); and

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2005-PWR10 (class
    S; $10.7 million loss).

According to the remittance report, Centerline 2007-1
was collateralized by 83 CMBS and three resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) certificates
($569.3 million, 100%) from 17 distinct transactions issued
between 2000 and 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Centerline 2007-1 according to its
current criteria. The analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
H        D (sf)               CC (sf)
J        D (sf)               CC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

Class    Rating
B        CC (sf)
C        CC (sf)
D        CC (sf)
E        CC (sf)
F        CC (sf)
G        CC (sf)


CENTRAL PARK: S&P Gives 'B+' Rating on Class F Deferrable Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Central Park CLO Ltd./Central Park CLO Corp.'s
$633 million floating-rate notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 30,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which can
    withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO
    Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
    assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, (see 'Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.3439%-12.5332%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Central Park CLO Ltd./Central Park CLO Corp.

Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)                  428
B                       AA (sf)                    91
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                     38
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                   36
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                    33
F (deferrable)          B+ (sf)                     7
Subordinated notes      NR                      54.95

NR -- Not rated.


CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd.:

US$ 381,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due August
2019 (current outstanding balance of $377,282,262), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$ 40,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due August
2019, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$ 27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes due August 2019, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$ 24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes due August 2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June
22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$ 21,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
due August 2019, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk and (2) modeling the collection of half a
period's interest payment on defaulted assets.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in August 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2537 compared to 2900
in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in August 2009. The Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 125.70%, 118.06% 112.01% and 107.96%, respectively,
versus July 2009 levels of 118.36%, 111.17%, 105.47 and 100.94%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $527.76 million,
defaulted par of $1.03 million, a weighted average default
probability of 18.49% (implying a WARF of 2641) a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.78%, and a diversity score of 71.
Moody's generally analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by
assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for all
collateral quality tests. However, in this case given the limited
time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis
reflects the benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that certain
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive "cushion" relative to the covenant requirements, as seen
in the actual collateral quality measurements. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high
   prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by
   the manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


CLYDESDALE CLO: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 notes from Clydesdale CLO 2004
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by Nomura Corporate Research and Asset Management. "At the same
time, we affirmed our rating on the class D notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect improved performance we have observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our ratings on
the rated notes on Oct. 23, 2009, following the application of our
September 2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria. As of the May 17, 2011, trustee report, the transaction
had $7.44 million in defaulted obligations and approximately
$14.23 million in assets from obligors with a Standard & Poor's
rating in the 'CCC' range. This was down from $32.24 million in
defaulted obligations and approximately $29.11 million in assets
from obligors with a Standard & Poor's rating in the 'CCC' range
noted in the Sept. 15, 2009, trustee report, which we used for our
October 2009 rating actions," S&P related.

S&P also observed an increase in the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to support the rated notes. The trustee reported these
ratios in the May 17, 2011 monthly report:

    The class A (O/C) ratio test was 129.64%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 119.31% in September 2009;

    The class B (O/C) ratio test was 117.88%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 111.67% in September 2009;

    The class C (O/C) ratio test was 110.50%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 106.63% in September 2009; and

    The class D (O/C) ratio test was 105.77%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 103.31% in September 2009.

"The affirmation of the rating on the class D notes reflects our
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating level," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And CreditWatch Actions

Clydesdale CLO 2004 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1                A- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2                A- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2                BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

Clydesdale CLO 2004 Ltd.

Class              Rating
D                  CCC- (sf)


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: Moody's Upgrades 2007-1 CLO Notes Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2007-1:

US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Place
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Place
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Place Under Review
for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's confirmed the rating of these notes:

US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at A1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Place Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in October 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile and (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in October 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2392 compared to 2897
in September 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in October 2009. The Class A/B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
119.62%, 113.31% and 108.13%, respectively, versus September 2009
levels of 115.49%, 109.45% and 104.48%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
Moody's also notes that the Class E Notes are no longer deferring
interest and that all previously deferred interest has been paid
in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $472.9, defaulted
par of $1.7, a weighted average default probability of 23.2%
(implying a WARF of 3001), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.42%, and a diversity score of 80. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2007-1, issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for
a copy of this methodology.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: Moody's Upgrades 2007-1 CLO Notes Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2007-1:

US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Place
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Place
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Place Under Review
for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's confirmed the rating of these notes:

US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at A1 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Place Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in October 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile and (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in October 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2392 compared to 2897
in September 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in October 2009. The Class A/B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
119.62%, 113.31% and 108.13%, respectively, versus September 2009
levels of 115.49%, 109.45% and 104.48%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
Moody's also notes that the Class E Notes are no longer deferring
interest and that all previously deferred interest has been paid
in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $472.9, defaulted
par of $1.7, a weighted average default probability of 23.2%
(implying a WARF of 3001), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.42%, and a diversity score of 80. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2007-1, issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for
a copy of this methodology.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


COMM 2000-C1: Fitch Downgrades COMM 2000-C1 Ratings
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of COMM 2000-C1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-C1:

   -- $26.9 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $6.7 million class H to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks:

   -- $8.5 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS5' Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.2 million class F at 'AAsf/LS5' Outlook to Negative from
      Stable.

Fitch affirms this class and revises the Recovery Rating:

   -- $6.7 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'Csf/RR2'

The $2.6 million class K remains at 'Dsf/RR6'. Classes L, M and N
remain at 'Dsf/RR6' and are fully depleted. Fitch does not rate
class O, and classes A-1, A-2, B, C, and D have all paid in full.

The downgrade is the result of principle losses following the
liquidation of specially serviced assets which Fitch had expected.
Fitch modeled losses of 31.4% of the remaining pool.

As of the June 2011 remittance report, the transaction has paid
down 93.0% to $62.7 million from $879.9 million at issuance. Ten
loans remain in the transaction, of which six (40.0%) are in
special servicing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal year-end net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and 9.5% to
determine value. All the loans also underwent a refinance test by
applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. All of the loans are modeled to
pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a 598 unit
manufactured housing community in Thetford Township, MI. This loan
was transferred to special servicing in May 2010, at which time
the borrower was granted a maturity extension to April 2012. The
trust continues to accrue unpaid principle and interest payments
to the closing of this modification.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
596,392 square foot (sf) industrial warehouse in Romulus, MI. This
loan, reported current as of June 2011, has a servicer-reported
year end 2010 DSCR of 0.86x. The servicer reported a 2010 year-end
occupancy of 67.8%, and average rental rates of $9.17/sf.


COMM 2004-RS1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 5 Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed nine classes issued
by COMM 2004-RS1, Ltd. (COMM 2004-RS1) as a result of continued
negative credit migration.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, the credit quality
of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted average Fitch
derived rating of 'BB+/BB', down from 'BBB-/BB+' at last review.
As of the May 30, 2011 trustee report, 8% of the portfolio is
currently experiencing interest shortfalls, compared to 0% at the
last review. The portfolio's concentration risk is high with only
21 assets from 12 obligors. One obligor, Marquee 2004-1, comprises
77.1% of the portfolio. Marquee 2004-1 is a repack of one
mezzanine class of CMCMT 1998-C1, a commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) resecuritization. The current weighted average
Fitch derived rating of CMCMT 1998-C1 has remained the same since
last review at 'B-/CCC+'.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The Rating Loss Rates (RLR)
were then compared to the credit enhancement of the classes. Given
the significant concentration of Marquee 2004-1 within the
portfolio, Fitch assigned shadow ratings to the Marquee 2004-1
classes based on an analysis of the CMCMT 1998-C1 portfolio using
the PCM. Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement for
classes A and B are generally consistent with the ratings assigned
below.

For the class C through N notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class C notes have been downgraded to 'CCCsf', indicating that
default is possible. Similarly, classes D through G have been
downgraded and classes H through N have been affirmed at 'CC',
indicating that default is probable.

The Negative Outlook on the class A and B notes reflects the risk
of adverse selection as the portfolio continues to amortize and
becomes more concentrated. The Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates
a tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance
Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with the probability of default for tranches. Fitch
does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and
below.

COMM 2004-RS1 is a CMBS mezzanine resecuritization that closed in
November 2004. Currently, 77.1% of the portfolio is composed of
six classes of Marquee 2004-1 and 22.9% is CMBS collateral.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $212,310,471 class A affirmed at 'BBBsf/LS2'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $39,020,000 class B-1 affirmed at 'Bsf/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $41,298,000 class B-2 affirmed at 'Bsf/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $13,386,000 class C downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $12,955,000 class D downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $4,318,000 class E downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $3,023,000 class F downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $2,056,000 class G downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $2,176,000 class H affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $725,000 class J affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $1,313,000 class K affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $1,520,000 class L affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $622,000 class M affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $2,384,528 class N affirmed at 'CCsf'.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms CSFB Series 1997-C1 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms five classes of Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s (CSFB) series 1997-C1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

The affirmations are a result of defeasance, stable performance
and minimal Fitch expected losses.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 93.4% to $89 million from $1.356 million at
issuance.

Four (51.4%) of the remaining 12 loans in the pool are defeased
and no loans are specially servied. Two loans (3%) are identified
as Loans of Concern (LOC) by Fitch.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal year-end net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and 9.5 %
to determine value. All the loans also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. All of the loans are modeled to
pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).

The largest Fitch LOC (1.8%) is secured by a privately owned
country club with an 18-hole golf course in Glastonbury, CT, a
southeast suburb of Hartford. Servicer reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) as of year-end (YE) 2009 was 0.89x. Property
revenue declined due to economic conditions however appears to be
recovering as YE 2010 DCSR has increased to 1.1x.

The second Fitch LOC (1.2%) is collateralized by a 74,400 square
foot office/R&D facility in Newbury, MA, and is 100% leased by
Varian Semiconductor (VSEA). The servicer recently advanced a
partial tax payment for the property and is expecting to be
reimbursed by the borrower.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Outlooks for these classes:

   -- $24 million class F at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13.6 million class G at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $27.1 million class H at 'BBB/LS1'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $17 million class I at 'B/LS1'; Outlook Negative.

The $7.5 million class J remains 'D/RR2' due to realized losses.
Classes A-1, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, B, C, and D have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate classes E or K. Due to released losses, class K has
been reduced to zero.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on CSFB 1998-C1
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 1998-C1.

The affirmations are a result of the pool's stable performance,
defeasance, as well as the high concentration of the pool
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction. As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has paid down 91.18% to $219 million from
$2.48 billion at issuance.

There are 63 of the original 326 loans remaining in the
transaction. Thirteen loans (13.53% of the pool balance) are
defeased. The remaining portfolio contains a high concentration of
retail properties (74.5%), most of which are secured by credit
tenant leases (71.2%). There are no specially serviced loans as of
the June 2011 remittance report.

Fitch modeled losses of 1.55% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 3.75%, which also
reflect losses already incurred to date. Any incurred losses are
expected to be absorbed by the non-rated class H. Fitch has
designated 28 loans (58.28%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Loss Severity (LS)
ratings:

   -- $23.2 million class E at 'AAA'; loss severity to 'LS2' from
      'LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $0 class I at 'D/RR6'.

Classes F, G, H and J are not rated by Fitch. Due to realized
losses classes I and J have been reduced to zero, and class H has
been reduced to $34.5 million from $49.6 million at issuance.
Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2MF, B, C and D have paid in full.

Fitch had withdrawn the rating of the interest-only class A-X on
June 23, 2010.


CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Affirms Ratings on 5 Classes at 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd. (Cobalt I), a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction. "We
also affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on five other classes from
this transaction. We also removed our ratings on classes A-1 and
A-2 from CreditWatch negative, where it was placed on Jan. 18,
2011," S&P said.

"The downgrade of class A-1 reflects our application of our
criteria for assessing counterparty and supporting obligations.
Cobalt I has in-place interest rate swaps with IXIS Financial
Products Inc. (A+/Stable/A-1) to mitigate interest rate risk that
may arise due to the class paying floating-rate coupon and the
transaction's assets paying fixed-rate coupons. In our analysis,
we modeled the transaction without the interest rate swaps and
determined that the 'AA+ (sf)' rating will not be able to
withstand the interest rate risk across different interest rate
scenarios. As a result, we lowered the rating on class A-1 to 'AA-
(sf)', which reflects the rating outcome without the interest rate
swaps, as well as our analysis of the transaction and the
underlying collateral," S&P said.

"The downgrades and affirmations on classes A-2 through G
primarily reflect our analysis of the transaction following our
rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
and CRE CDO securities that serve as collateral in Cobalt I.
We downgraded 22 securities from 14 transactions totaling
$102.2 million (31.4% of the total asset balance)," S&P related.

According to the May 18, 2011 trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included:

    Forty-one CMBS conduit tranches ($175.0 million, 54.7% of the
    collateral pool);

    Six CRE CDO tranches ($30.2 million, 9.5%);

    Six credit-linked notes ($27.9 million, 8.7%);

    Three raked bonds ($22.7 million, 7.1%);

    Four mezzanine loans ($16.8 million, 5.3%);

    One senior participations loan ($15.1 million, 4.7%);

    One whole loan ($12.1, 3.8%);

    One B note ($11.9 million, 3.7%); and

    Two junior participations loans ($8.1 million, 2.5%).

S&P's analysis of Cobalt I reflected exposure to these CMBS and
CRE CDO collateral that it has downgraded:

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. 2003-C2 (classes K
    and L; $13.8 million, 4.3%);

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. 2005-GG3 (class M
    and N; $13.5 million, 4.2%); and

    Kimberlite CDO I Ltd. 2006-1(class H; $13.0 million, 4.1%).

The trustee report noted seven defaulted loans in the
pool ($60.0 million, 18.8%) and 29 defaulted securities
($119.9 million, 37.5%). Standard & Poor's estimated specific
recovery rates for the defaulted loans to have a weighted average
of 59.9%. "We based the recovery rates on information from the
collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party data
providers," S&P said. The
defaulted loan assets are:

    The Dunes at Chesterfield senior participation ($15.1 million,
    4.7%);

    The Hilton Garden whole loan (12.1 million, 3.8%);

    The Four Seasons Town Centre B note ($11.9 million, 3.7%);

    The El Dorado Pointe Apartments mezzanine loan ($7.1 million,
    2.2%);

    The Shadow Pines Apartments mezzanine loan ($5.6 million,
    1.8%);

    The Brass Mill Center & Commons junior participation ($4.1
    million, 1.3%); and

    The Aguilar Apartments junior participation ($4.0 million,
    1.3%).

According to the trustee report, the deal is failing all interest
coverage tests and overcollateralization tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets according to its current criteria. "Our analysis
is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To               From
A-1              AA- (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2              A (sf)           AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To               From
B-1              BB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
B-2              BB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C                CCC- (sf)        BB (sf)
D                CCC- (sf)        B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd.

Class    Rating
E-1      CCC- (sf)
E-2      CCC- (sf)
F-1      CCC- (sf)
F-2      CCC- (sf)
G        CCC- (sf)


CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'B+ (sf)'
from 'BBB (sf)' on class A-1 from CWCapital COBALT Vr Ltd. (COBALT
Vr), a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction.

"The downgrade primarily reflects our analysis of the transaction
following the downgrade of 103 classes of commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) and CDO securities from 34 transactions.
The securities total $1.1 billion (41.3% of the total asset
balance)," S&P said.

According to the June 27, 2011 trustee report, COBALT Vr's current
assets include 197 classes ($1.8 billion, 69.9%) of CMBS pass-
through certificates from 46 distinct transactions. Cobalt Vr's
assets also include six classes ($406.6 million, 15.4%) from
CRIIMI MAE Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 1998-C1 and 10
classes ($388.5 million, 14.7%) from 10 CDO transactions. Total
assets totaled $2.6 billion, while total liability totaled
$3.2 billion. COBALT Vr has exposure to these collateral that
Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

    Crest 2003-1 Ltd (preferred shares; $179.0 million, 6.8%);

    Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-HQ6 (classes K through Q;
    $79.1 million, 3.0%);

    ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5 (classes H through P;
    $75.3 million, 2.8%);

    Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C22 (J
    through P; $74.4 million, 2.8%); and

    Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
    2005-C5 (classes K through Q; $68.8 million, 2.6%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets according to its current criteria. "Our analysis is
consistent with the lowered rating," S&P added.

Rating Lowered

CWCapital COBALT Vr Ltd.
$3.452 billion notes
              Rating
Class    To              From
A-1      B+ (sf)         BBB (sf)


DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Finalizes Rating of Class E at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has finalized the provisional ratings for these classes Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-LC2 issued by DBUBS
2011-LC2 Mortgage Trust.  The trends are Stable.

  -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-1FL at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3C at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (sf)
  -- Class C at A (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
  -- Class F at B (low) (sf)
  -- Class FX at B (low) (sf)

The collateral consists of 67 fixed-rate loans secured by 132
multifamily, mobile home parks and commercial properties.  The
portfolio has a balance of $2,143,913,255.  The pool consists of
relatively low-leverage financing, with a DBRS weighted-average term
DSCR and debt yield of 1.42 times (x) and 9.6%, respectively, based on
the trust amount.  Debt yields per rating category for the transaction
are relatively low compared with other fixed-rate conduit transactions
issued in 2010 and 2011, but they are still much higher than
transactions in 2006 and 2007.


DRYDEN IX: S&P Affirms Ratings on Dollar Fund & Euro Fund at 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, B-3, dollar fund, and euro fund notes
issued by Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund 2005 PLC. "At the same
time, we removed our ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and B-3 notes
from CreditWatch, where we had placed them with positive
implications on March 1, 2011," S&P said.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
at the current rating levels. As of the May 2011 trustee report,
the transaction had $6.7 million of defaulted assets, down from
$19.5 million noted in the February 2010 trustee report. The class
A overcollateralization ratio increased to 133.25% from 128.59%
during the same time period.

"We had placed our ratings on three classes on CreditWatch
positive in March 2011 to reflect the transaction's improved
performance since our last downgrade in April 2010, which followed
the application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized
debt obligation criteria," S&P related.

Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund 2005 PLC is a collateralized loan
obligation transaction managed by Prudential Investment
Management. The portfolio primarily consists of senior secured
leverage loans denominated in U.S. dollars and euros. The class A-
2, B-2, B-3, and euro fund notes were issued in euros.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Positive

Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund 2005 PLC
                              Rating
Class                     To           From
B-1                       A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2                       A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-3                       A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund 2005 PLC
                          Rating
Class                     To
A-1                       AA+ (sf)
A-2                       AA+ (sf)
Dollar fund               BB (sf)
Euro fund                 BB (sf)


DUANE STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2a, A-2b, B, C, D, and E notes from Duane Street CLO III
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by DiMaio Ahmad Capital LLC. "At the same time, we removed
four of the ratings from CreditWatch, where we placed them with
positive implications on March 30, 2011," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect the improved performance we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio. As of the May 31, 2011
trustee report, the transaction had $2.00 million in defaulted
assets, compared with the $35.09 million noted in the Nov. 30,
2009, trustee report, which we referenced for our December 2009
rating actions," S&P related.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the May 31, 2011 monthly
report:

    The class B O/C ratio was 123.66%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 118.52% in November 2009; and

    The class D O/C ratio was 109.65%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 105.09% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Duane Street CLO III Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To          From
A-1       AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2a      AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2b      AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B         AA- (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C         BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
D         BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)
E         B- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:              Duane Street CLO III Ltd.
Collateral manager:  DiMaio Ahmad Capital LLC
Underwriter:         Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.
Trustee:             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


EDUCATIONAL LOAN: Fitch Affirms Rating on Sr. Subordinate Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan note at 'AAAsf' and
the subordinate student loan note at 'Bsf' issued by Educational
Loan Company Trust I. The Rating Outlook remains Stable for senior
notes and Fitch has assigned a Negative Rating Outlook for the
subordinate note.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria', as well as the refined
basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press
release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP
SLABS Review' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement consisting of
subordination, overcollateralization and the projected minimum
excess spread to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.

Outlook Negative was assigned to the subordinate note to reflect
the low parity of approximately 97% as of the April 2011 report.
In addition, the trust is currently generating negative excess
spread resulting in the inability of the trust to increase parity
to par.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Educational Loan Company Trust I

   -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

   -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

   -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

   -- Class B affirmed at 'B/LS3'; Outlook Negative.


EM FALCON: Fitch Upgrades EM Series 2008-1 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the notes issued by EM Falcon Limited
Series 2008-1 (EM Falcon) and revised the Rating Outlook:

   -- COP49,000,000,000 variable rate notes to 'BBsf' from
      'BB-sf'; Outlook to Stable from Positive.

The upgrade reflects the June 22, 2011 upgrade of the reference
entity, Republic of Colombia, to 'BBB-' with a Stable Rating
Outlook. The rating also considers the credit quality of Morgan
Stanley (rated 'A', with a Stable Outlook by Fitch) as the swap
counterparty and issuer of the collateral (ISIN: US617446Q77).

Fitch considers the reduction of interest coupon from 15.67%
to 0.10% upon the occurrence of a credit event by the Republic
of Colombia (rated 'BB+', with a Stable Outlook by Fitch) a
conditional event. Therefore, Fitch's current rating on the
notes addresses the payment of a 15.67% annual coupon and
return of principal. This is a result of Fitch's application
of its 'Criteria for Rating Caps in Global Structured Finance
Transactions' dated June 23, 2010. The criteria state that in
cases where the terms and conditions specify the reduction of
interest subject to certain events, Fitch will depart from the
principle of rating to the documents and will also consider the
likelihood of a conditional event occurring in combination with
other structural arrangements.

At closing, the issuance proceeds from the notes were used
to purchase US Dollar (USD) 38,113,000 of the Morgan Stanley
senior unsecured notes (the collateral). Additionally, the
issuer entered into an interest rate/cross currency swap with
the swap counterparty, Morgan Stanley Capital Services (MSCS),
which is guaranteed by Morgan Stanley (rated 'A/F1', with a
Stable Outlook). Through the swap, the issuer forwards all USD
payments of interest and principal from the collateral to MSCS
in exchange for the agreed upon variable interest and ultimate
principal amounts, as described below. Also through the swap,
the interest paid to the issuer is variable and is linked to
the credit risk of the reference entity, the Republic of Colombia.
Upon a credit event of Colombia, principal redemption amounts
(COP49,000,000,000) are guaranteed by MSCS; however, the interest
rate paid to the noteholders (also paid by MSCS) will be reduced
from 15.67% per annum to 0.10% per annum, as per the governing
documents.

Payments of interest and principal are based on the COP Fixed
Rate Payer Calculation Amount (COP49,000,000,000), converted
into USD at the then-prevailing value of the COP/USD exchange
rate. If an Early Redemption Event occurs, as defined in the
governing documents, investors may be exposed to the market value
risk of the collateral due to its liquidation prior to maturity,
as well as foreign exchange risk upon conversion of the USD-based
collateral proceeds into COP. In addition, a swap termination
payment could be due from the issuer to the swap counterparty upon
early redemption.

Fitch applied its 'Global Rating Criteria for Single- and
Multi-Name Credit-Linked Notes' for this review and based
its rating on the two-risk CLN matrix with restructuring.
The highest risk-presenting entity (Republic of Colombia) is
considered the 'weakest link', as it contributes the most risk
to the transaction in terms of probability of default. The swap
counterparty guarantor and the collateral issuer are the same
(Morgan Stanley), and therefore treated as one risk presenting
entity.


ESSEX PARK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Essex Park CDO Ltd:

US$220,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2016 (current outstanding balance of $112,251,082.98), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$500,000 Class A-1v Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2016
(current outstanding balance of $255,116.10), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$49,500,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating Rate
Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of $25,256,493.67),
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$500,000 Class A-2v Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating Rate
Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of $255,116.10),
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$18,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$11,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$13,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$23,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$3,000,000 Class Z Combination Notes Due 2016 (current
outstanding Rated Amount of $1,360,400.61), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The
actions also reflect consideration of delevering of the senior
notes and credit improvement of the underlying portfolio since the
rating actions in August 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the 30% default probability macro
stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET
liability stress factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.
Additional changes to the modeling assumptions include (1)
subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted assets to
default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of half a
period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4) reducing
certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in
credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 49% or $132.5 million since the rating action in
August 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in August 2009. Based on the latest trustee report dated
June 16 2011, the Senior and Mezzanine overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 138.9% and 112.6%, respectively, versus
June 2009 levels of 123.8% and 106.5%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in August 2009. Based on the June 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 2488 compared to 2793 in June
2009, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately
4.7% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.9% in June 2009. The
deal also experienced a decrease in defaults. In particular, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about
$1.5 million from approximately $25 million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $240 million,
defaulted par of $1.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.1% (implying a WARF of 2685), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 50.0%, and a diversity score of 47.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Essex Park CDO Ltd., issued in September 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


ESSEX PARK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised and removed from
CreditWatch positive its ratings on nine classes of notes issued
by Essex Park CDO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by GSO Capital Partners L.P.

"We raised our ratings on the nine classes to reflect paydowns to
the class A-1a, A-1v, A-2a, and A-2v notes (the A notes) since our
December 2009 rating actions, following the application of our
September 2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria. After the June 2011 distribution as reported by the
trustee, the A notes were paid down to $138.017 million from
$270.500 as reported on the November 2009 trustee report," S&P
said.

The senior overcollateralization (O/C) ratio increased to 138.84%
from 123.49%, while the mezzanine O/C ratio increased to 112.61%
from 106.24% in the same time period. Also during this period, the
amount of assets in the transaction rated 'CCC' decreased to
$17.792 million from $38.601 million, while the amount of
defaulted obligations decreased to $1.480 million from
$22.450 million.

"We will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in our view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available," S&P added.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Essex Park CDO Ltd.

                  Rating
             To               From
A-1a         AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1v         AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2a         AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2v         AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1          AA (sf)          A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2          AA (sf)          A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1          A (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2          A (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BBB (sf)         BB (sf)/Watch Pos


FIRST UNION: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of FUNBC 2000-C1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of First Union National
Bank Commercial (FUNBC) Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2000-C1.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 5.41% of the
remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at 2.66%,
including losses already incurred to date. Fitch has identified 11
loans (44.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes six
specially-serviced loans (24.8%). Of the six loans in special
servicing, three loans (18.9%) are in foreclosure, one loan
(1.35%) is 90 days or more delinquent, one loan (3.4%) is past
maturity and non-performing, and one loan (1.15%) is past maturity
and performing. Fitch expects losses from loans currently in
special servicing to deplete class N and impact class M
significantly.

Of the original 143 loans, 24 loans remain outstanding. As of the
June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has reduced by 84.8% to $118.1 million from $776.3 million
at issuance. In addition seven loans (29.8%) have been fully
defeased. Interest shortfalls totaling $990,756 are currently
affecting classes M and N.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (6.97%)
secured by a 206,011 square foot (sf) retail center located in
Decatur, IL. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to the borrower's request for a discounted
payoff. The servicer reported occupancy as of March 2011 is 8%
even though the property is 87% leased with two vacant anchor
tenant spaces paying rent. The special servicer has agreed to a
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure to expedite the foreclosure process.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a limited
service hotel (7.7%) with 141 rooms located in Tampa, FL. The loan
was previously modified extending the maturity date until January
2012 and reducing the interest rate. The servicer reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of year end (YE) 2010 was .88
times (x) and the occupancy was 65%.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.15%)
secured by a 12,057 sf office complex located in Las Vegas, NV.
The loan was transferred to Special Servicing in January 2011 due
to the loan's pending maturity default of February 2011. The
original maturity date was February 2010 and the borrower was
granted a one-year extension but has still been unable to
refinance. The special servicer is currently in discussions with
the borrower on the workout strategy.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal YE net operating income, and
applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and 11.00% to
determine value.

All the loans also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Of the 24 remaining loans 16 are considered to
pay off at maturity and could refinance to a DSCR above 1.25x. The
current weighted average DSCR is 1.17x.

Fitch has downgraded and revised or assigned Recovery Ratings
(RRs) to these classes:

   -- $5.8 million class L to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B-/LS3';

   -- $8.7 million class M to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR3'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings:

   -- $6.2 million class C at 'AAA'; LS to LS4' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class D at 'AAA'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $25.2 million class E at 'AAA'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS2';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29.1 million class G at 'A+'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class H at 'A/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $3.9 million class J at 'A-'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class K at 'B-/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative.

Class N, which is not rated by Fitch has been reduced to $327,425
from $14.6 million at issuance due to realized losses. Classes A-
1, A-2, and B have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only class IO.


FORD AUTO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2010-R1, Class D
---------------------------------------------------------------
As part of DBRS's continued effort to provide market participants with
updates on an annual basis, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on these
notes issued by Ford Auto Securitization Trust (the Trust):

  -- AAA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-1

  -- AAA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-2

  -- AAA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-3
     (collectively with Class A-1 and Class A-2, the Class A Notes)

  -- AA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class B

  -- A (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class C

  -- BB (high) (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class D
     (collectively, with the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes, the
     Notes)

The ratings are based on these factors:

(1) High levels of credit enhancement are available to protect the
Notes.  Credit protection is provided to all the Notes by a non-
amortizing cash reserve account that was seeded with 1.0% of the
Initial Pool Balance and that represents 1.7% of the current Notes
outstanding amount as of April 2011.

(2) In addition, the Class A Notes have preferential access to
collections arising from the subordination of the Class B, Class C and
Class D Notes, equivalent to 10.7% of the outstanding amount of the
Notes as of April 2011.  Class B has preferential access to collection,
equivalent to 6.1% of the Notes, and Class C, to 3.1%.

(3) Front-end risk to the repayment of the Notes was addressed in this
transaction, with the inclusion of a requirement to maintain an
overcollateralization amount calculated as the addition of the excess,
if any, of 1.5% of the current pool balance over 1.0% of the Initial
Pool Balance.

(4) Total credit enhancement levels available to the Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D notes have increased to 12.4%, 7.8%, 4.7% and 1.7%,
respectively, measured as a percentage of the aggregate outstanding
notes balance as of April 2011.

(5) As the Initial Pool Balance was sold to the Trust at a discounted
value, the yield supplement overcollateralization amount created
contributes to the generation of excess spread of approximately 5.6% on
an annualized basis to support repayment of the Notes, assuming no
losses or requirements to pay the 1.0% replacement servicer fee.

(6) The collateral has performed well since inception and continues to
perform within expectations. The average delinquency ratio since the
onset of the transaction has been 58 bps, while the annualized loss
ratio has been 31 bps. Cumulative losses as of April 2011 amount to 32
bps of the Initial Pool Balance.

(7) The demonstrated experience of Ford Credit Canada Limited (FCCL) in
the origination and servicing of retail auto loan securitization
transactions backed by those assets.

(8) The performance guarantee provided by FCCL's parent, Ford Motor
Credit Company LLC.

(9) A high number of loans are greater than 60 months, resulting in
longer periods of exposure to potential losses.

The net proceeds of the Notes were applied by the Trust to finance the
purchase of a pool of retail car and light truck loans (the Portfolio
of Loans) acquired by FCCL.  As some of the loans were originated under
special programs that provided for low-rate financing, the average
annual percentage rate of the Portfolio of Loans was not sufficient to
cover the funding costs of the Notes issued by the Trust.  In order to
provide for interest spread, the purchase price paid for the loans by
the Trust was based on the net discounted book value.

The Notes pay a fixed rate of interest with monthly repayment of
interest and principal based on actual cash flows from the Portfolio of
Loans.  Principal on the Notes is being paid sequentially, with the
Class A-1 Notes being paid prior to repayment of the Class A-2 Notes
and the Class A-2 Notes being paid prior to repayment of any principal
on the Class A-3 Notes.  No amounts of principal will be applied to the
Class B, Class C and Class D Notes until the Class A Notes have been
repaid in full.  Principal on the Class B Notes will be repaid prior to
any principal repayments on the Class C Notes or Class D Notes and the
Class C Notes must be repaid in full prior to any repayment of
principal on the Class D Notes.

As the Portfolio of Loans receives blended monthly payments of
principal and interest on a fixed-rate basis, there is currently no
requirement to hedge the cash flows for interest rate mismatch since
the Notes offered also pay a fixed rate of interest.

Based on the current ratings of FCCL (BB and R-4, with Stable trends),
the structure of cash collections includes a mechanism to limit the
commingling risk of the servicer that, broadly, requires all amounts
collected to be remitted within two business days.  Recoveries from
charged-off receivables are remitted on a monthly basis net of auction
expenses.

If an event of default with respect to a series occurs other than
because of bankruptcy or insolvency of the Trust, the indenture trustee
or a majority of the controlling class for that series may accelerate
the notes of the series and declare them to be immediately due and
payable.  If an event of default with respect to a series occurs
because of bankruptcy or insolvency of the Trust, the notes of that
series will be accelerated automatically.  After an event of default,
principal due will be paid sequentially by class and interest due on
the notes will be paid pro rata, based on the principal amount of the
notes as of the end of the preceding payment date.

The performance and characteristics of the Portfolio of Loans and the
Notes are available and updated each month in the Monthly Canadian ABS
Report.


FORD AUTO: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2010-R2, Class D
---------------------------------------------------------------
As part of DBRS's continued effort to provide market participants with
updates on an annual basis, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on these
notes (collectively, the Notes) issued privately by Ford Auto
Securitization Trust (the Trust):

  -- AAA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R2, Class A
  -- AA (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R2, Class B
  -- A (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R2, Class C
  -- BB (high) (sf) on the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R2, Class D

The collateral has performed well since inception and continues to
perform within expectations.  In addition, the overall protection
levels are high and could withstand a significant deterioration in
credit performance.

DBRS is committed to confirming the ratings of publicly rated asset-
backed securities transactions on an annual basis as part of the
continuing effort to provide market participants with timely and
transparent updates.


G-FORCE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Certificates to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd. (G-Force 2006-1), a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on
six other classes, including our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on classes A-1
and A-2. We also removed our ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative implications on
Jan. 18, 2011," S&P said.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect continued interest
shortfalls to the transaction. "The affirmation of classes A-1 and
A-2 reflects our analysis and the classes ability to withstand the
current shortfalls. However, if the interest shortfalls increase,
we may take further rating actions as we see appropriate. As of
the June 29, 2011, remittance report, classes B through J have
accumulated interest shortfalls totaling $9.5 million. We lowered
our rating on the nondeferrable class B certificates to 'D (sf)'
due to the interest shortfalls. We previously lowered our ratings
on the nondeferrable class C, D, and E certificates to 'D (sf)'
following their interest shortfalls. We have determined that these
interest shortfalls to G-Force 2006-1 resulted from interest
shortfalls on the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) collateral. The interest shortfalls primarily reflect the
master servicer's recovery of prior advances, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees," S&P
related.

"On Jan. 18, 2011, following the implementation of our revised
criteria for assessing counterparty and supporting obligations, we
placed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 on
CreditWatch negative. The affirmation of our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
classes A-1 and A-2 reflects our application of our criteria for
assessing counterparty and supporting obligations, as well as our
analysis of the transaction and its underlying collateral. G-Force
2006-1 has in place interest rate swaps with JPMorgan Chase Bank
N.A. (AA-/Stable/A-1+) to mitigate interest rate risk that may
arise due to the certain classes paying a floating-rate coupon and
the transaction assets paying fixed-rate coupons. In our analysis,
we modeled the transaction without the interest rate swaps and
determined that our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 will
be able to withstand the interest rate risk across different
interest rates environments. Subsequently, we removed our 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 from CreditWatch negative,"
S&P stated.

According to the June 29, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
current assets included 77 classes ($542.5 million, 97.2%) of CMBS
pass-through certificates from 35 distinct transactions issued
between 1997 and 2006. The current assets also included two CRE
loans ($15.8 million, 2.8%). The aggregate principal balance of
the assets totaled $558.2 million, and the transaction liabilities
totaled $804.0 million.

Standard & Poor's has downgraded 21 securities from 11
transactions totaling $163.6 million (29.3% of the total asset
balance). G-Force 2006-1 has exposure to these securities that
Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding 2003-C1 (classes K
    through P; $43.9 million, 7.9%);

    GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II 2005-GG4 (class AJ;
    $20.0 million, 3.6%);

    Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C1 (class AJ;
    $20.0 million, 3.6%);

    Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C2 (class AJ;
    $20.0 million, 3.6%); and

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2003-PWR2 (classes
    K, L, M, and N; $17.3 million, 3.1%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria. "Our analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
SSFL             BB+ (sf)         BBB+ (sf)
A-3              CCC (sf)         BB (sf)
JRFL             CCC (sf)         BB (sf)
B                D (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
A-1              AAA (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
A-2              AAA (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Class            Rating
F                CCC- (sf)
G                CCC- (sf)
H                CCC- (sf)
J                CCC- (sf)


GALLTIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Gallatin CLO II 2005-1, Limited:

US$365,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$36,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

US$14,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017
(current outstanding balance of $13,756,049), Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and/or an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization
ratios since the rating action in July 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on the
latest trustee report dated June 2, 2011, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 2426 compared to 2776 in the June 2009
report. The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have
also improved since the rating action in July 2009. The Senior
Class A, Class A, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 122.57%, 115.11%, 108.5%, and 105.3%,
respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 120.32%, 112.92%,
106.44%, and 102.4%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of 487 million,
defaulted par of $11 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.63% (implying a WARF of 2590), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.12%, and a diversity
score of 51. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Gallatin CLO II 2005-1, Limited, issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


GEMSTONE CDO: S&P Affirms Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes at 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
the class A-1, A-3, B, and C notes from Gemstone CDO Ltd., a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction managed by HBK
Investments L.P., and removed its ratings on the class B and C
notes from CreditWatch with negative implications. "At the same
time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-2, D-1, D-2 and E
notes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect the credit deterioration we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our
ratings on two of the rated notes on Sept. 1, 2010. As of the
April 30, 2011 trustee report, the transaction had 31.0% in
defaulted obligations. This was up from 25.9% in defaulted
obligations noted in the July 30, 2010, trustee report, which was
used for our September 2010 rating actions," S&P stated.

S&P also observed a decrease in the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to support the rated notes. The trustee reported these
ratios in the April 30, 2011, monthly report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 86.95%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 120.78% in July 2010;

    The class C O/C ratio test was 65.75%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 96.90% in July 2010; and

    The class D O/C ratio test was 47.33%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 73.52% in July 2010.

"The affirmation of the ratings on the class A-2, D-1, D-2, and E
notes reflects our belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating level," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Gemstone CDO Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                BBB- (sf)    A (sf)
A-3                BBB- (sf)    A (sf)
B                  CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Neg
C                  CC (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Gemstone CDO Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-2                AA (sf)
D-1                CC (sf)
D-2                CC (sf)
E                  CC (sf)


GENESIS FUNDING: Moody's Sees No Negative Ratings Impact Lease
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) stated that its ratings on the
notes issued by Genesis Funding Limited (the Issuer), are not
being downgraded or withdrawn as a result of the appointment of
AerCap Ireland Limited (AerCap) as replacement servicer to the
Issuer's aircraft lease ABS transaction pursuant to the servicing
agreement dated as of June 30, 2011 (the New Servicing Agreement),
among Aercap, the Issuer and Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.
The former servicer was GE Capital Aviation Services, Limited. The
referenced ratings are the Issuer's Series Class G-1 Floating Rate
Asset Backed Notes Series 2006-1 due 2032 rated A3(sf).

The servicing transfer required a rating agency confirmation.

In assessing the potential impact on the ratings of the notes,
Moody's focused on the qualifications of AerCap as replacement
servicer and the obligations it undertakes under the New Servicing
Agreement.

Moody's notes that AerCap is the original and current servicer for
these aircraft lease ABS transactions: Aircraft Lease
Securitization Limited, Series 2007-1 Class G-3 due May 2032
currently rated Baa1(sf); Aircraft Lease Securitization II
Limited, Series 2008-1 C1ass A-1 and A-2 both due June 2038 and
currently rated A1(sf); and AerCo Limited Trust, Class A-3 due
July 2025 currently rated Ba3(sf), Class A-4 due July 2025
currently rated A3(sf), Class B-1 due July 2023 currently rated
Caa3(sf), Class B-2 due July 2025 currently rated Caa3(sf), Class
C-1 due July 2023 currently rated C(sf), Class C-2 due July 2025
currently rated C(sf) and Class D-2 due July 2025 currently rated
C(sf).

Moody's concluded that the servicing transfer would not have an
adverse effect on the credit quality of the rated securities.
However, Moody's is not expressing an opinion as to whether the
sale could have other, non credit-related effects that investors
may or may not view positively.

The principal methodology used in assessing the breach in
concentration limits was " Moody's Approach To Pooled Aircraft-
Backed Securitization", published in March 1999 and available on
www.moodys.com in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the
Research & Ratings tab. Other methodologies and factors that may
have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also
be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.


GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1 and A-2 notes from Granite Ventures III Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Stone Tower Debt
Advisors LLC. "At the same time, we removed the ratings from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
March 30, 2011. We also affirmed our ratings on three other
classes from the same transaction and removed our rating on the
class B notes from CreditWatch with positive implications," S&P
said.

"The upgrades reflect the improved performance we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio, as well as a roughly
$102.96 million paydown to the class A-1 notes. As of the May 16,
2011 trustee report, the transaction had $2.42 million in
defaulted assets, compared with the $2.79 million noted in the
Sept. 15, 2009, trustee report, which we referenced for our
October 2009 rating actions. Additionally, the class A-1 notes
were paid down to $209.04 million from $312.00 million over the
same time period," S&P said.

The affirmations reflect adequate credit enhancement available to
support the classes at the current rating levels.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the May 16, 2011 monthly
report:

    The class A-2 O/C ratio was 126.34%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 117.32% in September 2009;

    The class B O/C ratio was 116.15%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 110.63% in September 2009;

    The class C O/C ratio was 108.70%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 105.52% in September 2009; and

    The class D O/C ratio was 105.91%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 103.55% in September 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Granite Ventures III Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To          From
A-1       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2       AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B         A- (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Granite Ventures III Ltd.
Class        Rating
C            BB+ (sf)
D            B+ (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:              Granite Ventures III Ltd.
Collateral manager:  Stone Tower Debt Advisors LLC
Underwriter:         Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Trustee:             U.S. Bank N.A.
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms GS Mortgage Series 1998-C1 Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-C1.

The affirmation is based on sufficient credit enhancement for the
rating category offsetting Fitch expected losses and increasing
loan concentration with only 35 non-defeased loans remaining.
Rating Outlooks indicate the likely direction of any changes to
the ratings over the next one to two years.

Fitch modeled loss estimates reflect assumed losses on loans in
special servicing and on performing loans with declines in
performance indicative of a higher probability of default. Fitch
modeled losses of 8.3% of the remaining pool balance, the majority
of which are from the loans in special servicing.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 92.9% to $131.64 million from
$1.86 billion at issuance. As of June 2011, there are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $7.1 million, affecting
classes H through K. Twelve of the remaining 44 loans (19%) are
defeased.

In total, there are five loans (25.8%) in special servicing, one
of which is real-estate owned (REO). The largest contributors of
Fitch expected losses are all in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced asset (10.9% of the pool) is a
211,089 square foot (sf) office property located in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The asset was transferred to special servicing in
February 2011 for imminent default. The last reported occupancy
was 66% and the borrower has requested a loan modification.

The second largest specially serviced loan (8.2%) is secured by a
296,735 sf retail property located in Queensbury, NY. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2008 due to imminent
maturity default and a receiver has been appointed to oversee
operations at the property.

Fitch affirms this class:

   -- $23.3 million class G at 'BBBsf/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

The $46 million class H remains at 'Dsf/RR4', and class J remains
at 'Dsf/RR6' as it has been reduced to zero due to realized
losses. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and E have paid in full.
The unrated class K has been reduced to zero due to realized
losses. Fitch does not rate the $62.3 million class F.


HARCH CLO: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
---------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Harch CLO II Limited:

US$27,600,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$38,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and delevering of the senior notes
since the rating action in September 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A1 Notes have been paid down
by approximately 51% or $140.9 million since the rating
action in September 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in September 2009. Based on the latest trustee report
dated June 10, 2011 the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 128.97%, 119.71%,
105.64%, and 102.21%, respectively, versus August 2009 levels
of 115.44%, 110.63%, 102.69%, and 100.49% respectively. In
particular, the Class E overcollateralization ratio has increased
in part due to the diversion of excess interest to delever the
Class E Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $234 million,
defaulted par of $7.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.01% (implying a WARF of 2898), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.56%, and a diversity
score of 50. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Harch CLO II Limited, issued in November 9, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Upgrades the Ratings of CLO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd.:

US$321,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Notes Due August, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $285,598,243), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$14,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$12,700,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Amortizing Senior Secured Notes
Due August, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $3,810,007),
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,800,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Notes Due
August, 2017, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011,
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,800,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Notes Due August, 2017,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$14,800,000 Class D Deferrable Subordinated Secured Notes Due
August, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $13,317,806),
Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Caa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in January 2011. Based on the May 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2205 compared to 2258
in November 2010. Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the
rating action in January 2011 due to a decrease in the percentage
of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or
with a "Negative Outlook".

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in January 2011. The Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported in May 2011 at 118.11%, 112.56%, 107.51% and 103.34%,
respectively, versus November 2010 levels of 117.85%, 112.32%,
107.28% and 103.07%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. Since the
rating action in January 2011, $0.85 million of interest and
principal proceeds have reduced the outstanding balance of the
Class B-1 Notes by 6.7%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $351 million,
defaulted par of $8.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 14.13% (implying a WARF of 2358), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.86%, and a diversity
score of 64. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that certain collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements, as seen in the actual
collateral quality measurements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO III, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: A source of uncertainty in this transaction is
   whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace after the reinvestment period ends.
   Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
   loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
   have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


HUDSON STRAITS: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, D-1, D-2, and E notes from Hudson Straits CLO 2004
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by GSO Capital Partners L.P. "At the same time, we removed our
ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C, D-1, and D-2 notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
March 30, 2011," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect the improved performance we have observed
in the transaction and the paydowns on the class A-1 and A-2
outstanding note balances since our December 2009 rating actions.
According to the May 2, 2011 trustee report, the transaction held
approximately $1.6 million in defaulted assets, down from
$16 million noted in the November 2009 trustee report.
Additionally, the deal held approximately $7 million in assets
from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category, down from $26 million
during the same time period. The class A-1 and A-2 notes have paid
down approximately $44.6 million and $98.9 million of their
original balances since the transaction's reinvestment period
ended in July 2010," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And CreditWatch Actions

Hudson Straits CLO 2004 Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C           A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D-1         BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-2         BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E           B- (sf)     CCC- (sf)


JP MORGAN: DBRS Rating on Downgrades Class C to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed these ratings of nine classes of the J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2005-
LDP4:

Class A1A at AAA (sf)
Class A-3A1 at AAA (sf)
Class A-3A2 at AAA (sf)
Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
Class A-M at AAA (sf)
Class P at C (sf)
Class X-2 at AAA (sf)
Class X-1 at AAA (sf)

In addition, DBRS has downgraded these ratings of 13 classes:

Class A-J to A (low) (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
Class B to BBB (low) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
Class C to BB (low) (sf) to BBB (high) (sf)
Class D to B (low) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
Class E to CCC (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
Class F to C (sf) from B (low) (sf)
Class G to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class H to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class J to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class K to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class L to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class M to C (sf) from CCC (sf)
Class N to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

Classes F through P have Interest in Arrears. All trends are
Stable.

The downgrades are largely due to the projected loss associated
with the largest loan in the pool, Prospectus ID#2, Silver City
Galleria (6.05% of the current pool balance as of the June 2011
remittance report).  This loan is secured by 715,000 sf of a
971,000 sf regional shopping mall in Taunton, Massachusetts ,
which is located a 15 miles east of Providence, Rhode Island and
33 miles south of Boston.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in October 2009 due to imminent default and subsequently,
the borrower defaulted on the December 2009 payment.  The property
initially began experiencing cash flow issues when a former large
tenant, Steve and Barry's, vacated the premises.  Since that time,
the property has struggled to attract new tenants, and based on
the December 2010 rent roll was 81.7% occupied, with inline
vacancy at approximately 15.7%.  The property received an
updated appraisal in September 2010, which suggests a value of
approximately $56 million.  When compared against the current
outstanding balance on the loan of approximately $124 million, a
substantial loss is implied.  DBRS has liquidated this loan at a
67% loss severity, deflating the September 2010 appraised value
and comparing it to the current outstanding balance on the loan,
inclusive of outstanding fees and advances.  The projected loss on
this loan represents approximately 45% of the losses DBRS has
modeled in this review of the transaction.

Further prompting the downgrades is the projected loss associated
with the fourth largest loan in the pool, Prospectus ID#6,
Creekside Apartments (3.27% of the current pool balance, as
of the June 2011 remittance report).  This loan is secured
by a 1,026 unit garden-style multifamily property located in
Bensalem, Pennsylvania , which is approximately 25 miles north
of Philadelphia.  DBRS previously had this loan on the HotList,
as it was anticipated that the loan would experience difficulties
when converting from interest-only payments to P&I payments in
August 2010.  Shortly after the loan began amortizing, the
borrower defaulted and the loan was transferred to the special
servicer.  The property received an updated appraisal in June
2010, indicating a value of $50 million; however, DBRS has
obtained a T-12 as of February 2011 operating statement and by
using a conservative cap rate against the NOI reported in that
operating statement, the implied value is significantly less.
DBRS has used this value derived from this NOI and a 10% cap rate
to liquidate the loan at a 57% loss severity.

Together, the Silver City Galleria loan and the Creekside
Apartments loan represent 65% of the losses DBRS has modeled with
this review of the transaction.

As of the June 2011 remittance report, there are 173 loans
remaining in the pool, reporting a weighted-average DSCR of 1.46x,
which compares well with the weighted-average DSCR of 1.49x at
issuance.  However, the weighted-average LTV of 94% is
significantly higher than the weighted-average LTV of 73% at
issuance, and is representative of the 14 loans in special
servicing (17.9% of the current pool balance) and their respective
decline in value.

With this review, DBRS has confirmed the shadow rating of
Prospectus ID#3, Plastipak Portfolio (4.01% of the current pool
balance) at BBB (high).  This loan is secured by a 14 building
industrial and office portfolio that is fully leased to Plastipak
Holdings Inc.  The January 2011 OSAR reports a DSCR of 2.04x as
compared with a DSCR of 1.80x at issuance.  Additionally, the loan
amortizes on a 20-year schedule, down to $14 psf at maturity in
2015.  According to the January 2011 OSAR, the portfolio remains
fully occupied.  Given the enhancement performance, DBRS has
confirmed the shadow rating.

The DBRS analysis included an in-depth look at the top fifteen
loans in the transaction, in addition to the loans on the
servicer's watchlist, DBRS Hotlist, shadow-rated loans, and the
loans in special servicing.  Cumulatively, these loans represent
52% of the current pool balance.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis for
changes at the bond and loan level.  Although DBRS has
conservatively projected losses for the specially serviced and
most pivotal loans in the transaction, we continue to monitor
these loans on a monthly basis for any changes that may impact the
losses that those loans may realize.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Class H Rating to 'Dsf/RR6'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of J.P. Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp. series 1999-C8 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates:

   -- $15.9 million class H to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'Csf/RR4'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks:

   -- $646,266 class F at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $16.5 million class G at 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative.

Class J remains at 'Dsf/RR6', and Fitch does not rate class NR.
Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E have paid in full.

The downgrade is the result of principle losses following the
liquidation of specially serviced assets which Fitch had expected.
Fitch modeled losses of 20.9% of the remaining pool.

As of the June 2011 remittance report the transaction has paid
down 95.5% to $33 million from $731.5 million at issuance. Sixteen
loans remain in the transaction, of which one loan (1.5%) is
defeased and three (28.3%) are in special servicing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal year-end net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and 9.5 %
to determine value. All the loans also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. All of the loans are modeled to
pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a 61,786 square
foot (sf) multi-tenant office building in St. Louis, MO. CoStar
reports that the occupancy is 59% as of June 2011. The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2008 due to monetary
default, and the special servicer subsequently scheduled a
foreclosure for December 2008. The special servicer is attempting
to stabilize occupancy prior to marketing the property for sale.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled loss is
collateralized by a 120 unit health care facility in Lantana, FL.
This loan, which is current as of June 2011, has a servicer-
reported year end 2010 DSCR of 0.34x. According to the Master
Servicer Watchlist, as per latest inspection of July 2010, the
subject is well maintained and in good condition.


JP MORGAN: S&P Revises Rating on Class 3-A-4 Certs. to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
3-A-4 from J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R3 by
raising it to 'CCC (sf)' from 'D (sf)', and its ratings on classes
3-A-2, 3-A-3, 3-A-4A, 3-A-4B, 3-A-5, 3-A-6, and 3-A-7 from
Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through certificates WMALT Series
2006-5 Trust by raising them to 'CC (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.

"On April 19, 2010, we incorrectly lowered our ratings on classes
3-A-2, 3-A-3, 3-A-4A, 3-A-4B, 3-A-5, 3-A-6, and 3-A-7 from
Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through certificates WMALT Series
2006-5 Trust to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' based on the trustee's
March 2010 remittance report, which indicated that the classes
had experienced  principal write-downs. On May 25, 2010, we
incorrectly lowered our rating on class 3-A-4 from J.P. Morgan
Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R3 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
based on the trustee's April 2010 remittance report, which
indicated that the class had experienced a principal write-down,"
S&P stated.

However, the trustees subsequently issued revised remittance
reports that did not include the losses previously allocated to
these classes. "In turn, we corrected our rating on class 3-A-4
from J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R3 to its
previous rating of 'CCC (sf)'. We also corrected our ratings on
classes 3-A-2, 3-A-3, 3-A-4A, 3-A-4B, 3-A-5, 3-A-6, and 3-A-7 from
Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through certificates WMALT Series
2006-5 Trust to 'CC (sf)'. The corrected ratings reflect our
current analysis of the projected credit support for these classes
as of the May 2011 remittance report relative to projected
losses," S&P related.

Ratings Corrected

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R3
Series 2008-R3
                                 Rating
Class   CUSIP        Current     05/25/10     Pre-05/25/10
3-A-4   466308AH6    CCC (sf)    D (sf)       CCC (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series
2006-5

Trust
Series 2006-5
                                 Rating
Class   CUSIP        Current     04/19/10     Pre-04/19/10
3-A-2   93935BAC4    CC (sf      D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-3   93935BAD2    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-4A  93935BAE0    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-4B  93935BAF7    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-5   93935BAG5    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-6   93935BAH3    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)
3-A-7   93935BAJ9    CC (sf)     D (sf)       CCC (sf)


KINGSLAND I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Kingsland I, Ltd.:

US$100,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Delayed Drawdown Notes
(current outstanding balance of $98,575,877), Upgraded to Aaa;
previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$190,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
(current outstanding balance of $187,294,167), Upgraded to Aaa;
previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A2; previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A2; previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,250,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,750,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$7,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to B1; previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Type II Composite Notes (current outstanding rated
balance of $3,584,597), Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jun 22,
2011 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the 30% default probability macro
stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased BET
liability stress factors and increased recovery rate assumptions.
Additional changes to the modeling assumptions include (1)
subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted assets to
default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of half a
period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4) reducing
certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in
credit estimate updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in June 2011, and "Annual Sector Review
(2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $375 million, defaulted par of
$3.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 15.9%
(implying a WARF of 2553), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.8%, and a diversity score of 54. Moody's generally
analyzes deals in their reinvestment period by assuming the worse
of reported and covenanted values for all collateral quality
tests. However, in this case given the limited time remaining in
the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the
benefit of assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Kingsland I, Ltd., issued in July 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Kingsland I, Ltd. was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations",
published in June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2. Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


LACERTA ABS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 4 Classes of Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class B, C, D, and E notes from Lacerta ABS CDO 2006-1
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
backed primarily by synthetically referenced residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that the transaction has
insufficient collateral to return the principal amount currently
due on the rated class B, C, D, and E notes," S&P said.

"We based our opinion regarding insufficient collateral on the
June 6, 2011, trustee report, which stated that the transaction
held $413.84 million in total assets. Based on the May 16, 2011,
note valuation report, the transaction had $608.50 million in
funded liabilities and $414.09 million in an unfunded super senior
class that Standard & Poor's does not rate. The June 6, 2011,
trustee report listed $333.84 million of the transaction's total
assets as defaulted and noted that these assets had a combined
current market value of zero," S&P related.

Rating Actions

Lacerta ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
B                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
C                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
D                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
E                  D (sf)       CC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Lacerta ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-1                D (sf)
A-2                D (sf)


LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B to 'CCC+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 55
classes from Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Trust Series 2005-2, 2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2007-1, 2007-2, and
2007-3 and removed all of the ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications. "At the same time, we affirmed ten ratings
from seven transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications. Consequently, we withdrew our rating on
class A-IO from Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial's series
2005-2 after lowering it to 'A+ (sf)'," S&P said.

The transactions are backed by small business loans secured by
real estate. Historically, these types of loans are used to
purchase or refinance commercial real estate, and the collateral
consists primarily of first liens on commercial real estate.
Nearly all the loans in these transactions are also secured by
personal guarantees from the primary principals of the businesses.

"We placed 21 of the affected ratings on CreditWatch negative on
Jan. 18 2011, in connection with the implementation of our revised
counterparty criteria. We placed the other 44 ratings on
CreditWatch negative on April 4, 2011, due to the deterioration in
the credit performance as evidenced by rising delinquencies,
increased default frequencies, and lower recovery rates," S&P
related.

"The lowered ratings take into account both the updated
counterparty criteria and transactions' current performance. In
our review, we generated cash flow analysis to assess the credit
support available to these notes without giving benefit to the
interest rate hedge agreement that the transactions have entered
into with counterparties, stressing the transactions under various
interest rate scenarios in the absence of an interest rate hedges.
We also applied our conduit/fusion criteria, and found
that, in our view, the downgraded classes were not able to
withstand one or more stresses commensurate with their prior
rating levels. Consequently, we downgraded these classes to rating
levels commensurate with the stresses they could withstand," S&P
said.

All the transactions in this review have completely depleted their
reserve accounts due to the recent performance deterioration of
the pools backing them, as evidenced by rising delinquencies and
increased default frequencies. Total delinquencies range between
about 22% and 33% of the current pool balances and cumulative net
losses are between of 2.65% and 9.02% of the original pool
balances. Comparatively the total delinquencies were between
about 8% and 32% of the current pool balances and cumulative net
losses were between 0.7% and 2.15% of the original pool balances
as of May 2010.

"We withdrew our rating on class A-IO from Lehman Brothers Small
Balance Commercial's series 2005-2 after lowering the rating to
'A+ (sf)'. These actions reflect the application of our criteria
for rating interest-only securities," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review the outstanding ratings
and take additional rating actions as it deems appropriate.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial
2005-2

           Rating
Class   To          From
1A      A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A      A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BB+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      BB (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      B+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial
2006-1
           Rating
Class   To          From
1A      A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A      A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A3     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BBB+ (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      BB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      B+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
B       B (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2006-2

            Rating
Class   To          From
1A      A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      BB+ (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      B+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2006-3

           Rating
Class   To          From
1A      BBB+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3     BBB+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BB+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      B+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      B- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg


Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Loan Trust
2006-SBA

           Rating
Class   To          From
A       BBB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-1

            Rating
Class   To          From
1A      BBB- (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
2A1     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2     AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3     BBB- (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BB- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      B- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      CCC (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M4      CCC- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-2

           Rating
Class   To          From
1A2     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
1A3     BBB- (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
1A4     BBB- (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
2A1     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2     AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3     BBB- (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      BB- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      B+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      CCC+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M4      CCC- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M5      CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC- (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-3

           Rating
Class   To          From
1A2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A3     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A4     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A1     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AM      BBB (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Neg
AJ      BB (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M1      B+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M2      CCC+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
M3      CCC (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M4      CCC- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M5      CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
B       CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial
2005-2
             Rating
Class   To    Interim    From
A-IO    NR    A+ (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg


LNR CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. (LNR 2003-1), a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction. "At
the same time, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A. We
also removed our ratings on classes A, B, C-FL, C-FX, D-FL, and D-
FX from CreditWatch negative, where we placed them on Jan. 18,
2011," S&P stated.

"We lowered our ratings on classes B through J to reflect the
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral following
our downgrades of 47 securities that serve as underlying
collateral for LNR 2003-1," S&P stated.

LNR 2003-1 has interest rate swaps with Deutsche Bank AG
(A+/negative/A-1) to mitigate interest rate risk that may arise
due to the classes paying floating-rate coupons and the
transaction assets paying fixed-rate coupons.

"The affirmation of our 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A reflects
the application of our criteria for assessing counterparty and
supporting obligations and our analysis of the transaction and its
underlying collateral. In our analysis, we modeled the transaction
without the interest rate swaps and determined that the 'AAA (sf)'
rating on class A will be able to withstand the interest rate
risk across different interest rate environments. Subsequently, we
removed our rating on class A from CreditWatch negative," S&P
said.

"We lowered our rating on class B to 'AA (sf)' due to credit
deterioration of the assets. Class B was also able to withstand
the interest rate risk across different interest rate environments
in our analysis. We removed our ratings on classes C-FL, C-FX, D-
FL, and D-FX from CreditWatch negative as it is now at or below
the issuer credit rating assigned to the swap counterparty in the
transaction following our analysis of the transaction and its
underlying collateral," S&P related.

According to the June 21, 2011 trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes 125 classes of commercial mortgage-
backed securities from 33 transactions. According to the trustee
report, the deal is failing two principal coverage tests and two
interest coverage tests.

The 47 downgraded securities are from 15 transactions and total
$229.2 million (38.8% of the total asset balance). LNR 2003-1 has
exposure to these securities that Standard & Poor's has
downgraded:

    LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C4 (classes L through T;
    $50.9 million, 8.6%);

    LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C7 (classes M through T;
    $38.6 million, 6.5%);

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. series 2002-C1
    (classes M through P; $27.2 million, 4.6%); and

    LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C5 (classes L through Q;
    $21.3 million, 3.6%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria. "Our analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P added.

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
B                AA (sf)          AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C-FL             A+ (sf)          AA (sf)/Watch Neg
C-FX             A+ (sf)          AA (sf)/Watch Neg
D-FL             BBB+ (sf)        AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
D-FX             BBB+ (sf)        AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
E-FL             BB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
E-FX             BB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
F-FL             B- (sf)          BB+ (sf)
F-FX             B- (sf)          BB+ (sf)
G                CCC+ (sf)        BB (sf)
H                CCC- (sf)        BB- (sf)
J                CCC- (sf)        CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
A                AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)/Watch Neg


LNR CDO: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B, C, D-FL, D-FX, E-FL, E-FX, and E-FXD notes from LNR CDO
2002-1 Ltd., a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
backed primarily by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
and managed by LNR Property Corp, and removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class A, F-FL, F-FX, G, and H from the
same transaction and removed the rating on class A from
CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said.

"The lowered ratings reflect deterioration we have observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our ratings on
the class B, C, D-FL, D-FX, E-FL, E-FX, and E-FXD notes in October
2010. As of the April 2011 trustee report, the transaction had
$186.9 million (or 25.8%) of defaulted assets, up from the
reported $107.4 million (or 14.9%) in defaults noted in
the August 2010 trustee report, which we used for the October 2010
rating actions," S&P said.

"The affirmations of the ratings on the class A, F-FL, F-FX, G,
and H notes reflect our opinion of the availability of credit
support commensurate with the current rating level," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review its ratings on the notes
and assess whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent
with the credit enhancement available to support them and take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                   To           From
A                       A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                       BBB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C                       B+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Neg
D-FX                    CCC (sf)     B (sf)/Watch Neg
D-FL                    CCC (sf)     B (sf)/Watch Neg
E-FX                    CC (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
E-FXD                   CC (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
E-FL                    CC (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
F-FX                    CC (sf)
F-FL                    CC (sf)
G                       CC (sf)
H                       CC (sf)


LONE STAR FUNDS: Fitch Assigns Class E 'BBsf/LS5' Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Outlooks to LSTAR
(Lone Star Funds) 2011-1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

   -- $218,383,000 class A 'AAAsf/LS2'; Stable Outlook;

   -- $17,974,000 class B 'AAAsf/LS4'; Stable Outlook;

   -- $28,309,000 class C 'Asf/LS3'; Stable Outlook;

   -- $27,411,000 class D 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Stable Outlook;

   -- $7,639,000 class E 'BBsf/LS5'; Stable Outlook;

   -- $6,740,000 class F 'Bsf/LS5'; Stable Outlook.

Fitch does not rate the $53,023,579 class G, the residual class R
or the interest only class X.

Prior to closing, one loan, secured by 275 Chestnut Street (0.9%),
was removed from the pool.


MARQUETTE PARK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Marquette Park CLO Ltd.:

US$240,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due July
2020 (current outstanding balance of $222,746,030), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$26,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due July 2020, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,250,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due July 2020, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011,
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; and

US$8,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due July 2020, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22,
2011, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Moody's also notes that the deal has also benefited from
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in July 2009. Based on the June 2011
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2379 compared to 2608 in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009. The Class A, Class
B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
in June 2011 at 124.44%, 111.43%, 107.44%, 103.91%, respectively,
versus June 2009 levels of 117.24%, 105.68%, 102.10%, 98.89%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance. Since the rating action in July 2009,
$15 million of interest proceeds have reduced the outstanding
balance of the Class A Notes by 6.3% due to overcollateralization
test failures. Additionally, deferred interest on the Class D
Notes have been repaid since the last rating action in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $277.74 million,
defaulted par of $5.75 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.88% (implying a WARF of 2788), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.07%, and a diversity
score of 81. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that certain collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements, as seen in the actual
collateral quality measurements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Marquette Park CLO Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace at the end of the reinvestment period.
   Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
   loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may
   have significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 13 Classes
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 13 classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass through certificates,
series 2002-IQ2.

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement after
consideration for both defeased loans and expected losses from the
specially serviced loan. As of the June 2011 distribution date,
the pool's certificate balance has paid down 65% to $272.7 million
from $778.6 million at issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 1.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool are 1%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the losses associated with
the specially serviced loans to be absorbed by the unrated
class O.

There are 35 remaining loans from the original 105 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, three loans (37.4%) have
defeased.

There is one specially serviced asset (0.90%) in the pool which is
also the largest contributor to losses. The Meadowbrook Village
asset, which is a 36,810 retail property located in York, PA was
foreclosed upon in December 2009. The first phase of the property
was sold and proceeds from the sale were used to pay down the
loan. The remaining phase is real estate owned (REO) and was
occupied at 10.3% as of January 2011.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $262.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $25.3 million class B at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.3 million class C at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class D at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class F at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.8 million class G at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.7 million class H at 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.8 million class J at 'Asf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.9 million class K at 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.9 million class L at 'B+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.9 million class M at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.9 million class N at 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch does not rate class O. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and interest
only class X-2 have paid in full. Fitch has withdrawn the rating
of the interest only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Series 2001-IQ Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2001-IQ.

The affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance, low
future expected losses, as well as the high concentration of the
pool following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to
the transaction. As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has paid down 92.2% to $23.8 million from
$713 million at issuance.

There are 10 of the original 91 loans remaining in the
transaction. There are no specially serviced loans as of the June
2011 remittance report. Fitch expects minimal losses to the
remaining pool balance. Any incurred losses are expected to be
absorbed by the non-rated class O.

Fitch has identified four Loans of Concern (44.4% of the pool
balance). The largest loan of concern (20.1%) is secured by a
54,597 square foot suburban office complex in Charlotte, NC.
Updated financial information for the property have not been
received by the servicer since year end (YE) December 2005, which
at that time reported the debt service coverage ratio at 1.62
times (x), compared to 1.70x at issuance. Based on CB Richard
Ellis' first quarter 2011 Market View report, vacancy in the
Charlotte Midtown submarket is 18.1% with average market rents at
$20.97 per square foot (psf). The May 2011 rent roll reported
occupancy at 93%, with in place rents at $23.27 psf. Fitch
stressed the most recently received YE 2005 net operating income
(NOI) by 25% and applied an adjusted market cap rate of 10% which
resulted in zero losses for the loan. The servicer reported that
the property received a rating of 'good' at its most recent July
2010 inspection. The loan remains current as of the June 2011
remittance date.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to the most YE net operating income, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 8% and 11% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. All seven of the remaining loans are
considered to pay off at maturity, and could refinance to a DSCR
above 1.25x. The current weighted average DSCR for the remaining
loans is 1.50x.

Seven (63.3%) of the remaining 10 loans are fully amortizing.
Based on the weighted average maturity of 56 months for the
remaining loans and the future scheduled principal payments,
Fitch anticipates several years before full repayment of the
$9.7 million class J.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Loss Severity (LS)
ratings:

   -- $9.7 million class J at 'BBB'; loss severity to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.6 million class K at 'BB+'; loss severity to 'LS1' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.8 million class L at 'BB'; loss severity to 'LS2' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.4 million class M at 'B'; loss severity to 'LS1' from
      'LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.8 million class N at 'B-'; loss severity to 'LS2' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Negative;

Class O is not rated by Fitch, which has been reduced to
$1.66 million from $1.71 million at issuance due to realized
losses. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G and H have paid
in full.

The interest only class X-2 has paid in full. Fitch withdraws the
rating on the remaining interest-only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Cuts Class J Rating to 'Csf/RR5'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed three classes
of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc.'s commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2000-LIFE1.

The downgrade reflects an increase in Fitch expected losses. Fitch
modeled potential losses of 6.49% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 4.90%, reflecting
losses already incurred to date. The pool has become extremely
concentrated with only seven loans remaining.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 95.78% (to $29.1 million from $689
million), of which 91.16% were due to paydowns and 4.62% were due
to realized losses.

Fitch has designated two loans in the pool as Fitch Loans of
Concern, both of which are specially serviced loans (65.88%).
Fitch expects the losses associated with the specially-serviced
loans to impact classes J and K.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (30.36%) is a
specially-serviced loan secured by 113,071 square foot (sf) retail
store located in Scottsdale, AZ. The loan matured on Oct. 1, 2009
and was transferred to special servicing on Oct. 7, 2009 due to
maturity default. The borrower filed for bankruptcy on July 7,
2010 and the tenant, Robb & Stucky, filed for bankruptcy in
February 2011. The special servicer and borrower continue to try
to negotiate to resolve the default.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (35.52%) is
a specially-serviced loan secured by 136,213 square foot office
building located in Columbus, OH. The loan was transferred to
special servicing on Jan. 4, 2011 due to maturity default. The
property was 83% occupied as of Sept. 30, 2010. The special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

Fitch downgrades this class:

   -- $6.9 million class J to 'Csf/RR5' from 'CCsf/RR3'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and Outlook and revises
the Recovery Ratings (RR) and Loss Severity (LS):

   -- $5.8 million class F at 'AAsf', loss severity to 'LS3' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13.8 million class H at 'CCCsf', recovery rating to 'RR4'
      from 'RR1'.

   -- $0.9 million class K at 'D/RR6'.

Classes A-1, A-2 and B through E have repaid in full. Classes L
and M have been reduced to zero due to realized losses. Fitch does
not rate classes G and M.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Class L Rating to 'Csf/RR3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc., series 2005-XLF commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The transaction has one loan remaining and is collateralized
by the inline portion and sub-leasehold interest in the former
Macy's portion of Metrocenter Mall, a 1.4 million square foot (sf)
regional mall located in Phoenix, AZ. Metrocenter Mall is anchored
by Macy's, Dillard's, and Sears, and there are currently two
vacant anchor units. Dillard's currently operates a clearance
center out of the upper floor of their space.

The loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2009 due to
imminent default, and passed its final maturity date in February
2010. The property has suffered due to the downturn in the Phoenix
economy. Recent valuations have declined significantly over the
past two years due to falling market rents and occupancy.
Therefore, significant losses are expected on the securitized
loan. Fitch modeled losses would deplete class M and will likely
impair class L upon liquidation.

Fitch has downgraded this class and assigned a Recovery Rating:

   -- $36.8 million class L to 'Csf/RR3' from 'BBBsf'.

Fitch has affirmed this class:

   -- $3.5 million class K at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed and revised the Recovery Rating of this class:

   -- $64.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'Csf/RR5'.

Classes A-1 through J and the unrated classes N-TG, N-FB, and O-FB
have all paid in full.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Morgan 2002-TOP7 Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I
Trust 2002-TOP7 (MSDW 2002-TOP7) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 3.25% of the
remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at 3.38%,
including losses already incurred to date. Fitch has identified 20
loans (13.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include seven
specially-serviced loans (4.3%). Of the seven loans in special
servicing, three loans (1.23%) are in foreclosure, one loan
(.15%)is in REO, one loan (2.04%) is 90 days or more delinquent,
and one loan (1.45%) is past maturity and non-performing. Fitch
expects losses from loans currently in special servicing to
deplete classes N and M and impact class L significantly.

Of the original 146 loans, 123 loans remain outstanding. As of the
June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has reduced by 32.5% to $654.7 million from $969.4 million
at issuance. In addition 26 loans (24.95%) have been fully
defeased. Interest shortfalls totaling $416,548 are currently
affecting classes M, N, and O. The transaction is high
concentrated regionally with 28.5% located in the state of
California.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.75%)
secured by a 430,770 square foot (sf) industrial warehouse located
in Lathrop, CA. The property was a former Chrysler Parts facility
until Chrysler Motors filed bankruptcy and vacated the premises in
late 2009. The servicer reported the property as vacant as of
March 2011 as being marketed for prospective tenants.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (.66%)
secured by multifamily property with 211 garden style apartments
located in Forest Park Georgia, within the Atlanta MSA. The loan
was transferred to Special Servicing in April 2011 due to monetary
default. The special servicer is currently reviewing the
information and ordering third party reports.

Fitch has downgraded and revised or assigned Recovery Ratings
(RRs) to these classes:

   -- $10.9 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $8.5 million class J to 'B/LS5' from 'BB/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $7.3 million class K to 'CC/RR2' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $4.8 million class L to 'C/RR3' from 'CC/RR1'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Loss Severity and
Recovery Ratings:

   -- $530.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.2 million class B at 'AAA'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $29.1 million class C at 'AA'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.3 million class D at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.3 million class E at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $12.1 million class F at 'A-'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.3 million class G at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.8 million class M at 'C'; RR to 'RR6' from 'RR4'.

The $1 million class N remains at 'D/RR6'. Class O, which is not
rated by Fitch has been reduced to zero due to realized losses.
Class A-1 has paid in full.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Rating on Class J Certs. at 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-PPM, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on three other classes from the
same transaction," S&P said.

"The upgrades and affirmations follow our analysis of the
transaction primarily using our U.S. conduit and fusion criteria.
Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction structure,
the liquidity available to the trust, and increased credit
enhancement levels due to deleveraging of the pool. The upgrades
also considered the seasoning of the remaining loans in the pool,
our low adjusted loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 39.6%, and adjusted
debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.31x for the pool. We also
considered the fact that 19 ($47.7 million, 87.4%) of the 22
remaining loans will fully amortize by their respective maturity
dates. In addition, as of the June 15, 2011, trustee remittance
report, there were no loans with the special servicer," S&P said.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted DSC of 1.31x and a LTV ratio of 39.6%. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.14x and an LTV ratio of 49.3%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
7.3% and 8.2%, respectively. All of the DSC and LTV calculations
we noted exclude one loan ($2.7 million, 4.9%) we determined to be
credit-impaired, which is discussed further below. We separately
estimated losses for the credit-impaired loan and included it in
the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures," S&P
related.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our rating
on the class X interest-only certificate based on our current
criteria," S&P said.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 15, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a trust balance of $54.5 million and 22 loans, down from
$623.6 million and 132 loans at issuance. The master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), provided financial
information for all the remaining loans in the pool, 95.8% of
which was full-year 2010 data and the remainder was full-year
2009 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.31x for the pool based
on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.31x
and 39.6%, excluding the one loan ($2.7 million, 4.9%) we
determined to be credit-impaired. We separately estimated losses
for the credit-impaired loan and included it in the 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures. The trust has
experienced $14.8 million in principal losses related to three
assets. Five loans ($15.1 million, 27.8%), including three of the
top 10 loans in the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Six loans in the pool ($16.7 million, 30.6%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.10x," S&P said.

                    Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $40.1 million (73.7%). "Using servicer-reported numbers,
we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.26x for the top 10
loans. Excluding the ninth-largest loan in the pool, the IRS
Office Building loan ($2.7 million, 4.9%), which we determined
to be credit-impaired and is also on the master servicer's
watchlist, our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for nine of the top 10
loans were 1.28x and 43.2%, respectively. Two other top 10 loans
($10.4 million, 19.1%) appear on the master servicer's watchlist,"
S&P said. The three loans on Berkadia's watchlist are discussed.

The Crabtree Crossing Apartments loan ($7.2 million, 13.2%) is
the second-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 208-unit
apartment complex in Morrisville, N.C. According to the master
servicer, the loan is on its watchlist because of a low reported
DSC. The reported DSC and occupancy have improved as of Dec. 31,
2010, to 1.00x and 97.1% from 0.83x and 68.0% as of Dec. 31, 2009.
Berkadia expects to remove the loan from its watchlist for its
July reporting period.

The Bayside Bridge Plaza Shopping Center loan ($3.2 million, 5.9%)
is the sixth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 172,600-
sq.-ft. retail center in Clearwater, Fla. According to Berkadia,
the loan is on its watchlist because of a low reported DSC and
occupancy. As of Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.00x and 48.0%. According to the January 2011, rent roll,
occupancy had improved to 75.0%.

The IRS Office Building loan ($2.7 million, 4.9%) is the ninth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 52,500-sq.-ft. office
building in Fresno, Calif. Although the property has been 100%
vacant for over two years, the reported payment status of the loan
is current as of the June reporting period. According to Berkadia,
the loan was modified on Dec. 30, 2008. The modification terms
included, among other items, interest only payments and an
interest rate reduction until September 2011. Berkadia indicated
that the borrower is marketing the property for sale. "We
determined this loan to be credit-impaired because given that the
property is currently 100% vacant and debt service payment is
expected to increase commencing in September 2011, we considered
this loan to be at an increased risk of default and loss," S&P
stated.

Standard & Poor's stressed the remaining collateral in the pool
according to its criteria. "The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with our raised and affirmed ratings," S&P
said.

Ratings Raised

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-PPM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Rating
Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
C      AAA (sf)        AA (sf)                       81.54
D      AAA (sf)        AA- (sf)                      71.53
E      AA- (sf)        A- (sf)                       51.50
F      A (sf)          BBB+ (sf)                     42.92
G      BB+ (sf)        BB- (sf)                      27.19

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-PPM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
H        B- (sf)                               10.03
J        CCC (sf)                               4.30
X        AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MORTGAGE CAPITAL: Fitch Upgrades MCF Series 1998-MC2 Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed four classes of
Mortgage Capital Funding, Inc.'s (MCF) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 1998-MC2.

The upgrade reflects reductions to the pool's principal
balance resulting in increased credit enhancement to the senior
classes and minimal Fitch expected losses. As of the June 2011
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 93.96% (including 1.51% of realized losses) to
$60.9 million from $1 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls are
affecting class L. There are currently no delinquent, specially
serviced, or defeased loans remaining in the transaction.

The largest loan in the pool, Fiesta Trails Power Center (37.44%),
has a final maturity date of October 2012 and is secured by
312,370 square foot (sf) retail center located in San Antonio,
Texas. As of March 2011, the servicer-reported property occupancy
was 88% and the year end 2010 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
was 1.43 times (x).

Eleven loans within the pool (27.47%) have the same sponsor and
are located in Columbus, OH. The loans are cross-defaulted and
cross-collateralized and secured by various property types: retail
(9 loans), office (one loan), and multifamily (one loan). The
combined year end 2010 DSCR for the properties was 1.18x. Ten of
the 11 loans are fully amortizing and all the loans have a
maturity date of March 1, 2018.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $25.2 million class G to 'AAsf/LS1' from 'A+sf/LS1'; Outlook
      Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Outlooks,
Loss Severity (LS) ratings, and Recovery Ratings (RR):

   -- $2.9 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Loss Severity to 'LS2' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.6 million class H at 'BBB-sf'; Loss Severity to 'LS1'
      from 'LS2'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

   -- $15.1 million class J at 'B+sf/LS1'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.6 million class K at 'CCC/sf'; Recovery Rating to 'RR5'
      from 'RR1'.

Fitch does not rate the $2.5 million class L certificates. Classes
A-1, A-2, and B through E have paid in full.


N-STAR REAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K From 'B+' to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from N-Star Real Estate CDO IX Ltd. (N-Star IX), a U.S.
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transaction. "We also removed the rating on class A-1 from
CreditWatch negative, where we placed it on Jan. 18, 2011," S&P
said.

"The downgrades primarily reflect our analysis of the transaction
following our rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) and CRE CDO securities that serve as collateral
in N-Star IX. We lowered our ratings on 45 securities from 36
transactions totaling $248.5 million (24.3% of the total asset
balance). The downgrades also reflect our analysis of the
defaulted and credit risk assets ($279.4 million, 27.7%)," S&P
related.

"We placed the rating on class A-1 on CreditWatch negative on
Jan. 18, 2011, according to our updated counterparty criteria.
Our CreditWatch removal reflects the fact that the rating is
now at the same level as the issuer credit rating on the swap
counterparty in the transaction, Citigroup Financial Products Inc.
(Citibank N.A., A+/Negative/A-1). We arrived at the 'A+ (sf)'
rating based on our analysis of the underlying collateral," S&P
said.

According to the June 1, 2011, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included:

    168 CMBS tranches ($799.6 million, 79.4% of the collateral
    pool);

    18 CRE CDO tranches ($124.3 million, 12.3%);

    Three commercial real estate debt interests ($35.5 million,
    3.5%);

    Three whole loans and senior interest loans ($29.2 million,
    2.9%); and

    Six real estate investment trust (REIT) securities
    ($18.8 million, 1.9%).

S&P's analysis of N-Star IX reflected exposure to these CMBS and
CRE CDO collateral that it downgraded:

    ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 (classes F, G, and H;
    $24.2 million, 2.4%);

    Dillon Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 (classes A1J and B1;
    $22.6 million, 2.2%);

    JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust
    2006-RR1 (class A-1; $20 million, 2.0%);

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. series 2006-GG7
    (classes H and J; $18 million, 1.8%); and

    Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 (classes H
    and J; $16 million, 1.6%).

The trustee report noted one defaulted loan in the pool
($12.5 million, 1.2%), one credit risk REIT security
($2.2 million, 0.2%), and 45 defaulted or credit risk CMBS
and CRE CDO securities ($264.6 million, 26.3%). The Memorial Mall
first mortgage loan, which has a balance of $12.5 million (1.2%),
is the only defaulted loan in the pool. "We estimate 35.0% as the
specific recovery rate for this asset based on the recovery rates
information from the collateral manager, special servicer, and
third-party data providers," S&P said.

According to the June 1, 2011 trustee report, the deal is passing
its interest coverage tests and principal coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria. S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

N-Star Real Estate CDO IX Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To               From
A-1              A+ (sf)          AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

N-Star Real Estate CDO IX Ltd.
                      Rating
Class            To               From
A-2              BBB+ (sf)        A- (sf)
A-3              BBB- (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
B                BB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)
C                BB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)
D                BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)
E                BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)
F                BB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)
G                BB- (sf)         BB (sf)
H                B+ (sf)          BB- (sf)
J                B+ (sf)          BB- (sf)
K                B (sf)           B+ (sf)


NANTUCKET CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Nantucket CLO I Ltd.:

US$215,700,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020 (current outstanding balance of $215,028,550), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,600,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$12,600,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
2020, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio
and an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in September 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on the
latest trustee report dated June 2011, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 2373 compared to 2907 in the August 2009
report. The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have
also improved since the rating action in September 2009. The Class
A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 124.55%, 115.51%, 108.67%, and 103.72%,
respectively, versus August 2009 levels of 121.29%, 112.49%,
105.83%, and 101.01%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $286.5 million,
no defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 20.82%
(implying a WARF of 2652), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.62%, and a diversity score of 52. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Nantucket CLO I Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the
   worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
   rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
   coupon, and diversity score. However, as part of the base case,
   Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: S&P Ups Ratings on 5 Classes of Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-2, B, C-1, C-2, C-3, type II combination, and type
IV combination notes from Northwoods Capital IV Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Angelo, Gordon, & Co. L.P. "We removed our ratings on the
class A-2 and B notes from CreditWatch, where we placed them
with positive implications on March 30, 2011. At the same time,
we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1a and A-1b notes," S&P
said.

"The upgrades reflect improved performance we have observed in the
transaction's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our
ratings on all of the rated notes on March 26, 2010, following the
application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria. As of the June 1, 2011, trustee report,
the transaction had $24.77 million in defaulted obligations and
approximately $32.45 million in assets from obligors with a
Standard & Poor's rating less than or equal to 'CCC+'. These were
down from $49.34 million in defaulted obligations and
approximately $41.03 million in assets from obligors with a
Standard & Poor's rating less than 'CCC+' noted in the Dec. 1,
2009, trustee report, which was used for our March 2010 rating
actions," S&P related.

S&P also observed an increase in the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to support the rated notes. The trustee reported these
ratios in the June 1, 2011 monthly report:

    The class A O/C ratio test was 133.01%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 127.38% in December 2009;

    The class B O/C ratio test was 120.33%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 115.42% in December 2009; and

    The class C O/C ratio test was 111.14%, compared with a
    reported ratio of 106.72% in December 2009.

The type II combination notes reference 100% of the class C-2
notes and 4.35% of the subordinated interest, with a rated
coupon of 3.00% per year. After the May 2011 payment date, the
rated balance remaining on the type II combination notes was
$6.84 million, compared with an initial rated balance of
$11.50 million.

The type IV combination notes reference 100% of the class C-3
notes and 5.80% of the subordinated interest. After the May 2011
payment date, the rated balance on the type IV combination notes
remained the initial $8.00 million representing the class C-3 note
component. Standard & Poor's rating addresses the ultimate receipt
of payments equal to the type IV rated balance, which does not
give credit to payments that have been received from the type IV
subordinated interest component.

"The affirmations of the class A-1a and A-1b notes reflect our
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating level," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Northwoods Capital IV Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-2                AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
C-2                BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
C-3                BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
Type II Comb.      BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
Type IV Comb.      BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

ratings affirmed

Northwoods Capital IV Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-1a               AA+ (sf)
A-1b               AA+ (sf)


NOVASTAR ABS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class C and D notes from NovaStar ABS CDO I Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed primarily
by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and managed by
NovaStar Asset Management Co.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that the transaction has
insufficient collateral to return the rated principal amount
currently due on the class C and D notes. We based our opinion
regarding insufficient collateral on the overcollateralization
(O/C) available to support the rated notes," S&P said. The trustee
reported these ratios in the May 3, 2011, monthly report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 0.324%;

    The class C O/C ratio test was 0.296%; and

    The class D O/C ratio test was 0.280%.

In addition, as of the May 3, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction held $56.23 million in outstanding assets, with
$343.68 million in rated liabilities. The May 3, 2011, trustee
report also listed $56.23 million in defaulted assets, noting that
these assets had a combined market value of $0.73 million.

Rating Actions

NovaStar ABS CDO I Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
C                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
D                  D (sf)       CC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

NovaStar ABS CDO I Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1                D (sf)
A-2                D (sf)
B                  D (sf)


NYLIM STRATFORD: Moody's Upgrades SF CDO Notes Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of two classes
of notes issued by NYLIM Stratford CDO 2001-1, Limited. The
classes of notes affected by the rating action are:

US$312,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2031 (current
balance of $18,796,465), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
8/7/2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

US$40,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2036, Upgraded to
A2 (sf); previously on 8/7/2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action results primarily from
delevering of the Class A Notes.

The Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately
$48.8 million since the last rating action in August 2009.
Since that time, the Class A/B Overcollateralization Ratio has
increased from 117.6 to 123.9. As of the latest trustee report
dated May 31, 2011, there are $65.7 million of performing assets
in the portfolio, providing credit support to the approximately
$18.7 million of outstanding Class A Notes.

NYLIM Stratford CDO 2001-1, Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of Bonds, REIT's,
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS), and other Asset-
Backed Securities originated from 1995-2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010. Please see
the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.


OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
--------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced has upgraded the ratings of
these notes issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners III, Ltd.:

US$15,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$28,000,000 Class B-1 Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,000,000 Class B-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$17,500,000 Class C-1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$11,000,000 Class C-2 Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
on June 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and delevering of the senior notes
since the rating action in August 2010.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling partial interest
collection from defaulted assets, and (4) reducing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing time lags in credit estimate
updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 48% or $131.6 million since the rating action in
August 2010. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in August 2010. Based on the latest trustee report dated
June 1, 2011, the Class A , Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 161.65%, 132.42%,
118.24% and 116.06% respectively, versus July 2010 levels of
141.42%, 123.18%, 113.48%, and 111.94%, respectively.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes
a number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes. Based on the June 2011 trustee report,
reference securities that mature after the maturity date of the
notes currently make up approximately 27% of the underlying
reference portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $279 million,
defaulted par of $0.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 13.96% (implying a WARF of 2439), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.88%, and a diversity
score of 35. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Oak Hill Credit Partners III, Ltd., issued in December 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these two classes of notes issued by
Pacific Coast CDO, Ltd./Inc. (Pacific Coast):

   -- $72,467,662 class A notes at 'CCCsf';
   -- $96,000,000 class B notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis'. Fitch also
considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis to
conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2010, the credit quality
of the underlying collateral has remained relatively stable, with
approximately 16.6% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average
of 3.2 notches and 10.7% of the portfolio upgraded a weighted
average of 2.7 notches. Approximately 79.3% of the current
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
51.4% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared
to 73.7% and 55.4% respectively, at last review.

Over the past four distribution dates, the class A notes
have received approximately 31 million, or 30% of its previous
review balance, which has increased credit enhancement levels
and improved cash flow model passing ratings in several, but not
all, scenarios. However, the sources of the principal proceeds
have been from atypical circumstances that are unlikely to occur
again: an asset was called and a defaulted asset received a
settlement payment. These collections accounted for approximately
$21.2 million of the class A redemption, otherwise the rate of
amortization would have been consistent with the previous two
years. The rate of amortization is likely to decrease further as
the portfolio continues to pay down due to adverse selection.
Additionally, there is a significant mismatch between assets that
earn a fixed rate coupon, approximately 76% of the portfolio,
while all notes are floating rate, resulting in model-based
failures in Libor 'up' scenarios. Due to potential concentration
issues and interest rate sensitivities, Fitch believes the current
rating of 'CCCsf' continues to reflect the default risk of the
class A notes.

Breakeven levels for the class B notes were below SF PCM's 'CCC'
default level, the lowest level of defaults projected by SF PCM.
For this class, Fitch compared the credit enhancement level to the
expected losses from the distressed and defaulted assets in the
portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This comparison indicates that
default continues to appear inevitable for the class B notes at or
prior to maturity.

Pacific Coast is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on Sept. 25, 2001 and is monitored
by Pacific Investment Management Company. The portfolio is
composed of residential mortgage-backed securities (42.3%),
commercial and consumer asset-backed securities (21.6%),
commercial mortgage-backed securities (13%), SF CDOs (10.7%),
corporate CDOs (8.4%) and corporate debt (4%) from primarily 1997
through 2004 vintage transactions.


PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Pacifica CDO III, Ltd.:

US$25,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$4,000,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$6,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,900,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$5,100,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

Class J Blended Securities Due 2016 (current outstanding Rated
Balance of $3,186,878.17), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

Class L Blended Securities Due 2016 (current outstanding Rated
Balance of $3,279,192.73), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
delevering of the senior notes since the rating action in May
2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 16% (or $29.4M) since the rating action in May 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $232.1 million,
defaulted par of $6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.04% (implying a WARF of 2724), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.8%, and a diversity
score of 52. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Pacifica CDO III, Ltd., issued in May 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011 and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004. Please see the Credit
Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


PALISADES CDO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 7 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of notes issued by
Palisades CDO, Ltd. (Palisades CDO):

   -- $174,996,856 class A-1A notes at 'Bsf'; loss severity
      revised to 'LS4' from 'LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2,868,801 class A-1B notes at 'Bsf'; loss severity revised
      to 'LS4' from 'LS3'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $88,500,000 class A-2 notes at 'Csf';

   -- $78,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'Csf';

   -- $6,000,000 class B-2 notes at 'Csf';

   -- $12,844,000 class C-1 notes at 'Csf';

   -- $13,266,501 class C-2 notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis
to conclude the rating actions for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2010, the credit quality
of the underlying collateral has declined further, with
approximately 12.6% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average
of 4.1 notches. Currently, 68.8% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 58.7% has a rating in
the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 66% and 55.9%,
respectively, at last review. In addition, 30.6%.of the portfolio
is considered defaulted per the trustee; increasing from 8.1% at
last review.

The cash flow model indicates a range of passing ratings for the
class A-1A and A-1B notes (together, class A-1) across different
interest rate and default timing scenarios. In general, the model
results are consistent with the class A-1 current rating. The
lower passing ratings in Fitch's 'up' interest rate scenarios
demonstrate the notes sensitivity to interest rates. This reflects
the fact that approximately 40% of the portfolio earns a fixed
rate coupon while all notes are floating rate and the interest
rate swap gradually steps down by 2013. Since Fitch's last rating
action, class A-1 notes received $51.7 million of paydowns, or
22.5% of the previous balance, with the paydowns funded through
both principal amortization and excess spread. As a result of
these paydowns, the class' credit enhancement levels sufficiently
increased to mitigate the increased risk in the remaining
portfolio. In Fitch's opinion, 'Bsf', Outlook Negative,
appropriately reflects the notes' exposure to the risks described.

The Loss Severity (LS) rating of 'LS4' for the class A-1 notes
indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating. Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks
to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

Breakeven levels for the class A-2, class B-1 and B-2 (together,
class B), and class C-1 and C-2 (together, class C) notes were
below SF PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults
projected by SF PCM. For these classes, Fitch compared the
respective credit enhancement levels to the expected losses from
the distressed and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf'
or lower). This comparison indicates that default continues to
appear inevitable for these classes of notes at or prior to
maturity.

Palisades CDO is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on July 15, 2004 and is managed by
Western Asset Management Company. As of the May 2011 trustee
report, the portfolio is primarily comprised of residential
mortgage backed securities (86%), consumer and commercial asset
backed securities (8.7%), commercial mortgage backed securities
(3%), and corporate CDOs (1.9%) from 1997 through 2004 vintage
transactions.


PARTS STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Senior Note Rating
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the rating on the senior note and downgrades
the subordinate and Jr. Subordinate notes for PARTS Student Loan
Trust 2007-CT1. The Outlook remains Negative for the all the
notes. Fitch used its 'Global SF Criteria' and 'U.S. Private SL
ABS Criteria' to review the transaction.

The affirmation on the senior note is based on a loss coverage
multiple commensurate with the rating at 'AAA'. The downgrades on
the subordinate and Jr. Subordinate notes are due to an increase
in the level of defaults to 12.87% which contributed to a decrease
in the loss coverage multiples. In addition, total parity has
decreased substantially from the previous quarter (January 2011)
to the current (April 2011), from 99.84% to 91.93%. Private
Student Loan Trust is based on collateral performance data as of
April 2011.

Loss coverage multiples were determined by comparing the projected
net loss amount to available credit enhancement. Fitch used
historical vintage loss data provided by Access Group, Inc. to
form a loss timing curve representative of the collateral pool.
After giving seasoning credit for those loans in repayment, Fitch
applied the current cumulative gross loss level to the loss timing
curve to derive the expected gross losses over the remaining life.
A recovery rate of 30% was applied, which was determined to be
appropriate based on the recovery assumptions at closing. The
Negative Outlooks are assigned to all ratings consistent with
Fitch's negative view of the private student loan sector in
general.

Credit enhancement consists of excess spread and
overcollateralization. Furthermore, senior notes benefit from
additional credit enhancement provided by the subordinate note.
Fitch assumed excess spread to be the lesser of the current
annualized excess spread; the average historical excess spread;
and the most recent 12-month average excess spread. That same rate
was applied over the remaining life.

The collateral securing the notes are private loans originated
according to either TERI or LEARN underwriting guidelines. PHEAA
services the loan portfolio.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

PARTS Student Loan Trust 2007-CT1

   -- Class A affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Negative;

   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'A-sf', Outlook
      Negative;

   -- Class C downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'BB-sf', Outlook Negative.


PERITUS I: S&P Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of notes issued by Peritus I CDO Ltd., a collateralized
bond obligation (CBO) transaction managed by Peritus Asset
Management LLC, and removed two of the ratings from CreditWatch
with positive implications. "At the same time, we affirmed our
rating on one class from the same transaction," S&P said.

"The upgrades to the class A, X, and B notes reflect paydowns to
the class A notes since our rating action on April 2010, following
the application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized
debt obligation criteria. As of the June 2011 trustee report, the
class A notes were paid down to $38.463 million from a balance of
$172.007 million as reported in the March 2010 trustee report,"
S&P stated. The trustee reported these overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios in its June 2011 report:

    The class A O/C ratio was 324.59%, compared with 147.25% in
    March 2010;

    The class B O/C ratio was 268.70%, compared with 140.71% in
    March 2010; and

    The class C O/C ratio was 126.85%, compared with 108.15% in
    March 2010.

The affirmation of the class C note rating reflects the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
level.

"We will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in our view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available," S&P said.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Peritus I CDO Ltd.

                  Rating
Class        To            From
A            AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
X            A+ (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos
B            A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

Peritus I CDO Ltd.

             Rating
C            CCC- (sf)


PPM AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Class C Notes Rating at 'Csf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class of notes issued by PPM
America High Grade CBO I, Ltd. (PPM HG I) and revised Recovery
Ratings:

   -- $13,968,529 class C notes at 'Csf'; RR to 'RR4' from 'RR6'.

The affirmation and Recovery Rating revision are indicative of
insufficient collateral and principal proceeds remaining to repay
the rated balance of the notes at maturity. Only one asset remains
in the portfolio ($10 million par, rated 'BBB' by Fitch) along
with $1 million in principal proceeds.

Fitch considered the credit quality of the remaining obligor and
its default probability through the asset's maturity date in
August 2012. Principal proceeds are expected to be applied under
the terms of the waterfall as a pro rata payment between the class
C notes and the class A-3 participating notes, which were not
rated by Fitch. Fitch expects class C to receive 60% of the
remaining principal proceeds under this pro rata payment. Default
remains inevitable since this pro rata share will be less than the
class C note's rated balance of almost $14 million.  This review
was conducted under the framework described in the reports 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global Rating Criteria
for Corporate CDOs'. Fitch did not utilize the Portfolio Credit
Model (PCM) or a cash flow model in this analysis due to the
single obligor in the portfolio and the short remaining term to
the asset's maturity.

The class C notes were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR), which
provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently
distressed or defaulted securities. Fitch assumed a one-year
probability of default and a senior unsecured corporate recovery
for a 'BBB' asset to derive an expected recovery amount on the
remaining asset. This recovery amount was added to the $1 million
in principal proceeds to arrive at a net recovery between 31%-50%,
indicative of a RR assignment of 'RR4'.

PPM HG I is a collateralized bond obligation (CBO) managed by PPM
America, Inc. that closed Dec. 19, 2000. The remaining portfolio
is composed of one investment grade corporate bond. Payments are
made semi-annually in January and July, and the reinvestment
period ended in January 2005. Since Fitch's last rating action in
April 2010, collateral sales provided principal proceeds to fully
redeem classes A-2A and A-2B on the payment date in July 2010.
Classes B-1, B-2 and A-3 (accreted) were paid in full on the
payment date in January 2011.


REALT 2007-1: DBRS Confirms Class F Rating at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed these ratings of REALT 2007-1:

  -- Classes A-1, A-2, XP-1, XP-2, XC-1 and XC-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (sf)
  -- Class C at A (sf)
  -- Class D-1 and D-2 at BBB (sf)
  -- Class E-1 and E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
  -- Class G at BB (sf)
  -- Class H at BB (low) (sf)
  -- Class J at B (high) (sf)
  -- Class K at B (sf)
  -- Class L at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the shadow-ratings for Langley Power
Centre (8.32% of the current pool balance) at BBB (high) and Atrium
Pooled Interest (8.21% of the current pool balance) at A (low).  DBRS
has removed the shadow-rating for Port Kells Industrial due to decline
in net cash flow since issuance and upcoming tenant roll.

After approximately 51 months of seasoning, the underlying loans have
exhibited stable performance, with the transaction's weighted-average
DSCR increasing to 1.61x from 1.37x at issuance.  All 76 loans from
issuance remain in the pool as of the June 2011 remittance.  The
servicer's watchlist consists of four loans (4.1% of the current pool
balance), although one of these loans, Impero Properties (1.91% of the
current pool balance), reportedly transferred to special servicing in
September 2010.  The pool is concentrated within the top ten loans,
which represent 53.6% of the pool.  This risk is mitigated by the fact
that there are a total of 30 properties that collateralize the top ten
loans.  Additionally, DBRS maintains investment grade shadow-ratings on
two of the top ten loans.

Impero Properties was originally placed on the servicer's watchlist due
to the discovery of unauthorized subordinate debt registered on the
property in the amount of $3 million.  The loan was then transferred to
the special servicer for payment default.  Since the transfer in
September 2010, the loan has remained one month or less past due, as
the borrower has continued to remit payments in order to bring the loan
current.  Collateral for the loan is a roll-up of three office
buildings in Edmonton.  The current leverage point for the loan, on a
per square foot basis, is $79, and the average occupancy across the
properties is 96%, according to the February 2011 rent roll.  DBRS will
continue to monitor this loan.

One loan on the servicer's watchlist, 771-785 Industriel Boulevard
(0.25% of the current pool balance), is also more than 90 days
delinquent.  This loan was placed on the watchlist in January 2009 when
the property's occupancy dropped to below 30% from 100% at issuance.
The loan is paid through December 2010 and has not yet been transferred
to special servicing.  DBRS will continue to monitor this loan.

The DBRS analysis included an in-depth look at the top fifteen loans in
the transaction, in addition to the loans on the servicer's watchlist,
DBRS Hotlist, shadow-rated loans, and one loan in special servicing.
Cumulatively, these loans represent 67.5% of the current pool balance.


REVELSTOKE CDO: DBRS Confirms Ratings on Various Notes at CC & C
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the ratings of various notes issued by Revelstoke
CDO I Limited (Revelstoke or the Transaction).  The Class A-1 Notes,
Class A-2 Notes and Class A-3 Notes issued by Revelstoke have been
confirmed at CC (sf), C (sf) and C (sf), respectively.

The Transaction is exposed to pools of U.S. non-prime residential
mortgages, as well as other collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
backed by residential mortgages, among other assets.  The Class A-1
Notes, Class A-2 Notes and Class A-3 Notes (collectively, the Notes)
had approximate initial enhancement levels of 40%, 20% and 9%,
respectively.

As a result of poor performance of the Transaction's underlying
securities, the Notes were previously downgraded to CC (sf) or lower.
DBRS expects that the Class A-1 Notes will suffer a partial loss of
principal, and it is expected that holders of both the Class A-2 Notes
and Class A-3 Notes will not receive any return of initial principal
over the remaining term of the Transaction.


ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Rosedale CLO Ltd.:

US$25,000,000 Class A-1R First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Revolving Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$23,808,628.08), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$25,000,000 Class A-1D First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$23,808,628.08), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$106,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Term Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$100,948,583.06), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22,
2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$8,500,000 Class A-1J First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Term Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June
22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$22,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$6,500,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable Step-
Up Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $8,510,985),
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$9,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection
of half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and
(4) reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing
time lags in credit estimate updates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $283 million,
defaulted par of $7.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.24% (implying a WARF of 2777), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.84%, and a diversity
score of 56. Moody's generally analyzes deals in their
reinvestment period by assuming the worse of reported and
covenanted values for all collateral quality tests. However, in
this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's
reinvestment period, Moody's analysis reflects the benefit of
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to the covenant requirements. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Rosedale CLO Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

A Source of additional performance uncertainties is:

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.


SANTANDER DRIVE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Final Rating to Class E
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to these classes issued
by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-2:

  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class B rated AA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class C rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class D rated BBB (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class E rated BB (sf)


SANTANDER DRIVE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-2
(SDART 2011-2). This is the second public senior/subordinated
transaction of the year for Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC USA).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-2

Cl. A-1, Assigned P-1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationals

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SC USA as
servicer.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction is
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities,"
published in May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the SDART 2011-
2 pool is 12.0% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating (i.e. Aaa proxy) is 43.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SC USA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of a highly rated
parent, Banco Santander (Aa2 negative outlook/P-1), in addition to
the size and strength of SC USA's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, 25% or 35.0%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
Aaa to Aa1, Aa2, and A1, respectively; Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to A3, Baa3, and below B3, respectively; Class C notes
might change from A1 to Ba1, B2, and below B3, respectively; Class
D notes might change from Baa2 to B3, below B3, and below B3,
respectively; and Class E notes might change from Ba2 to below B3
in all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms Individual 'C' Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Santander Holdings USA, Inc.'s (SHUSA)
Individual rating of 'C' and Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'AA-
/F1+'. SHUSA's IDRs reflect ownership by Banco Santander
(Santander), which is rated 'AA/F1+' with a Stable Outlook.

SHUSA's Individual rating of 'C' reflects its sound overall
financial condition including profitable operations, manageable
level of problem loans and comfortable capital position. Loan
portfolio problems have diminished recently, but still remain
above those of higher-rated U.S. peers. SHUSA has a relatively
higher reliance on non-depository funding compared with many U.S.
peers largely due to its significant consumer finance operation,
Santander Consumer USA, Inc. This unit performed comparatively
well during the financial crisis and continues to enhance
consolidated returns.

The Individual rating could be positively affected if NPAs improve
to levels more in line with 'B/C' averages, while solid capital is
maintained. Conversely, the Individual rating could be negatively
affected if loan portfolio quality deteriorates, particularly if
significant operating losses emerge and SHUSA's capital position
is meaningfully reduced. This is not expected at least in the near
term. SHUSA's IDRs would be negatively affected if the parent
bank's ratings are downgraded or Fitch's view of support changes.
Currently there is a one-notch difference between SHUSA's IDR and
the parent bank's. SHUSA and the U.S. market are strategically
important to Santander but are not considered integral to
Santander's operations.

SHUSA with assets totaling over $90 billion has two wholly-owned
operating subsidiaries, Sovereign Bank, a regional bank in the
Northeast and Santander Consumer USA, Inc., an auto lender and
servicer. In January 2009, Santander increased its ownership of
SHUSA to 100% from 24%.

Fitch takes these rating actions:

Santander Holdings USA, Inc.

Fitch affirms these:

   -- Individual rating at 'C';

   -- Long-term IDR at 'AA-';

   -- Short-term IDR at 'F1+';

   -- Short-term Debt at 'F1+';

   -- Support rating at '1'.

In addition Fitch assigns this:

   -- Senior debt 'AA-'

The Rating Outlook remains Stable


Sovereign Bank

Fitch affirms these:

   -- Individual rating at 'C';

   -- Long-term IDR at 'AA-';

   -- Short-term IDR at 'F1+';

   -- Long-term deposits at 'AA';

   -- Short-term deposits at 'F1+';

   -- Subordinated debt at 'A+';

   -- Support rating at '1'.

Sovereign Capital Trust I, IV, VI

   -- Preferred stock affirmed at 'A'.

ML Capital Trust I

   -- Preferred stock affirmed at 'A'.

Sovereign Real Estate Investment Trust Holdings

   -- Preferred stock affirmed at 'A'.


SOUTH STREET: Fitch Affirms Ratings of Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of notes issued by South
Street CBO 2000-1 Ltd. /Corp. (South Street CBO 2000-1):

   -- $14,115,897 class A-4L notes at 'Csf/RR5';

   -- $5,646,359 class A-4A notes at 'Csf/RR5';

   -- $7,057,948 class A-4C notes at 'Csf/RR5';

   -- $15,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $4,198,658 class B-2 notes at 'Csf/RR6'.

The affirmations of the class A-4L, class A-4A and class A-4C
(collectively, class A-4) notes indicate Fitch's expectation
that available proceeds will be insufficient to redeem the
cumulative $26.8 million principal balance due to these notes
at the scheduled maturity in May 2012. The underlying portfolio
consists of just one performing bond with a $3.5 million par
balance and several defaulted and equity positions. While the
class A-4 notes have remained timely on their interest payments
to date, the class B-1 and B-2 notes are currently not receiving
any interest or principal distributions and are not expected to
receive any further distributions. Fitch expects all notes to
default given the minimal recovery values of the remaining assets
in the portfolio.

Fitch expects the class A-4 notes to recover between 11% and 30%
of their current principal balance, consistent with an 'RR5' on
Fitch's Recovery Rating scale. The class B-1 and B-2 notes are not
expected to receive any future distributions, consistent with an
'RR6'. Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities. Distressed securities are defined
as bonds that face a real possibility of default at or prior to
maturity and by definition are rated 'CCC' or below. For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

Fitch's PCM was not utilized in this rating analysis due to
the performing portfolio's concentration in a single security.
Interest rate stresses and default timing were also not considered
in the analysis of this transaction.

South Street CBO 2000-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) that closed on May 3, 2000. Payments are made
semi-annually in May and November. The scheduled maturity date is
May 2012.


SOUTHFORK CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1a, A-1b, A-1g, A-2, A-3a, A-3b, B, and C notes from Southfork
CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Highland Capital Management L.P. "Concurrently, we
removed our ratings on the class A-3a, A-3b, B, and C notes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
March 30, 2011," S&P said.

"The upgrades mainly reflect an improvement in the performance of
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since our April 1,
2010, downgrades of the A-1a, A-1b, A-2, A-3a, A-3b, B, and C
notes following the application of our September 2009 corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria. The insured class
A-1g notes, which benefit from a financial guarantee by Assured
Guaranty Corp, were downgraded on Oct. 25, 2010, following the
downgrade of Assured Guaranty Corp.," S&P related.

"As of the May 2011 trustee report, the transaction had
$28.5 million of defaulted assets, down from $63.8 million noted
in the November 2009 trustee report, which we referenced for our
April 2010 rating actions. Furthermore, assets from obligors rated
in the 'CCC' category were reported at $58.5 million in May 2011,
compared with $99.4 million in November 2009," S&P said.

The transaction has further benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the May 31, 2011, monthly
report:

    The class A O/C ratio was 123.6%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 117.5% in November 2009;

    The class B O/C ratio was 114.7%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 109.3% in November 2009; and

    The class C O/C ratio was 107.5%, compared with a reported
    ratio of 102.5% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Southfork CLO Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To           From
A-1a      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-1b      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-1g      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-2       AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
A-3a      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3b      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B         A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Transaction Information

Issuer:             Southfork CLO Ltd.
Coissuer:           Southfork CLO Corp.
Collateral manager: Highland Capital Management L.P.
Underwriter:        JPMorgan Securities Inc.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


STACK 2007-2: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class C, D, and E notes from Stack 2007-2 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed primarily
by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) managed by TCW
Asset Management Co.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that the transaction has
insufficient collateral to return the rated principal amount
currently due on the class C, D, and E notes," S&P said.

"We based our opinion regarding insufficient collateral on the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes,"
S&P said. The trustee reported these ratios in its monthly report
dated April 29, 2011,:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 0.79%;

    The class C O/C ratio test was 0.74%;

    The class D O/C ratio test was 0.70%; and

    The class E O/C ratio test was 0.69%.

In addition, as of the April 29, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction held $10.29 million in total assets and had
$539.48 million in liabilities. The April 29, 2011 trustee
report listed $10.16 million of the total assets as defaulted,
noting that these assets had a combined current market value of
$2.13 million.

Rating Actions

Stack 2007-2 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
C                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
D                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
E                  D (sf)       CC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Stack 2007-2 Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1                D (sf)
A-2                D (sf)
B                  D (sf)


STANFIELD CARRERA: Moody's Upgrades $85MM of CLO Notes Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Stanfield Carrera CLO, Ltd.:

$228,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 (current
outstanding balance of $45,504,325.23), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

$16,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$5,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$6,750,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$12,000,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

$4,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015
(current outstanding balance of $2,011,322.34), Confirmed at Caa3
(sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

$4,250,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2015 (current
outstanding balance of $2,136,055.15), Confirmed at Caa3 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of the delevering of the senior notes since the
rating action in July 2010.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 60% or $68 million since the rating action in July
2010. As a result of the delevering, the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in July 2010. Based on the latest trustee report dated June
7, 2011, the Class A and Class B overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 172.34% and 127.21%, respectively, versus June 2010
levels of 132.2% and 115.0%, respectively.

Notwithstanding the positive effect of the delevering, Moody's
notes a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, observed through the average credit rating (as measured
by the weighted average rating factor). In particular, based on
the latest trustee report dated June 2011, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 2804 compared to 2659 in June 2010, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 14.07% of
the underlying portfolio versus 5.79% in June 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $90.4 million,
defaulted par of $4.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.55% (implying a WARF of 2946), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.69%, and a diversity
score of 33. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Stanfield Carrera CLO, Ltd., issued in December 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


STANFIELD VANTAGE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Carlyle Vantage CLO, Ltd.:

US$327,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $225,731,276.09), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 22, 2011 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade;

US$12,800,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

US$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$25,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2017,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

US$30,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade;

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of credit improvement of the underlying portfolio,
an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios and
delevering of the senior notes since the rating action in
September 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009 as well as (2) increased
BET liability stress factors and increased recovery rate
assumptions. Additional changes to the modeling assumptions
include (1) subjecting reinvestment of recoveries on defaulted
assets to default risk, (2) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, (3) modeling the collection of
half a period's interest payment on defaulted assets, and (4)
reducing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing time
lags in credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes and the Class A-2 Notes
have been paid down by approximately 31% (or $101.8M) and 39% (or
$20.2M), respectively, since the rating action in September 2009.
As a result of the delevering, the Senior overcollateralization
ratio which covers the Class A and the Class B notes has increased
since the rating action in September 2009. Based on the latest
trustee report dated June 10, 2011, the Senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 123.07% versus August
2009 level of 115.04%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $377 million,
defaulted par of $3.1 million, a weighted average default
probability of 17.11% (implying a WARF of 2593), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.64%, and a diversity
score of 61. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Carlyle Vantage CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2013 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


STATIC RESIDENTIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Classes of Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B-2, C and D notes from Static Residential CDO 2006-B Ltd.,
a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed
primarily by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), to 'D
(sf)'.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that the transaction
has insufficient collateral to return the rated principal
amount currently due on the class B-2, C, and D notes. We
based our opinion regarding insufficient collateral on the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes,"
S&P said. The trustee reported these ratios in the June 6, 2011,
monthly report:

    The class A/B O/C ratio test was 0.01%;

    The class C O/C ratio test was 0.01%; and

    The class D O/C ratio test was 0.01%.

In addition, as of the June 6, 2011, trustee report, the
transaction held $36.4 million in outstanding assets, with
$948.1 million in rated liabilities. The May 3, 2011, trustee
report also listed $36.3 million in defaulted assets, noting that
these assets had a combined market value of $0.1 million.

Ratings Lowered

Static Residential CDO 2006-B Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
B-2                D (sf)       CC (sf)
C                  D (sf)       CC (sf)
D                  D (sf)       CC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Static Residential CDO 2006-B Ltd.
Class                 Rating
A-1(a)                D (sf)
A-1(b)                D (sf)
A-2                   D (sf)
B-1                   D (sf)


US AIRWAYS: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Class C Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 rating to the Class C Pass
Through Certificates, Series 2010-1 of the 2010-1 Pass Through
Trusts ("Class C Certificates" and together with the previously
issued Class A and Class B Certificates of Series 2010-1, the
"Certificates") to be issued by US Airways, Inc. ("US Airways").
The subordination provisions of the inter-creditor agreement
provide for the payment of interest first on the Preferred Pool
Balance of the Class B Certificates and then on the Preferred Pool
Balance of the Class C Certificates before payments of principal
on the Class A Certificates. Amounts due under the Certificates
will, in any event, be subordinated to any amounts due on either
of the Class A or Class B Liquidity facilities, each of which
provides for three consecutive semi-annual interest payments due
the respective Certificate holders. There will be no liquidity
facility for the Class C Certificates.

Ratings Rationale

The Class A, Class B and Class C Equipment Notes ("Notes") issued
by US Airways and acquired with the proceeds of the Certificates
will be the primary assets of the Pass Through Trusts. The 2010-1
EETC of US Airways finances eight of its aircraft, including five
Airbus A321-200s, two Airbus A330-200's and one Airbus A320-200,
each delivered new in 2009. The proceeds of the Class C
Certificates will purchase the Class C Equipment Notes. The
airline will use the proceeds thereof for general corporate
purposes. The payment obligations of US Airways under the Notes
will be fully and unconditionally guaranteed by US Airways Group,
Inc. ("Airways Group"). Please refer to Moody's press release
dated December 15, 2010 in which Moody's assigned Ba2 and B2
ratings, respectively to the A and B tranches of US Airways'
Series 2010-1 Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates for the
rationale for Moody's ratings assignment.

The Class C Certificates have the most junior claim against the
assets of the respective Pass Through Trusts including via the
cross-subordination provisions of the inter-creditor agreement.
The loan to value of above 90% (based on Moody's estimate of
current market value) also provides little equity cushion.
Nevertheless, the B3 rating reflects the potential benefits of the
security interest under a default scenario.

The principal methodology used in rating US Airways Group, Inc.
was the Global Passenger Airlines Industry Methodology, published
March 2009 and Enhanced Equipment Trust And Equipment Trust
Certificates Methodology, published December 2010.

US Airways Group, Inc., based in Tempe, Arizona, through its
subsidiaries operates one of the largest airlines in the U.S. with
service throughout the U.S. as well as Canada, Mexico, Europe, the
Middle East, the Caribbean, Central and South America.

                           *********

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                           *********

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