TCR_Public/110626.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 26, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 175

                            Headlines

505 CLO: S&P Places Rating on Class D on Watch Positive
ALLY AUTO: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
ALLY FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Prime Auto Loan ABS
ALM IV: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class F Floating-Rate Notes
ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds BB Rating on Liquidity Facility

AMERICREDIT AUTO: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Puts BB Provisional Rating on Class E
ANTHRACITE: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes
BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Revenue Bond Ratings to B1

BUSINESS LOAN: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch to Rate Asset-Backed Notes Series 2011-II
CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Reviews Credit Card ABS for Downgrade
CBRE REALTY: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F From 'B' to 'CCC'

CIT GROUP: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating on Series C Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs. to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Various Actions on CSFB 2003-C3
CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings of One CRE CDO Classes
CREST 2002-IG: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes

DAWN CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Class A to 'Caa2'
DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Puts 'BB' Provisional Rating on Class E
DLJ MTG: Moody's Withdraws Ratings of Three Tranches
GRAND PACIFIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades 8 Classes of GSMC 2004-C1

HERTZ VEHICLE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to ABS
INVESCO CONISTON: S&P Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCC-'
JER CRE CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings of 14 CRE CDO Classes
JG WENTWORTH: Moody's Assigns Ratings to Class A and B Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Ratings Downgrades JPMCC 2001-CIBC2

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Certs. to 'D'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
LNR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Four CRE CDO Classes
LSTAR 2011-1: Fitch to Rate LSTAR 2011-1 Certificates
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Classes of MLMT 2005-CIP1

MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to 'B'
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms MS 1998-WF2 Ratings
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-IQ5 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-IQ7 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Certs. to 'CCC-'

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of 12 Tranches
NOMURA ASSET: Fitch Upgrades 2 Classes of Certificates
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Hikes Rating on $33.530MM Certs. to 'BB-'
SECURITY NATIONAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating of $12Mil. of RMBS
SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-2

SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-5
SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-8
SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-10
STUDENT LOAN: Moody's Confirms Ratings of Certificates
TEXAS HOUSING DEPT.: Moody's Downgrades Bond Ratings to 'B2'

* Fitch Downgrades 31 Bonds in 15 U.S. CMBS Transactions
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 5 CMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 437 Classes of 268 RMBS Transactions to 'D'

                            *********

505 CLO: S&P Places Rating on Class D on Watch Positive
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 58
tranches from 16 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications. "At the
same time, we placed our ratings on 11 tranches from four U.S. CDO
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said.

All the tranches with ratings on CreditWatch positive come from
CDO transactions backed by securities issued by corporate
obligors. The issuance amount of the tranches with ratings on
CreditWatch positive is $5.138 billion.

Most of the CreditWatch positive placements on the CLOs follow the
continued improvement in the credit quality of the obligors whose
loans collateralize the rated notes. These improvements reflect
principally an increase in upgrades to the speculative-grade
obligors whose loans collateralize the rated notes and a steep
reduction in default rates. Based on a recent Standard & Poor's
Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) report, the lagging 12-month
institutional loan default rate fell to a 40-month low of 0.91% by
principal amount and 1.5% by issuer count.

"As a result of these improvements, we believe that the tranches
with ratings we placed on CreditWatch positive may be able to
support higher ratings. We also placed our ratings on 11 tranches
from four transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to deterioration in the credit quality of portfolio. Two of
these transactions are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDO of
asset-backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large
part by mezzanine tranches of U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and other SF securities, one is a cashflow CDO
of CDO, which was collateralized primarily by notes from other
CDOs, and one is a hybrid CDO backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS). The CreditWatch negative placements reflect the
deterioration in the credit quality of the securities held by
these transactions. The issuance amount of the tranches with
ratings placed on CreditWatch negative is $0.999 billion," S&P
said.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placements after we complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions. We expect to resolve these CreditWatch
placements within 90 days. We will continue to monitor the CDO
transactions we rate and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as we deem appropriate," S&P said.

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Positive

505 CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Artus Loan Fund 2007-I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2L                AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-3L                A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
B-1L                BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
B-2L                B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Atlantis Funding Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

Brentwood CLO Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)

Flagship CLO III
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A Fund Nts          AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A Revol Nt          AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

Franklin CLO IV, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
E                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

GIA Investment Grade CDO 2001 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
B                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2004-1, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

Loomis Sayles CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Mayport CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-3L                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
B-1L                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
B-2L                CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos CCC- (sf)

Osprey CDO 2006-1 Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-1LB               A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
A-2L                BBB (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB (sf)
A-3L                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Race Point II CLO, Limited
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B-1                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
B-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C-1                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
C-2                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
D-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
D-3                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Sagamore CLO, Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)

Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

Venture IV CDO Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)
A-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
C-1                 BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
C-2                 BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
Def. B-1            BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
Def. B-2            BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Wind River CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
A-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
Defer B-1           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
Defer B-2           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
Defer C-1           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
Defer C-2           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)
Zero C-3            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Negative

Kimberlite CDO I, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC (sf)
Super Sen           B (sf)/Watch Neg    B (sf)

RFC CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B-1                 B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)
B-2                 B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)
C                   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC (sf)
D                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg CCC- (sf)

Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO IV, Limited
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BB- (sf)
C                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg CCC- (sf)


Zais Investment Grade Limited V
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 BB (sf)/Watch Neg   BB (sf)
B-1                 CCC (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC (sf)
B-2                 CCC (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC (sf)


ALLY AUTO: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2011-3 (AART 2011-3).

The complete ratings actions are:

$223,000,000, Class A-1, 0.22957% Asset Backed Notes, rated Prime-
1 (sf)

$306,000,000, Class A-2, Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes, rated
Aaa (sf)

$332,000,000, Class A-3, 0.97% Asset Backed Notes, rated Aaa (sf)

$140,040,000, Class A-4 , 1.61% Asset Backed Notes, rated Aaa (sf)

$29,050,000, Class B, 2.09% Asset Backed Notes, rated Aa3 (sf)

$30,012,000, Class C, 2.39% Asset Backed Notes, rated A3 (sf)

$13,440,000, Class D, 2.79% Asset Backed Notes, rated Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction was
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities,
ratings methodology published in May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation is 1.00% and the
Volatility Proxy Aaa Level is 8.00% for the AART 2011-3 pool.
Moody's net loss expectation and Volatility Proxy Aaa Level for
the AART 2011-3 transaction is based on an analysis of the credit
quality of the underlying collateral, historical performance
trends, the ability of Ally Financial, Inc. to perform the
servicing functions, and current expectations for future economic
conditions. In addition, the Class A-2 notes of the AART 2011-3
pay a floating rate coupon tied to the 1-month LIBOR rate. Moody's
analysis incorporated multiple stressed interest rate scenarios
for each class of notes in arriving at the assigned ratings.

The V Score for this transaction is Low/Medium, which is
consistent with the Low/Medium V score assigned for the U.S. Prime
Retail Auto Loan ABS sector. The V Score indicates "Low/Medium"
uncertainty about critical assumptions. While this is only the
tenth retail loan securitization for Ally Bank, the early
performance for the existing deals has been strong. Securitization
experience for Ally Bank's parent, Ally Financial Inc. (formerly
GMAC Inc.), dates back to the mid-1980's. AART 2011-3 should
benefit from this experience having Ally Financial as the servicer
for the transaction. In addition, early performance of Ally Bank
retail loan securitizations from 2009 and 2010 is strong to date
which is an important consideration along with conducting a deal-
by-deal comparison of collateral.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed from 1.00% to 3.00%
the initial model-indicated output might change from Aaa to Aa1
for the Class A notes, from Aa3 to Baa3 for the Class B notes,
from A3 to B2 for the Class C notes, and from Baa2 to below B3 for
the Class D notes. If the net loss were changed to 5.00% the
initial model-indicated output might change to A1 for the Class A
notes, to B3 for the Class B notes, and to below B3 for both the
Class C notes and Class D notes. If the net loss were changed to
6.00% the initial model-indicated output might change to A3 for
the Class A notes and below B3 for the Class B, Class C, and Class
D notes.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.

Additional research including a pre-sale report for this
transaction is available at www.moodys.com. The special reports,
"Updated Report on V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities for
Structured Finance Securities" and "V Scores and Parameter
Sensitivities in the U.S. Vehicle ABS Sector" are also available
on moodys.com


ALLY FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Prime Auto Loan ABS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded 24 tranches from 11 transactions and placed
on review for possible upgrade four tranches from two transactions
sponsored by Ally Financial Inc. (formerly known as GMAC inc.) and
Ally Bank. Ally Bank is a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Ally
Financial Inc., and is the sponsor of transactions issued since
2009. All transactions are serviced by Ally Financial Inc.

Ratings

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-1

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-2

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-3

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-4

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-A

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-B

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-1

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-2

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-A

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2009-B

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-1

Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Class C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-2

Class B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jun 28, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jun 28, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-3

Class B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Aug 24, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class C, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Aug 24, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions were prompted by the further accretion of credit
enhancement due to the non-declining reserve account and
overcollateralization, and in some cases, a downward revision of
collateral loss expectations. Moody's revised cumulative net Loss
(CNL) expectation for the upgraded CARAT transactions is between
2.50% and 3.65% of the original pool balance. This is similar to
Moody's expected range that was published when these securities
were placed on review on March 16, 2011. The expected CNL of the
two Ally Bank sponsored transactions that were previously placed
on review, were lowered significantly to 0.75%. The expected CNL
range of the more recent Ally Bank sponsored transactions that are
being placed on review for possible upgrade is 0.50% to 1.00%. The
improved performance of the Ally Bank Sponsored transactions can
be attributed to a combination of stronger underlying credit (as
compared to prior transactions), healthy used vehicle market, and
stabilizing economy that has persisted through the early term of
these transactions. The weighted average FICO scores in the Ally
transactions is between 758 and 764 while the FICO scores in the
CARAT transactions were between 700 and 715. Additionally, the
weighted average loan to value (LTV) ratio in the Ally
transactions is under 100% while the LTV on the CARAT transactions
was approximately 105%.

These are key performance metrics and credit assumptions for each
affected transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected
lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the
original pool balance; and Moody's lifetime remaining CNL
expectation and Moody's Aaa levels which are expressed as a
percentage of the current pool balance (adjusted for yield
supplement overcollateralization). Moody's Aaa (sf) level is the
level of credit enhancement that would be consistent with a Aaa
(sf) rating for the given asset pool. Performance metrics include
pool factor which is the ratio of the current collateral balance
and the original collateral balance at closing; total credit
enhancement (expressed as a percentage of the outstanding
collateral pool balance adjusted for YSOC) which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, reserve fund;
and YSOC. The YSOC compensates for the lower APR on the subvened
loans.

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 2.50%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 2.45% to 2.65%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.26%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 6%

Pool factor -- 7.29%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
D - 9.7%

YSOC -- Approximately 4.5%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 2.50%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 2.45% to 2.65%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 0.83%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 6%

Pool factor -- 9.80%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
D - 7.09%

YSOC -- Approximately 3.25%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-3

Lifetime CNL expectation - 2.90%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 2.80% to 3.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.54%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 7%

Pool factor -- 12.23%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
C -- 9.57% Class D - 5.74%

YSOC -- Approximately 2.51%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-4

Lifetime CNL expectation - 3.65%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 3.50% to 4.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 2.05%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 8%

Pool factor -- 15.69%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 18.16% Class C -- 9.08% Class D - 6.05%

YSOC -- Approximately 2.91%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-A

Lifetime CNL expectation - 2.50%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 2.45% to 2.65%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.45%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 6.5%

Pool factor -- 9.74%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
C -- 9.57% Class D - 5.74%

YSOC -- Approximately 2.51%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-B

Lifetime CNL expectation - 3.20%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 3.10% to 3.40%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.58%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 7%

Pool factor -- 13.21%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
C -- 8.94% Class D - 5.36%

YSOC -- Approximately 2.2%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 3.65%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 3.50% to 4.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 2.05%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 8%

Pool factor -- 19.63%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 14.46% Class C -- 7.23% Class D - 4.82%

YSOC -- Approximately 3.84%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 2.70%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 2.50% to 3.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.46%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 6.5%

Pool factor -- 24.06%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 11.67 Class C -- 5.83% Class D - 3.89%

YSOC -- Approximately 5.74%

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-A

Lifetime CNL expectation - 3.40%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 3.25% to 3.75%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.85%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 8%

Pool factor -- 25.91%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 13.57% Class C -- 8.14% Class D - 6.33%

YSOC -- Approximately 5.71%

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2009-B

Lifetime CNL expectation - 0.75%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 0.50% to 1.25%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.01%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 7%

Pool factor -- 54.51%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 10.21% Class C -- 6.66%

YSOC -- Approximately 9.67%

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 0.75%, prior expected range (March
2011) was 0.50% to 1.25%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.04%

Aaa (sf) level -- Approximately 7%

Pool factor -- 60.18%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 16.85% Class C -- 12.73%

YSOC -- Approximately 9.67%

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-2

Lifetime CNL Range expectation - 0.50% to 1.00%, prior expectation
(June 2010) was 2.25%

Pool factor -- 70.96%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 12.55% Class C -- 9.41%

YSOC -- Approximately 7.03%

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-3

Lifetime CNL Range expectation - 0.50% to 1.00%, prior expectation
(August 2010) was 1.75%

Pool factor -- 73.92%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread and YSOC): Class
B -- 10.08% Class C -- 7.39%

YSOC -- Approximately 5.49%

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment
continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle market.
Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as stronger now
than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating to the
economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers was
significantly greater. Overall, Moody's central global scenario
remains "Hook-shaped" for 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world largest economies, returning to
trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent
unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these notes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan Backed Securities (2011)" rating
methodology published in May 2011. Other methodologies and factors
that may have been considered in the process of rating these notes
can also be found on Moody's website. Further information on
Moody's analysis of this transaction is available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


ALM IV: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class F Floating-Rate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ALM IV Ltd./ALM IV LLC's $417.957 million floating-rate
notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 20,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated notes
    through the subordination of cash flows that are payable to
    the subordinated notes.

    The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
    withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
    (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
    can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
    CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
    the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
    collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, (see "Update To
    Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
    And Synthetic CDOs," published Sept. 17, 2009).

    The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
    bankruptcy remote.

    The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
    of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans.

    The asset manager's experienced management team.

    "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
    principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
    assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
    commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
    various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
    0.2600% to 11.5704%," S&P said.

    The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
    tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
    interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
    rated notes outstanding.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
ALM IV Ltd./ALM IV LLC

Class                 Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)             274.5
B                     AA (sf)               58.5
C (deferrable)        A (sf)              29.812
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)             20.25
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)             23.625
F (deferrable)        B (sf)               11.27
Subordinated notes    NR                   43.35

NR -- Not rated.


ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds BB Rating on Liquidity Facility
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) (sf) for the
Commercial Paper (CP) issued by Alpine Securitization Corp.
(Alpine), an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) vehicle
administered by Credit Suisse, New York branch.  In addition,
DBRS has confirmed the ratings and revised the tranche sizes of
the aggregate liquidity facilities (the Liquidity) provided to
Alpine by Credit Suisse.

The $8,183,340,099 aggregate liquidity facilities are tranched as:

-- $7,850,189,777 rated AAA (sf)
-- $66,742,504 rated AA (sf)
-- $45,600,026 rated A (sf)
-- $68,118,941 rated BBB (sf)
-- $58,581,258 rated BB (sf)
-- $26,366,967 rated B (sf)
-- $67,740,626 unrated (sf)

The ratings are based on January 31, 2011 data.

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio.  The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is
based on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-
wide credit enhancement (PWCE).  The rationale for the CP rating
is based on the updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as
DBRS' prior and ongoing review of legal, operational and liquidity
risks associated with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality
of Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses
each transaction to a term standard.  The tranching of the
Liquidity reflects the credit risk of the portfolio at each rating
level.  The tranche sizes are expected to vary each month based on
changes in portfolio composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS'
simulation methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse
ABCP conduit portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS CDO Toolbox
simulation model, with adjustments to reflect the unique structure
of an ABCP conduit and its underlying assets.  DBRS determines
attachment points for risk based on an analysis of the portfolio
and models the portfolio based on key inputs such as asset
ratings, asset tenors and recovery rates.  The attachment points
determine the portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA, A through B
as well as unrated.

DBRS models the portfolio on an ongoing basis to reflect changes
in Alpine's portfolio composition and credit quality.  The rating
results are updated and posted on the DBRS website.


AMERICREDIT AUTO: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3
(AMCAR 2011-3). This is the third senior/subordinated transaction
of the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.
(AmeriCredit).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3

Class A-1 Notes, rated Prime-1 (sf);

Class A-2 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

Class A-3 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

Class B Notes, rated Aa1 (sf);

Class C Notes, rated Aa3 (sf);

Class D Notes, rated Baa1 (sf);

Class E Notes, rated Ba1 (sf);

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit) as servicer, and the backup
servicing arrangement with Aa2-rated Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction is
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities,"
published in May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2011-
3 pool is 10.0% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating (i.e. Aaa proxy) is 39.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage
performance as well as performance of past securitizations, and
current expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the a Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the strong back-up servicing
arrangement present in this transaction in addition to the size
and strength of AmeriCredit's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, 25% or 35.0%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
Aaa to Aa1, Aa2, and A3, respectively; Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to A3, Baa3, and below B3, respectively; Class C notes
might change from Aa3 to Ba1, B3, and below B3, respectively;
Class D notes might change from Baa1 to below B3 in all three
scenarios; and Class E notes might change from Ba1 to below B3 in
all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.

Additional research including a pre-sale report for this
transaction is available at www.moodys.com. The special reports,
"Updated Report on V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities for
Structured Finance Securities" and "V Scores and Parameter
Sensitivities in the U.S. Vehicle ABS Sector" are also available
on moodys.com.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to these classes issued by
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3:

  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class B rated AA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class C rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class D rated BBB (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class E rated BB (sf)


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Puts BB Provisional Rating on Class E
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to these classes issued by
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3:

  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class B rated AA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class C rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class D rated BBB (sf)
  -- Series 2011-3 Notes, Class E rated BB (sf)


ANTHRACITE: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed five classes issued
by Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd./Corp (Anthracite 2004-HY1) as a result
of continued negative credit migration and increased losses on the
underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, approximately 26.9%
of the portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, the entire
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
91.2% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared
to 100% and 74.5%, respectively, at last review. As of the April
30, 2011 trustee report, the portfolio has experienced a total of
$77.8 million of losses since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The Rating Loss Rates (RLR)
were then compared to the credit enhancement of the classes. Based
on this analysis, the credit enhancement for the class A notes is
generally consistent with the rating assigned.

For the class B through F notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class B notes have been affirmed at 'CC', indicating that
default is probable. Similarly, the classes C through F notes have
been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable.

Anthracite 2004-HY1 is a commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) that closed on Nov. 9, 2004. The
portfolio is composed of commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) from the 1998 through 2004 vintages.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $23,791,000 class A notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
      'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $28,117,000 class B notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $21,628,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $19,898,000 class D notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $33,048,000 class E notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $17,995,000 class F notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Revenue Bond Ratings to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the $25,875,000
outstanding Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (American Opportunity for Housing - Colinas
LLC Project) Senior Series 2001A to B1 from Ba3 and downgraded to
B3 from B2 the $3,530,000 outstanding of Subordinate Series 2001C.

Rating Rationale

The downgrade is reflective of the deteriorating debt service
coverage and weighted average occupancy that has declined to
around 80%. The debt service reserve funds for both series are
invested in an MBIA, Inc now National Public Finance Guarantee
Corp GIC, ("National") (Baa1, Developing) Guaranteed Investment
Contract ("GIC"); the non-performance of the GIC provider is a
risk to bondholders in transactions where bond payments rely
wholly or partly on a GIC. The Senior bonds also carry bond
insurance from National. The outlook remains negative due to weak
occupancy levels as well as the growing number of down units that
have yet to be rehabilitated.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

The Properties: The bonds are secured by the revenues from three
cross collateralized properties, Las Colinas Apartments, Huebner
Oaks Apartments and Perrin Crest Apartments, as well as by funds
and investments pledged to the trustee under the indenture as
security for the bonds. Huebner Oaks is a 344-unit garden style
apartment complex built in 1984, composed of 23 two-story
buildings and is located approximately 12 miles north west of the
San Antonio central business district. Las Colinas is a 232-unit
garden style apartment complex built in 1978, composed of 30 two-
story buildings and is located approximately 20 miles north west
of the San Antonio central business district. Perrin Crest is a
200-unit garden style apartment complex built in 1985, composed of
13 two-story buildings and is located approximately 12 miles north
east of the San Antonio central business district.

The three properties are owned by American Opportunity for
Housing, a non-profit organization that maintains a Community
Housing Development Organization status in the state of Texas.
Management of the properties is overseen by United Apartment Group
based out of Grapevine, TX who specializes in affordable living
communities.

Recent Developments

On December 31, 2010, United Apartment Group replaced the Lynd
Company as property manager under the same agreement and terms
originally established. On January 1, 2011, 72% of the debt
service payment for the Subordinate Series C bonds required
tapping the Surplus fund for $154,519.26. However, both debt
service reserve funds remain fully funded at maximum annual debt
service and have never been tapped.

Debt service coverage ratios derived from 2010 audited financial
statements demonstrate continued stress as coverage fell to 1.02x
from 1.16x (2009) for 2001A and to 0.87x from 0.99x (2009) for
2001C. Management was unable to provide any further details for
the decline in coverage which was mostly driven by a 27% increase
in utilities and a 10% increase in administrative fees. April 2011
weighted average monthly occupancy was 80% which is below the low
90% average experienced over the prior two years. Rent at the
properties ranges between 10-20% below the average market rent for
San Antonio, TX.

CB Richard Ellis forecasts rent growth of 3.1% in 2011 and 4.0% in
2012 for the Huebner Oaks' and Las Colinas' submarket. Occupancy
in the submarket is forecasted to improve from 92.9% in 2011 to
94.2% in 2012. Perrin Crest's submarket has 3.18 rent growth
forecasted in 2011 and 4.5% in 2012. Occupancy in hat submarket is
forecast to improve from 93.6% in 2011 to 94.7% in 2012.

Credit Strengths

* Excess cash in the surplus fund of $492,212 as of 6/06/2011
  which has been used to meet debt service requirements before
  tapping the debt service reserve funds.

Credit Challenges

* Occupancy numbers continue to deteriorate across all three
  properties.

* Postponing maintenance and repair costs for the upkeep of these
  older properties has improved short term performance but could
  negatively impact debt service coverage going forward.

* High concentration of renters at Las Colinas from the student
  population of the University Texas at San Antonio and a high
  concentration of contract employees from USAA World Headquarters
  who live at Huebner Oaks could negatively impact occupancy if
  university attendance declines or large layoffs occur.

Outlook

The outlook for the bonds remains negative based on the
deteriorating financial performance and declining occupancy.

What could change the rating -- Up

Improved debt service coverage.

Improved weighted average occupancy.

What could change the rating -- Down

Tapping of the Debt Service Reserve Funds.

Declines in debt service coverage levels.

Weakened occupancy or concessions having a negative impact on
rental income.

Principal Methodology Used

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Housing
Projects published in July, 2010.


BUSINESS LOAN: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
tranches from five U.S. small business loan transactions related
to Business Loan Express (BLX) and removed 11 of those ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications. "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on two tranches from Business Loan Express
SBA Loan Trust 2003-2 and removed the ratings from CreditWatch
negative. We had initially placed the 13 tranche ratings on
CreditWatch negative on April 4, 2011," S&P said.

All six deals are asset-backed securities transactions
collateralized primarily by a pool of small business development
loans that are not insured or guaranteed by any governmental
agency. The vast majority of the loans are secured by first-lien,
multipurpose commercial real estate. Roughly 10%-20% of the
properties are non-owner-occupied. The four Business Loan Express
SBA Loan Trusts consist solely of SBA 7(a) small business loans,
while the two Business Loan Express Business Loan Trusts consist
of both conventional and SBA 7(a) small business loans.

"The downgrades reflect our view that the 12 tranches can no
longer withstand our stress tests for the current rating levels
because their credit performance has deteriorated due to rising
delinquencies, increasing cumulative net losses, and decreasing
recoveries in the loan portfolios. Consequently, we are
downgrading the 12 tranches to the rating levels that we believe
are commensurate with the stresses they can withstand," S&P
stated.

"The affirmations reflect our view that the two tranches are still
able to withstand our stress tests for their current rating
levels. We provide additional information for each transaction,"
S&P said.

          Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-1

The credit support for the class A and M notes is provided by
subordination, a reserve account, and excess spread. As of
April 20, 2011, BLX 2003-1's loan pool had a pool factor of
12.77%; the securitized loan balance was $14.04 million; the class
A note balance was $12.845 million; the class M note balance was
$0.56 million; and the reserve account balance was $2.62 million,
which was lower than the reserve account requirement
(approximately $3.67 million).

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) decreased to 15.87%
from 25.87%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) decreased to 9.18% from 19.66%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 24.48% from 22.51%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 8.03%
from 6.34%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 38.54% from
43.66%.

           Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-2

The credit support for the class A and M notes is provided by
subordination, a reserve account, and excess spread. As of
April 20, 2011, BLX 2003-2's loan pool had a pool factor of
14.5%; the securitized loan balance was $29.01 million; the
class A note balance was $24.31 million; the class M note
balance was $3.51 million; the unrated class B note balance was
$2.38 million; and the reserve account balance was $7.0 million,
which was slightly lower than the reserve account requirement
(approximately $7.68 million).

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) decreased to 20.83%
from 23.42%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) decreased to 14.06% from 18.99%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 17.08% from 15.19%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 5.41%
from 3.69%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 43.05% from
51.54%.

Compared with BLX 2003-1, BLX 2003-2 has relatively higher
subordination and reserve amount. "Therefore, even though the BLX
2003-2 transaction's cumulative net loss has increased, both the
class A and B tranches can still withstand the stress tests that
we believe are commensurate with the current ratings," S&P said.

            Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2005-1

The credit support for the class A and M notes is provided by
subordination, a reserve account, and excess spread. As of
April 30, 2011, BLX 2005-1's loan pool had a pool factor of
23.27%; the securitized loan balance was $23.27 million; the class
A note balance was $21.36 million; the class M note balance was
$1.90 million; and the class B note balance was $0.60 million; and
the reserve account balance was $5.39 million, which is lower than
the reserve account requirement ($6.74 million).

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) increased to 28.06%
from 25.05%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) decreased to 18.99% from 19.62%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 17.57% from 14.34%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 6.68%
from 3.89%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 33.06% from
42.34%.

             Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2006-1

The credit support for the class A notes is provided by
subordination and excess spread; this transaction has no reserve
account. As of April 30, 2011, BLX 2006-1's loan pool had a pool
factor of 23.27%; the securitized loan balance was $28.49 million;
and the class A note balance was $28.86 million.

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) increased to 24.52%
from 22.31%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) increased to 19.96% from 17.42%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 17.30% from 13.38%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 9.80%
from 6.84%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 24.67% from
31.32%.

         Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2006-A

The credit support for the class A and B notes is provided by
subordination, a reserve account, and excess spread. The credit
support for the class C tranche is provided by a reserve account
and excess spread. As of April 30, 2011, BLX 2006-A's loan pool
had a pool factor of 43.64%; the securitized loan balance was
$130.13 million; the class A note balance was $116.10 million;
the class B note balance was $10.55 million; the class C note
balance was $5.28 million; and the reserve account requirement
was $35.43 million. The reserve account balance, however, was
only $6.91 million.

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) decreased to 28.42%
from 33.68%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) decreased to 25.65% from 26.59%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 14.03% from 6.31%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 7.75%
from 1.34%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 37.76% from
71.81%.

         Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2007-A

The credit support for the class A, B, and C notes is provided by
subordination, a reserve account, and excess spread. The credit
support for the class D tranche is provided by a reserve account
and excess spread. As of April 30, 2011, BLX 2007-A's loan pool
had a pool factor of 54.19%; the securitized loan balance was
$238.42 million; the class A note balance was $208.21 million; the
class B note balance was $14.72 million; the class C note balance
was $9.88 million; and the class D note balance was $9.88 million;
and the reserve account requirement was $87.29 million. The
reserve account balance, however, was zero.

Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total delinquency (as a
percentage of the then-current pool balance) increased to 33.05%
from 29.42%; the 90-plus-day delinquency (as a percentage of the
then-current pool balance) increased to 27.74% from 21.48%; the
cumulative gross default (as a percentage of the original pool
balance) increased to 21.68% from 15.85%; the cumulative net loss
(as a percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 14.17%
from 9.19%; and the cumulative recovery decreased to 25.91% from
30.85%.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review outstanding ratings and
take additional rating actions as appropriate.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-1

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 AA- (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M                 B+ (sf)          A (sf)/Watch Neg

Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2005-1

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 A+ (sf)          AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M                 BBB+ (sf)        A (sf)/Watch Neg

Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2006-A

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 CCC+ (sf)        BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
B                 CCC (sf)         BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C                 CCC- (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2007-A

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 CCC+ (sf)        BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
B                 CCC (sf)         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
C                 CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)/Watch Neg
D                 CCC- (sf)        CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Lowered

Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2006-1

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 CCC- (sf)        CCC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-2

                       Rating
Class             To               From
A                 AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M                 A (sf)           A (sf)/Watch Neg


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch to Rate Asset-Backed Notes Series 2011-II
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign these ratings to Cabela's Credit
Card Master Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2011-II:

   -- $212,500,000 Class A-1 and A-2 fixed/floating-rate
      'AAAsf'/LS1, Outlook Stable;

   -- $20,000,000 Class B fixed-rate 'A+sf'/LS2, Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,625,000 Class C fixed-rate 'BBB+sf'/LS2, Outlook Stable;

   -- $6,875,000 Class D fixed-rate 'BB+sf'/LS3, Outlook Stable.

Fitch's expected ratings are based on the underlying receivables
pool, available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's
underwriting and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's
legal and cash flow structures, which employ early redemption
triggers.

The transaction structure is similar to series 2010-II, with
credit enhancement totaling 15% for class A, credit enhancement of
7% for the class B, credit enhancement of 2.75% plus an amount
from a spread account for the class C, and credit enhancement of
an amount from a spread account for the class D notes only.


CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Reviews Credit Card ABS for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade 34 classes of asset-backed securities issued out of
the Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust. These securities
are backed by a $40 billion revolving pool of consumer and small
business credit card receivables originated by Capital One Bank
(USA), N.A.

Rationale

This action follows Moody's announcement on June 16 that it is
reviewing for possible downgrade the unsupported Bank Financial
Strength Rating (BSFR) and long-term unsecured ratings of Capital
One Bank (C and A3 respectively). The rating action follows the
company's announcement that it plans to acquire ING Direct for
approximately $9 billion. Capital One Bank is the sponsor bank and
seller/servicer of the Trust.

The financial strength of the seller/servicer is an important
factor in Moody's determination of card ABS ratings, as an
issuer's ongoing willingness and ability to maintain card utility
(i.e. the purchase rate) is a significant driver of trust
collateral performance in an early amortization scenario. A
downgrade from A3 would imply a higher probability of default of
the sponsor bank and would result in a weaker credit profile for
the credit card trust, holding other variables constant. ABS
maturing within the next six months (i.e. before January 2012)
were excluded from this rating action due to the low probability
of early amortization in the very near future.

Moody's performance expectations for the Trust are unchanged. The
current expected range for the gross charge-off rate is 4.5%-6.5%,
for the principal payment rate is 16%-19%, and for the yield is
20%-23%.

These performance expectations indicate Moody's forward-looking
view of the likely range of performance over the medium term. From
time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these
expectations. Performance that falls outside a given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than anticipated when the related securities were rated.
Even so, a deviation from the expected range will not necessarily
result in a rating action nor does performance within expectations
preclude such actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating
action is dependent on an assessment of a range of factors
including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics. The
primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment continues to
remain at elevated levels. Overall, Moody's expects a sluggish
recovery in the U.S. economy, with elevated fiscal deficits and
persistent, high unemployment levels.

During the review process, which typically takes up to 90 days,
Moody's will reassess whether Capital One's ability and
willingness to maintain card utility under stress scenarios are
consistent with the current credit enhancement and ratings on the
ABS. A downgrade, if any, is not likely to exceed two notches.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust

$500,000,000 Class A (2004-1) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2004-4) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$750,000,000 Class A (2005-1) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$455,000,000 Class A (2005-6) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2005-7) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$325,000,000 Class A (2005-9) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2005-10) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2006-1) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$400,000,000 Class A (2006-3) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2006-5) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$300,000,000 Class A (2006-8) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$750,000,000 Class A (2006-11) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2006-12) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$625,000,000 Class A (2007-1) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$700,000,000 Class A (2007-2) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$750,000,000 Class A (2007-4) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$600,000,000 Class A (2007-5) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$1,000,000,000 Class A (2007-7) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$500,000,000 Class A (2007-8) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$200,000,000 Class A (2007-A) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$600,000,000 Class A (2008-3) Aaa (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

$150,000,000 Class B (2004-3) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$184,605,000 Class B (2004-7) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$175,000,000 Class B (2005-1) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$100,000,000 Class B (2005-3) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$175,000,000 Class B (2006-1) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$350,000,000 Class B (2007-1) A2 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
A2 (sf)

$250,000,000 Class C (2003-3) Ba1 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

$100,000,000 Class C (2004-2) Ba1 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

$367,500,000 Class C (2004-3) Ba1 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

$300,000,000 Class C (2007-1) Ba1 (sf); Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

$250,000,000 Class C (2007-2) Ba1 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

$350,000,000 Class C (2007-4) Ba1 (sf) Placed on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on December 20, 2010 confirmed at
Ba1 (sf)

Counterparty Instrument Rating to the Swap Agreement relating to
credit card backed notes issued by COMET Class C(2004-3) Ba1 (sf)
Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
December 20, 2010 confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating these transactions was
"Moody's Approach To Rating Credit Card Receivables-Backed
Securities", published in April 2007.


CBRE REALTY: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1 Ltd. (CBRE 2006-1), a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transaction. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on two other classes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"The downgrades and affirmations follow our analysis of the
transaction and primarily reflect an increase in reported
impaired assets to $160.8 million (35.9%) in the transaction's
collateral pool. The volume of impaired assets has caused
further deterioration in the collateralization of the transaction.
The downgrades and affirmations also reflect our analysis of the
transaction following our rating actions on commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) that serve as collateral in CBRE 2006-1.
Standard & Poor's has downgraded 13 securities from nine
transactions totaling $36.9 million (8.2% of the total asset
balance)," S&P related.

The transaction's current asset pool included:

    Thirteen whole loans and senior interest loans
    ($262.2 million, 58.6% of the collateral pool);

    Six subordinate-interest loans ($102.1 million, 22.8%); and

    Twenty-two (CMBS) tranches ($83.2 million, 18.6%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the non-impaired loan assets. "We based the analyses on our
adjusted net cash flow, which we derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral manager, Realty Finance
Corp., and trustee, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, as well as
market and valuation data from third-party providers," S&P said.

The May 19, 2011 trustee report noted five impaired loans in the
pool ($114.2 million, 25.5%), as well as 16 impaired securities
($46.6 million, 10.4%). In addition Standard & Poor's determined
one loan, the Lockheed - Hope note, ($3.7 million, 0.8%) to be
credit-impaired. Standard & Poor's estimated asset-specific
recovery rates for the loan assets, which ranged from 0.0% to 68%.
"We based the recovery rates on information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers," S&P
said. The impaired loan assets are:

    The Night Hotel first mortgage loan ($35.0 million, 7.8%);

    The Ironhorse first mortgage loan ($29.3 million, 6.5%);

    The JW Marriott subordinate interest loan ($20.0 million,
    4.5%);

    The Belle Island Village subordinate interest loan
    ($18.2 million, 4.1%); and

    The Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio subordinate interest
    loan ($11.7 million, 2.6%).

S&P's analysis of CBRE 2006-1 also reflected exposure to these
CMBS certificates that it has downgraded:

    CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2005-C4 (classes H,
    J, and K; $11.6 million, 2.6%);

    LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2 (class L;
    $7.0 million, 1.6%);

    Deutsche Mortgage and Asset Receiving Corp. 2006-CD2 (class J;
    $6.0 million, 1.3%); and

    LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7 (class N;
    $4.5 million, 1.0%).

According to the May 2011 trustee report, the transaction is
failing all five of its overcollateralization tests and passing
all of its interest coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets according to its current criteria. "Our analysis
is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P added.

Ratings Lowered

CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A-1       BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
A-2       BB  (sf)             BB+ (sf)
B         B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
C         CCC+ (sf)            BB (sf)
D         CCC- (sf)            BB- (sf)
E         CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)
F         CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)
G         CCC- (sf)            B- (sf)
H         CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations

Class     Rating
J         CCC- (sf)
K         CCC- (sf)


CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F From 'B' to 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd. (Cedarwoods), a commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.
"At the same time, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' rating on class
A-1. We also removed our ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 from
CreditWatch negative, where we had placed them on Jan. 18, 2011,"
S&P said.

"The downgrades of classes A-2 through F primarily reflect our
analysis of the transaction and its underlying collateral
following the deterioration in the credit quality of the
collateral following our downgrades of 47 securities that serve
as underlying collateral for Cedarwoods. Since our last review
in Aug. 18, 2010, the class A principal coverage ratio, with a
threshold of 101.75%, has declined to 109.8% from 130.5%. We
placed our rating on class A-2 on CreditWatch negative on Jan. 18,
2011, following our revised criteria for assessing counterparty
and supporting obligations. We removed our rating from CreditWatch
negative because it is now below the issuer credit rating assigned
to the swap counterparty in the transaction, Bank of America N.A.
(A+/negative/A-1)," S&P said.

"The affirmation of our 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A-1 reflects
our application of our criteria for assessing counterparty and
supporting obligations, as well as our analysis of the transaction
and its underlying collateral. Cedarwoods has in place interest
rate swaps with Bank of America N.A. (A+/negative/A-1) to mitigate
interest rate risk that may arise due to the class paying a
floating-rate coupon and the transaction assets paying fixed-rate
coupons. In our analysis, we modeled the transaction without the
interest rate swaps and determined that our 'AAA (sf)' rating on
class A-1 will be able to withstand the interest rate risk across
different interest rates environments. In addition, class A-1
benefits from principal pay-downs as a result of principal
coverage test failures. Subsequently, we removed our ratings on
class A-1 from CreditWatch negative," S&P noted.

According to the May 19, 2011 trustee report, Cedarwoods' current
asset pool includes:

    One hundred twenty-six commercial mortgage-backed securities
    (CMBS; $337.7 million, 72.1%);

    Twenty-six CRE CDO tranches ($104.5 million, 22.3%); and

    Five real estate investment trust debt securities
    ($26.0 million, 5.6%).

According to the trustee report, four CRE CDO ($27.7 million,
5.9%) and one CMBS securities ($3.0 million, 0.6%) in the
transaction are deemed defaulted. According to the trustee report,
the deal is failing all the principal coverage tests but passing
the interest coverage tests.

The 47 downgraded underlying securities are from 30 transactions
and total $149.1 million (39.0% of the total asset balance). The
credit deterioration of the underlying collateral also prompted
the failure of the principal coverage tests in the transaction.
Cedarwoods has exposure to these securities that Standard & Poor's
has downgraded:

    LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. (classes B, H, and J; $24.0 million,
    6.3%);

    Fairfield Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd. (classes A1, B1, and E1;
    $15.6 million, 4.1%); and

    ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc. (classes B, E, F, and G;
    $9.5 million, 2.5%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria. "Our analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings," S&P added.

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
A-2              A (sf)           AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
A-3              BBB+ (sf)        A+ (sf)
B                BBB- (sf)        A- (sf)
C                BB+ (sf)         BBB+ (sf)
D                B+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)
E                B (sf)           BB (sf)
F                CCC (sf)         B (sf)

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Cedarwoods CRE CDO Ltd.
                        Rating
Class            To               From
A-1              AAA (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)


CIT GROUP: DBRS Assigns 'B' Rating on Series C Notes
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has assigned its B (high) rating to the new
Series C Notes issued by CIT Group Inc. (CIT or the Company).

The new Series C Notes were issued as a result of the Company's
completed exchange offer for outstanding Series A Notes.  The new
Series C Notes have maturities in 2015, 2016, and 2017.  The trend
on the ratings is Positive.

The rating considers the secured position of the Series C Notes,
which benefit from a second lien on substantially all U.S. assets
of CIT that are not otherwise pledged to secure the borrowings of
special purpose entities and the equity of foreign subsidiaries.
Moreover, the Series C Notes rank pari passu with the existing
second lien Series A Notes and Series C Notes.  Given the
aforementioned, the rating reflects DBRS's view that recovery
on the Series C Notes would be less than the first lien notes
but greater than the unsecured debt.

The rating action does not impact the issuer rating of CIT, which
remains B (high), with a Positive trend.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C7, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrade follows a principal loss to the class J
certificates, which was detailed in the June 10, 2011, remittance
report. Class J experienced a 5.9% loss of its $16.2 million
original balance. The class K, L, and M certificates, which
Standard & Poor's had previously lowered to 'D (sf)', have
lost 100% of their respective opening balances.

According to the June 10, 2011 remittance report, the trust
experienced a $33.1 million principal loss upon the liquidation of
the CGM RRI Portfolio loan, which was with the special servicer,
LNR Partners LLC.

The CGM RRI Hotel Portfolio loan was the second-largest asset in
special servicing. The property consisted of 52 Red Roof Inn
hotels totaling 6,030 rooms in 21 states and Washington, D.C. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in May 2009, because
the borrower requested a loan modification. The loan had an
outstanding balance totaling $37.8 million at the time of
liquidation.

Rating Lowered

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
          Rating
Class  To         From
J      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Various Actions on CSFB 2003-C3
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2003-C3 (CSFB 2003-C3)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 4.56% of the
remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at 3.88%,
including losses already incurred to date. Fitch has identified 25
loans (13.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes six
specially-serviced loans (3.5%). Of the six loans in special
servicing, three loans (3.3%) are in foreclosure and three loans
(.27%) are 90 days or more delinquent. Fitch expects losses from
loans currently in special servicing to deplete classes N through
P and impact class M significantly.

As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 33.4% to $1.17 billion from
$1.76 billion at issuance. In addition 27 loans (17.3%) have
been fully defeased. Interest shortfalls totaling $692,970 are
currently affecting classes M through P.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (2.25%)
secured by a 216,416 square foot (sf) office complex located in
Farmington Hills, Michigan, 25 miles northwest of Detroit. The
servicer reported occupancy has declined to 60% which has resulted
in a low debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.0 times (x) as of
year-end (YE) 2010. All of the tenants at the property have leases
that expire by 2013 and have above market rental rates for this
location.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (1.8%) secured by a 708 unit multifamily property in
Houston, TX. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to imminent payment default and foreclosure is
being pursued. The property incurred damage from hurricane Ike and
the borrower was involved in ongoing litigation with the insurance
company, which has since settled with the borrower and issued a
claims check. A judge ruled that the foreclosure process must be
handled judicially and this is expected to add months to the
foreclosure process.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (.8%) secured by an 81,054 square foot (sf) office
building in Exton, PA. The loan transferred to special servicing
in December 2009 due to payment default. The servicer-reported
DSCR as of YE 2010 was .52x and the occupancy as of March 2011 was
67%. The loan is currently in foreclosure since July 2010.

The largest loan in the transaction, 622 Third Avenue, (19.2%), is
secured by a one million sf class A office building located in
midtown Manhattan. The whole loan is divided into a $188.3 million
pooled portion, a $37.1 million non-pooled portion (representing
classes 622A through 622F) and a B-note held outside of the trust.
As of March 2011, occupancy is 99% compared to 98% at issuance.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings (RRs) to these
classes:

   -- $19.4 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'B/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $12.9 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $6.5 million class L to 'CC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $10.8 million class M to 'CC/RR4' from 'CCC/RR3';

   -- $2.2 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';

   -- $4.3 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Also, Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Outlooks and
Loss Severity ratings:

   -- $35.8 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $862.4 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $47.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS4' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $19.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS5' from 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $38.8 million class D at 'AA/LS5' from 'AA/LS3'; Outlook to
      Positive from Stable;

   -- $19.4 million class E at 'A+/LS5' from 'A+/LS4'; Outlook to
      Positive from Stable;

   -- $19.4 million class F at 'A/LS5' from 'A/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $12.9 million class G at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19.4 million class H at 'BB/LS5' from 'BB/LS4'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $2.4 million class 622A at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.6 million class 622B at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.6 million class 622C at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.6 million class 622D at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $16.5 million class 622E at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.5 million class 622F at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

The $6.7 million class P is not rated by Fitch. Class A-1, A-2, A-
3, and A-SP have paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings on the interest-only classes A-X,
and A-Y.


CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings of One CRE CDO Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one and downgraded five classes of Notes
issued by CRESS 2008-1, Ltd., due to an improvement in the credit
quality of the performing collateral, the amount of Defaulted
Securities and undercollateralization due unscheduled paydowns and
writeoffs. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

Class A-1 Notes, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 30,
2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Class B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

CRESS 2008-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
A-Notes and whole loans (62.3% of the pool balance), commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (12.4%) and B-Notes (16.7%).
As of the May 31, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate Note
balance of the transaction has decreased to $621.6 million from
$679.9 million at issuance, with the interest proceeds after
paying Class B being directed to the Class A Notes. This is a
result of the failing of the Class A/B overcollateralization test.
Since last review, the reinvestment period in this transaction
expired and the deal is currently static.

There are fourteen assets with par balance of $112.8 million
(20.7% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the May 31, 2011 Trustee report. Seven of these
assets (66.4% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS, two assets are
either A-Notes or whole loans (22.0%) and five assets are B-Notes
(11.6%). Defaulted Securities that are not CMBS are defined as
assets which are 30or more days delinquent in their debt service
payment. While there have been limited realized losses to date,
Moody's does expect significant losses to occur once they are
realized. In addition to expected losses to Defaulted Securities,
the Notes are currently undercollateral by $27 million when
including cash reserves.

Though the dollar balance of Defaulted Securities has declined
since last review, over $200 million of collateral debt securities
has liquidated for below par value within the past year. For the
purpose of analyzing the more junior classes, this decrease in
collateral more than offsets the improvement in weighted average
rating factor (WARF) for the deal.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,110 compared to 9,422 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (6.0% compared to 2.0% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (3.8% compared to 1.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (10.9%
compared to 0.0% at last review), and Caa1-C (79.3% compared to
96.5% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.7
years compared to 7.0 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
50.1% compared to 38.6% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.0% compared to 100.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
51% to 41% or up to 62% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward and 0 to 3 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Other methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real Estate
Securities" published on June 17, 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


CREST 2002-IG: Fitch Downgrades, Affirms Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed two classes issued
by Crest 2002-IG Ltd./Corp (Crest 2002-IG). The affirmations to
the senior classes are a result of significant deleveraging of the
capital structure. The downgrades to the junior classes are a
result of further negative credit migration and increased interest
shortfalls on the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2010, the class A notes
have received $139.2 million in paydowns. The remaining portfolio
is concentrated with 24 assets from 19 obligors. Currently, 22.3%
of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 6% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 13.1% and 2.4%, respectively, at last review. As of
the May 31, 2011 trustee report, 8.16% of the portfolio is
currently experiencing interest shortfalls compared to 0% at last
review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'. Based on this analysis,
the class A through C notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned.

For the class D notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class D
notes have been downgraded to 'CCsf', indicating that default is
probable. On the April 28, 2011 payment date, the class D notes
received interest paid in kind (PIK) whereby the principal amount
of the notes is written up by the amount of interest due.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's view that
the notes will continue to delever. Similarly, the Stable Outlook
on the class B notes reflects adequate cushion between the current
stress threshold and the breakeven levels to withstand some future
negative credit migration. The Negative Outlook on the class C
notes reflects the concentration risk of the underlying
collateral. The Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates a tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for the
collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss
Severity Ratings'. The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the probability of default for tranches. Fitch
does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and
below.

Crest 2002-IG is a cash flow commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) which closed on May 16, 2002. The
collateral is composed of 73.4% commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) and 26.6% real estate investment trusts (REIT).

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $44,135,914 class A notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $78,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative; to 'LS3' from 'LS4';

   -- $40,168,900 class C notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS3' from
      'BBBsf/LS5' Outlook Negative;

   -- $14,332,500 class D notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'B/LS5'.


DAWN CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Class A to 'Caa2'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class of
notes issued by Dawn CDO I, Ltd. The class of notes affected by
the rating action is:

   -- US$162,700,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $8,890,655),
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 13, 2010,
      Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action results primarily from
delevering of the Class A Notes.

The Class A Notes have been paid down by approximately
$6.8 million since the last rating action in July 2010. As of the
latest trustee report dated May 31, 2011, there are $27.7 million
of performing assets in the portfolio, providing credit support to
the approximately $8.9 million of outstanding class A.

Dawn CDO I, Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed by a portfolio of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
(RMBS), Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), CDO's and
other Asset-Backed Securities originated from 1994-2001.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched down to Ca:

Class A: -1
Class B: 0
Class C: 0

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched up to Caa1:

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0


DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Puts 'BB' Provisional Rating on Class E
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to these classes Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-LC2 to be issued
by DBUBS 2011-LC2 Mortgage Trust.

  -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (sf)
  -- Class C at A (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
  -- Class F at B (low) (sf)
  -- Class FX at B (low) (sf)

The trends are Stable.

The collateral consists of 67 fixed-rate loans secured by 132
commercial, mobile home parks and multifamily properties.  The
portfolio has a balance of $2,143,917,866.  The pool consists of
relatively low-leverage financing, with a DBRS weighted-average
term DSCR and debt yield of 1.42 times (x) and 9.6%, respectively,
based on the trust amount.  Debt yields per rating category for
the transaction are relatively low compared with other fixed-rate
conduit transactions issued in 2010 and 2011, but they are still
much higher than transactions in 2006 and 2007.


DLJ MTG: Moody's Withdraws Ratings of Three Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of three
tranches from the DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp. 1990-02 (Carteret) and 1993-
04 transactions. These tranches are backed by a pool of mortgage
loans with a pool factor less than 5% and containing fewer than 40
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1990-02 (Carteret)

A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
(sf)

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1993-04

A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
(sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

S, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
(sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to pools
with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. As a
result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops
below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40 loans
or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement floor
or pool insurance).

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating pursuant
to published credit rating methodologies that allow for the
withdrawal of the credit rating if the size of the pool
outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen below a
specified level.


GRAND PACIFIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of floating-rate deferrable interest notes from Grand
Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1.

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the deteriorating
performance of the transaction's remaining collateral. The
lowered ratings also reflect a significant reduction in the
spread account, which provides credit enhancement to the rated
certificates," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of all of the remaining collateral
in the pool, including loans that were charged off after 12 months
of payment delinquency, in accordance with the transaction
documents. According to the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., there are currently 10 charged-off loans totaling
approximately $36.0 million, which have not been liquidated as of
the May 2011 remittance report. While liquidation of these assets
may provide principal recoveries, we believe that several of these
assets will fail to recover their entire outstanding balance," S&P
said.

"We considered the performance of the collateral to date in our
analysis of the remaining 13 loans in the pool, as well as the
impact the current economic stress and liquidity conditions may
have on future performance. Four of the 13 loans are matured
balloon loans with delinquent payment status. Of the remaining
nine loans, one loan is matured and the borrower is paying a
default rate, three loans have had maturity extensions and are
current, and five loans are current without extensions," according
to S&P.

As of the May 20, 2011 remittance report, the spread account,
which provides credit enhancements to the rated notes, has a
balance near zero. This is a significant reduction from the
$7.9 million balance at issuance. The class C notes, which also
provide credit support to the rated notes, incurred two losses to
date totaling $2.1 million since issuance. This further reduced
the amount of support available to the rated notes.

Ratings Lowered
Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1
Floating-rate deferrable interest notes
           Rating
Class    To       From           Credit enhancement (%)
A        BBB (sf) AAA (sf)                        26.84
B        B (sf)   A (sf)                          11.80


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades 8 Classes of GSMC 2004-C1
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes of GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II (GSMC) series 2004-C1 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates:

   -- $7.8 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Rating
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $2.6 million class J to 'D/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $0 class K to 'D/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';

   -- $0 class L to 'D/RR6' from 'CC/RR3';

   -- $0 class M to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6';

   -- $0 class N to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6';

   -- $0 class O to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6'.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-1A, B, C, D, E and F have paid in full.

Fitch does not rate class P.

The downgrades are the result of principle losses following the
liquidation of a specially serviced asset which Fitch had
expected.

There is one remaining specially serviced asset in the
transaction, Westbay Office Park. The property is collateralized
by a 107,650 square feet (sf) multi-tenant office building in Las
Vegas, NV. The most recent servicer reported occupancy is 52% as
of the May 2011 rent roll. The loan transferred to special
servicing in September 2010 due to monetary default, and the
special servicer subsequently foreclosed in March 2011. The
special servicer has engaged CBRE for leasing and property
management.


HERTZ VEHICLE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Ratings to ABS
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has assigned the definitive ratings of Aaa(sf) to the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes (Class A notes) and Baa2 (sf) to the
Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes (Class B notes and, together with
the Class A notes, the Series 2011-1 notes) of the Series 2011-1
Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes issued by Hertz Vehicle Financing
LLC (HVF or Issuer), a limited liability company whose sole member
is The Hertz Corporation (Hertz). The Class A-1 and Class B-1
notes have an expected maturity of approximately three years. The
Class A-2 and Class B-2 notes have an expected maturity of
approximately five years. The Class B notes are subordinated to
the Class A notes. The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC

$320,000,000 Series 2011-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A-
1, rated Aaa(sf)

$200,000,000 Series 2011-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class A-
2, rated Aaa(sf)

$48,000,000 Series 2011-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B-
1, rated Baa2 (sf)

$30,000,000 Series 2011-1 Rental Car Asset Backed Notes, Class B-
2, rated Baa2 (sf)

The ratings are based, among other things, on the collateral, the
presence of Hertz as lessee, credit enhancement and the structural
features of the transaction.

Credit enhancement consists of overcollateralization and a minimum
liquidity requirement in the form of letter of credit or cash;
and, for the Class A notes, subordination provided by the Class B
notes. Overcollateralization levels vary. The lowest enhancement
level is 25%, the intermediary enhancement level is 32% and the
highest enhancement level is also 32%.

Transaction Overview

The Class A notes and the Class B notes were issued by HVF which
is a master trust structure under which multiple series of notes
share the same pool of vehicles as collateral. The Series 2011-1
notes are secured by a first-priority perfected security interest
in a collateral pool, shared with other series, which primarily
consists of among other things eligible program and non-program
vehicles from eligible manufacturers. The repayment of these notes
will be from three primary sources: (1) lease payments from Hertz
under a master lease agreement, (2) payments from program
manufacturers under their repurchase agreements, and (3) proceeds
from the sale of non-program vehicles in the open market.

The Class A notes and the Class B notes have revolving periods
followed by controlled amortization periods if no rapid
amortization event occurs. During the revolving period, the
collateral for the notes may be sold and replaced and, unless a
rapid amortization event has occurred, no payment of principal for
any class of notes is required. Amortization events include, among
other things, bankruptcies of Hertz or the Issuer, termination of
the lease between the Issuer and Hertz, payment default under the
lease and credit enhancement deficiencies.

The Class B notes are subordinated in all respects to the Class A
notes. No payment of interest on the Class B notes will be made on
any payment date unless all interest due on the Class A notes has
been paid in full. During any controlled amortization period with
regards to the three-year notes or five-year notes, no payment of
principal of the Class B notes will be made until the controlled
distribution amount related to the Class A notes has been paid in
full. During the rapid amortization period, no payment of
principal of the Class B notes will be made unless and until the
aggregate outstanding principal amount of Class A notes has been
paid in full

Credit support for the Class A notes consists of a combination of
subordination of Class B notes, overcollateralization, cash or
letters of credit. Credit support for the Class B notes consists
of a combination of overcollateralization, cash or letters of
credit. The required minimum credit enhancement for the Class B
notes expressed as a percentage of the adjusted principal amount
of Class A notes and Class B notes consists of three buckets: (1)
25.0% for program vehicles from eligible manufacturers rated at
least Baa2 (unlimited) or Baa3 (subject to a limit of 10% of the
total securitized fleet by net book value); (2) 32.0% for all
other program vehicles; and (3) 32.0% for non-program vehicles and
vehicles of bankrupt manufacturers. Part of the credit enhancement
will consist of minimum liquidity equal to at least six months of
interest on the notes plus a cushion of at least 50 bps to cover
operating and other expenses. The final required enhancement for
Class B notes will be a blended rate depending on the fleet mix.
The actual required amount of credit enhancement therefore
fluctuates based on the mix of vehicles in the securitized fleet.

V-Score And Loss Sensitivity

Moody's V Score. The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which
is the same as the V score assigned for the U.S. Rental Car ABS
sector. The V Score indicates "Medium" uncertainty about critical
assumptions. The Medium V-score is largely driven by the average
quality of historical data as well as the average performance
variability for the Issuer and for the sector, the average
collateral pool disclosure and ongoing disclosure of
securitizations for the Issuer, and the medium transaction
complexity and analytical complexity. The historical downgrade
rate for the sector is worse than average. However, the governance
for the transaction is better than average against other ABS
assets. Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and the potential
variability around the various inputs to a rating determination.
The V Score ranks transactions by the potential for significant
rating changes owing to uncertainty around the assumptions due to
data quality, historical performance, the level of disclosure,
transaction complexity, the modeling and the transaction
governance that underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire
transaction (rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities. For this exercise, Moody's
analyzed stress scenarios assessing the potential model-indicated
ratings impact if (a) the current B1 rating of Hertz was to
immediately decline to B3, Caa1, Caa2 and Caa3 and (b) the assumed
modeled haircuts to estimated vehicle market values were increased
by 5%, 10% and 15%. Haircuts are expressed as a percentage of the
estimated market value of the vehicle collateral. Moody's models
potential vehicle collateral liquidation value by estimating
market value and then applying haircuts. Moody's uses triangular
distributions for those haircuts (see methodology below). The
stresses increase the base case triangular distribution haircuts
by these percentage points: 5%, 10% and 15%. For example, if the
haircuts in the base case are determined by a triangular
distribution with parameters of (5%, 15%, 30%), and this is
increased by 5 percentage points, then the resulting stressed
haircut would be determined by a triangular distribution with
parameters of (10%, 20%, 35%).

Using such assumptions, the Aaainitial model-indicated rating for
the Series 2011-1 notes might change as follows: (a) with Hertz
rated B1, the Aaainitial note rating would remain unchanged under
the base market value haircut, or if the market value haircut is
increased by 5%, but would change to Aa1 if the market value
haircut is increased by 10%, or change to Aa2 if the market value
haircut is increased by 15%; (b) with Hertz rated B3, the
Aaainitial note rating would remain unchanged under the base
market value haircut assumption or if the market value hair is
increased by 5%, but would change to Aa1 if the market value
haircut is increased by 10%, or change to Aa3 if the market value
haircut is increased by 15%, (c) with Hertz rated Caa1, the
Aaainitial note rating would remain unchanged under the base
market value haircut assumption or if the market value haircut is
increased by 5%, but would change to Aa1 if the market haircut is
increased by 10% or change to Aa3 if the market value haircut is
increased by 15%;(d) with Hertz rated Caa2, the Aaainitial note
rating would remain unchanged under the base market value haircut
assumption or if the market value haircut is increased by 5%, but
would change to Aa1 if the market haircut is increased by 10% or
change to Aa3 if the market value haircut is increased by 15%; and
(e) with Hertz rated Caa3, the Aaainitial note rating would remain
unchanged under the base market value haircut assumption, or if
the market value haircut is increased by 5%, but would change to
Aa2 if the market value haircut is increased by 10%, or change to
A1 if the market value haircut is increased by 15%.

Using such assumptions, the Baa2 initial model-indicated rating
for the Class B notes might change as follows: (a) with Hertz
rated B1, the Baa2 initial note rating would remain unchanged
under the base market value haircut, but would change to Baa3 if
the market value haircut is increased by 5%, or change to B1 if
the market value haircut is increased by 10%, or change to below
B3 if the market value haircut is increased by 15%; (b) with Hertz
rated B3, the Baa2 initial note rating would remain unchanged
under the base market value haircut assumption, but would change
to Ba1 if the market value hair is increased by 5%, or change to
B3 if the market value haircut is increased by 10%, or change to
below B3 if the market value haircut is increased by 15%, (c) with
Hertz rated Caa1, the Baa2 initial note rating would remain
unchanged under the base market value haircut assumption or change
to Ba1 if the market value haircut is increased by 5%, or change
to B3 if the market haircut is increased by 10% or change to below
B3 if the market value haircut is increased by 15%;(d) with Hertz
rated Caa2, the Baa2 initial note rating would remain unchanged
under the base market value haircut assumption or change to Ba2 if
the market value haircut is increased by 5%, or change to below B3
if the market haircut is increased by 10% or change to below B3 if
the market value haircut is increased by 15%; and (e) with Hertz
rated Caa3, the Baa2 initial note rating would remain unchanged
under the base market value haircut assumption, or would change to
Ba2 if the market value haircut is increased by 5%, or change to
below B3 if the market value haircut is increased by 10%, or
change to below B3 if the market value haircut is increased by
15%.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Principal Rating Methodology

The primary asset backing the notes is the monthly lease payments
by Hertz as well as the pool of vehicles comprising the bulk of
the Hertz daily rental car fleet, including both program vehicles
(vehicles subject to repurchase, or guaranteed depreciation
agreements provided by the related auto manufacturer) and non-
program vehicles (vehicles that do not benefit from such
repurchase or guaranteed depreciation agreements).

The key factors in Moody's rating analysis include the probability
of default by Hertz, the likelihood of a bankruptcy or default by
the auto manufacturers providing vehicles to the rental car fleet
owned by the lessor, and the recovery rate on the rental car fleet
in the event that Hertz defaults. Monte Carlo simulation modeling
was used to assess the impact on bondholders of these variables.

The default probability of Hertz was simulated based on its
current corporate probability of default rating and Moody's
idealized default rates. Moody's stresses the rating of Hertz as
lessee to provide a limited degree of de-linkage of the rated ABS
from the corporate rating of the sponsor. With the Class B notes
Moody's stressed the rating of Hertz by two notches to B3 to
provide an additional degree of ratings stability given that the
subordinate position of the Class B notes renders them more
sensitive to credit risk factors particularly the sponsor's
default risk. In contrast, for comparably rated senior notes,
Moody's normally stresses the sponsor's rating by only one notch.

Like all rental car companies, Hertz's fleet includes both program
cars and non-program cars (also known as 'risk' cars). Under the
terms of the simulation, in cases where Hertz does not default, it
is assumed that bondholders are repaid in full and no liquidation
of the Issuer's rental car fleet is necessary.

In cases where Hertz does default, the Issuer's fleet must be
liquidated in order to repay the bondholders. In those cases, the
default probability of the related auto manufacturers must also be
simulated. Due to the Detroit Three's current highly uncertain
credit status, their defaults were simulated based on estimates
for probability of default provided by Moody's corporate analysts
that incorporated the likelihood of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
bankruptcies. The default probability of other manufacturers is
derived from their respective ratings. For each manufacturer
simulated to be in Chapter 11, Moody's further simulates whether
each such manufacturer will honor its obligation with respect to
program vehicles or default on the obligation. In simulating
liquidation of the rental car fleet following a Hertz default, it
is assumed that the portion of the program vehicle fleet
associated with non-defaulting manufacturers (both non-bankrupt
manufacturers and bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers honoring their
program obligations) is returned to the related manufacturer at
full book value. For the non-program vehicle (risk) fleet, as well
as the portion of the program vehicle fleet associated with
defaulting manufacturers not honoring obligations on their program
vehicles, it is assumed the vehicles will be sold in the open
market.

For vehicles sold in the open market, the market value of a
vehicle at the time of liquidation, before any haircuts are
applied, is estimated using market depreciation data from the
National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) for each
manufacturer with vehicles in the collateral pool. In making this
calculation Moody's generally assumes a purchase price for program
and non-program (risk) vehicles which is 10% below MSRP, to give
credit to the volume discounts typically achieved by rental car
companies. In addition, Moody's assumes a delay in sale of six
months and therefore net an additional six months of depreciation.
This six month delay in fleet liquidation following the Lessee's
default contemplates potential legal challenges to obtaining
control of the fleet and the potential difficulties of marshaling
and selling such a large quantity of vehicles. The base
liquidation value of sold vehicles is determined by applying a
base haircut to this estimated depreciated market value. The base
haircut is simulated using a triangular distribution (i.e.,
minimum, mode, maximum) with values of (5%, 15%, 30%). The
resulting calculation provides the base liquidation value.
Additional haircuts may be applied to the base liquidation value
depending on the manufacturer's simulated status: non-bankrupt,
bankrupt Chapter 11 or bankrupt Chapter 7. No further haircuts are
applied to either (i) non-program (risk) and program vehicles from
non-bankrupt manufacturers or (ii) program vehicles from bankrupt
Chapter 11 manufacturers who are assumed to honor their program
obligations. However, in all other cases, the base liquidation
value is further reduced. For bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers,
Moody's reduces the base liquidation of their non-program (risk)
vehicles and their program vehicles whose obligations are assumed
not to be honored by multiplying the base liquidation value by a
haircut, which is simulated using a triangular distribution with
input parameters (14%, 18%, 19%). For manufacturers assumed to be
in Chapter 7, Moody's reduces base liquidation value of their
vehicles by multiplying the base liquidation value by a haircut,
which is simulated using a triangular distribution with input
parameters (25%, 35%, 50%).

Slightly higher volatility of the fleet mix by manufacturer was
assumed given greater potential for changes in fleet mix in a
seven year tranche. Additional sensitivities were conducted to
test the impact of extra volatility in the pool mix on the ratings
on the notes.


INVESCO CONISTON: S&P Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
Invesco Coniston B.V.'s notes.

Specifically, S&P:

    Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
    rating on the class A1 notes;

    Raised and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the
    class A2 notes;

    Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
    the class B and C notes;

    Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
    the class D and E notes; and

    Affirmed its rating on the class F notes.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio and an increase in the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes. The rating
actions also reflect the application of our 2010 counterparty
criteria (see 'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology
And Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

"Since our last transaction update in December 2009, we have
observed an improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, which comprises loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate obligors," S&P related.

"Our credit and cash flow analysis on the class A1 notes indicate
that the level of available credit enhancement is sufficient for
the notes to maintain their 'AAA (sf)' rating," S&P noted.

"For the class A2 notes, our analysis indicates that the
improvements in scenario default rates (SDRs) and the increase in
available credit enhancement has benefited the class A2 notes to
an extent where we can raise the ratings from their current
levels. Therefore, we have raised our ratings on the class
A2 notes to 'AA (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)'," S&P noted.

"Our analysis indicates that the number of loans rated in the
'CCC' category has decreased. Currently, 5.76% of the portfolio's
performing balance is rated in this category, compared with 7.64%
in December 2009," according to S&P.

Overall, this has led to an improvement in our SDR assumptions for
each class of notes, thereby lowering our expectation of portfolio
losses at each rating level. "At the same time, we have also
observed an increase in the credit enhancement available to all
classes of notes," S&P noted.

"On Jan. 18, 2011, we placed the ratings on the class A1 and A2
notes on CreditWatch negative when our 2010 counterparty criteria
became effective (see 'EMEA Structured Finance CreditWatch Actions
In Connection With Revised Counterparty Criteria')," S&P stated.

"In our opinion, the transaction documents reflect our 2010
counterparty criteria in respect of direct obligations (account
banks, custodians, and liquidity facility). For derivatives, we
believe that the swap documentation does not fully reflect our
2010 criteria. We have conducted our cash flow analyses assuming
that the transaction does not benefit from support under the
swaps. We concluded, after conducting these cash flow analyses,
that the proposed ratings could be maintained and have therefore
removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class A1 and
A2 notes," S&P stated.

"Following a review of cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) performance, on April 18, 2011, we placed the class B to E
notes on CreditWatch positive (see 'Ratings Placed On CreditWatch
Positive On 67 tranches In 24 European Corporate CLO
Transactions')," S&P related.

"Similarly, the improvements we have seen in the transaction since
our last transaction update have, in our view, filtered down to
the class B and C notes where we believe the credit enhancement
available to these classes is now commensurate with higher rating
levels. We have therefore raised and removed from CreditWatch
positive our ratings on the class B and C notes," S&P said.

"The increase in available credit enhancement for the class D and
E notes is, in our opinion, currently insufficient to justify an
upgrade on these notes. We have therefore affirmed and removed
from CreditWatch positive our ratings on the class D and E notes,"
S&P stated.

"We have also affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class F
notes, as we still believe that noteholders are vulnerable to non-
repayment of these notes," S&P added.

Ratings List

Class             Rating
            To              From

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          AA (sf)         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

B           A+ (sf)         A (sf)/Watch Pos
C           BBB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

D           BB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E           B- (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1          AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

F           CCC-


JER CRE CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings of 14 CRE CDO Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed fourteen classes of Notes issued by JER CRE
CDO 2006-2, Limited due to the deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor (WARF), and increase in Defaulted
Securities, and sensitivities to recovery rates. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. G-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. H-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J-FX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2010 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

JER CRE CDO 2006-2, Limited is a cash CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(68% of the collateral balance), mezzanine loans (22.7%), CRE CDO
(5.2%) and whole loans (4.1%). As of the May 20, 2011 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $885.3 million from $1,200.5 million at issuance,
with the paydown directed to the Class A-FL Notes, as a result of
a combination of failing the overcollateralization tests and
redirection of interest on Defaulted Securities as principal. The
deal went into Event of Default on the September 27, 2010 payment
date as a result of failure of payment of interest on the Class A-
FL and Class B-FL Notes, which has since been cured. The current
balance of the Preferred Shares has been reduced to zero due to
realized losses as of the May 20, 2011 Trustee report.

There are eighty-three assets with a par balance of $510.5 million
(58.8% of the collateral balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the May 20, 2011 Trustee report. While there have
been realized losses in the form of $292.5 million on the
underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect significant
losses to occur on the Defaulted Securities once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,969 compared to 8,709 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Baa1-Baa3 (0.5% compared to 0.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(0.0% compared to 1.0% at last review), B1-B3 (2.4% compared to
5.1% at last review), and Caa1-C (97.1% compared to 93.5% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 7.1 years compared
to 6.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
2.2% compared to 2.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 0.0% at last review.
The high MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption up from
2.2% to 7.2% would result in average rating movement on the rated
tranches of 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Other methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Revolving Facilities in CDOs Backed by Commercial Real
Estate Interests" published in July 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


JG WENTWORTH: Moody's Assigns Ratings to Class A and B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by J.G. Wentworth XXIII LLC (Issuer), an indirect
subsidiary of J.G. Wentworth, LLC, collateralized by a pool of
structured settlements and assignable annuities.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: J.G. Wentworth XXIII LLC

   -- $226,044,000 Class A, 4.70% Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes,
      Series 2011-1, rated Aaa (sf)

   -- $21,212,000 Class B, 7.49% Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes,
      Series 2011-1, rated Baa2 (sf)

It should be noted that final amounts of each class are
different from the amounts that were assigned provisional ratings
on June 6, 2011. Specifically, the Class A Notes were increased by
approximately $3.3 million while the Class B Notes were increased
by approximately $0.3 million, resulting in an increase in the
total issuance of approximately $3.6 million. The higher amounts
are due solely to the lower actual coupon rates on the notes as
compared to the coupon rates assumed when analyzing the notes for
the provisional ratings.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings on the Notes reflects the assessed quality of the
court ordered structured settlements and annuity receivables (the
receivables), the credit worthiness of the obligors, the servicing
arrangement and the structural and legal features. Historically,
Wentworth's originated court ordered structured settlements
receivables have experienced very low losses, totaling less than
0.11% cumulatively since 2002. In addition, the pool of obligors
under the receivables is diverse and comprised primarily of highly
rated life insurance companies, of which approximately 88.7% based
on the present value of the securitized receivables, have an
insurance financial strength ratings of A3 or higher.

The Issuer's assets will include court ordered structured
settlements (approximately 94.6% of the present value of the
receivables), annuity receivables (approximately 5.4% of the
present value of the receivables) (together the receivables) and
approximately $61.8 million, which will be used to purchase 25% of
the net present value of the total receivables, deposited into the
Prefunding Account. The receivables were originated by J.G.
Wentworth Origination LLC (J.G. Wentworth).

This will be the second J.G. Wentworth transaction that utilizes a
Prefunding Account. Amounts on deposit in the prefunding account
may be used within a prefunding period of ninety day after closing
to acquire additional receivables. The addition of new receivables
is subject to eligibility criteria and to a Rating Agency
Confirmation in which Moody's must affirm that it will not
downgrade, withdraw or qualify its ratings of the Notes solely as
a result of the acquisition of additional receivables. Any amount
remaining in the Prefunding Account at the end of the Prefunding
Period will be deposited into the collection account and
distributed in accordance with the priority of payments.

The servicing arrangement adequately reduces the risk of a
servicing disruption; Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (DBTCA)
will act as the master servicer, and will initially subcontract
with J.G. Wentworth Management Company, LLC (JGW Management) to
perform its servicing obligations. In addition, Portfolio
Financial Servicing Company (PFSC) will act as hot back-up
servicer.

The transaction utilizes a turbo structure in which all
collections from the receivables, net of certain fees and
expenses, are first used to meet interest payments on the Notes
and second to pay down the Notes' outstanding principal balance
until paid in full. The Class A Notes will benefit from 14.75%
subordination comprised of Class B Notes and the Issuer Interest.
The Class A subordination is expected to increase over time as the
Class B will not receive any principal payments in the first 48
months after the closing date and the Issuer Interest will not
receive any principal until all the Notes are paid in full;
performance triggers provide additional protection to the Class A
notes. The Class B benefits from 6.75% subordination provided by
the Issuer Interest. Finally, the Notes benefit from a non-
declining reserve account equal to 1% of the initial present value
of the receivables; if and when additional receivables are added
to the pool during the prefunding period, the amount on deposit in
the reserve account and the target reserve account balance will
increase accordingly.

Moody's V-Score And Parameter Sensitivities

The V Score for this transaction is Low/Medium. The V Score
indicates better than "Average" structure complexity and
uncertainty about critical assumptions. The Low/Medium score for
this transaction is driven by a variety of factors. Historic
collateral performance in this sector has been consistent with
expectations, and there have been no downgrades to date.
Securitization performance data dates back fifteen years or so.
Nevertheless, transactions have very long durations of thirty to
forty years, and the past experience does not include a period of
significant stress such as a default by a major life insurance
carrier. Additionally, the vast majority of the assets are
originated though a court order process which minimize origination
and legal risk. Finally, the obligors under the receivables are
life insurance companies which are subject to regulations and
oversight. Servicing responsibilities are low because the
insurance company obligors are reliable payors.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities

For this exercise, Moody's analyzed scenarios stressing two key
model input assumptions to determine the potential model-indicated
ratings impact. The two key model inputs and associated stressed
values were as follows: (a) for the default probability, the ten
largest obligors were used as a proxy for the pool as a whole.
Moody's lowered its ratings by two and four notches as a proxy for
increase in default probability; and (b) for the recovery rate
upon an obligor default Moody's lowered the assumed recovery rate
by an additional 15% and 30%. Moody's base case assumes a range of
recoveries centered at around 70% for companies that are rated
investment grade and centered around 50% for non investment grade
companies.

For the Class A notes, using the assumptions , the Aaa (sf)
initial rating might change as follows based purely on model
results: (a) If the assumed ratings for the ten largest obligors
are their current ratings, the model-indicated output based on the
changes in recovery rates becomes as follows: base case, Aaa(0);
15% lower than base case, Aa1(1); and 30% lower than base case,
Aa2(2); (b) If the assumed ratings for the ten largest obligors is
two notches down, the model-indicated output based on the changes
in recovery rates becomes as follows: base case, Aa1(1); 15% lower
than base case, Aa2(2); and 30% lower than base case, Aa3(3); and
(c) If the assumed ratings for the ten largest obligors are four
notches down, the model-indicated output based on the changes in
recovery rates becomes as follows: base case, Aa3(3); 15% lower
than base case, A2(5); and 30% lower than base case, A3(6).

For the Class B notes, using such assumptions, the Baa2 (sf)
initial rating might change as follows based purely on model
results: If the assumed ratings for the ten largest obligors are
their current ratings, the model-indicated output based on the
changes in recovery rates becomes as follows: base case, Baa2(0);
15% lower than base case, Baa2(0); and 30% lower than base case,
Baa3(1); (b) If the assumed ratings for the ten largest obligors
are two notches down, the model-indicated output based on the
changes in recovery rates becomes as follows: base case, Baa3(1);
15% lower than base case, Ba2(3); and 30% lower than base case,
Ba3(4); and (c) If the assumed ratings for the ten largest
obligors are four notches down, the model indicated output based
on the changes in recovery rates becomes as follows: base case,
B1(5); 15% lower than base case, B3(7); and 30% lower than base
case, 7).

Principal Methodology

In assigning credit ratings on structured settlement-backed notes,
Moody's relies on both qualitative and quantitative analysis.

Qualitative Analysis

Moody's qualitative analysis focuses primarily on evaluating (i)
the servicer's capacity to fulfill its duties and whether the
servicing arrangement adequately reduces the likelihood and extent
of a servicing disruption; (ii) cash management, and (iii) the
extent of payment diversion risk.

Moody's evaluates a number of factors regarding servicing,
including: the effectiveness of the servicer's systems to flag
future dates when large payments are due and the servicer's
ability to quickly detect inappropriately allocated payments and
to act on improperly missed or diverted payments. Moody's also
evaluates the risk of servicing disruption. The risk of servicing
disruption tends to be low when servicing is provided by an
experienced, stable, financially strong servicer, or the
transaction provides for backup servicing arrangements that would
likely lead to a smooth, quick transfer of servicing to another
entity if needed.

Structured settlement securitizations benefit from strong legal
protections; however, funds may be diverted from investors in
connection with a sponsor's bankruptcy, or as a result of either
fraud by the claimants or administrative error. Moody's assessment
of that risk focuses on evaluating the extent to which obligors'
payments are isolated from the sponsor by lock box arrangements or
other means and the servicer's oversight over incoming payments to
ensure they are in line with scheduled payments.

Payment diversion risk arises from settlement claimants attempting
to divert payments from the securitization. This risk is low
because the vast majority of the receivables in the analyzed
transactions (based on discounted balance of the securitized
receivables at the time of each transaction's closing date)
consisted of court-ordered transfers of structured settlement
receivables. Court-ordered structured settlements consist of
receivables created after the enactment of the Victims of
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (the Act). The Act stipulates
that the sale of a structured settlement receivable must be
subject to a court order under which the structured settlement
obligors are directed by the court to remit payments to a given
party. Therefore, the securitization's right to receive settlement
payments is backed by strong legal protections.

Quantitative Analysis

Moody's used a Monte Carlo analysis to simulate no less than
10,000 different scenarios of the structured settlement pool
performance. The modeled cash-flows are then used to pay down the
Notes and to observe the probabilities and severities of defaults
for the different classes of Notes. Specifically, the IRR of the
simulated ABS cash flows is calculated for each iteration, and
then compared to the promised IRR (coupon) to measure the
reduction in IRR. If there is a principal loss, this loss is noted
and the amount is logged. After completing the simulations, an
average reduction in IRR, an average frequency of loss and an
average loss (expected loss) is calculated. From these results
model-indicated ratings are determined using the appropriate
Moody's idealized reference tables. Of these measures, the primary
driver to the rating outcome is the IRR reduction.

The Monte Carlo simulation model uses asset level information
about the pool of securitized receivables including the credit
quality of the obligors. The model relies on identifying key
variables important to the performance of the assets and on
assigning probability distributions for these variables. The key
variables include the probability of default for the obligors
making payments under the securitized receivables, the recovery
rate on the receivables upon the default of an obligor, the
correlation between obligors' defaults, and losses. In defining
the parameters for the variables, Moody's relied on a combination
of historical data, market knowledge on current and future trends
in the insurance industry and the sub-servicer's own experience.

This is a more detailed explanation of the key variables and
Moody's assumptions for each:

1. The obligor mix in these transactions consists of insurance
   companies (primarily life insurance companies) which are
   typically highly rated. For probability of default assumptions,
   Moody's used the actual credit ratings for the obligor if
   available; for obligors for which Moody's credit rating was not
   available, a probability of default consistent with a Ba rating
   level was assumed. Finally, obligors which are part of the same
   insurance group were treated as a single obligor.

2. Moody's recovery assumptions for the structured settlements of
   defaulted obligors range from 35% to 75%. For most investment
   grade rated life insurers, the distribution is centered toward
   the upper end of that range.

3. For obligor correlation, Moody's assumes that each individual
   company's default is correlated with all other obligors in the
   pool, reflecting the fact that they are all in the life
   insurance industry. This approach is consistent with the
   correlation approach Moody's uses to evaluate other pools of
   corporate credit. Generally speaking, Moody's employs single
   industry correlation assumptions that range from 3% to 50%,
   depending on the industry, the nature of the obligation and the
   geographic dispersion of the obligors. Moody's uses a
   correlation assumption of 25% in analyzing the behavior of
   pools of insurance company obligors in structured settlements.
   This level of correlation results in the default of
   approximately half of the obligors in a typical pool within ten
   years, as compared to approximately one sixth of the pool with
   no correlation. In arriving at the 25% correlation assumption,
   Moody's considered the fact that the securitized obligations
   are claims Moody's views on par with insurance policies, rather
   than corporate debt obligations, and the relatively low
   observed correlation among life insurance companies.

4. Direct collateral losses, not associated with failures of
   insurance companies defaulting on their obligations, were
   assumed to be less than 2%. Though historically losses on
   court-ordered structured settlements have been very low (for
   example, totaling less than 25 basis points cumulatively since
   2002 for one leading industry participant), losses for a
   specific transaction may be higher than the historical levels.
   Losses may stem from bankruptcy of claimant, fraud,
   administrative error by the originator or obligor or other
   reasons.

5. Overall, Moody's assesses the sufficiency of the available
   credit enhancement in light of the various structural features
   of the transaction.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issue can be found at www.moodys.com in
the Ratings Methodologies subdirectory within the Rating
Methodologies and Performance directory.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.

Moody's Investors Service received a third party due diligence
report on the underlying assets or financial instruments in this
transaction.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Ratings Downgrades JPMCC 2001-CIBC2
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMCC), commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2001-CIBC2.

The downgrades are the result of an increase in Fitch expected
losses of the remaining pool. Fitch modeled losses of 18.9% of the
remaining pool; expected losses of the original pool are at 5.7%,
including losses already incurred to date. The losses are expected
to deplete class K through class H and impair class G. Fitch has
identified 13 loans (34.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes nine specially serviced loans (30%).

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by approximately 72.2% to
$207.7 million from $961.7 billion at issuance. Interest
shortfalls are affecting the non rated class NR through class G,
with cumulative unpaid interest totaling $2.3 million.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2009 or 2010 fiscal year-end net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8.10% and 11.00 %
to determine value.

All the loans also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. All of the loans are considered to pay off at
maturity, and could refinance to a debt-service coverage ratio
(DSCR) above 1.25 times (x). The current weighted average DSCR is
1.41x.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are Gateway Executive
Park (7.2%), Oakpointe Business Centre (2.7%) and Wright Point
Office Complex (4.6%) loans.

Gateway Executive Park is a 231,256 square foot (sf) office
property in Schaumburg, IL, a northwest Chicago suburb. The
property became a real estate owned asset (REO) in March 2011 and
is currently 73% leased. The property will be listed for sale in
the next 30 days. The most recent servicer valuation of the
property indicates losses upon liquidation.

Oakpointe Business Centre is a 96,213 sf office property in
Arlington Heights, IL. The special servicer foreclosed on the
property in August 2010 via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
Settlement proceeds collected from the borrower have been applied
to repay the outstanding balance of the loan.

Wright Point Office Complex is secured by a 162,568 sf office
property in Riverside, OH and transferred to the special servicer
in January 2010 due to imminent default. The special servicer has
initiated foreclosure and the most recent property valuation
indicates losses upon the liquidation of the property.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

   -- $25.2 million class G to 'CC/RR2' from 'CCC/RR1';

   -- $7.2 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3';

   -- $10.7 million class K to 'D/RR6' from'C/RR6'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $25.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $38.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $38.5 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.4 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $28.9 million class E at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $12 million class F at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.2 million class J at'C/RR6';

   -- $4.8 million class L at 'D/RR6';

   -- $7.8 million class M at 'D/RR6.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Fitch does not rate NR
class certificates. Fitch has withdrawn the ratings on the
Interest-only class X-1.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-
LN2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The downgrade follows a principal loss to the class L certificate,
which was detailed in the June 15, 2011, remittance report. "Class
L experienced a 2.5% loss of its $4.7 million original balance.
The class M certificate, which we previously downgraded to 'D
(sf)', was also affected by the principal loss. Class M has lost
100% of its opening balance," S&P said.

According to the June 15, 2011 remittance report, the trust
experienced $3.6 million in principal losses during the monthly
reporting period; $3.3 million of the principal losses were due to
the liquidation of the Timber Park Apartments real estate owned
(REO) asset, which was with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC. The asset, a 158-unit multifamily property in
Dallas, Texas, was transferred to the special servicer in
September 2009 and became REO in March 2010. The asset had an
outstanding trust balance totaling $3.6 million at the time of
liquidation.

Rating Lowered

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-LN2

          Rating
Class  To         From
L      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrades were due to principal losses and the potential for
future interest shortfalls.

"We lowered our ratings on the class J, K, and L certificates
to 'D (sf)' because of principal losses resulting from the
liquidation of one asset that was with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC. According to the June 17, 2011, remittance report,
the trust experienced $43.7 million in principal losses upon the
recent disposition of The Chapel Hills Mall asset, which
liquidated at a 35.8% loss severity based on its $122.0 million
original balance. The Chapel Hills Mall is a regional mall in
Colorado Springs, Colo., with 500,757 net rentable square feet.
The sponsor was General Growth Properties Inc., and the loan had
been with the special servicer since April 2009. The class J
certificate experienced a loss of 37.5% of its $18.4 million
original balance. Classes K, L, and M experienced losses of 100%
of their original balances. Standard & Poor's had previously
lowered its rating on the class M certificate to 'D (sf)'," S&P
said.

"We lowered our ratings on classes F, G, and H certificates
because of increased susceptibility to future interest shortfalls
due to the reduced liquidity support available to these
certificates. As of the June 17, 2011, trustee remittance report,
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $20.3 million were in
effect for seven ($57.5 million, 2.8%) of the transaction's
nine ($87.0 million, 4.3%) specially serviced assets. The current
interest shortfalls primarily resulted from appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts and special servicing fees.
The total reported ASER amount was $92,880, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $469,595. Standard & Poor's considered
six ASER amounts, which were based on Member of the Appraisal
Institute (MAI) appraisals, as well as current special servicing
fees ($69,637), workout fees ($90), and interest on advances
($19,234), in determining its rating actions. The reported monthly
interest shortfalls totaled $143,168 and affected all of the
classes subordinate to and including class K," S&P related.

Ratings Lowered

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                               Credit       Reported
          Rating          enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From            (%)    Current  Accumulated

F      B (sf)     BB- (sf)       2.81          0           0
G      CCC (sf)   B+ (sf)        1.76          0           0
H      CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)        0.56          0           0
J      D (sf)     B (sf)         0             0           0
K      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)      0        87,348     567,331
L      D (sf)     CCC  (sf)      0        49,802     434,021


LNR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Four CRE CDO Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded four and affirmed four classes of Notes
issued by LNR CDO 2003-1, Ltd. due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor (WARF), increase in
Defaulted Securities, and increase in realized losses. The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions.

Cl. A, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

LNR CDO 2003-1, Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the collateral balance). As of the May 19, 2011 Trustee report,
the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$596.6 million from $762.7 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A Notes, as a result of failing the Class F
par value test.

There are 37 assets with par balance of $137.5 million (23.0% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the May 19, 2011 Trustee report. While there have been
limited realized losses in the underlying collateral in the form
of $159.3 million to date, Moody's does expect significant losses
to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 5,825 compared to 4,506 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.8% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(6.3% compared to 1.7% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.4% compared to
32.9% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 28.1% at last
review), and Caa1-C (54.8% compared to 37.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.8 years compared
to 3.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
8.1% compared to 9.2% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.2% compared to 20.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
14.2% to 9.5% or up to 5% would result in average rating movement
on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward and 0 to 1 notch
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Other methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real Estate
Securities" published in June 2004

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


LSTAR 2011-1: Fitch to Rate LSTAR 2011-1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on LSTAR Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2011-1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Loss Severity
(LS) ratings and Outlooks:

   -- $220,414,000 class A 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18,141,000 class B 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,572,000 class C 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27,666,000 class D 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,710,000 class E 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,803,000 class F 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 10, 2011. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$362,822,295* interest-only class X, or the $53,516,295 class G.

*Notional amount and interest only.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 150 seasoned loans secured by 152
commercial properties, having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $362.8 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were
acquired by Lone Star Funds over the past nine months.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 49% of the properties by
balance, including nine of the top 10 properties by balance, and
performed cash flow analysis of 52.4% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.74 times (x), a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of
128.9%, and a Fitch debt yield of 7.8%. Fitch's aggregate net cash
flow represents a variance of 8.3% to the most recently reported
NOI.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Midland Loan
Services, Inc., (rated 'CMS1' by Fitch) and Hudson Advisors, LLC
(rated 'CSS2-' by Fitch), respectively.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Classes of MLMT 2005-CIP1
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 12 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust (MLMT) 2005-CIP1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates. In addition, Fitch has revised the Loss Severity
(LS) ratings and assigned Ratings Outlooks and Recovery Ratings as
applicable.

The downgrades reflect Fitch expected losses, most of which are
associated with the specially serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 7.91% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 8.15%, which also
reflect losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated 42
loans (40.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include seventeen
specially serviced loans (18%). Five of the Fitch Loans of Concern
(23.82%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans by unpaid
principal balance. Fitch expects that class M through P may
eventually be fully depleted from losses associated with loans
currently in special servicing. Fifteen loans (15.54%) have
transferred to special servicing since Fitch's last review.

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 15.54% (including 1.31% of
realized losses) to $1.78 billion from $2.06 billion at issuance.
Due to realized losses, the unrated class Q has been reduced to
zero ($0) from $25.7 million at issuance, and class P has been
reduced to $3.9 million from $5.1 million at issuance. Interest
shortfalls are affecting classes J through Q.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Highwoods
Portfolio (8.99%) loan, the second largest in the pool. The loan
is secured by a pool of 31 cross-collateralized office properties
in Charlotte, NC (18 properties) and Tampa, FL (13 properties).
The combined year end (YE) December 2010 debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and portfolio occupancy reported at 1.14 times (x)
and 61%, respectively. The loan sponsor group consists of Eola
Capital, Utah State Retirement Investment Fund, and Banyan Street
Partners.

The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2010, and has
been in maturity default since August 2010. On May 13, 2011 the
lender and borrower were able to successfully close on a loan
modification which consisted of an A/B loan restructure ($100
million A-Note and $60 million B-Note), an $18 million capital
infusion, and maturity date extensions on both notes to May 2014.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
Equity Lifestyle Portfolio (2.15%) loan. The loan is
collateralized by three manufactured housing recreational vehicle
parks with two located in upstate New York and one located in New
Hampshire. The properties have struggled since issuance. The
servicer has reported that the subject properties experience
seasonal peaks and are out of season until April or May of each
year. The combined servicer-reported YE 2010 DSCR and YE December
2009 was 0.62x and 0.55x, respectively.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
University Village (1.75%) loan. The loan is collateralized by
161,090 square foot retail center located in Riverside, CA, near
the University of California at Riverside campus. The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. The
September 2010 rent roll reported occupancy at 87%. The servicer
provided YE December 2010 financial statements reported DSCR at
1.06x. The asset transferred to special servicing in January 2009
upon the borrower's request for a loan modification. The servicer
has reported a loan modification was executed in May 2011.

Fitch downgrades, revises and assigns Outlooks, Loss Severity (LS)
ratings or Recovery Ratings (RR) on these classes:

   -- $18 million class C to 'BBB-sf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $38.6 million class D to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $25.7 million class E to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- $33.4 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $20.1 million class G to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $25.7 million class H to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $10.3 million class J to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $5.1 million class K to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $7.7 million class L to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $7.7 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $5.1 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $3.9 million class P to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.


In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises the LS
ratings:

   -- $381.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $157.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $50 million class A-3B at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $90.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $510.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from 'LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $205.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $138.8 million class A-J at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $43.7 million class B at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has repaid in full. Fitch does not rate class Q, which
has been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Fitch had withdrawn the rating of the interest-only classes X-C
and X-P on July 13, 2010.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
F commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors Inc.'s series 1996-C2 to 'B (sf)'.

The lowered rating primarily reflects liquidity considerations.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing
(Wells Fargo), has indicated that it intends to recover a portion
of prior advances related to two specially serviced hotel assets-
the Estes - Best Western - Orlando ($13.8 million, 28.9%) and the
Estes - HoJo Main Gate - Kissimmee ($3.2 million, 6.8%) loans.
Specifically, the master servicer plans to recover a total of
$956,622: $538,806 for Estes - Best Western - Orlando and $417,816
for Estes -HoJo Main Gate - Kissimmee. Wells Fargo expects to
recover these prior advances from all available principal and
interest to the trust, excluding interest due the interest-only
(IO) class.

As of the May 23, 2011 trustee remittance report, the reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $239,465 and have affected
all of the classes subordinate to class F. Standard & Poor's
considered all of the drivers of the interest shortfalls: interest
not advanced ($140,206), additional trust fund expenses ($95,697),
special servicing fees ($3,544), and workout fees ($17). Standard
& Poor's expects the additional shortfalls associated with the
aforementioned advance recoveries to cause the class F to
experience interest shortfalls for the next several months, and
thus, S&P is lowering its rating on this class to 'B (sf)'. The
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital),
indicated that the hotel assets associated with the anticipated
shortfalls are being marketed for sale and may be liquidated
within the next several months. "We may downgrade class F further
if the two hotel assets are not liquidated in the near term.
However, in the interim, we expect the class F certificate to
experience recurring interest shortfalls," S&P said.

As of the May 23, 2011, trustee remittance report, two assets were
with the special servicer. The larger of these is the Estes - Best
Western - Orlando asset, which is secured by a 672-room hotel in
Orlando, Fl. The asset is the largest asset in the pool and has a
total exposure of $17.4 million, which includes $3.7 million in
advancing and interest thereon. The asset was transferred to
CWCapital on Nov. 26, 2008, due to monetary and franchise
defaults and became real estate owned (REO) on Nov. 1, 2010. An
April 2010 appraisal valued the hotel property significantly below
the total exposure. "We expect a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset," S&P said.

The Estes - HoJo Main Gate - Kissimmee asset is the remaining
asset with the special servicer. The asset is the third-largest in
the pool and is secured by a 367-room hotel in Kissimmee, Fl. The
total exposure is $4.8 million, which includes $1.6 million in
advancing and interest thereon. The asset was transferred to
CWCapital on Dec. 10, 2008, due to imminent default and became
REO on Sept. 7, 2010. An April 2010 appraisal valued the hotel
property significantly below the total exposure. We expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

Rating Lowered

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1996-C2
             Rating
Class  To             From
F      B (sf)         A (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms MS 1998-WF2 Ratings
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of eight classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-WF2. In addition, Fitch has revised the
Loss Severity (LS) ratings as applicable. The Rating Outlooks
remain as indicated.

The affirmations reflect stable portfolio performance and
significant portfolio amortization. As of the June 2011
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has been reduced
by 89.5% (to $111.6 million from $1.06 billion), of which 88.8%
were due to paydowns and 0.70% were due to realized losses. In
addition, one loan (8.9%) has been defeased.

Fitch modeled losses of 0.30% of the remaining pool balance (0.73%
of the original pool balance, including losses already incurred to
date) from two loans in the pool, one of which is in special-
servicing. In total, Fitch has identified three Fitch Loans of
Concern (15.87%), one of which is the specially-serviced loan.
Fitch expects the losses associated with these loans to be
absorbed by the non-rated class N.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a Loan of Concern
(0.70%) secured by a 7,971 square foot retail property located in
Cameron Park, CA. The property was previously occupied by
Hollywood Video and is now vacant as of the January 2011 rent
roll.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (1.62%) secured by a 47,550 square foot (sf) retail
center located in Indianapolis, IN. The loan transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 due to a payment default. The
borrower submitted a discounted payoff offer which was denied. The
special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
5% reduction to 2010 fiscal year-end (YE) net operating income,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 8% and 11% to
determine value. Each loan also underwent a refinance test by
applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. With the exception of the two
loans which contributed to modeled losses, all the loans in the
pool are considered to pay off at maturity, and could refinance to
a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) above 1.25 times (x).

Fitch affirms the ratings and revises the LS ratings for these
classes; the Outlooks remain:

   -- $18.1 million class E affirmed at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21.2 million class F affirmed at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23.9 million class G affirmed at 'AAAsf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.6 million class H affirmed at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS2' from
      LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8 million class J affirmed at 'Asf'; LS to 'Asf/LS2' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8 million class K affirmed at 'BB+sf'; LS to 'LS2' from
      'LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15.9 million class L affirmed at 'B-sf'; LS to 'LS1' from
      'LS4'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms this class:

   -- $5.3 million class M at 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch does not rate class N.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-IQ5 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 13 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
commercial mortgage pass through certificates, series 2003-IQ5.

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the pool and
minimal expected losses as there are no loans currently in special
servicing and only three Fitch loans of concern (1.81%). Any
incurred losses will be absorbed by the non-rated O class.

As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 48.1% to $404.2 million from $778.8 million
at issuance.

There are 62 remaining loans from the original 86 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, eight loans (12.8%) have
defeased.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms and revises LS ratings and Outlooks to these
classes:

   -- $22.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $30.2 million class B at 'AAAsf; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS2';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class C at 'AA+sf'; LS to 'LS3' from 'LS2';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $5.8 million class D at 'AA-sf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $6.8 million class E at 'A+sf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.8 million class F at 'A-sf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.8 million class G at 'BBBsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.9 million class H at 'BBB-sf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.9 million class J at 'BB+sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.9 million class K at 'BBsf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.9 million class L at 'B+sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $1 million class M at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class N at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative.

Fitch does not rate class O. Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid in
full. Additionally, Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest
only class X-1 and X-2.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-IQ7 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 14 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
commercial mortgage pass through certificates, series 2004-IQ7.

The downgrades reflect Fitch's expectation of losses across the
pool. Fitch modeled losses of 2.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool are 1.9%, reflecting losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the losses associated with
the specially serviced loans to be absorbed by the non-rated class
O.

The affirmations reflect paydown of the pool's principal balance
resulting in increased credit enhancement to the senior classes.
As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 19.6% to $694.2 million from $863 million at
issuance.

There are 118 remaining loans from the original 129 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, seven loans (15.6%) have
defeased. Fifty-seven loans (18.6%) are backed by multifamily
cooperative (co-op) properties.

Fitch has identified seven loans as Fitch loans of concern
(4.33%), which includes two specially serviced loans (2.06%).

The largest contributor to losses is the Boise Towne Plaza loan,
which is secured by a 116,677 square foot (sf) retail property in
Boise, ID. The loan is sponsored by General Growth Properties and
transferred to the special servicer subsequent to the borrower's
bankruptcy filing. The loan most recently returned to the master
servicer in January 2010 after loan modification whereby the
maturity date was extended to July 2015.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-defeased loans by applying
a 5% reduction to the most recent year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate to determine value.

Fitch affirms, revises LS ratings and Outlooks to these classes:

   -- $41.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $550.5 million class A-4 at'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $22.7 million class C at 'Asf'; LS to 'LS4' from 'LS3';
      Outlook to Positive from Stable;

   -- $6.8 million class D at 'A-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.4 million class E at 'BBB+sf'; LS to 'LS5' from 'LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.4 million class F at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.3 million class G at 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $5.4 million class H at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $4.3 million class J at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2.2 million class K at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2.2 million class L at 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $2.2 million class M at 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $2.2 million class N at 'CCCsf/RR1'.

Fitch does not rate class O. Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in
full. Additionally, Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest
only classes X-1 and X-Y.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Certs. to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CCC-
(sf)' on the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate
from Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2005-XLF, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
"Concurrently, we affirmed our 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class
K certificate from the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions on classes K and L follow our analysis of the
transaction, which included our revaluation of the remaining
collateral in the transaction, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. The remaining collateral in the
transaction consists of the Metrocenter Mall loan, a floating-rate
loan indexed to one-month LIBOR that is with the special servicer
and matured on Feb. 9, 2010," S&P related.

"The downgrade of the class L certificate to 'CCC- (sf)' primarily
reflects our expectation that this class will most likely
experience a principal loss upon the ultimate resolution of the
sole remaining loan in the trust, the specially serviced
Metrocenter Mall loan. Our downgrade also considered the declining
performance of the collateral securing the loan and this class'
susceptibility to interest shortfalls," S&P noted.

"Our affirmation of the 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class K
certificate reflects the fact that, despite the current high
credit enhancement level of 96.63% (based on the June 15, 2011,
trustee remittance report) and low debt per sq. ft. ($7 per sq.
ft.), the Metrocenter Mall loan is with the special servicer and
operating performance at the retail property has deteriorated over
the last four years," S&P said.

The Metrocenter Mall loan, the remaining loan in the trust, was
transferred to the special servicer, Midland Loan Services
(Midland), on June 26, 2009, due to imminent default after the
borrower expressed difficulty securing refinancing. The loan
matured on Feb. 9, 2010. Based on a February 2011 valuation of
$30.0 million, as reported in the June 2011 trustee remittance
report, an appraisal reduction amount of $78.4 million is in
effect against the loan. According to the special servicer, the
court-appointed receiver is marketing the retail property for
sale. Midland indicated that it is currently evaluating the best
and final offers received on the property. Midland also reported
that if an offer is accepted and approved, it expects a sale to be
consummated as early as in August 2011. "Based on the most recent
reported valuation, we expect a significant loss, which will
likely affect classes up to and including class L, upon the
ultimate resolution of this loan," S&P said.

The Metrocenter Mall loan is secured by 534,900 sq. ft. of a
1.37-million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall in Phoenix and has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $105.2 million. In addition, there
is a mezzanine loan with an outstanding balance of $22.0 million
that is held outside the trust. "Based on our review of the
borrower's operating statements for year-end 2010, its 2011
budget, and its May 2, 2011, rent roll, our adjusted net cash flow
for this loan has declined 33.5% since our last review dated June
24, 2010. This primarily reflects decreases in base rents,
occupancy, and expense reimbursement income at the property.
Occupancy has fallen to 59.4% from 66.5% for the same period.
Using a capitalization rate of 9.25%, our analysis yielded a
stressed loan-to-value ratio that is significantly above 100% on
the trust balance. The master servicer, also Midland, reported a
debt service coverage of 6.14x for the 12-months ended July 31,
2010. The current one-month LIBOR reported in the June 15, 2011,
trustee remittance report was 0.198%," S&P said.

Rating Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF
             Rating
Class    To              From        Credit enhancement (%)
L        CCC- (sf)       BB+ (sf)                     61.70

Rating Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF
Class             Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
K                 BBB+ (sf)                           96.63


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of 12 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 12 classes of notes and
confirmed 77 classes of notes in 15 National Collegiate student
loan securitizations backed by private (i.e. not government
guaranteed) student loans. First Marblehead Data Services, Inc.
(FMDS) and First Marblehead Education Resources, Inc., (FMER)
subsidiaries of First Marblehead Corporation (FMC), are the
administrator and the special servicer of the transactions,
respectively.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were prompted by elevated defaults and the
consequent erosion of parity levels (i.e. the ratio of total
assets to total liabilities) for the subordinate notes. For more
seasoned transactions (i.e., those closed in 2004 or earlier)
which should have experienced a slowdown in defaults, and
therefore an increase in total parity, the parity continued to
decline from a range of 86.8-94.4% in August 2010 to 85.2-92.2% in
April 2011. Among the more recent transactions (i.e., those closed
in 2005 or later), the total parity declined from 87.7-92.7% to
87.6-90.8% during the same period. We expect additional defaults
and further declines in parity as more borrowers enter repayment.

FMC provides to Moody's supplemental static pool cumulative
default information by repayment year and loan type on a quarterly
basis. In March 2011, Moody's received a third-party audit of this
supplemental performance information, which contained no
significant exceptions.

Available credit enhancement to the transactions includes
overcollateralization, reserve funds, subordination, and excess
spread. Significant structural features include subordinate note
interest triggers, reserve fund floors, and the change in the cash
flow allocations among the senior classes upon the occurrence of
certain triggers. In particular, senior notes from most trusts
(other than the Master Trust, 2003-1, 2004-1, 2007-3 and 2007-4)
benefit from the subordinate note interest trigger event, which
redirects interest payments on the subordinate notes to principal
payments on the senior notes. As of the April 2011 reporting
period, the Class C interest trigger was in effect for the 2005-1,
2005-2, 2006-1, and 2006-2 transactions. In addition, the Class D
interest trigger was in effect for the 2007-2 transaction.

The principal methodology used in National Collegiate Student Loan
Trust rating actions was "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Private
Student Loan-Backed Securities", published on January 6th, 2010
and is available at www.moodys.com in the Rating Methodologies
sub-directory under the Research & Ratings tab. Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issue can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

Our expected lifetime net losses as a percentage of the original
pool balance plus any loans added subsequently are approximately
23.9%, 28.6%, 26.3%, 31.2%, 25.8%, 31.2%, 28.6%, 29.2%, 35.9%,
30.7%, 36.2%, 33.4%, 34.4%, 33.9% and 33.8% respectively for the
Master Trust, 2003-1, 2004-1, 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3,
2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2007-1, 2007-2, 2007-3 and 2007-4
trusts. For the trusts excluding the Master Trust and 2007-3 and
2007-4, the ratings of the most junior Class A tranches could be
upgraded in the future if the lifetime expected net losses are 10%
lower, or downgraded if the lifetime expected net losses are 10%
higher than the levels indicated. The ratings of Class 2005AR-16
of the Master Trust and Class A-3-AR-7 of 2007-3 and 2007-4 will
not be affected in the future if the lifetime expected net losses
are 10% lower or 10% higher than the levels indicated.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of uncertainty with
regard to expected losses are the weak economic environment and
the high unemployment rate, which adversely impacts the income-
generating ability of the borrowers. Overall, we expect overall a
sluggish recovery in most of the world largest economies,
returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and
persistent unemployment levels. The performance of DTC loans in
particular is highly sensitive to these factors. In addition, the
historical loss performance data available for these pools is
relatively limited particularly for the most recent
securitizations, as over 90% of the borrowers in the pools were
still in school when the notes were issued.

Moody's Investors Service has received and taken into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Ratings

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1 (The)

Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. IO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. IO, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl.A-IO, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl.A-IO, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl.A-IO, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3

Cl. A-2-AR-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-L, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl-A-IO, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4

Cl. A-2-AR-4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-AR-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. A-3-L, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: The National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I (2001
Indenture)

Ser. NCT-2002-AR9, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30,
2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ser. NCT-2002-AR10, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30,
2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade


NOMURA ASSET: Fitch Upgrades 2 Classes of Certificates
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades two classes of Nomura Asset Securities
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-D6.

The upgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates for
the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis. Fitch
expects potential losses of 2.6% of the remaining pool balance,
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.

As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool has paid down 70.6%
to $1.1 billion from $3.7 billion at issuance and approximately
54.6% of the transaction has defeased. Fitch has identified 22
Loans of Concern (8.2%), including two loans in special servicing
(0.6%).

The two specially serviced loans are former single-tenant Circuit
City properties, a 33,221 square foot (sf) center located in
Columbus, OH and a 27,723 sf property located in Wallkill, NY.
Losses are expected upon disposition of the assets.

Fitch upgrades these classes and revises the Outlooks:

   -- $37.2 million class B-2 to 'Asf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $37.2 million class B-3 to 'BBsf/LS5' from B-sf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Fitch also affirms these classes and maintains the Outlooks:

   -- $135.2 million class A-1C at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $223.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $204.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $167.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $55.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

The $11.8 million class B-5 and the fully depleted class B-6 both
remain at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Classes A-1A and A-1B have been paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the interest-only class A-CS1, which has been paid in full; the
$158.2 million class B-1; the $65.1 million class B-4; the fully
depleted class B-7; or the fully depleted B-7H certificates.

Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class
PS-1.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Hikes Rating on $33.530MM Certs. to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series BLC-2's $33.530 million certificates to
'BB-' from 'B'.

"Our rating on the certificates is dependent on our rating on the
underlying security, Belo Corp.'s 7.25% debentures due Sept. 15,
2027," S&P said.

"The upgrade follows our June 17, 2011, upgrade of the underlying
security to 'BB-' from 'B'. We may take subsequent rating actions
on the certificates due to changes in our rating on the underlying
security," S&P said.


SECURITY NATIONAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating of $12Mil. of RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from 2 RMBS transactions. The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
"scratch and dent" residential mortgages.

Scratch and Dent deals are classified outside of Moody's primary
categorizations (Prime Jumbo, Subprime, Option ARMs and Alt-A) for
a number of reasons. The pools may include mortgages that have
been originated outside an originator's program guidelines in some
way, or mortgages where borrowers missed payments in the past.
These pools may also include loans with document defects at
origination that were since rectified. Due to the varied content
of Scratch and Dent mortgage pools, which can range from seasoned
prime-like loans to non-prime loans that were seriously delinquent
at the time of securitization, credit quality of these pools
varies considerably.

Ratings Rationale

The action takes into account the pace of principal pay down of
the bonds in relation to the rate of credit support depletion. The
action reflects Moody's updated loss expectations on Scratch and
Dent pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology for Scratch and Dent" published in May
2011, which accounts for the deteriorating performance and
outlook.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current levels of credit
enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level loss
expectations. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

   -- Cl. AV, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

   -- Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)


SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-2
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan-backed notes at
'AAAsf' and affirms the subordinate student loan-backed note at
'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2. The collateral
supporting the notes is comprised of student loans originated
under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). The
rating outlook is Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2
senior and subordinate notes based on the sufficient level of
credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.
Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes consists
of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess spread,
while the senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by
the class B notes.

The loans are serviced and originated by SLM Corp. SLM Corp.
provides funds for educational loans, primarily federal guaranteed
student loans originated under the FFELP. SLM Corp. and its
subsidiaries are not sponsored by or are agencies of the U.S.
government. Fitch currently rates SLM Corp. with long- and short-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BBB-' and 'F3',
respectively.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-2 Student Loan-Backed Notes:

   -- Class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-5
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan-backed notes at
'AAAsf' and the subordinate student loan-backed note at 'BBsf'
issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-5. The collateral supporting
the notes is comprised of student loans originated under the
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). The Rating Outlook
is Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-5
senior and subordinate notes based on the sufficient level of
credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.
Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes consists
of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess spread,
while the senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by
the class B notes.

The loans are serviced and originated by SLM Corp. SLM Corp.
provides funds for educational loans, primarily federal guaranteed
student loans originated under the FFELP. SLM Corp. and its
subsidiaries are not sponsored by or are agencies of the U.S.
government. Fitch currently rates SLM Corp.'s long- and short-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) 'BBB-' and 'F3', respectively.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-5 Student Loan-Backed Notes:

   -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-8
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan-backed notes at
'AAAsf' and affirms the subordinate student loan-backed note at
'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-8. The collateral
supporting the notes is comprised of student loans originated
under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). The
rating outlook is Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-8
senior and subordinate notes based on the sufficient level of
credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.
Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes consists
of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess spread,
while the senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by
the Class B notes.

The loans are serviced and originated by SLM Corp. SLM Corp.
provides funds for educational loans, primarily federal guaranteed
student loans originated under the FFELP. SLM Corp. and its
subsidiaries are not sponsored by or are agencies of the U.S.
government. Fitch currently rates SLM Corp. with long- and short-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BBB-' and 'F3',
respectively.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-8 Student Loan-Backed Notes:

   -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on SLM 2004-10
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan-backed notes at
'AAAsf' and affirms the subordinate student loan-backed note at
'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10. The collateral
supporting the notes is comprised of student loans originated
under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). The
Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10
senior and subordinate notes based on the sufficient level of
credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.
Credit enhancement for the senior and subordinate notes consists
of overcollateralization and projected minimum excess spread,
while the senior notes also benefit from subordination provided by
the class B notes.

The loans are serviced and originated by SLM Corp. SLM Corp.
provides funds for educational loans, primarily federal guaranteed
student loans originated under the FFELP. SLM Corp. and its
subsidiaries are not sponsored by or are agencies of the U.S.
government. Fitch currently rates SLM Corp. with long- and short-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BBB-' and 'F3',
respectively.


Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10 Student Loan-Backed Notes:

   -- Class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-5A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-5B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-7A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-7B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-8 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


STUDENT LOAN: Moody's Confirms Ratings of Certificates
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of nine classes of
certificates in two Student Loan Repackaging trusts. Deutsche Bank
Trust Company Americas is the administrator and trustee for both
transactions.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1

Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-IO, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Oct 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 4-A-IO, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Oct 1, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 5-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-IO, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A-IO, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repacking Trust, Series 2007-2

Cl. IO, Confirmed at B3; previously on Oct 1, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the certificates were confirmed primarily due to
the confirmation of the underlying securities referenced in these
transactions. The ratings of the certificates issued by Student
Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1, are based on the ratings of
the underlying securities and the payment timing swap provided by
Deutsche Bank AG, New York Branch. The payment timing swap covers
any interest shortfalls on the certificates if the interest
accrual period for the certificates is longer than the interest
accrual period for the underlying securities on the related
underlying distribution date. Below is a list of the underlying
securities referenced in this transaction:

Group 3 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-
1, Class A-7 (current rating Caa1) and Class IO Notes (current
rating Caa1);

Group 4 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-
1, Class A-4 (current rating Caa3) and Class A-IO-2 Notes (current
rating Caa3);

Group 5 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-
1, Class A-5-1 (current rating Ba1) and Class A-5-2 Certificates
(current rating Ba1);

Group 6 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-
3, Class A-5-1 Certificates (current rating Ba1).

The assets of the Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2
consist primarily of the Class 1-A-IO, Class 2-A-IO, Class 3-A-IO,
Class 4-A-IO, Class 5-A-IO, Class 6-A-IO and Class 7-A-IO
Certificates issued by the Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust,
Series 2007-1. The rating of the Class IO in the Student Loan
Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2 was determined based on the
weighted average rating of the underlying IO bonds. As a
consequence of the confirmation of the ratings on Class 3-A-IO,
Class 4-A-IO, Class 5-A-IO and Class 6-A-IO, Class IO was also
confirmed.

The methodology used in rating the certificates issued by the
Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1 considered the
higher of the pass-through rating of the underlying groups of
securities and the guarantors' rating for the tranches within
the 2007-1 trust that benefit from any financial guarantee.
The methodology used in rating the Class A-IO from the Series
2007-2 trust considered Moody's idealized expected loss rate
corresponding to each IO's respective weighted average remaining
life. Then the average idealized loss and remaining average life
for Class A-IO, both weighted by outstanding notional amount of
the tranches, were used to determine the rating. Moody's idealized
expected loss rates table was published in the methodology report
"Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" rating methodology, published
on August 14th, 2009, and is available at www.moodys.com in the
Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the Research & Ratings
tab. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered
in the process of rating this issue can also be found in the
Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

For Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1, the primary
sources of uncertainty with regard to the rating are the ratings
of underlying notes in reference and the ratings of the financial
guarantors. For Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2, the
primary sources of uncertainty with regard to the rating are the
ratings of the referenced underlying IO certificates issued by
Series 2007-1, the weighted average life and the notional balance
of the IO's.

The ratings of certificates issued under both the Series 2007-1
and the Series 2007-2 could be downgraded or upgraded if the
underlying securities referenced in both trusts are downgraded or
upgraded.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


TEXAS HOUSING DEPT.: Moody's Downgrades Bond Ratings to 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded to B2 from Aaa the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds
(Greens Road Apartments) Series 2001 and removed it from
Watchlist, following a review of projected cash flow and asset-
liability ratio for the life of the bonds. This rating action
affects $7,530,000 of outstanding debt.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade is based on the current asset-to-debt ratio that is
below 100% and a projected debt service default in 2033.

Detailed Credit Discussion

The bonds are secured by a mortgage that is guaranteed by a Fannie
Mae Stand-by Credit Enhancement Instrument. Revenue from the
monthly mortgage receipts and interest earned on those receipts
from a guaranteed investment contract with CDC Funding Corp.
(rated Aaa) need to be at least sufficient to pay debt service and
expenses on the bonds. The Aaa rating was based on Moody's
expectation that at all times the ratio of the value of the assets
held by the trustee, consisting of the amortized value of the
credit-enhanced mortgage and funds pledged to bondholders, to the
bonds outstanding and accrued interest to any redemption date
would exceed 100%.

The current projected cash flow sufficiency and ratio of assets to
liabilities are not consistent with a Aaa rating. Based on
information Moody's has received, the current parity ratio is
below 100%, and estimated future cash flows show a default
beginning in 2033. While small, these losses will not be
remediated without action from the borrower, issuer or trustee.
Moody's believes these losses result in part from the use of funds
pledged under the indenture for bond repayments to pay fees owed
by the borrower.

What Could Change the Rating: Up

  -- Cash contribution to restore asset-liability parity and
     ensure cash flow sufficiency.

What Could Change The Rating: Down

  -- Further increase in the projected losses to bondholders.

Principal Methodology Used

The principal methodologies used in this rating was Multifamily
Housing Bonds Secured By Freddie Mac Standby Credit Enhancement
Agreement published in December 2008.


* Fitch Downgrades 31 Bonds in 15 U.S. CMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 31 bonds in 15 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were all
previously rated 'CC', or 'C', which indicates that Fitch expected
a default.

The rating action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.
The remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed
as part of this review. Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of
the ongoing surveillance process and will continue to monitor
these transactions for additional defaults.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 5 CMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these classes from four U.S. commercial
mortgage backed security (CMBS) transactions:

   -- $436,913 class F-2 of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
      Securities Corp. 1995-M1 at 'D/RR5';

   -- $3.2 million class F of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust
      1995-C2 at 'D/RR2';

   -- $2.9 million class F of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust
      1996-C2 at 'D/RR3';

   -- $176,315 class H of Prudential Securities Secured Financing
      Corp 1995-MCF-2 at 'D/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only
class IO of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust 1996-C2 and class
X of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust Conduit 1999-C2.

Fitch considers the classes affirmed as in default, having
incurred prior principle losses.


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 437 Classes of 268 RMBS Transactions to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 437 classes of mortgage pass-through securities from 268 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2008.

"The 437 downgrades to 'D (sf)' reflect our assessment of
principal write-downs on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods. Four of the downgraded classes have bond
insurance from Ambac Assurance Corp. (currently rated 'NR')," S&P
said.

All of the ratings were rated 'CC (sf)' or 'CCC (sf)' before the
downgrades.

Approximately 77.12% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) or subprime mortgage
loan collateral. The 437 defaulted classes consisted of:

    262 classes from Alt-A transactions (59.95% of all defaults);

    82 from prime jumbo transactions (18.76%);

    75 from subprime transactions (17.16%);

    Six from reperforming transactions;

    Four from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
    conduit (re-REMIC) transaction;

    Three from seasoned loan transactions;

    Two from a first-lien high loan-to-value transaction;

    Two from outside-the-guidelines transactions; and

    One from an RMBS small balance commercial transaction.

The complete rating list is available for free at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/S&P_RMBSClassesAffected_0621.pdf

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and will adjust
the ratings as it considers appropriate in accordance with its
criteria.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Marie Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G.
Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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