TCR_Public/110522.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 22, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 140

                            Headlines

AIRPLANES REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritization Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Auto ABS Transactions
ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. To 'D'
ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
ASG RESECURITIZATION: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on 2 Re-REMIC Classes

BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades 8 Classes of BACM 2005-1
BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades 3 Classes of Series 2001-3
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades 2005-PWR10 Certificates
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-TOP18 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on BSCMI 2002-TOP8

BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $1.98 Bil. RMBS
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Resecuritized RMBS
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Action on $1.9 billion of Alt-A RMBS
C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Upgrades Rating of One Class of Notes
CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Upgrades Prime and Subprime Auto Loan ABS

CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Five CMBS Classes of CBAC 2006-1
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of CBAC 2006-2
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of CBAC 2007-1
CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
CHASE EDUCATION: Fitch Affirms Subordinate Notes at 'BBsf'

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades 2 Classes of 2005-EMG
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 5 Classes to 'D'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritized RMBS
CPS AUTO: Moody's Upgrades Subprime Auto Loan ABS
CRATOS CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Notes Ratings

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Corrects May 6, 2011 Release
CREST 2001-1: Fitch Downgrades Class C Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
CREST 2004-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
CRF 19: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-'
CSFB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of CSFB 2007-TFL1

CWMBS INC: Fitch Takes Various Actions on CWMBS 2004-8 RMBS
DSLA 2007-AR1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'D'
GALAXY X: S&P Raises Rating on 1 Class on Improved Performance
GE COMMERCIAL:  Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-C2
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Two & Affirms 22 CMBS Classes

GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades GMACC 2005-C1 Ratings
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of GMAC 2000-C1
GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: Fitch Affirms 9 Classes of CDO 2007-1
GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Raises Ratings of CLO Notes
JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 2-A1 to 'CCC'

JOHNSTON RE: S&P Rates Two Classes of Notes at 'BB-'
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades 12 Classes of JPMCC 2005-CIBC13
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms 33 CMBS Classes of JPMCC 2006-LDP9
JP MORGAN: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class H Certificates
JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Takes Various Actions on JPMCC 2004-C1

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs. to 'D'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 4 Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Various Actions on Certificates
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades 1 and Affirms 8 CMBS Classes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades 4 and Affirms 23 CMBS Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
MARYLAND TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Two Life Insurance Transactions
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-BPC1

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Two & Affirms 16 CMBS Classes
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
METROFINANCIERA: Fitch Downgrades RMBS Bonds Ratings
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms 7 Classes of MSDW 2003-TOP9
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of MSDW 2002-IQ3

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of MSC 2005-IQ10
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Two and Affirms 21 CMBS Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Five CMBS Classes of MSDWC 2002-HQ
NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Fitch Affirms 5 Classes of Notes at 'Csf'
NEWCASTLE CDO VII: Fitch Affirms 5 Classes of Notes at 'Csf'

NEWTON CDO: Moody's Upgrades CBO notes Ratings
NORTH TEXAS: Moody's Corrects Rating History; Withdraws Ratings
PALOMAR POMERADO:  Fitch Downgrades L-T Rating to 'BB'
PUTNAM STRUCTURED PRODUCT:  Fitch Affirms 7 Classes
RESIX FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades $87.1 Mil. Synthetic Jumbo RMBS

SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades 1 and Affirms 8 CMBS Classes
SANTANDER DRIVE: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
SATURNS SEARS: Moody's Reviews Rating of Units for Downgrade
SHASTA CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL:  Fitch Downgrades Seven Classes

SYMPHONY CLO: S&P Rates Class E Floating-Rate Notes 'BB'
TW HOTEL: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of 2005-LUX
UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Class B-1-A Notes
WELLS FARGO: Fitch Issues Presale Report on WFRBS 2011-C3
ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 5 Classes of Notes


                            *********


AIRPLANES REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritization Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the Class B Notes issued by each of the
Airplanes Repackaged Transferred Securities Ltd (ARTS) Series
2004-1 and ARTS Series 2004-2.

The complete rating action is:

   Issuer: Airplanes Repackaged Transferred Securities Ltd.,
   Series 2004-1

   -- Class B Notes maturing in 2031, downgraded to Caa2 (sf) from
      B2 (sf); Previously placed on Review for Possible Downgrade;

   Issuer: Airplanes Repackaged Transferred Securities Ltd.,
   Series 2004-2

   -- Class B Notes maturing in 2031, downgraded to Caa2 (sf) from
      B2 (sf); previously placed on Review for Possible
      Downgrade;.

Ratings Rationale

ARTS Series 2004-1 issued Class A and Class B notes (the Class A
and Class B ARTS Notes respectively), backed by $156 million face
amount of Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT) Class A-1 and A-2
Notes, and $156 million face amount of zero coupon Treasury
Securities. ARTS Series 2004-2 issued Class A and Class B notes
(the Class A and Class B ARTS Notes respectively), backed by
$30 million face amount of Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT)
Class A-1 and A-2 Notes, and $30 million face amount of zero
coupon Treasury Securities. Interest generated by the LIFT Notes
are applied to pay the amounts due to the ARTS Class A Insurer,
interest on ARTS Class A Note and expenses, and any remaining
amounts as principal on the ARTS Class B Note. Principal payments
generated by the LIFT Notes are applied to prepay the ARTS Class A
principal. At maturity of the ARTS Notes, should any of the
principal on the LIFT Notes remain outstanding, the proceeds from
the zero coupon Treasury Securities will be used to retire the
remaining Class A Notes, and any surplus will be applied to the
ARTS Class B Notes.

The downgrade follows from the downgrade of the LIFT Class A-1 and
A-2 Notes being downgrade from B2 to Caa2 as a result of
materially lower paydown expectations. The ratings on the Class B
ARTS Notes are based on (i) interest and principal payments from
the Class A-1 and A-2 LIFT Notes (ii) recovery rate on the
principal portion of LIFT Notes, and (iii) the structure of the
transaction. Due to Moody's expectations of impending losses on
the LIFT Notes, Moody's views it as highly likely that a portion
of the zero coupon securities will be needed to cover those losses
to make whole the Class A ARTS notes, thereby reducing assets
available for the repayment of Class B ARTS notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in
March 1999.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


AMERICREDIT AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Auto ABS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
upgrade five tranches from three near-prime transactions and 28
tranches from 13 subprime auto loan transactions sponsored by
AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc (AmeriCredit). Moody's has
also upgraded two tranche form two subprime AmeriCredit
transactions.

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-B-G

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8,
   2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
   previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-R-M

   -- Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8,
   2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-A-X

   -- Cl. A-4, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., (Ca; previously on
   3/9/2009 Downgraded to Ca from Caa1)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-B-F

   -- Cl. A-4, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-C-M

   -- Cl. A-4-A, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   -- Cl. A-4-B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-D-F

   -- Cl. A-4-A, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   -- Cl. A-4-B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2009-1

   -- Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Jul 20, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Jul 20, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned A2
      (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Auto Receivables Trust 2010-1

   -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Feb 19, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Feb 19, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned A1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Feb 19, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-2

   -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on May 27, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on May 27, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned A1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on May 27, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on May 27, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
      (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-3

   -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Sep 30, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Sep 30, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned A1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Sep 30, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-4

   -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 23, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 23, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 23, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
      (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 23, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
      (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A

   -- Cl. A-2, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Apr 2, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

   Underlying Rating: A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Mar 26, 2010 Assigned A1 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   -- Cl. A-3, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Apr 2, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

   Underlying Rating: A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Mar 26, 2010 Assigned A1 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-B

   -- Cl. A-2, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Aug 24, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

   Underlying Rating: A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on August 24, 2010 Assigned A1 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   -- Cl. A-3, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Aug 24, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

   Underlying Rating: A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on August 24, 2010 Assigned A1 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-1

   -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-2-M

   -- Cl. A-4-A, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   -- Cl. A-4-B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on Nov 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2009-1

   -- Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 16, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
      (sf)

   -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Nov 16, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned A1
      (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions were driven by a combination of downward revision of
collateral loss expectations and further accretion of credit
enhancement. In the case of the 2007-2-M, 2007-C-M, 2007-D-F and
2008-A-F, consideration was also given to past amendments that,
among other things, resulted in revised credit performance
triggers and an increase in the amount required for the spread
(reserve) account. For the 2006-B-G, 2007-A-X and 2007-B-F, the
reserve accounts have increased due to earlier breaches of the
cumulative net loss triggers. Even though the triggers for these
transactions are curable, the current cumulative net losses (CNL)
are higher than the highest trigger level for all these
transactions. The reserve account will therefore not step down.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the April distribution
date, except for AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A,
AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-1 and
AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2009-1 which are as
of the May distribution date) and credit assumptions for each
affected transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected
lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the
original pool balance. Performance metrics include pool factor
which is the ratio of the current collateral balance to the
original collateral balance at closing; total credit enhancement,
which typically consists of subordination, overcollateralization,
and a reserve fund; and per annum excess spread.

AmeriCredit Subprime transactions:

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-B-G

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.00%, prior expectation
      (November 2010) was 18%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 10.0%

   -- Pool factor -11%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 47%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 9% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-R-M

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 16.75%, prior expectation
      (November 2010) was 17%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 9.1%

   -- Pool factor -8%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 35%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 9% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-A-X

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 18.00% -- 18.50%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 18.50%

   -- Pool factor -14%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 37%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 10% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-B-F

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 18.00% -- 18.50%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 18.50%

   -- Pool factor -17%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 23%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 9% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-C-M

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 18.00% -- 18.50%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 18.50%

   -- Pool factor -21%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 33%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 9% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-D-F

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 19.50% -- 20.25%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 20.50%

   -- Pool factor -23%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 37%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 9% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2009-1

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 12.75% -- 13.50%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 14%

   -- Pool factor -48%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      -- 58%, Class C -- 38%

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 6% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-1

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 6.75% -- 7.75%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 16%

   -- Pool factor -65%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 50%, Class C -- 32%, Class D -- 23%

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 13% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-2

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 6.75% -- 8.00%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 14%

   -- Pool factor -72%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 46%, Class C -- 32%, Class D -- 18%, Class E -- 15%

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 11% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 7.00% -- 8.25%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 14%

   -- Pool factor -73%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 26%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 12% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-B

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 6.75% -- 8.75%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 13%

   -- Pool factor -84%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 24%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 11% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-3

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 7.75% -- 8.75%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 13%

   -- Pool factor -87%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 40%, Class C - 28%, Class D - 18%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 12% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-4

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 7.75% -- 8.75%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 11.50%

   -- Pool factor -84%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 37%, Class C - 27%, Class D - 16%, Class E -- 14%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 12% per annum

AmeriCredit Near-Prime transactions:

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-1

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 7.50% -- 8.00%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 8.25%

   -- Pool factor -14%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class D
      - 25%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 3% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2007-2-M

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 11.50% -- 12.25%, prior
      expectation (November 2010) was 12.75%

   -- Pool factor -22%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 28%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 5% per annum

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Prime Automobile Receivables Trust 2009-1

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation range- 6.5% -- 7.5%, prior
      expectation (at closing) was 10.50%

   -- Pool factor -50%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 39%, Class C -- 31%;

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 6% per annum

Ratings on the affected notes could be upgraded (where applicable)
if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or downgraded if the
lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment
continues to remain at elevated levels, and strength in the used
vehicle market. Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
much stronger now than it was at the end of 2008 when the
uncertainty relating to the economy as well as the future of the
U.S auto manufacturers was significantly greater. Overall, we
expect a sluggish recovery in the U.S. economy, with elevated
fiscal deficits and persistent, high unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these notes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities" rating
methodology published in June 2007. Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
these notes can also be found on Moody's website.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transactions' guarantees from monoline
bond insurers. The current ratings on the below notes are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. To 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class H, J, and K certificates from ARCap
2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc. (ARCap 2004-RR3). ARCap 2004-RR3 is
a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
(re-REMIC) transaction.

The downgrades of the class J and K certificates follow an
$8.8 million principal loss, as detailed in the April 21, 2011,
remittance report. Class K has since lost 100% of the original
principal balance, while class J experienced a $2.6 million
loss. "We lowered the rating on class H to 'D (sf)' primarily
due to interest shortfalls that we expect will continue for the
foreseeable future. Class H has experienced interest shortfalls
since the September 2010 trustee report, and has current
accumulated interest shortfalls of $499,454," S&P stated.

According to the April 21, 2011, trustee report, the principal
loss was due to losses on the underlying commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) collateral. Six distinct transactions
experienced a total of $8.8 million in principal losses. These
CMBS classes experienced significant principal losses in the
current trustee report:

    * First Union National Bank-Bank of America Commercial
      Mortgage Trust 2001-C1 (class L {not rated}; $5.1 million
      loss); and

    * JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2001-
      CIBC2 (class L {'D (sf)'}; $1.9 million loss).

Per the remittance report, ARCap 2004-RR3 was collateralized by 48
CMBS certificates ($396.8 million, 100%) from 17 distinct
transactions issued between 1999 and 2004.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2004-RR3 according to its current
criteria. The analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.


ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class A-1 and A-2 certificates from ARCap
2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc. (ARCap 2005-RR5), a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC).

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the interest shortfalls
affecting the transaction, as noted in the April 25, 2011, trustee
report. We expect the interest shortfalls to continue for the
foreseeable future," S&P related.

According to the April 25, 2011, trustee report, remaining
deferred interest to the transaction totaled $8.3 million, and
classes A-1 and A-2 have outstanding interest shortfalls totaling
$194,085. Both classes have experienced interest shortfalls since
the June 2010 payment period. The interest shortfalls to ARCap
2005-RR5 resulted from interest shortfalls on 10 of the underlying
certificates primarily due to the master servicer's recovery
of prior advances, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions,
servicers' nonrecoverability determinations for advances, and
special servicing fees.

According to the April trustee report, ARCap 2005-RR5 was
collateralized by 11 CMBS certificates ($61.9 million, 100%) from
nine distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2005.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2005-RR5 according to our current
criteria. The analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.


ASG RESECURITIZATION: S&P Keeps 'BB' Rating on 2 Re-REMIC Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from three residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions issued between 2005 and 2010. Each of these
transactions has a pro rata interest payment structure in at
least one of its loan groups. "At the same time, we removed
five of these ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 182 classes from six
transactions and removed 181 of them from CreditWatch negative,"
S&P noted.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on 186 classes from the
nine transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative,
along with ratings from a group of other RMBS re-REMIC securities.
Additionally, on April 1, 2011, we provided an update on the
CreditWatch placements and provided clarification regarding our
analysis of interest payment amounts within re-REMIC
transactions," S&P continued.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address the
timely payment of interest and principal. We reviewed the interest
and principal amounts due on the underlying securities, which are
then passed through to the applicable re-REMIC classes. When
performing this analysis, we applied our loss projections,
incorporating, where applicable, our recently revised loss
assumptions to the underlying collateral to identify the principal
and interest amounts that could be passed through from the
underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories to
assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the stressed
losses associated with their ratings while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal consistent with our criteria,"
said S&P.

"In applying our loss projections we incorporated, where
applicable, our recently revised loss assumptions as outlined in
'Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime, Subprime, And Alt-A
U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,' published on March 25, 2011, into
our review. Such updates pertain to the 2005-2007 vintage prime,
subprime, and Alternative-A (Alt-A) transactions, some of which
are associated with the re-REMICs we reviewed," S&P explained.

Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Lifetime Loss Projections For Alternative-A RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
                            Fixed/
          Aggregate       long-reset
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.75  11.25    12.75   9.60
2006      29.50  26.25    25.25  25.00
2007      36.00  31.25    31.75  26.25
         Short-reset
            hybrid        Option ARM
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.25  14.75    15.50  13.25
2006      30.00  30.50    34.75  26.75
2007      41.00  40.75    43.50  37.50

"As a result of this review, we lowered our ratings on certain
classes based on our assessment as to whether there were principal
and/or interest shortfalls from the underlying securities that
would impair the re-REMIC classes at the applicable rating
stresses. The affirmations reflect our assessment of the
likelihood that the re-REMIC classes will receive timely interest
and principal under the applicable stressed assumptions," S&P
noted.

As noted, one of these transactions pays interest entirely on a
sequential basis, while each of the other eight has a pro rata
payment structure in at least one of its loan groups. This
sequential interest payment transaction is ASG Resecuritization
Trust 2010-4. "For the three transactions that had downgrades and
have a pro rata interest payment (Structured Asset Securities
Corp. Trust 2005-15, Lehman Structured Securities Corp., and
Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-
PR1), we based our downgrades on our projections of principal loss
amounts, as opposed to interest shortfalls, allocated to the
relevant re-REMIC classes under the applicable ratings stress
scenarios," S&P added.

Rating Actions

ASG Resecuritization Trust 2010-4
Series      2010-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-G23      00190UAX1   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-G14      00190UAU7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A20      00190UBC6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A17      00190UBB8   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A26      00190UBE2   B (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Neg
2-G17      00190UAV5   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A23      00190UBD4   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-G20      00190UAW3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-G26      00190UAY9   B (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Neg

BCAP LLC 2010-RR5-II Trust
Series      2010-RR5-II
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
VI-A7      05533QAV9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A3      05533QAR8   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A5       05533QAE7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A4       05533QAD9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A6       05533QAF4   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A8       05533QAH0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A4      05533QAS6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A8      05533QAW7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A2       05533QAB3   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A1      05533QAP2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A5      05533QAT4   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A7       05533QAG2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A2      05533QAQ0   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A3       05533QAC1   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A9      05533QAX5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
V-A9       05533QAJ6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
VI-A6      05533QAU1   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg

BCAP LLC 2010-RR7 Trust
Series      2010-RR7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4A3        05533DBN5   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
12A3       05533DFG6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2A4        05533DAN6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
9A2        05533DDY9   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3        05533DAM8   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
14A7       05533DFZ4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3A9        05533DBF2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6A6        05533DCV6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
14A5       05533DFX9   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A2        05533DAY2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
9A4        05533DEA0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
9A5        05533DEB8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A7        05533DAR7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4A2        05533DBM7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
18A9       05533DHW9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
9A7        05533DED4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
5A4        05533DCE4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4A7        05533DBS4   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
5A2        05533DCC8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
16A2       05533DGM2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
5A1        05533DCB0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
7A4        05533DDC7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
16A1       05533DGL4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4A1        05533DBL9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
16A3       05533DGN0   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
14A4       05533DFW1   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
7A9        05533DDH6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
12A8       05533DFM3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
5A3        05533DCD6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
12A6       05533DFK7   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2A9        05533DAT3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
18A5       05533DHS8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
16A5       05533DGQ3   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
6A1        05533DCQ7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
18A1       05533DHN9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5A7        05533DCH7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6A9        05533DCY0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2A5        05533DAP1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
9A8        05533DEE2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
16A4       05533DGP5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4A6        05533DBR6   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4A9        05533DBU9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
18A2       05533DHP4   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
16A7       05533DGS9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
9A9        05533DEF9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2A6        05533DAQ9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
6A7        05533DCW4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
7A8        05533DDG8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6A5        05533DCU8   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
18A7       05533DHU3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3A7        05533DBD7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6A2        05533DCR5   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
6A4        05533DCT1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
14A1       05533DFT8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
16A6       05533DGR1   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
16A9       05533DGU4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
7A1        05533DCZ7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
12A5       05533DFJ0   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
6A3        05533DCS3   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
18A6       05533DHT6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
18A3       05533DHQ2   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
7A5        05533DDD5   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4A10       05533DBV7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
12A2       05533DFF8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
12A1       05533DFE1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
7A2        05533DDA1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
14A6       05533DFY7   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A5        05533DBB1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
18A4       05533DHR0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
14A9       05533DGB6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A6        05533DBC9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
9A3        05533DDZ6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
4A4        05533DBP0   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
5A6        05533DCG9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
14A2       05533DFU5   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
18A8       05533DHV1   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6A8        05533DCX2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3A1        05533DAX4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
9A1        05533DDX1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A3        05533DAZ9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
7A6        05533DDE3   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
7A7        05533DDF0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
16A8       05533DGT7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
9A6        05533DEC6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
5A5        05533DCF1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4A5        05533DBQ8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
5A8        05533DCJ3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
14A8       05533DGA8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
14A3       05533DFV3   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A10       05533DBG0   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2A8        05533DAS5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2        05533DAL0   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
12A4       05533DFH4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2A1        05533DAK2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5A9        05533DCK0   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
12A9       05533DFN1   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
7A3        05533DDB9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
4A8        05533DBT2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
12A7       05533DFL5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3A4        05533DBA3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3A8        05533DBE5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

CSMC Series 2010-17R
Series      2010-17R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4-A-2      12645BBV2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-3      12645BAE1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-3      12645BBH3   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A-5      12645BDW8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-6      12645BBM2   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-4      12645BAY7   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-6      12645BCU3   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-1      12645BBT7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-2      12645BBF7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-3      12645BCN9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A-3      12645BDS7   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-1      12645BAA9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A-6      12645BDY4   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-5      12645BCB5   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A-2      12645BDQ1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-3      12645BBX8   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-1      12645BAS0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-6      12645BCD1   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-5      12645BBK6   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-5      12645BAJ0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      12645BAU5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-1      12645BBD2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-2      12645BEP2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-4      12645BAG6   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-6      12645BAL5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-1      12645BCL3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A-1      12645BDN8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-5      12645BCS8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-
PR1
Series      2006-PR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
CW-A1      25157GCT7   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2010-8
Series      2010-8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      46635FAK8   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-5      46635FAP7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-9      46635FAJ1   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-1      46635FAA0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-2      46635FAB8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      46635FAM4   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-5      46635FAE2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-6      46635FAQ5   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-3      46635FAC6   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      46635FAL6   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-6      46635FAF9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Structured Securities Corp.
Series      2005-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        52518RCC8   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        52518RCD6   CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
IO         52518RCE4   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Nomura Resecuritization Trust 2010-4R
Series      2010-4R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2A5        65539EBA9   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A2        65539EAY8   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A3        65539EAC6   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A3        65539EAQ5   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A6        65539EAT9   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2A1        65539EAX0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A5        65539EAE2   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A5        65539EAS1   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A8        65539EAH5   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
2A6        65539EBB7   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
3A2        65539EAP7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2A3        65539EAZ5   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
1A7        65539EAG7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
3A1        65539EAN2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1A1        65539EAA0   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-15
Series      2005-15
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
6-A1       86359DNZ6   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
6-A2       86359DPA9   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

Rating Affirmed

BCAP LLC 2010-RR5-II Trust
Series      2010-RR5-II
Class      CUSIP       Rating
V-A1       05533QAA5   AAA (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades 8 Classes of BACM 2005-1
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-1.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes losses on loans in special servicing and
on performing loans that have experienced declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default. Fitch modeled
losses of 6.4% for the current pool.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 32.9% to $1.5 billion from
$2.3 billion at issuance. Approximately 8.6% of the collateral is
currently defeased. As of April 2011, there are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $3.9 million, affecting
classes H through P.

In total, there are seven loans (7.3% of the pool) in special
servicing, five of which (6.7%) are 60+ days delinquent on debt
service payments. At Fitch's last review, there were nine loans
(14%) in special servicing.

The largest contributor to loss (2.6%) consists of a 902-pad
manufactured housing community located in Bourbonnais, IL, about
50 miles south of Chicago. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2010 for imminent default, and the special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure. Foreclosure has been delayed due
to bankruptcy of the borrower; the special servicer is working on
getting the stay lifted in order to move forward with
receivership.

The next largest contributor to loss (2.1%) consists of a
multifamily/mixed-use property in Dallas, TX. The collateral
consists of a 20-story historic landmark building, which includes
183 multifamily units and ground floor retail, and an adjacent
608-space parking garage located in downtown Dallas. The loan,
which matured in February 2010, has been in special servicing
since October 2009. The property is under contract for sale
through the receiver, subject to an assumption of debt and a
modification which includes a principal write down. The servicer
anticipates the sale to be complete by the end of June.

The next contributor to loss (1%) consists of a 288,175 sf office
property in Atlanta, GA. The loan on this property, which
transferred to special servicing in June 2009 for imminent
default, was modified in December 2009. Terms of the modification
included an extension to the original loan term and bifurcation of
the loan into a senior and junior component. Although losses are
not expected imminently, any recovery to the B-note is contingent
upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at the loan's maturity
in 2016. Unless collateral performance improves, recovery to the
B-note component is unlikely.

Fitch has downgraded, revised Outlooks and Loss Severity (LS)
ratings, and assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) to these classes:

   -- $20.3 million class E to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $26.1 million class F to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $20.3 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $34.8 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR4' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $5.8 million class J to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.7 million class K to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.7 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $2.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings:

   -- $162.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $127.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $343.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $79.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $381.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $168.4 million class A-J at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61 million class B at 'AAsf/LS5' from LS4; Outlook Stable;

   -- $20.3 million class C at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $43.5 million class D at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.1 million class SM-A at 'BB+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.1 million class SM-B at 'BB+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.4 million class SM-C at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.5 million class SM-D at 'BB-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2 million class SM-E at 'BB-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.8 million class SM-F at 'B+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.1 million class SM-G at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.5 million class SM-H at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch maintains distressed ratings on these classes
and adjusts the Recovery Ratings:

   -- $4.4 million class N at 'Dsf/RR6' from 'RR1';

   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only class XW.

Fitch does not rate the SM-Jsf LMsf, and Psf classes. Classes A-
1sf, A-2sf, FM-Asf, FM-Bsf, FM-Csf, and FM-Dsf have paid in full.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades 3 Classes of Series 2001-3
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and revises Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity (LS) ratings on Bank of America, N.A.-First Union
National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's (BofA-FUNB) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-3:

   -- $8.5 million class L to 'BBB/LS5' from 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $8.5 million class M to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $14.2 million class N to 'CC/RR1' from 'B/LS4';

   -- $5.7 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks and
LS ratings:

   -- $276.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.7 million class A-2F at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $42.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.2 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.1 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.1 million class G at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.2 million class H at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.2 million class J at 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Positive;

   -- $29.8 million class K at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3 million class P at 'D/RR6'.

Class A-1 has paid-in-full. Fitch did not rate the $13.7 class Q
which has been fully written off or the subordinate component
class V-1, V-2, V-3, V-4, and V-5 certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets. Fitch
expects losses of 4.96% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $25.9 million.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 54% to $522.9 million from $1.1 billion at
issuance. Thirteen of the remaining 76 loans have defeased
(21.8%).

As of April 2011, there are nine specially serviced loans (13%).
The largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 119,300 square
foot (sf) retail center located in Gainesville, FL. The property
was constructed in 1999 and recent inspections indicate it is in
fair condition. Recent values indicate that the property is worth
less than the outstanding loan amount.

The second largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 350,661
sf retail mall located in Monroe, NC. The subject property was
built in 1979 and renovated in 2000. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2010 due to maturity default. The
special servicer is determining the resolution strategy.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class XC.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades 2005-PWR10 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 15 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMST), series 2005-PWR10 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates due to further deterioration of
performance relative to the previous full transaction review, most
of which involves increased projected losses on the specially
serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 12.7% for the remaining pool;
expected losses as a percentage of the original pool balance are
at 11.8%, including losses already incurred to date (0.3%). Fitch
has designated 59 loans (36.0%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes the 13 specially serviced loans (12.3%). Fitch expects
that classes J through S may be fully depleted from losses
associated with the specially serviced assets.

As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 9.6% to $2.38
billion from $2.63 billion at issuance, due to a combination of
paydown (9.3%) and realized losses (0.3%). Interest shortfalls
totaling $3.4 million are affecting classes O through S.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially
serviced World Market Center loan (8.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 10-story, approximately 1.1 million-square foot (sf)
furniture mart approximately five miles north of the center of the
Las Vegas Strip. The loan has been in special servicing since its
September 2009 transfer for imminent default. The property
suffered during the recession as vacancy increased, tenant
payments came in late, and the borrower was forced to offer high
concessions to attract new tenants.

According to various media reports, the property was recently
acquired by a venture majority-owned by funds managed by Bain
Capital and Oaktree Capital Management at an undisclosed price.
According to the special servicer, an assumption and modification
is in the process of being finalized, with details to be disclosed
in the June remittance.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses (4% of the pool)
is a mixed-use lifestyle center in Westlake, OH, approximately 15
miles west of Cleveland's central business district. Collateral
includes approximately 398,000 sf of retail space, 84,000 sf of
office space, and 158 multifamily units. While the office and
multifamily components had not yet stabilized at issuance,
occupancy has since risen to 97% as of year-end (YE) 2010 and
revenues reported by the servicer were in line with expectation at
issuance. However, with expenses 37% higher than underwritten, the
property remained unable to service its related debt out of
operating cash flows as of YE 2010, with a reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.75 times (x).

Fitch has downgraded these classes and assigned Recovery Ratings
(RRs):

   -- $19.8 million class B to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $29.6 million class C to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $23 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $16.5 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $26.3 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $26.3 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $29.6 million class H to 'CCsf/RR4' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $26.3 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $36.2 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $3.3 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $9.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $13.2 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $6.6 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $6.6 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $9.9 million class Q to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating
Outlooks:

   -- $49.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $59.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $157.1 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.05 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $282.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $263.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $210.7 million class A-J at 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $25.5 million class S. Class A-1 has
repaid in full.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-TOP18 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades 13 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-TOP18.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 3.4% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 3.4%, including
losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated 29 loans
(19.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, including nine specially
serviced loans (4.4%). At Fitch's last review, there were seven
specially serviced loans (9.4%). Currently, Fitch expects eventual
losses associated with the specially serviced loans may fully
deplete classes M through P and materially reduce the balance of
class L.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 12.6% to $980 million from
$1.12 billion at issuance. Two loans (0.5%) have defeased since
issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes M
through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (0.5% of the
pool) that is secured by a 128,899 square foot (sf) community
shopping center located in St. Petersburg, FL. Property
performance has suffered following the departure of Home Depot in
2009. While an Office Depot opened at the center, property
occupancy remains weak at 44% as of Dec. 31, 2010. In addition,
the center faces significant rollover; as of the March 2011 rent
roll, the remaining leases expire within 18 months. As a result of
the low occupancy, the servicer-reported debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) fell to 0.29 times (x) at year end (YE) 2010 down
from 1.73x at YE2009 and 2.08x at issuance. The loan remains
current as of the April remittance date.

The second largest contributor to expected losses, which is a non-
performing specially serviced asset (1.1% of the pool), is secured
by a 115,177 sf anchored retail center located in Whiting, NJ. The
asset transferred to special servicing in July 2009 as the
borrower was unable to meet debt service obligations due to
delinquent rents from tenants. The anchor tenant, a grocery store,
is affiliated with the borrower and has been unable to pay rent
due to operating losses. The special servicer plans to have a
receiver appointed by the courts and is pursuing foreclosure of
the asset.

The third largest contributor to losses is a loan (0.6% of the
pool) secured by a full-service 104-room boutique hotel and a non-
contiguous parking garage located in Baltimore, MD. Hotel
amenities include a restaurant, lounge, nine meeting rooms,
business center and a fitness center. The property continues to
suffer from weak performance due to a decline in leisure and
business travel in the market. The servicer-reported net operating
income (NOI) DSCR of 0.71 at YE2010 is down from 1.12 at YE2009
and 2.15 at issuance. The loan remains current as of the April
remittance date.

Fitch downgrades, assigns Loss Severity (LS) ratings and Rating
Outlooks:

   -- $29.4 million class B to 'A/LS4' from 'AA/LS3'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $8.4 million class C to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $12.6 million class D to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $11.2 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9.8 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;

   -- $9.8 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;

   -- $8.4 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS4';

   -- $4.2 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';

   -- $4.2 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5' ;

   -- $4.2 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5' ;

   -- $1.4 million class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $1.4 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $2.8 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and Rating
Outlooks:

   -- $69.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $41.6 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $105.7 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $517.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $75 million class A-4FL at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $74.3 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

Class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the $3.1 million
class P. Fitch has withdrawn the ratings on the interest-only
class X.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on BSCMI 2002-TOP8
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and upgraded one of
class Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-TOP8.

The downgrades reflect Fitch projected losses which are expected
to reduce to zero the balance of the unrated class O. The upgrades
and Positive Rating Outlooks reflect increased credit enhancement
to senior classes as a result of paydown and defeasance along with
minimal Fitch expected losses. In addition, Fitch applied
additional cap rate stresses which still allowed for the upgrade.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.23% of the remaining pool. Fitch has
designated 15 loans (11%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include
five specially serviced loans (4.2%).

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by approximately 19.7% to
$675.7 million from $842.2 million at issuance. Twenty-one loans
(29%) in the transaction are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
affecting the unrated class O.

The largest contributor to loss (1.18% of pool balance) is a
205,000 square foot single tenant retail property located in
Sacramento, CA. The loan transferred to special servicing on
Sept. 29, 2010, and has remained current while in special
servicing. The special servicer approved a lease amendment which
modified the terms of the lease extension options. The property's
tenant, who has a lease expiration of Oct. 31, 2011, has executed
a two year extension at a lower lease rate while retaining options
for additional extensions. Fitch modeled losses are based on the
new lease payment.

The second largest contributor to losses (.57%) is a 124 unit Low
Income Housing Tax Credit property located in Tomball, TX. The
loan transferred to special servicing on Feb. 2, 2010 when the
carve out guarantor filed bankruptcy. The special servicer
foreclosed on the property on March 1, 2011.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises the Outlooks and
assigns Recovery Ratings (RRs):

   -- $4.2 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;

   -- $3.2 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+/LS5'; Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;

   -- $3.2 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $3.2 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5'.

Fitch upgrades this class and revises the Outlook:

   -- $28.4 million class C to 'AA/LS3' from at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook
      to Positive from Stable.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the rating Outlooks:

   -- $22.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $538.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $25.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.5 million class D at 'A/LS3'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $11.6 million class E at 'BBB+/LS3'; Outlook to Positive
      from Stable;

   -- $6.3 million class F at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $4.2 million class G at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.4 million class H at 'BB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.2 million class J at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $5.1 million class O and the interest only
class X-2 has been paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-1.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $1.98 Bil. RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 61
tranches and has confirmed the ratings of six tranches issued by
15 RMBS resecuritization transactions.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectations on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the "Surveillance Approach for Resecuritized transactions" section
in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in February 2011.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumption on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificates) and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates. The
ratings on the underlying certificates are based on expected
recoveries on the bonds under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves. The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to
small increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds,
losses on the underlying certificates were ascribed to the
resecuritized bonds, according to the structure of each
resecuritized transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust 2007-R6

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 13,
      2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSMC 2005-1R

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
   Series 2006-22R

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
   Series 2007-26R

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
   Series 2008-2R

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-11, Re-Remic Trust
   Certificates, Series 2007-11

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2006-RS1

   -- Cl. N-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc., REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2008-RS3

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-2

   -- Cl. I-A3B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R1

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-R1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 13,
      2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-1

   -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
      2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Lehman Structured Securities Corp. Series 2005-1

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2011
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-R5

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: RBSGC Structured Trust Pass-Through Certificates,
   Series 2008-A

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Resecuritized RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches and has confirmed the ratings of two tranches issued by 8
RMBS resecuritization transactions.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectations on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the "Surveillance Approach for Resecuritized transactions" section
in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in February 2011.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans backing the underlying certificates and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in determining the underlying
ratings is described in the Monitoring and Performance Review
section in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities" published in December 2008. For other
methodologies used for estimating losses on 2005-2008 vintage Alt-
A/Option Arm, Subprime, and Prime Jumbo pools, please refer to the
methodology publication " Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010", "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection Update: February
2010", and "Prime Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update: January
2010", available on Moodys.com.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-2

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2005-WF1

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2007-RS3

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2007-RS4

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2007-RS7

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-1

   -- Cl. I-A3A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A3B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Greenwich Capital Structured Products Trust 2005-1

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Action on $1.9 billion of Alt-A RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 87
tranches from nine Alt-A deals issued by Bear Stearns ARM Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

Moody's previous rating actions considered a loss allocation
limitation defined in the prospectus supplement which provides
protection to the senior certificates backed by stronger
performing groups. However, as per the pooling and servicing
agreement (PSA), the language does not indicate a loss allocation
limitation in these deals. Moody's has confirmed with the Trustee
that it is employing this interpretation. As such, all senior
certificates will be allocated losses from the related collateral
group without regard to any limits, and Moody's has adjusted the
ratings accordingly.

Similarly, Moody's previous rating actions on Bear Stearns ARM
Trust 2004-8 relied on language in the prospectus supplement for
that transaction to treat Class I-1-A-2 as a super senior tranche
supported by Class I-1-A-3, with Class I-1-A-3 covering the pro-
rata share of losses of Class I-1-A-2 as long as Class I-1-A-3
remains outstanding. The PSA, however, provides for pro-rata loss
allocation among all the senior classes. The trustee confirmed
that it is following the PSA, and Moody's has adjusted its ratings
accordingly.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005. The principal methodology used in
these ratings is described in the Monitoring and Performance
Review section in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in December 2008. Other
methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011, which accounts for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The approach " Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology " is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages. .

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. in addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated is multiplied by a factor ranging from
0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5%
to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-10

   -- Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr
      13, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr
      13, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-11

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-12

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-3

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-4

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-5

   -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2009
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-6

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8

   -- Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-1-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-1-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Upgrades Rating of One Class of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class of
notes issued by C-Bass CBO IX, Ltd. The class of notes affected by
the rating action is:

   -- US$220,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2039 (current balance: $19,884,448),
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 4, 2010 Downgraded
      to B1 (sf);

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes.

On the most recent payment date in April 2011 the Class A-1 Notes
received a principal payment of $4.7mm. Since the last review in
June 2010 the Class A-1 Notes have paid down by approximately
$22mm. As a result of the delevering, the par coverage of the
Class A-1 Notes exceeds 200%. Over 40% of the names in the
portfolio have an investment grade Moody's rating.

Moody's also notes that since the last review, the number of
defaults has remained stable, the A/B OC has slightly deteriorated
and the WARF has deteriorated as well. Based on the April 2011
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is 2381
compared to 1665 in April 2010. The Class A/B OC ratio was
reported as 101.835% in April 2011 compared to 107.8% in the April
2010 report. However, the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes has
outweighed the negative effects of the WARF deterioration.

C-Bass CBO IX is a collateralized debt obligation issuance backed
by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
(RMBS), the majority of which originated in 2003 and 2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal
(or "Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched down to Ca:

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched up to Caa1:

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0


CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Upgrades Prime and Subprime Auto Loan ABS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded one tranche from one prime and two tranches
from two subprime auto loan securitizations sponsored by Capital
One Auto Finance, Inc (Cap One).

Ratings

   Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-B

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
      Nov 19, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

   Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-C

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19,
   2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
   previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

   Issuer: Capital One Prime Auto Receivables Trust 2007-2

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of lower lifetime cumulative net loss
(CNL) expectations and build-up in credit enhancement relative to
remaining losses due to the non-declining nature of reserve
accounts in the transactions. The Overcollateralization (OC) for
the transactions is at its target level as a percentage of the
current pool balance .

Moody's expects the Capital One Prime Auto Receivables Trust 2007-
2 to incur lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) of 3.25%, lower than
the expectation of 3.35% when Moody's previously reviewed this
transaction in November 2010.

For the two subprime transactions that were issued in 2007,
Moody's currently expects lifetime CNLs to be 8.50% and 9.00% for
the 2007-B and 2007-C respectively, this compares favorably to
Moody's previous loss expectation of 9.00% and 9.50% respectively
when these transactions where last reviewed in November 2010. Both
transactions benefit from financial insurance however, the
insurance did not factor into the ratings.

Moody's listed key performance metrics and credit assumptions for
each affected transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's
expected lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a
percentage of the original pool balance, and Moody's lifetime
remaining CNL expectation and Aaa levels which are expressed as a
percentage of the current pool balance; The Aaa level is the level
of credit enhancement that would be consistent with a Aaa rating
for the given asset pool. Performance metrics include pool factor
which is the ratio of the current collateral balance and the
original collateral balance at closing; total credit enhancement,
which typically consists of subordination, overcollateralization,
and a reserve fund; and per annum excess spread.

Capital One Prime transaction:

   Issuer: Capital One Prime Auto Receivables Trust 2007-2

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 3.25%, prior expectation
      (November 2010) was 3.35%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 1.5%

   -- Aaa level -- Approximately 7.7%

   -- Pool factor -13%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class B
      - 8%;

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 2% per annum

Capital One Subprime transaction's:

   Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-B

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 8.5%, prior expectation
      (November 2010) was 9.0%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 3.95%

   -- Pool factor -14%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 20%;

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 6% per annum

   Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-C

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 9.0%, prior expectation
      (November 2010) was 9.5%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 4.38%

   -- Pool factor -19%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread ): Class A
      - 17%;

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 6% per annum

Ratings on the affected notes could be upgraded (where applicable)
if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or downgraded if the
lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment
continues to rise moderately, and strength in the used vehicle
market. Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as much
stronger now than it was at the end of 2008 when the uncertainty
relating to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto
manufacturers was significantly greater. Overall, Moody's expects
a sluggish recovery in the U.S. economy, with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent, high unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these securities was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities" rating
methodology published in June 2007. Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
these notes can also be found on Moody's website.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the transactions' guarantees from
monoline bond insurers. The current ratings on the securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Five CMBS Classes of CBAC 2006-1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes of
CBA Commercial Assets Securities Inc., Series 2006-1:

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 17.4%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
19.8% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was CMBS" Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions," published in
September 2000. Moody's also considered in its analysis "Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 85 compared to 88 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 25, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to
$90.1 million from $166.8 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 162 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 22% of the pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Forty loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $16.1 million loss (77%
loss severity on average). Realized losses have resulted in 100%
principal loss to Classes M-4 through M-8 and an 97% principal
loss to Class M-3. At Moody's prior review, aggregate realized
losses represented $14.7 million. Thirty-seven loans, representing
15.4% of the pool, are currently in special servicing. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $8.3 million loss (75% expected loss on
average) for specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on four loans,
representing 1.7% of the pool. These loans are on the watch list
due to poor performance. Moody's has estimated a $863,297 million
aggregate loss (55% expected loss based on a 75% default
probability) from these loans. Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of losses
from these troubled loans.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of CBAC 2006-2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2006-2:

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transaction

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
21.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 21.7%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
23.0% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

The other methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" published in December 2004.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 78 compared to 87 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Deal Performance

As of the April 25, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 38% to
$80.35 million from $130.48 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 188 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 28% of the pool.

Twenty-six loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Forty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $15.9 million loss (73%
loss severity on average). Forty-four loans, representing 25% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing. The master servicer
has recognized an aggregate $4.97 million appraisal reduction for
six of the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $14.7 million loss (73% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of CBAC 2007-1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of four
classes of CBA Commercial Assets Securities Inc., Series 2007-1:

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
24.9% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 28.9%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
31.3% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was CMBS" Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions," published in
September 2000. Moody's also considered in its analysis "Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 84 compared to 91 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 22, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 25, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to
$91.9 million from $127.6 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 304 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 24% of the pool.

Eleven loans, representing 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $12.6 million loss (77%
loss severity on average). Realized losses have resulted in 100%
principal loss to Classes M-3 through M-8 and an 18% principal
loss to Class M-2. At Moody's prior review, aggregate realized
losses represented $9.2 million.

Sixty-four loans, representing 43% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$3.5 million appraisal reduction for seven of the specially
serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $18.9 million
loss (75% expected loss on average) for specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on four loans,
representing 2% of the pool. These loans are on the watch list
due to poor performance. Moody's has estimated a $1.2 million
aggregate loss (55% expected loss based on a 75% default
probability) from these loans.


CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CC (sf)' on the class M certificates from Centerline 2007-1
Resecuritization Trust (Centerline 2007-1), a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction. "At
the same time, we affirmed 10 'CC (sf)' ratings from the same
transaction," S&P related.

The downgrade reflects a principal loss of $12.7 million to class
M as detailed in the April 20, 2011, remittance report. As a
result of the principal loss, the principal balance of class M was
$16.9 million, down from $29.6 million at issuance. "The class N
certificates, which we previously downgraded to 'D (sf)', lost
100% of their issuance balances according to the April remittance
report," S&P noted.

The affirmed 'CC (sf)' rating affirmations on classes B through L
reflect our expectations that the interest payments on these
classes will be deferred for an extended period of time due to a
termination payment owed to the hedge counterparty.

According to the most recent trustee report, the principal loss
was due to losses on the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) collateral. Eleven distinct transactions
experienced aggregate principal losses in the amount of
$36.5 million. These CMBS classes experienced significant
principal losses in the current trustee report:

    * JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2007-
      CIBC18 (classes M through P; $13.2 million loss);

    * Morgan Stanley Capital I 2006-T23 (classes M through P;
      $9.1 million loss);

    * Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2007-PWR15
      (class P; $7.0 million loss);

    * Credit Suisse 2006-C2 (class P; $3.5 million loss);

    * Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2006-TOP22
      (class P; $1.8 million loss); and

    * Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities 2006-PWR11
      (class P; $1.2 million loss).

Per the remittance report, Centerline 2007-1 was collateralized by
98 CMBS and three resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit (re-REMIC) certificates ($710.6 million, 100%) from 18
distinct transactions issued between 2000 and 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Centerline 2007-1 according to its
current criteria. The analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

Rating Lowered

Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
M        D (sf)               CC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

Class    Rating
B        CC (sf)
C        CC (sf)
D        CC (sf)
E        CC (sf)
F        CC (sf)
G        CC (sf)
H        CC (sf)
J        CC (sf)
K        CC (sf)
L        CC (sf)


CHASE EDUCATION: Fitch Affirms Subordinate Notes at 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior and subordinate student loan
notes issued by the Chase Education Loan Trust 2007-A at 'AAAsf'
and 'BBsf', respectively.  The Rating Outlook remains Stable.
Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'U.S. FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria', as well as the
refined basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29, 2010
press release 'Fitch to Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying
Updated Criteria' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses. Credit enhancement for the senior
and subordinate notes consists of overcollateralization and
projected minimum excess spread, while the senior notes also
benefit from subordination provided by the Class B notes.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Chase Education Loan Trust, Series 2007-A:

   -- Class A-1 note affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-2 note affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-3 note affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-4 note affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B note affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades 2 Classes of 2005-EMG
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and revised the Loss Severity (LS)
ratings and Rating Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Securities mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2005-EMG.

The upgrades reflect paydown of approximately 41% since Fitch's
last review along with stable performance. Fitch modeled losses of
1.95% of the remaining pool. Fitch has designated 11 loans (5.5%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
loan (0.5%). At Fitch's last review, there was one specially
serviced loan (0.2%).

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 74.26% to $185.9 million from
$772.1 million at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class M.

The largest loan in the pool (8.1%) is secured by a 144,378 square
foot (sf) mixed use property in Midtown Manhattan. The servicer
reported year-end 2009 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 3.91
times (x).

The second largest loan in the pool (7%) is secured by a 254,518
sf retail property in Scarsdale, NY. The property lost its largest
tenant, Linens N' Things in 2009 but has since leased the space to
a grocery store. The servicer reported year-end 2009 DSCR was
3.43x.

The third largest loan in the pool (6.1%) is secured by a 171 room
Red Roof Inn located in the Herald Square area of Manhattan. The
servicer reported year-end 2009 occupancy and DSCR were 87% and
2.51x respectively.

Fitch has upgraded these classes and revised the Loss Severity
(LS) ratings:

   -- $5.4 million class D to 'AAA/LS5' from 'AA/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $1.8 million class E to 'AA/LS5' from 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms, revises LS ratings and Rating
Outlooks:

   -- $98.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $46 million class A-J to 'AAA/LS3' from LS2; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.6 million class F at 'A/LS5'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $1.8 million class G at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $3.6 million class H at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $8.1 million class J to 'BB/LS4' from LS3; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $2.7 million class K at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $1.8 million class L at 'CCC/RR1'.

The $1.8 million class M has experienced realized losses and is
affirmed at 'D/RR2'.

Fitch withdrew the rating of the interest-only class X.

Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid in full.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 5 Classes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C7, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "We
lowered five of the nine ratings to 'D (sf)'," S&P stated.

"We lowered our ratings on the class M, N, and O certificates
because of principal losses resulting from the liquidation of one
asset that was with the special servicer LNR Partners LLC.
According to the May 12, 2011, remittance report, the trust
experienced $21.0 million in principal losses upon the recent
disposition of the Mall St. Vincent asset, which liquidated at a
42.9% loss severity based on its $49.0 million original balance.
Classes N and O both experienced losses of 100.0% of their
original balances. The class M certificate experienced a loss of
69.6% of its $6.94 million original balance. The remaining
principal losses affected the class P certificate, and Standard
& Poor's had previously lowered its rating on that class to 'D
(sf)'," S&P continued.

The lowered ratings on the six remaining classes reflect current
and potential interest shortfalls, as well as reduced liquidity
available to the more senior classes to absorb any future interest
shortfalls. As of the May 12, 2011, trustee remittance report,
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $78.0 million were in
effect for 12 ($184.7 million, 11.0%) of the transaction's 15
($205.3 million, 12.2%) specially serviced assets. The current
interest shortfalls primarily resulted from appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts and special servicing fees.
The total reported ASER amount was $306,639, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $1.4 million. Standard & Poor's
considered nine ASER amounts, which were based on Member of the
Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees ($88,789), workout fees ($2,619), and interest on
advances ($898), in determining its rating actions. The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $396,513 and affected all of
the classes subordinate to, and including, class H.

"We lowered our ratings on classes K and L to 'D (sf)' because of
interest shortfalls that have affected the classes for the past
two consecutive months. Furthermore, classes K and L had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five and eight
prior months. We expect interest shortfalls to affect these
classes for the foreseeable future," noted S&P.

S&P continued, "The downgrades of the class H and J certificates
to 'CCC- (sf)' reflect current interest shortfalls that we project
will continue and accumulated interest shortfalls which we expect
to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the
class J certificate had two months of accumulated interest
shortfalls that were paid off before the current shortfall."

The lowered ratings on classes F and G reflect their increased
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls due to the reduced
liquidity support available to these certificates.

Ratings Lowered

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                               Credit       Reported
          Rating          enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To         From            (%)    Current  Accumulated

F      CCC+ (sf)  B+ (sf)        5.07          0           0
G      CCC (sf)   B- (sf)        3.97          0           0
H      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)      2.87     68,355      68,355
J      CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)       1.91     82,163      82,163
K      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)      0.81     85,527     121,062
L      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)      0.13     53,455     106,910
M      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)         0     32,072      64,144
N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)         0     32,072      64,144
O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)         0     32,072      64,144


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritized RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches issued by five RMBS resecuritization transactions. The
actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectations on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the "Surveillance Approach for Resecuritized transactions" section
in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in February 2011.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans backing the underlying certificates and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates. The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying ratings
is described in the Monitoring and Performance Review section in
"Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in December 2008. For other methodologies
used for estimating losses on pre-2005 vintage RMBS pools, please
refer to the methodology publication "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, available on
Moodys.com.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
   Certificates, Series 2004-RR1

   -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. XS-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2003-1

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Lehman Structured Securities Corp. Pass-Through
   Certificates, Series 2001-GE5

   -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QR19 Trust

   -- Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Resecuritization Mortgage Pass-Through
   Certificates, Series 2005-8R

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CPS AUTO: Moody's Upgrades Subprime Auto Loan ABS
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded thirteen tranches from eight transactions
sponsored and serviced by Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS)
from 2006 to 2008.

Ratings

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-A

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp . (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-B

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-C/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2006-C

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., (Ca; previously on
   3/9/2009 Downgraded to Ca from Caa1)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-D/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2006-D

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp . (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-A/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2007-A

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3; previously
   on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-B

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp . (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-C

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp . (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-TFC

   -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., (Ca; previously on
   3/9/2009 Downgraded to Ca from Caa1)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2008-A

   -- Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2011
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp . (Aa3;
   previously Confirmed on 11/12/2009)

   Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3,
   2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions were prompted by decrease in cumulative net
loss expectations relative to current levels of credit
enhancement, short remaining term of the securities, and
diminished operational risk associated with the servicer of the
transactions.

All outstanding transactions are highly seasoned, with
significantly low pool factors (the ratio of the current
collateral balance to the original collateral balance). As of
March distribution date, the pool factor ) for outstanding
transactions range between 5% and 31%, with only three
transactions having pool factors greater than 20% .

Although the performance of an auto loan-backed transaction
depends primarily on the credit quality of the underlying
obligors, the stability of the servicer can also affect the
performance of the transaction. Should the servicer become unable
to fulfill its obligations to the transaction, cash flows to
investors may be negatively impacted . Collection efficiency may
deteriorate and the receipt of collections delayed upon a servicer
transfer. CPS transactions have weathered the economic downturn
without signs of operational disruption. The company, after
curtailing originations and cutting staff during the downturn, has
significantly increased its loan originations and serviced
portfolio from 2009 levels and has recently hired additional
marketing staff. The company was also successful in securing
additional lower cost warehouse capacity and term financing.

Moody's listed key performance metrics and credit assumptions for
each affected transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's
expected lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a
percentage of the original pool balance; and Moody's lifetime
remaining CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of
the current pool balance. Performance metrics include pool factor;
total credit enhancement (expressed as a percentage of the
outstanding collateral pool balance) which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per
annum excess spread.

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 16.75%, prior expectation
      (February  2011) was 16.50% to 17.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 11.00%

   -- Pool factor -5%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 -- 63%

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 7.4% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-B

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.25%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 18.00% to 19.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -8.60%

   -- Pool factor - 8%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 72%; Class B -- 65%, Class C - 31%

   -- Excess spread -- Approximately 7.2% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-C/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2006-C

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 9.30%

   -- Aaa level -- Approximately 37%

   -- Pool factor - 10%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 52%; Class B -- 39%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 7.6% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2006-D/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2006-D

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 11.20%

   -- Aaa level -- Approximately 45%

   -- Pool factor - 14%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 34%; Class B -- 28%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 8.4% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-A/CPS Cayman Residual
   Trust 2007-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 13.37%

   -- Aaa level -- Approximately 47%

   -- Pool factor - 17%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 39%; Class B -- 31%; Class C -- 13%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 8.2% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-B

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 10.91%

   -- Pool factor - 21%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 34%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 7.7% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-C

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 10.67%

   -- Pool factor - 25%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 29%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 7.6% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2007-TFC

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 16.50%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 16.00% to 17.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 12.89%

   -- Pool factor - 11%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      4 - 55%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 7.6% per annum

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2008-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 20.00%, prior expectation
      (February 2011) was 19.00% to 21.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation --13.47%

   -- Pool factor - 31%

   -- Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class A-
      3 -- 42%; Class A-4 - 42%

   -- Excess spread - Approximately 5.8% per annum

Ratings on the affected securities could be upgraded (where
applicable) if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or downgraded
if the lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment
continues to remain at elevated levels, and strength in the used
vehicle market. Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
much stronger now than it was at the end of 2008 when the
uncertainty relating to the economy as well as the future of the
U.S auto manufacturers was significantly greater. Overall, Moody's
expects a sluggish recovery in the U.S. economy, with elevated
fiscal deficits and persistent, high unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these securities was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities" rating
methodology published in June 2007. Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
these notes can also be found on Moody's website. Further
information on Moody's analysis of this transaction is available
onwww.moodys.com.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the transactions' guarantees from
monoline bond insurers. The current ratings on the securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CRATOS CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Notes Ratings
--------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Cratos CLO I Ltd.:

   -- US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 13, 2009
      Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$35,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      October 13, 2009 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

   -- US$34,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on October 13,
      2009 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$30,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due 2021, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on October 13,
      2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in October
2009. Credit improvement reflects the collateral manager's
decision to shift its investment focus from middle market loans to
less concentrated positions in broadly syndicated loans from
obligors with higher ratings in a wider range of industries, which
resulted in a substantial improvement in the diversity and
weighted average rating factor. In particular, current diversity
and weighted average rating factor levels are significantly better
than covenant levels, which were structured for a deal with a much
higher concentration of middle market loans.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in diversity and a
decrease in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below. In particular, as of the latest trustee report dated
April 1, 2011, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2333 compared to 2931 in the September 2009 report, diversity is
currently 78 compared to 46 in September 2009, and securities
rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 3.28% of the underlying
portfolio versus 13.12% in September 2009. In addition, there are
currently $3.56 million of defaulted securities based on the April
2011 trustee report, compared to $64.54 million in September 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in October 2009. The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 136.41%, 123.87%, 113.72% and 106.05%, respectively,
versus September 2009 levels of 132.04%, 120.11%, 110.42% and
103.08%, respectively. All related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $470.2 million, defaulted par of $3.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 27.35% (implying a WARF
of 3436), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.19%,
and a diversity score of 53. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Cratos CLO I Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months. In addition, Moody's applied a
1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated
between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. This is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2749)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +3

   -- Class D: +3

   -- Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4123)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D: -1

   -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee may create volatility
   in the deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing
   of recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered a weighted average rating factor level lower than
   the covenant level and diversity and spread levels higher than
   the covenant levels due to the large differences between the
   reported and covenant levels.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Corrects May 6, 2011 Release
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has made a correction to its May 6, 2011
release wherein Moody's took action on $321.36 million of Prime
Jumbo and Option-ARM RMBS issued by Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. from 2002 to 2003.

According to Moody's, the May 6, 2011 press release for theaction
failed to identify that one of the affected transactions is backed
by Option-ARM collateral. This has been corrected, and the full
explanation provided. The Revised release is.

New York, May 6, 2011: Moody's Investors Service has downgraded
the ratings of 78 tranches and confirmed the ratings of six
tranches from eight prime jumbo deals and one Option-ARM deal
(CSFB 2002-P1) issued by Credit Suisse. The collateral backing
these deals consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate prime jumbo and Option-ARM residential mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo and Option-ARM pools securitized before 2005. Although most
of these pools have paid down significantly, the remaining loans
are affected by the housing and macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk. To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average for a jumbo pool. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated is multiplied
by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings of 14 tranches from the CSFB
Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR33
transaction. The tranches were backed by a pool of mortgage loans
with a pool factor less than 5% and containing fewer than 40
loans. Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to
pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%.
As a result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor
drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40
loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement floor
or pool insurance). Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the
credit rating pursuant to published credit rating methodologies
that allow for the withdrawal of the credit rating if the size of
the pool outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen
below a specified level.

Moody's is also reinstating the rating on Class I-P issued by CSFB
Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-23. The
rating on this tranche was previously withdrawn due to an internal
administrative error.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Pass-Through Certificates, 2002-P1

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
   2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2008
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2002-AR31

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2002-AR33

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-3, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-4, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-5, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-10

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-19

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-15, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-23, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR12

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-X-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR15

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR22

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR24

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-23

   -- Cl. I-P, Reinstated to A1 (sf)


CREST 2001-1: Fitch Downgrades Class C Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two and downgraded one class issued by
Crest 2001-1 Ltd./Corp (Crest 2001-1). The affirmations to the
senior classes are a result of significant amortization of the
capital structure. Meanwhile, the junior notes are subject to
adverse selection as the portfolio is highly concentrated.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, there has been
substantial repayment on the underlying real estate investment
trust (REIT) debt. A total of $169.7 million was used to pay down
the remaining class A note balance in full and $12.5 million was
used to paydown the class B notes. The remaining portfolio is
highly concentrated with only 14 bonds from 10 obligors.
Currently, 59.6% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 37.9% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 26.5% and 7.2%, respectively, at
last review. As of the April 29, 2011 trustee report, 29% of the
underlying collateral is experiencing interest shortfalls,
compared to 7.2% at last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) under the
various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as
described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in
Corporate CDOs'. Based on this analysis, the class B notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the current ratings
of the notes. Fitch also considered qualitative factors into its
analysis to conclude the rating actions for the notes.

The downgrade to the class C notes is based upon Fitch's view that
the notes will ultimately be reliant on distressed collateral as a
result of adverse selection. Since Fitch's last rating action, the
principal balance of the portfolio has decreased by approximately
60%. Based on these factors, the class C notes have been
downgraded to 'CCCsf', indicating that default is possible.

The Negative Outlook on the class B notes reflects Fitch's view
that adverse selection will cause interest and principal proceeds
to decline significantly. The Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates
a tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance
Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with the probability of default for tranches. Fitch
does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and
below.

Crest 2001-1 is a static CDO that closed on March 7, 2001. The
current portfolio consists of 86% commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) and 14% REIT debt.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $0 class A notes marked as 'PIF';

   -- $24,227,601 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'BBB-sf/LS3';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $28,323,868 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'BBB-sf/LS3';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $30,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
      'Bsf/LS4'.


CREST 2004-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 classes issued by Crest 2004-1
Ltd./Corp (Crest 2004-1) as a result of significant negative
credit migration on the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, approximately 63.9%
of the portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, 86.6% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
45.4% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared
to 82.5% and 23%, respectively, at last review. As of the April
28, 2011 trustee report, 30.9% of the underlying collateral is
experiencing interest shortfalls, compared to 8.6% at last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'. Based on this analysis,
the class A through C notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned.

For the class D through H notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class D through H notes have been downgraded. Furthermore, all
overcollateralization tests are failing their respective triggers
and interest has been diverted to pay down the senior notes. As
such, the class C through H notes have been receiving interest
paid in kind (PIK) whereby the principal amount of the notes is
written up by the amount of interest due.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's view that
the notes will continue to de-lever. The Negative Outlook on the
class B notes reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) loans will continue
to face refinance risk and prolong the repayment of the notes. The
Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates a tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches. Fitch does not assign LS
ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

The rating of the preferred shares addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive the ultimate return of the aggregate
outstanding rated balance by the legal final maturity date. The
assigned rating for the preferred shares indicates that default is
inevitable, as they are reliant on defaulted collateral.
Crest 2004-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Nov. 18, 2004. The current portfolio consists of 128
bonds from 47 obligors, of which 96.7% are CMBS from the 1999
through 2004 vintages, 2.1% are real estate investment trust
(REIT) debt securities, and 1.2% are structured finance CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

   -- $125,800,333 class A notes to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'BBB/LS3'; to
      Outlook Stable from Negative;

   -- $44,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BB/LS5';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $8,491,250 class B-2 notes to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BB/LS5';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $2,723,667 class C-1 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $23,579,875 class C-2 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $17,582,547 class D notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $13,212,354 class E-1 notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from
      'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $13,437,907 class E-2 notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $6,552,304 class F notes to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $2,070,285 class G-1 notes to 'Csf' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $10,486,801 class G-2 notes to 'Csf' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $7,832,896 class H-1 notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $1,129,151 class H-2 notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';

   -- $96,412,500 preferred shares notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.


CRF 19: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on CRF 19
LLC's class D notes to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and class E notes
to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B (sf)'. "In addition, we affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)', 'A (sf)', and 'BBB (sf)' ratings on the transaction's class
A-2 and A-3, B, and C notes, respectively. At the same time, we
removed all of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where we had initially placed them on April 4,
2011," S&P stated.

CRF 19 LLC is an asset-backed securities transaction that is
collateralized primarily by a pool of small business development
loans not insured or guaranteed by any governmental agency. These
loans are generally secured by owner-occupied, multipurpose
commercial real estate. Approximately 80% of these loans are
second lien. The credit support for each class of rated notes
is provided by a combination of subordination, an interest reserve
account in the amount of three-months interest on the offered
notes (reduced as the offered note principal is paid), and excess
spread.

The downgrades reflect the rising delinquency and increasing
cumulative net loss in the underlying small business loan
portfolio. Between April 2010 and April 2011, the total
delinquency (as a percentage of the then-current pool
balance) increased to 24.43% from 18.17%; the 90-plus-day
delinquency (as a percentage of the then-current pool balance)
increased to 21.98% from 13.5%; and the cumulative net loss (as a
percentage of the original pool balance) increased to 4.13% from
3.29%. As a result of the loan pool's deteriorating performance,
the class D and E notes were not able to withstand the stresses
commensurate with their prior rating levels. "Consequently, we
downgraded the two classes to the rating levels commensurate with
the stresses they could withstand," S&P stated.

S&P continued, "We affirmed our ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B,
and C notes because they were still able to withstand our stress
tests at their current rating levels."

As of April 30, 2011, CRF 19's loan pool had a pool factor of
74.24%; the class A-1 notes had been fully paid off; the class A-2
notes' remaining balance was approximately $12.45 million, which
was approximately 79% of its original balance; and the class A-3,
B, C, D, E, F, and G notes had not received any principal
payments. The class B through F notes allow for interest to be
deferred if available funds are insufficient to pay the current
interest. A cumulative loss rate event has been triggered for the
class D, E, F, and G notes because the cumulative loss rate
exceeded the thresholds for these notes, as set in the transaction
documents for the related payment periods. As a result of this
event, per the transaction documents, the class D through G
interest payments have been deferred and deferred interest will be
carried forward.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review outstanding ratings and
take additional rating actions as appropriate.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

CRF 19 LLC
                       Rating
Class         To                  From
D             B- (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
E             CCC- (sf)           B (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A-2           AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3           AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B             A (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
C             BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)/Watch Neg


CSFB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of CSFB 2007-TFL1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of 14 classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TFL1:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated June 30, 2010. Please see the
ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last
rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 Payment Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 10%
to $1.14 billion from $1.26 billion at securitization due to the
pay off of two loans and partial pay downs associated with two
loans. The two loans that paid off were the Renaissance M Street
Hotel Loan and the specially-serviced Allerton Hotel Loan that
was liquidated in June 2010 without a loss to the trust. The
certificates are currently collateralized by nine floating-rate
loans. The largest three loans account for 51% of the pooled
balance. The pool composition includes hotel properties (65% of
the pooled balance), one mixed-use property consisting of both
office and retail space (20%) and office properties (15%).

Moody's weighted average loan to value ("LTV") ratio for the total
pool is 90%, the same as at Moody's previous review in June 2010.
Moody's debt service coverage (DSCR) is 1.22X, compared to 1.25X
at last review.

There is currently one loan in special servicing, the SLS Beverly
Hills Loan ($61.0 million -- 5% of the pooled balance), secured by
a 297-room hotel located in Beverly Hills, California. The whole
mortgage includes a non-trust junior component with a current
balance of approximately $38.4 million. There is also mezzanine
debt of approximately $22.9 million. The property was closed in
2007 and most of 2008 while it was being renovated as part of its
re-positioning to a luxury boutique hotel under the SLS brand. The
renovations that were scheduled to be completed in 2007 were not
completed until 2008. The hotel did not generate cash flow during
the construction period and the loan was transferred to special
servicing in October 2009, when it failed to qualify for the
second of three 12-month loan extension options. A loan
modification was completed in February 2010 extending the maturity
date to February 2013. Modification terms also included a
$13.5 million pay down of the mortgage loan. Net cash flow, after
reserves for furniture fixture and equipment ("FF&E"), was
negative in calendar year 2009 as the hotel continued to ramp-up
after its reopening. Net Cash Flow in calendar year 2010 was
approximately $5.2 million. The property was appraised in November
2009 for $116 million or $390,572/key. Loan payments are current
through April 2011 and the loan is pending return to the master
servicer. Moody's LTV ratio and credit estimate for the pooled
debt are 75% and B1, respectively.

The largest five remaining loans in the transaction include:

The Manhattan Mall Loan ($232.0 million -- 20%), the largest loan
in the pool, is secured by a 13-story, 1.1 million square foot
mixed-use property consisting of approximately 815,000 square feet
of office space, 244,000 square feet of retail space, and 20,000
square feet of storage. The property is located on Sixth Avenue
between West 32rd and 33rd Streets in New York, NY. The retail
space is anchored by a 154,038 square foot JC Penney store that
opened in July 2009. JC Penney's only Manhattan location is in the
Manhattan Mall. The lease has a 20-year term, expiring in 2029. As
of January 2011 the office component was approximately 95% leased,
the same as at securitization, and the retail component was
slightly less than 100% leased, compared to 94% at securitization.
The largest office tenants include Interpublic Group and Bank of
America N.A. who occupy 37% and 17% of the office space,
respectively. The three largest retail tenants after JC Penney are
Strawberry (5% of total retail space), Charlotte Russe (4%) and
Vertical Club (4%). The interest-only loan has a final maturity
date in February 2012. Moody's current pooled LTV ratio is 70% and
stressed DSCR is 1.44X. Moody's current credit estimate is Baa1,
the same as last review.

The Park Central Hotel Loan ($203.0 million -- 18%), the second
largest loan, is secured by a full-service hotel condominium unit
containing a 934-guestrooms within a larger 33-story condominium
parcel that consists primarily of time share units. The property
is located on Seventh Avenue, between West 55th and 56th Streets
in New York, NY. Revenue per available room ("RevPAR") for
calendar year 2010 was $186, compared to $183 at last full review.
The interest-only loan has a final maturity date in November 2011.
The $407.0 million mortgage loan includes a $204.0 million non-
trust junior component and there is additional mezzanine financing
in the amount of $58.0 million. Moody's current LTV ratio for the
pooled debt is 85% and stressed DSCR is 1.17X. Moody's current
credit estimate is B1, the same as last review.

The JW Marriott Las Vegas Resort & Spa Loan ($150.0 million --
13%), the third largest loan, is secured by a 548-guestroom full-
service hotel that was constructed in 1999 and renovated in 2006.
The hotel is located in Summerlin (Las Vegas), Nevada. Amenities
include a spa, five restaurants and a casino. RevPAR for calendar
year 2010 was $81, slightly lower than in 2009 and 47% less than
at securitization. Casino revenue, which in calendar year 2010
contributed approximately 24% to total revenue, compared to 20% at
securitization, declined approximately 41% since securitization.
The $160.0 mortgage loan includes a $10.0 million non-trust junior
component. The interest-only mortgage loan has a final maturity
date in November 2011. Moody's current LTV ratio for the pooled
debt is 116% and stressed DSCR is 0.83X. Moody's current credit
estimate is Caa3, the same as last review.

The Doubletree Guest Suites Times Square Loan ($140.0 million --
12%), the fourth largest loan, is secured by a 460-guestroom all-
suite full-service hotel located on Broadway at 47th Street, New
York, NY. The property is partially operated subject to air rights
and ground lease encumbrances which expire in 2037. The leases
have three, 30-year extension options and are fully financeable.
RevPAR for calendar year 2010 was $302, compared to $293 at
Moody's last review. The interest-only loan has a final maturity
date in January 2012. There is also $130.0 million in mezzanine
debt. Moody's current LTV ratio for the pooled debt is 93% and
stressed DSCR is 1.22X. Moody's current credit estimate is B2,
compared to B1 at last review.

The Hines Portfolio Loan ($125.0 million -- 11%), the fifth
largest loan, is secured by 44 cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted office/R&D buildings located primarily in San Jose and
vicinity with a total of 1.6 million square feet. As of December
2010, the portfolio was approximately 58% leased, compared to 73%
at Moody's last review and 75% at securitization. The increase in
vacancy is the result of Mentor Graphics vacating its space upon
lease expiration in September 2010. Mentor Graphics had been the
largest tenant in the portfolio occupying 208,433 square feet (13%
of total net rentable area). Asking rent for the space is
significantly lower than what Mentor Graphics had been paying. CB
Richard Ellis indicates 1st Quarter 2011 vacancy rates for both
office and R&D of approximately 20% for the overall San Jose
market. The interest-only loan has a final maturity date in
November 2011. The $270.0 million mortgage loan includes a
$145.0 million non-trust junior component. Moody's current LTV
ratio is over 100% and stressed DSCR is 1.04X. Moody's current
credit estimate is Caa2, compared to Caa1 at last review.


CWMBS INC: Fitch Takes Various Actions on CWMBS 2004-8 RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on CWMBS Inc. 2004-
8.

The transaction was reviewed as a result of a proposed re-
securitization of at least one of the rated classes. The mortgage
pool consists primarily of 15 and 30 year fixed-rate Prime
mortgage loans. The mortgage loans were originated or acquired by
Countrywide Home Loans and are currently serviced by BAC Home
Loans Servicing, rated RPS1- by Fitch.

The negative rating actions reflect an increase in the projected
mortgage losses as a percentage of the remaining pool balance.
While realized mortgage losses to date remain low (15 basis
points), mortgage pool delinquency has increased to over 6% since
the last review reflecting continued negative pressure in the
economy and housing sector. Additionally, historically low
mortgage rates drove relatively high voluntary prepayments over
the past year and have resulted in some adverse selection of the
remaining borrowers in the mortgage pool. Finally, changes to
servicing loss mitigation practices combined with weak demand for
distressed properties continues to extend liquidation timelines
increasing upward pressure on loss severities. In response, Fitch
has increased the loss severity projections in the base-case and
rating-stressed scenarios.

On Feb. 1, Fitch published an exposure draft describing its
proposed new rating model for determining losses on pools of newly
originated U.S. Prime RMBS. Since that date, Fitch has worked to
expand the model's application to seasoned loans. Upon completion
of the model's development period for seasoned loans, Fitch
expects to review all outstanding rated Prime RMBS classes using
the new loss model. The classes placed on Rating Watch Negative
are expected to be resolved at that time.

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- Class 1-A-1 (CUSIP: 12669FZH9) affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1' with
      an Outlook stable;

   -- Class 1-A-2 (CUSIP: 12669FZJ5) affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1' and
      placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-3 (CUSIP: 12669FZK2) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-4 (CUSIP: 12669FZL0) downgraded to 'Asf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-5 (CUSIP: 12669FZM8) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS4' from
      'AAAsf/LS3' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-6 (CUSIP: 12669FZN6) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-7 (CUSIP: 12669FZP1) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-8 (CUSIP: 12669FZQ9) downgraded to 'Asf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-10 (CUSIP: 12669FZS5) affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1' and
      placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-11 (CUSIP: 12669FZT3) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1'
      from 'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-12 (CUSIP: 12669FZU0) affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1' and
      placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 1-A-13 (CUSIP: 12669FZV8) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1'
      from 'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class 2-A-1 (CUSIP: 12669FZW6) downgraded to 'Asf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class PO (CUSIP: 12669FZX4) downgraded to 'BBsf/LS1' from
      'AAAsf/LS1' and placed on Rating Watch Negative;

   -- Class M (CUSIP: 12669FZZ9) downgraded to 'CCsf/RR3' from
      'BBBsf/LS3';

   -- Class B-1 (CUSIP: 12669FA29) downgraded to 'Csf/RR5' from
      'CCsf/RR4';

   -- Class B-2 (CUSIP: 12669FA37) affirmed at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- Class B-3 (CUSIP: 12669FA45) affirmed at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- Class B-4 (CUSIP: 12669FA52) affirmed at 'Dsf/RR6'.


DSLA 2007-AR1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on
classes 1A-1B and 2A-1C from DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
and class M-1 from Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3 by lowering
them to 'D (sf)' from 'B (sf)/Watch Neg', 'B (sf)/Watch Neg',
and 'B- (sf)/Watch Neg'.

"On May 11, 2011, we incorrectly raised our ratings on these
classes and placed them on CreditWatch with negative implications.
Prior to the rating change, these classes were already at 'D
(sf)', having been downgraded on April 22, 2011. We lowered these
classes back to 'D (sf)' and removed them from CreditWatch
Negative," S&P stated.

In addition, the rating actions listed in "U.S. RMBS Classes
Included In May 11, 2011, CreditWatch Placements," published
May 11, 2011, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal, at
www.globalcreditportal.com, incorrectly listed the ratings on
classes 1A-1A and 2A-1A from DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
and classes 1-A-1 and 2-A-4 from Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3 as
being placed on CreditWatch negative. The ratings on these classes
were on CreditWatch negative prior to the publication and
therefore should have been listed as remaining on CreditWatch
negative.

Ratings Corrected

DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
Series 2007-AR1
                             Rating
Class   CUSIP      Current  05/11/11           Pre-05/11/11
1A-1B   23333YAB1  D (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg   D (sf)
2A-1C   23333YAE5  D (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg   D (sf)

Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3
Series 2007-3
                             Rating
Class   CUSIP      Current  05/11/11           Pre-05/11/11
M-1     43710TAF4  D (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg  D (sf)


GALAXY X: S&P Raises Rating on 1 Class on Improved Performance
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A notes from Galaxy X CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction managed by PineBridge Investments LLC. "At the
same time, we affirmed our ratings on the class B, C, and D notes.
Concurrently, we removed our ratings on all four classes from
CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications on
March 1, 2011," S&P stated.

"The upgrade reflects improved performance we have observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our ratings on
the class A notes on Dec. 11, 2009, following the application of
our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria. As of the April 4, 2011 trustee report, the transaction
did not have any defaulted assets and had approximately
$17.93 million in assets from obligors with S&P ratings in the
'CCC' range. These figures are down from $17.62 million in
defaults and approximately $36.59 million in assets from obligors
with ratings in the 'CCC' range noted in the Oct. 1, 2009, trustee
report," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's has also observed an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these ratios in the April 4, 2011, monthly
report:

    * The senior O/C ratio test was 134.65%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 130.67% in October 2009;

    * The class C O/C ratio test was 124.75%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 121.06% in October 2009; and

    * The class D O/C ratio test was 119.69%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 116.15% in October 2009.

"The affirmations of the ratings on the class B, C, and D notes
reflect our opinion of the sufficient credit support available at
the current rating levels," S&P continued.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Galaxy X CLO Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A                  AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  AA (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  A (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos
D                  BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos


GE COMMERCIAL:  Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-C2
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded five, downgraded four and affirmed five
classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation series 2004-C2
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 3.5% and cumulative
transaction losses of 2.6% which includes losses realized to date.
Fitch expects losses on specially serviced loans to affect class
P. As of April 2011, there are cumulative interest shortfalls in
the amount of $64,781 currently affecting class P.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 27.7% to $995 million from
$1.38 billion at issuance.

Fitch has identified 17 loans (15.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced loan (0.53%). There are 12
defeased loans (9.53%) in the pool.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Stonebriar Plaza
loan (2.79%) which is collateralized by a shopping center in
Collin, TX totaling 182,147 sf. Property occupancy is 79% as of
September 2010 which is in line with performance at YE 2009 (77%).
The September 2010 DSCR is 0.49x which is in line with DSCR at YE
2009 (0.54x). Property vacancy is primarily due to small shop
vacancy but also includes a larger 13,965 sf vacancy that was
temporarily leased to a seasonal tenant that has now vacated.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the Knox Park
Village loan (1.64%) which is collateralized by a mixed-use
property in Dallas, TX. Property occupancy was 65% as of September
2010 with a DSCR of 0.66x which is in line with performance at YE
2009 when occupancy was 63% and DSCR was 0.79x.

The Tanglewood Plaza loan (0.56%), which is a retail center in
Naples, FL, is the only loan in special servicing. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in December 2010 due to
monetary default. The loan matured in April 2011 and the servicer
is negotiating a short-term forbearance with the borrower.

Fitch upgrades, assigns Loss Severity ratings and Outlooks to
these classes:

   -- $41.3 million class B to 'AAAsf/LS4' from 'AA+sf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.2 million class C to 'AAAsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $25.8 million class D to 'AAsf/LS4' from 'A+sf/LS3'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $15.5 million class E to 'AAsf/LS5' from 'A-sf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $18.9 million class F to 'Asf/LS5' from 'BBB+sf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades, assigns Loss Severity ratings, Outlooks and
Recovery Ratings to these classes:

   -- $10.3 million class J to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BB+sf/LS4';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $8.6 million class K to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- $6.9 million class L at to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BB-sf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $5.2 million class M to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B+sf/LS5'.

Fitch affirms, assigns Loss Severity ratings and Outlooks to these
classes:

   -- $56.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $574.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $151.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17.2 million class G at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.9 million class H at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3 million class PPL-1 at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.3 million class PPL-2 at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.6 million class PPL-3 at 'BB+sf; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.9 million class PPL-4 at 'BB-sf; Outlook Stable;

   -- $3.7 million class PPL-5 at 'B+sf; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4.5 million class PPL-6 at 'Bsf; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest only class X-1.

The underlying collateral for the PPL rake classes is the Pacific
Place loan which is a mixed-use property located in the Union
Square area of San Francisco, CA. Fitch affirms these classes as
the performance of the loan has remained stable since issuance
while the loan has concurrently paid down 7.7% due to
amortization.

Fitch does not rate classes N, O and P. Classes A-1, A-2 and
interest only class X-2 have paid in full.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Two & Affirms 22 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed 22 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2:

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-A, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-B, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Assigned Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-C, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-D, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-E, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. PPL-F, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased subordination due to loan
payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool performance. The
pool has paid down by 8% since Moody's last review

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.3% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.4%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.8% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the credit estimate level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated August 13, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $1 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 97 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 42% of
the pool. The pool contains three loans with investment grade
credit estimates that represent 18% of the pool. Thirteen loans,
representing 8.5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.3 million (12% loss severity
overall). One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$36.3 million loss (57% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.6 million aggregate loss (30% expected loss based on a 100%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 91%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 86% compared to 87% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
1.41X and 1.18X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30 compared to 31 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($87 million -- 8.5%), which represents a 28% pari-
passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 2.0 million square foot regional mall
located in McLean, Virginia. The mall is anchored by
Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Nordstrom, and Lord & Taylor. The
property's financial performance has improved since securitization
due to additional rental income from a 265,000 square foot
renovation/expansion that was completely in 2007. The property is
currently 97% leased. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Aaa and 2.28X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.27X at
last review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is the Pacific
Place Loan ($79 million -- 7.7%), which is secured by a two-
building mixed use property including retail, office and leased
hotel components. The property is located in the Union Square
submarket of San Francisco, California. The two buildings are
referred to as Pac One and Pac Two. Pac One is an eight-story
property built in 1907 and renovated in 1981 and 1999. Old Navy
occupies a portion of the ground floor and all of the basement,
second and third floors. Part of the ground floor as well as
floors five through nine are leased to the 200-room Palomor Hotel
through June 2097. Pac Two is a 16-story building housing the
subject's office component as well as the Container Store on the
two lower levels. Pac Two was built in 1907 and renovated in 1999.
As of December 2010, the complex was 98% leased, compared to 100%
at last review. The loan was interest only for the first two years
and now amortizes on a 360-month schedule. The loan is divided
into a senior component which is security for the pooled classes
and six subordinate components which are security for non-pooled
Classes PPL-A, PPL-B, PPL-C, PPL-D, PPL-E and PPL-F. Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR for the pooled portion
of the loan are Baa2 and 1.51X, essentially the same at last
review.

The third largest loan with a credit estimate is the AFR Portfolio
Loan ($15 million -- 1.5%), which represents a 5.9% pari-passu
interest in a first mortgage loan secured by 115 properties
located in various states. The properties consist of office,
operation centers and retail bank branches. As of December 2010,
the portfolio was 88% leased compared to 86% at last review. Six
properties have been released from the pool and 31 properties,
representing 24% of the loan balance, have defeased since
securitization. Due to property releases, defeasance and loan
amortization, the loan balance has decreased by approximately 24%
since securitization. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are A1 and 1.54X, respectively, compared to A1 and 1.25X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Prince Building Loan ($65 million --
6.3%), which is secured by a 312,570 square foot office and retail
building located in the SoHo submarket of New York City. The
building was built in 1897 and renovated in 1991. The 12-story,
Class B office building includes 22,335 square feet of street
level retail space and 312,570 square feet of office space. The
largest tenant is Scholastic, which occupies 43% of the property's
net rentable area (NRA) through 2013 and 2018. The three retail
tenants are Equinox, Forever 21, and Armani. Although Armani only
represents 4% of the NRA (lease expiration January 2012), it
generates approximately 16% of the property's revenue. As of
December 2010, the property was 99% leased, the same as at last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 1.92X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.35X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Princeton Office Loan
($51.4 million -- 5%), which is secured by a six Class A office
buildings located in the 10-building College Park Research Center
in Plainsboro Township, New Jersey. The complex was built in
phases between 1976 and 1981 and is encumbered by a ground lease
through 2037. As of December 2010, the property was 93% leased
compared to 92% at last review and 85% at securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to
84% and 1.18X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Stonebriar Plaza Loan ($28.8 million
-- 2.6%), which is secured by a 182,147 square foot retail
property located in Frisco, Texas. As of July 2010, the property
was 67% leased compared to 97% at securitization. The property's
performance is in line with last review, however significantly
declined since securitization due to the occupancy declining.
Moody's believes that due to poor performance there is a high
probability that this loan may default and has identified this as
a troubled loan. The loan matures in 2014. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 156% and 0.62X, respectively, compared to 159%
and 0.61X at last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades GMACC 2005-C1 Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., series 2005-C1 (GMACC 2005-C1)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, due to further
deterioration of loan performance.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 11.8% of the remaining pool;
modeled losses of the original pool are at 9.2%, including losses
already incurred to date. Fitch expects the modeled losses
associated with the specially-serviced loans to impact classes G
through P and a portion of class F.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 39.6% to $0.964 billion from
$1.598 billion at issuance, due to a combination of paydown
(37.6%) and realized losses (2.0%). Interest shortfalls totaling
$4.6 million are currently affecting classes C through P.
Fitch has identified 22 loans (42.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 13 specially-serviced loans (31%). Of the 13 loans
in special servicing, one loan (0.8%) is real estate-owned, one
loan (1.3%) is in foreclosure, eight loans (13.8%) are 90 days or
more delinquent, and three loans (15.1%) are current. The current
percentage of specially-serviced loans has increased from 19.8% at
Fitch's last review.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-serviced
loan (6%) secured by a 321,041 square foot (sf) office property
located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2009 due to imminent default. The loan was
restructured in December 2010 and was bifurcated into an A-note
and a B-note. The maturity date was amended to May 2020 from an
original anticipated repayment date of May 2010. Occupancy at the
property was 48% as of December 2010.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (2.3%) secured by a 460-unit multifamily property
located in Winter Haven, Florida. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in September 2009 due to imminent default.
According to the special servicer, a final offer on the property
has been approved with an assumption of the existing debt.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (2.1%) secured by a 5,300-stall parking facility
located in Windsor Lock, Connecticut. In January 2010, the
property's sole tenant filed for bankruptcy and rejected its
lease. Since then, the borrower has entered into a new management
agreement with another third party. According to the special
servicer, a modification of the loan was recently approved and is
in the process of documentation with the borrower.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned or revised Loss Severity (LS)
ratings and Recovery Ratings (RRs) to these classes:

   -- $127.8 million class A-J to 'Asf/LS4' from 'AAsf/LS3';
      Outlook to Negative from Stable;

   -- $34 million class B to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $12 million class C to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $24 million class D to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $16 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $16 million class F to 'CCsf/RR5' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $16 million class G to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $20 million class H to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

   -- $6 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

   -- $6 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

   -- $8 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $138 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $153.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $68.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $157.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $159.8 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

The $1.6 million class M remains at 'Dsf/RR6'. Class N has been
reduced to zero due to realized losses and remains at 'Dsf/RR6'.
The rating on class O was previously withdrawn. Class P has been
reduced to zero due to realized losses and is not rated by Fitch.
Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes X-1
and X-2.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Four CMBS Classes of GMAC 2000-C1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Series 2000-C1 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2000
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2004
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2006
      Downgraded to C (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio (LTV), Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
39.3% of the current balance compared to 42.6% at last review.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of performance over the medium term. From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations. Performance
that falls outside the given range may indicate that the
collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had
anticipated when the related securities ratings were issued. Even
so, a deviation from the expected range will not necessarily
result in a rating action nor does performance within expectations
preclude such actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating
action is dependent on an assessment of a range of factors
including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. Due to the high percentage of loans in special
servicing, Moody's analysis also considered a loss and recovery
analysis for specially serviced loans. Under this approach,
Moody's assumes an expected loss for each loan and determines the
impact of losses and recoveries on the certificates.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 28, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to
$21.4 million from $879.9 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging
in size from 4% to 23% of the pool. One loan, representing 4% of
the pool, has defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $22.9 million (16% loss severity on
average). Due to realized losses, classes O through M have been
eliminated entirely and Class L has experienced a 31% principal
loss. Currently there are six loans, representing 96% of the pool,
in special servicing. All of the loans in special servicing are
due to imminent maturity default. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Brookscrossing Apartments Loan ($5.0 million -- 23% of
the pool), which is secured by a 224 unit multifamily property
located in Riverdale, Georgia. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in July 2009 and became real estate owned (REO) on
July 6, 2010. The servicer has recognized a $753,294 appraisal
reduction on the loan. The remaining five specially serviced loans
are secured by a mix of property types. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $10.9 million loss (51% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K and L
have cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $643,182. Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially serviced
loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.


GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: Fitch Affirms 9 Classes of CDO 2007-1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes and affirmed nine
classes of Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd./LLC (Gramercy
2007-1) reflecting an increase in Fitch's base case loss
expectation to 29.8% from 18.3% at last review primarily due
to the negative credit migration of the underlying CMBS bonds
that serve as collateral.

Since last review, the average Fitch derived rating for the
underlying CMBS collateral declined to 'B+/B' from 'BB+/BB'.
The CMBS collateral represents 78.6% of the total collateral,
which is a higher percentage than at last review (74.5%).
Commercial real estate loans (CREL) comprise approximately
21.4% of the collateral. Approximately 40% of the CREL are
whole loans or A-notes with the remainder B-notes or mezzanine
loans.

Since last review, the senior class A-1 has received paydown of
$14.9 million primarily from recoveries on distressed assets.
Additionally, the transaction continues to fail all three of its
principal coverage tests resulting in the diversion of principal
proceeds and interest (after class B) to pay principal to class A-
1; and the capitalization of interest to classes C through K.
Since last review, the disposal of two assets resulted in realized
losses of approximately $24.7 million to the CDO. Defaulted loans
currently comprise 4.6% of the collateral while loans of concern
comprise an additional 5.6%. Further, approximately 17.5% of total
collateral are CMBS bonds that have a Fitch derived rating in the
'CCC' category.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 42% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
29.1% reflecting low recovery expectations upon default of the
CMBS tranches and non-senior real estate loans.

While the largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is the modeled losses on the CMBS bond collateral, the second
largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
defaulted mezzanine loan (4.6%) secured by ownership interests in
a multifamily property located in New York, NY. The property
contains over 11,000 residential units and approximately 120,000
square feet of office and retail space. The sponsors' plan was to
convert the majority of rent controlled units to market rates;
however, the plan has faced significant economic and legal
hurdles. The loan was transferred to special servicing on Nov. 6,
2009, at the borrower's request, to facilitate negotiations on
restructuring the debt. The special servicer gained control of the
property by acquiring some of the mezzanine debt of the borrower.
The special servicer is working to stabilize the asset and intends
to renovate 570 vacant units in 2011. Fitch modeled no recovery on
this highly leveraged mezzanine position.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is the combined modeled loss on the C-note and mezzanine loan
secured by interests in a downtown New York City office building.
While the property is currently 97% leased, there is major lease
roll scheduled in 2014. Fitch modeled the loans as maturity
defaults with significant losses.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on
stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The credit enhancement to class A-1 was then compared to the
modeled expected losses, and determined to be consistent with the
rating assigned below. Based on prior modeling results, no
material impact was anticipated from cash flow modeling the
transaction. Class A-1's Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from
Negative reflecting the class's senior position in the capital
stack.

The 'CCC' and below ratings for classes A-2 through J are based on
a deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement. These
classes were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in order to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.

Gramercy 2007-1 is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO managed by
GKK Manager LLC (GKKM), an affiliate of Gramercy Capital Corp. The
transaction has a five-year reinvestment period which ends in
August 2012.

Fitch has downgraded, revised Outlooks, and assigned Recovery
Ratings for these classes:

   -- $687 million class A-1 Notes to 'Bsf/LS3' from 'BBsf/LS3';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $121 million class A-2 Notes to 'CCCsf/RR2' from 'Bsf/LS4';

   -- $29.5 million class B-FL Notes to 'CCsf/RR4' from
      'CCCsf/RR4';

   -- $20 million class B-FX Notes to 'CCsf/RR4' from 'CCCsf/RR4';

   -- $20.7 million class C-FL Notes to 'CCsf/RR6' from
      'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $3.8 million class C-FX Notes to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $116.6 million class A-3 Notes at 'CCCsf/RR3';

   -- $4.6 million class D Notes at 'CCsf/RR6';

   -- $5.2 million class E Notes at 'CCsf/RR6';

   -- $9.9 million class F Notes at 'CCsf/RR6';

   -- $3.2 million class G-FL Notes at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $2.3 million class G-FX Notes at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $2.2 million class H-FL Notes at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $5.8 million class H-FX Notes at 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $15.5 million class J Notes at 'Csf/RR6'.

Class K is not rated by Fitch.


GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Raises Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by GSC Partners CDO Fund II, Limited:

   -- US$600,500,000 Class A Guaranteed Floating Rate Senior Notes
      Due 2013 (current outstanding balance of $61,680,498),
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 12, 2009
      Confirmed at Aa3 (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Subordinated Notes Due
      2013 (current outstanding balance of $5,254,681), Upgraded
      to Aaa (sf); previously on November 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3
      (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 52% or $67 million since the last
rating action in November 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased. As of the latest
trustee report dated May 2, 2011, the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 163.45% and 150.62%,
respectively, versus September 2009 levels of 124.69% and 119.79%,
respectively. In addition, Moody's notes that the latest trustee
report reflects $56.7 million of proceeds in the principal
account, which will likely be used to pay down the Class A-1A
Notes on the May 22, 2011 payment date.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the actual underlying
rating of the Class A Notes. This underlying rating is based
solely on the intrinsic credit quality of the Class A Notes in the
absence of the guarantee from Financial Security Assurance Intl
Ltd., whose insurance financial strength rating is currently Aa3.
The action on the Class A Notes is a result of, and is consistent
with, Moody's modified approach to rating structured finance
securities wrapped by financial guarantors as described
in the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's
modifies approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped
by financial guarantors."

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance of $43
million, defaulted par of $18 million, a weighted average default
probability of 31.60% (implying a WARF of 6805), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 31.22%, and a diversity
score of 9. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

GSC Partners CDO Fund II, Limited, issued in March 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, non-senior secured loans, and senior
unsecured bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009. This publication incorporates rating criteria that
apply to both collateralized loan obligations and collateralized
bond obligations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009. In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.8 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model. Moody's also supplemented its modeling with
individual scenario analysis to assess the ratings impact of jump-
to-default by certain large obligors.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months. For each CE where the related
exposure constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's
applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the
CEs representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) in lieu
of the aforementioned stresses, as described in "Updated Approach
to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published
in October 2009. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in all cases the
lowest assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. A summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (5444)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (8166)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the credit market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.

3. Management continuity: GSC Group, Inc. has filed a motion with
   the bankruptcy court to sell its investment management
   contracts. Until a new manager is appointed GSC will continue
   to manage the transaction under Chapter 11 protection. There is
   some uncertainty as to whether a new manager will be found to
   take over this transaction and how well a transition to a new
   manager is going to be handled.

4. Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors that are rated Caa1 or lower, especially when
   they experience jump to default. Due to the deal's low
   diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented
   its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a
   simulated default distribution using Moody's CDOROM software
   and/or individual scenario analysis.


JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Rating on Class 2-A1 to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class 2-
A1 from Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6, a residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction issued in 2010,
and removed it from CreditWatch negative.  "In addition, we
affirmed our ratings on 64 classes from five RMBS re-REMIC
transactions, including Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6.
At the same time, we removed 44 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative," S&P stated.

"Four of the transactions we reviewed pay interest on a pro rata
basis, and RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2010-2 has a sequential
payment structure for all of its loan groups," S&P continued.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on 45 classes from the
five transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative,
along with ratings from a group of other RMBS re-REMIC securities.
On April 1, 2011, we provided an update on the CreditWatch
placements and provided clarification regarding our analysis of
interest payment amounts within RMBS re-REMIC transactions," S&P
added.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address
the timely payment of interest and principal. We reviewed
the interest and principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed through to the applicable
re-REMIC classes. When performing this analysis, we applied
our loss projections, incorporating, where applicable, our
recently revised loss assumptions for the underlying collateral
to identify the principal and interest amounts that could be
passed through from the underlying securities under our rating
scenario stresses. We stressed our loss projections at various
rating categories to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could
withstand the stressed losses associated with their ratings
while receiving timely payment of interest and principal
consistent with our criteria," S&P explained.

"As noted, in applying our loss projections, we incorporated,
where applicable, our recently revised loss assumptions as
outlined in 'Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime,
Subprime, And Alt-A U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,' published
on March 25, 2011, into our review. Such updates pertain to the
2005-2007 vintage prime, subprime, and Alternative-A (Alt-A) RMBS
transactions; some of which are associated with the re-REMICs we
reviewed," S&P related.

Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Lifetime Loss Projections For Alt-A RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
                            Fixed/
          Aggregate       long-reset
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.75  11.25    12.75   9.60
2006      29.50  26.25    25.25  25.00
2007      36.00  31.25    31.75  26.25
          Short-reset
            hybrid        Option ARM
Vintage Updated  Prior  Updated  Prior
2005      13.25  14.75    15.50  13.25
2006      30.00  30.50    34.75  26.75
2007      41.00  40.75    43.50  37.50

"As a result of this review, we lowered our rating on one class
based on our assessment as to whether there were principal and/or
interest shortfalls from the underlying securities that would
impair the re-REMIC class at the applicable rating stresses. The
affirmations reflect our assessment of the likelihood that the re-
REMIC classes will receive timely interest and principal under the
applicable stressed assumptions," stated S&P.

"As noted, RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2010-2 contains a
sequential interest payment structure for all of its loan groups.
We based our downgrade of class 2-A1 from Jefferies
Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6 on our projections of interest
shortfalls, allocated to the relevant re-REMIC classes under the
applicable rating stress scenarios," S&P added.

Rating Actions

Banc of America Funding 2010-R3 Trust
Series      2010-R3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
4-A-1      05955YAN9     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-IO     05955YAQ2     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-4      05955YAF6     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-2      05955YAP4     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
7-A-1      05955YAZ2     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-1      05955YAC3     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      05955YAD1     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-1      05955YAA7     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-4      05955YAS8     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
6-A-1      05955YAW9     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

BCAP LLC 2009-RR14 Trust
Series      2009-RR14
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
XII-A7     05532LCP2     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2010-R6
Series      2010-R6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
2-A1       47233TAH9     CCC (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A6       47233TAF3     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A1       47233TAA4     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A4       47233TAD8     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A2       47233TAB2     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A5       47233TAE6     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A7       47233TAG1     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-1
Series      2005-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
II-A-1     74160MHA3     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-2     74160MHB1     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-3     74160MHC9     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-4     74160MHD7     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A-5     74160MHE5     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2010-2
Series      2010-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
14-A1      74929CDA1     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A2      74929CDB9     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A3       74929CBF2     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A1       74929CAA4     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A3      74929CDD5     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
11-A2      74929CBY1     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A6      74929CDG8     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
13-A3      74929CCH7     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A1       74929CAF3     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A1       74929CBD7     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
13-A5      74929CCK0     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A4      74929CDE3     BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A1       74929CAC0     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
13-A1      74929CCF1     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A1       74929CAM8     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A5       74929CAR7     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A3       74929CAP1     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A5       74929CAK2     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
14-A5      74929CDF0     A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
11-A1      74929CBX3     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A3       74929CAH9     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
8-A5       74929CBH8     AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

BCAP LLC 2009-RR14 Trust
Series      2009-RR14
Class      CUSIP         Rating
X-A11      05532LBU2     BBB (sf)
XII-A3     05532LCK3     AA (sf)
X-A9       05532LBS7     AA (sf)
XII-A1     05532LCH0     AAA (sf)
IV-A1      05532LAJ8     AAA (sf)
XII-A5     05532LCM9     A (sf)
IX-A1      05532LBD0     AAA (sf)
XIII-A1    05532LCU1     AAA (sf)
VI-A1      05532LAN9     AAA (sf)
XIII-A5    05532LCY3     A (sf)
XIII-A3    05532LCW7     AA (sf)
X-A12      05532LBV0     BBB (sf)
X-A10      05532LBT5     A (sf)
XIII-A8    05532LDB2     A (sf)
XII-A8     05532LCQ0     A (sf)
X-A3       05532LBL2     AA (sf)
X-A5       05532LBN8     A (sf)
X-A1       05532LBJ7     AAA (sf)
XIII-A7    05532LDA4     AA (sf)
X-A7       05532LBQ1     BBB (sf)


JOHNSTON RE: S&P Rates Two Classes of Notes at 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB- (sf)' ratings
on the Series 2011-1 Class A and B notes issued by Johnston Re
Ltd.

Johnston Re is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted company
licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands. HSBC Bank
(Cayman) Ltd., as share trustee, holds all of Johnston Re's issued
and outstanding shares in trust for charitable or similar
purposes.

The ceding reinsurer is Munich Reinsurance America Inc. (Munich Re
America; AA-/Stable/--). Munich Re America will be responsible for
the premium payments due under the retrocession agreement in place
between Munich Re America and Johnston Re. Johnston Re will cover
losses on a per-occurrence basis due to hurricanes.

Covered losses will not be directly linked to Munich Re America's
exposure in the covered area (North Carolina), rather they will be
based on the losses of the North Carolina Joint Underwriters Assn.
(NCJUA) and the North Carolina Insurance Underwriters Assn.
(NCIUA).

Ratings List

Ratings Assigned

Johnston Re Ltd.
Series 2011-1 Class A Notes       BB- (sf)
Series 2011-1 Class B Notes       BB- (sf)


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades 12 Classes of JPMCC 2005-CIBC13
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 12 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2005-CIBC13 (JPMCC
2005-CIBC13) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, due to
further performance deterioration, which includes an increase in
expected losses on the specially serviced loans as well as other
loans in the pool.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 12.4% for the remaining pool
(expected losses of the original pool are at 13.2% and includes
losses realized to date). Fitch has designated 54 loans (39.7%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 24 specially serviced loans
(23.6%).

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased by 8.1% to $2.5 billion from
$2.7 billion at issuance. Realized losses incurred to date total
$48.4 million. No loans are currently defeased. Cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $18.4 million are currently
affecting classes C and below.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a portfolio of
16 office properties located in various markets. Eleven of the
properties are Real Estate Owned (REO) and the remaining five
properties are in foreclosure. Fitch expects a significant loss
upon liquidation based on a December 2010 appraised value well
below the outstanding loan balance.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
defaulted loan secured by a 322-room luxury hotel property located
in the South Beach area of Miami, FL. The special servicer is
currently pursuing foreclosure. Fitch expects a significant loss
upon liquidation based on a December 2010 appraised value well
below the outstanding loan balance.

The third largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is secured
by a 700,000 square foot (sf) office property located in downtown
Los Angeles. Between year end (YE) 2009 and YE 2010, occupancy
dropped 16% resulting in a YE 2010 Servicer reported DSCR of
0.98x. Further, the third largest tenant (15% of NRA) expires in
December 2011 and it is unknown if they will renew or vacate.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these classes:

   -- $187 million class A-J to 'Bsf/LS4' from 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $54.4 million class B to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $23.8 million class C to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $44.2 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR5' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $34 million class E to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $37.4 million class F to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $30.6 million class G to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $34 million class H to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $10.2 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $17 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $10.2 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $6.8 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms these classes:

   -- $274.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $124.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $181.6 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $57.3 million class A-2FX at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $206.4 million class A-3A1 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $25 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $751.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $112.4 million class A-SB at ''AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $272.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $6 million class N remains at 'Dsf/RR6';

   -- $0 class P remains at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-1 and X-
2.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms 33 CMBS Classes of JPMCC 2006-LDP9
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 33 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-LDP9:

   -- Cl. A-1S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2SFL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2007
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2SFX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3SFL, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-MS, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-JS, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-S, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-S, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-S, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-S, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. F-S, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. G-S, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H-S, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 10.9%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
20.7% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 2, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $4.7 billion
from $4.9 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 241 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 42%
of the pool. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit estimates that represent 5% of the pool. One loan,
representing less than 1% of the pool, has defeased and is
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Seventy-two loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $40.6 million (84% loss severity
overall). Thirty-one loans, representing 12% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $91.9 million appraisal reduction for 20 of the
specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$130 million loss (40% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 29 poorly
performing loans representing 21% of the pool and has estimated a
$167 million aggregate loss (17% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial/full year
2010 operating results for 100% and 68% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 111% compared to 117% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 0.88X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 0.91X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 40 compared to 45 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Merchandise Mart
Loan ($175.0 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which represents a 50%
pari passu interest in a $350 million first mortgage loan. The
property is also encumbered by a $300 million mezzanine loan. The
loan is secured by a 3,448,680 square foot (SF) office and design
showroom building located in downtown Chicago, Illinois. The
sponsor is Vornado Realty, L.P. The property was 93% leased as of
November 2010 compared to 87% as of December 2009. Property
performance has declined due to lower revenues and expense
reimbursements. Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are A3 and 1.54X, respectively.

The other loan with a credit estimate is the Raytheon LAX Loan
($51.8 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
B office buildings, totaling 565,264 SF, located in Los Angeles,
California. The tenants are Raytheon Company (63% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration December 2018) and DIRECTV
(37% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2013). As of December
2010 the property was 100% leased, the same at last review.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and
1.45X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.47X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the 131 South Dearborn Loan
($236.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which represents a 50% pari
passu interest in a $472 million first mortgage loan. The property
is also encumbered by a $50 million mezzanine loan. The loan is
secured by 1.5 million SF office building located in downtown
Chicago, Illinois. The three largest tenants are JP Morgan Chase &
Co. (36% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2017), Citadel
Investment Group (22% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2013)
and Seyfarth Shaw LLP (21% of the NRA; lease expiration June
2022). The property was 95% leased as of December 2010, the same
as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and
0.76X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.78X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Galleria Towers Loan
($232.0 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by three
Class A office buildings, totaling 1.4 million SF, located in
Dallas, Texas. The property is also encumbered by a $29 million
mezzanine loan. The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist for having a low DSCR. Tenants include FedEx Kinko's,
Inc. (14% of the NRA; lease expiration August 2013) and Ryan &
Company, Inc. (7% of the NRA; lease expiration January 2020).
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.71X, respectively,
compared to 131% and 0.72X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Corporate Woods Portfolio Loan
($219.9 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by 20
office buildings and one retail center located in an office park
in Overland Park, Kansas. The loan has performed in line with
expectations since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 117% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.84X at
last review.


JP MORGAN: S&P Gives 'B' Rating on Class H Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2011-C4's $1.45 billion commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 17,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the credit support provided by
the subordinate classes of certificates; the liquidity provided
by the trustee; and the underlying loans' economics, geographic
diversity, and property type diversity. "In our analysis, we
determined that, on a weighted average basis, the pool has a
debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.26x based on a weighted average
Standard & Poor's loan constant of 8.22%, a beginning loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of 86.6%, and an ending LTV ratio of 77.6%," S&P
added. (Note: Standard & Poor's excluded the Sheraton Chicago
Hotel and Towers loan {$68.0 million, 4.7% of the pool balance},
which is secured by the fee interest on the land beneath the
hotel, from all of our calculated DSC and LTV ratios. We analyzed
this loan separately from the general pool.)

To calculate the number of loans, S&P considered each group of
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans as one loan.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C4

Class      Rating             Amount ($)
A-1        AAA (sf)           77,861,000
A-2        AAA (sf)          336,403,000
A-3        AAA (sf)          353,150,000
A-3FL(i)   AAA (sf)          125,000,000
A-4        AAA (sf)          226,811,000
A-SB       AAA (sf)           61,976,000
X-A(i)     AAA (sf)    1,181,201,000(ii)
X-B(i)     NR            265,906,233(ii)
B          AA (sf)            48,840,000
C          A (sf)             72,356,000
D          A- (sf)            23,515,000
E          BBB (sf)           48,840,000
F          BB+ (sf)           14,471,000
G          BB- (sf)           19,898,000
H          B (sf)             18,089,000
NR         NR                 19,897,233

(i)Interest-only class. (ii)Notional amount. NR--Not rated.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Fitch Takes Various Actions on JPMCC 2004-C1
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six and upgraded three classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series
2004-C1 (JPMCC 2004-C1) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 4.3% of the
remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at 3.14%,
including losses already incurred to date. Fitch has identified 29
loans (21.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes four
specially-serviced loans (3.7%). Of the four loans in special
servicing, one loan (.23%) is real-estate owned, two loans (1.8%)
are 90 days or more delinquent, and one loan (1.73%) is current.

The upgrades are due to defeasance and 20.2% paydown since
Fitch's last rating action resulting in increased credit
enhancement to the senior classes. As of the April 2011
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance
has reduced by 36.9% to $657.4 million from $1.04 billion
at issuance. In addition 15 loans (15.9%) have been fully
defeased. Interest shortfalls totaling $486,187 are currently
affecting class NR.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.5%) secured
by a 157,711 square foot (sf) industrial complex located in
Ontario, California. Servicer reported occupancy has declined to
77% due to vacancy and has resulted in a debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 0.69 times (x) as of year-end (YE) 2010.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (1%) secured by a 303 pad mobile home park located
in Elyria, Ohio. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
April 2010 due to monetary default and is now more than 90 days
delinquent. The special servicer continues to work with the
borrower to cure the default and is evaluating the borrower's
proposal to return the property via a deed-in-lieu.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.69%)
secured by a 170,791 sf retail center in Boise, Idaho. The largest
tenant is Edward's Cinema Boise owned by the Regal Entertainment
Group and occupies 62% of the space. Servicer reported DSCR has
declined to .93x as of June 2010. Performance of the property has
declined due to temporary rent reductions which have reduced
rental income but helped maintain occupancy.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings (RRs) to these
classes:

   -- $6.5 million class J to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $5.2 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'BB/LS5; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $3.9 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $5.2 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $2.6 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $2.6 million class P to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5'.

Fitch has upgraded these classes:

   -- $22.1 million class D to 'AAA/LS5' from 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $13 million class E to 'AA/LS5' from 'A/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $11.7 million class F to 'A/LS5' from 'A-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable.

Also, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $46.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $303.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $165.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $27.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.1 million class G at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.4 million class H at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

The $10.95 million class NR is not rated by Fitch. Class A-1 has
paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from the
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
transaction, one of which S&P lowered to 'D (sf)'. "In addition,
we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on five classes from the same
transaction," S&P stated.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit and fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades of several
certificates reflect credit support erosion we anticipate will
occur upon the resolution of 29 ($634.2 million, 11.9%) of 31
assets ($744.7 million, 13.9%) that are with the special servicer.
In addition, current and potential interest shortfalls, primarily
due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts,
and special servicing fees, prompted us to lower our ratings on
classes G, H, and J," S&P related.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.20x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 133.8%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.70x
and an LTV ratio of 189.6%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 97.0% and 49.4%. All of the DSC and
LTV calculations we noted above exclude 29 ($634.2 million,
11.9%) of the transaction's 31 ($744.7 million, 13.9%) specially
serviced assets. We separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures," continued S&P.

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $400,445. The shortfalls were
primarily related to ASER amounts totaling $1.6 million associated
with 25 of the specially serviced assets, as well as special
servicing fees of $159,490, workout fees of $7,074, legal fees of
$2,500 and interest shortfalls due to rate modifications of
$222,735. These amounts were reduced during this period by
ASER recoveries from loan liquidations of $1.4 million and
$146,271 in other interest proceeds due to the bonds. "These cash
flows that mitigated the overall interest shortfalls were
nonrecurring events, and we do not anticipate they will have an
effect on future interest shortfalls. Class J has experienced
shortfalls for 10 months, and we anticipate that these shortfalls
will continue for the foreseeable future. Consequently, we lowered
the rating on this class to 'D (sf)'. Based on current ASER
amounts affecting the transaction, the downgrades of the class G
and H certificates to 'CCC- (sf)' reflect their susceptibility to
future interest shortfalls. If these shortfalls occur and remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time, we may lower the
ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P related.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our rating
on the class X interest-only (IO) certificate based on our current
criteria," S&P noted.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, 31 ($744.7 million,
13.9%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). The payment status
of the specially serviced assets is: 13 ($259.3 million, 4.9%)
are real estate owned (REO), eight ($236.2 million, 4.4%) are
in foreclosure, two ($88.4 million, 1.6%) are more than 90
days delinquent, two ($24.6 million, 0.5%) are 60 days delinquent,
three ($102.8 million, 1.9%) are less than 30 days delinquent,
and three ($33.4 million, 0.6%) are the subject of borrower
bankruptcies. Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling
$377.2 million were in effect for 28 specially serviced assets.
The four largest specially serviced assets are:

    * The Hyatt Regency-Jacksonville loan, the seventh-largest
      asset in the pool, is the largest asset with the special
      servicer and has a total exposure of $154.7 million, which
      consists of an outstanding principal balance of $150.0
      million (2.8%) and $4.7 million of advancing and interest
      thereon. The loan is secured by a mortgage on a 963-room
      full-service hotel in Jacksonville, Fla. The loan was
      transferred to CWCapital on Aug. 17, 2010, due to imminent
      monetary default and is currently in foreclosure.

      Modification discussions between the special servicer and
      the borrower are ongoing; however, CWCapital indicated that
      the discussions have proven unsuccessful to this point. An
      ARA of $85.2 million is in effect against this loan.
      Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the
      eventual resolution of this loan.

    * The Lembi Portfolio asset is the second-largest asset with
      the special servicer and has a total exposure of
      $98.7 million, which consists of an outstanding principal
      balance of $90.0 million (1.7%) and $7.2 million of
      advancing and interest thereon. The asset is a 16-property,
      662-unit portfolio of multifamily buildings in San
      Francisco, Calif. The underlying mortgage loan transferred
      to the special servicer on Feb. 25, 2009, due to monetary
      default and was foreclosed on Oct. 26, 2010. The property is
      currently REO. As of April 1, 2011, the property was
      reported to be 98.0% occupied. An ARA of $8.2 million is in
      effect against this asset. "We expect a minimum loss upon
      the eventual resolution of this asset," S&P stated.

    * The Denmark MHC Portfolio loan is the third-largest asset
      with the special servicer and has a total exposure of
      $95.1 million, which consists of an outstanding principal
      balance of $89.3 million (1.7%) and $5.8 million of
      advancing and interest thereon. The loan is secured by a
      mortgage on a 10-property, 3,489-unit manufactured housing
      portfolio, with eight properties in Michigan and two
      properties in Indiana. The loan transferred to the special
      servicer on Sept. 3, 2009, due to payment default. The loan
      was modified in August 2010 and, according to the special
      servicer, will be returned to the master servicer. An ARA of
      $54.4 million is in effect against this loan.

    * The Stadium Towers loan is the fourth-largest asset with the
      special servicer and has a total exposure of $84.9 million,
      which consists of an outstanding principal balance of
      $83.2 million (1.6%) and $1.7 million of advancing and
      interest thereon. The loan is secured by a mortgage on a
      257,248-sq.-ft. office building in Anaheim, Calif. The loan
      transferred to the special servicer on August 10, 2009 due
      to imminent monetary default (categorized as 90-plus days
      delinquent in the April 2011 trustee remittance report) and
      is currently in receivership. CWCapital reported that the
      property was 43.0% occupied as of February 2011. An ARA of
      $54.4 million is in effect against the loan. Standard &
      Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual
      resolution of this loan.

The 27 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.0% of the total pool balance.
"Our expected losses from 25 of these specially serviced assets
ranged from 16.1% to 90.1%. Weighted by loan balance, the average
loss severity was 60.0%. We did not estimate losses for the
Denmark MHC Portfolio loan and the Washington Commons loan. The
Denmark MHC Portfolio loan has been modified and will be returned
to the master servicer. The Washington Commons loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 22, 2011, and a
workout strategy is still being developed," S&P related.

Three loans totaling $135.7 million (2.5%) were previously with
the special servicer but have since been returned to the master
servicer. According to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future
principal and interest payments on the loans (including the
balloon maturity payments) if they continue to perform and remain
with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had trust balance of $5.34 billion, down from
$5.41 billion at issuance. The pool currently includes 250 loans
and 13 REO assets. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
provided information for 88.1% of the loans in the pool, 99.3% of
which was for full-year 2009, interim-2010, or full-year 2010
data. "We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.17x for the pool
based on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were
1.20x and 133.8%,which exclude 29 ($634.2 million, 11.9%) of the
31 specially serviced assets. We separately estimated losses for
the 29 specially serviced assets. If we included these assets in
the calculation, the pool's adjusted DSC would have been 1.17x,"
S&P related.

The trust has experienced principal losses of $10.6 million
relating to two assets. Seventy ($1.71 billion, 32.0%) loans,
including the fifth-, sixth-, ninth-, and 10th-largest loans in
the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist. Sixty-nine
($1.80 billion, 33.7%) loans in the pool have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, 52 of which ($1.26 billion, 23.5%) have a
reported DSC below 1.00x.

                       Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $1.77 billion (33.1%). "Using servicer-reported numbers,
we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.02x for the top 10
loans. Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10 loans were
1.06x and 140.8%. These figures exclude the seventh-largest loan,
which we discussed under the Credit Consideration section above,
as well as the Americold Portfolio loan, the eighth-largest loan,
for which no financials were reported. Four of the top 10 loans
($575.6 million, 10.8%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,"
S&P related.

The Save Mart Portfolio loan ($193.5 million, 3.6%) is the
fifth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 31-property,
1.6-million sq.-ft. grocery store portfolio located throughout
California. The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist
due to a low reported DSC. As of Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC
and occupancy were 1.04x and 100%.

The Franklin Mills loan ($174.0 million, 3.3%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 1.6 million sq.-ft.
regional mall in Philadelphia. The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. According to the
master servicer, the property occupancy and DSC were adversely
affected by the Steve & Barry's bankruptcy in 2010. As of
Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC for the property was 1.04x. As
of Dec. 31, 2010, the reported property occupancy was 81.9%.

The Genessee Valley Center loan ($110.7 million, 2.1%) is the
ninth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by 542,588 sq. ft.
of a 1.3-million sq.-ft. regional mall in Flint, Mich. The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported
DSC, which the master servicer has attributed to increased vacancy
and an overall decline in tenant sales. As of Dec. 31, 2010, the
reported DSC for the property was 0.96x. The reported property and
collateral occupancy were 93.3% and 79.0%, respectively, as of the
same date.

The ChampionsGate Hotel loan ($97.4 million, 1.8%) is the 10th-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 730-room full-service
hotel in Champions Gate, Fla. The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC. As of the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported property DSC was
0.43x and the occupancy at the property was 64.0%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria and the analysis is consistent with its lowered and
affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
             Rating
Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
A-4    BBB+ (sf)       A- (sf)                        30.20
A-SB   BBB+ (sf)       A- (sf)                        30.20
A-1A   BBB+ (sf)       A- (sf)                        30.20
A-M    BB (sf)         BB+ (sf)                       20.07
A-J    B (sf)          B+ (sf)                        12.09
B      B (sf)          B+ (sf)                        11.46
C      B- (sf)         B+ (sf)                         9.94
D      B- (sf)         B (sf)                          8.92
E      B- (sf)         B (sf)                          8.42
F      CCC+ (sf)       B (sf)                          7.53
G      CCC- (sf)       B- (sf)                         6.51
H      CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)                        5.25
J      D (sf)          CCC- (sf)                       4.36

Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Class    Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
A-1      AAA (sf)                              30.20
A-2      AAA (sf)                              30.20
A-2FL    AAA (sf)                              30.20
A-3      AAA (sf)                              30.20
X        AAA (sf)                                N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-
LDP2, one of which S&P lowered to 'D (sf)'. "At the same time, we
removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where we had placed them
on April 12, 2011, with negative implications. Finally, we
affirmed our ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction," S&p said.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades of several
certificates also reflect credit support erosion we anticipate
will occur upon the resolution of 19 ($232.5 million, 9.4%) of the
transaction's 24 specially serviced assets. In addition, current
and potential interest shortfalls, primarily due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and special servicing
fees, prompted us to lower our rating on class J to 'D (sf)'. We
expect these interest shortfalls to continue for the foreseeable
future," S&P related.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-provided financial
information, we calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC)
of 1.38x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 102.3%. We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted-average DSC of 0.97x and a LTV ratio of 130.7%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
75.6% and 35.4%, respectively. All of the DSC and LTV calculations
we noted above exclude the transaction's nine ($43.1 million,
1.8%) defeased loans and 19 ($232.5 million, 9.4%) of the
transaction's 24 ($282.4 million, 11.5%) specially serviced
assets. We separately estimated losses for the excluded specially
serviced assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures," S&P noted.

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $519,406. The shortfalls were
primarily related to ASERs totaling $514,953 (associated with 19
of the specially serviced assets) and special servicing fees of
$53,601. The interest shortfalls affected class J and all classes
subordinate to it. "We anticipate that class J and all classes
subordinate to it will continue to experience interest
shortfalls for the foreseeable future, and consequently, we
lowered the rating on class J to 'D (sf)'," S&P stated.

"The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels and liquidity that we believe are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. We affirmed our ratings
on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only (IO) certificates based on
our current criteria," S&P noted.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, 24 ($282.4 million,
11.5%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC. The reported payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: six ($90.8 million, 3.7%) are real estate
owned (REO), six ($57.9 million, 2.3%) are in foreclosure,
nine ($87.6 million, 3.6%) are 90-plus days delinquent, one
($36.4 million, 1.5%) is late, but less than 30 days delinquent,
one ($2.2 million, 0.1%) is part of borrower bankruptcy
proceedings, and one ($7.5 million, 0.3%) is current. Appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling $111.2 million were in effect
for 19 of the specially serviced assets.

The Cross Creek Shopping Center REO asset ($45.5 million, 1.9%) is
the largest asset with the special servicer and the eighth-largest
asset in the pool. It is secured by an anchored retail center
totaling 363,333-sq.-ft. in Memphis, Tenn. The asset became REO as
of Oct. 12, 2010. According to the special servicer, there are
life safety issues at the property. The asset will be listed for
sale shortly. Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon
the resolution of this asset.

The Ashwood-Southfield loan ($36.4 million, 1.5%), the second-
largest specially serviced asset, is secured by two properties:
Ashwood Office Park and Southfield Crossing I & II. Ashwood Office
Park comprises a 204,464-sq.-ft., eight-story multi-tenant class A
office building in a submarket of Atlanta. Southfield Crossing I &
II is a 129,622-sq.-ft., two-building, one-story multi-tenanted
office property in suburban Detroit. The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on March 28, 2011, due to imminent monetary
default. As of Dec. 31, 2010, reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.02x and 94.0%.

The Lincoln at Wolfchase loan ($26.8 million, 1.1%) is secured
by a 408-unit garden-style multifamily property in Cordova, Tenn.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in July 2010 due
to monetary default, and its reported payment status is 90-plus
days delinquent. According to the special servicer, it is
currently engaged in discounted payoff (DPO)/restructuring
discussions with the borrower. The most recent reported DSC was
1.02x as of Dec. 31, 2009. Standard & Poor's expects a significant
loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Preston Creek REO asset ($25.3 million, 1.0%) is secured by a
334-unit garden-style apartment complex in McDonough, Ga. The
asset became REO on May 4, 2010. According to the special
servicer, the asset will be listed for sale shortly. Standard &
Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the resolution
of this asset.

The 20 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 0.9% of the total pool balance.
"We estimated losses for 16 of these assets, resulting in a
weighted-average loss severity of 47.9%. Of the four other assets
for which we did not estimate losses, two recently transferred to
the special servicer, one is current, and one is part of
borrower bankruptcy proceedings," S&P stated.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the April 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had a trust balance of $2.47 billion, down from
$2.98 billion at issuance. The pool currently includes 256 loans
and six REO assets. The master servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A.,
provided financial information for 92.4% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, which was primarily full-year 2009, interim-2010, or
full-year 2010 data. "We calculated a weighted-average DSC of
1.41x for the pool based on the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV ratios were 1.38x and 102.3%, which exclude the
transaction's nine ($43.1 million, 1.8%) defeased loans and 19
($232.5 million, 9.4%) of the transaction's 24 ($282.4 million,
11.5%) specially serviced assets. We separately estimated losses
for the 19 excluded specially serviced assets. To date, the trust
has experienced principal losses of $35.7 million related to 18
assets. Seventy-three ($483.1 million, 19.6%) loans are on the
master servicer's watchlist. Fifty-two ($417.5 million, 16.9%)
loans in the pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, of which
37 ($215.0 million, 8.7%) have a reported DSC below 1.00x,"
according to S&P.

                     Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$676.6 million (27.4%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.44x for the top 10 assets.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratios for the top 10 assets were 1.36x
and 111.2%. These figures exclude the Cross Creek Shopping Center
REO asset discussed," S&P noted.

Two of the top 10 loans, The City Place Corporate Center loan
($118.0 million, 4.79%) and Bentley Green/Sandpiper - Milestone
loan ($45.0 million, 1.83%), have upcoming maturity dates in April
2012. The reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2010, were 1.25x and 88%, for The City Place Corporate
Center loan and 1.19x and 94%, respectively, for the
Bentley Green/Sandpiper - Milestone loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria, and the analysis is consistent with its lowered and
affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP2
                Rating
Class    To                    From          Credit enhancement
(%)
A-M      AA- (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg            22.72
A-MFL    AA- (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg            22.72
A-J      BBB (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Neg             13.96
B        BBB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg           13.20
C        BB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg            11.54
D        BB (sf)      BBB-(sf)/Watch Neg            10.48
E        BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg             9.43
F        B+ (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Neg              8.22
G        B (sf)       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg             7.16
H        CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Neg              5.35
J        D (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg            4.14

Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP2

Class    Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
A-3      AAA (sf)                               34.80
A-3A     AAA (sf)                               34.80
A-4      AAA (sf)                               34.80
A-SB     AAA (sf)                               34.80
A-1A     AAA (sf)                               34.80
X-1      AAA (sf)                                 N/A
X-2      AAA (sf)                                 N/A


N/A -- Not applicable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 4 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and upgraded one class
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust (LB-UBS) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C5.

The downgrades reflect the expected losses on the specially
serviced loans as well as other loans in the pool. Fitch modeled
losses of 4.5% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 3.7%, including losses already
incurred to date. Fitch has designated 24 loans (16.6%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes 10 specially serviced loans
(7.7%). At Fitch's last review, there were three specially
serviced loans (11.8%). Currently, Fitch expects that the nonrated
classes Q through T may be fully depleted from losses associated
with the specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting the nonrated classes S and T.

The upgrade reflects increased credit enhancement as a result of
principal paydown. As of the April 2011 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has paid down by 17.9% to
$1.93 billion from $2.34 billion at issuance. The pool paid down
by over 11% at the April 2011 remittance following the payoff of
the $244.5 million Providence Place loan, previously the second
largest in the pool. One loan (0.01%) has defeased since issuance.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is the specially-
serviced TAG Portfolio (2.8% of the pool), which is secured by two
adjoining office buildings in Downers Grove, IL and an office
building in Dulles, VA totaling approximately 405,000 square feet
The loan transferred to special servicing in April 2010 for
imminent default, and the loan is currently more than 60 days
delinquent. The loan's scheduled maturity is Aug. 11, 2011. The
special servicer continues to discuss a potential loan restructure
with the borrower.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the Sandpiper
Apartments loan (1.7%), which is secured by a 488-unit apartment
complex built in 1987 and located just west of the strip in Las
Vegas. Over the past several years, occupancy has fallen into the
low- to mid-70% range. In 2010, servicer-reported NOI was down by
44% compared with the issuer's underwriting. Despite the
insufficiency of property cash flow to cover debt service, the
loan remains current.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the West
Hartford Portfolio (1.2%), which is secured by five office
properties totaling 133,000 sf located in close proximity to one
another in West Hartford, CT. Annualized servicer-reported NOI for
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010 was down by 24% compared with
the issuer's underwriting. Once amortization began in 2008
following an initial interest-only period, the loan has only
maintained a DSCR of approximately 1.0x.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns Recovery Ratings (RRs):

   -- $20.5 million class K to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.8 million class L to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $5.9 million class M to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.8 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $187.5 million class A-J to 'AAsf/LS3' from 'Asf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the Rating Outlooks:

   -- $59.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $158 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $57.8 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $809.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $138.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $234.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $20.5 million class B at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $32.2 million class C at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Positive
      from Stable;

   -- $29.3 million class D at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Positive
      from Negative;

   -- $23.4 million class E at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Positive
      from Negative;

   -- $29.3 million class F at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $26.4 million class G at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $23.4 million class H at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $14.7 million class J at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
classes P through T.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only classes X-CL and
X-CP.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Various Actions on Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and upgraded two
classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2005-C7
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates. In addition, Fitch
has revised the Loss Severity (LS) ratings and assigned Rating
Outlooks and Recovery Ratings as applicable.

The downgrades reflect Fitch expected losses across the pool.
Fitch modeled losses of 5.55% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 6.28%, reflecting
losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated 42 loans
(38.47%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include 13 specially
serviced loans (14.96%). Seven of the Fitch Loans of Concern
(25.84%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans by unpaid
principal balance. Fitch considers the Loans of Concern to have a
high probability of defaulting during the term, with losses
ranging from $19,000 to $21.4 million. Fitch expects that classes
K through P may eventually be fully depleted from losses
associated with loans currently in special servicing.

The upgrades reflect reductions to the pools principal balance,
resulting in increased credit enhancement to the senior classes.
As of the May 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 15.08% (including 1.57% of
realized losses) to $1.99 billion from $2.34 billion at issuance.
One of the previously top 15 loans by loan balance, Bethesda
Towers (3.7% of original pool balance) had matured and repaid in
November 2010. Class A-1 has paid in full. Due to realized losses,
classes Q through T have been reduced to zero, and class P has
been reduced to $1.3 million from $2.9 million at issuance. No
loans are currently defeased. Interest shortfalls are affecting
classes J through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Sarasota
Main Plaza loan (1.74%). The loan is secured by a 253,504 square
foot (sf) mixed use (office/retail) building located in the
downtown sector of Sarasota, FL. Primary tenants include a Regal
Cinemas (30.03% of the net rentable area (NRA), Sarasota County
Public Hospital Offices (23.67% NRA), and Florida Department of
Revenue (10.29% NRA). The loan had transferred to the special
servicer in December 2008 for imminent default. The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. In
addition, due to the economic downturn the borrower has been
proactively renegotiating leases at lower rents in order to retain
several existing tenants. The April 2011 rent roll reported
occupancy at 86%, a decline from 99% at issuance. Based on the
servicer provided year end (YE) December 2010 financial statements
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reports at 1.16 times (x), a
decline from YE December 2009 at 1.21x. In late 2010, a
modification and forbearance proposal of the loan was negotiated
and terms were agreed upon with the special servicer, however was
rejected by the borrower prior to execution. In March 2011, the
borrower submitted several alternative proposals which included a
deed in lieu (DIL) or friendly foreclosure, a discounted pay-off
of the loan, or a modification of the current terms. All proposed
strategies are being reviewed and considered by the special
servicer. In the interim, the loan payments remain current.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Tri-
County Business Park loan (1.85%). The loan is securitized by a
676,165 sf flex-office park in Tampa, FL. The property has
experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines. The
December 2010 rent rolls reported a combined occupancy of 65%, a
decline from 88% at issuance. The servicer provided YE December
2010 financials statements report DSCR at 1.04x, a decline from YE
December 2009 at 1.28x. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in May 2010 for payment default, and had matured without
repayment in September 2010. The special servicer continues to
negotiate with the borrower for a potential loan modification and
maturity extension proposals, while simultaneously pursuing
foreclosure and placing the property under receivership.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (1.01%) is
secured by a 73,235 sf retail center in Los Angeles, CA. The
property is anchored by A.J. Wright (34.27% NRA) and Walgreens
(19.64% NRA). DSCR for YE December 2010 and YE December 2009
reported at 1.02x and 0.87x, respectively, a significant decline
from YE December 2008 at 1.68x. Occupancy has remained unchanged
at 100%. The decline in property performance is primarily
attributed to a 47% increase in real estate taxes at YE 2009
compared to YE 2008. Despite the decline in performance, the loan
has remained current.

Fitch downgrades, removes Outlooks and assigns Recovery Ratings
(RR) on these classes:

   -- $26.4 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $17.5 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $17.5 million class J to 'CCsf/RR5' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $23.4 million class K to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.8 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $11.7 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $2.9 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

Prior to the downgrades, all of the classes had a Negative Rating
Outlook.

Fitch upgrades, revises Outlooks and affirms LS ratings on:

   -- $195.9 million class A-J to 'Asf/LS3' from 'BBBsf/LS3';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative.

   -- $35.2 million class C to 'BBB-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and LS ratings, and
revises the Outlooks:

   -- $219.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $48 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $112.4 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $847.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $92.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $233.9 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.2 million class B at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Positive
      from Negative;

   -- $29.3 million class D at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $23.5 million class E at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $23.5 million class F at 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $1.3 million class P at 'Dsf/RR6';

   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf/RR6';

   -- $0 class S at 'Dsf/RR6';

Class A-1 has repaid in full. Classes Q and S have been reduced to
zero due to realized losses. Fitch does not rate class T, which
has also been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Also, Fitch has affirmed and revised the Outlooks of these
classes:

   -- $1 million class CM-1 at 'AA'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $5 million class CM-2 at 'A'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $956 thousand class CM-3 at 'A-'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $3 million class CM-4 at 'BBB'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

The CM rake classes represent the B-note for the Cherryvale Mall.
The $75.4 million A-note is included in the pooled portion of the
trust. Fitch does not rate the SP-1 through SP-7 classes, which
are specific to the Station Place I $63 million B-Note. A
$20.1 million A-note for Station Place I is included in the
pooled portion of the trust.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-CP and
X-CL.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades 1 and Affirms 8 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of one class and
affirmed eight classes of LBUBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C4,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C4:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2006
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to overall improved pool performance and
increased subordination due to loan amortization and payoffs.
The pool has paid down by 12% since Moody's prior review. The
affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss
of 16.2% of the current balance. At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 21.9%. Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 21.5% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

The other methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 11, compared to nine at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 28, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to
$94.6 million from $999.1 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 69% of the pool. Two loans, representing 3% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. The conduit component includes nine loans representing
47% of the pool. The remaining pool consists of nine specially
serviced loans (38% of the pool) and six tenant leases (CTL; 12%
of the pool).

Five loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$31.1 million loss (51% loss severity on average). Nine loans,
representing 38% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Western Select
Properties Loan ($7.5 million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 1.5 million square foot (SF) warehouse/distribution
property located in Indianapolis, Indiana. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in June 2010 due to maturity
default. The borrower has requested a two year loan extension and
the loan is dual tracking modification and foreclosure. The
remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$6 million appraisal reduction for three of the specially serviced
loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $12.3 million loss (34%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 13% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.4 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Due to the high percentage of loans in special servicing, Moody's
analysis was largely based on a loss and recovery analysis for
specially serviced and troubled loans. The performance of the CTL
component and performing conduit loans is stable and performing
in-line with Moody's expectations.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$7.1 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The largest conduit loan is the 111 Franklin Place Loan
($10.7 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
138,801 SF office building located in Roanoke, Virginia. At last
review, the loan was in special servicing due to imminent monetary
default but was returned to the master servicer in October 2010.
The property lost several major tenants in 2009 but is gradually
leasing up the space. Occupancy has improved to 92% as of April
2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 143% and 0.78X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Dulles North - Phase 2
Loan ($7.6 million -- 8.0%), which is secured by a single-story,
79,000 SF multi-tenant office/flex building located in Sterling,
Virginia. The property was 100% leased as of March 2011 compared
to 90% at last review. Property performance is stable. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.53X, respectively, compared to 74%
and 1.49X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Dulles North - Phase 5
Loan ($5.9 million -- 6.3%), which is secured by a single-story,
90,000 SF office/flex building located in Sterling, Virginia. The
property is 100% leased to NTT Worldwide Communications through
February 2020. Property performance is stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 49% and 2.21X, respectively, compared to 50% and
2.18X at last review.

The CTL component consists of six loans leased under bondable
triple net leases to three corporate credits. The largest
corporate credits include CVS/Caremark Corp. (51% of the CTL
component; senior unsecured rating Baa2, stable outlook) and
Walgreen Co. (40% of the CTL component; senior unsecured rating
A2, stable outlook).


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades 4 and Affirms 23 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four rake
classes and affirmed the ratings of 23 pooled classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. CBM-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. CBM-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. CBM-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CBM, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2009
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. ML-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. ML-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2005
      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades of four raked classes were due to the improved
performance of the Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio Loan. The rake
classes are secured by the B-note secured by a pool of hotel
properties. The affirmations are due to overall stable pool
performance and key rating parameters, including Moody's loan to
value (LTV) ratio, and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.6% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 7.6%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
13.9% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. Due to the high
level of credit subordination and defeasance, it is unlikely that
investment grade classes would be downgraded even if losses are
higher than Moody's expected base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, essentially the same as last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 23, 2009. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to
$1.77 billion from $1.97 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 109 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool. The pool includes three
loans, representing 18% of the pool, with investment grade credits
estimates. Three loans representing 10% of the pool have defeased
and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a $4.2 million loss (29% loss
severity). Twelve loans, representing 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Pacific Pointe Loan ($39.0 million; 2.2% of the pool).
The loan matured in June 2010 and the borrower and special
servicer are negotiating a loan expension. The loan is highly
leveraged, but performance has been stable since securitization.
Moody's is not currently expecting a loss on this loan. Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $47.6 million loss for the remaining 11
specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$15.7 million loss (16% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) for the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and full or partial year
2010 operating results for 73% and 89% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 109% compared to 121% at last
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 14% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.18X and 0.93X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with an credit estimate is the 200 Park
Avenue Loan ($278.5 million -- 15.7%), ), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $900 million first mortgage loan secured by a
2.9 million square foot Class A office building located near the
Grand Central Terminal in New York City. The pool also includes a
$51.2 million junior non-pooled component which is the security
for non-pooled Classes ML-1 and ML-2. Based on the leasable area,
the office component represents 96% of the property and retail
represents 4%. The property is primarily tenanted by legal,
finance and insurance companies. The property was 92% leased as of
September 2010. Performance has been stable. Moody's underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.17X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The remaining two loans with credit estimates represent 2% of
the pool. The Wachovia Portfolio Loan ($15.6 million -- 0.9%)
is secured by a portfolio of 131 office properties, operations
centers, retail bank branches and parking garages totaling
6.6 million square feet and located in ten states. In 2007, the
loan was split and $155.6 million was defeased. Moody's underlying
rating is Aa2 , the same as last review. The 1919 Park Avenue Loan
($15.0 million -- 0.8%) is secured by a 208,600 square foot office
building located in Weehawken, New Jersey. The property is
currently 100% leased to Savvis Communications Corporation (Long
Term Rating: B1; on review for possible upgrade) through January
2031. Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and
2.76X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.46X at last review.

The loan that previously had a credit estimate is the 101 Avenue
of Americas Loan ($82.0 million -- 4.6%), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $136.7 million first mortgage loan secured by
a leasehold mortgage on a 411,100 square foot office building
located in New York City. The building is 100% leased by Service
Employees International Union Building Services Local 32B-J and
affiliated operations under a lease which expires in December
2011. The tenant is expected to vacate at the end of its term. The
lease and loan maturity are coterminus. Moody's is concerned about
refinance risk due to the expected vacancy at the end of the loan
term and considers this a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 111% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.24X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 900 North Michigan Avenue Loan
($58.7 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a mixed
use property consisting of a vertical mall (475,400 square feet),
an office tower (349,900 square feet) and garage (1,660 spaces)
located in the northern end of Chicago's Magnificent Mile. The
collateral is part of a larger complex which includes a 343-room
Four Seasons Hotel and 106 residential condominium units. As of
March 2011, the property was 97% leased compared to 95% at last
review. The largest tenants are Bloomingdales (31% of NRA; lease
expiration September 2013) and JMB Realty Corp (11% of NRA; lease
expiration June 2018). Performance has remained stable since last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 0.88X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 0.86X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio
Loan ($114.0 million -- 6.4%), which represents a participation
interest in a $487 million first mortgage loan secured by a
portfolio of 64 limited service hotels located in 29 states. The
pool also includes a $40.0 million junior non-pooled component
which is the security for non-pooled Classes CBM-1, CBM-2, CBM-3
and the interest only strip related to those rake bonds, Class X-
CBM. Performance has improved significantly since last review
although the loan is still on the servicer's watchlist due to low
DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 168% and 0.61X at last review. Moody's
is upgrading the rake classes due to improved property
performance.

The third largest loan is the Crossroads Towne Center Loan
($49.4 million -- 2.8%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.3 million square foot regional retail center
located in Gilbert, Arizona. The property was 88% leased as of
March 2010, the same as last review. The loan is currently on the
watchlist due to Linens 'N Things vacating. The largest tenants
are Ross Stores, Barnes & Noble and Michaels. Property performance
has declined since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
125% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.84X at last
review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "We lowered two of the
ratings to 'D (sf)'. Concurrently, we affirmed our ratings on
eight other classes from the same transaction," S&P stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust. The downgrades also reflect
anticipated credit support erosion upon the eventual resolution of
17 ($209.9 million, 7.1%) of the 18 ($211.7 million, 7.2%)
assets in the pool that are with the special servicer," S&P
related.

"Using servicer-provided financial information, we calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.50x and loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 108.5% for the pool. We further stressed the loans'
cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted-average
DSC of 0.93x and an LTV ratio of 147.0%. The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 68.4% and 41.6%,
respectively. The DSC and LTV calculations noted exclude 17
($209.9 million, 7.1%) of the transaction's 18 ($211.7 million,
7.2%) specially serviced assets. We separately estimated losses
for the 17 excluded assets and included them in our 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures," according to S&P.

"We downgraded classes H and J to 'D (sf)' due to outstanding
accumulated interest shortfalls that we expect to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. As of the April 15, 2011,
remittance report, the trust had experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $391,249 and accumulated interest shortfalls
totaling $7.9 million, affecting class H and all classes
subordinate to it. The interest shortfalls were primarily due to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs; $410,657),
special servicing fees ($46,895), interest rate modification
($42,600), and interest not advanced on an asset the master
servicer determined to be nonrecoverable ($41,595). Based
on our analysis, we expect that classes H and J will continue to
experience interest shortfalls for the foreseeable future. As a
result, we lowered our ratings on classes H and J to 'D (sf)',"
S&P said.

S&P continued, "Our rating affirmations on the principal and
interest certificate classes reflect subordination and liquidity
support levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.
We affirmed our ratings on the class X-CL, X-CP, and X-W interest-
only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria."

                    Credit Considerations

As of the April 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, 18
assets ($211.7 million, 7.2%) in the pool were with the
special servicer, CW Capital Asset Management LLC. The
reported payment status of the specially serviced assets
is: eight are real estate owned (REO) ($119.6 million,
4.0%), seven are in foreclosure ($79.6 million, 2.7%),
two are 90-plus days delinquent ($10.7 million, 0.4%), and
one is late, but less than 30 days delinquent ($1.8 million,
0.1%). Sixteen of the 18 specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$108.2 million. "In addition, we determined one loan, the
Route 6 and Stoneleigh loan ($8.1 million, 0.3%), to be
credit-impaired. The loan is reported as 60 days delinquent.
We discuss details of the two largest specially serviced
assets (one of which is a top 10 asset)," S&P said.

The Arizona Retail Portfolio asset ($86.0 million, 2.9%) is
the eighth-largest asset in the pool and largest asset with
the special servicer. The asset comprises 14 retail properties
containing 600,178 square feet located in, or around, Phoenix,
Ariz.: 12 are unanchored, one is single-tenanted, and one is
shadow anchored. The asset is REO and has an ARA of $49.8 million
in effect against it. Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss
upon the resolution of the asset.

The 695/710 Route 46 loan ($35.0 million, 1.2%) is the second-
largest asset with the special servicer and is secured by two,
four-story office buildings totaling 258,657-sq.-ft. located in
Fairfield Township, N.J. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on June 8, 2010, for monetary default and is currently in
foreclosure. Wachovia reported a DSC of 0.82x as of year-end
2009 and occupancy of 66% as of June 2010. An ARA of $23.5 million
is in effect against this loan. Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

"The remaining 16 specially serviced assets and the one loan that
we determined to be credit-impaired have individual balances
representing less than 0.7% of the pool balance. We estimated
losses for 15 of these assets, resulting in a weighted-average
loss severity of 48.5%. The remaining loan will be modified
and returned to the master servicer," S&P stated.

Twelve loans totaling $63.9 million (2.1%) were previously with
the special servicer but have since been returned to the master
servicer. According to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future
principal and interest payments on the loans (including the
balloon maturity payments) if they continue to perform and remain
with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
transaction pool balance was $2.96 billion, which is 98.0% of the
balance at issuance. The pool includes 172 loans and eight REO
assets, down from 184 loans at issuance. There are no defeased
loans in the pool. The master servicer, Wachovia Real Estate Asset
Management (Wachovia), provided financial information for 88.5%
of the loans in the pool, the majority of which was interim-2010
(12.1%) or full-year 2010 (70.2%) data.

"We calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.52x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures. Our adjusted DSC
and LTV figures were 1.50x and 108.5%. These figures exclude 17 of
the transaction's 18 specially serviced assets. We separately
estimated losses for these excluded assets and included them in
our 'AAA' scenario-implied default and loss severity figures. The
transaction has experienced $18.7 million in principal losses to
date on four assets. Fifty-three loans ($721.8 million, 24.4%) in
the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist, including five of
the top 10 assets, which are discussed below. Thirty-nine loans
($472.5 million, 16.0%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, 34 of which
($424.2 million, 14.3%) have reported DSC below 1.00x," S&P
stated.

                    Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.63 billion (55.1%). "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.74x for the top 10 assets.
Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10 assets were 1.69x
and 102.2%. The eighth-largest asset is with the special
servicer," S&P noted. Five of the top 10 assets ($426.8 million,
14.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. Details on these
five assets are:

    * The Colony Square loan ($116.0 million, 3.9%), the fifth-
      largest asset in the pool, is secured by a mixed-use office
      and retail property totaling 827,252 sq. ft. in Atlanta, Ga.
      The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
      low reported DSC. Wachovia reported a DSC of 0.65x and
      occupancy of 74.2% as of year-end 2010. This loan is
      scheduled to mature on Oct. 11, 2011.

    * The Republic Portfolio loan ($100.0 million, 3.4%), the
      sixth-largest asset in the pool, is secured by two office
      buildings totaling 531,008 sq. ft. in Herndon, Va. The loan
      appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low
      reported DSC, which was 0.83x as of September 2010. December
      2010 reported financials indicate a DSC of 1.40x and
      occupancy of 91.0%.

    * The Government Property Advisors Portfolio loan ($96.5
      million, 3.3%), the seventh-largest asset in the pool, is
      secured by 38 office properties located in 15 states
      totaling approximately 1.06 million sq. ft. The properties
      are generally classified as single-tenant and are leased to
      various federal and state government agencies of the U.S.
      The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to
      deferred maintenance at one of the properties. Wachovia
      reported a DSC of 1.20x as of September 2010, and an
      occupancy of 97.0% as of November 2010. This loan is
      scheduled to mature on Nov. 11, 2011.

    * The Midtown Plaza loan ($65.0 million, 2.2%), the ninth-
      largest asset in the pool, is secured by three office
      buildings in Atlanta, Ga. totaling 494,012 sq. ft. The loan
      appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
      reported DSC. Wachovia reported a DSC of 0.30x and occupancy
      of 73.0% as of September 2010. This loan is scheduled to
      mature on Oct. 11, 2011.

    * The Martin Resorts loan ($49.3 million, 1.7%), the 10th-
      largest asset in the pool, is secured by five lodging
      properties with a total of 375 rooms located in Pismo Beach,
      Avila Beach, and Paso Robles, Calif. The loan appears on the
      master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.
      Wachovia reported a DSC of 1.12x and occupancy of 68.4% as
      of year-end 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
current criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
Class     To            From      Credit enhancement (%)
A-M       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)                     19.78
A-J       BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf)                    9.83
B         B+ (sf)       BB (sf)                     9.06
C         B (sf)        BB- (sf)                    8.04
D         B- (sf)       B+ (sf)                     7.02
E         CCC+ (sf)     B+ (sf)                     6.13
F         CCC (sf)      B (sf)                      5.24
G         CCC- (sf)     B (sf)                      4.34
H         D (sf)        CCC+ (sf)                   3.32
J         D (sf)        CCC- (sf)                   2.43

Ratints Affirmed

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-1      AAA (sf)                             29.99
A-2      AAA (sf)                             29.99
A-AB     AAA (sf)                             29.99
A-3      AAA (sf)                             29.99
A-1A     AAA (sf)                             29.99
X-CL     AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-CP     AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-W      AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction. "In addition, we affirmed
our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on five other classes. We removed one
rating from CreditWatch with negative implications where it was
placed on Jan. 18, 2011, based on our current counterparty
criteria. We lowered our ratings on classes F, G, and H to 'D
(sf)' because we expect the interest shortfalls to continue and
we believe the accumulated interest shortfalls will remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust. In addition, current and
potential interest shortfalls primarily due to interest rate
modifications, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), and special servicing fees, prompted us to lower our
ratings on the class F, G, and H to 'D (sf)'. The downgrades
also reflect credit support erosion we anticipate will occur
upon the resolution of the nine assets ($174.2 million; 17.9%)
with the special servicer. The Memphis Retail Portfolio asset
($25.5 million; 2.6%), was transferred to the special servicer
after the April reporting period," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool. Using servicer-provided financial
information, we calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC)
of 1.25x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 107.7%. We further
stressed the assets' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 0.83x and an LTV ratio of 161.3%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
94.9% and 40.2%, respectively. The DSC and LTV calculations we
noted above exclude one defeased loan ($3.8 million; 0.4%), one
nonreporting loan ($2.1 million; 0.2%), and six ($104.6 million;
10.7%) of the transaction's nine assets ($174.2 million; 17.9%)
with the special servicer. We separately estimated losses for the
six specially serviced assets, which we included in our 'AAA'
scenario-implied default and loss severity figures," S&P related.

S&P continued, "The downgrades also reflect our analysis of
interest shortfalls that have affected the trust. As of the
April 15, 2011, remittance report, the trust experienced
$385,681 in interest shortfalls, primarily due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) that are generating
monthly shortfalls of $232,073, as well as interest shortfalls
due to rate modification. The monthly interest shortfalls
affected class C and all of the classes subordinate to it. We
expect shortfalls affecting class F, G, and H to continue for
the foreseeable future. As a result, we lowered our ratings on
these classes to 'D (sf)'."

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificate
classes reflect subordination levels and liquidity that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on class A-2FL and removed it from CreditWatch with
negative implications following the trustee's confirmation that
the interest rate swap originally associated with the class has
been terminated. We affirmed our rating on the class X interest
only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria," S&P noted.

                        Credit Considerations

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, eight assets
($148.7 million; 15.3%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital). The
payment status of these assets is: one is REO ($27.4 million;
2.8%), three are in foreclosure ($46.7; 4.8%), two are 90-plus-
days delinquent ($36.0 million; 3.7%), one is less than 30
days delinquent ($19.6 million; 2%), and one is in bankruptcy
($19.1 million; 2%). The Memphis Retail Portfolio asset
($25.5 million; 2.6%) was 30 days delinquent, and appears on
the servicer's watchlist as of the April 15, 2011, remittance
report. The asset was transferred to CWCapital following the
April reporting period. Six loans ($102.6 million; 10.5%) have a
total of $53.0 million appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in
effect, resulting in ASERs of $232,072. Four of the top 10 assets
in the pool are with the special servicer.

The Kettering Tower asset ($27.4 million; 2.8%) is the seventh-
largest asset in the transaction and the largest asset with
CWCapital. The total exposure outstanding is $28.9 million. The
asset is secured by a 484,265-sq.-ft. office building located in
Dayton, Ohio. The asset was transferred to CWCapital on
April 15, 2009, due to a violation of the cash management
agreement. Foreclosure took place on April 1, 2011. Recent
financial reporting is not available; however, occupancy was 66%
as of December 2010. A $19.2 million ARA is in effect against this
asset. Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this asset.

The Chicago Hotel Portfolio loan ($24.6 million; 2.5%) consists
of three crossed-collateralized and crossed-defaulted loans and
is the 10th-largest exposure in the transaction and the third
largest exposure with CWCapital. The total exposure outstanding
is $28.1 million, which includes approximately $3.5 million of
advancing and interest thereon. The loans are secured by three
independent boutique hotels totaling 152 rooms in Chicago, Ill.
The loans were transferred to CWCapital on Jan. 13, 2010, due
to monetary default. Recently, the loans were modified and are
expected to be returned to the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), after a monitoring period. A $10.5 million ARA
is in effect against the loans. The reported DSC was 0.46x as of
Sept. 30, 2009.

The Sutton Plaza loan ($26.5 million; 2.7%) is the eighth-largest
loan in the transaction and the second-largest loan with
CWCapital. The total exposure outstanding is $27.5 million, which
includes approximately $945,262 in servicer advances and interest
thereon. The loan is secured by a 167,164-sq.-ft. retail property
located in Mount Olive Township, N.J. The loan was transferred to
CWCapital on Jan. 20, 2011, due to monetary default. The property
was 89% occupied as of the December 2010 rent roll. However,
according to CWCapital, A&P, the largest tenant in the property
occupying 58,547 sq. ft, will vacate its space at the property. We
expect occupancy will decline to approximately 65%.  The reported
DSC was 1.25x as of Dec. 31, 2009. Standard & Poor's expects a
severe loss upon the resolution of the loan.

The Memphis Retail Portfolio loan ($25.5 million; 2.6%) is the
ninth-largest loan in the pool, and is secured by five retail
properties located in Memphis and Collierville, Tenn., totaling
145,531 sq. ft. The loan is on the watchlist due to a low DSC and
is reported as 30 days delinquent. "It is our understanding that
Wells Fargo transferred the loan to CWCapital after the April
reporting period. CWCapital is currently in the process of
contacting the borrower to determine if any of the properties
sustained damage from the recent flood. The reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.26x and 86.7% at year-end 2008. For nine months
ending Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC was 0.81x with an
occupancy rate of 82% as of June 30, 2010.

The five remaining specially serviced loans represent 7.2%
($70.2 million) of the pooled trust balance. ARAs totaling
$23.3 million are in effect against four of these loans. "We
estimated losses for four of these loans ($50.7 million; 5.2%),
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 56.4%. It is our
understanding that the Southwest Retail Portfolio ($19.6 million;
2%), one of the five remaining loans with CWCapital, may be
modified," S&P stated.

                         Transaction Summary

As of the April 15, 2011, remittance report, the aggregate
trust balance was $973.6 million, which is 96.7% of the
balance at issuance. The trust includes 60 loans and one
REO asset, down from 62 loans at issuance. Wells Fargo
provided recent financial information for 81.4% of the
pool balance, all of which was full-year 2009, interim
2009, or full-year 2010 information. One loan ($3.8 million; 0.4%)
is defeased. "We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.39x for
the loans in the pool based on the reported figures. Our adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.25x and 107.7%, respectively, which exclude six
of the nine assets with the special servicer. The trust has
experienced a total of $4.4 million in principal losses to date.
The principal losses were related to two loans, one of which was
liquidated in March 2011 for a $4.1 million loss. The remaining
losses were due to the servicer's recovery of prior advances per
the trustee report," S&P said.

Nine loans ($70.8 million; 7.3%), including the Memphis Retail
Portfolio, which was subsequently transferred to special
servicing, are on the master servicer's watchlist as of the April
reporting period. Six of the loans are on the watchlist due to low
DSCs. Two of the loans appear on the watchlist due to tenant
bankruptcy or near-term tenant lease rolls at the properties
securing the loan. The last loan on the watchlist is due to
deferred maintenance at the property.

                    Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$622.6 million (64.0%). "Using recent servicer-reported financial
information, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.49x. This
excludes the second-, seventh-, and ninth-largest assets in the
transaction because they did not report recent full-year financial
information. Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10
assets were 1.21x and 106.5%, respectively. Our adjusted figures
exclude the seventh-largest asset in the pool ($27.4 million;
2.8%) and the eighth-largest asset in the pool ($26.5 million;
1.3%), for which we separately estimated losses and discuss in
'Credit Considerations,'" S&P related.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class    To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-M      BBB (sf)  A (sf)                         20.24
A-J      B+ (sf)   BBB (sf)                       13.13
B        B (sf)    BBB- (sf)                      11.71
C        B- (sf)   BB+ (sf)                       10.54
D        CCC+ (sf) BB (sf)                         9.77
E        CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)                         8.86
F        D (sf)    B- (sf)                         8.09
G        D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                       6.92
H        D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                       5.76

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
A-2FL    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 30.58


Ratings Affirmed

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-1       AAA (sf)                  30.58
A-AB      AAA (sf)                  30.58
A-2       AAA (sf)                  30.58
X         AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


MARYLAND TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Two Life Insurance Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded four Series A
Investor Certificates (certificates) transactions issued under
the Patrons' Legacy banner, and two Series A Investor Certificates
(certificates) transactions issued under the Maryland Trust
banner. These transactions represent the securitization of a small
number of insurance policies (primarily life and single life
annuities), with no additional pool-level enhancement. As such,
Moody's ratings on the certificates are directly linked to the
lowest of the rating of any of the insurance companies providing
the policies. The downgrades stem solely from downgrades on these
insurance companies: AIG Life Insurance Company, American General
Life and Accident Insurance Company, and American General Life
Insurance Company to A2, , Chartis Specialty Insurance Company
(formerly known as American International Specialty Lines
Insurance Company) to A1, Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance
Company (formerly known as OM Financial Life Insurance Company) to
Ba1, and the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company to A1.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Maryland Trust 2006-1

   -- Ser. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2006
      Assigned A1 (sf)

   Issuer: Maryland Trust 2006-IV

   -- 2007 Ser. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 16,
      2007 Assigned A1 (sf)

   Issuer: Patrons' Legacy 2003-1

   -- LILAC 03-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2010 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   Issuer: Patrons' Legacy 2003-II

   -- LILAC 03-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2010 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

   Issuer: Patrons' Legacy 2003-III

   -- LILAC 03-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2010 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   Issuer: Patrons' Legacy 2004-I

   -- LILAC 04-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Principal Methodology

Each of these transactions represents a securitization of a pool
of life insurance policies, single life annuities and supplemental
policies (the Policies) on a small number of covered individuals,
all residents of the particular state, that were acquired by an
issuing trust (the Issuer Trust). Each individual covered by a
policy in the pool consented to the issuance of the policy on his
or her life and designated a charitable organization located in
the same state as the covered individuals, to acquire a
certificate representing a beneficial interest in the Issuer
Trust. Due to the small number of covered individuals in each
transaction, there are also only a small number of insurance
companies providing the related Policies (Supporting Insurance
Companies).

The certificates represent beneficial interests in the Issuer
Trust, the assets of which consist of the Policies. The payments
to certificate-holders are based on the payments from the
Supporting Insurance Companies. The transaction is structured to
ensure timely payment of cash flows from the Policies to
investors. Using a 'weakest link' approach, the ratings of the
transaction reflect the rating of the lowest-rated Supporting
Insurance Company.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can be found on www.moodys.com
in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the Research &
Ratings tab.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-BPC1
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 13 classes and affirmed six classes
of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2004-BPC1.

The downgrades reflect Fitch expected losses, most of which are
associated with the specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses
of 6.81% of the remaining pool; expected losses based on the
original pool size are 6.07%, which also reflect losses already
incurred to date. Fitch designated 27 loans (27.12%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, including five specially serviced loans (9.09%).
Fitch expects classes P and Q may eventually be fully depleted
from losses from loans in special servicing.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 18.6% to $1.01 billion from
$1.24 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls are affecting
classes E through Q. Three loans (3.2%) have defeased since
issuance.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is secured by a
448,762 square foot (sf) retail property in Indianapolis, IN. The
loan (2.7% of the outstanding pool) transferred to special
servicing in June 2010 and was modified. The modification closed
in December 2010 and the loan was transferred back to the master
servicer in March 2011. The loan was modified and split into a
$15 million A-Note and $12.8 million B-Note. The borrower made a
equity contribution to fund additional reserves and paydown a
portion of the outstanding balance. The maturity of the loan has
been extended to July 1, 2016.

The next largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is a
portfolio of 10 office buildings totaling 287,921 sf (2.8% of the
outstanding pool), located in Washington state, mainly in around
the state capital. The tenants are primarily state agencies and
divisions of the state. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in 2010 after the borrower placed junior financing on
the properties without consent. Custodial receiver has been in
place for all properties since year end 2010 and the special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure on all of the buildings except
one.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns Rating Outlooks or
Recovery Ratings:

   -- $26.4 million class B to 'Asf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $12.4 million class C to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS4';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.6 million class D to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'A+sf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9.3 million class E to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $15.5 million class F to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBB+sf/LS4';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $10.9 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBBsf/LS5';

   -- $15.3 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS4';

   -- $6.2 million class J to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $4.7 million class K to 'CCsf/RR4' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $6.2 million class L to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $4.7 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $3.1 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $3.1 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch also affirms these classes:

   -- $138.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $171.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $48.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $397.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $94.8 million class A-J at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $10.5 million class Q. Class A-1 has paid
in full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-C and X-
P.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Two & Affirms 16 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed 16 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-KEY2:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses resulting from
anticipated losses from specifically serviced and troubled loans
and concerns about increased interest shortfalls.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 5%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 11.6% of
the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans,
the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels. If future performance materially
declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the credit estimate level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 9, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to
$816.9 million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 96 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 36% of the pool. The pool contains one loan with an
investment grade credit estimate that represents 10% of the pool.
Sixteen loans, representing 12% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-six loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $22.6 million (37% loss
severity overall). Eight loans, representing 10% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $33.4 million loss (42% expected loss on average)
for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$3.3 million aggregate loss (12.5% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 93%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 87% compared to 88% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
1.33X and 1.16X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 33 compared to 33 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Crossroads Center Loan
($80.8 million -- 9.9%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 905,300 square foot (775,300 square feet of
collateral) regional mall located in St. Cloud, Minnesota. The
mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's, and Sears. In-line
occupancy was 98% as of March 2010 compared to 92% at last review.
The loan sponsor is General Growth Properties (GGP). The property
was included in GGP's bankruptcy filing, but has been returned to
the master servicer. The loan maturity was extended from August 1,
2010 to January 30, 2014. Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.28X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.34X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the U-Haul Portfolio Loan
($44 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by two
similarly sized loans which are cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted. The loans are secured by 34 U-Haul operated self-
storage and retail properties located across 18 states and
totaling 1.5 million square feet. The combined occupancy was 74%
as of March 2010. Performance has increased since last review due
to the amortization and increased rental rates. The loan has
amortized 2% since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
66% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.43X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 1900 Ocean Apartments Loan
($43.3 million -- 5.3%), which is secured by a 266 unit
multifamily property located in Long Beach, California. The
property was 97% leased as of March 2010 compared to 93% at last
review. The loan has amortized 1% since last review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to
98% and 0.86X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 150 & 200 Meadowlands Parkway Loan
($21.9 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by two
office properties located in Secaucus, New Jersey. The properties
were 89% leased as of March 2010. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 100% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at
last review.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1, and removed the rating on
class A-2FL from CreditWatch with negative implications. "In
addition, we affirmed our ratings on seven other classes from the
same transaction," S&P said.

"We based the lowered rating on class A-2FL to 'A+ (sf)' on our
current counterparty criteria. We lowered our ratings on classes G
and H to 'D (sf)' due to interest shortfalls that have affected
these classes. We expect these interest shortfalls to continue for
the foreseeable future," S&P continued.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
primarily using our U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. Our
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust. In addition, current and
potential interest shortfalls primarily due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and special servicing
fees prompted us to lower our ratings on the class G and H
certificates to 'D (sf)'. The downgrades also reflect credit
support erosion we anticipate will occur upon the resolution of
14 ($938.7 million; 23.7%) of the 16 assets ($949.6 million;
24.0%) with the special servicer," S&P noted.

According to S&P, "Our analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-
provided financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage (DSC) of 1.22x and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
125.4%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.77x and LTV
ratio of 155.8%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 92.4% and 45.3%. The DSC and LTV calculations
we noted above exclude 14 ($938.7 million; 23.7%) of the
transaction's 16 specially serviced assets ($949.6 million;
24.0%). We separately estimated losses for these assets, which we
included in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures."

"The downgrades also reflect our analysis of interest shortfalls
that have affected the trust. As of the April 14, 2011, remittance
report, the trust had experienced monthly interest shortfalls
totaling $1,653,898, of which $1,416,020 were ASERs related to 14
of the 16 specially serviced assets. Special servicing fees also
contributed significantly to the total monthly interest
shortfalls. The monthly interest shortfalls affected class C and
all classes subordinate to it. We expect that class G, and all
classes subordinate to it, will continue to experience interest
shortfalls for the foreseeable future. As a result, we lowered our
ratings on classes G and H to 'D (sf)'," S&P elaborated.

"The downgrade of the class A-2FL certificates reflects our
application of our updated counterparty criteria for structured
finance transactions. Floating-rate interest payments to the class
are partially dependent upon the performance of the interest rate
swap counterparty, Bank of America (A/Negative/A-1). We lowered
the rating to one notch above our rating on the counterparty based
primarily on our understanding that the derivative obligation
contains a counterparty replacement framework," S&P stated.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is
consistent with the outstanding ratings. "We affirmed our 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class X interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P said.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the April 14, 2011, remittance report, 16 assets
($949.6 million; 24.0%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC. The reported payment
status of these assets is: four are real estate owned (REO)
($169.4 million; 4.3%), four are in foreclosure ($40.4 million;
1.0%), six are 90-plus days delinquent ($729.0 million; 18.4%),
one is 60 days delinquent ($4.5 million; 0.1%), and one is 30 days
delinquent ($6.5 million; 0.2%). Fourteen assets ($938.7 million;
23.7%) have ARAs in effect totaling $297.9 million. Three of the
top 10 assets secured by real estate are with the special
servicer.

The Empirian Multifamily Portfolio Pool 1 loan ($384.8 million
balance; 9.7%; $396.1 million total exposure) and the Empirian
Multifamily Portfolio Pool 3 loan ($330.3 million balance; 8.3%;
$341.6 million total exposure), which are the two largest loans in
the pool, are with the special servicer. The former is secured by
78 multifamily properties consisting of 7,964 units located
across eight states, and the latter is secured by 79 multifamily
properties consisting of 6,860 units located across eight states.
Both portfolios exhibit concentrations in Florida, Ohio, Georgia,
and Indiana. The loans were transferred to special servicing on
Nov. 10, 2010, due to imminent default. The payment status of both
loans were reported as 90-plus days delinquent, and the loans
currently have automatic ARAs against them ($96.2 million for the
Pool 1 loan, and $82.6 million for the Pool 3 loan). According to
the special servicer, appraisals have been ordered for both loans.
For year-end 2010, the reported DSCs for the Pool 1 and Pool 3
loans were 1.04x and 1.10x. Standard & Poor's anticipates a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of these loans.

The B2 Portfolio REO asset ($130.5 million balance; 3.3%;
$151.4 million total exposure) is the fifth-largest asset in
the pool and the third-largest specially serviced asset. The
property comprises 11 multifamily properties totaling 2,904
units in Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. The asset was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 11, 2009, due to
payment default. According to the special servicer, the Georgia
and North Carolina properties are currently under contract, with
the respective transactions expected to close by the end of May. A
$75.2 million ARA is in effect against this asset. Standard &
Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution of the
asset.

The remaining 13 assets with the special servicer ($104.1 million;
2.6%) individually represent less than 0.6% of the total pool
balance. "We estimated losses for 11 of these assets to arrive at
a weighted-average loss severity of 51.0%," S&P noted.

"We also considered pending maturities; 17.3% of the pool balance
(15 loans) have anticipated repayment dates (ARDs) or final
maturities scheduled through June 2012," S&P stated.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the April 14, 2011, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $3.96 billion (253 loans and four
REO assets), compared with $4.05 billion (265 loans) at issuance.
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and KeyBank Real Estate Capital, the master
servicers, provided financial information for 95.4% of the pool
(by balance), which was primarily full-year 2009 and full-year
2010 information. There are no defeased loans. "We calculated a
weighted-average DSC of 1.27x for the loans in the pool based on
the reported figures. Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.22x and
125.4%, respectively, which exclude 14 ($938.7 million; 23.7%) of
the 16 specially serviced assets. The trust has experienced nine
principal losses to date totaling $22.3 million. Sixty-six loans
($642.4 million; 16.2%) are on the master servicers' watchlists,
including one of the top 10 assets secured by real estate, which
is discussed below. Sixteen loans ($257.4 million, 6.5%) have
reported DSCs between 1.00x and 1.10x, and 43 loans ($343.0
million, 8.7%) have reported DSCs of less than 1.00x," according
to S&P.

                     Summary of Top 10 Assets

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding trust balance of
$1.92 billion (48.4%). Using servicer-reported information, we
calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.27x. "Our adjusted DSC and
LTV figures for the top 10 assets were 1.15x and 130.2%. The
adjusted figures exclude the three of the top 10 assets with the
special servicer," S&P noted.

The Gwinnett Place loan ($115.0 million; 2.9%), the eighth-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by 566,908 sq. ft. of retail space
that represents a portion of a 1.3-million-sq.-ft. mall in Duluth,
Ga., that was built in 1984 and renovated in 1988. The loan, which
matures in June 2012, is on the watchlist due to low DSC. For
year-end 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.13x and
57.3%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. CMBS conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed
ratings.

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C1
            Rating
Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
A-2FL    A+ (sf)   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg                 30.11

Ratings Lowered

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C1
            Rating
Class    To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
AM       BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)                      19.89
AJ       B+ (sf)    BB (sf)                        11.45
AJ-FL    B+ (sf)    BB (sf)                        11.45
B        CCC+ (sf)  BB- (sf)                        9.28
C        CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                         8.26
D        CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                         7.11
E        CCC- (sf)  B (sf)                          5.96
F        CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)                         4.68
G        D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                       3.66
H        D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                       2.63

Ratings Affirmed

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C1
Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-2       AAA (sf)                  30.11
A-3       A+ (sf)                   30.11
A-3FL     A+ (sf)                   30.11
A-SB      A+ (sf)                   30.11
A-4       A+ (sf)                   30.11
A-1A      A+ (sf)                   30.11
X         AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


METROFINANCIERA: Fitch Downgrades RMBS Bonds Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed the Rating Watch Negative
for two residential mortgage backed securities originated and
serviced by Metrofinanciera, S.A.P.I. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R.:

MTROCB07U

   -- Long-term rating downgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'BBB-sf';
      removed Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Negative Rating
      Outlook.

   -- National long-term rating downgraded to 'A-(mex)' from 'AA-
      (mex)'; removed Rating Watch Negative and assigned a
      Negative Rating Outlook.

MTROCB08U

   -- Long-term rating downgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'BBB- sf';
      removed Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Negative Rating
      Outlook.

   -- National long-term rating downgraded to 'A-(mex)' from 'AA-
      (mex)'; removed Rating Watch Negative and assigned a
      Negative Rating Outlook.

The MTROCB07U transaction, issued in June 2007, originally
featured an overcollateralization (OC) of 2.5% with a target OC of
9.5%; however, according to Fitch's calculations based on the most
recent information provided by the servicer and the common
representative, as of May 2, 2011, the OC decreased to negative
12%. This transaction has experienced an increasing trend in
delinquencies during the last year for both 90 days or more and
180 days or more. As of March 31, 2011, 90 days or more
delinquencies rose to 28.4% from 23.4% at the end of September
2010, while 180 days or more delinquencies rose to 24.1% from
19.2% during the same period. The mortgage loans that back this
bond include mortgage insurance provided by Sociedad Hipotecaria
Federal, Genworth, or United Guaranty. The top three states that
compose this portfolio are: Baja California (26.6%), Jalisco
(20.81%) and Guanajuato (6.64%).

The MTROCB08U transaction, issued in June 2007, originally
featured an OC of 4% with a target of 12%; however, according to
Fitch's calculations based on the most recent information provided
by the servicer and the common representative, as of May 2, 2011,
the OC decreased to negative 9.7%. This transaction has also
experienced an increasing trend in delinquencies during the last
year for both 90 days or more and 180 days or more. As of March
31, 2011, 90 days or more delinquencies rose to 23.9% from 18.5%
at the end of September 2010, while 180 days or more delinquencies
rose to 19.4% from 15.3% during the same period. The mortgage
loans that back this bond include mortgage insurance provided by
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, Genworth or United Guaranty. The top
three states that compose this portfolio are: Jalisco (24.07%),
Baja California Norte (16.46%) and Guanajuato (8.18%).

When re-running the cash flow model during this review, Fitch
incorporated an increase in overall expenses as they have been
increasing due to the costs related to increase in delinquencies.
Extraordinary servicing efforts have been made on severely
delinquent loans, with 90 days or more delinquencies. These
increased costs may be offset in the future by potentially lower
time and foreclosure costs, but it is difficult to predict the
overall success of this effort and the impact on future cashflows
of the transaction.

The analysis conducted by Fitch included the review of the monthly
surveillance data, as well as a re-evaluation of delinquency and
loss assumptions and a break-even scenario by re-running Fitch's
cash flow model. The re-running of the cash flow model determines
the maximum level of defaults each structure could sustain without
suffering a loss. These results were compared to Fitch's new
delinquency and loss numbers assumed for each portfolio and at
each given rating category.

The cash flow model incorporates all credit enhancements for each
issuance, as well as their structural characteristics such as the
waterfall of payments described in the legal documents. The cash
flow model also incorporates Fitch's analysis on Constant
Prepayment Rate (CPR), excess spread, and mortgage insurance, and
Fitch's view on the recovery proceeds of any houses yet to be sold
within the trust. As unsold inventory and non-performing loans
(NPLs) continue to increase, the importance of the recovery
assumptions and the actual recoveries becomes increasingly
important. Fitch will continue to monitor the evolution of these
increasing NPLs and any proceeds generated from the sales of these
properties.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms 7 Classes of MSDW 2003-TOP9
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades six classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Capital I Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2003-TOP9 due to increased loss expectations.

Fitch expects losses of 2.06% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $15.6 million. Currently there are no specially
serviced or delinquent loans; however, 4.6% of the pool is
considered a Fitch loan of concern.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 29.9% to $755.4 million from $1.1 billion at
issuance. There are 123 of the original 137 loans remaining in
transaction, 22 of which have defeased (14.0% of the current
transaction balance).

The largest loan of concern and largest contributor to Fitch
expected losses is a 245,293 square foot anchored retail property
in Weymouth, MA. The property experienced some lease turnover that
reduced occupancy. New leases have been signed and the property is
now 100% occupied. However, the new tenants have been signed on at
reduced rental rates. The loan is current as of April 2011.

Fitch Ratings downgrades, revises Loss Severity (LS) ratings and
revises Outlooks:

   -- $10.8 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $4.0 million class J to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $5.4 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'BB/LS3'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $5.4 million class L to 'B/LS5' from 'B+/LS3'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $2.7 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS4';

   -- $2.7 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS4'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these ratings, LS ratings and Outlooks:

   -- $610.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35.0 million class C at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $12.1 million class D at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;

   -- $14.8 million class E at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.7 million class F at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.4 million class G at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $7.9 million class O.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of MSDW 2002-IQ3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-IQ3:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2002
      Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2002
      Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.3%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.9% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to
$600.7 million from $909.6 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 172 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 36% of the pool. The pool contains one loan
with an investment grade credit estimate that represents 3% of
the pool. Twelve loans, representing 16% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Fifty-two loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $16.8 million (49% loss severity
overall). Four loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $18.8 million appraisal reduction for two of the
specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$20 million loss (62% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$23.5 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial/full year
2010 operating results for 96% and 49% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 71% compared to 73% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.77X, respectively, compared to
1.51X and 1.67X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared to 28 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the 2731 San Tomas
Expressway Loan ($15.8 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 125,000 square foot (SF) Class A office located in
Santa Clara, California. The property is 100% leased to Nvidia
Corporation through January 2019. Moody's underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.78X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.88X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the 77 P Street Office Loan
($58.8 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
342,411 SF office building located in the Capitol Hill submarket
of Washington, D.C. The building was 100% leased as of July 2010,
the same as at last review. All the tenants are departments of the
Washington, D.C. municipal government with leases expiring in June
2011 (31% of the net rentable area (NRA)), November 2011 (47% of
the NRA) and April 2012 (23% of the NRA). Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 73% and 1.38X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.33X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Richards Building Loan
($29.2 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
leasehold mortgage on a 126,000 SF biotechnology office building
located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The property was 100% leased
as of February 2010, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 76% and
1.35X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 125 Delawanna Avenue Loan
($17.8 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
361,120 SF industrial warehouse facility located in Clifton,
New Jersey. The property was 100% leased as of December 2010,
the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70%
and 1.47X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.39X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of MSC 2005-IQ10
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) affirmed the ratings of 25
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ10, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-IQ10:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3-1FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21,
      2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rational

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected
loss of 6.0% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 5.5%. Moody's stressed
scenario loss is 13.2% of the current balance. Depending on
the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses
from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated
for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 29, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to
$1.38 billion from $1.55 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 202 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 50% of the pool. The pool includes 74 loans secured
by residential cooperative properties (10% of the pool). These
loans have a credit estimate of Aaa.

Forty-five loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a $103,854 realized loss (.05% loss severity). Four loans
have been modified with principal writedowns resulting in a
$5.1 million realized loss. Seven loans, representing 5% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The loans are secured
by a mix of property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$31.9 million loss (48% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans. The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $21.9 million appraisal reduction for five of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$6.6 million loss (12.5% expected loss based on a 25% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 93% and 83% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 93% compared to 95% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.12X, respectively, compared to
1.45X and 1.07X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 22 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 195 Broadway Loan ($196.0 million
-- 14.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 915,000 square foot
(SF) office building located in New York City. The property was
84% leased as of September 2010, essentially the same as at last
review and securitization. Performance has declined slightly due
to lower rents and higher expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 98% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 1875 K Street Loan ($85.0 million -
- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 188,000 SF Class A
office building located in Washington D.C. The property was 94%
leased as of December 2010 compared to 95% at last review.
Performance has increased due to higher rents. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 123%
and 0.75X at last review.

The third largest loan is the L-3 Communications Loan
($80.7 million - 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by an eight
building office/industrial complex totaling 901,000 SF located in
Salt Lake City, Utah. The complex was 100% leased as of June 2010,
the same as at last review and securitization. Performance has
improved due to an increase in rents. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.06X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Two and Affirms 21 CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two
classes and affirmed 21 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HQ7:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans. The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.4% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.9%. The cumulative base expected loss
plus realized losses represents 8.1% of the current balance
compared to 6.7% of the outstanding balance at Moody's previous
review. Moody's stressed scenario loss is 16.7% of the current
balance. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated
for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 22, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

Deal Performance

As of the April14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 12% to
$1.72 billion from $1.95 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 255 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 29% of the pool. Three loans, representing 2% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Eighty-six loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $46.4 million (56% loss severity).
The pool had realized an aggregate $15.1 million loss at last
review. Thirteen loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$23 million loss (39% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$6.5 million appraisal reduction for two of the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 26 poorly
performing loan representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$28.5 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 94% and 93% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 100% compared to 101% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.04X, respectively, compared to
1.40X and 1.03X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 55 compared to 57 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the 261 Fifth Avenue Loan
($141 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
434,000 square foot (SF) office building located in New York City.
The property was 96% leased as of March 2011 compared to 89% at
last review. Despite the increase in occupancy, performance has
declined slightly due to increased expenses. The loan is interest
only for its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124%
and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.78X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the U-Store-It Portfolio Loan
($80 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 29 self-storage properties located in 14 states.
Facility sizes range from 246 units to 1,014 units and total
16,318 SF. Performance has been stable. The loan is interest only
for its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
1.05X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is Hilltop Mall Loan ($64.4 million -- 3.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1 million SF regional mall
(564,410 SF of collateral) located in Richmond, California. The
loan has been on the watchlist since June 2010 due to low
occupancy. The collateral's largest tenants are Walmart (34% of
the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration January 2022) and 24
Hour Fitness (7% of the NRA, lease expiration January 2016). The
center is also anchored by Macy's, JC Penny and Sears, which are
not part of the collateral. The loan sponsor is Simon Property
Group Inc. As of December 2010, the property's inline occupancy
was 55%. Moody's believes that there is a high likelihood of
default due to the property's decline in performance and near term
maturity loan maturity of July 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 133% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 132% and 0.76X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Five CMBS Classes of MSDWC 2002-HQ
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed five classes of Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter Capital Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-HQ on review for possible downgrade:

   -- Cl. H, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on May 14, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on May 14, 2008 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jul 19, 2005 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Nov 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to the expectation of
increased interest shortfalls beginning with the May 2011
remittance statement. The pool contains one specially service
loan, Southwick Office Building 1 ($4.4 million -- 1.2%), which is
real estate owned (REO). The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage, LLC, has declared this loan as non-recoverable and
informed Moody's that it will be recouping approximately $140,000
in previous advances on this loan during the next two months,
causing an increase in interest shortfalls. Based on the most
recent remittance statement, interest shortfalls total $602,200
and affect Classes O through L.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated November 18, 2010. Please see
ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on Moodys.com for the last
rating action and the rating history.

Deal And Performance Summary

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 57% to $364.8
million from $845.9 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 32% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
62% of the pool. Eight loans, representing 16% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Fourteen loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC; formerly the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $6.7 million (15% loss severity), which
is essentially the same at last review. The only loan in special
servicing is the Southwick Office Building 1 Loan.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool, as well as the affect of interest shortfalls on the rated
bonds.


NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Fitch Affirms 5 Classes of Notes at 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed five classes issued
by Newcastle CDO VI, Limited (Newcastle VI) as a result of
significant negative credit migration on the underlying
collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, approximately 31.5%
of the portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, 64% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
32.1% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared
to 68.1% and 25.9%, respectively, at last review. As of the April
18, 2011 trustee report, 25.4% is considered default per the
transaction documents, compared to 22.1% at last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'. Based on this analysis,
the class I-MM notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent
with the rating assigned.

For the class I-B through IV notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class I-B notes have been downgraded and the class II through
IV notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable. On the April 26, 2011 payment date, the class II
through IV notes received interest paid in kind (PIK) whereby the
principal amount of the notes is written up by the amount of
interest due.

The class I-MM notes are money market notes that are remarketed
from time to time by the remarketing agent, Banc of America
Securities LLC ('A+/F1+' on Rating Watch Negative) and are
supported by the put agreement provided by Bank of America N.A. On
March 3, 2009, Bank of America exercised its option to terminate
the put agreement in its entirety. Fitch is therefore withdrawing
the short-term rating on the I-MM classes, while maintaining the
long-term rating.

Newcastle CDO VI closed on April 19, 2005. Currently, the
portfolio is composed of 43.7% commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) from the 2001 through 2007 vintages, 21.6%
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) from the 2004
through 2009 vintages, 19.3% real estate investment trust (REIT)
debt, and 15.4% commercial real estate loans (CREL).

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $226,488,833 class I-MM notes long-term rating downgraded to
      'CCCsf' from 'Bsf/LS3'; short-term rating of 'Bsf'
      withdrawn;

   -- $59,000,000 class I-B notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $33,496,933 class II notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $15,364,410 class III-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $5,652,182 class III-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $10,029,351 class IV-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $2,764,856 class IV-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


NEWCASTLE CDO VII: Fitch Affirms 5 Classes of Notes at 'Csf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed five classes issued
by Newcastle CDO VII, Limited/Corp. (Newcastle VII) as a result of
significant negative credit migration on the underlying
collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, approximately 59.5%
of the portfolio has been downgraded. Currently, 81.2% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and
57.2% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared
to 79% and 35.7%, respectively, at last review. As of the April
18, 2011 trustee report, 53.1% is considered in default per the
transaction documents, compared to 22.6% at last review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. However, given the
portfolio's distressed nature, Fitch believes that the probability
of default for all classes of notes can be evaluated without
factoring in potential further losses from the non-defaulted
portion of the portfolio. Therefore, this transaction was not
modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF
PCM).

On Dec. 3, 2009, the trustee notified noteholders of an event of
default (EOD) due to the Class I Par Value Ratio falling below the
103% threshold. On April 21, 2011, the holders of the majority of
the controlling class directed to accelerate the notes. In
addition, the holders of at least 66 2/3% Aggregate Outstanding
Amount of each class of notes directed to sell and liquidate the
collateral. On the April 26, 2011 payment date, the class II notes
did not receive their full and timely accrued interest. The class
II notes are a non-deferrable class and have been downgraded, due
to default in the payment of their accrued interest.

For all classes, the credit enhancement levels were compared to
the percent of distressed collateral, defaulted or imminently
defaulting (53.1%). The class I-A notes are currently receiving
interest; however, based on the April 18, 2011 trustee report, the
entire amount of interest due was paid using principal proceeds,
given insufficient interest due to a significant hedge payment;
this trend is likely to continue as the hedge notional is not set
to amortize until September 2011. As such, the class I-A notes
have been downgraded to 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable. For class I-B and classes III through V, Fitch does
not expect full recoveries given the amount of defaulted
collateral in the portfolio. Class I-B is receiving current
interest; however, the interest is being paid entirely through
principal proceeds. Further, classes III through V are receiving
interest paid in kind (PIK) whereby the principal amount of the
notes is written up by the amount of interest due.

Newcastle VII closed in Dec. 20, 2005. Currently, the portfolio is
composed of 68.2% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
from the 2004 through 2007 vintages, 16% residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS) from the 2004 through 2007 vintages,
15.1% real estate investment trust (REIT) debt, 0.2% commercial
asset backed securities (ABS), and 0.5% commercial real estate
loans (CREL).

Fitch has taken these actions:

   -- $319,682,655 class I-A floating-rate notes downgraded to
      'Csf' from 'CCsf';

   -- $21,800,000 class I-B floating-rate notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $53,000,000 class II floating-rate notes downgraded to 'Dsf'
      from 'Csf';

   -- $28,806,094 class III deferrable floating-rate notes
      affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $21,362,892 class IV-FL deferrable floating-rate notes
      affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $7,131,995 class IV-FX deferrable floating-rate notes
      affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $19,129,489 class V deferrable floating-rate notes affirmed
      at 'Csf'.


NEWTON CDO: Moody's Upgrades CBO notes Ratings
----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Newton CDO Ltd.:

   -- US$243,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2014
      (current outstanding balance of $41,858,724.95), Upgraded to
      Baa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf);

   -- US$27,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2014
      (current outstanding balance of $4,641,419.19), Upgraded to
      Baa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 75% or $140.8 million since the
rating action in May 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratio has increased since the rating action
in May 2009. As of the latest trustee report dated April 10, 2011,
the Class A overcollateralization ratio is reported at 129.42%
versus the April 2009 level of 106.73%.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in May 2009. Based on the April 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 2303 compared to 3523 in April
2009. The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults. In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $6 million from approximately $16.8 million in
April 2009.

In addition, the rating on Class A-1 Notes reflects the actual
underlying rating of the Class A-1 Notes. This underlying rating
is based solely on the intrinsic credit quality of the Class A-1
Notes in the absence of the guarantee from Syncora Guarantee Inc.,
previously known as XL Capital Assurance Inc. The above action is
a result of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach to
rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors as described in the press release dated November 10,
2008, titled "Moody's modifies approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors."

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $60.6 million, defaulted par of $6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 11.49% (implying a WARF of
2857), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 25.11%,
and a diversity score of 14. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CBO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Newton CDO Ltd., issued in March 2002, is a collateralized bond
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009. This publication incorporates rating criteria that
apply to both collateralized loan obligations and collateralized
bond obligations. Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009. In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.8 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. A summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2286)

   -- Class A-1: +2

   -- Class A-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3428)

   -- Class A-1: -1

   -- Class A-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the bond market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2. Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CBO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.

3. Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors, especially when they experience jump to
   default. Due to the deal's low diversity score and lack of
   granularity, Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial
   Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated default
   distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and/or individual
   scenario analysis.


NORTH TEXAS: Moody's Corrects Rating History; Withdraws Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Ratings corrects the rating history and
withdraws the ratings on eleven notes from two North Texas Higher
Education Authority's bonds.

Moody's has published a press release that clarifies and corrects
the press release issued on April 28, 2011 titled, "Moody's
corrects rating history and withdraws the ratings for eight notes
from two North Texas Higher Education Authority's bonds". In that
press release, the rating histories for some of the affected bonds
were not correct.

Moody's is correcting the rating history of six variable rate
demand obligation (VRDO) bonds issued by the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-1 Indenture) and five VRDO bonds
issued by the North Texas Higher Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2
Indenture). When the ratings on these bonds were initially
assigned, they were based on financial guaranty insurance policies
provided by Ambac Assurance Corporation. If a structured finance
security is wrapped by a financial guarantor, Moody's rating will
be the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and
(ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of
the guaranty) on the security. The corrections are being made to
reflect the underlying intrinsic credit quality of the notes.

In addition, because these securities were fully repaid on
2/24/2011, the ratings have been withdrawn as of that date.

The methodology that was used in rating these transactions is
"Methodology Update on Basis Risk in FFELP Student Loan-Backed
Securitization," which was published in November 2008. Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issue can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-1 Indenture) 1991C Due 4/20-2
(Bank Bond), Ser. 1996A (Bank Bond), 2006A (Bank Bond), 2006B
(Bank Bond) and 2006C (Bank Bond) is:

   -- 12/22/2008 Rating Assigned: Aa3 On Watch Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to B3 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating B3 Withdrawn

The correct short-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-1 Indenture) 1996-A is:

   -- 3/26/1996 Rating Assigned: VMIG 1

   -- 11/17/2008 Rating Downgraded to S.G. from VMIG 1

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating S.G. Withdrawn

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-1 Indenture) 1996-A is:

   -- 3/26/1996 Rating Assigned: Aaa

   -- 1/16/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 3/12/2008 Rating Aaa Confirmed

   -- 6/4/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 6/19/2008 Rating Downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

   -- 9/18/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 11/17/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch Continued Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Baa1 Downgraded to Ba3

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to B3 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating B3 Withdrawn

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2 Indenture) 1991F Due 4/20 (Bank
Bond), and 2006D (Bank Bond) is:

   -- 12/22/2008 Rating Assigned: Aa3 On Watch Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating Caa1 Withdrawn

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2 Indenture) 1991F Due 4/20 is:

   -- 4/30/1991 Rating Assigned: Aaa

   -- 1/16/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 3/12/2008 Rating Aaa Confirmed

   -- 6/4/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 6/19/2008 Rating Downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

   -- 9/18/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 11/17/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch Continued Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Baa1 Downgraded to Ba3

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating Caa1 Withdrawn

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2 Indenture) Ser. 1996C (Bank
Bond) is:

   -- 12/29/2008 Rating Assigned: Aa3 On Watch Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating Caa1 Withdrawn

The correct short-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2 Indenture) 1996-C is:

   -- 3/26/1996 Rating Assigned: VMIG 1

   -- 11/17/2008 Rating Downgraded to S.G. from VMIG 1

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating S.G. Withdrawn

The correct long-term rating history for the North Texas Higher
Education Authority, Inc. (1991-2 Indenture) 1996-C is:

   -- 3/26/1996 Rating Assigned: Aaa

   -- 1/16/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 3/12/2008 Rating Aaa Confirmed

   -- 6/4/2008 Rating Aaa On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 6/19/2008 Rating Downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

   -- 9/18/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 11/17/2008 Rating Aa3 On Watch Continued Direction Uncertain

   -- 1/30/2009 Rating Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

   -- 3/3/2009 Rating Baa1 On Watch for Possible Downgrade

   -- 4/13/2009 Rating Baa1 Downgraded to Ba3

   -- 7/29/2009 Rating Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3

   -- 2/24/2011 Rating Caa1 Withdrawn


PALOMAR POMERADO:  Fitch Downgrades L-T Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades to 'BB' from 'BBB-' and simultaneously
withdraws the long-term rating on series 1999 Certificates of
Participation issued by the Palomar Pomerado Health System (a
California Local Health Care District) on behalf of Indian Health
Council, Inc.

The rating downgrade reflects lack of compliance with certain
covenants articulated in a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the Indian Health Council, the trustee, the USDA, and the
Indian Health Service. Since the initial rating, the MOU has been
the primary rating driver as it put in place an intercept
mechanism that distributed to the trustee, on a monthly basis,
Indian Health Service funds that, in aggregate, were sufficient to
make annual debt service payments on the certificates. Fitch has
recently become aware that this mechanism is no longer being
adhered to.

The rating withdrawal is based on the lack of receipt of timely
and relevant information sufficient to maintain an accurate
rating.


PUTNAM STRUCTURED PRODUCT:  Fitch Affirms 7 Classes
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes and withdrawn the short-
term ratings on two classes of notes issued by Putnam Structured
Product CDO 2001-1, Ltd. (Putnam 2001-1). The rating actions are:

   -- $23,076,223 class A-1MM-a notes affirmed at 'A+sf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable; short-term rating to 'WD' from 'F1';

   -- $20,603,770 class A-1MM-b notes affirmed at 'A+sf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable; short-term rating to 'WD' from 'F1';

   -- $43,267,917 class A-1SS notes affirmed at 'A+sf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $33,708,716 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'BBsf'; LS revised
      to 'LS3' from 'LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

   -- $8,594,801 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'Csf';

   -- $9,613,686 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' for
the class A-1MM-a, A-1MM-b, A-1SS (together, class A-1) and class
A-2 notes.

Breakeven levels for the class B and class C-1 and C-2 (together,
class C) notes indicated ratings below SF PCM's 'CCC' default
level, the lowest level of defaults projected by SF PCM. For these
classes, Fitch compared the class's respective credit enhancement
(CE) levels to expected losses from the distressed and defaulted
assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This comparison
indicates that default continues to appear probable for the class
B notes and inevitable for the class C notes at or prior to
maturity. The class B notes continue to receive timely interest
distributions and the class C notes continue to pay in kind.

The current interest rate swap counterparty, AIG Financial
Products Corp. (AIG), does not meet Fitch's counterparty criteria,
titled 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance
Transactions'. In its analysis, Fitch considered the impact of a
hypothetical default by the counterparty as one of the scenarios.
Given that the interest rate swap is out of the money, the
scenario assumed that the swap will not be terminated by the
issuer and instead the CDO will continue to pay its leg of the
swap but not receive payment from the counterparty until the swap
expiration in August 2013. The results in this scenario indicated
that all notes have sufficient credit enhancement levels to endure
the hypothetical counterparty default under the relevant rating
stresses.

The affirmation of the class A-1 and A-2 notes reflects the
deleveraging of the structure offset by the negative migration
of the collateral. All principal amortizations and excess
interest proceeds have been used to redeem the class A-1 notes'
balance due to the failing class A/B overcollateralization test.
Since Fitch's last review in May 2010, the class A-1 notes have
received $26.9 million of principal repayments or 23.6% of the
notes balance at last review.

The Outlook for the class A-1 and class A-2 notes will remain
Stable to reflect Fitch's view that the notes have sufficient
enhancement levels to offset potential further deterioration of
the underlying portfolio over the next one to two years. Fitch
does not assign outlooks to tranches rated 'CCC' or below.

The short-term rating of the class A-1MM-a and A-1MM-b notes are
dependent on the short-term rating of the put provider, AIG, and
are withdrawn following the withdrawal of the short-term rating of
AIG by Fitch.

The Loss Severity (LS) rating of 'LS3' for the class A-1 and A-2
notes indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating. Fitch does not assign LS ratings to
tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

Since the last review, the credit quality of the collateral has
remained relatively stable with approximately 23.1% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 2.1 notches and 7.4% of
the portfolio upgrade a weighted average of 1.7 notches.
Approximately 27% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 12.5% has a rating in the 'CCC+' rating
category or lower, compared to 28% and 13.6% respectively, at last
review.

Putnam 2001-1 is a cash flow structured finance collateralized
debt obligation (SF CDO) that closed on Nov. 30, 2001. The
portfolio is monitored by Putnam Advisory Company, LLC and is
compromised of 32.3% commercial and residential real estate
investment trusts, 22.6% residential mortgage-backed securities,
17.7% corporate bonds, 14.7% commercial mortgage-backed
securities, 5.2% SF CDOs, 4% commercial and consumer asset-backed
securities, and 3.5% corporate CDOs from 1995 through 2006 vintage
transactions.


RESIX FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades $87.1 Mil. Synthetic Jumbo RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches from three synthetic jumbo deals issued by RESIX. The
reference portfolios of these transactions consist primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate and adjustable-rate prime Jumbo residential
mortgages purchased from various originators.

Ratings Rationale

The credit-linked notes issued by RESIX replicate the cash flow of
select subordinate tranches issued by synthetic RMBS deals RESI
2003-C, RESI 2003-D, and RESI 2004-A. RESI deals are synthetic
transactions that provide the owner of a sizable pool of mortgages
(the "Protection Buyer") credit protection through a credit
default swap with the issuer (the "Protection Seller") of the
notes. Through this agreement, the Protection Buyer pays a fee in
return for the transfer of a portion of the reference portfolio
credit risk.

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the ratings on the bonds,Moody's considered the level of
credit enhancement available for each tranche relative to updated
loss expectations of the reference pools.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

To assess ratings sensitivities, Moody's ran a 10% higher
projected loss on the reference pool of mortgages backing the RESI
deals and found that the ratings on the issued RESIX bonds do not
change as a result.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in these transactions and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-
   C

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-D

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2004-A

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades 1 and Affirms 8 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) downgraded the rating of one
class and affirmed eight classes of Salomon Brothers Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-C3:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2000
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Confirmed at A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and interest shortfalls.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss
is $42.3 million or 43.6% of the current balance. At last full
review, Moody's cumulative base expected loss was $34.8 million
or 12.9% of the previous outstanding balance. Moody's stressed
scenario loss is 44.6% of the current balance. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses
from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality
is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
current review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination
due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying performance in
the commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's
expects to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in rating SBM7 2000-C3 was "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. Moody's also considered "CMBS: Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July
2000 in analyzing the transaction. Other methodologies and factors
that may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer
can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 13 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010. Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to
$97.1 million from $914.7 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 94% of the pool. One loan, representing 0.7%
of the pool, has defeased and is collateralized with a U.S.
Government security, compared to 36.8% at last review.

Three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $24.7 million loss (18%
loss severity on average). Currently eight loans, representing 77%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Jorie Plaza Loan ($20.4 million -- 21% of the
pool), which is secured by two office buildings located in Oak
Brook, Illinois. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 due to imminent default and is currently real
estate owned (REO). The second largest specially serviced loan is
the Westland Meadows Loan ($20.1 million -- 20.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a manufactured housing property located in
Westland, Michigan. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in August 2009 due to imminent default and is in the process of
foreclosure. The third largest specially serviced loan is the
Granite State Marketplace Loan ($16.3 million total -- 16.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a grocery anchored retail property
located in Hooksett, New Hampshire. The loan was transferred into
special servicing in September 2008 due to maturity default. The
loan has been modified into a $13 million A note and $3.3 million
B note. The loan has been performing under the modification.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail, office, and industrial properties. The master servicer
has recognized an aggregate $38.1 million appraisal reduction for
the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
loss of $41.7 million (55.9% expected loss on average) for all of
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$193,000 loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H
through P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $4.0 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool
will continue to experience interest shortfalls because of
the high exposure to specially serviced loans. Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing
by the master servicer based on a determination of non-
recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and full and partial
year 2010 operating results for 79% and 72% of the performing
pool, respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 77% compared to 82% at
last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.21X and 1.68X, respectively, compared to
1.00X and 1.41X at last full review. Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top performing conduit loan is the Seatac Village Shopping
Center Loan ($13.7 million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured
by a 164,326 square foot retail center located in in suburban
Seattle, Washington. Major tenants include T.J. Maxx, DSW, and Big
5 Sporting Goods. The center was 72% leased as of September 2010,
the same as last review. Linens N Things, which leased 20% of the
net rentable area (NRA) at securitization, vacated in 2008. The
loan had an anticipated payment date (ARD) of September 1, 2009.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.16X, respectively,
compared to 91% and 1.19X at last full review.


SANTANDER DRIVE: S&P Gives 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-S2's
$545.52 million automobile receivables-backed notes series
2011-S2.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 17,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    * The availability of approximately 46.5%, 38.7%, 31.1%, and
      25.6% credit support (based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios), including excess spread, for the class B, C, D,
      and E notes. "These credit support levels provide coverage
      of more than 2.30x, 1.85x, 1.50x, and 1.25x our expected net
      loss range of 18.50%-19.50% (of the outstanding collateral
      balance) for the class B, C, D, and E notes, and are
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings," S&P
      stated.

    * The soft linking of the ratings to the rating on Santander
      Consumer USA Inc. (SC USA; A/Stable/A-1) and capping the
      rating on the class B notes to 'AA' while the SDART 2010-A
      notes are outstanding. Upon an event of default in the
      underlying transaction (Santander Drive Auto Receivables
      Trust 2010-A [SDART 2010-A]), including breaches of
      representations, warranties, and covenants, the underlying
      pool can be sold with the approval of 100% of SDART 2010-A
      noteholders. As a result, the SDART 2011-S2 noteholders have
      no liquidation voting rights until the SDART 2010-A notes
      are repaid.

      Accordingly, for this transaction, the notes rely on the
      performance of Santander Consumer USA under the transaction
      documents as a mitigant to the sale of the portfolio for
      less than par, after an event of default and acceleration,
      rather than relying on the typical liquidation voting rights
      granted to subordinated noteholders under transaction
      documents. "Although we believe that the risk of breaching a
      nonmonetary event of default is minimal given the 'A' rating
      of the servicer and its performance track record to date, we
      believe that capping the rating on the class B notes to 'AA'
      while the SDART 2010-A notes are outstanding, and soft-
      linking the preliminary ratings on the 2011-S2 notes to the
      rating on SC USA (A/Stable/A-1)in the event that SC USA is
      downgraded, properly reflects the subordinated position of
      the class B notes relative to the senior SDART 2010-A notes,
      and the lack of liquidation voting rights granted to the
      notes being offered in this transaction," S&P explained.

    * The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve fund, and excess spread.

    * The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are consistent
      with the assigned 'AA (sf)','A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB
      (sf)' preliminary ratings. The stressed cash flow scenarios
      include a breach of the level I and/or level II triggers in
      the SDART 2010-A underlying transaction. In this scenario,
      receivables collections that flow from SDART 2010-A to SDART
      2011-S2 are temporarily disrupted. Nonetheless, timely
      interest would continue to be paid to class B, C, D, and E
      noteholders due to the dedicated liquidity reserve account,
      which was sized to cover 24 months of fees and interest on
      the subordinated notes.

    * "The rating on the class B notes remaining within one
      category, and those on the class C, D, and E notes remaining
      within two categories, of the assigned preliminary ratings
      under a moderate stress scenario of 1.5x our expected loss
      level. This is within the outer boundaries for credit
      deterioration during the first year as outlined in Standard
      & Poor's rating stability criteria," according to S&P

    * The underlying receivables' high degree of seasoning (26
      months comprising 18 months as of SDART 2010-A's closing
      plus an additional eight months of securitization
      performance).

    * The transaction's legal structure.

    * SC USA's 10-year history of originating, underwriting,
      servicing, and securitizing subprime auto loans.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2011-S2

Class             Rating         Amount (mil. $)
B                 AA (sf)                 131.42
C                 A (sf)                  128.94
D                 BBB (sf)                161.18
E                 BB (sf)                 123.98


SATURNS SEARS: Moody's Reviews Rating of Units for Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
rating of these units issued by SATURNS Sears Roebuck Acceptance
Corp. Debenture Backed Series 2003-1:

   -- $60,191,699 of 7.25% Callable Units due June 1, 2032; Ba3,
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; Previously on
      April 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.00% Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. debentures due
June 1, 2032, which were placed on review for downgrade by Moody's
on May 11, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating Repackaged Securities published in April 2010.


SHASTA CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
---------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Shasta CLO I Ltd.:

   -- US$296,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021
      (current balance of $286,570,908), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
      previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$45,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
      April 2021 (current balance of $43,566,523), Upgraded to Aa1
      (sf); previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$38,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
      Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf);

   -- US$26,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
      Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
      Downgraded to B2 (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
      Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and increase in the overcollateralization ratios of the
rated notes since the rating action in August 2009.

The deal has benefited from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in August 2009.
Based on the April 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2428 compared to 2934 in July 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 5.2% of the
underlying portfolio versus 14.2% in July 2009. The deal also
experienced a decrease in defaults. In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to $3.4 million from
approximately $41 million in July 2009.

Moody's also notes that the overcollateralization ratios of the
rated notes have improved primarily due to higher than previously
anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted securities as a
result of restructuring of defaulted securities. As of the latest
trustee report dated April 2011, the Senior Class A, Class A,
Class B-1L and Class B-2L overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 123.38%, 115.24%, 110.2%, and 105.59%, respectively,
versus July 2009 levels of 118.17%, 110.5%, 105.76%, and 100.33%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $447 million, defaulted par of $9 million, a
weighted average default probability of 25.2% (implying a WARF of
3250), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.8%, and
a diversity score of 59. These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in Moody's cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Shasta CLO I Ltd. issued on January 24, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. A summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2600)

   -- Class A-1L: +1

   -- Class A-1LV: +1

   -- Class A-2L: +2

   -- Class A-3L: +2

   -- Class B-1L: +2

   -- Class B-2L: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3900)

   -- Class A-1L: -1

   -- Class A-1LV: -1

   -- Class A-2L: -2

   -- Class A-3L: -1

   -- Class B-1L: -2

   -- Class B-2L: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
   the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.


SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL:  Fitch Downgrades Seven Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes of Sovereign Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-C1.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default. The total Fitch
modeled losses were 6% of the current pool.

The loans in this transaction do not have the same features as a
typical commercial mortgage conduit loans originated for
securitization. Additionally, the loans lack some of the typical
structural features and reporting requirements seen in CMBS
transactions. Therefore, Fitch applied additional stresses,
including adjustments of operating income and cap rates.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 36.8% to $640.6 million from
$1.01 billion at issuance. As of April 2011, there are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $686.156 affecting classes J
through N.

In total, there are six loans (3% of the pool) in special
servicing as of the April 2011 remittance date, with one
additional loan (0.5%) that has since transferred. At Fitch's last
review, there were seven loans (4.3%) in special servicing.

The two largest contributors of expected losses are a two-property
retail portfolio located in Scarsdale, NY (1.7% of the pool
balance) and an office property located in Princeton, NJ (1.3% of
the pool). Fitch modeled losses are based on actual performance or
expected changes in performance.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) to these
classes:

   -- $20.3 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS4';

   -- $10.1 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $7.6 million class F to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $2.5 million class G to 'Csf/RR2' from 'CCCsf/RR1';

   -- $2.5 million class H to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

These classes have been downgraded due to the classes being fully
depleted:

   -- $3.8 million class J to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'Csf/RR6';

   -- $2.5 million class K to 'Dsf/RR6' from 'Csf/RR6'.

Class L and Class M are fully depleted and remain at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the Loss Severity
(LS) ratings:

   -- $252.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $207.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $105.2 million class A-J at 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $15.2 million class B at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $17.7 million class C at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The non-rated class N is fully depleted. Class A-1 is paid in
full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only class X.


SYMPHONY CLO: S&P Rates Class E Floating-Rate Notes 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Symphony CLO VII Ltd./Symphony CLO VII Inc.'s
$487.0 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 16,
2011. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    * The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

    * The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

    * The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

    * The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

    * The collateral manager's experienced management team.

    * "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
      assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.27% to 10.80%," S&P stated.

    * The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

    * The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees; subordinated
      hedge termination payments; collateral manager incentive
      fees; and subordinated note payments, to principal proceeds
      for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Symphony CLO VII Ltd./Symphony CLO VII Inc.

Class                Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)               334.0
B                    AA (sf)                 56.5
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                  41.5
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                27.5
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                 27.5
F (deferrable)       NR                      22.0
Subordinated notes   NR                      44.0

NR -- Not rated


TW HOTEL: Moody's Affirms 14 CMBS Classes of 2005-LUX
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 pooled
classes of TW Hotel Funding 2005, LLC, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-LUX. Moody's rating action:

   -- Cl. A1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations reflect the positive impact of lower leverage due
to principal pay down of $10 million, the inherent value of the
asset, strong sponsorship, and improving market fundamentals for
luxury lodging properties

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated June 17, 2010. Please see the
ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last
rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased to $310 million from
$320 million at last review and $425 million at securitization.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on October 28, 2009
due to imminent default but remains current. Terms of loan
modification and extension agreement included principal pay down
of the trust debt by $25 million, pledge of additional collateral
(Montecito Country Club located in Santa Barbara, CA) and a new
loan maturity date of January 9, 2011, with a one year extension
option.

The remaining one year extension option was exercised with an
additional principal pay down of $10 million in January 2011,
extending the loan to January 2012. The principal repayment was
made on pro rata basis within the trust. The transaction has a
modified pro rata structure where payments are made on pro rata
basis until the loan balance is reduced to 35% of the initial
balance. There is a mezzanine loan of $155 million outside the
trust.

The Ty Warner Portfolio Loan ($310 million -- 100% of pooled
balance) is secured by four luxury hotel properties totaling 686
guest rooms located in New York, California and Los Cabos, Mexico
plus Montecito Country Club. The hotels include Four Seasons
Hotel, New York; Four Seasons Resort - The Biltmore, Santa
Barbara; Las Ventanas Al Paraiso, A Rosewood Resort, Los Cabos,
Mexico; and San Ysidro Ranch, A Rosewood Resort, Santa Barbara, A
Ty Warner Property. These luxury price segment hotels suffered
dramatic declines in operating performance over the last two
years. But as Moody's anticipated during last review, properties
have showed improvement in net cash flow in 2010 and during the
first two months of 2011. Moody's expects the current trend to
continue in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, each of the properties are
market leaders in respective submarkets, and are considered
irreplaceable.

The hotels' net operating income (NOI) before replacement reserves
for 2010 was $33.8 million, up from $18.4 million in 2009. All
four properties showed significant increases in operating
performance. Comparing NOI for the first two months of 2011
($2.5 million) versus the first two months of 2010 ($61,000)
highlights the dramatic turnaround the luxury segment of the
lodging sector has undergone over the last two years.

Moody's trust loan to value (LTV) ratio is 82% compared to 90% at
last review. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
for the trust is at 0.83X compared to 0.58X at last review.
Although the credit metrics have improved since last review due
to principal pay down and increase in NCF, the current ratings
reflect stabilized operating performance levels not yet achieved.
As such, Moody's believes the pool warrants an affirmation at
this time. The trust has not experienced any losses since
securitization. There is an outstanding interest shortfall
totaling $7,071 affecting the lowest rated class, Class N.


UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Class B-1-A Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the Class
B-1-A notes and confirmed the rating of the B-1-B notes issued by
UCAT 2005-1, which is a resecuritization of certain pooled
aircraft leased-backed notes. The complete ratings actions are:

   Issuer: UCAT 2005-1

   -- Class B-1-A Notes maturing in July 2031, downgraded from Ba2
      (sf) to B3 (sf); Previously placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- Class B-1-B Notes maturing in July 2031, confirmed Caa2
      (sf); previously placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The assets of the trust consist of $145 million face amount of
Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT) Class A-1 and A-2 Notes (the
underlying LIFT Notes). The rating action stems from the downgrade
of the LIFT Class A-1 and A-2 Notes as a result of materially
lower pay-down expectations for these underlying LIFT notes.
Interest and principal payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are
allocated to pay UCAT's Class A-1 Interest, Class A-1 principal,
Class B-1-A principal and Class B-1-B principal, sequentially.
Since interest payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are greater
than interest payments on the UCAT Notes, excess spread is
generated which is applied as principal on the UCAT Notes to
create overcollateralization (OC). In addition to the excess
spread, as of April 2010, the Class A-1 benefited from total
subordination of 40% comprised of the Class B-1-A,B-1-B and OC,
while Class B-1-A benefits from 18% subordination comprised of
Class B-1-B and OC.

The steep decline in interest rates in the past year or so has
reduced the amount of interest paid on the underlying LIFT Notes,
and therefore has reduced the excess spread that was available to
pay down the UCAT Notes. This in turn, reduces the payment
prospects, particularly for the Class B-1-A and B-1-B Notes due to
their subordinate position in the waterfall.

The analysis focused on the effective LTV for the UCAT notes based
on the UCAT structure and the LTV of underlying Class A-1 and A-2
LIFT notes. In addition, Moody's also conducted cashflow analysis
for the underlying LIFT transaction and the effect on UCAT Class B
notes.

Moody's notes that its review of UCAT Class A-1, which benefits
from all cash flow until paid in full, indicates it to be
adequately protected for its rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in
March 1999.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


WELLS FARGO: Fitch Issues Presale Report on WFRBS 2011-C3
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C3 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates:

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Loss Severity
(LS) ratings and Outlooks:

  -- $102,839,000 class A-1 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $313,090,000 class A-2 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $225,499,000 class A-3 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $556,955,000 class A-4 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,198,383,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41,573,000 class B 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46,995,000 class C 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $79,531,000 class D 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,690,000 class E 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19,883,000 class F 'Bsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 11, 2011. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$247,630,393 interest-only class X-B, or the $37,958,393 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 73 loans secured by 144 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.45 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were originated by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, C-III
Commercial Mortgage LLC, Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC, RCG LV
Debt IV Non-REIT Assets Holdings, LLC, and RBS Financial Products
Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 66.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.1% of the pool and asset
summary reviews of 87.1% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.26 times (x), a Fitch stressed loan-to value (LTV) of
90.9%, and a Fitch debt yield of 10.3%. Fitch's aggregate net cash
flow represents a variance of 6.4% to issuer cash flows.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Wells Fargo and
Midland Loan Services, Inc., rated 'CMS2-' and 'CSS1',
respectively, by Fitch.


ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 5 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 5 classes of
notes issued by ZAIS Investment Grade Limited X. The classes of
notes affected by the rating actions are:

   -- US$13,500,000 Class S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
      2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 9, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$152,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2057, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on September 9,
      2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

   -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2057, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on September 9,
      2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

   -- US$59,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2057, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on September 9,
      2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

   -- US$75,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2057, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on September 9,
      2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the improvement in the credit quality of the
portfolio.

The deal has benefited from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio since the last rating action in September
2009. Based on the March 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2789 compared to 3583 in the July 2009 report.
The transaction also experienced a decrease in the number of
defaults. In particular, the dollar amount of securities in
default has decreased to about $107 million from approximately
$162 million in July 2009.

As of the latest trustee report in March 2011, the Class A
overcollateralization ratio improved and is reported at 78.53%
versus July 2009 levels of 69.16%. Currently all the OC tests are
failing resulting in diverted interest proceeds to the payment of
the principal on the Class A-1 notes and resulting in deferred
interest payments to the Classes B, C and D Notes. All the IC
ratios are passing their test levels.

Due to the improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio, the
actions also take into consideration the diminished risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default. An Event of Default
may occur due to a missed interest payment on Class A or Class S
or due to the Class A-3 Par Value Ratio falling below 100%. The
Class S and Class A interest payments are covered by a cashflow
swap with a highly rated counterparty. And the Class A-2 Par Value
Ratio currently stands at 143.75%.

ZAIS Investment Grade Limited X. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below. Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched down to Ca:

   -- Class S: 0

   -- Class A-1a: -1

   -- Class A-1b: -1

   -- Class A-2: -1

   -- Class A-3: -1

   -- Class A-4: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched up to Caa1:

   -- Class S: 0

   -- Class A-1a: 0

   -- Class A-1b: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class A-3: 0

   -- Class A-4: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0


                           *********

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                           *********

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