TCR_Public/110508.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 8, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 126

                            Headlines

505 CLO II: Moody's Upgrades Class E Notes to A1 From Ba2
ABN AMRO: Moody's Downgrades $150 Million of Prime Jumbo RMBS
ACAS BUSINESS: S&P Places 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Action on Six Second Lien RMBS
ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Rating to 'Caa3'

ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Downgrades Cl. B Rating to 'B3'
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Rating to 'Caa3'
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Class A-1A Notes Rating at 'Ca'
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms 4 CRE CDO Classes Ratings at 'C'
ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades $1.8-Bil. of Subprime RMBS

ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Gives 2004-W10 Cl. M-7 'C' Rating
ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Hikes Class F CLO Notes Rating From Caa3
AVIATION CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'B-'
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Says Omega Loan High Risk of Default
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on One 2002-X1 CMBS Class

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's May Cut Rating on 6 2006-5 CMBS Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Classes to 'BB-'
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Class O Notes Rating to 'CCC'
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of BSCMS 2007-PWR15
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Cuts Six 2006-1 Commercial Loan Tranches

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades 16 Classes of 2007-PWR16 Certs
CABELAS CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Loss Severity Ratings
CALCULUS SCRE: Moody's Affirms Five CRE CDO Classes Ratings at 'C'
CALCULUS SCRE: Moody's Affirms One CRE CDO Class Rating at 'C'
CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts 8 Classes of 2007-CD4 Bonds to 'C/RR6'

CENTERLINE 2007: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 CRE CDO Classes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $2.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $2.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades $700MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to 'B+'

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three CMBS Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four 2005-C1 Classes to 'C'
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Junk Ratings on Class I & J Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms 18 2002-CKS4 CMBS Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.55BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Gives Five CMBS Classes C(sf) Ratings
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Class E Notes Rating to 'BB+'
FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1999-C2 CMBS Classes
FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Class E CLO Notes Rating to Caa1

GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Class J Rating to Caa1
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Cuts 2005-1 Cl. B Tranche to 'B3(sf)'
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 CRE CDO Classes

GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 10 Series 2005-ROCK Classes
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $72.8MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Raises Class C Notes Rating From 'BB+'
ICE 1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
IXION PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 25 Notes to 'D'

JP MORGAN: Fitch Upgrades 5 Classes of 2003-CIBC6 Bonds
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 17 2004-C1 CMBS Classes
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Cl. 1-A-2 Rating to 'Ba2'
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Cl. H Rating at B1; Cl. J Rating at C
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of JPMCC 2007-LDP11

KEY COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 CMBS Classes
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 23 CMBS Classes
LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Downgrades Cl. B Rating to 'Ba1'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms 20 CMBS Classes of MLMT 2005-LC1

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 22 2005-CKI1 CMBS Classes
MKP CBO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class A-2 2039 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 3 2000-Life2 Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Cuts $6.2MM of 2005-TOP19 Bonds to 'CCsf'
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 10 2001-TOP3 CMBS Classes

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Confirms 2004-NC5 Cl. B-2 Rating at Ca(sf)
MSC 2007-SRR3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 11 CRE CDO Classes at 'C'
MSC 2007-SRR4: Moody's Affirms Class B & C Ratings at 'C'
NEW SOUTH HOME: Moody's Confirms Ratings on $23MM of Subprime RMBS
OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Class B-1L Rating to 'Ba1'

OWS CLO: Moody's Hikes $8.5MM of Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
PARADISO TRUST: S&P Affirms Rating on Trust II S.A. Notes to 'B'
PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Cuts Cl. B & C Mezzanine Notes to 'Ca'
PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Downgrades Class A-2 Senior Notes to 'Ba3'
PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Downgrades Class A-1 Rating to 'Ba1'

R.E. REPACK: Moody's Downgrades CRE CDO Class Rating to Ba1
REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Downgrades TRUP CDO Notes Rating
REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 & B-2 Notes to 'Ca'
RENTAL CAR: Moody's Reviews ABS Ratings for Possible Upgrade
RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $12.4BB Synthetic Jumbo RMBS

RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $12.4BB Synthetic Jumbo RMBS
ROSEMONT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 2013 Notes
SANKATY HIGH: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'D'
SBI HOME: Moody's Confirms Cl. 1M-4 Rating at 'Ba2'
SEAWALL 2006: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five CRE CDO Classes

SEAWALL SPC: Moody's Affirms One CRE CDO Class Rating at 'Ba1'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 184 Tranches
SOLOSO CDO: Moody's Cuts $45.5MM of Class A-2L Notes to 'Ca'
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings of Six 2003-AR4 Tranches
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $919.5MM of Jumbo RMBS

VITALITY RE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class B Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 21 2005-C17 CMBS Classes
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $3.9Bb of Prime Jumbo RMBS

* S&P Lowers Ratings on 18 Classes of Pass-Through Certs. to 'D'


                            *********


505 CLO II: Moody's Upgrades Class E Notes to A1 From Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by 505 CLO II Ltd.:

   -- US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      November 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 8,
      2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$55,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due November 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July
      8, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

   -- US$30,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due November 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July
      8, 2010 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

   -- US$15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due November 2018, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July
      8, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 77% or $143 million since the
rating action in July 2010. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in July 2010. As of the latest trustee report dated
April 1, 2011, the Class A/B, and Class C overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 320.5% and 231.5% respectively, versus June
2010 levels of 166.5% and 147.6% respectively.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
Based on the April 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 3354 compared to 3251 in June 2010, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 17% of the
underlying portfolio versus 18% in June 2010.

While the transaction has benefited from delevering, Moody's notes
that its rating action on the Class E Notes reflects the
consideration of potential risk that the Class E notes may defer
interest during the next few payment periods. The risk of deferral
exists due to the high weighted average coupon of the rated notes
as well as limited cash flow based on scheduled interest and
principal proceeds.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $473.2 million, defaulted par of $12.9 million,
weighted average default probability of 31.81% (implying a WARF of
5586), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.4%, and
a diversity score of 26. These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

505 CLO II Ltd., issued in December 2008, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Other methodologies used in this rating were "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs
that were not updated within the last 15 months, a 1.5 notch-
equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 12-15
months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs
last updated between 6-12 months ago. For each CE where the
related exposure constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool,
Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only
on the CEs representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool)
in lieu of the stresses. Notwithstanding, in all cases the lowest
assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis described, Moody's also
performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated
notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary of the
impact of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of
WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (4468)

   -- Class A-1: 0
   -- Class A-2: 0
   -- Class B: 0
   -- Class C: 0
   -- Class D: 0
   -- Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (6703)

   -- Class A-1: 0
   -- Class A-2: 0
   -- Class B: 0
   -- Class C: 0
   -- Class D: 0
   -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus selling defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates. Moody's also conducted stress
   tests to assess the collateral pool's concentration risk in
   obligors bearing a credit estimate that constitute more than 3%
   of the collateral pool.


ABN AMRO: Moody's Downgrades $150 Million of Prime Jumbo RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from five prime
jumbo deals issued by ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation.  The
collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien,
fixed rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.  .

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%.  in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-9

   -- Cl. M, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2005
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2005
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-10

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-12

   -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-3

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABN AMRO Mortgage Corporation, Multi-Class Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-4

   -- Cl.  M, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2005
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl.  B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.  B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ACAS BUSINESS: S&P Places 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 49
tranches from 14 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.

"At the same time, we placed our ratings on nine tranches from six
U.S. CDO transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications,"
S&P said.

All the tranches with ratings being placed on CreditWatch positive
come from CDO transactions backed by securities issued by
corporate obligors. The issuance amount of these tranches equals
$2.885 billion.

Most of the CreditWatch positive placements on the CLOs reflect
the continued improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
corporate securities. The improved underlying credit quality
performance reflects both the increase in upgrades on the
underlying speculative-grade corporate securities and the
steep reduction in default rates. Based on a recent Standard &
Poor's Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) report, the lagging 12-
month institutional loan default rate fell to a 38 month low of
0.95% by principal amount and 1.5% by issuer count. "As a result
of these improvements, we believe that the tranches with ratings
we placed on CreditWatch positive may be able to support higher
ratings," S&P noted.

S&P continued, "We also placed our ratings on nine tranches from
six transactions on CreditWatch negative due to deterioration in
the credit quality of the deals' portfolios. Three of these
transactions are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDOs of asset-
backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large part
by mezzanine tranches of U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and other SF securities; one is an investment-
grade SF CDO of ABS, which was collateralized at origination
primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated tranches of U.S. RMBS and
other SF securities; one is a CDO backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities; and one is a CDO retranched from another
collateralized bond obligation retranche that is already on
CreditWatch negative. The CreditWatch negative placements reflect
the deterioration in the credit quality of the securities held by
these transactions. The issuance amount of the tranches with
ratings placed on CreditWatch negative equals $0.846 billion."

"We will resolve the CreditWatch placements after we complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions. We expect to resolve these CreditWatch
placements within 90 days. We will continue to monitor the CDO
transactions we rate and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as we deem appropriate," S&P added.

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Positive

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
B                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB- (sf)
C                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)
D                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

ARCC Commercial Loan Trust 2006
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Babson Loan Opportunity CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BB (sf)

Comstock Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos    A- (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)

Duane Street CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)
E                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D-1                 B- (sf)/Watch Pos    B- (sf)
D-2                 B- (sf)/Watch Pos    B- (sf)

Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
B                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)

Jasper CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D-1                 CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)
D-2                 CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Katonah VII CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-1                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)
A-2                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
D                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Moselle CLO S.A.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
B1E                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
B1L                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)

Nob Hill CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-2                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)
E                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Valhalla CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-2                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Veritas CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
B                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB- (sf)
E                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BB- (sf)

Vinacasa CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A1                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)
A2                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)
B                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB (sf)
C                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Negative

ACA ABS 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-2                 BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)

Aspen Funding I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-2L                BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Crest G-Star 2001-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
B-1                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC+ (sf)
B-2                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC+ (sf)

Restructured Asset Backed Securities (RABS) 2003-3
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-3                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC+ (sf)

Stack 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)
B                   B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Whitehawk CDO Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                   From
A-1LT               BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Action on Six Second Lien RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from six
assorted deals issued between 2001 and 2007.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of closed end second lien
loans and HELOCs.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools and HELOCs in conjunction with
home price and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.
The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second
lien pools and HELOCs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities"
published in December 2008.  Other methodologies used include
"Second Lien RMBS Loss Projection Methodology: April 2010"
published in April 2010.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities wrapped by
Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their underlying rating
without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The Class G tranche from the CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-
HF1 transaction was withdrawn since the balance of this tranche is
zero and can never increase due to an Amortization Event.  The
Class G no longer funds additional draws after cumulative losses
exceeded a certain threshold, causing an "Amortization Event".
The tranche is treated as paid off and is withdrawn according to
"Moody's Guidelines for the Withdrawal of Ratings" dated December
5, 2008.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the collateral pool were to increase by 10%,
model implied results indicate that the ratings would not change.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-3

   -- Cl. III-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18,
      2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18,
      2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-PO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18,
      2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Home Loan Owner Trust 2001-A

   -- Cl. B Ctf, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S6

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-3

   -- Cl. B-2A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman ABS Corporation Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed
Notes, Series 2005-1

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL1

   -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-HF1

   -- Cl. G, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Rating to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded one class and affirms 16 classes of Notes
issued by Ansonia CDO 2007-1 Ltd. due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate,
and an increase in defaulted assets and defaulted reference
obligations since last review. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      owngraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ansonia CDO 2007-1 Ltd. is a static hybrid CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of cash assets in and credit default swap
contracts referencing to commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) (94% of the pool balance), and CRE CDO (6%). All of the
CMBS cash assets and reference obligations were securitized in
2004 (38%), 2005 (24%), 2006 (36%), and 2007 (2%). As of the March
21, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including Preferred Shares, has decreased to $497
million from $500 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the Class A-1 Notes. The paydown was due to payments of
interest in respect of Defaulted Securities being classified as
Principal Proceeds per the Indenture dated as of July 18, 2007.

Thirty-eight cash assets and reference obligations with a par or
notional balance of $325 million (65 % of the pool balance) were
listed as either Defaulted Securities or Impaired Securities, as
of the March 21, 2011 Trustee report, compared to twenty-six (45%)
as of last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,514 compared to 3,793 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings is as follows: Baa1-
Baa3 (5.0% compared to 22.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (8.0%
compared to 12.0% at last review), B1-B3 (10.0% compared to 38.0%
at last review), and Caa1-C (77.0% compared to 28.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.0
years compared to 6.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool. Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 3.0%, compared to 8.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of
diversity). Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 23.8% at
last review. The increase in MAC is due to higher credit risk
collateral concentrated within a small number of names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the collateral pool. Holding
all other key parameters static, stressing the non-Moody's rated
cash assets' and reference obligations' credit estimates,
excluding Ca/C credit estimates (six cash assets and reference
obligations, 10.0% of total par and notional amount) by one notch
downward, the resulting impact negatively affects the model
results between 0.0 to 0.05 notch downward on average.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010 and "U.S.
CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial
Real Estate Securities" published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Downgrades Cl. B Rating to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed four and downgraded three classes of Notes
issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, and increase in
Defaulted Collateral. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FL, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FX, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 13, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (90.3% of
the pool balance) and real estate investment trust (REIT) debt
(9.7%). As of the March 22, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction, including Preferred Shares, has
decreased to $464 million from $478 million at issuance, with the
paydown directed to the Class A Notes. The paydown was due to
principal repayment of underlying collateral; the collateral par
amount is $388.6 million, representing approximately $14.7 million
decrease due to principal repayment of underlying collateral since
securitization and approximately $75.3 million decrease due to
realized losses to the collateral pool since securitization.

There are twenty-seven assets with par balance of $149.0 million
(38.3% of the current collateral pool balance) that are considered
Defaulted Collateral as of the March 22, 2011 Trustee report,
compared to 16 Defaulted Collateral with 29% of the pool balance
at last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 6,904 compared to 5,999 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Aaa-Aa3 (1.3% compared to 1.1% at last review), A1-A3
(1.0% compared to 0.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (12.3% compared
to 11.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (6.4% compared to 8.9% at last
review), B1-B3 (9.2% compared to 16.7% at last review), and Caa1-
Ca/C (69.8% compared to 61.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.7
years compared to 5.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Due to the speculative-grade
collateral, Moody's modeled a fixed 7.8% WARR, compared to 7.6% at
last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0% , the same as last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
7.8% to 2.8% or up to 12.8% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward or 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010 and "U.S.
CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial
Real Estate Securities" published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Cl. A-1 Rating to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded one class and affirms one classes of Notes
issued by Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd. due to the deterioration
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate
since last review. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit linked notes
referencing $1.8 billion notional amount of commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS). All of the CMBS reference obligations
were securitized in 2005 (36.7%) and 2006 (63.3%). Currently,
71.7% of the reference obligations are currently rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,302 compared to 1,149 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings is as follows: A1-A3
(0.0% compared to 15.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (11.7% compared
to 51.7% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (26.7% compared to 20.0% at last
review), B1-B3 (13.3% compared to 6.6% at last review), and Caa1-C
(48.3% compared to 6.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.0
years compared to 6.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool. Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 6.5%, compared to 16.5% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of
diversity). Moody's modeled a MAC of 23.4%, compared to 28.4% at
last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the collateral pool. Holding
all other key parameters static, stressing the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations' credit estimates, excluding Ca/C credit
estimates (thirteen reference obligations; 21.7% of notional
amount) by one notch downward, the resulting impact negatively
affects the model results between 0.0 to 0.01 notch downward on
average.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Class A-1A Notes Rating at 'Ca'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed nine classes of Notes issued by Aphex Capital
NSCR 2007-7SR, Ltd. The key indicators of the expected loss within
CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating factor (WARF),
weighted average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate
(WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions.

   -- US$116,000,000 Class A-1A Credit Linked Variable Floating
      Rate Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at Ca (sf);
      previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1B Credit Linked Variable Floating
      Rate Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at Ca (sf);
      previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- US$54,000,000 Class A-2 Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$13,500,000 Class B Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$15,750,000 Class C Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$5,000,000 Class D-A Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$8,500,000 Class D-B Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$12,150,000 Class E Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- US$10,350,000 Class F Credit Linked Variable Floating Rate
      Notes Due December 2038, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-7SR, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit linked notes
referencing $1.8 billion notional amount of commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS). All of the CMBS reference obligations
were securitized in 2006 (80.0%) and 2007 (20.0%). Currently,
73.3% of the reference obligations are currently rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC). These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,640 compared to 1,933 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings is as follows: Baa1-
Baa3 (0.0% compared to 58.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (18.3%
compared to 21.7% at last review), B1-B3 (16.7% compared to 6.7%
at last review), and Caa1-C (65.0% compared to 13.3% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.4
years compared to 7.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool. Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 2.7%, compared to 14.2% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of
diversity). Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 22.9% at
last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to rating changes within the collateral pool. Holding
all other key parameters static, stressing the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations' credit estimates, excluding Ca/C credit
estimates (twelve reference obligations; 20.0% of notional amount)
by one notch downward, there is no impact on the model results.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologly used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms 4 CRE CDO Classes Ratings at 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed five and downgraded two classes of Notes
issued by ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritzation Trust due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions.

Moody's rating actions are:

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritzation Trust is a static CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(100.0% of the pool balance). As of the April 21, 2011 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $562.4 million from $568.4 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A Notes. The paydown was due to
Defaulted Securities Interest Proceeds being classified as
Principal Proceeds. The current collateral par amount is $426.5
million, representing an approximately $141.8 million decrease due
to realized losses to the collateral pool since securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,200 compared to 6,391 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Baa1-Baa3 (3.6% compared to 4.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(5.8% compared to 15.0% at last review), B1-B3 (7.7% compared to
18.6% at last review), and Caa1-C (82.9% compared to 61.5% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 8.3
years compared to 8.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Due to the speculative-grade
collateral, Moody's modeled a fixed 2.2% WARR, compared to 3.9% at
last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0% compared to 99.9% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
2.2% to 0% or up to 7.2% would result in average rating movement
on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward or 0 to 1 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010 and "U.S.
CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial
Real Estate Securities" published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades $1.8-Bil. of Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 131
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 5 tranches from 22 Subprime
deals issued by Argent Securities Inc. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

Due to an oversight, the March 18th press release for this action
did not include information regarding the correction of an error
in a previous rating action, namely a misidentification of the
capital structure of Argent Securities 2003-W6 affecting Class MV-
6 of that transaction. This information has been added in the
revised release.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

In addition, as to Argent Securities 2003-W6 Class MV-6, Moody's
has adjusted the rating to reflect the fact that this tranche is
treated the same as the Class MF-6 tranche. A previous rating
action in 2010 misidentified the capital structure by treating the
Class MV-6 as senior to the Class MF-6. Moody's has adjusted its
analysis to apply the correct capital structure, and the
correction is reflected in today's rating action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization,

excess spread, time tranching, and other structural features
within the senior note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach " Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology " is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005. The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools. Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%. In addition,
if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W1

   -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2006
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2003
      Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2003
      Assigned Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W10

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W2

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2003
      Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W3

   -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2003
      Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W4

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W5

   -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W6

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2004
      Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W7

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W8

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W9

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-PW1

   -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W1

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W10

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2004
      Assigned Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W2

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W3

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W4

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to Ca,
   Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W5

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W6

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W7

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
      Assigned Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W8

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W9

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Gives 2004-W10 Cl. M-7 'C' Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
from a Subprime deal issued by Argent Securities. The collateral
backing the deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W10

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Hikes Class F CLO Notes Rating From Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of various
notes issued by Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd.:

   -- US$133,320,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
      Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of $130,428,375),
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 23, 2010 Upgraded
      to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$30,300,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
      2016 (current outstanding balance of $29,642,813), Upgraded
      to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 23, 2010 Upgraded to A1
      (sf);

   -- US$36,360,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding
      balance of $35,571,375), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
      August 23, 2010 Upgraded at Baa3 (sf);

   -- US$18,180,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding
      balance of $17,785,688), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
      on August 23, 2010 Upgraded at B1 (sf);

   -- US$18,180,000 Class F Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding
      balance of $17,785,688), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      August 23, 2010 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes and improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in August 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
substantially as a result of delevering of the Class A Notes,
which have been paid down by approximately 49% or $68 million
since the last rating action in August 2010.  A substantial
proportion of this paydown is attributable to principal
prepayments on the underlying loans.  As of the latest trustee
report dated February 28, 2011, the Class C, Class D, Class E and
Class F overcollateralization ratios are reported at 149.12%,
129.15%, 121.05%, and 113.9%, respectively, versus July 2010
levels of 133.37%, 120.11%, 114.43%, and 109.25%, respectively.
Additionally, the Class F Notes are no longer deferring interest
and all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action.  Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 3046 compared to 3309 in July
2010, and securities rated Caa1 and below or CCC+ and below make
up approximately 10.75% of the underlying portfolio versus 12.28%
in July 2010.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.
In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to $15 million from approximately $31.3 million in July
2010.

While the transaction has benefited from delevering, Moody's noted
that the number of investments in securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes has grown as a result of the deal's
decision to participate in amend to extend activities.  As of the
February 2011 trustee report, securities that mature after the
maturity date of the notes make up approximately 14% of the
underlying portfolio versus 6.8% in July 2010.  These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $345.2 million, defaulted par of $15 million, weighted
average default probability of 25.4% (implying a WARF of 3855), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.2%, and a
diversity score of 38.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd.  issued on March 19, 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  A summary of the
impact of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of
WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3084)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +2

   -- Class F: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4626)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D: -2

   -- Class E: -1

   -- Class F: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


AVIATION CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Aviation
Capital Group Trust's class A-1 notes to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'
and removed the negative outlook on the rating. "At the same time,
we lowered the rating on Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A notes
to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and removed the rating from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where we had initially
placed it on June 29, 2009," S&P said.

Aviation Capital Group Trust is an aircraft asset-backed
securities transaction collateralized primarily by the lease
revenue and sale proceeds from 22 aircraft. Acapulco Funding 2005-
1's $50 million (the original amount at issuance in 2005) class A
notes constitute a repackaging of Aviation Capital Group Trust's
$58.14 million class A-1 notes.

The downgrade of Aviation Capital Group Trust's class A-1 notes
reflects S&P's opinion of:

    * The quality and value of the 22 aircraft;

    * The number of aircraft on the ground; and

    * The credit enhancement for the class A-1 notes, which is
      provided in the form of subordination.

The downgrade of Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A notes reflects
S&P's opinion of:

    * The credit enhancement for Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A
      notes, which is provided in the form of
      overcollateralization;

    * The excess spread received on the underlying notes (Aviation
      Capital Group Trust's class A-1 notes) over Acapulco Funding
      2005-1's class A notes; and

    * The underlying notes' performance.

"In our analysis, we first projected Aviation Capital Group
Trust's cash flow by stressing the lessees' default rates and the
timing of those defaults, each aircraft's future lease rate as a
result of the downturn, the repossessed aircraft's time off-lease,
the repossession and remarketing expenses, the maintenance
expenses, and the interest-rate risk. We then analyzed the amount
of projected cash flow for Aviation Capital Group Trust that can
be passed on to repay Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A notes
according to the payment structure and cash flow mechanics
described in Acapulco Funding 2005-1's transaction documents," S&P
noted.

S&P continued, "The fleet in Aviation Capital Group Trust's
portfolio is significantly concentrated in older aircraft that
were designed in the 1980s, some of which, in our view, are likely
to become economically obsolete earlier than expected. According
to Aviation Capital Group Trust's April 2011 report, its aircraft
collateral consisted of six B737-300, four A320-230, three A320-
210, three B757-200, and six other aircraft, all of which were
manufactured between 1981 and 1997. Some of these aircraft, such
as the B737-300, have become less attractive to airlines due to
high fuel prices, which has reduced the aircrafts' lease rentals
and values. Of the 22 aircraft, 19 were leased to 15 airlines in
10 countries and three were on the ground as of April 2011 and the
total lease income in the April 2011 payment period was
approximately $3.18 million. Two of the 19 aircraft were leased to
bankrupt Mexicana de Aviacion, which did not pay lease rental to
Aviation Capital Group Trust."

Aviation Capital Group Trust's class A-1 minimum principal payment
was behind schedule: In April 2011, Aviation Capital Group Trust
paid only $0.47 million of the $29.31 million cumulative targeted
minimum principal payment. This was primarily due to the
significant increase in aircraft-related expenses; the decrease in
rental income; and the reduced aircraft appraisal value as of
August 2010, which led to a much higher targeted minimum principal
payment on the class A-1 notes. As of April 15, 2011, the average
monthly principal repayment to the class A-1 noteholders in the
past 12 months was $2.4 million and the remaining balance of the
class A-1 notes was approximately $256.25 million.

As of April 18, 2011, Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A notes
received $17,286 in interest payments and $82,532 in principal
repayments; the average monthly principal repayment to the class A
noteholders in the past 12 months was $392,475 and the remaining
balance of the class A notes was approximately $31.17 million.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on Aviation Capital Group Trust's class A-1
notes and Acapulco Funding 2005-1's class A notes remain
consistent with the credit enhancement available to support the
ratings and take rating actions as it deems necessary.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Says Omega Loan High Risk of Default
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed 15 classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-5:

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-P, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to overall stable pool performance, increased
subordination levels due to amortization and paydowns and
increased defeasance.  The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.2% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.0% Moody's stressed scenario loss is 9.5%
of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of base
and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 12, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 41% to $809 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 81 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 40% of
the pool.  Currently, there is one loan, representing 17% of the
pool, with an investment grade credit estimate.  Five loans,
representing 14% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U. S.  Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 8% of the pool.

Twenty-four loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a $2.9 million loss (3% loss severity
on average).  Currently three loans, representing 9% of the pool,
are in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the Simon - Cheltenham Square Mall Loan ($53.8 million -- 6.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a the borrower's interest in a
639,406 square foot (SF) anchored mall (423,440 SF of collateral)
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The mall is shadow
anchored by Home Depot.  The collateral's largest tenants are
Target (32% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration in
January 2030); Burlington Coat Factory (19% of the NRA; lease
expiration in February 2012) and Shop Rite (17% of the NRA: lease
expiration in March 2015).  As of September 2010, the property was
96% leased, the same as at last review.  The loan is current and
was transferred to special servicing in August 2010 when the
borrower requested a loan modification due to cash flow issues.
Moody's does not currently project any loses on this loan.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a retail
and multifamily property.  The master servicer has recognized a
$3.0 million appraisal reduction for one of these loans.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $7.5 million loss (41% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $10.4 million loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 99% and 93%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV for the
conduit component is 88% , compared to 87% at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs for
the conduit component are 1.47X and 1.22X, respectively, compared
to 1.44X and 1.19X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 33, the same as at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Bank of America Center Loan
($137.0 million -- 16.9% of the pool), which represents a 33%
participation interest in a $417.0 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by three office buildings totaling 1.8 million
SF located in downtown San Francisco, California.  The largest
tenants are Bank of America (35% of the NRA; lease expiration in
September 2015) and Kirkland and Ellis (7% of the NRA; lease
expiration in September 2016).  The complex was 94% leased as of
December 2010 compared to 90% at last review.  Property
performance has improved since last review due to higher
occupancy, increased rent and lower expenses.  The loan is full
term interest-only and matures in September 2011.  Vornado Realty
is the sponsor.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.40X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.31X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 7% of the pool.
The largest loan is the James River Towne Center Loan ($20.7
million -- 2.6% of the pool), is secured by a 155.337 SF retail
property located in Springfield, Missouri.  The property is shadow
anchored by Wal-Mart and Kohl's.  The property was 97% leased as
of December 2010.  Property performance has improved due to an
increase in rent and a decrease in expenses.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 90% and
1.09X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Omega Corporate Center Loan ($19.8
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 284,723 SF
office building located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The property
was 84% leased as of February 2011.  This loan is currently on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy and low DSCR.
Moody's considers this loan as a high risk for default.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR 135% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to
108% and 1.00X at last review.

The third largest loan is the L'Oreal Warehouse Loan ($19.5
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 649,250 SF
industrial building located in Streetsboro, Ohio.  The property is
100% to L'Oreal until October 2019.  Property performance has been
stable since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 78%
and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.24X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on One 2002-X1 CMBS Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed one class of Banc of America Structured Securities Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-X1:

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2002
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and lower expected losses than at last review.
The pool has paid down by 76% since Moody's last review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
26% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 22%.  The current cumulative base expected
loss represents a higher percentage of the pool than at last
review due to significant pay downs since last review, even though
the dollar amount of expected loss is less.  At last review
Moody's cumulative expected loss was $20.8 million compared to
$6.0 million at this review.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
33% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were: "Moody's
Approach to Rating Conduit Transactions", published on September
15, 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 26, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $22.4
million from $287.8 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
92% of the pool.  One loan, representing 2% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by U.S. Government bonds.  The pool faces
significant refinance risk as 69% of the pool has matured or
matures within the next six months.

Two loans, representing 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $10 million (27% loss severity).  Eight loans,
representing 75% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $4.8 million loss (44% expected
loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
100% of the performing loans.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 93% compared to
70% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.45X, respectively, compared to
1.31X and 1.77X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest performing loan is the Pennsylvania Place Apartments
Loan ($2.8 million -- 13% of the pool), which is secured by a 152
unit apartment building located in Fort Worth, Texas.  The
property is currently 92% leased compared to 96% at last review.
The property's rent and vacancy rates are in line with the Fort
Worth market, and the performance remains stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.48X, respectively, compared to 74% and
1.39X at last review.

The top three specially serviced loans represent 63% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Steeple Chase Apartments Loan
($5.2 million -- 24% of the pool) which is secured by a 98 unit
multifamily property located in Toledo, Ohio.  The property is
currently 91% leased.  Forbearance terms have been agreed upon, as
the borrower was unable to pay off the balance at maturity.
Moody's is not assuming a loss on this loan.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 138%
and 0.72X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Village Park at
Colleyville Shopping Center Loan ($4.6 million -- 20%), which is
secured by a 45,000 square foot retail center located in
Colleyville, Texas, which is about six miles west of the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport.  The property is currently 49% leased,
essentially the same as last review.  The property is real estate
owned (REO).

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Comfort Inn-Palm
Springs, CA Loan ($4.0 million -- 18%), which is secured by a
limited service hotel located in Palm Springs, California.  The
hotel's performance was stable until 900 rooms were added to the
Palm Springs market in 2007 and 2008.  The borrower filed for
chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2010 and foreclosure has been
initiated.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's May Cut Rating on 6 2006-5 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed six classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-5 on review for possible downgrade as:

   -- Cl. A-J, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
      previously on Jun 9, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to an increase in interest
shortfalls and realized losses and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.  The rating action is a
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative
tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial
Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a
comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated June 9, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE:

As of the April 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 6% to
$2.11 billion from $2.24 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 176 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 41% of the pool.  The pool includes one loan,
representing 7.2% of the pool, with a credit estimate.

Forty loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  At last review loans representing 12% of
the pool was on the watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in $44
million of realized losses (50% average severity).  The pool had
$11 million of realized losses at last review.  Eighteen loans,
representing 18% of the pool, are in special servicing.  There
were 17 loans, representing 15% of the pool, in special servicing
at last review.  The servicer has recognized $98 million of
appraisal reductions as compared to $37 million at last review.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $5.9
million.  Interest shortfalls totaled $2.4 million and were
contained to Classes H though P at last review.  Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls due to the increased exposure to specially serviced
loan and troubled loans since last review.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on the interest shortfalls, potential
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans and the
performance of the overall pool.

The principal methodology used in rating and monitoring this
transaction is "US CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion
Transactions" published April 19, 2005, which is available on
www.moodys.com


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Classes to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes from five residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions issued in 2007-2010. Four of these transactions
distribute interest entirely on a pro rata basis while the other
transaction contains both pro rata and sequential interest payment
structures.

"At the same time, we removed six of these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, we affirmed
our ratings on 21 classes from the same transactions and removed
two of them from CreditWatch negative," S&P noted.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on eight classes from the
five transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative along
with ratings from a group of other RMBS re-REMIC securities.
Additionally, on April 1, 2011, we provided an update on the
CreditWatch placements and clarified our analysis of interest
payment amounts within re-REMIC transactions," S&P related.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address the
timely payment of interest and principal. We reviewed the interest
and principal amounts due on the underlying securities, which are
then passed through to the applicable re-REMIC classes. When
performing this analysis, we applied our loss projections,
incorporating, where applicable, our recently revised loss
assumptions to the underlying collateral in order to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories in
order to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the
stressed losses associated with their ratings while receiving
timely payment of interest and principal consistent with our
criteria," according to S&P.

"We incorporated, where applicable, our recently revised loss
assumptions as outlined in "Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For
Prime, Subprime, And Alt-A U.S. RMBS Issued In 2005-2007,"
published March 25, 2011, in applying our loss projections in our
review. Such updates pertain to the 2005-2007 vintage prime,
subprime, and Alternative-A (Alt-A) transactions, some of which
are associated with the re-REMICs we reviewed," S&P said.

Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Table 2
Lifetime Loss Projections For Alternative-A RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
                               Fixed/
          Aggregate          long-reset
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005       13.75  11.25      12.75   9.60
2006       29.50  26.25      25.25  25.00
2007       36.00  31.25      31.75  26.25
           Short-reset
              hybrid         Option ARM
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005       13.25  14.75      15.50  13.25
2006       30.00  30.50      34.75  26.75
2007       41.00  40.75      43.50  37.50

S&P continued, "As a result of this review, we lowered our ratings
on certain classes based on our assessment of whether there were
principal and/or interest shortfalls from the underlying
securities that would impair the re-REMIC classes at the
applicable rating stresses. The affirmations reflect our
assessment of the likelihood that the re-REMIC classes will
receive timely interest and principal under the applicable
stressed assumptions."

Four of the five transactions included in this review contain
a pro rata interest payment structure for all groups within the
transactions. These four transactions are Banc of America Funding
2010-R4 Trust, BCAP LLC 2009-RR5 Trust, Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust 2009-10, and Bear Stearns Products Inc. Trust 2007-R6. The
remaining transaction, J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust Series
2008-R4, contains two structures: one pays interest pro rata and
the other pays interest sequentially.

"We based our downgrades on Banc of America Funding 2010-R4 Trust
on our projections of interest shortfalls allocated to the
relevant classes under the applicable rating stress scenarios. We
based our downgrades on the other affected transactions on our
projections of principal loss amounts allocated to the relevant
re-REMIC classes under the applicable rating stress scenarios,"
S&P added.

Rating Actions

Banc of America Funding 2010-R4 Trust
Series 2010-R4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
7-A-1      05952XAZ7   BB- (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
6-A-1      05952XAV6   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
3-A-2      05952XAP9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
5-A-1      05952XAT1   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
3-A-1      05952XAN4   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

BCAP LLC 2009-RR5 Trust
Series 2009-RR5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
VI-A-3     05531UAY6   B- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
VIII-A-1   05531UAQ3   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust 2007-R6
Series 2007-R6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      07402FAA3   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10
Series 2009-10
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
5A2        17316AAX8   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)
6A2        17316AAZ3   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)/Watch Neg

J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust Series 2008-R4
Series 2008-R4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      466309AA9   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-1      466309AC5   B+ (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Funding 2010-R4 Trust
Series 2010-R4

Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-2      05952XAJ3   A (sf)
1-A-1      05952XAA2   AA (sf)
1-A-IO     05952XAB0   AA (sf)
2-A-1      05952XAG9   AA (sf)
4-A-1      05952XAR5   A (sf)
1-A-7      05952XBF0   BBB (sf)
1-A-3      05952XAD6   BBB (sf)
2-A-3      05952XAK0   BBB (sf)
1-A-2      05952XAC8   A (sf)
2-A-7      05952XBH6   BBB (sf)
2-A-IO     05952XAH7   AA (sf)

BCAP LLC 2009-RR5 Trust
Series 2009-RR5

Class      CUSIP       Rating
VI-A-1     05531UAL4   AAA (sf)
VI-A-2     05531UAM2   AAA (sf)

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust 2007-R6
Series 2007-R6

Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A-1     07402FAC9   CCC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10
Series 2009-10

Class      CUSIP       Rating
6A1        17316AAY6   AAA (sf)
1A1        17316AAA8   AAA (sf)
3A1        17316AAN0   AAA (sf)
1A2        17316AAB6   AAA (sf)
5A1        17316AAW0   AAA (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Class O Notes Rating to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 's series 2004-5.

"In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 11 other classes from the
same transaction," S&P said.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the transaction using our
conduit/fusion criteria. We also considered the deal structure and
the liquidity available to the trust. Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.49x and an adjusted loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 96.5%. We further stressed the loans' cash flows
under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.04x
and an LTV ratio of 122.6%. The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 58.4% and 26.3%, respectively. The
DSC and LTV calculations we noted exclude five defeased loans
($114.8 million, 14.2%) and one of the three specially serviced
loans ($4.2 million, 0.5%). We separately estimated losses for one
of the three specially serviced loans and included the estimate in
our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures," S&P related.

"The rating affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity
support levels that we consider to be consistent with our
outstanding ratings on these classes. We affirmed our ratings on
the class XC and XP interest-only (IO) certificates based on our
current criteria," S&P noted.

                         Credit Considerations

As of the April 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, three assets
($72.2 million, 1.3%) in the pool, were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. The reported payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: one loan ($4.2 million, 0.5%) is a matured
balloon loan, and two ($67.9 million, 8.4%) are current. One of
the specially serviced assets ($4.2 million, 0.5%) has an
appraisal reduction amount (ARA) in effect totaling $3.0
million.

The Simon-Cheltenham Square Mall loan ($53.8 million, 6.7%), the
largest asset with the special servicer, is the second-largest
real estate exposure in the pool. The loan is secured by a
423,440-sq.-ft. retail property in Philadelphia. The borrower is
requesting a modification of the loan due to cash flow issues. It
is our understanding from the special servicer that negotiations
regarding the modification are in discussion. The DSC and
occupancy for the property as of year-end 2009 was 0.91x and 95%.

The two remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.8% of the deal balance. An ARA
totaling $3.0 million is in effect against one of the assets.
Standard & Poor's estimated a significant loss for one of these
assets upon resolution.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the April 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, the aggregate
pooled trust balance was $809.0 million, which represents 59.4% of
the aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance. Eighty-two loans
remain in the pool, down from 109 at issuance. The master servicer
provided financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, 68% of which was interim- or full-year 2010 data,
with the balance reflecting interim- or full-year 2009 data. "We
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the pool based on
the reported figures, which excluded five defeased loans ($114.8
million, 14.2%). Twenty-four loans ($136.9 million, 16.9%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist. Sixteen loans ($150.7 million,
18.6%) have reported DSCs below 1.10x, and 13 of these loans
($137.1 million, 16.9%) have reported DSCs of less than 1.00x. To
date, the transaction has realized four principal losses totaling
$3.0 million," S&P stated.

              Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $337.2 million (41.7%). "Using
servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.88x for the top 10 nondefeased loans. "Our adjusted DSC and LTV
figures were 1.54x and 100.5%, respectively. One of the top 10
loans is with the special servicer. Two of the top 10 real estate
loans ($36.1 million, 4.5%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist," said S&P.

The Omega Corporate Center loan ($19.8 million, 2.4%) is the
fourth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool, and the largest loan
on the watchlist. The loan is secured by a 284,723-sq.-ft. office
building in Pittsburgh. The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low reported DSC. The borrower noted it has
several prospects for tenants but nothing has been finalized. As
of the Sept. 30, 2010, rent roll, the property occupancy was 84.6%
and the reported DSC was 0.49x for the nine months ended Sept. 30,
2010.

The Princeton Arms & Court loan ($16.3 million, 2.0%) is the
ninth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool. The loan is secured by
two multifamily properties totaling 592 units located in
Princeton, N.J. The loan appears on the watchlist due to a low
reported DSC. As of the October 2010 rent roll, the property
occupancy was 89.4% and the reported DSC was 0.65x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria, and the analysis is consistent with its lowered and
affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-5
                Rating
Class     To           From         Credit enhancement (%)
F         BBB (sf)     BBB+(sf)                       9.32
G         BBB- (sf)    BBB (sf)                       7.84
H         BB (sf)      BBB-(sf)                       5.11
J         BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                       4.27
K         B+ (sf)      BB  (sf)                       3.42
L         B (sf)       BB- (sf)                       3.00
M         B- (sf)      B+ (sf)                        2.37
N         CCC+ (sf)    B (sf)                         1.95
O         CCC (sf)     B- (sf)                        1.53

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-5

Class  Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
A-3    AAA (sf)                               33.31
A-AB   AAA (sf)                               33.31
A-4    AAA (sf)                               33.31
A-1A   AAA (sf)                               33.31
A-J    AAA (sf)                               22.15
B      AA+ (sf)                               17.31
C      AA (sf)                                15.63
D      A (sf)                                 12.89
E      A- (sf)                                11.42
XC     AAA (sf)                                 N/A
XP     AAA (sf)                                 N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of BSCMS 2007-PWR15
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 25 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR15:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2007
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 11.4%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
26.0% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were: "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April
2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 33 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 11, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $2.62 billion
from $2.81 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 195 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
41% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 8% of the pool, have
investment grade credit estimates.  The pool does not contain any
defeased loans.

Thirty-nine loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $19.0 million (12% loss severity).  Currently
fifteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the World
Market Center II Loan ($345.0 million -- 13.2% of the pool), which
is secured by a 1.4 million square foot (SF) furniture showroom
and design center located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in September 2009 due to imminent
default.  In recent months, the borrower formed a venture to
acquire a competing furniture showroom space in High Point, North
Carolina and to restructure debt secured by the World Market
Center, including the subject loan.  Moody's analysis incorporated
a lower expected loss for the loan than last review but accounted
for the significant amount of uncertainty surrounding the
resolution of the loan.

The remaining 14 specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $145.6
million loss for the specially serviced loans (34% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $8.5 million loss (24% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 85%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 114%, the same as last review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to
the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.27X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
1.21X and 0.90X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the AMB-SGP, L. P.
Portfolio Loan ($149.1 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is
secured by 20 industrial properties totaling 6.5 million SF
located in California (42% of the portfolio by balance), Georgia
(17%), Illinois (16%), New Jersey (16%), New York (8%) and Texas
(1%).  The loan represents an 80% pari-passu interest in a $186.4
million A-note.  The property is also encumbered by a non-pooled
$105 million interest only B-note.  The slight deterioration in
performance due to a decline in occupancy to 85% in June 2010 from
91% in the same period a year earlier was offset by the
amortization of the loan.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed
DSCR are Baa1 and 1.52X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.50X
at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Commerce Crossings
Nine Loan ($14.5 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is secured by
a 500,000 SF industrial building located in Louisville, Kentucky
that is fully leased to Solectron USA, a subsidiary of Flextronics
International Ltd , until June 2016.  Moody's underlying rating
and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.38X, respectively, compared to
Baa3 and 1.36X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 10% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 1325 G Street Loan ($100.0 million --
3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 306,563 SF office
property located in Washington, D. C.  The loan is interest only
for the full term.  The property's tenant base consists of several
government entities including the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corp
(17% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration May 13, 2013
and the FBI (14% of the NRA; lease expiration unknown).  As of
June 2010, the property was 94% leased, which was in-line with
last review.  Performance improved since last review due to rent
steps and stable tenancy.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105%
and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 110% and 0.84X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Cherry Hill Town Center
Loan ($88.0 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
511,306 SF retail center located in Cherry Hill, New Jersey -- a
suburb of Philadelphia.  Major tenants include Home Depot (30% of
the NRA; lease expiration January 31, 2031), Wegmans Food Markets
(25% of the NRA; lease expiration February 28,2031) and Bed Bath &
Beyond (17% of the NRA; lease expiration January 31, 2032).  The
property was 99% leased in June 2010, which is in-line with last
review and securitization.  Only 2% of tenant leases expire in the
next 24 months.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 108%
and 0.83X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Renaissance Orlando at Sea
World Loan ($83.3 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 778 room full-service hotel located in Orlando, Florida.  The
property underwent a $27 million ($34,700 per key) renovation in
2007.  After a significant decline from the prior year in 2009,
RevPAR and occupancy stabilized in 2010 at $83.37 and 64%,
respectively.  Moody's analysis reflects an outlook for the hotel
sector that has improved since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 119%
and 0.98X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Cuts Six 2006-1 Commercial Loan Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded six tranches of the Bear
Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1, a
securitization of conventional small balance commercial loans.
The servicer is Wells Fargo Bank.  The loans are secured primarily
by smaller franchised hotel properties.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust
2006-1

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade actions resulted from deterioration in collateral
performance.  Because approximately 85% of the pool is secured by
hotel properties in secondary and tertiary markets, the pool is
sensitive to downturns in the economy.  As travel began to slow
during 2008, property cash flows were negatively affected and loan
delinquencies began rising.  Over the past 12 months, loans 90+
delinquent, including amounts in foreclosure and REO, have
increased from 21% to 30% of the current pool balance as of the
March 2011 distribution date.  In the past few months however
delinquencies have leveled off.  Our current lifetime expected net
losses for the transaction is 15.25% of the original pool balance.

The methodology used in these rating actions included projecting
losses using a loan-by-loan analysis.  Moody's assessed the
likelihood of each loan to default based on the levels of current
delinquencies, business types, property locations, past payment
histories, borrower's creditworthiness, and either appraisals or
estimates of property market values.  The expected loss on the
pool was then examined in relation to available credit
enhancement, including overcollateralization, subordination, and
excess spread.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.  If the remaining
expected losses used in determining the ratings were increased by
15%, the model-indicated rating output suggests that Class A would
be further downgraded.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's Web site.  Further information on Moody's analysis of this
transaction is available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction, and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades 16 Classes of 2007-PWR16 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 16 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2007-PWR16 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates due to further deterioration of
performance relative to the previous full transaction review, most
of which involves increased projected losses on the specially
serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 9.5% for the remaining pool;
expected losses as a percentage of the original pool balance are
at 9.6%, including losses already incurred to date (0.5%).  Fitch
has designated 71 loans (40.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 20 specially serviced loans (18.7%).  Fitch expects that
classes L through S may be fully depleted from losses associated
with the specially serviced assets.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 5.1% to $3.15
billion from $3.31 billion at issuance, due to a combination of
paydown (4.5%) and realized losses (0.5%).  Interest shortfalls
totaling $5 million are affecting classes F through S.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially-
serviced Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio loan (12.8% of the pool),
which was originally secured by 16 properties, the pledge of the
mortgage and the borrower's ownership interest in one property
(Market Square), as well as the pledge of cash flows from three
properties (Reston Town Center, 1300 North Seventeenth Street, and
Washington Mutual Tower).  In the aggregate, the 20 properties
comprised approximately 9.8 million square feet (sf) of office
space.  The loan has been in special servicing since April 2010,
having transferred for imminent default.

The loan remained current as the borrower was negotiating a
modification, which closed in December 2010.  Key modification
terms included a five-year extension of the loan to May 2017, a
deleveraging structure that provides for the release of properties
over time, and an interest rate reduction.  The largest property
by allocated loan amount, Market Square in Washington D.C.,
recently sold in March 2011 with proceeds used to pay down the
loan, build up a new reserve account, and repay prior interest
shortfalls.  In addition, a sale of the 1300 North 17th Street
property is expected to close shortly.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses (1% of the pool)
was transferred to special servicing on Feb.6, 2009 due to
monetary default.  The loan is secured by a 145,536-sf home
furnishing retail center located in Palm Beach Gardens, FL.  Per
the special servicer, the only remaining tenant at the property
(56% of the net rentable area) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection and has until June 2011 to decide whether to accept or
reject its lease.  The most recently reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for the loan was 0.46 times (x) as of year-
end (YE) 2009.

The servicer began foreclosure in July 2009 but the borrower and
guarantor have and continue to put up strong legal resistance, and
the borrower's settlement offers have been deemed unacceptable.  A
receiver has been in place since April 2010.  The next hearing for
summary judgment with respect to the foreclosure is anticipated
for second-quarter 2011.

Collateral for the third-largest contributor to modeled losses
(1.8% of the pool) consists of a 504-unit multifamily property
located in Atlanta.  As of September 2010, the property was
approximately 97% occupied at average in-place rents roughly 4%
lower than those collected at issuance.  With expenses
approximately 17% higher than underwritten, the servicer-reported
DSCR was 0.96x as of third-quarter 2010 on a net operating income
basis, compared with 0.89x at YE 2009 and 1.24x underwritten at
issuance.

According to the master servicer, the borrower has requested a
transfer to special servicing in order to present a modification
proposal; however, the requests have been denied.  There is a
partial guaranty on the loan in an amount limited to $15 million,
which will not be released until the property achieves debt
service coverage of 1.20x or greater for 12 consecutive months.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and revised Loss Severity (LS)
ratings, revised Rating Outlooks, and assigned or revised Recovery
Ratings (RRs):

   -- $273.4 million class A-J to 'BBB-sf/LS4' from 'Asf/LS3';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $33.1 million class B to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5';
      Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $33.1 million class C to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- $33.1 million class D to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $20.7 million class E to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $24.9 million class F to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $29 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

   -- $41.4 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

   -- $33.1 million class J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $33.1 million class K to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $16.6 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $12.4 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $12.4 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.3 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.3 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.3 million class Q to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised LS
ratings:

   -- $626.7 million class A-2 to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAAsf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $58.2 million class A-3 to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAAsf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $130.7 million class A-AB to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAAsf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $954.4 million class A-4 to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAAsf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $400.4 million class A-1A to 'AAAsf/LS2' from 'AAAsf/LS1';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $331.4 million class A-M to 'AAAsf/LS4' from 'AAAsf/LS3';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $23.2 million class S. Class A-1 has
repaid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X.


CABELAS CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Loss Severity Ratings
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term ratings, Loss Severity
(LS) ratings and Rating Outlooks assigned to Cabelas Credit Card
Master Note Trust:

Cabelas Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2006-III:

   -- Class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B at 'A+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class C at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class D at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Cabelas Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2008-IV:

   -- Class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B-1 at 'A+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class C-1 at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class D at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Cabelas Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2009-I:

   -- Class A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B at 'A+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class C at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class D at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Cabelas Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2010-I:

   -- Class A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B at 'A+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class C at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class D at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Cabelas Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2010-II:

   -- Class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B at 'A+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class C at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class D at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmation is based on continued positive trust performance.
Monthly payment rate (MPR), a measure of how quickly consumers are
paying off their credit card debts, has remained consistent over
the past year.  Currently the 12-month average is 41.77%, up
slightly from 40.24% at the March 2010 reporting period.  Cabela's
MPR is well above the industry average due to high transactor
prime borrowers.  The Fitch Prime Credit Card Index was 19.21% for
the March 2011 reporting period.

Gross yield remains stable since last review due to interchange
revenue and a favorable LIBOR base rate.  As of the March 2011
reporting period, the 12-month average gross yield was 21.03% down
slightly from the 12-month average of 21.27% at the March 2010
reporting period.

Gross chargeoffs have declined since last review.  Currently the
12-month average is 4.13%, down from 4.97% at the March 2010
reporting period.  As of the March 2011 reporting period, the 12-
month average 60+ day delinquencies were 0.78% compared to the 12-
month average of 1.02% at this point last year.  60+ day
delinquencies have declined 46 basis points since the peak in
March 2009.  Fitch expects that chargeoffs will continue to
decline toward pre-recessionary levels in the coming months.
As a result of a consistent gross yield, lower chargeoffs and
stable trust expenses, the trust has experienced a steady increase
in excess spread.  Over the past year, three month average excess
spread has increased 56 basis points to 8.57% from the twelve
month low.

Fitch runs cash flow breakeven analysis by applying stress
scenarios to 3-, 6-, and 12-month averages performances to test
that under the stressed conditions, the transaction can withstand
a level of losses commensurate with the risk associated to a
rating level with the available credit enhancement. The variables
that Fitch stresses are the gross yield, monthly payment rate,
gross charge-off, and purchase rates.  The break-even loss level
output for the notes provides an indication of the remoteness of
the class of notes to stressed performance deterioration.

The affirmations are based on the performance of the trusts in
line with expectations.  Stable outlook indicates that, as a
result of the continued positive performance trend for these
trusts, Fitch expects the ratings will remain stable for the next
two years.

Fitch's analysis included a comparison of observed performance
trends over the past few months to Fitch's base case expectations
for each outstanding rating category.  As part of its ongoing
surveillance efforts, Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of these trusts.


CALCULUS SCRE: Moody's Affirms Five CRE CDO Classes Ratings at 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed five classes of Notes issued by CALCULUS SCRE
Trust. The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: weighted average rating factor (WARF), weighted
average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 19, 2010.

   -- Series 2006-2 Trust Units, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Series 2006-3 Trust Units, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Series 2006-4 Trust Units, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Series 2006-5 Trust Units, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
      May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Series 2006-11 Trust Units, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
      on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


CALCULUS SCRE: Moody's Affirms One CRE CDO Class Rating at 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one class of Notes issued by Calculus SCRE
Trust, Series 2007-1. The key indicators of the expected loss
within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating factor
(WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 19, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

   -- US$5,588,823 Variable Distribution Trust Units Due 2037,
      Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010 Downgraded to
      C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts 8 Classes of 2007-CD4 Bonds to 'C/RR6'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 classes of CD Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2007-CD4 due to further deterioration of performance, most
of which involves increased losses on the specially serviced
loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 11.66% of the remaining pool;
expected losses of the original pool are at 11.39%, including
losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated 78 loans
(32.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 49 specially
serviced loans (20.8%). Fitch expects classes G thru S may be
fully depleted from losses associated with the specially serviced
assets and class F will also be impaired.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by approximately 2.8% to
$6.45 billion from $6.64 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes F thru S.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are three of the top 15
loans in the transaction which are currently specially serviced,
Citadel and Northwest Arkansas Mall Portfolio (4%), Riverton
Apartments (3.4%) and the Loews Lake Las Vegas (1.8%) of the
transaction.

The Citadel and North Arkansas Mall Portfolio (4%) is secured by
two regional malls totaling 1.04 million square feet (sf) located
in Colorado Springs, CO and Fayetteville, AR. The anchors at the
Citadel Mall, all of which own their own space, are JCPenney and
Dillard's. The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of October
2010 was 1.01 times (x).

The anchors at the Northwest Arkansas Mall are Dillard's (not part
of the collateral), JCPenney (28%), and Sears (25%). As of
February 2011, the mall was 93% leased. The DSCR as of October
2010 was 1.01x.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in October 2009 for
imminent default. The borrower requested a restructure of the loan
stating property cash flow was insufficient to cover debt service
and property operating expenses. The special servicer denied the
borrower's proposal for a principal write-down of the loan. The
properties cash flow is currently being managed through a hard
lockbox. Both properties were inspected by the special servicer in
December 2010 and found to be in good condition with limited
deferred maintenance.

Riverton Apartments (3.4%) is secured by a class B, rent-
stabilized multifamily housing project, consisting of 1,228 units,
located in Harlem, NY. The loan transferred to special servicing
in August 2008 for imminent default as the borrower's plan to
deregulate rent-stabilized units and increase rents to market
levels was never achieved.

Foreclosure occurred in March 2010 and the asset became real
estate owned (REO). Prior to foreclosure, all available funds from
the letter of credit and the reserve accounts were applied to
outstanding advances. Rose Associates, Inc. is currently managing
the property and actively leasing up vacant units. The property is
currently 96% occupied.

The Loews Lake Las Vegas (1.8%) is secured by a 493 room full-
service hotel located in Lake Las Vegas, NV, 13 miles east of the
Las Vegas strip. The property is an attractive resort with usual
amenities, but no casino. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2009 due to imminent default.

A receiver was appointed to the property in June 2009. The special
servicer continues to pursue foreclosure. A recent tax appeal has
reduced taxes considerably. Revenue per available room (RevPAR)
levels show declines from last year as group business demand is
down due to corporate cutbacks and concerns of Lake Las Vegas
future. Transient demand is also down with heavy competition from
not only the Las Vegas strip but also resorts throughout the
Southwest and California. The special servicer is currently
reviewing franchise re-branding options, and a hold until
stabilized strategy.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, assigns
Recovery Ratings (RR), revises Loss Severity (LS) ratings and
assigns Outlooks to these classes:

   -- $585.7 million class A-J to 'B/LS5' from 'BB/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $41.2 million class B to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $90.7 million class C to 'B-/LS5' from 'B/LS5'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $57.7 million class D to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $41.2 million class E to 'CC/RR3' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $49.5 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $66 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $74.2 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $66 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';

   -- $74.2 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

   -- $24.7 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

   -- $16.5 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

   -- $16.5 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms, removes classes A-MFX and A-MFL from Rating
Watch Negative, revises LS ratings, and assigns Outlooks to these
classes:

   -- $76 million class A-2A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.07 billion class A-2B at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $464.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $162 million class A-SB at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.7 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $939.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $595 million class A-MFX at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $65 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $40.5 million class WFC-X at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7.7 million class WFC-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.7 million class WFC-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.1 million class WFC-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 certificates have been paid in full. Fitch does not
rate classes O, P, Q, and S.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes XP, XC,
and XW.


CENTERLINE 2007: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 CRE CDO Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed 14 classes of Notes issued by Centerline
2007-SRR5, Ltd.  The key indicators of the expected loss within
CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating factor (WARF),
weighted average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate
(WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 19, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

   -- Class A-1, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Class A-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $2.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 200
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 31 tranches from 29 prime
jumbo deals issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%.  in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-21

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-39

   -- Cl. A-18, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-36, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-37, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-10

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-11

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-18, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-32, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-33, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-24

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-29

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-34

   -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-41

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-43

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-44

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-46

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-54

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-56

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-57

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-58

   -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-60

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-7

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J5

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-J5

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-16, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWBMS, Inc.  Series 2003-4

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $2.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 200
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 31 tranches from 29 prime
jumbo deals issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%.  in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-21

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-39

   -- Cl. A-18, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-36, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-37, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-10

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-11

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-18, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-32, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-33, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-24

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-29

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-34

   -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-41

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-43

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-44

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-46

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-54

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-56

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-7C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-57

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-58

   -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-60

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-7

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J5

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23,
     2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-J5

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-16, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWBMS, Inc.  Series 2003-4

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl.PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades $700MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 108
tranches and confirmed the ratings of six tranches from 20 prime
jumbo deals issued by Citicorp Mortgage Securities. The collateral
backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The ratings on three tranches -- Cl.A-1 from Citicorp Mortgage
Securities Inc. 1988-11, Cl. A from Citicorp Mortgage Securities
Inc. and Cl. P-T from Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc. 1988-17 --
were withdrawn pursuant to published credit rating methodologies
that allow for the withdrawal of the credit rating if the size of
the pool outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen
below a specified level. Moody's current RMBS surveillance
methodologies apply to pools with at least 40 loans or a pool
factor of greater than 5%. As a result, Moody's may withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the pool declines to 40 loans or fewer unless specific
structural features allow for the monitoring of the transaction
(such as a credit enhancement floor).

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors. For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2004-6

   -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-8, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2004-8

   -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIIA-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIIA-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIIA-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2003-5

   -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 16,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 16,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIIA-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 16,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. IIIA-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 16,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2003-6

   -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2003-7

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2003-9

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2004-2

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2008
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 1,
   2008 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2004-9

   -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-8, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HYB1

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1994-05

   -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2009
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1988-11

   -- A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to
      A2 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1988-17

   -- A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to
      A2 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1989-01

   -- A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 8, 2009
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1989-13

   -- P-T, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to
      A2 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1989-19

   -- A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 8, 2009
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1992-07

   -- A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 8, 2009
      Confirmed at A2 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB1

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO-3-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO-3-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB2

   -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB3

   -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Certs. to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
F commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Commercial
Mortgage Asset Trust's series 1999-C2 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+
(sf)'.

The downgrade reflects current interest shortfalls affecting this
class, as well the class' increased susceptibility to future
interest shortfalls.

As of the April 18, 2011, trustee remittance report, interest
shortfalls have affected the class F certificate for four months.
These shortfalls stem from an appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction (ASER) amount in effect for the sole asset with the
special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), as well as special
servicing fees and workout fees due to LNR. "We expect the
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding to be repaid upon the
eventual liquidation of the sole specially serviced asset. We will
likely further lower our rating on the class F certificate if the
liquidation does not occur in the near term and the interest
shortfalls continue," S&P stated.

According to the April 18, 2011 remittance report, monthly
interest shortfalls were $229,299, which were caused by an ASER of
$213,654, monthly special servicing fees of $6,109, workout fees
of $4,885, and interest paid on outstanding advances of $4,651.
The asset causing the ASER is the Henry W. Oliver loan, which has
a total exposure of $31.0 million including servicer advances and
interest thereon. The loan is secured by a 471,786 sq.-ft. office
building in Pittsburgh. The loan transferred to LNR on Oct. 8,
2009, and is currently in foreclosure. An appraisal dated April
28, 2010, valued the property at $9.4 million, and an appraisal
reduction amount of $24.2 million is currently in effect,
resulting in the monthly ASER.
According to LNR, the property is currently being marketed for
sale with the borrower's cooperation. If the property is sold at a
price consistent with the appraised value, it would result in
principal losses to the trust that would affect the classes
subordinate to class F and reduce overall transaction liquidity.

As of the April 18, 2011, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 21 loans, with an aggregate trust balance of $243.6
million, down from 80 loans totaling $775.2 million at issuance.
One loan, discussed above, with a principal balance of $29.3
million (12.0%) is with the special servicer. To date, the trust
has experienced losses totaling $40.1 million in connection
with 14 assets.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1:

   -- Cl A-X., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 1999
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl F., Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl L., Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 4, 2006
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
48.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 39.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
53.6% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current
list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were: "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published on April
19, 2005, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000, and "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions"
published on October 2, 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 4 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
(CTL) financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined; the
dark value must be sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant
and rejection of the lease, to support the expected loss
consistent with the certificates' rating.  Moody's may make
adjustments reflecting the possibility of lease affirmations by
the tenant and for the landlord's claim for lease rejection
damages in bankruptcy.  Moody's also may give credit for some
amortization of the debt, depending upon the rating of the credit
tenant.  In addition, Moody's considers the overall structure and
legal integrity of the transaction.  The certificates' rating may
change as the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate
family rating) of the tenant changes.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $91.9
million from $1.17 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 8 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
47% of the pool.  The pool includes a credit tenant lease (CTL)
component which comprises 32% of the pool.  The pool does not
contain any defeased loans or loans with underlying ratings.

Three loans, representing 41% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $49.0 million (28% loss severity).
Currently one loan, representing 47% of the pool, is in special
servicing.  The sole specially serviced loan is the Tallahassee
Mall Loan ($42.9 million -- 46.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a leasehold interest in a 973,973 square foot mall located in
Tallahassee, Florida.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2008 due to imminent default when the mall
lost two anchor tenants, Dillard's and Goody's.  Foreclosure was
completed in January 2011 and the property is currently Real
Estate Owned (REO).  The property is subject to a ground lease and
the Lender filed suit for damages with the Ground Lessor when the
Ground Lessor was unable to provide the Lender with a clean Ground
Lease Estopel Certificate (GLEC).  The lender cannot sell the
property without a clean GLEC.  The property was recently
appraised for $4.5 million but given the ongoing litigation
expenses with the Ground Lessor, Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $42.9 million loss (100% expected loss) for this
specially serviced loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through O
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $11.4
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the pool's exposure to
the loan secured by the leasehold interest of Tallahassee Mall.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses and
non-advancing by the master servicer based on a determination of
non-recoverability.  The master servicer has made a determination
of non-recoverability for the largest loan in special servicing
and is no longing advancing for this loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 88%
of the pool (excluding specially serviced loans).  Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 80% compared to 85% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 2.00X, respectively, compared to
1.11X and 1.45X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the IBM Corporate Center Loan ($8.1
million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 129,293 square
foot office property located in Parsippany, NJ.  The loan has
passed its September 2009 anticipated repayment date (ARD) and is
current.  As of December 2010, the property was 89% leased,
essentially the same as at the last review.  The largest tenant,
EchoStar Satellite Corp (51% of the NRA), has a lease that expires
in December 2011.  Moody's valuation is based on a stressed net
cash flow due to concerns with the property's near-term lease
rollover exposure.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and
1.15X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.13X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Park Glen West Business Center Loan
($4.7 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 127,336
square foot industrial property located in St.  Louis Park,
Minnesota.  As of February 2011, the property was 81% leased,
essentially the same as the prior review.  Three tenants, totaling
20,000 square feet (28% of the NRA) have leases that expire by
year-end 2011.  Moody's valuation is based on a stressed net cash
flow due to concerns with the property's near-term lease rollover
exposure.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.36X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pinewood Square Shopping Center Loan
($4.4 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by a Wal-Mart
anchored retail center located in Goldsboro, North Carolina.  The
loan has passed its August 2009 ARD and is current.  As of
December 2010, the property was 94% leased, essentially the same
as the prior review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and
1.38X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.34X at last review.

The CTL component ($29.4 million -- 31.9%) consists of two cross-
collateralized loans secured by a bondable lease to Accor SA.  The
collateral consists of 11 Motel 6 hotels totaling 1,224 rooms and
located in five states.  On July 2, 2010, Moody's withdrew Accor
SA's Prime-3 commercial paper rating due to business reasons.  For
the purpose of rating this component of the subject transaction,
Moody's developed an internal view of the credit quality of the
company.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four 2005-C1 Classes to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two, downgraded eight, and affirmed
seven classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp., series 2005-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement and
defeasance in the pool.  Since Fitch's last review, the
transaction has paid down further by $116.9 million (7.7% of the
original pool balance), totaling $285 million (18.9%) since
issuance.  In addition, 13 loans (8.1%) have been fully defeased.

The downgrades reflect Fitch modeled losses of 7.7% of the
remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at 7.2%,
including losses already incurred to date.  Fitch expects the
modeled losses associated with the specially-serviced loans to
impact classes L through P and a portion of class K.  Interest
shortfalls totaling $4 million are currently affecting classes H
through P.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 19.8% to $1.21 billion from
$1.51 billion at issuance.

Fitch has identified 50 loans (43.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 15 specially-serviced loans (9.5%).  Of the 15
loans in special servicing, five loans (2%) are real-estate owned,
two loans (1.9%) are in foreclosure, four loans (1.6%) are 90 days
or more delinquent, one loan (0.7%) is 60 days delinquent, and
three loans (3.3%) are current.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (3%) secured
by a 158,719 square foot (sf) retail and entertainment complex
located in downtown Manhattan.  Occupancy at the property has
declined to 79% as of March 2011 from 100% at issuance.  In the
third quarter of 2010, the second and third largest tenants (19%
and 12%, respectively, of NRA) both terminated their lease and
vacated prior to lease expiration.  The lease for the largest
tenant (45% of NRA) is also due for renewal during 2011.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-
serviced loan (2.8%) secured by a 305,887 sf anchored retail
property located in Yuba City, CA.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in March 2011 due to imminent default.  For
year-end (YE) 2010, the net-operating income debt service coverage
ratio (NOI DSCR) was 0.96 times (x), down from 1.12x and 1.33x at
YE 2009 and at issuance, respectively.  The DSCR declined due to a
reduction in pass through escalations and an increase in operating
expenses.  The special servicer continues to gather information
from the borrower and evaluate possible workout strategies.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (1.5%)
secured by a 404-unit multifamily property located in Kingwood,
TX. YE 2009 NOI DSCR was 0.60x compared to 0.87x and 1.28x at YE
2008 and issuance, respectively.  The DSCR declined due to a drop
in occupancy levels.  YE 2009 occupancy was 66.1%, down from 81.7%
and 92% at YE 2008 and at issuance, respectively.  In addition,
the sponsor on this loan has defaulted on other securitized
multifamily loans.

Fitch has upgraded these classes as indicated:

   -- $43.4 million class B to 'BBB/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $13.2 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned or revised Recovery Ratings
(RRs) to these classes as indicated:

   -- $15.1 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $18.9 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5;

   -- $5.7 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $5.7 million class K to 'CC/RR3' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $5.7 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $5.7 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';

   -- $5.7 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';

   -- $3.8 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Also, Fitch has affirmed and revised the Rating Outlooks to these
classes as indicated:

   -- $83.3 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $165.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $674.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $92.5 million class A-J at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24.5 million class D at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.9 million class E at 'B-/LS5'; revise Outlook to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $20.8 million class F at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The $8.3 million class P is not rated by Fitch.  Classes A-1 and
A-2 have paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes A-X
and A-SP.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Junk Ratings on Class I & J Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of one class and
affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Series 1997-C1:

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 1999
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. I, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2005
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2005
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is due to increased subordination due to loan
amortization and payoffs.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.4% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 2.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 6.0% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current
list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion
CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Conduit Transaction", published on September
15, 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions"
published in October 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of four, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to derive credit enhancement levels for CTL
component.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 21, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $91.8
million from $1.36 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
36% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 52% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U. S.  Government securities.
Six loans, representing 45% of the pool, are CTL loans.  The
conduit component consists of two loans, representing 3% of the
pool balance.

Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$19.5 million loss (20% loss severity on average).  No loans are
currently in special servicing.

The largest conduit loan is the Glastonbury Country Club Loan
($1.7 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-hole
golf course located in an upscale neighborhood near Hartford,
Connecticut.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due
to low DSCR caused by decrease in revenues.  However, property
performance has recently improved with a third quarter 2010 DSCR
of 0.89X compared to 0.70X at the year-end 2009.  The loan fully
amortizes over the loan term and has amortized by approximately
47% since securitization and 7% since last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.85X, respectively, compared to 89%
and 1.20X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Genus Inc.  Building Loan
($1.3 million -- 1.4%), which is secured by a 74,400 square foot
R&D facility located in Newburyport, Massachusetts.  The property
is 100% leased to Varian Inc.  through November 2015.  The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist due to outstanding servicer
advances for taxes.  The loan fully amortizes over the loan term
and has amortized by approximately 81% since securitization and
23% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 19% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 26% and >4.00X at last review.

The CTL component includes six loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases.  The CTL exposures are Bank of America
Corporation ($16.4 million -- 17.9%; Moody's senior unsecured
rating A2 - negative outlook), RadioShack Corporation ($11.3
million -- 12.3%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Ba2 - stable
outlook), Bon-Ton Stores Inc.  ($8.5 million -- 9.2%; Moody's
senior unsecured rating Caa1 -- stable outlook), and Kohl's
Corporation ($5.4 million -- 5.9%; Moody's senior unsecured rating
Baa1 - stable outlook).

Credits representing approximately 100% of the CTL exposure are
publicly rated by Moody's.  Moody's has downgraded the rating of
one credit since the prior review of this transaction in September
2010.  The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for
the CTL component has declined to 1,420 compared to 1,331 at last
review.  WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within the pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms 18 2002-CKS4 CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-CKS4:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. APM, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2008
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.5% of the current balance, the same as at last review.  Moody's
stressed scenario loss is 11.1% of the current balance.  Moody's
provides a current list of base and stress scenario losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was: "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 41, essentially the same as at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 22, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $939.8
million from $1.23 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 129 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
38% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans with investment
grade credit estimates, representing 17% of the pool.  Twenty-nine
loans, representing 21% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U. S.  Government securities.

Twenty loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$25.3 million loss (31% loss severity on average).  Currently 16
loans, representing 14% of the pool, are in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the McDonald Investment
Center Loan ($25.9 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured
by an office building located in Cleveland, Ohio.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently real estate owned (REO).  The remaining
15 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property
types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $54.7
million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $58.3 million (44%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.6 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 40% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 100% of the performing non-defeased pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 84% compared to 82% at last full review.  Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the
most recently available net operating income.  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.28X, respectively, compared to
1.32X and 1.31X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Crystal Mall Loan
($92.1 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 801,600 square foot (SF) regional mall
located in Waterford, Connecticut.  The center is anchored by
Sears, Macy's and J. C.  Penney.  The in-line space was 79% leased
as of December 2010 compared to 75% at last review.  Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.34 X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.31X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Arbor Place Mall
Loan ($62.3 million -- 6.7%), which is the senior pooled component
of a $66.4 million mortgage loan.  The $4.1 million B-Note is
included in the trust and is the security for the non-pooled Class
APM.  The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.0
million SF regional mall located in Douglasville, Georgia,
approximately 22 miles west of Atlanta.  The mall is anchored by
Dillard's, Belk, Macy's, and J. C.  Penney.  As of December 2010,
the inline space was nearly 100% leased, essentially the same as
at last review.  The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule and has
amortized by approximately 23% since securitization.  Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR of the senior component are
Aa3 and 1.94X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.98X at last
review.  The credit estimate of the B-Note is A1.

The top three performing loans represent 10% of the pool balance.
The largest performing loan is the SummitWoods Crossing Loan
($43.2 million -- 4.6%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 719,600 square foot retail center located in Lee's
Summit, Missouri.  The property was 100% leased as of September
2010, the same as last review.  Major tenants include Target,
Lowe's Home Centers and Kohl's.  Although performance has been
stable since last review, Moody's evaluation reflects a stressed
net cash flow due to concerns about upcoming lease expirations.
Leases for approximately 16% of the net rentable area (NRA)
expires throughout 2011.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96%
and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.98X at last
review.

The second largest performing loan is the Old Hickory Mall Loan
($29.3 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 555,000 square foot regional mall located in
Jackson, Tennessee.  The anchor tenants are Macy's, Sears, Belk
and J.C. Penney.  The in-line shops were 96% leased as of
September 2010, compared to 99% at last review.  The property's
performance has declined slightly due to the drop in occupancy.
The loan is structured with a 25-year amortization schedule and
has amortized 18% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 74% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.40X at
last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Creeks at Virginia Center
Loan ($24.7 million -- 2.6%), which is secured by a community
power center located in Glen Allen, Virginia.  The property was
87% leased as of October 2010, essentially the same as at last
review.  The property's performance has declined due to the drop
in occupancy.  Additionally, Moody's evaluation reflects a
stressed net cash flow due to concerns about upcoming lease
expirations.  The Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and
0.93X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.06X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.55BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 216
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 63 tranches from 20 prime
jumbo deals issued by Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Corp.
The collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. In addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool are low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2002-34

   -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2005
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-1

   -- Cl. III-B-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-B-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-B-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-11

   -- Cl. I-B-2, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-3, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-4, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-17

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-24, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-25, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-28, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-21

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-14, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-16, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-20, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-21, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-22, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 1,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 1,
      2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 1, 2004
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-23

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-16, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-17, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-18, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-21, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-8, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-9, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-A-12, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-P, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. III-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VII-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VIII-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. D-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. D-P, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. D-B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-25

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-8, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-27

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-15, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-16, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-17, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IX-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-29

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-7

   -- Cl. I-B-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-B-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-8

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-23, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-24, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-25, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-PPA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR18

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-M-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 12,
      2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
      Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR2

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR20

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR28

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2003-AR30

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-1

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-P-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-X-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-4

   -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-8, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-9, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. II-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-7, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. III-A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
      2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
      2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Gives Five CMBS Classes C(sf) Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-FL2.

Moody's rating action is:

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2004
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR), remaining within acceptable ranges. The transaction
is secured by a single hotel loan located in Lake Buena Vista,
Florida that has been Real Estate Owned (REO) since 2005.
Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in rating Credit Suisse First
Boston, Series 2001-FL2 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published on July 7, 2000.
Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated September 2, 2010.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $35 million
from $619 million at securitization. The Certificates are now
collateralized by a single mortgage loan, Hotel Royal Plaza loan.
As of April 18, 2011 remittance statement, the pool has
experienced $16.6 million of losses since securitization and
servicer advances total $12.3 million. In addition, cumulative
unpaid interest totaled $12.9 million, $2.8 million of which are
attributed to the Hotel Royal Plaza loan. The interest shorfalls
hit the remaining classes, Classes J through non-rated Class O. In
general, interest shortfalls are caused by trust expenses
associated with specially serviced loans, including special
servicing fees, legal expenses and other expenses associated with
the resolution of a loan. Interest shortfalls can also result when
the servicer only advances a portion of the monthly principal and
interest ("P&I") payment for a specially serviced loan because of
a decline in the value of the underlying property (based on an
appraisal reduction determination), or the servicer recovers
previous P&I over-advances prior to a loan being liquidated.

The remaining loan in the pool is collateralizd by the Hotel Royal
Plaza, a 394 room full service hotel located in Lake Buena Vista,
Florida. The property was transferred into special servicing in
November of 2001 and has been REO since September 2005. Despite
the 4.7% revenue per available room (RevPAR) increase for Orlando,
Florida in 2010 as reported by Smith Travel Research, the
property's RevPAR decreased by 7% to $56.13. The year to date
period ending Feb 28, 2011 shows a more positive results with the
RevPAR increasing 10% over the same period a year earlier. The
February 2010 appraisal valued the asset at $28.7 million. The
special servicer's expected resolution date for the loan is
December 2011. Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value
("LTV") ratio is over 100% similar to last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Class E Notes Rating to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
pooled classes and affirmed the ratings on six other pooled
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2006-TFL2 (CSFB 2006-TFL2).

"Concurrently, we affirmed our ratings on 20 raked certificates
and raised our ratings on two other raked classes from the same
transaction. In addition, we affirmed our ratings on the three
'KR' raked classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from COMM 2006-FL12. Both transactions are U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions," S&P
said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the CSFB 2006-TFL2
transaction, which included the revaluation of the remaining
collateral securing the seven floating-rate loans in the trust,
one of which is a nonpooled loan, and another is currently in
special servicing. All of the loans are indexed to one-month
LIBOR," S&P noted.

S&P continued, "Although our aggregate adjusted valuations for the
six pooled loans in CSFB 2006-FL2 are comparable to the levels we
assessed in our last review dated July 10, 2009, our downgrades on
the six pooled classes were primarily due to our 27.2% downward
property valuation of the second-largest loan in the CSFB 2006-
TFL2 pool (21.8%). We also considered in our analysis the
refinancing risk associated with the five loans that have
maturities in August through October 2011 (98.4% of the CSFB 2006-
TFL2 pooled trust balance). According to the master servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), the borrowers for these
five maturing loans indicated that they are either seeking
refinancing or have yet to determine their intentions."

"We raised our ratings on the 'MW' raked certificates from CSFB
2006-TFL2 based on our revised valuation of the Metropolitan
Warner Center loan, which has deleveraged significantly since our
last review and is discussed further below. These certificates
derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate nonpooled
component of the Metropolitan Warner Center loan," S&P stated.

"We affirmed our ratings on the 'KER' and 'KR' raked certificate
classes from CSFB 2006-TFL2 and COMM 2006-FL12. These certificates
derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate nonpooled
component of the Kerzner International loan. We also affirmed our
'CCC- (sf)' ratings on classes BEV-A and NHK-A from CSFB 2006-
TFL2, which derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate
nonpooled component of the Beverly Hilton loan and NH Krystal
Hotels loan. In addition, we affirmed our ratings on the 'SV'
raked certificates from CSFB 2006-TFL2, which derive 100% of their
cash flow from the nonpooled Sava/Fundamental Portfolio loan. The
affirmed ratings follow our analysis of the respective loans,"
according to S&P.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class A-X-1 and A-X-3 interest-
only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria," S&P said.

                         Lodging Collateral

Lodging properties secure five pooled loans in CSFB 2006-TFL2
totaling $698.7 million (98.4% of the pool trust balance)
according to the April 15, 2011, trustee remittance report. These
properties are predominantly located in Paradise Island, the
Bahamas (52.5% of the pool trust balance), Southern California
(21.8%), Tucson (11.0%), Mexico (7.0%), and Upstate N.Y. (2.9%).
"We based our hotel analysis on a review of the borrowers'
operating statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010, and their
2011 budgets (where available). Our property valuations are
comparable to the levels we assessed in our last review of CSFB
2006-TFL2," S&P stated.

According to Smith Travel, the general U.S. hotel industry
reported revenue per available room (RevPAR) declines of 16.7% in
2009. However, the lodging industry recovered some of that loss
with a reported RevPAR increase of 5.5% in 2010.

                         Largest Lodging Loan

The Kerzner International loan, the largest loan secured by hotel
properties, is the largest loan in CSFB 2006-TFL2. The fee
interest in two full-service resort hotels totaling 3,022 rooms
secures this loan. The collateral for this loan also includes a
water park, casino, 18-hole golf course, vacant land, the
assignment of the borrower's 50% joint-venture interest in
timeshare units, 50% joint-venture interest in net sale proceeds
from an on-site condo project, and marina project, all located on
Paradise Island. The whole-loan balance has been paid down by
$189.4 million to $2.59 billion, which is bifurcated into a $1.332
billion senior participation interest and a $1.258 billion
subordinate nontrust junior participation interest. The senior
participation interest is split into two pari passu notes. The
first note has a balance of $666.2 million that consists of a
$372.7 million senior pooled component (52.4% of the CSFB 2006-
TFL2 pool trust balance) and a $293.5 million subordinate
nonpooled component raked to the 'KER' certificates. The other
pari passu note is in COMM 2006-FL12. This includes a $512.0
million senior pooled component and a $154.2 million subordinate
nonpooled component raked to the 'KR' certificates. The master
servicer for this loan, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo),
reported a trust debt service coverage (DSC) of 5.05x and 62.2%
occupancy for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010. "Our adjusted
valuation, which yielded a stressed in-trust loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 93.7%, is comparable to our last review. The loan has a
final maturity of Sept. 9, 2011. The borrower is currently in
discussions with the servicers regarding its upcoming maturity,"
S&P stated.

                 Lodgin Loan With Special Servicer

The JW Marriott Starr Pass loan has a trust balance of $78.0
million (11.0% of the CSFB 2006-TFL2 pool trust balance) and a
whole-loan balance of $145.0 million. In addition, the borrower's
equity interests secure a $20.0 million mezzanine loan. This loan,
secured by a 575-room, full-service resort hotel in Tucson, was
transferred to the special servicer, Midland Loan Services
(Midland), on April 21, 2010, due to imminent default after the
borrower submitted a proposal for workout. Midland has indicated
that the resolution timing for this loan is uncertain as it is
currently working with the borrower toward a possible remediation,
while also considering foreclosure. The updated Oct. 12, 2010,
appraisal value for the property is $111.0 million. The loan
payment is current. The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a 0.92x
DSC for the 12 months ended June 30, 2010, and 60.4% occupancy as
of year-end 2010. S&P stated, "Our adjusted valuation, which
yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 127.8%, is comparable to
our last review. The loan matures on Aug. 9, 2011."

             Lodging Loans With Rated Raked Certificates

In addition to the CSFB 2006-TFL2 'KER' raked certificates,
Standard & Poor's also rates the CSFB 2006-TFL2 BEV-A and NHK-A
raked certificates.

The Beverly Hilton loan has a whole-loan balance of $264.0 million
that consists of a $155.0 million senior pooled component (21.8%
of the CSFB 2006-TFL2 pool trust balance), an $11.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component that supports the class BEV-A
raked certificate, and a $98.0 million nontrust junior
participation interest. In addition, the borrower's equity
interests secure a $36.0 million mezzanine loan. This loan,
secured by a 569-room, full-service hotel in Beverly Hills,
Calif., has a final maturity on Aug. 9, 2011. KeyBank has
indicated that the borrower is seeking refinancing, but no
commitments have been made at this point. KeyBank reported a DSC
of 1.32x and 70.1% occupancy for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010.
"Our adjusted valuation, which yielded a stressed in-trust LTV
ratio of 189.9%, has declined 27.2% since our last review. The
valuation decline is mainly due to a decrease in RevPAR," S&P
stated.

The NH Krystal Hotels loan has a whole-loan balance of $54.0
million that consists of a $50.0 million senior pooled component
(7.0% of the CSFB 2006-TFL2 pool trust balance) and a $4.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the class NHK-A
certificate. This loan, secured by three full-service hotels
totaling 982 rooms in Cancun, Ixtapa, and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,
has a final maturity of Aug. 9, 2011. KeyBank indicated that
the borrower intends to seek refinancing and would like to begin
dialogue with the master servicer to discuss its options. KeyBank
reported an overall 5.01x DSC and 56.5% occupancy for the 12
months ended Sept. 30, 2010. "Our adjusted valuation, which
yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 88.5%, is comparable
to our last review," S&P said.

               Other Loans With Rated Raked Certificates

The Metropolitan Warner Center loan has a whole-loan balance of
$24.7 million that consists of an $11.5 million senior pooled
component (1.6% of the CSFB 2006-TFL2 pool trust balance), a $5.1
million subordinate nonpooled component that supports the 'MW'
raked certificate classes, and two nontrust junior participation
interests totaling $8.1 million. This loan is secured by 685
residential units of a 1,279-unit garden-style condominium
conversion property in Woodland Hills, Calif. As of March 2011,
510 units had been sold, and seven additional units are under
contract. "Our adjusted valuation yielded a stressed in-trust LTV
ratio of 55.4% due primarily to the deleveraging of the loan from
proceeds from the sales. The loan has a final maturity of July 9,
2012," noted S&P.

The Sava/Fundamental Portfolio loan has a whole-loan balance of
$852.5 million that consists of an $842.7 million nonpooled trust
balance in CSFB 2006-TFL2, which supports the 'SV' raked
certificates and a $9.8 million nontrust junior participation
interest. In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the
whole loan secure mezzanine loans totaling $185.1 million. This
loan is secured by 194 health-care facilities totaling 23,303 beds
in various locations throughout the U.S. "Our adjusted valuation
is comparable to our levels in our last review. The loan was
recently modified, currently matures on June 9, 2013, and has one
12-month extension option remaining," S&P added.

                          Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

         Rating
Class    To         From        Credit enhancement (%)
E        BB+(sf)    BBB (sf)                     16.20
F        B+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)                    13.53
G        B- (sf)    BB- (sf)                     10.85
H        CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)                        8.18
J        CCC (sf)   CCC+ (sf)                     5.36
K        CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)                      2.26

Ratings Raised

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

         Rating
Class    To        From       Credit enhancement (%)
MW-A     BB+ (sf)  B+ (sf)                       N/A
MW-B     BB (sf)   B (sf)                        N/A

Ratings Affirmed

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

Class    Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
A-2      AAA (sf)                            35.91
B        AA (sf)                             30.14
C        A+ (sf)                             24.37
D        A- (sf)                             19.72
A-X-1    AAA (sf)                              N/A
A-X-3    AAA (sf)                              N/A
SV-A1    AAA (sf)                              N/A
SV-A2    AAA (sf)                              N/A
SV-B     AA+ (sf)                              N/A
SV-C     AA (sf)                               N/A
SV-D     AA- (sf)                              N/A
SV-E     A+ (sf)                               N/A
SV-F     A (sf)                                N/A
SV-G     A- (sf)                               N/A
SV-H     BBB+ (sf)                             N/A
SV-J     BBB (sf)                              N/A
SV-K     BBB- (sf)                             N/A
SV-AX    AAA (sf)                              N/A
KER-A    BB+ (sf)                              N/A
KER-B    BB (sf)                               N/A
KER-C    BB- (sf)                              N/A
KER-D    B- (sf)                               N/A
KER-E    CCC (sf)                              N/A
KER-F    CCC- (sf)                             N/A
BEV-A    CCC- (sf)                             N/A
NHK-A    CCC- (sf)                             N/A

COMM 2006-FL12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
KR1      CCC+ (sf)                             N/A
KR2      CCC (sf)                              N/A
KR3      CCC- (sf)                             N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six CMBS Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes of
First Union Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1 as:

   -- Cl. IO-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 1998
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl C., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2005
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl D., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2007
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl E., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl F., Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2008
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl G., Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 7.9%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
14.4% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were: "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published on April
19, 2005, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000, and "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions"
published on October 2, 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 8 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools
of credit tenant loans (CTLs) within CMBS transactions.  Moody's
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-5 is used to generate a
portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings.  Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 22, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 81% to $217.4
million from $1.16 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 36% of the pool.  Fourteen loans, representing 24% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U. S.  Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 23% of the
pool.  The pool also includes a credit tenant lease (CTL)
component which comprises 22% of the pool.

Fourteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $17.35 million (15% loss
severity).  Currently four loans, representing 11% of the pool,
are in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the Prince George Metro Center Loan ($20.0 million -- 9.2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 375,000 square foot office building
located in Hyattsville, Maryland.  The property was 59% leased as
of August 2010 and the borrower has been making partial debt
service payments while trying to work out a loan modification with
the special servicer.  If no modification can be agreed upon,
foreclosure will be the likely outcome.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily properties.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $12.9
million loss (56% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 93%
of the pool (excluding defeased, specially serviced, and CTL
loans).  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 74% compared to 69% at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.8%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.63X, respectively, compared to
1.36X and 1.64X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 16% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is The Clarinbridge Loan ($17.5 million
-- 8.0%), which is secured by a 306-unit multifamily property
located approximately 26 miles northwest of Atlanta in Kennesaw,
Georgia.  The property was 97% leased as of December 2010 compared
to 92% at the last review.  Per the most recent rent roll, renewal
rental rates at the property have increased by $370/unit.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
81% and 1.16X at the prior review.

The second largest loan is the New Brighton Manor Loan ($11.4
million -- 5.3%), which is secured by a 300-bed skilled nursing
home located in Staten Island, New York.  At the beginning of
2011, the borrower indicated that the property was not generating
sufficient income to pay operating expenses and debt service and
hired a bankruptcy lawyer to file bankruptcy.  The borrower
decided to not pursue bankruptcy and has continued making debt
service payments.  As of August 2010, the property was 95% leased
with an actual DSCR of 0.93X.  The loan fully amortizes over its
term and has amortized 42% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 123% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 124%
and 1.18X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Kelton Towers Loan ($6.8 million --
3.1%), which is secured by a 105-unit multifamily property located
in Westwood, California.  The property was 91% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 89% at the last review.  In order to
maintain its occupancy levels, the borrower lowered rents to
compete with existing product in the area.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.07X, respectively, compared to 37% and
2.59X at last review.

The CTL component includes 24 loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases.  Moody's provides public ratings for 79% of
the CTL component and an internal view on the remainder of the CTL
loans.  The largest exposures include Rite Aid Corp.  (38% of the
CTL component, Moody's Long Term Corporate Family Rating Caa2 --
stable outlook), Walgreen Co.  (16%; Moody's senior unsecured
rating A2 -- stable outlook), and CVS/Caremark (12%; Moody's
senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook).


FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1999-C2 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of three classes and
affirmed the ratings of four classes of First Union National Bank-
Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2:

   -- Cl IO., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 24, 1999
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl G., Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl H., Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl J., Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl K., Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2004
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl L., Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2004
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl M., Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool financial
performance and increased credit support due to amortization.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss
is 12.5% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current
list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were: "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April
2005, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000, and "CMBS: Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions" published
in October 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 13 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools
of credit tenant loans (CTLs) within CMBS transactions.  Moody's
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-5 is used to generate a
portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings.  Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $83.2
million from $1.18 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 40 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 45% of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 31% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U. S.  Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 29% of the
pool.

Seven loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.04 million (27% loss severity).
Currently three loans, representing 12% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Belmont Crossing Loan ($4.9 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 192-unit multifamily property located in Smyrna,
Georgia.  The loan transferred into special servicing in February
2009 due to imminent maturity default.  The borrower agreed to a
deed-in-lieu in December 2010 after exhausting all efforts to
refinance the loan.  The property is currently Real Estate Owned
(REO) and has been listed for sale for $4.0 million.  A recent
appraisal valued the property at $3.25 million.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Somerpoint
(Woodvalley) Loan ($3.5 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 143-unit multifamily property located in Marietta,
Georgia.  The loan transferred into special servicing in February
2009 due to imminent maturity default.  The loan has the same
sponsor as the Belmont Crossing Loan.  The property is currently
REO and has been listed for sale for $4.2 million.  A recent
appraisal valued the property at $3.75 million.

The remaining specially serviced property is secured by an
anchored retail center located in Medford, Oregon.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $3.5 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (42% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
100% of the pool (excluding defeased, specially serviced and CTL
loans).  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 70% compared to 84% at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 12% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.1%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.78X, respectively, compared to
0.99X and 1.56X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is a hotel portfolio ($9.1 million --
10.9% of the pool), which consists of four cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted fully amortizing loans secured by four limited
stay hotels with a total of 652 rooms.  Three hotels are located
in Virginia and one in Shreveport, Louisiana.  Property
performance has improved since last review as the Days Inn in
Shreveport finished hotel renovations and is fully now fully
operational.  Additionally, RevPAR and occupancy at all properties
improved in 2010 compared to 2009.  All four hotels are currently
on the watchlist due to low DSCR.  The loan is fully amortizing
and has paid down 3% since last review and 37% since
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.70X,
respectively, compared to 117% and 1.21X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Academy Plaza Loan ($9.1 million --
10.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 156,022 square foot
grocery-anchored retail center located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.  Property performance is in-line with last review
and the property is currently 81% leased, essentially the same as
at last review.  The loan has amortized 1% since last review and
17% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72%
and 1.43X, respectively, compared to 72% and 1.44X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Whitehall Estates Loan ($5.4 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 252-unit multifamily
property located in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Property
performance is in-line with last review and the property is
currently 98% leased, essentially the same as at last review.  The
loan is fully amortizing and has paid down 4% since last review
and 45% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
52% and 1.99X, respectively, compared to 60% and 1.72X at last
review.

The CTL component includes 15 loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases.  Moody's provides ratings for 93% of the
CTL component and has updated its internal credit estimate for the
remainder of the CTL credits.  The largest exposures include Rite
Aid Corp.  (39% of the CTL component, Moody's Long Term Corporate
Family Rating Caa2 -- stable outlook), Walgreen Co.  (29%; Moody's
senior unsecured rating A2 -- stable outlook), and CVS/Caremark
(26%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook).


FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Class E CLO Notes Rating to Caa1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Franklin CLO IV, Ltd.

   -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
      2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 26, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$18,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Notes due 2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
      previously on August 26, 2010 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

   -- US$15,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Notes due 2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
      previously on August 26, 2010 Upgraded to B2 (sf);

   -- US$8,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Notes due 2015 (current outstanding balance
      of $6,105,112.03), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
      August 26, 2010 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the amortization of the Class A Notes and
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in August 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
as a result of amortization of the Class A Notes, which have been
paid down by approximately $52 million or 48% since the rating
action in August 2010.  As per the March 2011 trustee report, the
Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 154.1%, 125.5%, 108.9%, and 103.4%
respectively, versus July 2010 levels of 132.9%, 116.7%, 106.0%,
and 102.3% respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  Based on the March 2011 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is 2204 compared to
2418 in July 2010.  The dollar amount of defaulted securities and
securities rated Caal or below remained constant at $2.0mm and
$3.8mm respectively, since the rating action in August 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $126 million, defaulted par of $2.0 million,
weighted average default probability of 14.5% (implying a WARF of
2665), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45%, and a
diversity score of 25.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Franklin CLO IV, Ltd., issued on August 28, 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2132)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +1

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (3198)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -2

   -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Class J Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes,
confirmed one class and affirmed three classes of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1999-C3:

   -- X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 13, 1999
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- G, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 A1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- H, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Ba2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2010 Downgraded
      to C (sf)

   -- L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2007 Downgraded
      to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are due to an increase in interest shortfalls from
specially serviced loans.  The confirmation and affirmations are
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

On March 2, 2011 Moody's placed three classes on review for
possible downgrade due to an anticipated increase in interest
shortfalls. This action concludes Moody's review. The master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia) had
previously advised Moody's that it would recover approximately
$600,000 of outstanding advances on a specially serviced loan, the
Jewelry Building ($6.5 million -- 12.1% of the pool) beginning in
March. The servicer has already recovered most of the advances it
currently plans to recover and the amount of outstanding advances
on the Jewelry Building loan has decreased from approximately $1.0
million to approximately $412,000. Berkadia spread out its
recoveries and the two classes with investment grade ratings
(Classes G & X) received timely payment of all accrued interest
during the advance recovery period.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
25.1% of the current balance as compared to 34% at last review.
Moody's stressed scenario loss is 27.7%. Moody's provides a
current list of base and stress scenario losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions", published April
2005 and "U.S. CMBS: Moody's Approach To Surveillance Of Large
Loan Transactions" published March 2006.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 2 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated October 28, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $53.7
million from $1.15 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 15%
of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 99% of the pool.
Two loans, representing 29% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council's (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $22 million loss (14%
loss severity on average). The pool had experienced a $19.7
million loss at Moody's prior review. Currently six loans,
representing 55% of the pool, are in special servicing. All of the
loans in special servicing were transferred due to imminent
maturity default. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Lakeside Place Office Building Loan ($6.5 million - 12% of the
pool), which is secured by a 84,000 square foot office building
located in Cleveland, Ohio. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in May 2009. The servicer has recognized a $4.0 million
appraisal reduction on the loan. The remaining five specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of office, industrial and
retail properties.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through N
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $4.3
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

The pool contains only three loans that are not defeased and not
in special servicing. Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and
partial year 2010 for all three of those loans. Excluding
specially serviced loan and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 73% as compared to 68% at last review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced loan and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.52X, respectively,
compared to 1.34X and 1.64X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance. The stressed DSCR is
greater than the actual DSCR for this deal because the pool's
loans are at or near maturity and the actual debt constant is
greater than Moody's 9.25% stressed rate.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2004-C2.

The lowered ratings reflect recurring interest shortfalls, as well
as reduced liquidity available to the more senior classes to
absorb any future interest shortfalls. "We lowered our ratings on
four classes to 'D (sf)' because we expect interest shortfalls to
continue and the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. The lowered ratings on the
remaining four classes reflect the potential for these classes to
experience interest shortfalls in the future resulting from
reduced liquidity available to these classes," S&P stated. The
recurring interest shortfalls for the certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals. "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations,
interest shortfalls due to loan modifications, and special
servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls," S&P stated.

The lowered ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes H, J, K, and L reflect
interest shortfalls for three or more months resulting from ASER
amounts related to five ($71.2 million, 9.3% of the pooled trust
balance) of the eight loans ($138.9 million, 18.1%) that are
currently with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.
Interest shortfalls were also caused by special servicing fees,
interest not advanced, and shortfalls due to a rate modification.
"We expect these interest shortfalls to continue for the
foreseeable future. We also considered the potential increase in
the ASER amounts resulting from the recent transfer of the
Parmatown Shopping Center Loan ($63.2 million, 8.2%). Our
downgrades on classes D, E, F, and G reflect the susceptibility of
those classes to future interest shortfalls and reduced liquidity
support available to these certificates," S&P pointed out.

As of the April 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$33.2 million were in effect for six loans. The total reported
ASER amount was $137,506, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1,316,618. Standard & Poor's considered the five ASER
amounts, which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees ($30,473), interest not advanced ($17,533),
and shortfall due to rate modification ($17,396), in determining
its rating actions. The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $204,953 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class H.

Ratings Lowered

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C2
                                   Credit       Reported
                 Rating          enhancement    Interest
                                                Shortfalls ($)
Class     To             From           (%)     Current
                                                Accumulated
D         BB+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)    11.18           0     0
E         CCC+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)     9.51           0     0
F         CCC (sf)       BB (sf)       8.14           0     0
G         CCC- (sf)      B+ (sf)       6.17           0     0
H         D (sf)         B- (sf)       4.35      66,783  126,183
J         D (sf)         CCC (sf)      3.59      24,098   72,293
K         D  sf)         CCC- (sf)     2.83      24,098   72,293
L         D (sf)         CCC- (sf)     2.22      19,279   98,067


GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.2BB of Prime Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 79
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 27 tranches from 10 prime
jumbo deals issued by GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust.  The collateral
backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%.  in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain tranches in transactions serviced by GMAC Mortgage, LLC's
(GMACM), were placed on review for possible downgrade in 2010 due
to two concerns regarding the servicer's practices.  Firstly,
GMACM used shared custodial bank accounts for multiple RMBS
transactions and secondly, GMACM had to suspend foreclosures in 25
states due to irregularities in its foreclosure processes.  As
GMACM is a subsidiary of C rated Residential Capital, LLC (RFC),
in case of a default, losses could have been absorbed by the
trusts.

Since the tranches were placed on review, GMACM has eliminated the
use of a common bank account across RMBS deals and set up
individual accounts for each transaction.  Also, GMACM has
reviewed and revamped its foreclosure process, and has lifted its
suspension of foreclosure sales and evictions on a case by case
basis.

Today's ratings actions are based on recent pool performance and
the available credit enhancement.  Moody's is not keeping these
bond under further review due to the two issues highlighted above
as they have been resolved.  However, the state attorneys general
are engaged in ongoing discussions with several servicers
regarding loan modifications and foreclosure procedures.  The
ultimate settlement of those discussions may entail fines, loan
forgiveness, cash payments to borrowers or other features that
could reduce future cash flows to RMBS investors.  Moody's will
continue to monitor the outcome and assess future credit
implications on the ratings as the situation evolves.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR1

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR2

   -- Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-II-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- CL. A-III-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 27,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-IV-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 27,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-J9

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-13, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-15, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2

   -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-I, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-II, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J1

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J2

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J3

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J4

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J5

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J6

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Cuts 2005-1 Cl. B Tranche to 'B3(sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A and Class B
tranches issued by Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1, a
securitization of conventional small balance commercial loans.
The sponsor is Grand Pacific Finance Corporation, and the master
servicer is Wells Fargo Bank.  The loans are secured primarily by
small commercial real estate properties owned by small businesses
and investors.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrades are caused by a significant deterioration in
collateral performance.  When issued in 2005, this transaction was
and remains highly exposed to the downturn in commercial real
estate values and liquidity due to a very large concentration of
balloon loans with maturities of five years or less.  The severe
downturned that occurred has realized these risks.  Moody's
current expected remaining net loss for the transaction is 25% of
the outstanding pool balance (approximately 19.5% lifetime net
loss).

In the past year, approximately 8.5% of the original balance was
charged-off in the deal primarily due to the transaction's policy
in which loans more than 12 months delinquent must be charged-off.
While Moody's expects future recoveries on many of these loans as
the collateral has not yet been sold, the recoveries will most
likely be less than the charged-off amount.  Loans 60+ delinquent,
including non performing matured balloon loans, are approximately
40% of the current pool balance as of the March 2011 distribution
date.  The servicer has extended several balloon payments by one
to two years.  However, many of these properties most likely will
not be able to obtain refinancing due to strained cash flows and
will need to be sold or foreclosed.

The methodology used in these rating actions included projecting
losses using a loan-by-loan analysis.  Moody's assessed the
likelihood of each loan to default based on the levels of current
delinquencies, business types, property locations, past payment
histories, borrower's creditworthiness, and either appraisals or
estimates of property market values.  The expected loss on the
pool was then examined in relation to available credit
enhancement, including a reserve account, subordination, and
excess spread.  Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating these transactions can also be
found on Moody's Web site.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.  If the remaining
expected losses used in determining the ratings were increased by
15%, the Class A may be further downgraded.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction, and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 CRE CDO Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one and downgraded three classes of
Certificates issued by Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-RR2 due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted
average rating factor (WARF), and decrease in weighted average
recovery rate (WARR).  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A-1FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

GCCFC 2007-RR2 is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the current pool balance).  As of the March 22, 2011 Trustee
report, the aggregate Certificate balance of the transaction has
decreased to $528.0 million from $528.7 million at issuance, due
to minimal realized losses to Class S.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life (WAL), WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 8,989 compared to 5,609 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is as
follows: Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 2.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(0.0% compared to 17.3% at last review), B1-B3 (6.5% compared to
32.8% at last review), and Caa1-C (93.5% compared to 47.1% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.1 years compared
to 7.0 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 0.3% compared to 3.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 100% at last review.
The low MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 0.3% to 10.3% does not affect the model results.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Other methodology used in these ratings was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real Estate
Securities" published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 10 Series 2005-ROCK Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 10 pooled
classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Trust Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2005-ROCK:

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-1, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to the stable performance of the real
estate collateral and key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be
mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in
collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels due
to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due
to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 17, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

The $1,685.0 million Rockefeller Center loan is secured by a
$1,210.0 million first lien mortgage on the borrower's fee and
leasehold interests in the property; the additional $475.0 million
in debt is secured by a pledge of 100% of the equity interest in
the borrower held by RCPI Mezz, LLC.  The sponsor of the loan is
Tishman Speyer Crown Equities.  The fixed-rate interest-only loan
has a 20-year term maturing in May 2025.

Rockefeller Center is a 12-building office, retail and
entertainment complex, located in midtown Manhattan, New York
City.  The landmark development consists of 6.7 million square
feet of net rentable area (NRA) with approximately 5.0 million
square feet of office space, approximately one-million square feet
of retail and storage space, Radio City Music Hall with a seating
capacity of 6,000, and Christie's Auction House.  As of December
2010, the office space was 93% leased and the retail and storage
space was 95% leased.  Including Radio City Music Hall,
Rockefeller Center was 94% leased, the same as at securitization.

The 10 largest office tenants lease approximately 35% of total NRA
and contribute approximately 38% of total rent.  The largest
office tenant is Deloitte, LLP with approximately 430,000 square
feet.  Deloitte, LLP signed an 18-year lease in January 2011 at 30
Rockefeller Plaza for approximately 430,000 square feet.  Rent
commenced on 25% of the space in January with rent to commence on
the balance of the space in 2015.  During February 2011 lease
renewals and expansions were signed with Lazard Freres & Co.  LLC
and the law firm Baker & Hostetler, LLP.  Lazard Freres, the
second largest office tenant, signed a 23-year lease for an
additional 60,000 square feet at 30 Rockefeller Plaza bringing its
total square footage at Rockefeller Center to 430,000 square feet.
Baker & Hostetler, LLP signed a 15-year renewal and expansion for
a total leased area of 117,633 square feet.

Significant retail tenants include Banana Republic (47,725 square
feet, lease expiration in 2016), Facconable USA (21,600 square
feet, lease expiration in 2018) and Kenneth Cole (17,362 square
feet, lease expiration in 2015).  The lease on the 548,250 square
foot Radio City Music Hall expires in 2023.

Moody's loan to value ("LTV" ) ratio is 78%, the same as last
review.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio ("DSCR") is
1.18X, the same as last review.


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $72.8MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 10
tranches and confirmed the ratings of six tranches from two prime
jumbo deals issued by GSR. The collateral backing these deals
consists primarily of first-lien, fixed rate prime jumbo
residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. In addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool are low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-13F

   -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-5F

   -- Cl. IA-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IA-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. IIA-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Raises Class C Notes Rating From 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, and C notes issued by Halcyon Structured Asset Management
Long Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd., and removed them from
CreditWatch positive.

"At the same time, we affirmed our current ratings on the class A-
1 and D notes and removed the rating on the
class A-1 note from CreditWatch positive. Halcyon Structured Asset
Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-3 is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Halcyon Structured
Asset Management LP," S&P stated.

"Additionally, we corrected our rating on the class X interest-
only note to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)'. Due to an error, we did
not lower the rating on this class during our Jan. 29, 2010,
rating action. The rating action corrects this," explained S&P.

"The raised ratings on the class A-2, B, and C notes reflect
improved performance we have observed in the underlying asset
portfolio for the deal since we lowered our ratings on most of the
notes on Jan. 29, 2010, following the application of our September
2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria. As
of the March 17, 2011, trustee report, the transaction reported a
par balance of zero in defaulted assets and approximately $31.13
million in assets from obligors with ratings, either by Standard &
Poor's or another rating agency, in the 'CCC' range. This was down
from the reported balance of $17.13 million in defaults and
approximately $59.04 million in assets from obligors with ratings
in the 'CCC' range noted in the Dec. 16, 2009, trustee report,
which we referenced for our January 2010 rating actions," S&P
stated.

Standard & Poor's has also noted an increase in the
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes. The
trustee reported these ratios in the March 17, 2011, monthly
report:

    * The class A overcollateralization ratio test was 125.07%,
      compared with a reported ratio of 119.77% in December 2009;

    * The class B overcollateralization ratio test was 118.02%,
      compared with a reported ratio of 113.02% in December 2009;

    * The class C overcollateralization ratio test was 115.21%,
      compared with a reported ratio of 110.33% in December 2009;
      and

    * The class D overcollateralization ratio test was 109.01%,
      compared with a reported ratio of 104.17% in December 2009.

"The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
reflect our opinion of the availability of credit support
commensurate with the current rating levels," S&P said.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-3 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                A+ (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A- (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
C                  BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
X                  AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)

Rating Affirmed

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-3 Ltd.

Class                  Rating
D                      B+ (sf)


ICE 1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-2, A-3, B, and C notes from ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction backed primarily
by loans and bonds to emerging market issuers and managed by ICE
Canyon LLC. "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the
class A-1D, A-1R, and D notes and removed them from CreditWatch,
where we placed them with negative implications on Sept. 20,
2009," S&P stated.

"The lowered ratings reflect a number of factors, including the
application of our updated criteria and assumptions used to rate
corporate backed CDO transactions. The revised criteria for
corporate backed CDOs incorporate several changes, including a
recalibration of the CDO Evaluator model, as well as reduced asset
recovery assumptions used in our cash flow analysis. These factors
are the primary contributors to the lowered ratings," S&P stated.

According to S&P, "The affirmations reflect our view that the
tranches have adequate credit support to maintain the current
ratings according to our corporate CDO criteria."

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

ICE 1:EM CLO Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1D        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1R        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2         AA (sf)     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3         A (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
D           BB (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg


IXION PLC: S&P Lowers Rating on Series 25 Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the notes
issued by Ixion PLC's series 25, a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation of asset-backed securities (CDO of ABS) transaction, to
'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' and then withdrew it.

The rating action follows a number of credit events within the
transaction's underlying portfolio that have caused the notes to
incur a complete principal loss.  "We then withdrew the rating
because the notes are no longer outstanding," noted S&P.

Rating Lowered and Then Withdrawn

Ixion PLC
Series 25
                        Rating
Class        To         Interim        From
Notes        NR         D (sf)         CC (sf)


JP MORGAN: Fitch Upgrades 5 Classes of 2003-CIBC6 Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades five classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corporation, series 2003-CIBC6.

There are 119 of the original 129 loans remaining in the
transaction, 24 of which have defeased (28.4% of the current
transaction balance. Three assets (2.2%) are specially serviced.

The largest specially serviced asset (1.04%) is an 82,100sf retail
center in Peoria, AZ.  The loan transferred in February 2010 due
to imminent default. Bashas'(66.3% of NRA), the largest tenant,
filed for bankruptcy in July 2009. Bashas' is still in occupancy
but at a reduced rental rate. The loan has been modified and is
current. The special servicer is monitoring the loan prior to
sending it back to the Master Servicer.

The second largest specially serviced asset (0.68%) is a 167,657sf
retail property built in 1979 and located in Lewisville, TX. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in April, 2010. Vacancies
reduced traffic flow at the property and have hindered prospective
tenants. A loan modification has been approved and the borrower is
working to resolve outstanding issues required to finalize the
modification.

The third largest specially serviced asset (0.51%) is secured by
three mobile home parks located in Colorado. The subject loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2011 due to imminent
payment default. The loan is currently due for December 2010
scheduled payment. The borrower indicated that one of the subject
properties has non-potable water and that cashflow from all
properties is being diverted to resolve this issue. The servicer
is pursuing modification.

Fitch upgrades and revises the Loss Severity (LS) ratings on these
classes:

   -- $11.7 million class D to AAA/LS4' from 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $14.3 million class E to 'AAA/LS4' from 'AA-/LS5', Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $10.4 million class F to 'AA/LS4' from 'A+/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $13 million class G to 'A/LS4' from 'A-/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $15.6 million class H to 'BBB/LS4' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch affirms and revises the Outlooks on these classes:

   -- $49.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $653.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32.5 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.2 million class J at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $7.8 million class K at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $5.2 million class L at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $3.9 million class M at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $1.3 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $13.5 million class NR.

The class X-2 notional balance is defined as zero as of the April
2011 remittance. Therefore, the class has been paid in full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only class X-1.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 17 2004-C1 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 classes of J.
P.  Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C1:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008
      Upgraded to Aaa(sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2008
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
9.4% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was: "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published on April 19,
2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 22 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 21, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $657.4
million from $1.04 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
39% of the pool.  Twelve loans, representing 16% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U. S.  Government securities.

Twenty-six loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $4.6 million (80% loss severity).  Currently four
loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the 610 Broadway Loan ($11.4
million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 152,454 square
foot office complex built in 1909 and renovated in 2002 and
located in the Jewelry District of downtown Los Angeles,
California.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to monetary default and the borrower subsequently
filed for bankruptcy in May 2010.  The borrower filed its
bankruptcy plan in November 2010 and the special servicer is
currently reviewing the plan.  The plan includes a modification to
the loan agreement.  Terms of the modification include an
extension of the maturity date, interest only payments for a
portion of the extension, and the ability to pay off the loan any
time prior to the new maturity date.

The remaining three specially serviced properties are secured by a
mix of property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.1
million loss for the specially serviced loans (61% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $3.7 million loss (24% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 98%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced loans with estimated
losses and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 82%,
the same as at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced loans with estimated losses and
troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.40X and
1.31X, respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.28X at last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Hometown America Portfolios IV & V
Loan ($87.8 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which is secured by 14
manufactured home communities totaling 3,742 units and located in
eight states.  The portfolio was 95% leased as of September 2010
compared to 89% at the prior review.  The loan has amortized 2%
since last review and 9% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.45X, respectively, compared to 74% and
1.32X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the One Fordham Plaza Loan
($45.7 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 414,002
square foot office building located in Bronx, New York.  The
property was 85% leased as of September 2010 compared to 92% at
last review.  The largest tenant is Montefiore Hospital, which
leases approximately 125,000 square feet of the net rentable area
(NRA) under various leases expiring in 2012 and 2013.  Included is
a proprietary lease (109,000 square feet), where upon expiration
of the initial term in 2012, Montefiore can extend through
September 2036 at $1.00 per annum plus expense reimbursements.
Other tenants include the New York City Housing Authority (18% of
the NRA; lease expiration March 2030) and the New York State
Division of Human Rights (13% of the NRA; currently on a month-to-
month lease -- working with borrower on a long term lease).
Property performance has declined due to both a decrease in rental
income as well as increased expenses.  The loan has amortized 4%
since last review and 29% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 83% and
1.31X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the White Oak Crossing Shopping
Center Loan ($40.4 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured
by a 517,000 square foot shopping center located approximately
seven miles southeast of Raleigh, North Carolina.  The center is
anchored by BJ's Wholesale Club (22% of the NRA; lease expiration
August 2023), Kohl's (17% of the NRA; lease expiration January
2024), and Dick's Sporting Goods (9% of the NRA; lease expiration
January 2019).  The center is shadow anchored by Target.  The
center was 95% leased as of December 2010 compared to 94% at the
last review.  The loan has benefitted from 2% of amortization
since last review and 15% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.38X, respectively, compared to 82% and
1.22X at last review.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Cl. 1-A-2 Rating to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 117
tranches and confirmed the ratings of five tranches from six prime
jumbo deals issued by JP Morgan Mortgage Trust. The collateral
backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011,which accounts
for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2003-A1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A5

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A6

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S1

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-P, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S2

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 2-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-P, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 3-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-P, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
      2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Cl. H Rating at B1; Cl. J Rating at C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2000-C9:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2002
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2005
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf) remaining
within acceptable ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
25.5% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 15.4%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
26.3% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011. The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" dated
September 15, 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and the CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a pay down analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates. Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying
ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into
an overall model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, essentially the same as at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.0. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated July 21, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $45.49
million from $814.38 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 9 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
22% of the pool. The pool faces significant refinance risk, as
three loans representing 52% of the pool, either have matured or
will mature within the next six months.

One loan, representing 18% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council's (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate $32.53 million realized loss (38% loss severity on
average). Currently there are three loans, representing 50% of the
pool, in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is
the Hickory Hospitality Portfolio Loan ($10.2 million -- 22.4%),
which is secured by four limited service hotels totaling 388
guest-rooms. The hotels are all located in North Carolina. The
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2010 due to
payment default. Competition from newer properties and the overall
decline in the hotel sector has contributed to the portfolio's
weak performance. The loan is in foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Cory Industries
Loan ($8.32 million -- 18.3%), which is secured by four industrial
buildings located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The loan transferred
to special servicing in October 2009 for imminent default. The
loan is current and the borrower has requested a loan
modification.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate $9.8 million loss (50% expected
loss on average) for the specially serviced loans. The master
servicer has recognized a $777,800 appraisal reduction for one of
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 15% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.7 million aggregate loss (25% expected loss based on a 100%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.6
million. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses and
non-advancing by the master servicer based on a determination of
non-recoverability. Interest shortfalls currently affect Class H.
Moody's is concerned that interest shortfalls may spike up beyond
this class because of the pool's high exposure to specially
serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2010 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 75% compared to
77% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.59X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.56X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
The top three performing loans represent 25% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Bridgewater Place Loan ($6.8 million --
15.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 140,200 square foot
office building located in Syracuse, New York. The building was
79% leased as of December 2010, essentially the same as at last
review. The loan is currently on the watchlist due to the drop in
leasing. The loan has passed its April 2009 anticipated repayment
date (ARD). Moody's has assumed a high probability of default for
this loan due to concerns with the property's declining
performance. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 1.14X at last review.

The second largest loan is the K-Mart -- Baltimore Loan ($3.2
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a retail center
located in Baltimore, Maryland. The property is anchored by K-
Mart, which leases 79% of the property's net rentable area (NRA)
through November 2014. The property was 95% leased as of September
2010, the same as at last review. The loan has passed its December
2009 ARD. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.14X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Greenmount Avenue Shopping Center
Loan ($1.4 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by a retail property
located in Baltimore, Maryland. The center was 100% leased as of
September 2010. Performance is stable. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 90% and 1.32X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.29X at
last review.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms 25 CMBS Classes of JPMCC 2007-LDP11
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed 25 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-LDP11:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2007
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. T, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 13.5%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
33.7% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets. However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy. The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was: "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions " published on
September 15, 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result. Fusion loan
credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels. Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the credit estimate level, is incorporated for loans with similar
credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 61, the same as at Moody's prior review.
Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated May 5, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1.3% to $5.34
billion from $5.41 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 265 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 33%
of the pool. The pool faces significant refinance risk as loans
representing 24% of the current pool balance mature within the
next 24 months. All of these loans have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage (DSCR) less than 1.00X.

Seventy loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council's (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $10.6 million realized loss (72% loss severity on
average). Currently there are thirty-one loans in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Hyatt
Regency -- Jacksonville Loan ($150.0 million -- 2.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 966-room full-service hotel located in
downtown Jacksonville, Florida. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in August 2010 for imminent monetary default.
The servicer has initiated foreclosure but is still discussing a
potential modification with the borrower. The remaining 30
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of the property
types. Most of these loans are real estate owned (REO) or in the
process of foreclosure. The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $377.2 million appraisal reduction for 28 specially
serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $365.5 million
loss (49% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 19 poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $143.5 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $21.5
million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and full or partial year
2010 operating results for 89% and 75% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 130% compared to 135% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.21X and 0.81X, respectively, compared to
1.17X and 0.79X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 13% of the pool balance.
The largest conduit loan is the GSA Portfolio Loan ($284.0 million
- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by nine office properties
located in West Virginia (4 properties), New York (2), Colorado
(1), Pennsylvania (1) and Kansas (1). The portfolio totals 1.1
million square feet and was 100% leased as of June 2010,
essentially the same as last review and securitization. The loan
is interest only for its entire term and matures in 2012. Although
performance has been stable, Moody's is concerned about near term
refinancing risk. The risk is partially mitigated by a fact that
the portfolio is 97% leased to the Government Service
Administration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 143% and 0.72X,
respectively, compared to 147% and 0.70X at last review.
The second largest loan is the Maple Drive Portfolio Loan ($220.0
million - 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by three office
properties located in Beverly Hills, California totaling 583,000
square feet. As of December 2010 the portfolio was 80% leased
compared to 92% at last review and 97% at securitization. The
largest tenant is Fox Interactive Media (28% of the net rentable
area (NRA); lease expiration May 2016). Performance has declined
due to lower revenues. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and
0.69X, respectively, compared to 130% and 0.73X at last review.
The third largest loan is the 315 Park Avenue South Loan ($219.0
million - 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 333,000 square
foot office building located in New York, New York. The property
is 85% leased as of March 2011. The largest tenant is Credit
Suisse (80% of NRA; lease expiration April 2017). Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.69X, respectively, the same as last
review.


KEY COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
Key Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL1, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SL1:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to A3(sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to A3(sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to A3(sf)

   -- Cl.  X, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to A3(sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3(sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to B2(sf)

   -- Cl. D, AFfirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2(sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3(sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca(sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C(sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C(sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C(sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to C(sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C(sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to C(sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C(sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
      Downgraded to C(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
17.0% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 86 compared to 88 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to $203.22
million from $237.49 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 141 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 24%
of the pool.

Fifty -five loans, representing 41% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $2.7 million loss (70%
loss severity on average).  Six loans, representing 3% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $752,950 appraisal reduction for three of
the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$4.2 million loss (70% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-MF1:

   -- Cl.  A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl.  B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl.  C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl.  X, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.8% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 14.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
29.5% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 162 compared to 173 at Moody's prior full
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 16, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 21, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 44% to $217.96
million from $387.35 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 228 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 12%
of the pool.

Sixty-nine loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $30.8 million loss (70%
loss severity on average).  Realized losses have resulted in 100%
principal loss to Classes D through N and an 11% principal loss to
Class C.  Thirty-one loans, representing 14% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $13.9 million appraisal reduction for ten
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $22.0 million loss (70% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes C through N
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.4
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 23 CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 23 classes of
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C7:

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-6, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-OL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2004
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. S, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
10.6% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used were Moody's Approach to Rating
Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005 and CMBS "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions",
published in September 2000.  Other methodologies and factors that
may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can
also be found on Moody's Web site.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 7 at Moody's prior full review.
The increase in Herf is due to the improved performance of several
loans that had been removed from the conduit pool at last review
for very high leverage.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 14, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $943.4
million from $1.42 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
49% of the pool.  The pool contains five loans with investment-
grade credit estimates that represent 12% of the pool.  At last
review, there was a sixth loan with an credit estimate.  However,
due to a decline in performance and increased leverage, this loan
is now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.  Four loans,
representing 21% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U. S.  Government securities.

Currently, there are 17 loans, representing 20% of the pool, on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

To date, four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in a $6.2 million aggregate loss (46% loss severity on average).
Currently, there are seven loans in special servicing,
representing 5% of the pool.  The largest loan in special
servicing is the North Dekalb Mall Loan ($26.5 million -- 3.9% of
the pool), which is secured by a 628,700 square foot (SF) regional
mall located in Decatur, Georgia.  The mall is anchored by Macy's,
Ross Dress for Less and AMC Theatres.  As of June 2010, the
property was 88% leased compared to 94% at last review.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in September 2010 due to
imminent monetary default when the Borrower requested a loan
modification.  The loan is current.  The remaining six specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  Moody's
estimates a total loss of $13.2 million (a 35% loss severity on
average) for five of the seven specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four loans
representing 1% of the pool.  Moody's has estimated a $2.4 million
aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% default
probability) from these loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
financials for 74% and 72% of the pool, respectively.  Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 99% compared to 96% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specialy serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.02X, respectively, compared to
1.36X and 1.05X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Montgomery Mall
Loan ($85.5 million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
1.1 million SF regional mall located in North Wales, Pennsylvania,
approximately 20 miles northwest of Philadelphia.  The collateral
space is 559,000 SF.  The mall is anchored by Macys, Sears and
Dick's Sporting Goods.  Comparable in-line sales for 2010 were
$324 per square foot compared to $317 per SF at last review.
Boscov's, a non-collateral anchor tenant at securitization,
vacated its space in 2008 prior to its lease expiration in 2027
when it filed for bankruptcy.  As of December 2010, the total
property was 80% leased compared to 77% at last review; the
collateral space was 85% leased compared to 82% at last review.
Performance remains stable.  The loan has amortized 2% since last
review.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
A3 and 1.39X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.34X at last
review.

The remaining four loans with credit estimates comprise 3% of the
pool.  The Kimco Portfolio - Enchanted Forest Loan ($11.0 million
-- 1.2% of the pool) is secured by a grocery-anchored retail
center located in Ellicott City, Maryland.  The performance
remains stable.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1
and 2.35X, the same as at last review.  The Kimco Portfolio -
Wilkens Beltway Plaza Loan ($8.2 million -- 0.9% of the pool) is
secured by a grocery-anchored retail center located in Baltimore,
Maryland.  Performance has declined due to a drop in occupancy.
The property is 82% leased compared to 92% at last review.
Furthermore, leases for an additional 20% of the NRA expire in
2011.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa2 and
2.15X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.30X at last review.
The Kimco Portfolio - Perry Hall Super Fresh Loan ($5.5 million --
0.6% of the pool) is secured by a grocery-anchored retail center
located in Perry Hall, Maryland.  Performance remains stable.  The
loan has a credit estimate of Aa2 and stressed DSCR of 2.14X, the
same as at last review.  The Palmetto Place Apartments Loan ($4.9
million -- 0.5% of the pool), is secured by a garden style
apartment complex located in Miami, Florida.  Performance remains
stable.  The credit estimate is Aaa and stressed DSCR greater than
4.00X, the same as at last review.

The loan that previously had a credit estimate is the World
Apparel Center Loan ($69.3 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which
represents a 33% participation interest in a $210.1 million first
mortgage loan.  The whole loan is secured by a 1.1 million SF
Class A office building located in the Times Square submarket of
New York City.  The building's largest tenants include Jones
Apparel Group (50% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration April 2012), Jacque Moret (7% of the NRA; lease
expiration in June 2020) and Alfred Dunner & Co.  (4% of the NRA;
lease expiration January 2017).  As of December 2010, the property
was 93% leased compared 75% at last review.  Despite the increase
in occupancy, total income has declined for the fourth consecutive
year.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist
for DSCR.  The full year 2010 net operating income (NOI) is 34%
lower than in 2007 due to lower rents and re-imbursements and
higher operating expenses.  There is significant rollover risk
related to the Jones Apparel lease, which expires in 2012.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 0.96X, respectively,
compared to 70% and 1.36X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 22% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 600 Third Avenue Loan ($168.0 million
-- 17.8% of the pool),which is secured by a 541,000 SF Class A
office building located in the Grand Central/UN office submarket
of New York City.  Major tenants L-3 Communications Corporation
(15% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2018) and Sumitomo
Corporation of America (10% of the NRA; lease expiration August
2014).  As of January 2011, the property was 81% leased compared
to 91% at last review.  The rise in vacancy is due to Tru TV
(Court TV) vacating 120,000 SF when its lease expired in December
2010.  The Borrower was able re-lease some the vacant space when
Aaronson Rappaport, Feinstein and Deutsch LLP, a defense
litigation firm, signed a new lease for 44,000 SF starting in
January 2011.  Despite the high vacancy, Moody's anticipates that
the property will stabilize.  Borrower is proactively marketing
and improving the property.  Secondly, the building's in-place
rents of $45.20 per square foot are below the sub-market asking
rents of $53 per square foot reported by CB Richard Ellis.  For
the short term, it is anticipated that the cash flow will decline
due to lower recoveries and higher one-time charges related to the
tenant improvements and leasing commissions.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 106%
and 0.85X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is Guam Multifamily Loan ($20.  9
million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by 12 multifamily
properties and one retail center located in Yoga, Guam.  The loan
was placed on the master servicer's watchlist in April 2010 due to
a decline in financial performance and concerns about deferred
maintenance.  The portfolio has a combined occupancy of 87%.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.92X, respectively,
compared to 109% and 0.89X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Richard's of Greenwich Loan
($20.8 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 27,000
SF retail property located in Greenwich, Connecticut.  The
property is 100% leased to Ed Mitchell, Inc., a men's apparel
company, through 2024.  Performance remains stable.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.90X, the same as at last review.


LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Downgrades Cl. B Rating to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one and downgraded seven classes of Notes
issued by LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in
the weighted average rating factor and a decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate since Moody's last review. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
      Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
      Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
      Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FXD, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd. is a static CRE CDO transaction 100% backed by
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) issued between 1998
and 2002. As of the March 23, 2011 Trustee Report date, the
aggregate collateral balance of the transaction is $520.6 million
compared to $800.6 million at issuance, representing $280.0
million of realized losses to date and $23.5 million of
amortization on Class A resulting from both paydown from the
underlying collateral and redirecting of interest proceeds due to
failure in certain overcollateralization tests.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,200 compared to 5,363 at last
review. The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is as follows: A1-A3 (4.1% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-
Baa3 (2.9% compared to 2.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (12.5%
compared to 24.9% at last review), B1-B3 (11.3% compared to 24.0%
at last review), and Caa1-C (69.2% compared to 48.9% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.0
years compared to 3.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of
7.2% compared to 7.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9 compared to 18.1% at last review.
The high MAC is due to greater credit risk collateral concentrated
in a small number of names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
7.2% to 2.2% or up to 12.2% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 3 notches downward or 0 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010 and "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real
Estate Securities published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms 20 CMBS Classes of MLMT 2005-LC1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 20 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-LC1:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4FC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. AM, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2006
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's LTV
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.
Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.6% of the current balance, which is the same as at last review.
Moody's stressed scenario loss is 15.6% of the current balance.
Moody's provides a current list of base and stress scenario losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U. S.  CMBS Transactions", published
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 40 compared to 43 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 5, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to $1.38
billion from $1.55 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 133 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 40%
of the pool.  The pool contains one loan, representing 8.3% of the
pool, with a credit estimate.

Thirty-three loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a $7
million loss (51% average loss severity).  Nine loans,
representing 8% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Four Forest/Lakeside
Loan ($58 million -- 4% of the pool).  The loan is secured by two
office properties located in Dallas, Texas.  The collateral was
81% leased as of August 2010.  The loan's maturity date was
extended from November 2010 to June 3, 2011.  The collateral was
reappraised for $73.1 million on February 10, 2011.  Moody's does
not estimate a loss for this loan.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail, office and industrial properties.  Moody's has
estimated a $24 million loss (44% expected loss based on an 93%
probability of default) for the eight remaining specially serviced
loans.  The servicer has recognized a $23 million aggregate
appraisal reduction for seven of the remaining eight specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $6 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through Q
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.9
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls due to the increased exposure to
specially serviced loans since last review.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 92% and 91% of the pool's loans,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced loans, troubled loans
and loans with credit estimates, Moody's weighted average LTV is
101%, which is the same as at last review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, troubled loans and loans with
credit estimates, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.32X and
1.02X, respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.03X at last review.
Part of the decline in actual DSCR can be attributed to loan
repayment converting from interest only to principal and interest
repayment.  Currently 97.5% of the pool's loans are amortizing.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Glendale Galleria Loan
($115 million - 8.3% of the pool).  The collateral consists of the
borrower's interest in a 1.3 million square foot (SF) enclosed
regional shopping mall located in Glendale, California.  More
specifically, the collateral includes 661,000 SF of retail, office
and storage space.  The loan represents a 45% pari-passu interest
in a $255 million amortizing loan.  There is also an $82.2 million
B Note and $27.8 million of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.
As of December 2010, the property was 98% leased with in-line mall
tenant occupancy @ 86%, similar to last review.  Financial
performance has declined slightly since last review due to lower
revenue achievement and higher operating expenses.  The loan
sponsors include GGP and NYSTRES.  Moody's credit estimate, loan
to value (LTV) and stressed DSCR are Baa2, 67% and 1.26X,
respectively compared to Baa1, 65% and 1.26X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Colonial Mall Bel Air Loan ($118
million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.3 million SF regional mall located in Mobile,
Alabama.  The property has maintained a high and stable occupancy
as the entire mall is 97% leased, which is the same as at last
review.  Inline sales have experienced a 3.7% year over year
increase through July 2010.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 103% and 0.95x, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.92x at
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the MOB Portfolio Loan ($57
million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by seven medical
office buildings and one surgical center.  Six of the properties
are located in Dallas, Texas and two are located in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.  The portfolio totals 338,000 SF and was 76% leased as
of September 2010 compared to 79% at 2009 year end.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.90x, respectively, compared to
111% and .94x at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Colonial Mall Greenville
($43 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 450,000 SF Class B regional mall located
in Greenville, North Carolina.  Total mall occupancy is 83%
compared to 96% at securitization.  The decline in occupancy is
mainly attributed to Steve & Barry's vacating its 54,000 SF space
during its 2008 bankruptcy.  The space remains vacant.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and .73X, respectively, compared to
125% and 0.80X at last review.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 22 2005-CKI1 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 22 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CKI1:

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-6, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. AM, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
      Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
15.9% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in September
2005, which is available on Moody's Web site at www.moodys.com.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 36 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 30, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence report(s) on the underlying assets
or financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
report(s) had a neutral impact on the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to $2.6 billion
from $3.1 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 160 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 37% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 3% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U. S.  Government
securities.  The pool includes three loans, representing 7% of the
pool, with investment grade credit estimates.

The pool faces near-term refinancing risk as two large portfolio
loans plus four smaller balance loans, in aggregate representing
9% of the pool, mature within the next 12 months.

Thirty-eight loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC; formerly the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $22.8 million (20% loss severity).  At
last review, realized losses totaled $7.5 million.  Fourteen
loans, representing 10% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, retail, office, and self storage property types.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Louisiana Boardwalk
Loan ($123.4 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
544,175 square foot (SF) lifestyle center located in Bossier City,
Louisiana.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2010 and attempts to modify the loan terms with the
borrowers have failed.  The trust initiated foreclosure
proceedings February 15, 2011.  The 13 remaining specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master
servicer has recognized $96 million in appraisal reductions for 13
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $101.7 million loss (39% expected loss on average) for
all of the specially serviced loans.

As of the most recent remittance statement date, the transaction
has experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$4.1 million affecting Classes H through Q.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and interest payment reductions due
to loan modifications.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$22.7 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 97%
of the pool and partial year 2010 results for 84% of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 101% versus 103% at last full review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.7% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.03X, respectively, compared to
1.60X and 1.03X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Glendale Galleria
Loan ($140.2 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.3 million SF enclosed regional shopping
mall (the collateral consists of 661,000 SF of retail, office and
storage space) located in Glendale, California.  The loan
represents a 55% pari-passu interest in a $255 Million amortizing
loan.  There is also an $82.2 million B Note and $27.8 million of
Mezzanine debt held outside the trust.  As of December 2010, the
property was 98% leased with in-line mall tenant occupancy at 86%,
similar to last review.  Financial performance has declined since
last review due to lower revenue achievement and higher operating
expenses.  The loan sponsors include GGP and NYSTRS.  Moody's
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.26X, respectively
compared to Baa1 and 1.3X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is the Blue Cross
Building Loan ($28.2 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is
secured by two adjacent office buildings totaling 517,244 SF
located in Richardson, Texas.  The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
1.39X, respectively compared to Baa1 and 1.37X at last review.

The third largest loan with a credit estimate is the Plaza Loan
($20.0 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 171-
unit co-op apartment building located in Ft.  Lee, New Jersey.
Revenue generation has declined since last review due to higher
operating expenses.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 2.0X, respectively compared to Aaa and 2.06X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance.  The largest conduit loan is the Galileo NXL Retail
Portfolio and Westminster City Center Loan ($255 million - 9.7% of
the pool) which is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in a
portfolio of 19 anchored community shopping centers totaling 3.5
million SF.  The properties are cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted and located across 14 states including Colorado (18% of
the allocated balance), Florida (16%) and California (11%).  This
loan is interest-only for its entire term and matures September
2012.  Performance has declined slightly since last review due to
higher operating expenses and recent leasing activity reflecting
tenant concessions and leases signed at current market rents.
However, Moody's had stressed the cash flow at last review due to
concerns about lease rollover and current performance is better
than anticipated.  As of September 2010, the Galileo NXL Retail
Portfolio was 87% leased versus 83% at last review while
Westminster City Center was 83% leased versus 77% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.91X, respectively
compared to 115% and 0.92X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the Ashford Hotel Portfolio Loan
($158.4 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 10 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted hotel
properties totaling 1,703 guestrooms located across seven states
including Florida (42% of the allocated balance), California (14%)
and Minnesota (12%).  Financial performance is down slightly
compared to last review, mirroring the 55% average portfolio
occupancy compared to 56% at last review.  However, Moody's had
stressed the cash flow at last review due to concerns about lease
rollover and current performance is better than anticipated.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.99X, respectively,
compared to 127% and 0.95X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Galileo NXL Portfolio 2 Loan ($99.0
million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by the fee and
leasehold interest in a portfolio of 13 retail properties totaling
1.6 million SF.  The properties are cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted and located across nine states including Texas
(36% of the allocated balance), Virginia (18%) and West Virginia
(8%).  The loan is interest-only for its entire term.  Occupancy
was 84% as of September 20210, unchanged since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR is 104% and 0.94X, respectively,
compared to 100% and 0.97X at last review.


MKP CBO: Moody's Upgrades Rating of Class A-2 2039 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class of
notes issued by MKP CBO III Ltd.  The notes affected by today's
rating action are:

   -- Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes, Due 2039 (current balance of $29,474,211), Upgraded
      to Baa1(sf); previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to
      Ba1(sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating action results primarily from the
continuing amortization of the Class A-2 Notes, which have been
paid down by $20.5 million since Moody's last rating action on
July 31, 2009.  There are currently $59.2 million of performing
assets, roughly 65% of which have investment-grade ratings,
providing sufficient credit support to the approximately $29.5
million of outstanding Class A-2 Notes.

MKP CBO III Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and CMBS originated between 2003
and 2004.  Additionally, the deal triggered an EOD on July 24,
2009 due to the failure to maintain a Class AB OC ratio of at
least 100%, and subsequently declared Acceleration on November 2,
2009.  Pursuant to the Acceleration waterfall, the Class A2 Notes
are currently receiving all interest and principal proceeds
following the payment of senior expenses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present).  The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows.  The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa2 and Caa3 rated bucket notched down to Ca:

   -- Class A-2: -1

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

Moody's Caa rated bucket notched up by two notches:

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Keeps 'C' Ratings on 3 2000-Life2 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed six classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-Life2:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2000
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool
performance.  The pool has paid down by 74% since Moody's last
review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
19% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 11%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 24%
of the current balance.  The current cumulative base expected loss
represents a higher percentage of the pool than at last review due
to significant paydowns since last review, even though the dollar
amount of expected loss is less.  At last review Moody's
cumulative expected loss was $27.2 million compared to $11.8
million at this review.  Moody's provides a current list of base
and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS:
"Moody's Approach to Rating Conduit Transactions," published in
September 2000, and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions," published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 17, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15th, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $63 million
from $765.3 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
3% to 32% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 91% of
the pool.  The pool faces significant refinance risk as loans
representing 73% of the pool has matured or matures within the
next 12 months.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.  Eleven
loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $8.3 Million (17% loss severity).  Ten loans, representing
56% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $11 million loss (45% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
100% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 57% compared to 66% at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 15% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.96X and 2.20X, respectively, compared to 1.48X and
1.64X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top two performing conduit loans represent 38% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 825 Seventh Avenue loan ($20.4
million -- 32% of the pool) which is secured by 164,000 square
foot office building located in Midtown Manhattan.  The building
is 100% leased to to two tenants, Young and Rubicam Inc (81% of
Net Rentable Area (NRA), lease expiration in 2015) and
International Merchandising Corporation (19% of NRA, lease
expiration in 2013).  Property performance has improved
significantly since last review, mostly due to the renewal of
Young and Rubicam's lease at a higher base rent than their
previous lease.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.00X,
respectively, compared to 77% and 1.33X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Room & Board Store Loan ($3.6
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 20,000 square
foot single tenant retail building located in Denver Colorado.
The store is leased to Room and Board through 2017.  Performance
has been stable since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 65% and 1.75X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.73X at
last review.

The top three specially serviced loans represent 26% of the pool.
The largest loan is the BRHEBA, Inc Loan ($8.2 Million -- 13%)
which is secured by a single tenant industrial property in Jersey
City, New Jersey.  The building's sole tenant is a fragrance
company.  The property is currently in the foreclosure process.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 500 North
Woodward Avenue Loan ($4.3 Million -- 7%) which is secured by a
50,000 square foot suburban office property located in Bloomfield
Hills Michigan, located about 20 miles north west of Detroit.  A
two year extension was approved and closed on July 30, 2010.  This
loan is currently performing in accordance with the modification.
Moody's is not expecting a loss from this loan.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 193%
and 0.56X at last review

The third largest specially serviced loan is The Eisner Building
Loan ($4.0 Million -- 6%), which is secured by a three story,
35,000 square foot office and retail property located in Red Bank,
New Jersey.  The property is 90% leased compared with 95% at last
review.  A recent appraisal has been secured that had a value in
excess of the loan balance, and the trustee has consented to one
year forbearance.  Moody's is not expecting a loss from this loan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.34X, respectively,
compared to 84% and 1.29X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Cuts $6.2MM of 2005-TOP19 Bonds to 'CCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust Series 2005-TOP19 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, due to further deterioration of loan performance.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 5.1% for the remaining pool
(expected losses of the original pool are at 4.5% and includes
losses realized to date). Fitch has designated 28 loans (16.9%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes four specially serviced
loans (1.2%).

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased by 14.5% to $1.05 billion from
$1.23 billion at issuance. Realized losses incurred to date total
$2.2 million.  Seven loans (6.3%) are currently defeased.
Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $60,433 are
currently affecting class P.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan secured
by a 466,000 square foot (sf) office building located in the
Buckhead area of Atlanta, GA. The largest tenant (10%) vacated the
property in December 2010 resulting in year end 2010 vacancy of
27%.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan
secured by two cross-collateralized, cross-defaulted self-storage
properties located in Boca Raton and Deerfield Park, Florida.
Performance has declined significantly with occupancy at the two
properties averaging 60% in 2010 compared to 79% at year end 2008.

The third largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan
secured by a 162-room limited service hotel located in Palm Beach
Lakes, Florida. Property performance substantially declined
beginning in 2009 resulting in negative year end 2010 cash flow.

Fitch downgrades, revises Outlooks, and assigns Recovery Ratings
to these classes:

   -- $12.3 million class C to 'BBB-sf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $15.4 million class D to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.2 million class F to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $9.2 million class G 'to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'Bsf/LS5; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $10.7 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $3.1 million class J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf'/LS5;

   -- $3.1 million class K to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $6.1 million class L to 'CCCsf/RR1' from'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $1.5 million class M to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5'; '.

   -- $3.1 million class N to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $3.1 million class O to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch also affirms and revises LS ratings and Outlooks for these
classes:

   -- $42.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $70.7 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $642.8 million class A-4A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $88.1 million class A-4B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $87.5 million class A-J at 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23 million class B at 'Asf/LS5' from Asf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $12.3 million class E at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook to Negative
      from Stable


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 10 2001-TOP3 CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed 10 classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-
TOP3:

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2001
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2001
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2007
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses resulting from
anticipated losses from troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.7% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.3%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
13% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were: "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published on April 19,
2005 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 41 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 5, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 67% to $341 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 66 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 47% of
the pool.  The pool includes one loan with an investment-grade
credit estimate, representing 9% of the pool.  Eight loans,
representing 9% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U. S.  Government securities.  The pool faces significant
near-term refinance risk as 61% of the pool has matured or will
mature within the next 12 months.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 40% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $12 million (34% loss severity).  Nine loans,
representing 18% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $31 million loss (52% expected
loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $500,000 loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) for this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 97%
of the performing loans.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 67% compared to
70% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.83X, respectively, compared to
1.51X and 1.55X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Federal Plaza Loan ($31.7
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 240,000 square
foot anchored retail center located in Rockville, Maryland.  The
center is anchored by TJ Max (13% of the net rentable area (NRA),
lease expiration in 2022).  Leases for 25% of the NRA expire
within the next 12 months.  The loan is on the watch list due to
its upcoming maturity in June of 2011.  Although performance has
been stable over the life of the loan, Moody's analysis reflects a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about potential income
volatility due to near term lease expirations.  Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.65X, respectively,
compared to A3 and 1.7X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 140 Kendrick Street Loan ($49.7
million -- 15% of the pool) which is secured by three Class A
suburban office buildings that are located ten miles west of
Boston's financial district.  The buildings total 381,000 square
feet and are 100% leased to Parametric Technology Corporation as
its corporate headquarters through November 2012.  The loan
matures in July 2013.  Property performance has been stable since
securitization.  Moody's valuation reflects a dark/ lit analysis
and reflects similar market fundamentals to last review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to
85% and 1.24X at last review.

The second largest loan is the South Placer Business Park Loan
($14.2 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by 200,000
square foot industrial building located in Roseville California,
which is part of the Sacramento MSA.  The property is 86% leased
compared with 88% at last review and 100% at securitization.  The
loan is on the watch list due it's upcoming maturity on May 1,
2011.  Performance has remained steady since last review, however
down significantly since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 70% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 69% and 1.57X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Omnicom Building Loan ($11 million -
- 3% of the pool), which is secured by 100,000 square foot office
building located in Marina Del Ray California.  The building is
100% leased to Omnicom Group, Inc (senior unsecured shelf rating
(P)Baa1, stable outlook,) through June 2015.  Overall performance
of the loan has improved since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.83X, respectively, compared to 68% and
1.56X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Confirms 2004-NC5 Cl. B-2 Rating at Ca(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one tranche
from a Subprime deal issued by Morgan Stanley. The collateral
backing the deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC5

   -- Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MSC 2007-SRR3: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 11 CRE CDO Classes at 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by MSC 2007-SRR3.
The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: weighted average rating factor (WARF), weighted
average life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all performing within levels
commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 6, 2010.

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologyies used in this ratings wasere "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


MSC 2007-SRR4: Moody's Affirms Class B & C Ratings at 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by MSC 2007-SRR4
Segregated Portfolio. The key indicators of the expected loss
within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating factor
(WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC) are all
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transactions. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 6, 2010.

   -- Class B Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, Affirmed at C
      (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Class C Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, Affirmed at C
      (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.
However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in ratings was "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


NEW SOUTH HOME: Moody's Confirms Ratings on $23MM of Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating on one tranche
from New South Home Equity Trust 2001-1. The collateral backing
this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

In addition, Moody's has withdrawn the rating on one tranche from
New South Home Equity Trust 2001-1. Moody's Investors Service has
withdrawn the credit rating pursuant to published credit rating
methodologies that allow for the withdrawal of the credit rating
if the size of the pool outstanding at the time of the withdrawal
has fallen below a specified level.

Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to pools
with at least 40 loans or a pool factor of greater than 5%. As a
result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops
below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40 loans
or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors. For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier. RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty. The
primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: New South Home Equity Trust 2001-1

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Class B-1L Rating to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Octagon Investment Partners VI, Ltd.:

   -- US$18,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due January
      13, 2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 2,
      2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January 13,
      2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 2, 2009
      Downgraded to A2 (sf);

   -- US$12,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due January 13,
      2016 (current outstanding balance of $7,000,000), Upgraded
      to Aa3 (sf); previously on October 2, 2009 Confirmed at Baa3
      (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January 13,
      2016, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on October 2, 2009
      Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$6,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January 13,
      2016, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on October 2, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 53.63% or $118 million since the
rating action in October 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in October 2009. As of the latest trustee report dated
April 6, 2011, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class
B-2L overcollateralization ratios are reported at 128.80%,
122.81%, 109.70% and 105.93%, respectively, versus September 2009
levels of 116.96%, 113.65%, 105.93%, and 103.49%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in October 2009. Based on the April 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is 2241 compared to 2413 in
September 2009, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up
approximately 3.14% of the underlying portfolio versus 7.77% in
September 2009. The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.
In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $2 million from approximately $15.7 million in
September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $160 million, defaulted par of $4.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 13.72% (implying a WARF of
2697), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.34%,
and a diversity score of 46. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Octagon Investment Partners VI, Ltd., issued in November 2003, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described, Moody's also
performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated
notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary of the
impact of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of
WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2158)

   -- Class A-1LA: 0

   -- Class A-1LB: 0

   -- Class A-1L: 0

   -- Class A-2L: 0

   -- Class A-3L: +2

   -- Class B-1L: +2

   -- Class B-2L: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3236)

   -- Class A-1LA: 0

   -- Class A-1LB: 0

   -- Class A-1L: 0

   -- Class A-2L: -1

   -- Class A-3L: -2

   -- Class B-1L: -2

   -- Class B-2L: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


OWS CLO: Moody's Hikes $8.5MM of Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by OWS CLO I, Ltd.:

   -- US$235,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Notes due January
      6, 2016 (current outstanding balance of $131,838,102),
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2010 Confirmed
      at Aa3 (sf);

   -- US$14,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Notes due January 6,
      2016, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2010
      Confirmed at A3 (sf);

   -- US$3,000,000 Class X-1 Deferrable Amortizing Senior Secured
      Notes due January 6, 2016 (current outstanding balance of
      $1,741,685), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 17,
      2010 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$11,500,000 Class X-2 Deferrable Amortizing Senior Secured
      Notes due January 6, 2016 (current outstanding balance of
      $6,633,491), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 17,
      2010 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$14,000,000 Class B Deferrable Senior Secured Notes due
      January 6, 2016, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March
      17, 2010 Confirmed at B1 (sf);

   -- US$8,000,000 Class C Secured Notes due January 6, 2016,
      Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 17, 2010 Confirmed
      at Caa3 (sf);

   -- US$8,500,000 Class D Subordinated Secured Notes due January
      6, 2016 (current outstanding balance of $9,307,913),
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 6, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 37% or $76.0 million since the
rating action in March 2010.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in March 2010.  As of the latest trustee report dated March
31, 2011, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 121.25%, 112.32%,
107.78%, and 102.88%, respectively, versus January 2010 levels of
112.59%, 105.82%, 102.20%, and 98.50%, respectively.  Moody's also
notes that the Class X-1, X-2, B, and C Notes are no longer
deferring interest and that all previously deferred interest has
been paid in full. The Class D Notes have resumed paying interest
but still carry a deferred interest balance.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
Based on the March 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2265 compared to 2200 in January 2010.  The deal
also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $3
million from approximately $9 million in January 2010.

While the transaction has benefited from delevering, Moody's notes
that the portfolio includes a number of investments in securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes, primarily due to
the deal's participations in amend-to-extend offerings.  Based on
Moody's calculation, securities that mature after the maturity
date of the notes currently make up approximately 17.3% of the
underlying portfolio, compared to approximately 2.7% of the
underlying portfolio in January 2010.  These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $184 million, defaulted par of $6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 19.07% (implying a WARF of
3075), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.68%,
and a diversity score of 46.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

OWS CLO I, Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2460)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: +3

   -- Class X-1: +2

   -- Class X-2: +2

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +3

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3690)

   -- Class A-1: -1

   -- Class A-2: -2

   -- Class X-1: -2

   -- Class X-2: -2

   -- Class B: -1

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.

Further information on Moody's analysis of this transaction is
available on www.moodys.com. In addition, Moody's publishes a
weekly summary of structured finance credit, ratings and
methodologies, available to all registered users of Moody's Web
site, at http://www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck


PARADISO TRUST: S&P Affirms Rating on Trust II S.A. Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 20
tranches from five market value collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transactions.

"The affirmations reflect our assessment of the consistent
performance of the respective tranches," S&P stated.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Ratings Affirmed

Ares Enhanced Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd.
Class          Rating
A-1a           AAA (sf)
A-1b           AAA (sf)
A-2            AAA (sf)
A-3            AAA (sf)
B-1            AA (sf)
SecSrTermL     AA (sf)
C-1            A (sf)
MezzTermLn     A (sf)

Geer Mountain Financing Ltd.
Class          Rating
A-1            AAA (sf)
A-2            AAA (sf)
B-1            AA (sf)

OHSF Financing Ltd.
Class          Rating
A-1 2006       AAA (sf)
Sr Rev Ln      AA (sf)
B-1 2006       AA (sf)
C-1 2006       A (sf)
C-2 2006       A (sf)
D-1 2006       BBB (sf)
D-2 2006       BBB (sf)

P.A.R.A.D.I.S.O. Trust II S.A.
Class          Rating
Notes          B (sf)

Scandinavian Trust S.A.
Class          Rating
Notes          BB (sf)


PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Cuts Cl. B & C Mezzanine Notes to 'Ca'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following five notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.

   -- US$327,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2035
      (current balance of $275,059,813), Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);
      previously on December 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

   -- US$69,900,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2035,
      Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on December 22, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$12,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes Due
      2035, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on December 22, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$63,650,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due 2035
      (current balance of $64,459,491, including interest
      shortfall), Downgraded to C; previously on December 22, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf);

   -- US$77,650,000 Floating Rate Class C Mezzanine Notes Due 2035
      (current balance of $80,651,545, including interest
      shortfall), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf).

In addition, Moody's upgraded the rating on this combination note
issued by PreTSL Combination Trust I (for PreTSL XVI).

   -- US$5,000,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XVI-1
      (current Moody's Ratable Balance of $2,044,186), Upgraded to
      Ba2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
      (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions taken today are
primarily the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted
amount in the underlying portfolio.  The assumed defaulted amount
increased by $99 million since the last rating action in December
2009.  Cumulative assumed defaults now total $270 million (46.9%
of the current portfolio).  All the assumed defaulted assets are
carried at zero recovery in our analysis.  The remaining assets in
the portfolio have also shown a slight improvement, as indicated
by a WARF decrease to 1374, from 1533 as of the last rating action
date.  Currently, 38% of the portfolio is estimated to be Ba1 or
below, as determined both by using FDIC Q3-2010 financial data in
conjunction with Moody's RiskCalc model to assess non-publicly
rated bank and using financial data for insurance companies from
Moody's Insurance Team.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action.  As of the latest trustee report dated March 22,
2011, the Senior Principal Coverage Test is 86.44% (limit 128.00%)
and the Class B Mezzanine Principal Coverage Test is 72.23% (limit
115.00%),versus trustee reported levels from the report dated
September 23, 2009 of 113.11% and 97.73% respectively, which were
used during the last rating action.

Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd., issued on December 15, 2004,
is a collateral debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO').  On
December 22, 2009, the last rating action date, Moody's downgraded
four classes of notes, which were the result of the application of
revised and updated key modeling assumptions, as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.

PreTSL Combination Trust I (for PreTSL XVI), issued on December
15, 2004, is a combination note security trust linked to the CDO
tranches of Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.  Today's rating
upgrade action on the Combination Certificates is a result of the
pay down of its Moody's Ratable Balance.  The Combination
Certificates was originally composed of $2.5 million of Class A-1
Notes and $2.5 million of Income Notes.  Currently, the
Combination Certificates have adequate coverage from Class A-1
notes as the Class A-1 component is approximately $2.10 million to
cover the Moody's Ratable Balance of $2.04 million.  The rating of
the Combination Certificates addresses the return of principal
only.

The credit deterioration exhibited by the TRUP CDO portfolio is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.
With the exception of commercial P&C insurance which remains in
negative outlook, the insurance sector is stabilizing.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U. S.  community banks
and insurance companies that are generally not publicly rated by
Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality, Moody's uses RiskCalc
model, an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive
credit scores for these non-publicly rated bank trust preferred
securities.  Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority
of bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data
received as of Q3-2010.  For non rated insurance trust preferred
securities, Moody's depends on the insurance team and the
insurance firms annual financial reporting to assess the credit
quality of each insurance asset in the portfolio.  Moody's also
evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to the
volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions," October 2009.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity
of the model results to changes in the WARF (representing a slight
improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit quality of
the collateral pool) was examined.  If WARF is increased by 230
points from the base case of 1374, the model results in an
expected loss that is one notch worse than the result of the base
case for Class A-1 Notes.  If the WARF is decreased by 360 points,
expected losses are one notch better than the base case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating Preferred Term
Securities XVI, Ltd.  and PreTSL Combination Trust I (for PreTSL
XVI) were "Moody's Approach to Rating U. S.  Bank Trust Preferred
Security CDOs" published in June 2010, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Insurance Trust Preferred Security CDOs" published in June 2010,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to our rating
approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default distribution
from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter was obtained.
This parameter was then used as an input in a cash flow model
using CDOEdge.  CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of a
signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Downgrades Class A-2 Senior Notes to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXIV, Ltd.

   -- US$152,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due
      March 22, 2037 Notes (Current Balance of $150,798,744.39),
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 27, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- US$85,800,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
      March 22, 2037 Notes (Current Balance of $86,332,272.02),
      Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes
      Due March 22, 2037 Notes (Current Balance of
      $21,674,952.39), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on August
      18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- US$65,650,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
      March 22, 2037 Notes (Current Balance of $ 66,608,791.97),
      Downgraded to C (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- US$54,250,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes
      Due March 22, 2037 Notes (Current Balance of
      $59,272,122.52), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on August
      18, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken today are primarily
the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted amount in the
underlying portfolio. The assumed defaulted amount increased by
$146.7 million since the last rating action in August 2009.
Cumulative assumed defaults now total $401.8 million (38% of the
current portfolio). All the assumed defaulted assets are carried
at zero recovery in Moody's analysis. The remaining assets in the
portfolio have shown a slight improvement, as indicated by a
modeled Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) decrease to 1060,
from 1421 as of the last rating action date. As of the last rating
action date. Currently, 27% of the portfolio is estimated to be
Ba1 or below, as determined both by using FDIC Q4-2010 financial
data in conjunction with Moody's RiskCalc model to assess non-
publicly rated bank and using financial data for insurance
companies from Moody's Insurance Team.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action. As of the latest trustee report dated March 22,
2011, the Senior Coverage Test is 93.16% (limit 128.0%), Class B
Mezzanine Coverage Test is 80.70% (limit 115%), Class C Mezzanine
Coverage Test is 69.82% (limit 105.5%) and Class D mezzanine
Coverage Test is 64.77% (limit 100.3%) versus the trustee report
levels from the report dated June 22, 2009 of 116.10%, 101.41%,
88.70% and 82.61%, respectively, which were used during the last
rating action.

Preferred Term Securities XXIV, Ltd., issued on December 14, 2006,
is a collateral debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
Insurance trust preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO'). On August
18 2009, the last rating action date, Moody's downgraded five
classes of notes which were the result of the application of
revised and updated key modeling assumptions, as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase. In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.
With the exception of commercial P&C insurance which remains in
negative outlook, the insurance sector is stabilizing.

The portfolio of this CDO is partly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
and insurance companies that are generally not publicly rated by
Moody's. To evaluate their credit quality, Moody's derives credit
scores for these non-publicly rated assets and evaluates the
sensitivity of the rated transactions to their volatility, as
described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the
Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", October 2009.
The effect of the stress testing of these credit scores varies
between one and three notches, depending on the total amount and
relative size of these securities in the collateral pool.

To evaluate the credit quality of bank trust preferred securities
not publicly rated by Moody's, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores for these securities. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk
for a majority of obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial
data received as of Q4-2010. For insurance trust preferred
securities not publicly rated by Moody's that are included in the
portfolio, its credit quality is assessed by Moody's Insurance
team using data from each insurance company's annual regulatory
reporting. Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated
transactions to the volatility of the credit estimates, as
described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the
Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," October 2009.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings. The sensitivity of
the model results to changes in the WARF (representing a slight
improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit quality of
the collateral pool) was examined. If WARF is increased by 300
points from the base case of 1060, the model results in an
expected loss that is one notch worse than the result of the base
case for Class A-1 Notes. If the WARF is decreased by 340 points,
expected losses are one notch better than the base case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating Preferred Term
Securities XXIV, Ltd., were "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Bank
Trust Preferred Security CDOs" published in June 2010 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Insurance Trust Preferred Security CDOs"
published in June 2010

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's
rating approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained. This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com
under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of
a signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PREFERRED TERM: Moody's Downgrades Class A-1 Rating to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these
seven notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd.

   -- US$762,500,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2036
      (current balance of $703,162,568.67), Downgraded to Ba1
      (sf); previously on January 14, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1
      (sf);

   -- US$201,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due
      2036(current balance of $196,866,697.09, including interest
      shortfall), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 27,
      2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$65,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
      2036(current balance of $65,289,618.39, including interest
      shortfall), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on January 14,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

   -- US$50,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes
      Due 2036 (current balance of $51,151,842.31, including
      interest shortfall), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
      January 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

   -- US$30,300,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes
      Due 2036 (current balance of $33,836,753.29, including
      interest shortfall), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
      January 14, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

   -- US$77,250,000.00 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine
      Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $79,775,320.26, including
      interest shortfall), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
      March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

   -- US$71,650,000.00 Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
      2036 (current balance of $82,760,325.25, including interest
      shortfall), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 27,
      2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

In addition, Moody's downgraded the rating on this combination
note issued by PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1Trust.

PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1 (current Moody's Ratable
Balance of $403,428.74), Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
November 18, 2010 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions taken today are
primarily the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted
amount in the underlying portfolio. The assumed defaulted amount
increased by $182 million since the last rating action in January
2010. Cumulative assumed defaults now total $504.4 million (36.4%
of the current portfolio). All the assumed defaulted assets are
carried at zero recovery in Moody's analysis. The remaining assets
in the portfolio have shown a slight improvement, as indicated by
a weighted average weighting factor (WARF) decrease to 1118, from
1442, as of the last rating action date. Currently, 38% of the
portfolio is estimated to be Ba1 or below, as determined both by
using FDIC Q4-2010 financial data in conjunction with Moody's
RiskCalc model to assess non-publicly rated bank and using
financial data for insurance companies from Moody's Insurance
Team.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action. As of the latest trustee report dated March 22,
2011, the Senior Coverage Test is 105.40% (limit 128.00%), the
Class B Mezzanine Principal Coverage Test is 90.43% (limit
115.00%), and the Class C Mezzanine Principal Coverage test is
78.44% (limit 105.5%), versus trustee reported levels from the
report dated September 22, 2009 of 114.51%, 99.04% and 86.78%
respectively, which were used during the last rating action.

Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd., issued on June 15, 2006, is
a collateral debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO'). On January
14, 2010, the last rating action date,

Moody's downgraded four classes of notes as a result of the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.

PreTSL Combination Certificates Series P XXII-1 Trust, issued on
June 15, 2006, is a combination note security trust linked to the
CDO tranches of Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd. The
Combination Certificates was originally composed of $250,000 of
Class A-1 Notes, $200,000 of Income Notes and a $185,000 Fannie
Mae Strip. The Combination Certificates have adequate coverage
from the Class A-1 Notes and the Strip. The rating of the
Combination Certificates addresses the return of principal only.

The credit deterioration exhibited by the TRUP CDO portfolio is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase. In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.
With the exception of commercial P&C insurance which remains on
negative outlook, the insurance sector is stabilizing.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
and insurance companies that are generally not publicly rated by
Moody's. To evaluate their credit quality, Moody's uses RiskCalc
model, an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive
credit scores for these non-publicly rated bank trust preferred
securities. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority
of bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial data
received as of Q4-2010. For non rated insurance trust preferred
securities, Moody's depends on the insurance team and the
insurance firms annual financial reporting to assess the credit
quality of each insurance asset in the portfolio. Moody's also
evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to the
volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions," October 2009.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings. The sensitivity of
the model results to changes in the WARF (representing a slight
improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit quality of
the collateral pool) was examined. If WARF is increased by 200
points from the base case of 1118, the model results in an
expected loss that is one notch worse than the result of the base
case for Class A-1 Notes. If the WARF is decreased by 238 points,
expected losses are one notch better than the base case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating Preferred Term
Securities XXII, Ltd. and PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1 Trust
were "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Bank Trust Preferred
Security CDOs" published in June 2010, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Insurance Trust Preferred Security CDOs" published in June 2010,
and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-
Notes" published in February 2004.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's
rating approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained. This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com
under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of
a signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


R.E. REPACK: Moody's Downgrades CRE CDO Class Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the Class A Certificates issued by R.E.
Repack Trust 2002-1. The Class A Certificate is a repack of the
Class B Notes issued by the LNR CDO 2002-1, Ltd. transaction,
which was downgraded to Ba1 on April 29, 2011. This rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty
are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying
performance in the commercial real estate property markets.

However, Moody's expects to see increasing or stabilizing property
values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan
delinquencies and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in
2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show
signs of recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors
will be tied to recovery of the broader economy. The availability
of debt capital continues to improve with terms returning toward
market norms. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
reflects an overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing
individual, corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent
unemployment, and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in ratings were "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010, and "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real Estate
Securities published in June 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Downgrades TRUP CDO Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd.:

Issuer: Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd.

   -- US$170,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
      2036 (Current Balance $114,262,857), Downgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1b Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2036
      (Current Balance $6,721,344), Downgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2036,
      (Current Balance $70,000,000), Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

   -- US$79,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
      Notes Due 2036 (Current Balance $81,706,544), Downgraded to
      C (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Subordinate Notes
      Due 2036 (Current Balance $11,141,959), Downgraded to C
      (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating action is primarily the result of
an increase in the assumed defaulted amount in the underlying
portfolio.  The assumed defaulted amount increased by $108 million
since the last rating action in March 2009.  Cumulative assumed
defaults now total $201 million (65% of the current portfolio).
All the assumed defaulted assets are carried at zero recovery in
our analysis.  The remaining assets in the portfolio have shown a
slight improvement, as indicated by a modeled WARF decrease to
1449, from 2244 as of the last rating action date.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action.  As of the latest trustee report dated January 19,
2011, the Senior Principal Coverage Test is 98.6% (limit 125.0%)
and the Senior Subordinate Principal Coverage Test is 66.33%
(limit 104.2%), versus the trustee report levels from the report
dated January 21, 2009 of 130% and 68% respectively, which were
used during the last rating action.

Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd., issued on April 12,
2005, is a collateral debt obligation backed by a portfolio of
bank trust preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO') and TRUP CDO
tranches.  On March 27, 2009, the last rating action date, Moody's
downgraded five classes of notes which were the result of the
application of revised and updated key modeling assumptions, as
well as the deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction's underlying portfolio.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.

The portfolio of this CDO is partly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U. S.  community banks
that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate
their credit quality, Moody's derives credit scores for these non-
publicly rated assets and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated
transactions to their volatility, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions", October 2009.  The effect of the stress
testing of these credit scores varies between one and three
notches, depending on the total amount and relative size of these
securities in the collateral pool.

To evaluate their credit quality, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores for these non-publicly rated trust preferred securities.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of obligors
in the pool relies on FDIC financial data received as of Q3-2010.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity
of the model results to changes in the WARF (representing a slight
improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit quality of
the collateral pool) was examined.  If WARF is increased by 300
points from the base case of 1184, the model results in an
expected loss that is one notch worse than the result of the base
for Class A-1 Notes.  If the WARF is decreased by 200 points,
expected losses are one notch better than the base case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating Regional Diversified
Funding 2005-1, Ltd., were "Moody's Approach to Rating U. S.  Bank
Trust Preferred Security CDOs" published in June 2010 and "Moody's
Approach to Including TRUPS CDO Tranches in ABS CDOs" published in
June 2006.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to our rating
approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default distribution
from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter was obtained.
This parameter was then used as an input in a cash flow model
using CDOEdge.  CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of a
signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 & B-2 Notes to 'Ca'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd.:

Issuer: Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd.

   -- US$170,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
      2036 (Current Balance $114,262,857), Downgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1b Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2036
      (Current Balance $6,721,344), Downgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2036,
      (Current Balance $70,000,000), Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
      previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

   -- US$79,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
      Notes Due 2036 (Current Balance $81,706,544), Downgraded to
      C (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Subordinate Notes
      Due 2036 (Current Balance $11,141,959), Downgraded to C
      (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating action taken today is primarily
the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted amount in the
underlying portfolio.  The assumed defaulted amount increased by
$108 million since the last rating action in March 2009.
Cumulative assumed defaults now total $201 million (65% of the
current portfolio).  All the assumed defaulted assets are carried
at zero recovery in our analysis.  The remaining assets in the
portfolio have shown a slight improvement, as indicated by a
modeled WARF decrease to 1449, from 2244 as of the last rating
action date.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action.  As of the latest trustee report dated January 19,
2011, the Senior Principal Coverage Test is 98.6% (limit 125.0%)
and the Senior Subordinate Principal Coverage Test is 66.33%
(limit 104.2%), versus the trustee report levels from the report
dated January 21, 2009 of 130% and 68% respectively, which were
used during the last rating action.

Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1, Ltd., issued on April 12,
2005, is a collateral debt obligation backed by a portfolio of
bank trust preferred securities (the 'TRUP CDO') and TRUP CDO
tranches.  On March 27, 2009, the last rating action date, Moody's
downgraded five classes of notes which were the result of the
application of revised and updated key modeling assumptions, as
well as the deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction's underlying portfolio.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.

The portfolio of this CDO is partly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U. S.  community banks
that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate
their credit quality, Moody's derives credit scores for these non-
publicly rated assets and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated
transactions to their volatility, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions", October 2009.  The effect of the stress
testing of these credit scores varies between one and three
notches, depending on the total amount and relative size of these
securities in the collateral pool.

To evaluate their credit quality, Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores for these non-publicly rated trust preferred securities.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk for a majority of obligors
in the pool relies on FDIC financial data received as of Q3-2010.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity
of the model results to changes in the WARF (representing a slight
improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit quality of
the collateral pool) was examined.  If WARF is increased by 300
points from the base case of 1184, the model results in an
expected loss that is one notch worse than the result of the base
for Class A-1 Notes.  If the WARF is decreased by 200 points,
expected losses are one notch better than the base case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating Regional Diversified
Funding 2005-1, Ltd., were "Moody's Approach to Rating U. S.  Bank
Trust Preferred Security CDOs" published in June 2010 and "Moody's
Approach to Including TRUPS CDO Tranches in ABS CDOs" published in
June 2006.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to our rating
approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the default distribution
from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter was obtained.
This parameter was then used as an input in a cash flow model
using CDOEdge.  CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of a
signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


RENTAL CAR: Moody's Reviews ABS Ratings for Possible Upgrade
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade two series of
rental car asset backed notes issued by Rental Car Finance Corp.,
a special purpose entity owned by Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group,
Inc.  (Dollar Thrifty, B2 positive).  This is prompted by an
upgrade in the corporate rating of the sponsor to B2, outlook
positive, from B3, outlook positive, on April 19, 2011.

COMPLETE RATING ACTIONS:

Issuer: Rental Car Finance Corp.

Series Description: Series 2006-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

Class Description: Class A

Current Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on April 29, 2010 upgraded to Ba1

Underlying Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on April 29, 2010 upgraded to Ba1

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (NR; rating
withdrawn on April 7, 2011)

Series Description: Series 2007-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

Class Description: Class A

Current Rating: Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on April 29, 2010 upgraded to Ba2

Underlying Rating: Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on April 29, 2010 upgraded to Ba2

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (NR;
rating withdrawn on March 29, 2009)

The actions are motivated primarily by the strengthening credit
profiles of Dollar Thrifty as the sponsor, master servicer and the
directly-owned DTG Operations, Inc.  as the lessee, as reflected
by the upgrade of its rating to B2, positive from B3, positive.
The probability of default of the sponsor, while only one of
several important variables which drive Moody's ratings of rental
car asset-backed securities, is the single most important factor.
The principal methodology used in rating the transactions is
described below.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issue can also be
found in the Research & Ratings directory, in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on www.moodys.com  In addition,
Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured finance credit,
ratings and methodologies, available to all registered users of
its Web site, at http://www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck

Separately, Moody's notes that following the termination of Dollar
Thrifty's merger agreement with Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.
(Hertz) last year after Dollar Thrifty did not obtain the
requisite votes to execute its definitive merger agreement with
Hertz at the special meeting of shareholders held on September 30,
2010, Dollar Thrifty and Avis Budget have been cooperating to
pursue antitrust regulatory clearance of a potential acquisition
of Dollar Thrifty's common stock by Avis Budget.  Moody's views
the potential acquisition as neutral to credit positive to Dollar
Thrifty-sponsored ABS.  Given the uncertainties concerning the
completion of the acquisition, such as the outcome of FTC
approval, Moody's will take ratings actions if the transaction
comes to fruition, depending on its ultimate impact on the Dollar
Thrifty-sponsored ABS.

PRINCIPAL RATING METHODOLOGY

The primary asset backing the notes is the monthly lease payments
owed by DTG Operations, Inc., and guaranteed by the sponsor under
an operating lease, as well as a pool of vehicles comprising the
bulk of the sponsor's daily rental car fleet, including both
program vehicles (acquired vehicles subject to repurchase, or
guaranteed a minimum depreciation or resale value, by the related
auto manufacturer at pre-set prices) and non-program vehicles
(acquired vehicles that do not benefit from such repurchase or
guaranteed depreciation agreements).  The vehicles are owned by a
bankruptcy-remote entity, referred to as the lessor, which may
also be the issuer or be an affiliate of the issuer.  The sponsor
and/or operating affiliates act as lessees.  For quantitative
analysis Moody's uses a monte carlo simulation model which
simulates the potential cash flows from the vehicle assets and any
additional credit enhancements and the rated obligation repayment
requirements.

The key factors in Moody's rating analysis include the probability
of default of the sponsor, the likelihood of a bankruptcy or
default by the auto manufacturers providing vehicles to the rental
car fleet owned by the lessor, and the recovery rate on the rental
car fleet in case the rental car sponsor defaults.  Monte Carlo
simulation modeling was used to assess the impact on bondholders
of these variables.  The default probability of the sponsor is
simulated based on its current corporate probability of default
rating and Moody's idealized default rates.  For surveillance
purposes, in the event that an upgrade above the initial rating is
being considered, Moody's stresses the rating of the sponsor as
lessee to provide a limited degree of de-linkage of the rated ABS
from the corporate rating of the sponsor, otherwise, the current
rating of the sponsor is used.

All of the sponsoring rental car companies fleets include both
program vehicles and non-program vehicles (also known as 'risk'
vehicles).  Under the terms of the simulation, in cases where the
related sponsor does not default it is assumed that bondholders
are repaid in full and no liquidation of the lessor's rental car
fleet is necessary.  In cases where the sponsor does default, the
lessor's fleet must be liquidated in order to repay their secured
loans to the Issuer, and ultimately the bondholders.  In those
cases, the default probability of the related manufacturers must
also be simulated.  Due to Chrysler's, Ford's and GM's high
concentrations in the pool and non-investment grade ratings or
non-ratings, as applicable, their defaults were simulated based on
estimates for probability of default provided by Moody's corporate
analysts.  These default estimates differentiate between default
with continued operation and default with cessation of operations.
The default probability of the other manufacturers is derived from
their respective ratings.  For each manufacturer simulated to be
in Chapter 11, Moody's further simulate whether each such
manufacturer will honor its obligation with respect to program
vehicles or default on that obligation.

In simulating liquidation of the rental car fleet following a
sponsor default, it is assumed that the portion of the program
vehicle fleet associated with non-defaulting manufacturers (both
non-bankrupt manufacturers and bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers
honoring their program obligations) is returned to the related
manufacturer at full book value.  For the non-program (risk)
fleet, as well as the portion of the program fleet associated with
defaulting manufacturers not honoring obligations on their program
vehicles, it is assumed the vehicles will be sold in the open
market.  For vehicles sold in the open market, the market value of
a vehicle at time of liquidation before any haircuts are applied
is estimated using market depreciation data from the National
Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) for each manufacturer with
vehicles in the collateral pool.  In making this calculation
Moody's generally assume a purchase price for program and non-
program (risk) vehicles which is 10% below MSRP, to give credit to
the volume discounts typically achieved by rental car companies.
However, in the case of rental car ABS sponsored by Avis Budget,
Moody's assumes the discount for non-program (risk) vehicles is
15% to reflect both the terms required under the transaction
documentation and historic performance.  In addition, Moody's
assumes a delay in sale of six months and therefore net an
additional six months of depreciation.  This six month delay in
fleet liquidation following the sponsor's default contemplates
potential legal challenges to obtaining control of the fleet and
the potential difficulties of marshaling and selling such a large
quantity of vehicles.  The base liquidation value of sold vehicles
is determined by applying a base haircut to this estimated
depreciated market value.  The base haircut is simulated using a
triangular distribution (i.e., minimum, mode, maximum) with values
of (5%, 15%, 30%).  The resulting calculation provides the base
liquidation value.

Additional haircuts may be applied to the base liquidation value
depending on the manufacturer's simulated status: non-bankrupt,
bankrupt Chapter 11 or bankrupt Chapter 7.  No further haircuts
are applied to either (i) non-program (risk) and program vehicles
from non-bankrupt manufacturers or (ii) program vehicles from
bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers who are assumed to honor their
program obligations.  However, in all other cases, the base
liquidation value is further reduced.  For bankrupt Chapter 11
manufacturers, Moody's reduces the base liquidation of their non-
program (risk) vehicles and their program vehicles whose
obligations are assumed not to be honored by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (14%, 18%, 19%).
For manufacturers assumed to be in Chapter 7, Moody's reduces base
liquidation value of their vehicles by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (25%, 35%, 50%).

With respect to transaction maturity, for analytical purposes
Moody's is assigning each transaction to one of three assumed
maturity buckets based on its actual remaining expected maturity.
If the remaining expected maturity is less than 18 months, a
remaining maturity of 12 months will be assumed.  If the remaining
expected maturity is 18 months or more but less than 37 months, 24
months will the input to the model.  If the remaining expected
maturity is 37 months or more, 60 months will be assumed.  This is
a method of quantifying Moody's view that there is greater
uncertainty regarding fleet mix by manufacturer for transactions
with longer terms than for those with shorter terms.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $12.4BB Synthetic Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 75
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 20 tranches from eight
synthetic jumbo deals issued by RESI.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These synthetic transactions provide the owner of a sizable pool
of mortgages credit protection through a credit default swap with
the issuer (the "Protection Seller") of the notes.  Through this
agreement, the Protection Buyer pays a fee in return for the
transfer of a portion of the reference portfolio credit risk.

Investors in the notes have an interest in the holdings of the
issuer, which include highly rated investment instruments, a
forward delivery agreement and fee collections on the agreement
with the Protection Buyer.  Investors are exposed to losses from
the reference portfolio but benefit only indirectly from cash
flows from these assets.  Depending on the class of notes held,
investors have credit protection from subordination.

The reference portfolios of these transactions include prime
conforming and nonconforming fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
mortgages purchased from various originators.  The actions are a
result of deteriorating performance of prime jumbo pools
securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have paid
down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used to estimate losses on the
pools are described under "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011, which accounts for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the ratings on the bonds, Moody's considered the level
of credit enhancement available for each tranche relative to
updated pool-level loss expectations.  Within the senior note
waterfalls, Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided
by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, principal
payment waterfall, and other structural features .

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-A, Series 2003-A

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2006
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-C, Series 2003-C

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-CB1

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2003-D/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2003-D

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010  Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-A/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-A

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-B/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-B

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-C/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-C

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RESI FINANCE: Moody's Takes Action on $12.4BB Synthetic Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 75 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 20 tranches from eight synthetic
jumbo deals issued by RESI.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These synthetic transactions provide the owner of a sizable pool
of mortgages credit protection through a credit default swap with
the issuer (the "Protection Seller") of the notes.  Through this
agreement, the Protection Buyer pays a fee in return for the
transfer of a portion of the reference portfolio credit risk.

Investors in the notes have an interest in the holdings of the
issuer, which include highly rated investment instruments, a
forward delivery agreement and fee collections on the agreement
with the Protection Buyer.  Investors are exposed to losses from
the reference portfolio but benefit only indirectly from cash
flows from these assets.  Depending on the class of notes held,
investors have credit protection from subordination.

The reference portfolios of these transactions include prime
conforming and nonconforming fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
mortgages purchased from various originators.  The actions are a
result of deteriorating performance of prime jumbo pools
securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have paid
down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008.  Other methodologies used to estimate losses on the
pools are described under "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011, which accounts for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the ratings on the bonds,Moody's considered the level of
credit enhancement available for each tranche relative to updated
pool-level loss expectations.  Within the senior note waterfalls,
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, principal
payment waterfall, and other structural features .

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-A, Series 2003-A

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2006
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2006
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-C, Series 2003-C

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-CB1

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2003-D/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2003-D

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010  Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-A/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-A

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-B/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-B

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-C/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-C

   -- Class A1 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A3 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14,
      2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec
      14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ROSEMONT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of 2013 Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Rosemont CLO, Ltd.:

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Notes due 2013
      (current outstanding balance of $14,556,788), Upgraded to
      Aaa (sf); previously on July 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$7,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Notes due 2013
      (current outstanding balance of $5,660,973), Upgraded to Aaa
      (sf); previously on July 8, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

   -- US$13,200,000 Class C Senior Secured Notes due 2013,
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2010 Upgraded to
      Baa2 (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class 1 Composite Securities due 2013 (current
      rated balance of $5,304,741), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
      previously on July 8, 2010 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

   -- US$3,000,000 Class 2 Composite Securities due 2013 (current
      rated balance of $583,847), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
      on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf).

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from delevering of the transaction. The Class A notes
have been fully paid down, and the Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes
have been paid down by approximately $5 million in aggregate since
the rating action in July 2010.  As a result of the delevering,
the overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved.
Based on April 2011 trustee report, the Class B, Class C, and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 179.13%,
129.59%, and 103.56%, respectively, versus June 2010 levels of
143.15%, 118.86%, and 102.98%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
In particular, as of the latest trustee report dated April 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2805 compared to
2746 in the June 2010 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 19.01% of the underlying portfolio versus
21.03% in June 2010.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $7.5 million of the underlying portfolio compared to $13.4
million in June 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $43.7 million, defaulted par of
$7.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 15.7%
(implying a WARF of 3424), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45.0%, and a diversity score of 30.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Rosemont CLO, Ltd., issued in January 2002, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
August 2009, and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate
CDO Combo-Notes", published in February 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a
summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2739)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B1: 0

   -- Class B2: 0

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Combo 1: 0

   -- Combo 2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4109)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B1: 0

   -- Class B2: 0

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Combo 1: 0

   -- Combo 2: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

Further information on Moody's analysis of this transaction is
available on http://www.moodys.com/


SANKATY HIGH: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes of Sankaty High Yield Partners III, a
market value collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
managed by Sankaty Advisors LLC.

Typically, market value CDOs liquidate their collateral portfolio
and distribute the proceeds to pay the notes on or prior to their
legal final maturity date. "We based the downgrade after receiving
the notice of revocation of liquidation direction and the
forbearance agreement, each dated April 20, 2011, indicating that
on the final maturity date of April 30, 2011, the assets will not
be liquidated to pay the notes in full according to the terms of
the transaction. We lowered the ratings to 'D (sf)' because the
notes were not paid in full on their maturity date," S&P related.

Ratings Lowered

Sankaty High Yield Partners III
               Rating
Class       To       From
C           D (sf)   CC (sf)
D           D (sf)   CC (sf)
E           D (sf)   CC (sf)


SBI HOME: Moody's Confirms Cl. 1M-4 Rating at 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of six
tranches from one deal issued by SBI Home Equity Loan Trust in
2006. The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first and second lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A residential
mortgages.

Issuer: SBI Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

   -- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1A-2B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1M-3, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. 1M-4, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

These actions are a result of the stable performance of this
transaction despite the rapidly deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain
under duress. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is as described
under the "Monitoring and Performance Review" section in "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities"
published in December 2008. Other methodologies used include
"Second Lien RMBS Loss Projection Methodology: April 2010"
published in April 2010 and "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" published in February 2010.

If expected losses on the collateral pool were to increase by 10%,
model implied results indicate that the ratings listed below would
not change.


SEAWALL 2006: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five CRE CDO Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed five classes of Notes issued by Seawall
2006-1, Ltd.  due to the stable performance of the underlying
reference obligations.  The key indicators of expected loss are
performing within levels commensurate with the existing rating
levels.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-1, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C-2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2010
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.  is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a credit default swap on a portfolio of commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool balance).  As
of the March 31, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate issued Note
balance of the transaction is $290 million, the same as that at
issuance.

Moody's has identified the these parameters as key indicators of
the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5, the same as that at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (100% compared to 96.7% at last review) and
A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 3.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.9
years compared to 3.9 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 77% compared to 75% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 71.2% compared to 62.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, stressing the current ratings and
credit estimates of the reference obligations by one notch
downward negatively affects the model results by approximately 0.7
to 2.2 notches downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


SEAWALL SPC: Moody's Affirms One CRE CDO Class Rating at 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one class of Notes issued by Seawall SPC --
Series 2005-2 due to the stable performance of the look-through
underlying portfolio of reference obligations.  The key indicators
of expected loss are performing within levels commensurate with
the existing rating levels.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transactions.

   -- Cl.  C-2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 is direct pass-through of the Class
C-2 (Underlying Class) from Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.  On April 21,
2011, Moody's affirmed the Underlying Class.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, stressing the current ratings and
credit estimates of the look-through reference obligation
portfolio by one notch downward negatively affects the model
results by approximately 1 notch downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 184 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 184
tranches from 19 prime jumbo deals issued by Sequoia Mortgage
Trust. The collateral backing these deals consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.
Moody's is also reinstating the rating on the Class X-B tranche
from Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-1 transaction, which was
previously withdrawn based on the incorrect assumption that it had
been paid off.

Cl. X-B,an interest-only tranche linked to Cl. B-1 and Cl. B-2,
remains outstanding and is receiving interest payments, and the
rating has been adjusted accordingly.

In addition, Moody's has adjusted the ratings on the Cl. A-3 and
Cl. X-A2 from the Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-12 transaction. Cl.
X-A2 is an interest-only tranche linked to the outstanding
principal balance of Cl. A-3; Cl. A-3, in turn, is a
resecuritization of a portion of the Class A-1 tranche from
another transaction, Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-7. In a previous
rating action in July 2009, Moody's mistakenly downgraded Cl. A-3
and Cl. X-A2 as part of the rating action on Sequoia Mortgage
Trust 2004-12. Moody's has adjusted its analysis to reflect the
correct collateral pool for these tranches, and the deteriorating
performance of Cl. A-1 of Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-7.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deteriorating performance and outlook.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include fifty four different combinations
comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing curves and three
prepayment curves. For ratings implied Aa3 and above, an
additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience to a high
prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average. The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 10

   -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 11

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-X-1A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-X-1B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-X-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-X-B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
      2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-X-M, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-X-B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
      2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-B-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-B-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 18,
      2003 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-B-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
      Assigned B2 (sf)

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-5

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-8

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-1

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Reinstated to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-10

   -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-11

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-12

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-4

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-5

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-6

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl A-3-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl A-3-B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-7

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-8

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-9

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2010
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 6

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2002
      Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2002
      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2002
      Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 9

   -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2002
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)


SOLOSO CDO: Moody's Cuts $45.5MM of Class A-2L Notes to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded four classes of notes
issued by Soloso CDO 2005-1, Ltd.:

   -- US$170.0 million Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
      2035 (current balance $ 152,456,952.53), Downgraded to B1
      (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

   -- US$126.0 million Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due October
      2035 (current balance $108,972,924.50), Downgraded to Ba3
      (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

   -- US$39.0 million Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due October
      2035 (current balance $39,000,000), Downgraded to B3 (sf);
      previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$45.5 million Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      Due October 2035 (current balance $45,742,717.34, including
      interest shortfall), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
      October 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

RATINGS RATIONALE

Soloso CDO 2005-1, Ltd. issued on August 24, 2005, is a collateral
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.

Moody's indicated that the rating actions on the notes are
primarily the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted
amount of the pool.  The assumed defaults increased by $87M since
the last rating action on October 30, 2009.  Moody's assumed
defaulted amount currently totals $201.98 million (42.3% of the
portfolio).  All of the assumed defaulted assets are carried at
zero recovery in Moody's analysis.  The remaining performing
assets in the portfolio have also experienced an improvement on
the credit quality of the pool, as indicated by a WARF reduction
to 1404, from 2273 as of the last rating action date.  This
current WARF accounts for a credit estimate stress, described in
Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", October 2009.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action.  As of the latest trustee report dated January 07,
2011, the Senior Overcollateralization Ratio is reported at
107.77% (limit of 115.00%), the Class A2 Overcollateralization
Ratio at 93.56% (limit of 112.00%), the Class A3
Overcollateralization Ratio at 76.00% (limit of 105.00%) and the
Class B Overcollateralization Ratio at 70.76% (limit of 103.5%).
Moody's has noticed that the transaction continues to be
negatively impacted by large imbalanced fixed-floating interest
rate swaps, that results in significant payments to the hedge
counterparty.  In this case, the magnitude of the imbalance
between the cash inflows and outflows due to the presence of over-
hedging has been magnified by the increase in the defaulted assets
in the collateral portfolio.  In its analysis, Moody's has
accounted for the reduction of cash available to pay the notes due
to the significant swap payments to the hedge counterparty.

In Moody's analysis, Moody's assumes that there are no prepayments
and the assets amortize at their final maturity.  The weighted
average life of the portfolio is approximately 25 years.

The credit deterioration exhibited by this TRUP CDO portfolio is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of bank trust
preferred securities has continued to increase.  According to FDIC
data, 32 U.S. banks have failed so far in 2011, while 157 U.S.
banks failed in all of 2010, 140 U.S. banks failed in 2009 and 25
in 2008.

This portfolio is composed of trust preferred securities issued by
small to medium sized U.S. community bank that are generally not
publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive credit scores for these non-publicly rated
trust preferred securities.  Moody's evaluation of the credit risk
for a majority of obligors in the pool relies on FDIC financial
data received as of Q3-2010.

Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to the
volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions," October 2009.  For each credit score or
credit estimate where the related exposure constitutes more than
3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent
assumed downgrade (but on the CEs representing in aggregate the
largest 30% of the pool) in lieu of the stresses. Notwithstanding,
in all cases the lowest assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.  The
effect of stress testing of these credit scores varies between one
and three notches, depending on the total amount and relative size
of these securities in the collateral pool.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses on some of the
key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity analysis
includes further increase and decrease to the WARF (representing a
slight improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit
quality of the collateral pool) and the results indicate a one-
notch downward movement on Senior Notes when WARF was increased by
200 and a one-notch upward movement when the WARF was decreased by
244.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, risk Event of Default (EoD), the
recent deal performance in the current market environment, the
legal environment, and specific documentation features.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Bank Trust Preferred Security CDOs"
published in June 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's
rating approach, using CDOROM v.2.8 to develop the loss
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained. This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge.  CDOROM v.2.8 is available on moodys.com
under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of
a signed free license agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings of Six 2003-AR4 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches from Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2003-
AR4. Four tranches remain on review with direction uncertain. The
collateral backing the deal primarily consists of first-lien,
adjustable rate, Alt-A residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005. Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress. The
actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools
issued from prior 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings is described in
the Monitoring and Performance Review section in "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008. Other methodologies used include "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011, which
accounts for the deterioriating performance and outlook.  In this
rating action, Cl. A-1, Cl. A-2, Cl. X and Cl. M tranches were
downgraded but remain on review, with direction uncertain. The
predominant factor guiding ratings on these tranches is the
persistence of shortfalls in the payment of accrued interest and
principal in certain periods. The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009. Moody's will
continue to monitor the cashflow of these tranches and assess if
this intermittent behavior in payments continues.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance, principal and
interest shortfall, and updated pool-level loss expectations
relative to current level of credit enhancement. Moody's took into
account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, excess spread, time tranching, and other
structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for
the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively). The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%. in addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market. Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2003-AR4

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Apr 13, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $919.5MM of Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 41
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from six prime
jumbo deals issued by Thornburg.  The collateral backing these
deals consists primarily of first-lien, adjustable rate prime
jumbo residential mortgages.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.  The principal methodology
used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that varies from 3%
to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75. For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-1

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-3

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Pos