TCR_Public/110424.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 24, 2011, Vol. 14, No. 112

                            Headlines

505 CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
ABAG FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 58 US Municipal Transactions
AIRCRAFT FINANCE: Moody's Sees No Negative Ratings Impact on Notes
ALPINE III: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Puts 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Notes Ratings
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
APHEX CAPITAL: S&P Places Notes 'BB' Rating on Watch Negative
ATLANTIS FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
AUGUSTA FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Ratings of Bonds

BAKER STREET: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 4 Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class O Notes to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Acts on $476 Mil. of Resecuritized RMBS
BERKELEY STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes From 'CCC'
CAPITAL TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Rating of Housing Revenue Bonds

CAPMARK VII: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 6 Classes
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritized RMBS Rating
COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Two Classes of Notes
COAST INVESTMENT: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on Three Classes of Notes
COOKSON SPC: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'

CANYON CAPITAL: S&P Raises Class C Notes Rating to 'BB+'
CPS AUTO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2008-A Class C
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-J Notes to 'CCC-'
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'

CREST 2003: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Classes to 'CC'
CS FIRST BOSTON: Moody's Downgrades $14 Million of Subprime RMBS
CSAM FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
CSMC SERIES: Moody's Cuts Rating of Class A-1 to Junk From 'Baa3'
DSC FLOORPLAN: DBRS Puts 'BB' Final Rating to Class B Notes

EATON VANCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
FRANKLIN CLO VI: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings of 8 Classes of Certs.
GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Class O Notes Rating to 'D'
GOLDENTREE CAPITAL: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'BB'

GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Rating on Class H Notes Rating to 'BB+'
HERCULES REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers Tax Bonds Rating to 'CCC'
HIGHLAND LOAN: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'BB+'
IBIS RE: S&P Places Two Classes Notes 'BB' Ratings Under Watch
INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Junks Rating of Class A-1

JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2006 Warrants
KATONAH IV: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on CLO Notes
L2L EDUCATION: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class C Notes
LOCAL INSIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ambac-Wrapped Notes
LONGHORN CDO: Moody's Upgrades The Ratings Of CLO Notes

MADISON PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MAQUINARIA ESPECIALIZADA: Fitch To Put 'BB-' Rating on Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 195 Jumbo Deal Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Classes of Notes to 'D'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'CCC-'

NEWCASTLE CDO: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades the Ratings of CLO Notes
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to 'BB-'
NORTHAMPTON GENERATING: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Senior Bonds
OMEGA CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class A-1U Notes

PREMIUM LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Takes Action On $48 Million of Subprime RMBS
REPACS TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ROCKWALL CDO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B-1L Notes
SADDLE MOUNTAIN: Fitch Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Series 2003 COs

SANDELMAN FINANCE: S&P Lowers Class E Notes Rating to 'D'
SANDELMAN FINANCE: S&P Places Class E 'BB' Rating on Watch Neg.
SASCO AMORTIZING: Moody's Downgrades $9 Million of Subprime RMBS
SLC STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Subordinate Note
STONE TOWER: Moody's Upgs Rating on US$8MM Class D Notes to 'Ba1'

STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Lowers Certificates Rating to 'CCC'
TIERS BRISBANE: Moody's Withraw Rating of Series 2007-34
TRAINER WORTHAM: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Cuts Ratings of Wachovia 2007-C30 Certs.
WELLS FARGO: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 281 Tranches From Jumbo Deals

ZAIS INVESTMENT: S&P Puts 'D' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

* Fitch Cuts Ratings on 14 Bonds in 12 US CMBS Transactions to 'D'
* S&P Downgrades Five Tranches From Five CDOs Ratings to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Classes From Two CMBS Deals to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 16 Classes From Six CMBS Deals to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 58 Classes From 17 Re-REMIC Transactions

* S&P Lowers Ratings on 95 Classes on 40 CDO Transactions to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 111 Classes of 40 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 377 Classes From 267 RMBS Deals to 'D'
* S&P Lowers Ratings on Eight Classes of CMBS Certificate to 'D'
* S&P Takes Action on 247 Classes From 39 RMBS Transactions

                            *********

505 CLO I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
--------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by 505 CLO I Ltd.:

   -- US$562,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2015 (current
      balance of $219,232,526.6), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
      on August 26, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$67,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2015,
      Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2010 Upgraded
      to Baa2 (sf);

   -- US$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2015,
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2010
      Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Notes due 2015
      (current balance of $20,060,110), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
      previously on September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 37% or $126 million since the
rating action in August 2010.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in August 2010.  As of the latest trustee report dated
March 3, 2011, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 190.78%, 146.1%,
135.23%, and 127.79% respectively, versus August 2010 levels of
154.9%, 129.7%, 122.9%, and 118.01% respectively.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
Based on the March 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 3226 compared to 3485 in August 2010, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 13.8% of the
underlying portfolio versus 21% in August 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $415.6 million, defaulted par of $13.7 million,
weighted average default probability of 30.50% (implying a WARF of
4968), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.61%,
and a diversity score of 26.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

505 CLO I Ltd., issued in September of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009 and "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 12-15 months ago, and a
0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated
between 6-12 months ago.  For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied
a 2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs
representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) in lieu
of the aforementioned stresses.  Notwithstanding the foregoing,
in all cases the lowest assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.

This is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (3974)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +1

   -- Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (5961)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012
and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
      proceeds will continue and at what pace.  Delevering may
      accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
      and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
      significant impact on the notes' ratings.

   2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deals' overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.

   3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
      number of securities whose default probabilities are
      assessed through credit estimates.  In the event that
      Moody's is not provided the necessary information to update
      the credit estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction
      may be impacted by any default probability stresses Moody's
      may assume in lieu of updated credit estimates.  Moody's
      also conducted stress tests to assess the collateral pool's
      concentration risk in obligors bearing a credit estimate
      that constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.


ABAG FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 58 US Municipal Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings on 58 US
municipal deals supported by Allied Irish Banks plc. letters of
credit.  The downgrades include 12 ratings to Ba3 from Baa3; 41
downgrades to Ba3/SG from Baa3/VMIG 3; one downgrade of a
commercial paper transaction to NP from P-3; and four downgrades
of short-term ratings on jointly supported transactions to SG from
VMIG 3.  The SG (speculative grade) rating for variable rate
demand bonds corresponds to the short-term rating of NP (not
prime).  The long-term ratings on the four jointly supported
transactions remain on review for possible downgrade.

Summary Rating Rationale

The rating actions are based on two factors: (1) Moody's decision
to utilize the LOC provider's issuer ratings (or, if issuer
ratings are not available, senior unsecured debt ratings), as the
reference rating for letter of credit transactions supported by
banks located outside the United States, when issuer and senior
unsecured debt ratings diverge from deposit ratings; and (2) the
downgrade of AIB's long-term senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba3
from Ba2, and long-term and short-term deposit ratings to Ba2 from
Baa3 and to NP from P-3, respectively. Additional information on
the reference rating for LOCs provided by non-US banks may be
found in Moody's Special Comment titled, "U.S. Public Finance
Ratings Supported by Letter of Credit Banks Located Outside the
United States to Track Support Providers' Issuer Ratings or Senior
Unsecured Debt Ratings" dated April 18, 2011.

For the 54 transactions rated solely based on the rating of AIB
(see Section 1 of attached spreadsheet), Moody's is taking these
rating actions: downgrading the long-term ratings on 12
transactions to Ba3 from Baa3; downgrading the ratings on 41
transactions to Ba3/SG from Baa3/VMIG 3; and for the one
commercial paper transaction, downgrading the rating to NP from P-
3.  The rating on these transactions continue to be based upon the
letters of credit provided by AIB and the structural and legal
protections of the transaction which ensure timely debt service
and purchase price payments to bondholders.

In addition, the long-term ratings on four transactions continue
to be based on a joint default analysis (JDA) reflecting the
obligation of both AIB and the obligor to make timely payment of
principal and interest.  Moody's will now incorporate AIB's long-
term senior unsecured rating (Ba3) into our joint default
analysis.  The JDA ratings are based upon the long-term senior
unsecured rating of AIB as provider of the letter of credit; the
long-term rating of the obligor, the default dependence between
AIB and the applicable obligor, and the structure and legal
protections of the transaction.

The incorporation of AIB's senior unsecured long-term rating of
Ba3 into the joint default analysis does not affect these long-
term JDA ratings.  However, these ratings remain on review for
downgrade based on Moody's ongoing assessment of preference risk
(i.e. the risk that payments made to bondholders by AIB under the
LOCs could be subject to recovery as preferential payments upon
the insolvency of AIB).  The short-term ratings on these four
transactions are solely based on the senior unsecured short-term
rating of AIB and have been downgraded to SG from VMIG 3.

What Could Make The Ratings Go Up

Long-term: The long-term ratings on the bonds could be raised if
the long term senior unsecured rating on AIB were upgraded.  For
transactions based on a joint default analysis, the ratings could
also be raised if the long-term rating of the underlying bonds
were upgraded or if the default dependence between AIB and the
applicable obligor decreased.

Short-term: The short-term ratings on the bonds could be raised if
the short-term senior unsecured rating on AIB were upgraded.

What Could Make The Ratings Go Down

Long-Term: The long-term ratings on the bonds could be lowered if
the long term senior unsecured rating on AIB were downgraded.  For
transactions based on a joint default analysis, the ratings could
also be lowered if the long-term rating of the underlying bonds
were downgraded or the default dependence between the obligor and
AIB increased.

Short-term: Not applicable.

Principal Methodologies Used

The principal methodologies used in rating this issue were Moody's
Methodology for Rating U.S. Public Finance Transactions Based on
the Credit Substitution Approach published in August 2009 and for
those transactions rated based on a joint default analysis,
Applying Global Joint Default Analysis to Letter of Credit Backed
Transactions in the U.S. Public Finance Sector published on
October 2010.


AIRCRAFT FINANCE: Moody's Sees No Negative Ratings Impact on Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reported that its ratings on the notes
issued by Aircraft Finance Trust (AFT), are not being downgraded
or withdrawn as a result of the planned sale of an aircraft,
causing certain concentration limits to be exceeded.  The
referenced ratings are AFT, Series 1999-1, Class A-1 rated Caa1,
Class A-2 rated Ba3, and Classes B through D each rated C.

The Servicer, GE Capital Aviation Services, Limited (GECAS) plans
to sell one Boeing 767-300ER.  As a result, once the sale is
executed, four concentration limits would be exceeded: the five
largest lessees will exceed the 35% limit, undesignated countries
will exceed the 20% limit, undesignated countries rated below Baa2
will exceed the 10% limit, and undesignated counties from Africa
will exceed 5%.  According to the transaction documents, the
portfolio should comply at all times with the concentration
limits.  If a prospective action would result in one or more
concentration limits being exceeded, such action may be executed
if a rating agency confirmation is obtained.

In assessing the potential impact on the ratings of the notes,
Moody's focused on: the change to the credit profile and
concentrations of the lessees in the pool in light of the current
ratings on the notes, which are lower than the original ratings;
the experience and expertise of GECAS in placing aircraft.
Moody's notes that this aircraft is currently off lease, and the
potential leasing prospects has fallen away for various reasons
including the aircraft's old age and high technical investment
costs.  Moody's agrees that the sale of the aircraft at the
current agreed price is the best outcome for the trust.

Moody's concluded that the proposed sale of this aircraft would
not have an adverse effect on the credit quality of the rated
securities.  However, Moody's is not expressing an opinion as to
whether the sale could have other, non credit-related effects that
investors may or may not view positively.


ALPINE III: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
five notes from Alpine III, a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction backed by municipal bonds.

S&P withdrew the ratings at the issuer's request.

Ratings Withdrawn

Alpine III

                 Rating
Class         To        From
A             NR        AAA (sf)
B             NR        AA (sf)
C             NR        BBB (sf)
D             NR        BB+ (sf)
E             NR        BB- (sf)

NR -- Not rated.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Puts 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2:

  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class B rated AA (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class C rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class D rated BBB (sf)
  -- Series 2011-2 Notes, Class E rated BB (sf)


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: Moody's Assigns Definitive Notes Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2
(AMCAR 2011-2).  This is the second senior/subordinated
transaction of the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.
(AmeriCredit).

The complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2

   -- Class A-1 Notes, rated Prime-1 (sf);

   -- Class A-2 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

   -- Class A-3 Notes, rated Aaa (sf);

   -- Class B Notes, rated Aa1 (sf);

   -- Class C Notes, rated Aa3 (sf);

   -- Class D Notes, rated Baa1 (sf);

   -- Class E Notes, rated Ba1 (sf);

Ratings Rationals

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit) as servicer, and the backup
servicing arrangement with Aa2-rated Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction is
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities,"
published in June 2007.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2011-
2 pool is 11.75% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating (i.e. Aaa proxy) is 39.0%.  The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage
performance as well as performance of past securitizations, and
current expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector.  This is driven by the a
Low/Medium assessment for Governance due to the strong back-up
servicing arrangement present in this transaction in addition to
the size and strength of AmeriCredit's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination.  The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings.  V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, 25% or 35.0%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
Aaa to Aa1, Aa2, and A2, respectively; Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to A3, Baa3, and below B3, respectively; Class C notes
might change from Aa3 to Ba1, B3, and below B3, respectively;
Class D notes might change from Baa1 to below B3 in all three
scenarios; and Class E notes might change from Ba1 to below B3 in
all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed.  The analysis assumes that the deal has not
aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of
each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2's $926.318 million
auto receivables-backed notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    * "The availability of approximately 43.7%, 38.6%, 31.3%,
      25.1%, and 22.7% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively (based on stressed cash-flow
      scenarios, including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.55x, 1.75x, and 1.60x our
      11.75%-12.25% expected cumulative net loss range for the
      class A, B, C, D, and E notes.   These credit support levels
      are commensurate with the assigned 'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)',
      'A+ (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB+ (sf)' ratings on the class
      A, B, C, D, and E notes," S&P said.

    * S&P continued, "Our expectation that under a moderate, or
      'BBB', stress scenario, our ratings on the class A, B, and C
      notes would not decline by more than one rating category
      (all else being equal) over a 12-month period and our
      ratings on the class D and E notes would not decline by more
      than two rating categories within a 12-month period.  Our
      rating stability criteria describes the outer bounds of
      credit deterioration within one year as being one rating
      category in the case of 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' rated
      securities and two rating categories in the case of 'A+
      (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB+ (sf)' rated securities," S&P
      related.

    * The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

    * The timely interest and ultimate principal payments made
      under the stressed cash-flow modeling scenarios, which are
      consistent with the assigned ratings.

    * The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime auto loans.

    * General Motors Financial Co. Inc.'s (GM Financial, formerly
      known as AmeriCredit Corp.; B+/Stable/--) extensive
      securitization performance history going back to 1994.  On
      March 30, 2011, Standard & Poor's raised its long-term
      counterparty credit rating on GM Financial to 'B+' from 'B'
      and removed the rating from CreditWatch positive, where S&P
      had placed it on Oct. 8, 2010.

    * The transaction's payment and legal structures.

Ratings Assigned

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2

Class     Rating          Amount
                        (mil. $)
A-1       A-1+ (sf)      217.300
A-2       AAA (sf)       302.600
A-3       AAA (sf)       153.419
B         AA (sf)         73.077
C         A+ (sf)         90.717
D         BBB (sf)        89.205
E(i)      BB+ (sf)        23.682

(i) The class E notes will be privately placed and are excluded
    from the public offering amount.


APHEX CAPITAL: S&P Places Notes 'BB' Rating on Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 20
tranches from 14 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions on CreditWatch positive.  "At the
same time, we placed our ratings on four tranches from four
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions, six ratings from four
synthetic CDO transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), and one rating from one synthetic CDO
transaction backed by residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, we affirmed our
ratings on eight tranches from three corporate-backed synthetic
CDOs and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  Finally, we
lowered one rating from one CMBS-backed synthetic CDO transaction.
The rating actions followed our monthly review of U.S. synthetic
CDO transactions," S&P stated.

The CreditWatch positive placements reflect seasoning of the
transactions, rating stability of the obligors in the underlying
reference portfolios over the past few months, and synthetic rated
overcollateralization (SROC) ratios that had risen above 100% at
the next highest rating level.  The CreditWatch negative
placements and downgrades reflect negative rating migration in the
respective portfolios and SROC ratios that had fallen below 100%
as of the March month-end run.  The affirmations reflect stability
in the portfolios and SROC ratios that stayed above 100% at the
tranches' current rating level.

Rating Actions

Aphex Capital NSCR 2006-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    BB (sf)/Watch Neg   BB (sf)

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-5 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1FL                    B- (sf)/Watch Neg   B- (sf)
A-1FX                    B- (sf)/Watch Neg   B- (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$500 mil Credit Default Swap - CRA700426
                                 Rating
Class                    To                    From
Swap                     A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos  A-srp (sf)

Credit Default Swap
US$500 mil Credit Default Swap - CRA700436
                                 Rating
Class                    To                    From
Swap                     A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos  A-srp (sf)

Credit-Linked Trust Certificates
2005-I
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
2005-I-I                 BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB (sf)
2005-I-J                 BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB- (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1A-$LS                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1JPYLS                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
A3JPYFMS                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1A-$LMS                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Momentum CDO (Europe) Ltd.
2005-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2005-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2006-36
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2007-6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIIA                     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg   B+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2008-7
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
Notes                    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2008-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IA                       A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2005-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To               From
III A                    B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Neg
III B                    B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Neg
III C                    B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Neg
III D                    B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To               From
Combo                    B+ (sf)          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
III                      B- (sf)          B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2006-4
                                 Rating
Class                    To               From
IIIA                     B+ (sf)          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
IIIB                     B+ (sf)          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2006-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
IA                       CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
1 bil, US$225 mil Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC (Aviva) Series
2007-14
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIIA                     CCC (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
US$75 mil Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC (Aviva) Series 2007-12
                                 Rating
Class                    To                   From
IIIA                     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos  CCC- (sf)

Nomura International PLC
US$1 bil NSCR 2006-1 Class A-1 Nomura Synthetic CMBS
Resecuritization
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche                  BB (sf)/Watch Neg   BB (sf)

Pegasus 2006-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1                       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg  AAA (sf)
A2                       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg  AAA (sf)

REVE SPC
EUR50 mil, JPY3 bil, $154 mil REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series
2007-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
JSS Ser23                BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
A Series 4               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
A Series 7               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
A Series 9               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
A Series18               B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

Rutland Rated Investments
13
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Series 13                BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)

Seawall SPC
US$62.126 mil Series 2008 CMBS CDO-11 Class A Floating Rate Notes
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    B (sf)              B+ (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
2006-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A2-D2                    BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
2007-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)


ATLANTIS FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades CLO Notes Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Atlantis Funding Ltd.

   -- US$782,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 (current outstanding balance of
      $276,252,056.23),Upgraded to Aaa (sf); Previously on
      August 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf);

   -- US$23,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
      Previously on August 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

   -- US$42,500,000 Class B Third Priority Mezzanine Secured
      Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa1
      (sf); Previously on August 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$21,500,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
      Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2
      (sf); Previously on August 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes,
which have been paid down by approximately 57% or $368.4 million
since the rating action in August 2009.  As a result of the
delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the rating action in August 2009.  As of the latest trustee
report dated March 16, 2011, the Class A, Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 137.74%, 120.64% and
113.51%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 116.53%, 109.56%
and 106.34%, respectively.

Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the rating action in
August 2009 due to a decrease in the percentage of securities with
ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative
Outlook."  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $3 million from approximately $59 million in
August 2009.  Additionally, securities rated Caa1 and below make
up approximately 7.82% of the underlying portfolio versus 13.67%
in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $402.1 million, defaulted par of
$15.3 million, a weighted average default probability of 21.58%
(implying a WARF of 3582), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.85%, and a diversity score of 46.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atlantis Funding Ltd., issued in October 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed by a portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2866)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: +1

   -- Class B: +3

   -- Class C: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4298)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: -2

   -- Class B: -1

   -- Class C: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
      proceeds will continue and at what pace.  Delevering may
      accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
      and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
      significant impact on the notes' ratings.

   2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.


AUGUSTA FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Ratings of Bonds
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of the
following bonds issued by Augusta Funding Limited IV:

   -- $190,084,836 6.90% Secured Guaranteed Class A-2 Bonds Due
      2015, Withdrawn; Previously on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to
      Caa2

   -- $228,251,745 7.60% Secured Guaranteed Class A-3 Bonds Due
      2035, Withdrawn; Previously on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to
      Caa2

The current ratings assigned by Moody's to the Bonds is linked to
several factors, including, but not limited to, various series of
perpetual and long-dated floating rate notes owned by the Company,
and the rating of Ambac Assurance Corporation as Swap Guarantor.
The Bonds also benefit from a financial insurance agreement
entered into between the Company and Ambac.

The actions reflect the change in the rating of Ambac as the Swap
Counterparty, whose rating was withdrawn by Moody's on April 7,
2011.  The amounts received from the Swap Counterparty are used to
pay interest and principal on the Bonds.  The credit risk from the
FRNs is negligible compared to the credit risk from the Swap
Counterparty which provides the payments on the Bonds.

The credit rating has been withdrawn because Moody's Investors
Service believes it has insufficient or otherwise inadequate
information to support the maintenance of the credit rating.


BAKER STREET: Fitch Affirms Ratings of 4 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four and upgraded two classes of notes
issued by Baker Street CLO II Ltd./Corp. (Baker Street II):

   -- $263,802,663 class A-1 floating-rate notes affirmed at
      'AAsf/LS2'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $29,311,407 class A-2 variable funding floating-rate notes
      affirmed at 'AAsf/LS2'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $20,100,000 class B floating-rate notes affirmed at
      'Asf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $21,000,000 class C floating-rate deferrable notes affirmed
      at 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

   -- $15,900,000 class D floating-rate deferrable notes upgraded
      to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'CCCsf/RR2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11,402,275 class E floating-rate deferrable notes upgraded
      to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'CCsf/RR3'.

The affirmations and upgrades are based on positive portfolio
performance and improved credit enhancement to the rated notes.
Since the last rating review, the credit profile of the portfolio
has improved to an average rating of 'B+/B' from 'B/B-', with
approximately 14% of the portfolio considered 'CCC' or below by
Fitch, down from 28%.  Exposure to defaulted assets has decreased
to 3% from 7.3%.  Higher than expected recoveries on previously
defaulted loans contributed to the increase in available portfolio
collateral.  The transaction is still in its reinvestment period
through October 2012.  As of the most recent trustee report,
$10 million of proceeds is available for reinvestment.

The class A and E notes were partially redeemed in 2009 due to the
failure of overcollateralization (OC) tests.  Failure of the class
E OC test during the reinvestment period diverts interest proceeds
for the payment of class E principal, including any capitalized
interest, prior to principal distributions to the class A notes.
In addition to the OC tests, Baker Street II has a class E
reinvestment test, which diverts 60% of excess interest that
would otherwise be paid to the equity, to purchase additional
collateral.  Since Fitch's last review the class E reinvestment
test has cured and all OC and interest coverage tests are passing
their minimum test levels and the notes have maintained their
principal balances.

The class A-1, A-2, B and C notes have been affirmed and their
Outlook has been revised to Stable, as they should continue to
perform in line with their current ratings.

The performance of the underlying loan portfolio since Fitch's
last review has led to improved credit quality for the class D and
E notes.  As such, the ratings of the class D and E notes are
upgraded to reflect their improved credit position.

The class A, B and C notes carry and the class D notes are
assigned LS ratings.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for the
collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be
considered in conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.

The class E notes Recovery Rating was revised in this rating
review based on the total discounted future cash flows of
approximately $10.9 million projected to be available to these
bonds in a base-case default scenario.  These discounted cash
flows yield ultimate recovery projections of 96% which is
representative of an 'RR1'on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.
Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.

Baker Street II is a revolving cash flow transaction
collateralized by a portfolio of primarily leveraged loans that
closed on Sept. 15, 2006, and is managed by Seix Investment
Advisors LLC (Seix).  Baker Street II will exit its reinvestment
period in October 2012 and has a portfolio comprised of 94% senior
secured obligations and 6% second lien loans and unsecured
obligations.  Approximately 7% of the portfolio consists of
covenant lite loans.  If a covenant lite loan issuer defaults,
there is a potential that reduced recovery proceeds could
materialize.  To account for this risk, Fitch applied a 10%
recovery rate haircut to the covenant lite loans that do not carry
a Fitch explicit Recovery Rating.  The stated maturity of the
transaction is Oct. 15, 2019.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class O Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the
class O commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Bank
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2002-2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade follows a principal loss sustained by the class,
which is detailed in the April 11, 2011, remittance report.  The
class O certificate incurred reported losses amounting to 60.8% of
its beginning certificate balance ($4.2 million).  In addition,
class P, which Standard & Poor's does not rate, has lost 100% of
its original $38.8 million certificate balance.

According to the remittance report, the principal losses to the
trust of $7.6 million resulted from the liquidation of one asset
that was with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  The Braintree Executive Plaza asset consists of a
125,641-sq.-ft. office building in Braintree, Mass.  The asset
was transferred to C-III on May 4, 2010, due to imminent default.
At the time of liquidation, the asset had a total exposure of
$14.4 million, which consisted of $14.1 million of outstanding
principal balance and $0.3 million of advancing and interest
thereon.  The $7.6 million loss results in a loss severity of
54.8% on the asset.

The remittance report notes that the collateral pool consisted of
122 assets with an aggregate trust balance of $1.23 billion, down
from 154 assets totaling $1.74 billion at issuance.  Eight assets,
totaling $70.9 million (5.8%), are with the special servicer.  To
date, the trust has experienced losses on nine loans totaling
$42.9 million.  Based on the April 2011 remittance report data,
the weighted average loss severity for these loans was
approximately 51.5%.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Acts on $476 Mil. of Resecuritized RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
classes and has confirmed the rating of one class issued by Bear
Stearns ARM Trust.

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-8

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectation on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The Bear 2005-8 resecuritization bonds are backed by class
IV-A-1 issued by Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-4.  The underlying
certificate is backed primarily by first-lien, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.

The Bear 2005-8 resecuritization bonds receive principal payments
sequentially and absorb losses pro-rata to their remaining
certificate balances.  The Class X is an interest only bond whose
notional amount is linked to Classes A-2, A-3, and A-4.

The Bear 2006-3 resecuritization bonds are backed by class VII-A-1
issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust.
The underlying certificate is backed primarily by first-lien,
prime Jumbo residential mortgage loans.  The Bear 2006-3
resecuritization bonds receive principal payments pro-rata to
their remaining certificate balances.  The Class A-2 absorbs
losses before A-1.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates. Moody's current loss expectations
      on the Alt-A pools backing Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-4 is
      16% expressed as percentage of outstanding deal balance.
      The current rating on the IV-A-1 bond is Caa1.  Moody's
      current loss expectations on the Prime Jumbo pools backing
      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust is
      7.5% expressed as percentage of outstanding deal balance.
      The current rating on the VII-A-1 bond is B1.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transactions.

Moody's first updated its loss assumption on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificates) and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates.  The
ratings on the underlying certificates are based on expected
recoveries on the bonds under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves.  The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to
small increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.  For details
regarding Moody's approach to estimating losses on Prime Jumbo and
Alt-A pools, please refer to the methodology publications "Prime
Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update: January 2010" and " Alt-A RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" respectively, available on
Moodys.com.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds,
losses on the underlying certificates were ascribed to the
resecuritized bonds, according to the structure of the
resecuritized transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss on the pools of loans backing the underlying
certificates by an additional 10% and found that the implied
ratings of class A-3 issued by Bear Stearns 2005-8 and class A-1
issued by Bear Stearns 2006-3 change by one notch to Caa1 (sf) and
Ba2 (sf) respectively.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
neutral impact on the ratings.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243148


BERKELEY STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes From 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-1 and A-2 notes from Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd., a
collateralized bond obligation (CBO) transaction managed by MFS
Investment Management.  "At the same time, we removed the rating
on the class A-1 notes from CreditWatch, where we placed it with
positive implications on Jan. 19, 2011," S&P said.

According to S&P, "The upgrades reflect improved performance
we have observed in the deal's underlying asset portfolio since
our September 2009 rating actions, when we downgraded both
classes of notes.  According to the March 2011 trustee report,
the transaction had $28 million of nonperforming assets.  This
was down from $63 million noted in the August 2009 trustee report,
which we referenced for our September 2009 rating actions.
Similarly, the transaction's asset portfolio had $14 million of
'CCC' rated assets in March 2011, compared with $50 million at the
time of the September 2009 downgrades."

The upgrades also reflect consistent paydowns to the class A-1
notes.  The transaction has passed its reinvestment phase, and
as a result, the class A-1 note balance is being paid down with
principal proceeds.  Most recently, the notes received $44 million
in the March 2011 distribution.  This has, in turn, increased the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The class A overcollateralization ratio reported in the March 2011
trustee report was 135.6%, compared with a reported ratio of
105.9% in August 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the rating currently assigned to the notes remains consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To          From
A-1       AAA (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2       BBB- (sf)   CCC (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:               Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.
Co-Issuer:            Berkeley Street CDO (Delaware) Corp.
Collateral manager:   MFS Investment Management
Underwriter:          Merrill Lynch International
Trustee:              Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:     Cash flow CBO


CAPITAL TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Rating of Housing Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa3 from B3 the
rating on the Senior Series 2003A and to C from Caa2 the rating on
Subordinate Series 2003C Capital Trust Agency's Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (American Opportunities for Housing - Golf
Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments).  This rating
action affects $14,140,000 of Senior Bonds and $940,000 of
Subordinate Bonds outstanding.  The rating outlook on the bonds
remains negative for the Senior bonds and is revised to stable for
the Subordinate bonds.  The rating action is based on the poor
financial performance of the projects, low occupancy rates, and
taps to the debt service reserve funds.

Along with this transaction, the issuer also issued Senior Series
2003B bonds which have matured and Junior Subordinated Series
2003D bonds which are not rated by Moody's.

LEGAL SECURITY: The bonds are secured by the revenues and
mortgages from three cross-collateralized properties -- Golf
Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments, as well as funds
and investments pledged to the trustee pursuant to the indenture
as security for the bonds.  The Series A and B bonds have a first
lien on all program funds and are paid first in the monthly flow
of funds.  The Subordinate Series C bonds are to be paid before
the Junior Subordinate Series D bonds.  A payment default on the
Series C Subordinate and Series D Junior Subordinate bonds can
only trigger a default if the Series A and B bonds are retired
first.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

Recent Developments

Previously, the American Opportunity for Housing has contributed
financially to the projects in order to ensure timely payment of
debt service in full.  Currently, American Opportunity for Housing
has ceased contributing financially to support debt service
payments.

On December 1, 2010, the debt service reserve fund of the Senior
bonds was tapped to make up a shortfall amount of $179,209.  The
balance remaining on the debt service reserve fund for the Senior
Bonds is $861,222 or 83% of maximum annual debt service.  The tap
to the debt service reserve fund was made after the Borrower had
been experiencing financial difficulties and failed to make
required payments due to the Trustee under the bond documents.

The Borrower has failed to provide the Trustee with sufficient
funds to pay the June 1, 2010 debt service payments on the
Subordinate and Junior Subordinate Bonds, and continued to fail
to make the required monthly deposits through November 2010.  As
a result, there were no funds from the borrower to make the
December 1, 2010 debt service payment due on the Subordinate and
Junior Subordinate Bonds.  The remaining balance in the reserve
account for the Subordinate Bonds is $3,400.

Credit Challenges

   * All three projects have had difficulty maintaining occupancy
     due to significant competition within their real estate sub
     markets.  The Golf Villas, Rivermill and Village Square
     projects reported physical occupancy of 75%, 86% and 91%
     respectively as of FY 2010.

   * Revenues available to pay debt service generated from the
     projects continue to decrease. Audited financial statements
     show debt service coverage of 0.77x for the senior bonds and
     0.72x for the subordinate bonds for the year ending
     December 31, 2009.

Outlook

The outlook on the bonds has been remains negative, as Moody's
believes the declines in project occupancy rates and poor
financial performance may continue over the near to medium term.

What could change the rating up:

Sustained, improved physical and economic occupancy rates and
financial performance along with a stabilization of the local real
estate market.

What could change the rating down:

Further taps of the debt service reserves or failure to make debt
service payments on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Global Housing
Projects", published in July 2010.


CAPMARK VII: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 6 Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes and downgraded one class
of Capmark VII-CRE, Ltd./Corp. (Capmark VII) reflecting Fitch's
base case loss expectation of 22.6% compared to 25% at last
review.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate market values and cash flow
declines.

Since last review, the senior class A-1 has received paydown of
$166.8 million.  Four loans have paid in full with several other
loans subject to partial paydown or amortization.  Additionally,
the transaction continues to fail all three of its principal
coverage tests resulting in the diversion of principal proceeds
and interest (after class B) to pay principal to class A-1; and
the capitalization of interest to classes C through K.  Since last
review, the disposal of seven assets and re-structure of another
resulted in further realized losses of approximately $78 million
to the CDO.  Defaulted assets have risen slightly to 24.6% from
21.1% while loans of concern have decreased to 13.7% from 20.5% at
last review.  While credit enhancement to the two most senior
classes has increased since last review, it has decreased for
classes B and below.  The downgrade to class E reflects the
decreased credit enhancement to this class relative to the
expected losses on the defaulted assets.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 69% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 8.5% from, generally, year end 2010.  Fitch estimates
that average recoveries will be 67.2% due to the senior position
of the assets (99.9% of the assets are either whole loans or A-
notes).

Capmark VII is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO managed by
Urdang Capital Management, a real estate investment subsidiary of
BNY Mellon Asset Management.  The CDO's reinvestment period ends
August 2011.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation are A-
note and B-note interests in an underperforming portfolio of 14
multifamily properties located in Houston and Austin, TX.  This
Fitch Loan of Concern was restructured in June 2009.  Fitch views
the B-note interest (2.6% of the pool) as a 'hope' note and
modeled a full loss in the base case scenario; while the over-
leveraged A-note (9% of the pool) is modeled to have a significant
loss.

The second largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (4.7% of the pool) secured by a vacant office
property located in Redwood City, CA.  The single tenant vacated
when its lease expired in December 2010.  Fitch modeled a
significant loss on this loan in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a defaulted whole loan (4.4% of the pool) secured by
undeveloped land located adjacent to the Potomac River in
Arlington, VA.  Fitch modeled a significant loss on this loan in
its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on
stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates for classes A-1 and A-
2 are generally consistent with the ratings assigned.

The 'CCC' and below ratings for classes B through H are based on a
deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement.  These
classes were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in order to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.

Class A-1's Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from Negative
reflecting the class's senior position in the capital stack, and
positive cushion in the cash flow modeling.  Class A-2 maintains a
Negative Rating Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further
potential negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

   -- $7.6 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised LS ratings and Outlooks for these
classes:

   -- $398.7 million class A-1 at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable from
      Negative;

   -- $170 million class A-2 at 'BB/LS3' from 'BB/LS4'; Outlook
      Negative;

   -- $80 million class B at 'CCC/RR4';

   -- $30.2 million class C at'CC/RR6';

   -- $7.6 million class D at'CC/RR6';

   -- $33 million class F at 'C/RR6';

   -- $12.7 million class G at 'C/RR6';

   -- $10.2 million class H at 'C/RR6'.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Resecuritized RMBS Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes issued by Citigroup 2008-RR1.

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RR1

   -- Cl. A-1A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29,
      2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-1A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectation on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificate.

The resecuritization bonds are backed by class A-1A issued by
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-OPX1.  The underlying
certificate is backed primarily by first-lien, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.

The resecuritization bonds are receiving principal payments
sequentially.  Losses from the underlying certificate are not
allocated to the resecuritization bonds.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pool of loans backing the
      underlying certificate and the updated rating on the
      underlying certificate.  Moody's current loss expectations
      on the pool backing the Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
      OPX1 can be found at http://is.gd/YvzAqC.

      The current rating on the A-1A bond is Caa3 (sf).

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificate, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumption on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificate) and then
arrived at updated rating on the underlying certificate.  The
rating on the underlying certificate is based on expected
recoveries on the bonds under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves.  The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to
small increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds, loss
on the underlying certificate was ascribed to the resecuritized
bonds, according to the structure of the resecuritized
transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss on the pools of loans backing the underlying
certificate by an additional 10% and found that the implied
ratings of the resecuritized bonds do not change.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
neutral impact on the ratings.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
of notes issued by Coast Investment Grade 2001-1, Ltd.  The
classes of notes affected by the rating actions are:

   -- US$48,700,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
      due October 10, 2016 (current balance of $44,266,676),
      Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on December 11, 2009
      Confirmed at Caa3 (sf);

   -- US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
      October 10, 2016 (current balance of $4,544,833), Upgraded
      to B2 (sf); previously on December 11, 2009 Confirmed at
      Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A and B Notes and the
improvement of the credit quality of the portfolio.

On the last payment date the Class A Notes were paid in full and
the Class B notes started receiving principal payments totaling
$4.88mm.  As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization
ratios have increased since the last rating action in December
2009.  As of the latest trustee report dated April 5, 2011, the
Class B overcollateralization ratio is reported at 109.05% versus
November 2009 levels of 83.52%, and is currently passing its
trigger.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in December 2009.  Based on the April 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is 3116 compared to 3823 in
November 2009.  About $26mm of collateral was upgraded since the
last rating action including $8.5mm of Ca rated CLOs that were
upgraded to Caa3 and above.

Coast Investment Grade 2001-1 is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model . The cash flow model takes into account: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present).  The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows.  The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model
output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched down to Ca:

   -- Class B-1: 0

   -- Class B-2: 0

   -- Class C-1: 0

   -- Class C-2: 0

Moody's Caa3 bucket notched up to Caa1:

   -- Class B-1: +1

   -- Class B-2: +1

   -- Class C-1: 0
   -- Class C-2: 0


COAST INVESTMENT: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A, C-1, and C-2 notes from Coast Investment Grade 2002-1
Ltd., a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of
corporate CDO transaction managed by Coast Asset Management LLC
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where S&P placed them on Jan. 3, 2011.  "At the same time, we
affirmed our rating on the class D notes," S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect the credit deterioration of the
underlying assets in the collateral portfolio that has occurred
since our May 17, 2010, rating action, when we downgraded the
class A, C-1, C-2, and D notes.  Since our May 2010 rating action,
the percentage of assets in the collateral portfolio considered
defaulted has increased to 31.8% from 29.9%.  During the same
period, the percentage of assets in the collateral portfolio rated
in the 'CCC' range increased to 36.5% from 25.2%.  The class A
notes were paid down by $19.17 million to 51.31% of their original
balance," S&P related.

The transaction has also experienced a decrease in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes,
except for the class A O/C ratio.  The trustee reported the
following O/C ratios in the Feb. 28, 2011 and Feb. 26, 2010
monthly reports:

    * The class A O/C ratio was 67.00%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 65.04% in February 2010;

    * The class B O/C ratio was 60.45%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 63.76% in February 2010; and

    * The class C/D O/C ratio was 50.20%, compared with the
      reported ratio of 55.24% in February 2010.

"The affirmation of the 'CC (sf)' rating on the class D notes
reflects our view that the credit enhancement available to the
class is consistent with its current rating," S&P stated.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Coast Investment Grade 2002-1 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class        To         From
A            B (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-1          CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-2          CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

Coast Investment Grade 2002-1 Ltd.

Class        Rating
D            CC (sf)


COOKSON SPC: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class D and E notes from Cookson SPC's series 2007-31 to 'D (sf)'.
Cookson SPC is a synthetic collateralized debt obligation of
asset-backed securities (CDO of ABS) transaction.

The downgrades follow a number of credit events within the
transaction's underlying portfolio, which have caused the notes to
incur principal losses.

Ratings Lowered

Cookson SPC
Series 2007-31
                 Rating
Class        To          From
D            D (sf)      CC (sf)
E            D (sf)      CC (sf)


CANYON CAPITAL: S&P Raises Class C Notes Rating to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A, B, and C notes from Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1 Ltd.,
a collateralized bond obligation (CBO) transaction managed by
Canyon Capital Advisors LLC.  "At the same time, we removed our
rating on the class A notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect improvement in the credit profile of the
assets in the transaction's underlying portfolio as well as
$29.95 million in paydowns to the class A notes since we
downgraded the notes in July 2010," according to S&P.

According to the March 15, 2011 trustee report, the transaction
currently holds $3.0 million in 'CCC' rated assets, down from
$12.25 million noted in the May 14, 2010 trustee report.  In
addition, the transaction holds $14.11 million in defaulted
securities, up from $13.97 million in May 2010.

Standard & Poor's has also observed an increase in collateral
securities that mature after the notes' stated maturity date.
However, Standard & Poor's noted that this risk was mitigated by
the increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available to
support the rated notes.  The trustee reported these
ratios in the March 15, 2011 monthly report:

    * The class A O/C ratio is 151.70% versus 130.24% in May 2010;

    * The class B O/C ratio is 131.09% versus 119.68% in May 2010;
      and

    * The class C O/C ratio is 115.29% versus 110.64% in May 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1 Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A           AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA- (sf)    BB+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)    B (sf)


CPS AUTO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Series 2008-A Class C
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took rating actions on various
CPS Auto Receivables Trusts and one CPS Cayman Residual Trust,
each a securitization of subprime auto loans backed predominantly
by used automobiles and light-duty trucks:

    * "We affirmed our Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR)
      and long-term rating on the class A-2 notes from CPS Auto
      Receivables Trust 2005-D," S&P said.

    * "We raised the SPUR on the class A-4 notes from CPS Auto
      Receivables Trust's series 2006-A and removed it from
      CreditWatch with positive implications.  We lowered our
      long-term rating on the class and removed it from
      CreditWatch with negative implications, where we placed it
      on Oct. 29, 2010," according to S&P.

    * "We raised the SPURs on the class A-4 notes from CPS Auto
      Receivables Trust's series 2006-B, 2006-D, 2007-A, 2007-B,
      2007-C and the class A-3 and A-4 notes from series 2008-A.
      In addition, we removed the SPURs on the class A-4 notes
      from series 2006-B from CreditWatch with positive
      implications and the SPURs on the notes from series 2007-B,
      2007-C, and 2008-A from CreditWatch with negative
      implications, where we placed them on Dec. 22, 2009," S&P
      noted.

    * S&P raised the long-term ratings on the class A-4 notes from
      CPS Auto Receivables Trust's series 2006-B, 2006-C, and
      2007-A.  In addition, S&P removed the ratings on the notes
      from series 2006-B and 2006-C from CreditWatch with positive
      implications, where S&P placed them on Dec. 22, 2009.

    * "We affirmed the long-term ratings on the class A-4 notes
      from CPS Auto Receivables Trust's series 2006-D, 2007-B,
      2007-C, the class A-2 notes from series 2007-TFC, and the
      class A-3 and A-4 notes from series 2008-A," said S&P.

    * "We affirmed the long-term ratings on the class B and C
      notes from CPS Cayman Residual Trust 2008-A and removed them
      from CreditWatch with negative implications, where we placed
      them on Dec. 22, 2009," S&P noted.

"The rating actions reflect each transaction's collateral
performance to date, our views regarding future collateral
performance under various economic conditions, and the credit
enhancement available.  In addition, our analysis incorporated
secondary credit factors such as credit stability, payment
priorities under various scenarios, and sector- and issuer-
specific characteristics," S&P related.

"As of the February 2011 performance month, delinquencies and
cumulative net losses continue to trend higher than our initial
expectations for most transactions.  However, the rate at which
losses are being taken has declined, compared with our previous
review and loss revision in December 2009," S&P added.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the February 2011 performance month
Series    Mo.  Pool   60-      Current
               factor plus     CNL (%)
               (%)    day
                      del.(%)
2005-D    63   3.2    5.85     15.43
2006-A    60   5.1    7.42     16.19
2006-B    57   7.6    6.73     17.59
2006-C    54   10.0   6.95     19.08
2006-D    51   13.8   6.63     18.45
2007-A    48   17.4   6.96     17.67
2007-B    45   21.3   6.89     17.68
2007-C    42   24.9   7.13     17.34
2007-TFC  47   10.9   7.63     15.09
2008-A    36   31.2   6.43     15.80

CNL--cumulative net loss.

S&P related, "Based on the current performance of each transaction
and our forward-looking expectations, we have lowered our loss
expectations for series 2005-D, 2006-A, and 2006-B from our
December 2009 estimate.  We increased our loss expectations
for series 2006-D, 2007-A, 2007-B, 2007-C, 2007-TFC, and 2008-A."
S&P's expected loss remains the same for series 2006-C.

Table 2
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the February 2011 performance month
Series     Initial       Dec. 2009       Revised
           lifetime      lifetime        lifetime
           CNL exp.      CNL exp.        CNL exp.
           (%)           (%)             (%)*
2005-D     14.00        15.75-16.25      15.50-16.00
2006-A     14.00        16.75-17.25      16.50-17.00
2006-B     13.50        18.25-18.75      18.00-18.50
2006-C     12.75        19.75-20.25      19.75-20.25
2006-D     13.00        19.50-20.00      20.00-20.50
2007-A     12.75        19.00-19.50      20.00-20.50
2007-B     12.75        19.75-20.25      20.25-20.75
2007-C     12.75        20.00-20.50      21.00-21.75
2007-TFC   14.00        14.50-15.00      16.00-16.50
2008-A     13.75        20.25-20.75      20.75-21.25

CNL -- cumulative net loss.
*Revised CNL expectations are based on current performance data.

Ten of the 11 securitizations we reviewed benefit from a full-
guarantee insurance policy from a monoline bond insurer.  A SPUR
is our opinion of the stand-alone creditworthiness of a
transaction -- that is, the transaction's capacity to pay debt
service on a debt issue in accordance with its terms -- without
considering an otherwise applicable bond insurance policy.  "Under
our criteria, the issue credit rating on a fully credit-enhanced
bond issue is the higher of the two ratings: the credit enhancer's
or the SPUR," S&P noted.

The affirmation of the 'AAA (sf)' rating and SPUR on the class A-2
notes from series 2005-D reflects strong levels of credit
enhancement in relation to future expected losses, with the
outstanding note balance almost fully collateralized through the
existing cash reserve account.  The rating reflects a SPUR rating
that is higher than the rating on the monoline bond insurer.

"We lowered the long-term rating on the class A-4 notes from CPS
Auto Receivables Trust's series 2006-A and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where we placed it on
Oct. 29, 2010.  At the same time, we raised the SPUR on this class
and removed it from CreditWatch with positive implications, where
we placed it on Oct. 29, 2010.  The lowered long-term rating
reflects the rating of the monoline bond insurer, Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. (Assured; AA+/Stable/--), while the raised SPUR
reflects the credit enhancement available in relation to our
revised expected remaining losses.  The lowering of the long-term
rating on the notes was delayed from other US asset-backed
securities (ABS) rating actions related to Assured while
we assessed the creditworthiness of the SPUR," S&P stated.

S&P continued, "We raised the SPURs and long-term ratings on the
class A-4 notes from CPS Auto Receivables Trust's series 2006-B
and 2007-A to reflect the increase in credit enhancement as a
percentage of the amortizing collateral balance in relation
to our revised expected losses.  We removed the SPUR and long-term
rating on the notes from series 2006-B from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where we placed them on Dec. 22, 2009.
The ratings now reflect a SPUR that is higher than the rating
on the monoline bond insurer, MBIA Insurance Corp. (MBIA;
B/Negative/--)."

"We raised the long-term rating on the class A-4 from CPS Auto
Receivables Trust's series 2006-C to reflect the increase in
credit enhancement as a percentage of the amortizing collateral
balance in relation to our revised expected losses.  In addition,
we removed the rating removed from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where we placed it on Dec. 22, 2009.  The rating
now reflects a SPUR rating that is higher than the rating on the
monoline bond insurer, Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Syncora Guarantee;
NR)," S&P related.

"We raised the SPURs on the class A-4 for CPS Auto Receivables
Trust's series 2006-D, 2007-B, 2007-C, and the class A-3 and A-4
notes from series 2008-A to reflect the increase in credit
enhancement as a percentage of the amortizing collateral balance
in relation to our revised expected losses.  At the same time, we
affirmed the long-term ratings to reflect the rating on the
monoline bond insurer, Assured.  We also removed the SPURs on
series 2007-B, 2007-C, and 2008-A from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where we placed them on Dec. 22, 2009.  These
actions reflect the extended CreditWatch period during which the
transactions' rate of losses slowed and credit enhancement
improved as a percentage of the amortizing collateral balance,"
said S&P.

The affirmation of the 'AA (sf)' rating on the class A-2 notes
from CPS Auto Receivables Trust's series 2007-TFC reflects a SPUR
rating that is higher than the rating on the monoline bond
insurer, Syncora Guarantee.

"The affirmation of the long-term ratings on the class B and C
notes from CPS Cayman Residual Trust's series 2008-A reflects our
future loss expectations in relation to existing credit support
and stressed excess spread levels available to repay the
outstanding notes.  The class B and C notes are deferrable
interest notes.  Interest and principal will be paid from the
residual certificate of CPS Auto Receivables Trust's series 2008-
A," S&P related

The CPS Auto Receivables Trust transactions have pro rata payment
priority structures in which the class A notes share principal
payments with the subordinated certificate classes.  For series
2008-A, the only series with multiple senior notes remaining, the
payment priority within the class A notes is sequential, such
that the seniormost class A-3 notes receives all principal
payments dedicated to the senior tranche until it is fully paid.
Thereafter, the next most senior class A-4 notes will receive
principal distributions until it is paid in full.

The issuer structured each CPS Auto Receivables Trust transaction
with credit enhancement consisting of overcollateralization,
subordination, a nonamortizing reserve account, and significant
amounts of excess spread.  The overcollateralization was
structured to build over time to a target percentage of each
series' current pool balance.  For the 2005-D through 2007
vintages, if the transactions meet certain performance tests, the
overcollateralization amount may step down by 1% at months 24, 30,
and by 0.50% at month 36.  As of the February 2011 performance
month, no transaction's overcollateralization levels or spread
account had stepped down.

Each of the CPS Auto Receivables Trust transactions also contains
two levels of performance-related triggers.  If a transaction
breaches its level 1 trigger, according to the transaction
documents, its reserve account traps excess proceeds up to an
increased floor level.  If a transaction breaches its level 2
performance trigger or certain covenants in the insurance
agreements, the payment priority could change such that proceeds
cease being diverted to the subordinated certificate class (i.e.,
Cayman Residual Trust's series 2008-A) and instead are used to
either pay down the class A notes pro rata or get deposited into
the reserve account until the notes are fully collateralized.  All
2006-B and later vintage transactions have either breached
financial covenants in their transaction documents or level 1
triggers.  As a result the spread accounts have been trapping
excess proceeds.  The increased amounts in the spread accounts
could provide additional protection against future losses.  To
date, none of the transactions have breached their level 2
triggers or changed their payment priorities.

Since issuance, the credit enhancement for each transaction has
increased as a percentage of the amortizing pool balances.  "Hard
credit support has also increased as a percentage of the current
pool balances since we last reviewed the transactions in December
2009," S&P noted.

Table 3
Hard Credit Support (%)
As of the February 2011 performance month
Series    Total hard      Dec. 2009            Current total
          credit support  total hard           hard credit
          at issuance     credit support       support
          (%) (i)         (% of current)(i)    (% of current)(i)
2005-D    15.00           37.4                 100.0
2006-A    15.00           19.1                 62.8
2006-B    14.50           30.2                 71.6
2006-C    13.00           25.5                 52.0
2006-D    13.00           23.7                 34.4
2007-A    13.00           22.5                 39.3
2007-B    12.50           20.7                 34.4
2007-C    12.00           19.1                 28.8
2007-TFC  16.22           28.2                 55.3
2008-A    24.25           29.7                 42.0

(i) Consists of a reserve account, overcollateralization, and
    subordination.  Excludes excess spread that can also provide
    additional enhancement.

"Our review of these transactions included our cash flow analysis,
which used current and historical performance to estimate future
performance.  Our various cash flow scenarios included forward-
looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses, and voluntary
absolute prepayment speeds that we believe are appropriate given
each transaction's current performance.  Furthermore, we
evaluated various scenarios attributed to current or possible
future trigger breaches for each transaction.  The results
demonstrated, in our view, that all of the classes we reviewed
have adequate credit enhancement at their respective affirmed or
revised rating levels," S&P related.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of these transactions
to assess whether the credit enhancement remains sufficient, in
our view, to support the ratings on each class under various
stress scenarios," S&P added.

Long-Term Ratings Raised

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To           From
2007-A    A-4     A (sf)       BBB (sf)

Long-term Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Positive

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To           From
2006-B    A-4     AA+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
2006-C    A-4     AA (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

Long-term Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative
CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To           From
2006-A    A-4     AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Long-term Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative
CPS Cayman Residual Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To            From
2008-A    B       BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2008-A    C       BB (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Long-term Ratings Affirmed

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
Series       Class   Rating
2005-D       A-2     AAA (sf)
2006-D       A-4     AA+ (sf)
2007-B       A-4     AA+ (sf)
2007-C       A-4     AA+ (sf)
2007-TFC     A-2     AA (sf)
2008-A       A-3     AA+ (sf)
2008-A       A-4     AA+ (sf)

SPURs Raised

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To            From
2006-D    A-4     A+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
2007-A    A-4     A (sf)        BBB (sf)

SPURs Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Positive

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To            From
2006-A    A-4     AA+ (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
2006-B    A-4     AA+ (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

SPURs Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
                      Rating
Series    Class   To            From
2007-B    A-4     A (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2007-C    A-4     BBB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2008-A    A-3     A (sf)        A- (sf)/Watch Neg
2008-A    A-4     A (sf)        A- (sf)/Watch Neg

SPUR Affirmed

CPS Auto Receivables Trust
Series       Class   Rating
2005-D       A-2     AAA (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-J Notes to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C2.  "In
addition, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' ratings on five other
classes from the same transaction," S&P stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction using
our U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  Our analysis included a review
of the credit characteristics of all of the assets in the pool,
the transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust," S&P said.

S&P continued, "Our analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage (DSC) of 1.24x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
109.5%.  We further stressed the assets' cash flows under our
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.89x and an LTV
ratio of 142.3%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 87.2% and 41.5%.  The DSC and LTV calculations
we noted above exclude 18 loans with the special servicer ($323.5
million; 24.1%).  We separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced loans, which we included in our 'AAA' scenario-implied
default and loss severity figures."

The affirmed 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the principal and interest
certificate classes reflect subordination levels and liquidity
that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  "We affirmed
our 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only (IO)
certificates based on our current criteria," S&P noted.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the March 17, 2011, remittance report, 19 assets
($325.9 million; 24.3%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III).  Subsequent to the
remittance date, two additional loans ($13.3 million; 1.0%) were
transferred to the special servicer.  The payment status of these
assets is: two are real estate owned (REO; $10.6 million; 0.8%),
six are in foreclosure (246.2 million; 18.4%), two are matured
balloon loans ($13.9 million; 1.0%), eight ($52.8 million; 3.9%)
are more than 90 days delinquent, one is 60 days delinquent
($2.9 million; 0.2%), one is 30 days delinquent ($10.4 million;
0.8%), and one is less than 30 days delinquent ($2.4 million;
0.2%).  Fourteen loans ($305.5 million; 22.8%) have ARAs in effect
totaling $146.2 million.  Three of the top 10 loans in the pool
are with the special servicer," S&P noted.

The Babcock & Brown FX 1 loan ($157.4 million, 11.8%) is
the largest asset in the pool and has a total exposure of
$169.8 million.  It is secured by a 13-property multifamily
portfolio consisting of 4,990 units spread over eight properties
in Texas, four properties in South Carolina, and one in Alabama.
The loan was transferred to C-III on March 18, 2009, due to
imminent default, and the loan is in foreclosure.  A $60.0 million
ARA is in effect against this loan and an updated appraisal
received in November 2010 valued the property significantly below
the trust balance.  Standard & Poor's expects a severe loss upon
the resolution of this asset.

The Fortunoff Portfolio loan ($69.9 million, 5.2%) is the
second-largest loan in the pool and has a total exposure of
$79.7 million.  The loan is secured by a fee and leasehold
interest in a 208,000-sq.-ft. single-tenant retail property in
Westbury, N.Y., and a leasehold interest in a 150,000-sq.-ft.
single-tenant retail property in Woodbridge, N.J.  The loan was
transferred to C-III on Jan. 14, 2009, due to the bankruptcy of
the sole tenant, the Fortunoff chain of department stores, which
vacated the premises on June 2, 2009, following its liquidation.
The properties have been vacant since then, and efforts to secure
new tenants have not yet been successful.  A $56.4 million ARA is
in effect against this loan.  The special servicer is evaluating
purchase offers for the properties while pursuing foreclosure.
An appraisal received in November 2010 valued the property
significantly below the trust
balance.  "We expect a severe loss upon the resolution of this
asset," S&P said.

The remaining 19 loans with the special servicer ($111.9 million;
8.3%) individually represent less than 1.7% of the total pool
balance.  "For 16 of these loans ($96.1 million; 7.0%), we
estimated a weighted average loss of 35.6%.  The special servicer
expects to return one loan ($2.4 million; 0.2%) to the master
servicer.  The remaining two loans ($13.3 million; 1.0%) were
recently transferred to the special servicer," S&P stated.

                         Transaction Summary

As of the March 17, 2011, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $1.34 billion (184 loans and two REO
assets), compared with $1.44 billion (193 loans) at issuance.
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the master servicer, provided financial
information for 81.3% of the pool balance, which was primarily
full-year 2009 or 2010 information or interim 2009, 2010, or
2011 information.  No financial information is available for the
two largest loans in the pool ($227.3 million; 17.0%), both of
which are with the special servicer.  "We calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.21x for the loans in the pool based on the
reported figures.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.24x and
109.5%, which exclude 18 loans with the special servicer ($323.5
million; 24.1%).  If these 18 specially serviced loans are
included in the calculations, the adjusted DSC and LTV are 1.21x
and 122.1%," S&P noted.

The trust has experienced four principal losses totaling
$5.7 million to date.  Sixty-two loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist ($369.7 million; 27.6%).  Fifteen loans
($99.0 million, 7.4%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x,
and 49 loans ($215.6 million, 16.1%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                 Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $465.9 million (34.8%).  "Using servicer-reported information,
we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.16x.  Our adjusted
DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 assets were 1.18x and 115.4%.
The adjusted figures exclude the largest loan in the pool
($157.4 million; 11.8%), the second-largest loan in the pool
($69.9 million; 5.2%), and the ninth-largest loan in the pool
($22.3 million; 1.7%), for which we separately estimated losses
and discuss above.  Three of the top 10 real estate assets are on
the master servicer's watchlist," S&P stated.

The Lincoln Road Retail ($49.0 million; 3.7%) loan, the third-
largest asset in the pool, is secured by 53,000 sq. ft. of
unanchored retail space in Miami Beach, Fla., which was built in
1924 and renovated in 2002.  For year-end 2010, the reported DSC
and occupancy were 1.43x and 88%.  The loan is on the watchlist
for delinquent real estate taxes; however, the master servicer is
in the process of verifying the reported payment of the taxes.

The Summit Hill loan ($27.1 million, 2.0%) is the sixth-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by a 411-unit multifamily complex
in Chapel Hill, N.C.

The loan appears on the watchlist due to a reported DSC of 1.13x
as of Dec. 31, 2010.  Occupancy was 91.0% at that time.  According
to the master servicer, a fire occurred in July 2010 at the
property, which affected one building (15 units) and restoration
is largely complete.

The Parc at Duluth loan ($23.7 million, 1.8%) is the eighth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 165-unit senior
housing community in Duluth, Ga.  The loan also appears on the
watchlist due to a low reported DSC.  For year-end 2010, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.00x and 80.6%.  According to the
master servicer, the borrower has been funding any potential
payments shortfalls while attempting to improve occupancy.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with our lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
            Rating
Class    To        From      Credit enhancement (%)
A-M      BB+(sf)   BBB+(sf)                   21.06
A-J      CCC-(sf)  CCC+(sf)                   13.54

RATINGS Affirmed

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-1       AAA (sf)                  31.81
A-2       AAA (sf)                  31.81
A-3       AAA (sf)                  31.81
A-1A      AAA (sf)                  31.81
A-X       AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  "Concurrently, we affirmed our ratings on 11 other
classes from the same transaction," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction using
our U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  Our analysis included a review
of the credit characteristics of all of the remaining assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust," S&P noted.

The downgrades reflect anticipated credit support erosion upon the
eventual resolution of six of the eight specially serviced loans.
"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, we calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.46x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 102.3%.
We further stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.95x and an LTV ratio of
134.2%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 69.4% and 34.8%.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude six defeased loans ($86.5 million, 8.1%) and six
($20.3 million, 1.9%) of the eight specially serviced loans.  We
separately estimated losses for these six specially serviced loans
and included them in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures," S&P pointed out.

According to S&P, "Our rating affirmations on the principal and
interest certificate classes reflect subordination and liquidity
support levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.
We affirmed our ratings on the class A-X and A-SP interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our current criteria."

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, eight
loans ($52.6 million, 4.9%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III).  The payment
status of the specially serviced assets as reported in the March
2011 trustee remittance report is: two are 60-days delinquent
($32.2 million, 3.0%) and six are 90-plus-days delinquent
($20.3 million, 1.9%).  Four of the eight specially serviced
assets ($15.8 million, 1.5%) have appraisal reduction amounts
(ARAs) in effect totaling $6.9 million.

The 301 Yamato Road loan ($26.8 million, 2.5%), the eighth-largest
nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 206,447-sq.-ft.
office property in Boca Raton, Fla.  The loan payment status is
60-days delinquent and the loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Aug. 2, 2010, due to imminent default.  KeyBank
reported a DSC of 1.33x as of Dec. 31, 2010, and occupancy of
89.3% as of Nov. 10, 2010. C-III indicated that subsequent to the
March 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the borrower has
brought the loan current and C-III anticipates the loan being
returned to the master servicer.

The Woodbridge Apartments loan ($8.1 million, 0.8%) is secured
by a 304-unit multifamily property in Phoenix.  The loan is 90-
plus-days delinquent and was transferred to the special servicer
on Nov. 17, 2009, due to payment default.  No recent financial
information was reported by the master servicer.  C-III
has indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure.  An updated
appraisal received in July 2010 valued the property significantly
below the trust balance.  "We expect a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan," S&P noted.

The remaining six specially serviced assets ($17.7 million, 1.6%)
have individual balances below $5.5 million.  One loan is 60-days
delinquent and the remaining five are 90-plus-days delinquent.
"We estimated losses for five of these assets at a weighted-
average loss severity of 43.5%.  The remaining loan was recently
transferred to special servicing," S&P said.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.1 billion, which is 80.5% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 142 loans, down from 159 loans at
issuance.  The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital
(KeyBank), provided financial information for 98.9% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool; 23.1% was full-year 2009 data,
73.4% was partial-year or full-year 2010 data, and 2.4% was
interim-2011 data.

"We calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  Our adjusted DSC
and LTV figures were 1.46x and 102.3%.  These figures excluded six
defeased loans ($86.5 million, 8.1%) and six ($20.3 million, 1.9%)
of the eight specially serviced assets.  We separately estimated
losses for these six specially serviced assets and included them
in our 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures.
If these six specially serviced loans are included in the
calculations, the adjusted DSC and LTV are 1.44x and 106.5%," S&P
stated.

The transaction has experienced $35.6 million in principal losses
to date on eight loans at a weighted average loss severity of
68.2%, according to the March 2011 trustee remittance report.
Twenty-four loans ($115.5 million, 10.8%) in the pool are on the
master servicers' watchlist.  Nineteen loans ($83.0 million, 7.8%)
have reported DSCs below 1.10x, 17 of which ($72.3 million, 6.8%)
have reported DSCs of less than 1.00x.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 real estate loans have an aggregate outstanding balance
of $371.7 million (34.8%).  "Using servicer-reported numbers, we
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.44x for the top 10 real
estate loans.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10 real
estate loans are 1.39x and 113.6%.  The eighth-largest real estate
loan is with the special servicer.  The two largest top 10 real
estate loans ($111.9 million, 10.5%) mature in the first half of
2012.

The Hilton Gaslamp Quarter Hotel loan ($59.6 million, 5.6%), the
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 282-room
lodging property in San Diego, Calif.  The loan matures on July 1,
2012.  Keybank reported a DSC of 2.09x, occupancy of 74.1%, and
average room rate (ADR) of $194.48 as of year-end 2010.

The Och Ziff Portfolio loan ($52.3 million, 4.9%), the second-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by nine lodging
properties in various cities in Ohio with a total of 929 rooms.
The loan matures on May 11, 2012. KeyBank reported a combined DSC
of 1.36x, occupancy of 47.8%, and ADR of $105.54 as of year-end
2009.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4

                Rating
Class     To            From       Credit enhancement (%)
A-J       A- (sf)       A (sf)                      12.82
B         BBB+ (sf)     A- (sf)                     10.65
C         BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)                    9.40
D         BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)                     7.23
E         BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf)                     5.68

Ratings Affirmed

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4

Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-3      AAA (sf)                             21.52
A-4      AAA (sf)                             21.52
A-AB     AAA (sf)                             21.52
A-5      AAA (sf)                             31.33
A-5M     AAA (sf)                             21.52
A-1-A    AAA (sf)                             21.52
F        B+ (sf)                               4.12
G        CCC+ (sf)                             2.88
H        CCC- (sf)                             1.33
A-X      AAA (sf)                               N/A
A-SP     AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A -- Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Lowers Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from two
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
"We lowered our ratings on eight of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the interest shortfalls to continue," S&P
related.

"All of the classes that we downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for eight or more
months," S&P explained.  The recurring interest shortfalls for the
respective certificates are primarily due to one or more of the
factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * A lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P noted.

The servicer implements ARAs and the resulting ASER amounts
according to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  "We primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals because ARAs
based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to change,
or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the MAI
appraisals," according to S&P.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

       Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2

"We lowered our ratings on the class K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series
2007-C2 to 'D (sf)'.  The lowered ratings on these five classes
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to 10 ($97.2 million, 3.0%) of the 21 assets
($856.3 million, 26.5%) that are currently with the special
servicer, Torchlight Investors LLC.  The accumulated interest
shortfalls are also the result of special servicing fees and
shortfalls due to an interest rate modification on the Tartan
Square loan ($2.6 million, 0.1%).  We also lowered our rating on
the class J certificate due to reduced liquidity support
available to the class. As of the March 17, 2011, trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $63.8 million were in effect for
11 loans.  The total reported ASER amount was $271,069, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $4.4 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered seven ASER amounts (all based on MAI
appraisals), current special servicing fees, and an interest rate
reduction from the modification of the aforementioned loan in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $426,272, and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class K. Classes K, L, M, N, and O have had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding between eight and 12 months, which we
expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P
related.

               JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
                Securities Corp.'s series 2003-PM1

S&P related, "We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, and K
certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2003-PM1 to 'D (sf)' due to interest shortfalls
resulting from ASER amounts related to four ($29.8 million, 3.6%)
of the six ($82.7 million, 10.1%) assets that are currently
with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services (Midland), as
well as special servicing fees and interest not advanced.  We also
lowered our ratings on the class E, F, and G certificates due to
reduced liquidity support available to these three classes.  As
of the March 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$49.7 million were in effect for five loans."  The total reported
ASER amount was $20,106 and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.6 million. Standard & Poor's considered two ASER amounts
(based on MAI appraisals), current special servicing fees, and
interest not advanced ($237,249) on the Palm Beach Mall asset in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $274,081, and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class H.  "Classes H, J, and K have had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for 12 months, which we expect to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P noted.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                 Credit          Reported
          Rating            enhancement      interest shortfalls
($)
Class  To          From             (%)       Current  Accumulated
J      CCC- (sf)   CCC (sf)        3.33      (47,430)            0
K      D (sf)      CCC (sf)        2.31      150,494       749,560
L      D (sf)      CCC (sf)        2.06       35,669       298,607
M      D (sf)      CCC (sf)        1.80       35,673       321,060
N      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)       1.29       71,338       713,977
O      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)       1.16        7,839       214,066

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1
                                   Credit           Reported
          Rating              enhancement     interest shortfalls
($)
Class  To          From               (%)     Current  Accumulated
E      BBB- (sf)   A (sf)          11.61            0            0
F      B+ (sf)     BBB (sf)         9.68            0            0
G      CCC (sf)    B+ (sf)          8.10            0            0
H      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        5.81       55,352      814,644
J      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        3.88       72,756      873,069
K      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        3.00       33,070      396,835


CREST 2003: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Classes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, D-2 notes, and the
preferred shares from Crest 2003-1 Ltd., a static collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS).  "At the same time, we removed our
ratings on six of those classes from CreditWatch, where we placed
them with negative implications in January 2011," S&P related.

"The downgrades reflect the credit deterioration we have observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio, as well as the negative
rating actions on the underlying securities.  As of the Feb. 28,
2011, trustee report, the transaction had $134.12 million in
defaulted assets, compared with $59.43 million noted in the July
30, 2010, trustee report, which we referenced for our August 2010
rating actions," S&P stated.

The decrease in the overcollateralization (O/C) available to
support the rated notes also reflects the transaction's
deteriorating performance.  The trustee reported the following O/C
ratios in the Feb. 28, 2011, monthly report:

    * The class B-2 O/C ratio was 160.22%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 209.33% in July 2010;

    * The class C-2 O/C ratio was 110.59%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 153.56% in July 2010; and

    * The class D-2 O/C ratio was 86.97%, compared with a reported
      ratio of 125.16% in July 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Crest 2003-1 Ltd.
              Rating
Class     To         From
A-1       AA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2       AA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B-1       BBB (sf)   AA (sf)
B-2       BBB (sf)   AA (sf)
C-1       CCC (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-2       CCC (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
D-1       CC (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D-2       CC (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Pref Shs  CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)

Transaction Information
Issuer:              Crest 2003-1 Ltd.
Co-Issuer:           Crest 2003-1 Corp.
Underwriter:         Wachovia Securities Inc.
Trustee:             Bank of America N.A.
Transaction type:    Cash flow CDO


CS FIRST BOSTON: Moody's Downgrades $14 Million of Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp, CSFG ABS Trust Series
2001-HE8.  The collateral backing this deal primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprimeresidential
mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp, CSFB ABS Trust
Series 2001-HE8

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF242077

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


CSAM FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from CSAM Funding III, a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by CSFB Alternative
Capital Inc.  "At the same time, we removed our ratings on
the class A-1 and A-2 notes from CreditWatch, where we placed them
with positive implications on March 1, 2011," S&P related.

"The upgrades reflect a significant paydown to the class A-1
notes, as well as improved performance we have observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since we lowered our ratings on
all of the rated notes on March 30, 2010, following the
application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.  As of the Feb. 22, 2011 trustee
report, the class A-1 notes were paid down to $244.08 million from
$282.91 million balance as reported in the Feb. 22, 2010 trustee
report, which we referenced in our March 2010 rating actions.
As of the Feb. 22, 2011 trustee report, the transaction had
$10.64 million of defaulted assets and approximately $17.95
million in assets from obligors with ratings in the 'CCC' range.
This was up from $10.55 million in defaults and down from
approximately $33.40 million in assets from obligors with ratings
in the 'CCC' range noted in the Feb. 22, 2010 trustee report," S&P
noted.

Standard & Poor's has also observed an increase in collateral
securities that mature after the notes' stated maturity date.
However, Standard & Poor's noted that this was mitigated by the
increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available to support
the rated notes.  The trustee reported these ratios in the
Feb. 22, 2011 monthly report:

    * The class A par value ratio test was 128.69%, compared with
      a reported ratio of 123.39% in February 2010;

    * The class B par value ratio test was 119.86%, compared with
      a reported ratio of 115.59% in February 2010;

    * The class C par value ratio test was 112.84%, compared with
      a reported ratio of 109.33% in February 2010;

    * The class D par value ratio test was 110.78%, compared with
      a reported ratio of 107.48% in February 2010; and

    * The ratio for collateral securities that mature after the
      notes' stated maturity date was 15.10%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 4.90% in February 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Ratin and CreditWatch Actions

CSAM Funding III
                        Rating
Class              To           From
A-1                AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  A- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
C                  BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)


CSMC SERIES: Moody's Cuts Rating of Class A-1 to Junk From 'Baa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes and has confirmed the rating of one class issued by two
CSFB resecuritization deals.

Issuer: CSMC 2008-1R

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Series 2008-3R

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2010
      Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectation on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificates.

The CSMC 2008-1R resecuritization bonds are backed by class I-A-1B
issued by Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2007-1.  The underlying certificate is backed
primarily by first-lien, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
CSMC 2008-1R resecuritization bonds A-1 and A-2 receive principal
payments first pro-rata to their remaining certificate balances
till they reach planned principal balance.  The resecuritization
bond Class A-3 receives its principal thereafter.  Also, the
classes A-1 and A-2 will receive payments without regard to the
planned principal balance once class A-3 is paid off.  Losses are
allocated to the resecuritization bonds pro-rata to their
remaining certificate balances however class A-2 absorbs losses
that are otherwise allocable to A-1.

The CSMC 2008-3R resecuritization bonds are backed by class Cl. 1-
A-1 issued by Banc of America Funding 2006-2 Trust.  The
underlying certificate is backed primarily by first-lien, prime
Jumbo residential mortgage loans.

The CSMC 2008-3R resecuritization bonds receive principal payments
pro-rata to their remaining certificate balances.  The Class 2-A-2
absorbs losses before 2-A-1.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificates and the updated ratings on the
      underlying certificates.  Moody's current loss expectations
      on the Alt-A pools backing Nomura Asset Acceptance
      Corporation, Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2007-1 is 38%
      expressed as percentage of outstanding deal balance.  The
      current rating on the I-A-1B bond is Caa3 (sf).  Moody's
      current loss expectations on the Prime Jumbo pools backing
      Banc of America Funding 2006-2 Trust is 8.7% expressed as
      percentage of outstanding deal balance. The current rating
      on the 1-A-1 bond is Caa1 (sf).

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificates, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transactions.

Moody's first updated its loss assumption on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificates) and then
arrived at updated ratings on the underlying certificates.  The
ratings on the underlying certificates are based on expected
recoveries on the bonds under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves.  The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to
small increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds,
losses on the underlying certificates were ascribed to the
resecuritized bonds, according to the structure of the
resecuritized transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss on the pools of loans backing the underlying
certificates by an additional 10% and found that the implied
rating of class 2-A-1 issued by CSMC 2008-3R changes by one notch
to Caa1 (sf).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
neutral impact on the ratings.


DSC FLOORPLAN: DBRS Puts 'BB' Final Rating to Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to these classes issued by DSC
Floorplan Master Owner Trust Series 2011-VFN1:

  -- Series 2011-VFN1, Class A Notes rated A (sf)
  -- Series 2011-VFN1, Class B Notes rated BB (sf)


EATON VANCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of CLO Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Eaton Vance CDO VIII, Ltd.

   -- US$583,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of $553,500,000),
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 1, 2009
      Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$48,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
      October 1, 2009 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);

   -- US$23,250,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
      October 1, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

   -- US$33,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      October 1, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily due to an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action in
October 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in October 2009.  As per the March 2011
trustee report, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 126.8%, 116.7%,
112.3%, and 106.6% respectively, versus September 2009 levels of
122.8%, 113.0%, 108.8%, and 103.3% respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based on the
March 2011 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
2056 compared to 2454 in September 2009, and securities rated Caa1
and below make up approximately 5.3% of the underlying portfolio
versus 12.7% in September 2009.  The deal has also experienced a
decrease in defaulted securities.  The dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased from $36 million in September 2009 to
$2.4 million in March 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $698 million, defaulted par of $5.7 million,
weighted average default probability of 26.0% (implying a WARF of
3255), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.8%, and
a diversity score of 80.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Eaton Vance CDO VIII, Ltd., issued on July 27, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2604)

   -- Class A: +1

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (3906)

   -- Class A: -2

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deals' overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.

   2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
      the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
      may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest
      into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities
      and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's
      tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted
      average life in its analysis.

   3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
      reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
      collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
      covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
      lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
      rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
      coupon, and diversity score.  However, as part of the base
      case, Moody's considered spread and coupon levels higher
      than the covenant levels due to the large difference between
      the reported and covenant levels.


FRANKLIN CLO VI: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Franklin CLO VI, Ltd.:

   -- US$272,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      (current outstanding balance of $261,594,841) Due 2019,
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 29, 2010
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

   -- US$38,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
      2019, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on October 29, 2010
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      October 29, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

   -- US$15,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      October 29, 2010 Upgraded to B3 (sf);

   -- US$11,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes (current outstanding balance of $ 11,035,647) Due
      2019, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on October 29, 2010
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in October 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have increased
since the rating action in October 2010 and are currently all in
compliance.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 120.17%, 113.36%,
108.25%, and 104.77%, respectively, versus September 2010 levels
of 117.75%, 111.08%, 106.07%, and 102.59%, respectively.  Moody's
also notes that the Class E Notes received a small principal
repayment in the amount of $263,852 or 2.3% of the outstanding
balance on the payment date in November 2010 due to the failure of
the Interest Reinvestment Test.

The credit quality of the underlying portfolio has been relatively
stable since the last rating action in October 2010.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated March 25, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2522 compared to
2542 in the September 2010 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+
or lower make up approximately 6.2% of the underlying portfolio
versus 7.9% in September 2010.  Additionally, defaulted securities
total about $8.7 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$8.9 million in September 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $352.3 million, defaulted par of $12.5
million, weighted average default probability of 29.97% (implying
a WARF of 3740), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
44.66%, and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Franklin CLO VI, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in assigning the ratings of the
notes was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2992)

   -- Class A: +1

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4488)

   -- Class A: -2

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -2

   -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deals' overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.

   2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
      the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
      may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest
      into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities
      and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's
      tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted
      average life in its analysis.

   3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
      reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
      collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
      covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
      lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
      rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
      coupon, and diversity score.  However, as part of the base
      case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the
      covenant levels due to the large difference between the
      reported and covenant levels.


GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings of 8 Classes of Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 8 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2005-C1.  In addition, Fitch has revised the Loss Severity (LS)
ratings and assigned Ratings Outlooks and Recovery Ratings as
applicable.

The downgrades reflect Fitch expected losses, most of which are
associated with the specially serviced loans.

Fitch modeled losses of 5.86% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 5.02%, which also
reflect losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated 25
loans (25.25%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include six
specially serviced loans (10.76%).  Three of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (7.16%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans by
unpaid principal balance.  Fitch expects that class J through P
may eventually be fully depleted from losses associated with loans
currently in special servicing.  At Fitch's last review, there
were 12 loans in special servicing (22.3%).

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 25.3% (including 0.64% of
realized losses) to $1.25 billion from $1.67 billion at issuance.
Due to realized losses, class P has been reduced to $14.4 million
from $25.1 million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are affecting
classes H through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Washington
Mutual Buildings (3.12%), the seventh largest in the pool.  The
original loan was secured by fee and leasehold interest in a total
of 257,336 square feet of office space in Los Angeles, CA
previously 100% occupied by Washington Mutual.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 for imminent
default after Washington Mutual was acquired by merger into
JPMorgan Chase Bank and a formal notice of lease rejection was
subsequently received by the Federal Depository Insurance Corp.
(FDIC).  The completely vacant properties became real estate owned
(REO) in September 2009.

No real estate collateral currently exists, as the REO properties
were sold in two separate transactions in April 2010 and October
2010, for an approximate total of $10.5 million.  The special
servicer pursued a deficiency claim against the guarantor and
borrower, and was granted summary judgment in June 2010.  The
guarantor and borrower subsequently filed appeal and as a
condition of the appeal, have posted a bond for the amount of the
judgment which currently serves as the trust collateral.  Although
a full recovery of the outstanding balance is possible, until the
outcome of the appeal is known, Fitch will assume losses based on
the $10.5 million sale of the collateral.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (1.28%) is
a 66,778 square foot retail center in Henderson, NV.  The property
is anchored by Home Goods (36% of net rentable area [NRA]).  The
loan had transferred to special servicing in June 2009 due to
imminent default as a result of cash flow issues stemming from
occupancy declines.  The property became REO in August 2010.  The
February 2011 rent roll reported occupancy at 63%. The servicer
reported year to date (YTD) June 2010 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 0.62 times (x).

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses (1.07%) is a
301 unit multifamily property in Jacksonville, FL.  The property
has experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy declines and
increased competition.  The loan had transferred to special
servicing in February 2009 due to payment default.  The property
became REO in October 2009.  The December 2010 rent roll reported
occupancy at 94%, an increase from March 2010 at 74%.  The
property is currently listed for sale by the special servicer.

Fitch downgrades, and revises Outlooks, assigns Loss Severity (LS)
ratings or Recovery Ratings (RR) on the following classes as
indicated:

   -- $14.7 million class G to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
      to Negative from Stable;

   -- $25.1 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR3' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $4.2 million class J to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $8.4 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

   -- $10.5 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $2.1 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $6.3 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

   -- $4.2 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the
LS ratings as indicated:

   -- $171.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $155 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $36.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $457.9 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $70.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $110.9 million class A-J at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $41.9 million class B to 'AAsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $16.7 million class C at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $27.2 million class D at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.6 million class E at 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23 million class F at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

Class A-1 has repaid in full. Fitch does not rate class P.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-C and X-
P.


GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Class O Notes Rating to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
O commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from GE Commercial
Mortgage Corp.'s series 2004-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade follows a principal loss sustained by the class,
which was detailed in the April 11, 2011, trustee remittance
report.  The class O certificate incurred a reported 7.8% loss
($247,913) from its original $3.2 million certificate balance due
to the March 2011 liquidation of the specially serviced Northern
Corporate Center loan.  In addition, the class P certificate,
which Standard & Poor's does not rate, has lost 100% of its
original $19.1 million certificate balance.

According to the April 2011 trustee remittance report, the
Northern Corporate Center loan, which was with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital), liquidated
at a $2.0 million loss.  The loan, secured by a 69,680-sq.-ft.
suburban office building in Phoenix, was transferred to CWCapital
on May 21, 2010, due to imminent maturity default.  The loan
matured on Sept. 1, 2010, and the borrower was not able to payoff
the loan.  At the time of liquidation, the loan had a total
exposure of $7.0 million, which consisted of $6.5 million of
outstanding principal balance and $0.5 million of advancing and
interest thereon.  The $2.0 million loss results in a loss
severity of 30.8% on the loan.

As of the April 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $744.3 million, which is 58.4% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 100 loans, down from 133 loans at
issuance.  One loan, totaling $27.5 million (3.7%), is with the
special servicer.  The trust has experienced losses on nine loans
totaling $19.4 million.  Based on the April 2011 trustee
remittance report data, the weighted average loss severity for
these loans was approximately 38.1%.


GOLDENTREE CAPITAL: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
D-1, D-2, and E notes from GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.,
a cash flow corporate collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed
by GoldenTree Asset Management L.P.  "At the same time, we removed
our ratings on the class D-1 and D-2 tranches from CreditWatch,
where we placed them with positive implications on Jan. 3, 2011.
We also affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2,
C-1, and C-2 notes," S&P related.

"The rating actions reflect the improvement in the underlying
assets' credit quality since our Dec. 11, 2009, rating actions,
when we lowered our ratings on the class D-1, D-2, and E notes.
We based our December 2009 rating actions on results noted in the
Oct. 2, 2009, trustee report.  According to the March 2, 2011,
trustee report, the amount of defaulted assets in the
transaction's portfolio has decreased to 2.1% ($6.6 million) from
12.3% ($44.2 million) at the time of our December 2009 rating
actions.  Also, over this same time period, the amount of assets
rated in the 'CCC' range decreased to 17.2% ($54.2 million) from
19.9% ($71.2 million)," according to S&P.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported the O/C ratios in the March 2, 2011, monthly
report:

    * The class A/B O/C ratio was 149.0%, compared with the
      reported ratio of 143.2% in October 2009;

    * The class C O/C ratio was 132.7%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 127.6% in October 2009;

    * The class D O/C ratio was 121.0%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 116.3% in October 2009; and

    * The class E O/C ratio was 114.5%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 110.0% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.
                 Rating
Class        To         From
D-1          BBB (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-2          BBB (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E            BB (sf)    B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Class        Rating
A-1          AAA (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)
A-3          AAA (sf)
B-1          AA (sf)
B-2          AA (sf)
C-1          A (sf)
C-2          A (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Rating on Class H Notes Rating to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2002-C1 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  "In addition,
we affirmed our ratings on eight additional classes from the same
transaction and removed three of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications," S&P related.

"The rating actions reflect our analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, liquidity available to
the trust, and high volume of assets with near-term maturities.
Standard & Poor's previously placed its ratings on seven of the
affected classes on CreditWatch with negative implications,
reflecting interest shortfalls primarily attributable to the
Crown Commerce Center loan.  The March 15, 2011, trustee
remittance report detailed current interest shortfalls totaling
$247,343, which primarily comprised interest not advanced
($57,6785) and recovery of prior advances ($125,000) by the master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia).  The
current interest shortfalls caused class J, and all classes
subordinate to it, to experience liquidity interruptions in their
scheduled liquidity payments, and reduced the liquidity support
available to the classes senior to class J," S&P said.  "Based on
our recent discussions with the special servicer, also Berkadia,
it is our understanding that the Crown Commerce Center loan has
been modified.  Our analysis reflects the details associated with
the modification as conveyed to us by the special servicer.  Our
analysis of the liquidity available to the trust also considers
the significant volume of nondefeased and non-specially serviced
assets (51 assets; $281.9 million balance; 55.5% of total pool
balance) with 2011 final maturity dates or anticipated repayments
dates (ARDs).  If these assets are not able to be refinanced, they
could potentially be transferred to the special servicer,
resulting in additional interest shortfalls."

"We lowered our rating on class L to 'D (sf)' due to recurring
interest shortfalls.  The class has experienced interest
shortfalls for seven consecutive months, and we expect these
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P
related.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity support
that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  "We affirmed
our rating on the class X-1 interest-only (IO) certificate based
on our current criteria," S&P noted.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the March 15, 2011 remittance report, five ($32.5 million,
6.4%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer.  The
payment status of the specially serviced assets is: two
($17.5 million, 3.4%) are real estate owned (REO), one
($2.9 million, 0.6%) is 90-plus days delinquent, one
($2.2 million, 0.4%) is 60 days delinquent, and one ($9.9 million,
2.0%) is part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by its associated
borrower.  Appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totaling
$10.3 million were in effect for four of the specially serviced
assets.  The two largest specially serviced assets are:

    * The Tempe City Center ($14.3 million balance; 2.8% of total
      pool balance; $16.4 million total exposure) is the third-
      largest asset in the pool and the largest specially serviced
      asset.  The property comprises 163,814-sq.-ft. of office and
      retail space encompassing several buildings, located in
      Tempe, Ariz.  The asset became REO in January 2011.  An ARA
      of $8.2 million is currently in effect for this asset.
      According to the special servicer, the asset will be listed
      for sale shortly.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
      resolution of this asset.

    * The Crown Commerce Center loan ($9.9 million; 2.0%; $10.1
      million) is the ninth-largest asset in the pool and the
      second-largest specially serviced asset.  The loan is
      secured by a 244,501-sq.-ft. industrial/warehouse property
      in Los Angeles and was transferred to the special servicer
      in March of 2009 for payment default.  The borrowing entity
      filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during this time.  According
      to the special servicer, the bankruptcy court has confirmed
      the modification of the loan.  The terms of the modification
      include an extension of the maturity date to February 2015
      and a revised interest rate.

      The remaining three specially serviced assets have balances
      that, individually, represent less than 0.7% of the total
      pool balance.  "We estimated losses for two of these assets,
      arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 39.8%," S&P
      related.

      "In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined
      the 3915 E. Broadway loan ($2.3 million; 0.5%) to be credit-
      impaired.  The loan is secured by a 28,320-sq.-ft. office
      complex in Tucson.  The loan appears on the master
      servicer's watchlist for major tenant expirations.  In
      January 2011, the master servicer received a hardship letter
      from the borrower stating that the asset was 50% occupied,
      primarily by tenants with monthly leases.  The borrower
      explained that they were having cash flow problems that will
      cause difficulty in refinancing the loan, which is scheduled
      to mature in November 2011," S&P said.

                         Transaction Summary

As of the March 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had a trust balance of $507.6 million, down from
$710.1 million at issuance.  The pool currently includes 84 loans
and two REO assets.  Twenty-six loans ($178.5 million, 35.2%) are
defeased.  The master servicer provided full-year 2009, interim-
2010, or full-year 2010 financial information for 91.8% of the
nondefeased asets in the pool.  "We calculated a weighted average
debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.40x for the pool based on the
reported figures.  Our adjusted DSC and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
were 1.37x and 73.8%.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
the defeased assets, three of the transaction's five specially
serviced assets, and the one loan that we determined to be credit-
impaired.  We separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  Realized losses,
from the liquidation of eight assets, currently total
$8.4 million.  Thirteen ($59.8 million, 11.8%) exposures in the
pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x.  The master
servicer's reported watchlist of 21 ($100.2 million, 19.7%) loans
includes three of the top 10 exposures," S&P said.

                      Summary of Top 10 Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $132.2 million (26.1%).  "Using
servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.43x for the top 10 exposures.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio
for the top 10 loans are 1.25x and 81.9%," S&P noted.

The Mesa Grande loan ($12.9 million, 2.5%) is the sixth-largest
exposure in the pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 241,174-sq.-ft. retail center
in Mesa, Ariz.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to low
reported DSC, which was 1.03x as of September 2010.

The Parkaire Landing Shopping Center loan ($10.5 million, 2.1%) is
the eighth-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a
158,681-sq.-ft retail center built in 1973.  The loan appears on
the watchlist due to low reported DSC and occupancy, which, as of
September 2010, were 0.72x and 61.0%.

The Palm Springs Crossed Portfolio ($9.3 million, 1.8%) is the
10th-largest exposure in the pool.  The exposure reflects two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans, which are secured
by two unanchored retail centers, both located in Palm Springs,
Calif.  One of the loans appears on the watchlist due to low
reported DSC, which was 1.02x as of December 2009.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with its analysis.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

             Rating
Class  To              From             Credit enhancement (%)
H      BB+ (sf)        BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg               10.99
J      CCC+ (sf)       B (sf)/Watch Neg                   8.19
K      CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg                 5.75
L      D (sf)          CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                4.70

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

            Rating
Class  To              From             Credit enhancement (%)
E      AA+ (sf)        AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg                17.28
F      AA (sf)         AA (sf)/Watch Neg                 14.84
G      A (sf)          A (sf)/Watch Neg                  12.74

Ratings Affirmed

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

Class           Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
A-2             AAA (sf)                                 29.87
B               AAA (sf)                                 24.10
C               AAA (sf)                                 22.18
D               AAA (sf)                                 19.03
X-1             AAA (sf)                                   N/A


N/A -- Not applicable.


HERCULES REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers Tax Bonds Rating to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term and
underlying ratings on Hercules Redevelopment Agency, Calif.'s
series 2005 and 2007A tax allocation revenue bonds to 'CCC' from
'BB'.  Standard & Poor's also revised its outlook on the bonds to
negative from stable.

"These rating actions reflect what we view the agency's inadequate
debt service coverage by pledged net tax increment revenue after
increases in pass-through payments and housing set-aside revenue,
its current negative cash position, and debt service reserves
funded with sureties by Ambac Assurance Corp.," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Sussan Corson.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion of:

    * Significant drops in assessed value (AV) in the agency's
      project area in the past three years, which have led to
      declining tax increment revenue;

    * Nonhousing-secured series 2005 and 2007A bonds' debt service
      reserve being funded by sureties from Ambac; and

    * Continued concentration in the largest taxpayer, Bio-Rad
      Laboratories Inc. (BBB/Stable), which makes up 14% of fiscal
      2011 incremental AV.

The series 2007A and series 2005 bonds are secured by tax
increment revenues collected from the agency's merged project area
net of set-asides for low- and moderate-income housing and certain
senior pass-through developer payments.

"The negative outlook reflects what we view as the agency's
overspending, which has led to negative cash balances, and our
expectation that pledged revenue will be insufficient to cover
nonhousing debt service obligations after recent significant AV
declines in the project area.  The outlook also reflects the
agency's need to borrow from unpledged housing revenues to pay
nonhousing debt service and the city's already stressed general
fund to meet upcoming scheduled debt service payments in August
2011," S&P related.

The project area is in the western portion of Hercules, adjacent
to the San Francisco Bay, and covers a former industrial area,
including a central portion historically centered on explosives
production.  The merged project area covers 826 acres and consists
of two areas -- the original Dynamite project area and an
amendment area, project area No. 2 -- each with a different base-
year AV and different pass-through agreements.  The merged project
area is predominately residential (64% of fiscal 2011 AV), with
the remainder made up primarily of industrial (16%), government
(11%), and commercial (6%) uses.


HIGHLAND LOAN: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
the class A-II-A, A-II-B, B, C-1, and C-2 notes from Highland
Loan Funding V Ltd., a cash flow corporate collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Highland Capital
Management L.P., and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P placed them on Jan. 3, 2011.  "At the same
time, we affirmed our ratings on the class A-1 and D notes and
removed the rating on class A-1 from CreditWatch with negative
implications," S&P related.

"The rating actions reflect the credit deterioration of the
underlying assets in the collateral portfolio that has occurred
since our Dec. 8, 2009, rating actions, when we downgraded the
class A-II-A, A-II-B, B, C-1, C-2, and D notes.  Since our
December 2009 rating action, the percentage of assets in the
collateral portfolio considered defaulted increased to 25.2% from
23.1%.  During the same period, the percentage of assets in the
collateral portfolio rated in the 'CCC' range increased to 19.0%
from 14.7%.  The overall portfolio decreased by 38.8%.  The class
A-1 notes were paid down by $141.5 million to 49.14% of their
original balance," S&P said.

The transaction has also experienced a decrease in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the Feb. 28, 2011
and Sept. 30, 2009 monthly reports, respectively:

    * The class A O/C ratio was 115.23%, compared with the
      reported ratio of 119.92% in September 2009;

    * The class B O/C ratio was 103.36%, compared with the
      reported ratio of 112.23% in September 2009;

    * The class C O/C ratio was 92.17%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 104.60% in September 2009; and

    * The class D O/C ratio was 89.19%, compared with the reported
      ratio of 102.56% in September 2009.

"The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
reflect our view that sufficient credit enhancement is available
to support the current ratings on these notes," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.
                 Rating
Class        To         From
A-1          AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-II-A       BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
A-II-B       BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
B            CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C-1          CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-2          CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

RATING Affirmed

Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.

Class        Rating
D            CC (sf)


IBIS RE: S&P Places Two Classes Notes 'BB' Ratings Under Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has placed its ratings
on 16 natural peril catastrophe bonds on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

This rating action follows Risk Management Solutions Inc.'s (RMS)
release of its RiskLink V11 U.S. Hurricane model on Feb. 28.
Although modeling companies update their models periodically, such
updates do not typically spark rating changes.  However, recent
conversations with and information from RMS indicates that if the
company re-modeled existing transactions with RiskLink V11, the
results could be materially different from what the existing
models had yielded.  Some of the changes in the model are higher
inland wind speeds, increases to building vulnerability, updates
to secondary modifiers (such as roof type and construction), and
increases in storm surge modeled losses.  Some of the effects of
these model changes are that:

    * Loss estimates are expected to increase for all return
      periods.

    * Losses on commercial exposures are increasing more than on
      residential.

    * Losses in Florida show smaller increases than in other
      regions, losses in Texas increase the most, and losses in
      other states increase in varying degrees.

"The criteria we use to rate the issues -- 'Methodology And
Assumptions For Rating Natural Catastrophe Bonds,' May 12, 2009 --
states that if a model update significantly changes results, we
will review those deals that used older versions of the model and
take the appropriate ratings actions.  However, this does not mean
we are taking ratings actions on each natural peril catastrophe
bond that used an earlier version of RiskLink.  Rather, this
rating action is limited to issues that cover U.S. hurricane.  We
have requested (via the transaction administrator for each issue)
that RMS, using RiskLink V11, supply us with the information we
deem necessary to perform surveillance on the affected bonds.  We
will review each issue and publish our results, whether or
not they result in any further rating actions," S&P stated.

"We expect any rating actions to be between one and three notches,
though it is possible for changes to be greater or for there to be
no change.  We should complete this process by the end of May.
Currently, we are not contemplating a similar action for issues
modeled by AIR and EQECAT because we are not aware of any changes
to their U.S hurricane models that would significantly change the
output," S&P related.

Montana Re's 2010-E Class E notes are already on CreditWatch
negative because of the March 11, 2011, Japan earthquake.  If that
event turns out not to be an activation event, the rating on these
notes will still be subject to a ratings action because of the
model update.

Ratings List

Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative
                                 To                   From
Ibis Re Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)
Series 2009-1 Class B notes     BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
Series 2010-1 Class A notes     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)
Series 2010-1 Class B notes     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Lodestone Re Ltd.
Series 2010-1 Class A notes     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
Series 2010-1 Class B notes     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)
Series 2010-2 Class A-1 notes   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
Series 2010-2 Class A-2 notes   BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Montana Re Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes     BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
Series 2009-1 Class B notes     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
Series 2010-1 Class C notes     B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

Foundation Re III Ltd.
Series 2010-1 Class A notes     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Longpoint Re II Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
Series 2009-1 Class B notes     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)

Calabash Re III Ltd.
Series 2009-1 Class A notes     BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)
Series 2009-1 Class B notes     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)


INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Junks Rating of Class A-1
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
classes issued by IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-R1.

   Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-R1

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the bonds not having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings when compared to the
revised loss expectation on the pools of mortgages backing the
underlying certificate.

The resecuritization bonds are backed by the class 2-A-2-1 issued
by IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR25.  The underlying
certificate is backed primarily by first-lien, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.

The Classes A-1 and A-2 receive principal payments on a pro-rata
basis prior to the Class A3.  Losses on the underlying certificate
are allocated to resecuritization classes on a pro-rata basis
however the Class A-2 will absorb losses that would otherwise be
allocated to the Class A-1.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
      underlying certificate and the updated rating on the
      underlying certificate.  Moody's current loss expectation on
      the pool backing IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR25
      is 26% expressed as a percentage of outstanding deal
      balance.  The current rating on the 2-A-2-1 bond is Caa2.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificate, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumption on the underlying pools
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificate) and then
arrived at updated rating on the underlying certificate.  The
rating on the underlying certificate is based on expected
recoveries on the bonds under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves.  The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to
small increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is
taken into consideration when assigning ratings.  For details
regarding Moody's approach to estimating losses on Alt-A pools,
please refer to the methodology publications "Alt-A RMBS Loss
Projections Update: 2010", available on Moodys.com.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds,
losses on the underlying certificates were ascribed to the
resecuritized bonds, according to the structure of the
resecuritized transaction.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss on the pools of loans backing the underlying
certificates by an additional 10% and found that the implied
ratings of the resecuritized bonds A-3 changed by one notch from
Caa3 (sf) to Ca (sf).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
neutral impact on the ratings.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243164


JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 2006 Warrants
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has revised its rating outlook
on Jefferson County, Ala., to negative from developing.  "At the
same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'B' rating on the
county's general obligation (GO) warrants outstanding.  In
addition, we affirmed our 'B-' rating on the Jefferson County
Public Building Authority's (PBA) series 2006 lease-revenue
warrants.  Revenues available for payment of debt service on the
GO warrants include ad valorem taxes, sales and use taxes, and
other revenues flowing into the county's general fund; however,
none of these legally available revenues is specifically pledged
for payment of debt service," S&P related.

"The outlook revision reflects recent events that have created
additional layers of financial stress.  We no longer see the
potential to raise the rating within the next two years," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst James Breeding.

For the lease revenue bonds, county officials have indicated that
the lease payment related to those PBA bonds outstanding were made
as scheduled.

Standard & Poor's also affirmed its 'B' rating on Birmingham-
Jefferson Civic Center Authority, Ala.'s special tax warrants
series 2002-C and 2005-A.  The warrants are payable from certain
special taxes collected by the county and forwarded to the
authority.  These include a sales and use tax, a lodging tax,
and tobacco tax.  There has not been a disruption in the payment
stream from the county to the authority; however, the same
uncertainty exists regarding the impact a bankruptcy filing could
have on the flow of revenues.

Standard & Poor's has also affirmed its 'B' rating on Jefferson
County's series 2000 limited obligation school warrants secured by
lease payments from the Jefferson County Board of Education to the
county.

For the past three years, the primary concern related to the
county's general creditworthiness was the potential for a
bankruptcy filing resulting from the significant financial stress
associated with the county's sewer system.  However, recent events
have created another layer of financial stress specifically
related to the county's general operating fund.  The recent
decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama invalidating
the county's occupational tax and business license effectively
strips the county of about 30% of its annual general fund
revenues.

The outlook is negative.  Prior to the events surrounding the
occupational tax ruling, there was the potential for the rating to
move in either direction pending a resolution related to the issue
surrounding the sewer debt.

However, the situation now appears direr, as the immediate impact
to the county's operating fund is significant and perhaps
prolonged.  "Should Jefferson County not be able to generate
revenues through new sources or sufficiently reduce expenditures
to avoid the need to file for bankruptcy or default on debt
payments, then we will likely lower the rating.  This additional
financial stress is layered onto the ongoing concerns related to
the sewer system's debt.  Now, in addition to a potential
bankruptcy filing to address the sewer system debt, there is also
the potential for a bankruptcy filing related to the county's
general operations.  Either way, should the county file a
bankruptcy petition, the result would affect all facets of county
operations as numerous revenues could be subject to a stay and
payment streams interrupted, specifically for those issues not
secured by specific 'pledged' revenues, such as the lease revenue
and GO warrants," S&P added.


KATONAH IV: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Katonah IV, Ltd.:

   -- US$32,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf), previously on November 12, 2010
      Upgraded to A3 (sf);

   -- US$14,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
      Baa2 (sf), previously on November 12, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2
      (sf);

   -- US$2,250,000 Class D--1 Floating Rate Notes Due
      2015,Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on November 12, 2010
      Upgraded to B3 (sf);

   -- US$4,500,000 Class D--2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
      to Ba2 (sf); previously on November 12, 2010 Upgraded to B3
      (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 51.5% or $62.4 million since the
rating action in November 2010.  As a result of the delevering,
the overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in November 2010.  As of the latest trustee report dated
March 11, 2011, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 187.3%, 134.7%,
120.3% and 110.2%, respectively, versus October 2010 levels of
158.7%, 124.9%, 114.5% and 106.9%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
Based on the March 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 3227compared to 3107 in October 2010, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 16.3% of the
underlying portfolio versus 16.1%% in October 2010.  The deal
experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $1.5 million
from approximately $5.7 million in October 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $134.5 million, defaulted par of $2.7 million,
a weighted average default probability of 26.7% (implying a WARF
of 4488), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.55%,
and a diversity score of 42.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Katonah IV, Ltd., issued in February 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

Moody's also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on
all rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a
summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3590)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: +1

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D1: +1

   -- Class D2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5386)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D1: -2

   -- Class D2: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012
and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the bond or loan market and/or
   collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
   impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


L2L EDUCATION: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A-2, A-3, B, and C notes issued by L2L Education Loan Trust
2006-1, an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction backed by
private student loans.  "Concurrently, we removed these
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where we
placed them on July 27, 2010," S&P stated.

"The affirmations reflect our view of the collateral's performance
trends, the current available remaining credit enhancement, the
current collateral characteristics, and our revised expected base-
case cumulative lifetime gross defaults and net losses for the
trust," S&P noted.

                    Collateral and Credit Risks

The loans backing the transaction are not guaranteed or reinsured
by the federal government.  These private credit student loans
were originated under EduCap Inc.'s "Loan to Learn" student loan
program underwriting guidelines.

At issuance, the pool characteristics were:

    * 87.5% of the loans were cosigned.

    * The weighted average FICO score for the entire pool was 739.

    * 13.5% of the loans were made to borrowers or coborrowers
      with FICO scores of less than 680 but with minimum FICO
      scores of 640.

    * 37.7% of the loans were made to borrowers or coborrowers
      with FICO scores that were greater than 760.

    * None of the loans were originated through the school channel
      (the schools' financial aid office was not involved in the
      loan origination process).

    * 99.7% of the loans were in repayment status while the
      remaining 0.3% was in forbearance.

S&P has typically observed that loans with comparable loan and
obligor characteristics may perform:

    * Cosigned loans are more likely to perform better than
      noncosigned loans.

    * Obligors with higher FICO scores are likely to perform
      better than obligors with lower FICO scores.

    * Obligors with demonstrated payment behaviors are less likely
      to exhibit early payment default post securitization than
      obligors whose loans have not entered repayment.

    * Loans that are originated through a school channel are less
      likely to be the result of fraudulent applications than
      loans that are directly originated to consumers.

    * Loans that receive predefault special servicing (servicing
      efforts aimed at educating the borrower and co-borrower of
      their repayment obligations and contacting them early in the
      repayment cycle) are more likely to perform better than
      loans that do not receive predefault special servicing.

                          Pool Performance

"As part of our analytical review and in accordance with our
student loan criteria, we compare a transaction's remaining credit
enhancement with our projection of remaining net losses by
reviewing a trust's collateral performance and the current pool
collateral characteristics, including but not limited to, gross
cumulative defaults and levels of forbearance, deferments,
and delinquencies.  Based on our analysis, we believe the current
remaining credit enhancement for series 2006-1 is commensurate
with the current ratings," said S&P.

S&P continued, "We also believe the trust will benefit from
increasing recoveries from loans that were charged off but
subsequently became current and are now performing.  The trust
charges off defaulted receivables 119 days past the original due
date of the loan payment.  The issuer has indicated that some of
the defaulted loans became current after they were charged off.
The issuer believes that the trust's charge-off policy, which is
tighter than the industry standard of 179 days past due, has
caused loans to be charged off before the servicer can
successfully reach borrowers and their respective cosigners."

"Although the current cumulative gross defaults in series 2006-1
are higher than our February 2008 revised expectation, the rate of
acceleration has decreased over the last year.  Cumulative gross
defaults have increased approximately 16% over the last 12
calendar months compared with a 67% increase in 2008 and a 23%
increase in 2009," S&P noted.

Although total parity (the total asset balance including the
reserve account over the total balance of notes outstanding)
remains more than 400 basis points (bps) below the starting parity
of 99.6% at issuance (at 95.31% as of February 2011), the
stabilizing trend of defaults and increasing recoveries helped to
improve total parity by 60 bps during the last 12 months.

           Default Expectations and Net Loss Projections

"Based on our view of the current and projected performance of
this trust, we revised our base-case lifetime cumulative defaults
to between 23% and 25% (of the original pool balance from our
previous expected base case of 16%-17%.  We assume future stressed
recovery rates of approximately 25%-30%, depending on the rating
scenario, of the dollar amount of cumulative defaults, which
results in our expectation for remaining cumulative net losses of
8%-10% of the current principal balance," S&P said.

Projections
Projected lifetime cumulative defaults %(i)   23-25
Recovery assumption (%)                       25-30
Projected remaining cumulative net loss %(ii)  8-10

   (i) As a percent of the initial principal balance plus
       prefunding account.

  (ii) As a percent of current principal balance including accrued
       interest to be capitalized.

                        Payment Structure

All of the notes were offered as floating-rate notes at a spread
over one-month LIBOR.  Given the underlying student loans are
indexed to the prime rate, all notes are exposed to basis risk.
To address this risk, the trust entered into a basis risk swap
agreement with HSBC Bank USA N.A.('AA/A-1+') in which the trust
pays prime rate to HSBC and HSBC pays one-month LIBOR plus
2.74125% to the trust.  Currently, our rating on HSBC is higher
than the ratings on the series 2006-1 notes. We would review the
notes if we downgraded HSBC below the ratings on the notes," S&P
noted.

The 2006-1 transaction employs a senior-subordinate structure
whereby the class A, B, and C notes each benefit from the
subordination provided by its lower-rated classes and
overcollateralization, if any.  The initial overcollateralization
was 0% and is required under the transaction documents to build to
a target of the greater of 2.00% of the current loan balance and
1.00% of the initial (plus prefunded) loan balance if cumulative
realized losses on the trust's student loans exceed certain
thresholds.  The trust also benefits from a fully funded non-
amortizing 0.60% reserve account.

The transaction has a five-year lockout period during which time
principal is paid sequentially to the class A, B, and C notes.
After the five-year lockout (the step-down date in December 2011),
the principal payments will switch to pro rata as long as
cumulative realized losses on the underlying student loans do not
exceed certain specified limits and the total priority principal
distribution amount is equal to or less than zero (i.e., the sum
of all the classes of notes is equal to or less than the loan
balance plus prefunding amount).  The principal payment priority
will switch back to sequential whenever the cumulative realized
losses exceed such limits or the total priority principal
distribution amount is greater than zero.

Cumulative Realized Loss Test
Period                                         % of initial
                                               pool balance
Closing through May 2009 distribution date          10
June 2009 dist. date through Nov 2011 dist. date    15
Dec 2011 through Nov. 2014 distribution date        18
Dec 2014 distribution date and thereafter           20

In addition, the transaction pays principal sequentially within
the subclasses of the class A notes, provided that if the class A
notes become undercollateralized (i.e., class A parity falls below
100%), the class A notes outstanding would be paid pro rata (based
on their outstanding balances) until their principal balances have
been reduced to zero or the class A notes become collateralized
again.

Each class of notes has a required credit enhancement target.
When class A reaches its overcollateralization target (15% of the
current loan balance), the class B notes can begin to receive
principal; when class A and B reach their respective targets (3%
of the current loan balance), the class C notes can begin to
receive principal.  Once these credit enhancement targets are
reached, principal payments will be made from the remaining
available funds in reverse order to the class C, B, and A notes.

The transaction employs a subordinate interest reprioritization
structure.  Generally, if any class' parity falls below 100%, then
the transaction will make the necessary principal payments to the
most senior class to restore parity to 100% before making any
interest payments due to the next lower rated class.  The funds
that would otherwise be available to pay subordinate note interest
could be allocated to pay principal to the most senior class of
notes.  The trust has the ability to use any upcoming period
collections to pay the current period's interest and priority
principal distribution payments ("next period borrowings").

Principal payable to the notes will generally be equal to the
excess of the note balance over the total assets plus the amount
sufficient to first reach and then maintain the required
overcollateralization.  The excess spread, if any, will be used to
reach overcollateralization targets for each class.

             Break-even Cash Flow Modeling Assumptions

"We ran break-even cash flows under various interest rate
scenarios and rating stress assumptions.  These cash flow runs
provided break-even percentages (break-evens) that represent the
projected maximum amount of remaining cumulative net losses a
transaction can absorb (as a percent of the pool balance as of the
cash flow cutoff date) before failing to pay full and timely
interest and ultimate principal.  These are some of the major
assumptions we modeled as the loans enter repayment:

    * Straight-line default curves that covered periods between
      four and six years;

    * Recovery rates of 25%-30% depending on the rating scenario;

    * Prepayment speeds starting at approximately 6 CPR (constant
      prepayment rate, an annualized prepayment speed stated as a
      percentage of the current loan balance) and ramping up 1%
      per year to a maximum rate of 6-10 CPR, depending on the
      rating scenario.  S&P held the applicable maximum rate
      constant for the remaining life of the deal; and

    * S&P assumed that next period drawings would be drawn anytime
      that available funds cannot pay items 1 through 9 in the
      waterfall.

        Break-even Cash Flow Modeling Results and Rating Actions

"Based on our cash flow runs, which consider the collateral pool
balance as of the Feb. 28, 2011, cutoff date, the class A through
class C notes are projected to be able to absorb remaining
cumulative net losses before experiencing a payment default.
Based on the break-evens, per the cash flow runs, and the
remaining expected net losses of 8%-10% (based on the current pool
balance), we affirmed our ratings on all three classes of notes to
reflect our view of the current loss coverage levels," S&P stated.

Class  Approximate    Affirmed rating
       remaining      based on current
       CNLs*          loss coverage levels
A      22.0%          AA- (sf)
B      16.0%          BBB (sf)
C      12.0%          B+ (sf)

*Based on the current pool balance.  CNL--Cumulative net losses.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of the student loan
receivables backing this transaction relative to our revised
cumulative default expectations and our assessment of the credit
enhancement available to each class," S&P added.

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

L2L Education Loan Trust 2006-1
             Rating
Class     To        From
A-2       AA- (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3       AA- (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B         BBB (sf)       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C         B+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


LOCAL INSIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ambac-Wrapped Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the Class A-2 notes of Local Insight
Media's ("LIM") 2007-1 transaction.  The downgrades are a result
of the withdrawal of the insurance financial strength rating of
the notes' financial guarantor, Ambac Assurance Corporation, on
April 7, 2011, and are in accordance with Moody's practice of
rating insured securities at the higher of the financial
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and any underlying
rating.  The new rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of
the notes in the absence of the guarantee.

The complete rating action is:

   Issuer: Local Insight Media Finance LLC, Series 2007-1

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation, Withdrawn due
   to business reasons, previously on November 23, 2010, Caa2

Ratings Rationale

The principal methodology used in these securities was cash flow
simulation analysis and the assessment of the ability of the net
cash flows to make timely interest payments on the notes and
ultimate repayment of the principal by the legal maturity date.

Parameters which were incorporated in projecting ongoing cash
flows for LIM included (i) annual growth/decline of print revenue
and expenses, and (ii) the Chapter 11 status of The Berry Company
LLC, the marketing agent, and the potential adverse impact on the
transaction's cash flows.  Revenue streams were derived from
historical data and modeled using triangular distributions.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these notes can also be found on Moody's
website.


LONGHORN CDO: Moody's Upgrades The Ratings Of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced today that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Longhorn CDO III, Ltd.:

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 22, 2010 Upgraded
      to Aa3 (sf);

   -- US$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$4,500,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
      February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

   -- US$5,900,000 Class D-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
      Senior Secured Participating Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
      previously on February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from delevering of the Class A-1 notes, which
have been paid down by approximately $18 million since the
rating action in July 2010.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved.
Based on trustee report dated March 1, 2011 the Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 187.98%, 143.84%, 116.49%, 104.96%, and 99.49%,
respectively, versus June 2010 levels of 154.10%, 128.24%,
109.81%, 101.39%, and 97.25%, respectively.  The Class E
overcollateralization test and the Class E interest coverage
test are failing, and the Class E notes have a deferred interest
balance of about $1.0 million.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has improved since the last rating action. As of the
trustee report dated March 1, 2011, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 2504 compared to 2929 in the June 2010 report,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.80% of
the underlying portfolio versus 14.90% in June 2010. Additionally,
defaulted securities total about $1.4 million of the underlying
portfolio compared to $2.6 million in June 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $110 million, defaulted par of
$1.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.1%
(implying a WARF of 3519), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.3%, and a diversity score of 38.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Longhorn CDO III, Ltd., issued in March 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a
summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2815)

   -- Class A1: 0

   -- Class A2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D1: +3

   -- Class D2: +3

   -- Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4222)

   -- Class A1: 0

   -- Class A2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D1: -2

   -- Class D2: -2

   -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
      proceeds will continue and at what pace.  Delevering may
      accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
      and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
      significant impact on the notes' ratings.

   2. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.


MADISON PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Madison Park Funding VII Ltd./Madison Park Funding VII
LLC's $370.0 million notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 19,
2011.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

    * The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

    * The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

    * The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
       bankruptcy remote.

    * The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

    * The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

    * "Our projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which we
      assessed using our cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.30%-12.35%," S&P related.

    * The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

    * The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees; subordinated
      hedge and synthetic security termination payments; portfolio
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments, to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period and to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding, sequentially, after
      the reinvestment period.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Madison Park Funding VII Ltd./Madison Park Funding VII LLC

Class                     Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A                         AAA (sf)               255.0
B                         AA (sf)                 37.5
C-1 (deferrable)          A (sf)                  26.0
C-2 (deferrable)          A (sf)                  10.0
D (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                22.0
E (deferrable)            BB (sf)                 19.5
Subordinated notes        NR                      40.0

NR -- Not rated.


MAQUINARIA ESPECIALIZADA: Fitch To Put 'BB-' Rating on Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign this rating to the proposed
issuance of notes by the Maquinaria Especializada MXO Trust
Agreement No. F/00762 a Mexican Trust created by Maquinaria
Especializada MXO, S.A. de C.V. (Geo Maquinaria) and The Bank
of New York Mellon, S.A. Institucion de Banca Multiple.

   -- US$160,000,000 notes due 2021 'BB-(exp)'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's rating addresses the likelihood of timely payment of
interest and principal by legal final maturity, expected in 2021.
The transaction will have a 10 year tenor and is fully amortizing
over the term.  The interest rate will be fixed.

The transaction's rating is directly linked to the Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of Corporacion Geo (Geo Corp.; LC IDR 'BB-'/IDR
BB-'/'A-' [mex]), as Geo Corp. is responsible for all payments
under an unconditional and irrevocable service agreement (SA) as
well as any termination fees in the event of default and/or
termination of the agreement, which, in most instances, will equal
100% of the outstanding note balance plus any other amounts owed
to the trust, less amounts held in the debt service reserve
account.  Geo Corp. may terminate the SA if there is a breach by
Geo Maquinaria with justified cause that results in Geo Corp.
receiving less than 612,000 hours of machinery availability during
a quarter that remains uncured for four consecutive quarters.  In
this case, Geo Corp. will only be obligated to pay a termination
fee equivalent to 49% of the then outstanding note balance.

Repayment for the proposed issuance of notes will be supported by
an irrevocable and unconditional quarterly servicer payment paid
by Geo Corp during a 10 year period under the terms of the SA
entered into by Geo Corp., various Geo Corp. subsidiaries and Geo
Maquinaria in exchange for the machinery utilization services for
Geo Corp. and its subsidiaries.  Upon execution of the agreement,
which will be co-terminus with the transaction, Geo Maquinaria
will transfer the SA and the rights to all collections therein,
the machinery, and insurance policies to the Issuer for inclusion
in the Trust Estate.  Per the terms of the SA, Geo Corp. or the
Issuer may terminate the agreement under certain circumstances
regarding breaches of service, prior to its expiration date.

Additional credit support is provided in the form of the sale of
Geo Corp.'s essential construction equipment to the trust, with an
appraised value of $61.9 million as of Dec. 31, 2010.  In the
event of a default, the trust may liquidate this machinery and
apply the proceeds to pay down the debt balance.  This equipment
is considered essential for Geo Corp. to conduct its day to day
operations and its inclusion in the trust provides a strong
incentive for Geo Corp. to honor its obligations under the SA.  In
addition to the equipment, there is a $20 million reserve account
that will be funded at closing that may be used to cover any note
shortfalls during the transaction.

Geo Corp. maintains an important market share position within the
very competitive and fragmented Mexican homebuilding sector.
Between 2003 and 2010 the number of homes sold by Geo Corp.
increased from 29,520 to 56,093, while revenues and operating
income registered a compounded annual growth rate of 17.1% and
16.8%, respectively.  EBITDA margins have been relatively stable
at approximately 22.5% during the same period.  Fitch expects Geo
Corp.'s EBITDA margins to range between 21% to 23% during 2011,
considering a more balanced sales strategy that is increasingly
focused on the low-income segment.

Fitch expects to rate the US$160 million notes due in 2021 'BB-'.
Final rating assignment is subject to completion of legal
documentation review and analysis.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 195 Jumbo Deal Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 195
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 12 tranches from 23 prime
jumbo deals issued by Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals consists primarily of first-lien,
adjustable rate prime jumbo residential mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.  The principal methodology
used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To project losses
on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Bank USA Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
2001-A

Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-C

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

A-X-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-D

Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-E

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-F

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-G

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-H

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-A

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-C

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2006
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-D

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-E

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-F

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-G

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-HB1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI Series 2004-A2

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-A

Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-2A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-2A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-B

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A1

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A6

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A3

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A5

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Classes of Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1 and GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc.'s series 2000-C2.

"The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
We lowered our ratings on six of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future," S&P related.  The six
classes that we downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for four or more months.  The
recurring interest shortfalls for the certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P related.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts according
to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms
call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of
the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  "We primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which
classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'
because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly
subject to change, or even reversal, once the special servicer
obtains the MAI appraisals," S&P noted.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

      GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2000-C2

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class H certificate
from GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2000-C2.
The lowered rating on this class reflects accumulated interest
shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to one
($2.5 million, 4.6% of the pooled trust balance) of the 10 loans
($34.9 million, 63.9%) that are currently with the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage, as well as special
servicing fees, and interest not advanced on two loans.  We also
lowered the rating to 'CCC (sf)' on the class G certificate due to
current interest shortfalls and reduced liquidity support
available to this class," S&P stated.

As of the March 16, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$11.9 million were in effect for five loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $7,159, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was 532,514.  Standard & Poor's considered the ASER amount,
which was based on an MAI appraisal, as well as current special
servicing fees, and interest not advanced ($26,325) on the
Eastlake Commons and Brighton Park Shopping Center assets, in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $139,292, and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class G.  Class H has had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for 10 months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1

S&P noted, "We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes M, N, P,
Q, and S, from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2008-C1.  The lowered
ratings reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from
ASER amounts related to seven ($46.9 million, 5.0% of the pooled
trust balance) of the nine loans ($202.5 million, 21.6%) that
are currently with the special servicers, Midland Loan Services
Inc. and LNR Partners (LNR), as well as special servicing fees.
We also lowered our ratings on class K to 'CCC (sf)' and class L
to 'CCC- (sf)' due to current interest shortfalls and reduced
liquidity support available to these classes."

As of the March 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$18.2 million were in effect for seven loans. The total reported
ASER amount was $90,111, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $939,549.  Standard & Poor's considered six of the seven ASER
amounts, which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $174,353 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class K.

Classes M, N, P, Q, and S have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for four months or more, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

Ratings Lowered

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C2
                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
G      CCC  (sf) B- (sf)      38.17     17,714       79,791
H      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    27.54     33,857      177,981

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2008-C1
                            Credit          Reported
          Rating       enhancement    interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
K      CCC(sf)   B (sf)      4.55       20,402     126,418
L      CCC- (sf) B (sf)      3.67       29,936     119,743
M      D (sf)    B-(sf)      3.29       12,830      51,318
N      D (sf)    B-(sf)      2.91       12,826      51,304
P      D (sf)    B-(sf)      2.53       12,830      51,318
Q      D (sf)    B- (sf)     2.28        8,553      37,664
S      D (sf)    CCC+(sf)    1.90       12,830      64,148


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  "Concurrently,
we affirmed our ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction," S&P stated.

"Our rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction
using our U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  Our analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the assets in
the pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
we calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.47x
and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 113.7%.  We further stressed
the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 0.86x and an LTV ratio of 148.9%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 80.8%
and 41.5%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
exclude one defeased loan ($2.4 million, 0.09%), 29 of the 32
specially serviced assets ($258.4 million, 10.1%), and four
loans ($10.5 million, 0.4%) we deemed to be credit-impaired.  We
separately estimated losses for the 29 specially serviced assets
and four credit-impaired loans and included them in our 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures," S&P related.

"We also considered the volume of loans with full-term and
partial term interest-only (IO) loan structures.  Approximately
41.2% or $1.1 billion of the pool consists of IO loan payment
structures, including two of the top 10 loans, the Natick Mall
Rosslyn Heights loans, while 30.5% or $782.0 million of the pool
consists of partial IO loan payment structures.  The Natick Mall
($225.0 million, 8.8%), the second-largest loan in the pool, is a
five-year IO loan that matures on Oct. 7, 2011.  The Rosslyn
Heights loan ($64.2 million, 2.5%), the sixth-largest loan in the
pool, is a five-year IO loan that matures on Nov. 5, 2011.  We
discuss the loans below in further detail under our analysis of
the top 10 loans," S&P noted.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the six principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support levels
that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  We affirmed our
ratings on the class X-1, X-2, and X-W IO certificates based on
our current criteria," S&P continued.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the March 15, 2011, trustee remittance report, 32
assets ($323.9 million, 12.6%) in the pool were with the
special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III).  The
payment status of the specially serviced assets, as reported
in the trustee remittance report, is as follows: six are
real estate owned (REO) ($124.8 million, 4.9%), seven are in
foreclosure ($64.3 million, 2.5%), eight are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($37.0 million, 1.4%), one is 60 days delinquent
($612,022, 0.02%), one is 30 days delinquent ($9.7 million, ,
0.38%), five are less than 30 days late ($25.8 million, 1.0%),
one is a matured balloon loan ($3.4 million, 0.13%), and three
are current ($58.3 million, 2.3%).  Eighteen of the specially
serviced assets ($210.8 million, 8.2%) have appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling $86.2 million.

The Westin O'Hare asset ($101.0 million, 3.9%) is the fourth
largest exposure and is secured by a 525-room lodging property in
Rosemont, Ill.  The asset, which is REO, was transferred to C-III
on June 19, 2009, due to imminent default and has a $32.3 million
ARA in effect.  There was no recent financial information
available.  An updated appraisal received in September 2010 valued
the property significantly below the trust balance.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Harbour Centre loan ($51.2 million, 1.9%) is the ninth-largest
exposure and is secured by a 217,056-sq.-ft. office property in
Aventura, Fla.  The payment status of the loan is current and was
transferred to the special servicer on April 28, 2009, due to
imminent default.  No recent financial information was available.
A loan modification was approved, and this loan is in the process
of being transferred back to the master servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), as a corrected mortgage loan.

The Columbus Park Apartments loan ($23.6 million, 0.92%) is the
third-largest loan with the special servicer and is secured by a
622-unit multifamily property in Bedford Heights, Ohio.  The asset
was transferred to the special servicer on March 11, 2010, due to
payment default.  Berkadia reported a DSC of 1.17x as of Sept. 30,
2009.  An updated appraisal received in November 2010 valued the
property significantly below the trust balance.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Chatham II loan ($13.6 million, 0.53%) is the fourth-largest
loan with the special servicer and is secured by a 240-unit
multifamily property in Chicago, Ill.  The asset was transferred
to the special servicer in May 2007.  No recent financial
information was available.  An updated appraisal received in
December 2010 valued the property significantly below the trust
balance.  "We expect a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan," S&P disclosed.

The 28 remaining specially serviced assets ($134.6, 5.2%) have
individual balances below $10.0 million.  Five are REO, five are
in foreclosure, eight are 90-plus-days delinquent, one is 60 days
delinquent, one is 30 days delinquent, five are less than 30 days
late, one is a matured balloon loan, and two are current.  "We
estimated losses for 29 of the 32 specially serviced assets, to
arrive at a weighted-average loss severity of 50.6%," S&P noted.

"In addition to the specially serviced assets, we determined four
($10.5 million, 0.4%) loans to be credit-impaired.  The loans have
individual balances that represent less than 0.1% of the pool
balance and are secured by two retail properties, a lodging
property, and a multifamily property.  The loans all appear on
Berkadia's watchlist for delinquency and/or financial hardship
experienced by the borrowers.  We consider these loans to be at
increased risk of default and loss," S&P related.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the March 15, 2011 trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool balance was $2.57 billion, which is 6.0% lower
than the balance at issuance.  The pool includes 250 loans and
six REO assets, down from 269 loans at issuance.  The master
servicers, Berkadia and Prudential Asset Resources (Prudential),
provided financial information for 89.9% of the nondefeased
loans in the pool, 58.4% of which was full-year 2010 and 2009
data.  Berkadia is the master servicer for 237 loans, while
Prudential is the master servicer for the remaining 19 loans.

"We calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.53x for the loans
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  Our
adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.47x and 113.7%.  Our adjusted
DSC and LTV figures excluded one defeased loan ($2.4 million,
0.1%) and 29 specially serviced assets ($258.4 million, 10.1%).
The transaction has experienced $66.4 million in principal
losses to date.  Eighty-seven loans ($420.7 million, 16.4%) in
the pool are on the master servicers' watchlists. Sixty-two loans
($369.6 million, 14.4%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, 36 of which
($168.6 million, 6.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x,"
S&P noted.

               Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $1.06 billion (41.3%).  "Using servicer-reported
numbers, we calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.80x for the
top 10 real estate exposures.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV ratio
for the top 10 real estate exposures are 1.63x and 107.2%.  The
fourth- and ninth-largest exposures are with the special servicer
($152.2 million, 5.9%) and are discussed in detail in the Credit
Considerations section. Two ($289.2 million, 11.3%) of the top 10
loans mature in 2011 and are discussed in detail," S&P said.

The Natick Mall loan, the second-largest loan in the pool, has a
trust balance of $225.0 million (8.8%) and a whole-loan balance
of $350.0 million.  The $350.0 million whole-loan balance consists
of a $225.0 million senior pooled component and a $75.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component held outside of the trust.  This
loan matures on Oct. 7, 2011, and is secured by a 613,603-sq.-ft.
regional mall located in Natick, Mass., that was built in 1966
and renovated in 1994.  Berkadia reported a DSC of 2.24x for year-
end 2009 and overall occupancy of 98.3% as per the Sept. 30, 2010
rent roll.

The Rosslyn Heights loan ($64.2 million, 2.5%), the sixth-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 366-unit multifamily property
in Rosslyn, Va.  The loan matures in November 2011.  Berkadia
reported a 1.60x DSC for year-end 2010 and a 94.5% occupancy per
the Sept. 30, 2010 rent roll.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
A-M        BBB (sf)     A (sf)                       18.69
A-MFX      BBB (sf)     A (sf)                       18.69
A-J        B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)                      9.25
B          B (sf)       BB (sf)                       8.58
C          CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                       6.86
D          CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)                      5.79

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A     AAA (sf)                             29.34
A-4      AAA (sf)                             29.34
A-AB     AAA (sf)                             29.34
A-3      AAA (sf)                             29.34
A-NM     AAA (sf)                             29.34
A-2      AAA (sf)                             29.34
X-1      AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-2      AAA (sf)                               N/A
X-W      AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A Not applicable.


NEWCASTLE CDO: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on all of
the notes from Newcastle CDO V Ltd., a cash flow collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) collateral, managed by Newcastle
Investment Corp.  "We removed the ratings on the class II-FL, III-
FL, IV-FX, IV-FL, and V notes from CreditWatch with negative
implications," S&P said.

"We last lowered the ratings in August 2010.  Due to credit
deterioration in the transaction's underlying portfolio, we placed
the ratings on classes III-FL, IV-FL, IV-FX, and V on CreditWatch
negative in January 2011; we placed the rating on class II-FL on
CreditWatch negative in March 2011," S&P related.

"According to the June 2010 trustee monthly report (which we used
for the August 2010 rating actions), all par value tests (i.e.
overcollateralization {O/C} tests) were failing and continue to
fail.  As a result, the transaction continues to divert principal
and interest proceeds to pay down the class I balance to bring the
par value tests back into compliance.  The class balance decreased
to $283.3 million (73% of the original balance) after the March
24, 2011, payment date, down from $324.72 million (84% of the
original balance) after the June 24, 2010, payment," S&P noted.

However, despite the paydown, all O/C ratios declined:

    * Class I to 109.30% as of March 17, 2011 (prior to the
      paydown on March 24), compared with 114.14% in June 17, 2010
      (prior to paydown on June 24);
    * Class II to 101.31% from 107.39%;
    * Class III to 94.52% from 101.52%; and
    * Class IV to 89.28% from 96.80%.

The decline in the O/C ratios was primarily due to higher defaults
and the trustee haircuts.  The trustee reported no defaults in the
June 2010 monthly report; defaults totaled $24.34 million
according to the March 2011 monthly report.  In addition, the
report indicated that the transaction sold nearly $35 million of
prior defaults recently, many of which at prices less than the
recovery values.

When calculating the O/C ratios, the trustee haircuts the portion
of the collateral with ratings that exceed the percentages
specified in the transaction documents.  The trustee haircut 7.38%
of the collateral in March 2011, up from 4.01% in June 2010.

The credit quality of the portfolio decreased during this period.
According to the March 2011 monthly report, 24.85% of the
collateral had a rating of 'CCC+' or below, compared with 15.59%
in June 2010.

Standard & Poor's notes that the class II note deferred its
interest in the March 24 payment date.  The other junior classes
have already been deferring their interest.

These factors decreased the credit support to all the rated
tranches at their prior rating levels, which resulted in an
downgrade.  Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in
its view, the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain
consistent with the credit enhancement available to support them
and take rating actions as we deem necessary.

Ratings Actions

Newcastle CDO V Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
I                 BBB-(sf)    A+ (sf)
II-FL             B+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
III-FL            CCC+ (sf)   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-FL             CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-FX             CCC- (sf)   B-(sf) /Watch Neg
V                 CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades the Ratings of CLO Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1:

   -- U.S.$58,500,000 Class C Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3
      (sf); previously on September 2, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

   -- U.S.$27,000,000 Class D Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2
      (sf); previously on September 2, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

   -- U.S.$29,100,000 Class E Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Caa1
      (sf); previously on September 2, 2009 Confirmed at Caa2
      (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
largely from moderate improvement in the overcollateralization of
the notes due to delevering of the Class A-1 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 4% or $13.8 million since the last
rating action in August 2009.  Additionally, the Class E Notes are
no longer deferring interest and all previously deferred interest
has been paid in full.  Moody's also notes that the credit profile
of the underlying portfolio has been relatively stable since the
last rating action. Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 3498 compared to 3590 in August
2009.  However, the Moody's adjusted WARF has deteriorated due to
additional stresses applied on stale credit estimates.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $583 million (including Class A-2 notes
unfunded exposure of $68 million), charged-off securities of
$20.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 35.7%
(implying a WARF of 5210), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 42%, and a diversity score of 39.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
Moody's cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1, issued on June 5, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months.  In addition, Moody's applied a
1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated
between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.  This is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (4168)

   -- Class A-1: +1

   -- Class A-2: +1

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (6252 )

   -- Class A-1: -2

   -- Class A-2: -2

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -1

   -- Class E: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.

   2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
      number of securities whose default probabilities are
      assessed through credit estimates.  In the event that
      Moody's is not provided the necessary information to update
      the credit estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction
      may be impacted by any default probability stresses Moody's
      may assume in lieu of updated credit estimates.

   3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
      the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
      may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest
      into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities
      and participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's
      tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted
      average life in its analysis.

   4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
      reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
      collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
      covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
      worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
      rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
      coupon, and diversity score.  However, as part of the base
      case, Moody's considered spread and coupon levels higher
      than the covenant levels due to the large difference between
      the reported and covenant levels.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the
class D notes from Newstar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by Newstar Financial Inc.  "At the same time, we affirmed our
ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C, and E notes.  We removed our
ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from CreditWatch,
where we placed them with positive implications on Jan. 3, 2011,"
S&P related.

"In our May 2010 rating action, we lowered our rating on the class
D notes based on the application of the largest obligor test, a
supplemental stress test introduced as part of our September 2009
criteria.  Currently, the class D notes pass the largest obligor
test, which along with improved performance of the underlying
collateral, warrants an upgrade.  The charged-off loan balance
in the underlying asset portfolio was $21 million as of the
February 2011 trustee report, down from $24 million in the
November 2009 trustee report, which we used for our March 2010
analysis," S&P stated.

On each distribution date, interest proceeds are captured to
offset any charged-off loans since the prior distribution period,
and are subsequently required to pay down the notes.  In other
words, in the event that the cumulative charged-off loan balance
exceeds the cumulative amount of interest proceeds captured to
date, incremental interest proceeds will be captured and allocated
to the outstanding notes on each distribution date.  On the most
recent distribution date, the cumulative excess principal amount
exceeded the cumulative charged off amount, thereby requiring no
additional funds to be captured and allowing approximately
$5.5 million in interest proceeds to be distributed to the
certificateholders.

The transaction has been in sequential distribution mode
subsequent to a downgrade event on the outstanding notes in 2009.
As such, principal proceeds are paid out to the outstanding note
balances sequentially, with class A-1 and A-2 receiving principal
proceeds pro rata, then sequentially to the B, C, D, and E notes,
on each distribution date.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C, and
E notes reflect our view of the credit support available at the
tranches current rating levels," S&P explained

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Newstar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
               Rating
Class        To        From
D            BB- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and CreditWatch Actions

Newstar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
                  Rating
Class         To         From
A-1           AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/ Watch Pos
B             AA (sf)    AA (sf)/ Watch Pos
C             BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)/ Watch Pos
E             CCC- (sf)  CCC- (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:              NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
Collateral manager:  NewStar Financial Inc.
Underwriter:         Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Indenture Trustee:   U.S. Bank National Association
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


NORTHAMPTON GENERATING: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Senior Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating on Northampton Generating
Company, L.P.'s (Northampton) $153 million senior tax-exempt
series 1994 A resource recovery revenue bonds due 2019 (senior
bonds) at 'C'.  The debt was issued by the Pennsylvania Economic
Development Financing Authority in 1994 with the proceeds loaned
to Northampton.

The rating affirmation reflects continuing inability to meet
scheduled debt service payments on the senior bonds with cash flow
from operations.  Due to insufficient operating cash flow,
Northampton has relied on its senior debt service reserve in order
to pay its debt service in 2009 and 2010.  The reserve has not
been fully replenished and the current balance is less than five
percent of the required balance of $10.1 million.  Fitch expects
that operating cash flow will continue to be insufficient to meet
scheduled debt service and to replenish the reserve fund to
required levels.  Fitch expects that absent a restructuring or
external funding, a payment default is likely in 2011 or 2012.

Northampton's financial performance has been worse than expected
primarily due to fuel costs and operating and maintenance expenses
that have exceeded original projections, and power prices that
have not escalated to anticipated levels.  Senior debt service for
2011 is substantially reduced from prior levels, but cash flow
available for debt service is similarly reduced subsequent to a
2010 reduction in contractual energy payments under Northampton's
power purchase agreement (PPA).  The PPA further restricts
Northampton's ability to sell power in excess of its contractual
obligation at full market rates.  Debt service coverage ratios are
not expected to exceed break-even levels through scheduled
maturity of the senior bonds.  Fitch does not expect that
Northampton will be relieved from its obligations under the PPA,
or that sponsors will provide additional cash liquidity.  Any
deterioration in operating performance from expected levels may
accelerate an eventual default.

Future rating actions are likely to be influenced by:

   -- Service disruptions that would reduce PPA revenues;

   -- Increases in waste coal and alternative fuel costs;

   -- Increases in other operating and maintenance expense levels.

Northampton consists of a 112 megawatt (net) coal-fired qualifying
facility in Northampton County, PA, that supplies energy to
Metropolitan Edison Co. (Issuer Default Rating 'BBB-' by Fitch)
under a long-term PPA. Northampton is structured as a limited
partnership and is owned by indirect subsidiaries of Calypso
Energy Holdings LLC, which is owned by Cogentrix Energy, LLC
(Cogentrix) and investment companies managed by EIF Management,
LLC.


OMEGA CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class A-1U Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on class A-1U from Omega Capital Investments II PLC's Palladium
CDO II series 31, a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transaction.

"We withdrew the rating following the repurchase and subsequent
cancellation of the notes," S&P stated.


PREMIUM LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings of Notes
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced today that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following classes of notes issued by Premium Loan
Trust I, Ltd.:

   -- US$215,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Notes due
      October 25, 2014 (current outstanding balance of
      $35,467,115), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 18,
      2010 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf);

   -- US$16,000,000 Class X Deferrable Amortizing Senior
      Secured Notes due October 25, 2014 (current outstanding
      balance of $5,457,640), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
      March 18, 2010 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

   -- US$10,000,000 Class B Deferrable Senior Secured Notes due
      October 25, 2014 (current outstanding balance of
      $10,606,369), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 18,
      2010 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf);

   -- US$11,000,000 Class C Secured Notes due October 25, 2014
      (current outstanding balance of $12,070,693), Upgraded to
      Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3
      (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes,
which have been paid down by approximately 55% or $44.0 million
since the rating action in March 2010.  As a result of the
delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the rating action in March 2010.  As of the latest trustee
report dated February 28, 2011, the Class A, Class B, and Class
C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 164.74%, 126.82%,
and 100.49%, respectively, versus February 2010 levels of 120.49%,
106.50%, and 94.22%, respectively.  The Class B Notes, Class C
Notes, and Class Notes continue to defer interest, while the Class
X Notes have resumed paying interest but still carry a deferred
interest balance.  Moody's expects the Class X notes deferred
interest to be fully repaid over the next few payment periods.

Notwithstanding the positive effect of the delevering, Moody's
notes a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, observed through the average credit rating (as measured
by the weighted average rating factor).  In particular, based on
the latest trustee report dated February 2011, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 3077 compared to 2741 in the
February 2010 report.

As reported by the Trustee, on October 25, 2008 the transaction
experienced an Event of Default caused by a failure of the
Overcollateralization Ratio with respect to the Class A Notes to
be at least equal to 103%, as required under Section 5.1(d) of
the Indenture dated November 18, 2004.  This Event of Default is
continuing.  As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the
occurrence and continuance of an event of default, the Holders of
at least 66-2/3% of the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of each Class
of Notes may direct the Trustee to proceed with the sale and
liquidation of the collateral, potentially resulting in losses to
the note holders.

Today's rating actions also reflect Moody's consideration
that the risk of collateral liquidation has further receded as
a result of sustained improvement in loan market values.
According to a letter to the investors from the collateral
manager, Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC, dated October 22,
2010, the CLO collateral's mark-to-market improved to 82.03%
as of December 31, 2010, compared to 66.40% as of December 31,
2008 and 80.86% as of December 31, 2009.  Since each class of
notes must vote in order to liquidate the CLO collateral during
the occurrence and continuation of an event of default, in Moody's
opinion the increase in loan price raises the par coverage of all
the notes based on market value and lowers the likelihood that the
mezzanine and junior note holders will vote to liquidate.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $66 million, defaulted par of $7 million, a
weighted average default probability of 23.71% (implying a WARF of
4312), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 40.56%,
and a diversity score of 30.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Premium Loan Trust I, Ltd., issued in November 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009 and "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months, which currently account for
approximately 4% of the collateral balance.  In addition, Moody's
applied a 1 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago.  For each CE where the related
exposure constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's
applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the
CEs representing in aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) in lieu
of the aforementioned stresses.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in
all cases the lowest assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3450)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class X: 0

   -- Class B: +2

   -- Class C: +3

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5174)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class X: -1

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
      proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
      accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
      and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
      significant impact on the notes' ratings.

   2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
      defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
      to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
      deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
      sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
      Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
      the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
      for potential volatility in market prices.

   3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
      number of securities whose default probabilities are
      assessed through credit estimates.  In the event that
      Moody's is not provided the necessary information to update
      the credit estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction
      may be impacted by any default probability stresses Moody's
      may assume in lieu of updated credit estimates.  Moody's
      also conducted stress tests to assess the collateral pool's
      concentration risk in obligors bearing a credit estimate
      that constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.


RAMP SERIES: Moody's Takes Action On $48 Million of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches and confirmed the ratings of three tranches issued by
RAMP Series 2004-RZ4 Trust.  The collateral backing this deal
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

In addition, Moody's has corrected the rating history of the Class
M-1 tranche.  Class M-1 was originally assigned an insured rating
of Aaa, based on a guarantee by Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company (FGIC), with an underlying rating of Aa1 based on the
intrinsic credit quality without consideration of the guarantee.
Moody's is now removing the insured rating from this tranche as it
has come to our attention that this class was not guaranteed by
FGIC. The correct rating history is as follows: 4/18/2005 -- Aa1
rating assigned, 9/27/2010 -- Aa1 rating put on watch for possible
downgrade.

Certain tranches in transactions serviced by GMAC Mortgage, LLC's
(GMACM), were placed on review for possible downgrade in 2010 due
to two concerns regarding the servicer's practices.  Firstly,
GMACM used shared custodial bank accounts for multiple RMBS
transactions and secondly, GMACM had to suspend foreclosures in
25 states due to irregularities in its foreclosure processes.  As
GMACM is a subsidiary of C-rated Residential Capital, LLC (RFC),
in case of a default, losses could have been absorbed by the
trusts.

Since the tranches were placed on review, GMACM has eliminated
the use of a common bank account across RMBS deals and set up
individual accounts for each transaction.  Also, GMACM has
reviewed and revamped its foreclosure process, and has lifted
its suspension of foreclosure sales and evictions on a case by
case basis.

Today's ratings actions are based on recent pool performance and
the available credit enhancement.  Moody's is not keeping these
bond under further review due to the two issues highlighted above
as they have been resolved.

However, the state attorneys general are engaged in ongoing
discussions with several servicers regarding loan modifications
and foreclosure procedures.  The ultimate settlement of those
discussions may entail fines, loan forgiveness, cash payments to
borrowers or other features that could reduce future cash flows to
RMBS investors.  Moody's will continue to monitor the outcome and
assess future credit implications on the ratings as the situation
evolves.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe. For more
information please see www.moodys.com.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RZ4 Trust

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010
      Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF243183

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


REPACS TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes issued by REPACS Trust Series 2005 Step Up Debt Units I, II,
III, three synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) step up
transactions.

"We received the redemption notices for these transactions from
the trustee," according to S&P.

"We subsequently withdrew the ratings," S&P stated.

Ratings Withdrawn

REPACS Trust Series 2005
Step Up Debt Units I

                          Rating
Class                   To      From
Units                   NR      B+ (sf)

REPACS Trust Series 2005
Step Up Debt Units II

                           Rating
Class                    To      From
Units                    NR      CCC- (sf)

REPACS Trust Series 2005
Step Up Debt Units III

                           Rating
Class                    To      From
Step Up Debt Units       NR      CCC- (sf)


ROCKWALL CDO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B-1L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the A-
1LA, A-1LB, A-2L, A-3L, and A-4L notes from Rockwall CDO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Highland Capital Management L.P.  "At the same time, we
affirmed our ratings on the class X and B-1L notes," S&P said.

"The upgrades reflect an improvement in the performance of the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since our March 31, 2010 rating
action, when we lowered our ratings on some of the notes following
the application of our September 2009 corporate collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  As of the March 23, 2011 trustee
report, the transaction had $60.9 million in defaulted assets.
This was down from $79.9 million, as reported in the Jan. 21, 2010
trustee report, which we referenced for our March 2010 rating
actions.  Furthermore, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category were reported at $39.6 million in March 2011, compared
with $71.9 million in January 2010.  Additionally, this
transaction holds a relatively large percentage of CLO assets in
its portfolio (30.9%, as reported in March 2011).  Since the time
of the last rating action, the transaction has seen the total
notional of payable in kind CLO assets decrease to $8.2 million
from $26.2 million," S&P related.

The transaction has further benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the March 23, 2011,
monthly report:

    * The class A-4L O/C ratio was 106.6%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 104.26% in January 2010; and

    * The class B-1L O/C ratio was 95.11%, compared with a
      reported ratio of 93.86% in January 2010.

"The affirmations of our ratings on the class X and B-1L notes
reflect the availability of credit support at the current rating
levels," S&P stated.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Rockwall CDO Ltd.
               Rating
Class      To           From
A-1LA      A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
A-1LB      BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)
A-2L       BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)
A-3L       BB (sf)      B+ (sf)
A-4L       BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed:

Rockwall CDO Ltd.
Class                    Rating
X                        AAA (sf)
B-1L                     CCC- (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:             Rockwall CDO Ltd.
Coissuer:           Rockwall CDO (Delaware) Corp.
Collateral manager: Highland Capital Management L.P.
Underwriter:        The Bear Stearns Cos. LLC
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


SADDLE MOUNTAIN: Fitch Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Series 2003 COs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the 'BB' rating on the 2003 Saddle
Mountain Unified School District (USD) No. 90 (AZ) certificates of
ownership (COs) of supplement interest payments as the
certificates were not sold.


SANDELMAN FINANCE: S&P Lowers Class E Notes Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
E notes issued by Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd., a U.S. cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, to 'D (sf)' and
removed it from CreditWatch, where S&P placed it with negative
implications on April 7, 2011.  "We also withdrew our ratings on
the class A, B, C, and D notes from the same transaction," S&P
said.

The rating action follows Standard & Poor's receipt of the
April 15, 2011 trustee report showing that the class E notes were
redeemed for $50 million, which represents a loss of $12.5 million
from their principal balance.  "The class A, B, C, and D notes
were paid in full.  The subordinated notes, which we did not rate,
received a payment of $153.1 million," S&P noted.

"On April 7, 2011, we placed our rating on the class E notes on
CreditWatch with negative implications after receiving notice that
the collateral manager for the transaction, Mercer Park L.P. (an
affiliate of Sandelman Partners L.P.), directed the trustee to pay
down the class A, B, C, and D notes by exercising the special
amortization provisions in the transaction's indenture," said S&P.

The special amortization provision in the transaction's indenture
conditionally allows the collateral manager to designate all or a
portion of principal collections to pay down the notes during the
reinvestment period.

"In our view, the transaction's documents only allow the
collateral manager to exercise the special amortization provision
if the manager determines that it cannot find collateral it
believes is appropriate for reinvestment during a period of at
least 30 consecutive days," S&P added.

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class             To          From
E                 D (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class             To          From
A-1A              NR          AAA (sf)
A-1B              NR          AAA (sf)
A-2               NR          AAA( sf)
B-1               NR          AA+ (sf)
B-2               NR          AA (sf)
C                 NR          A (sf)
D                 NR          BBB (sf)


SANDELMAN FINANCE: S&P Places Class E 'BB' Rating on Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB (sf)' rating on
the class E notes issued by Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd., a U.S.
cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The other classes from
this transaction are not affected by this CreditWatch action.

The rating action follows Standard & Poor's receipt of a notice
that the collateral manager for the transaction, Mercer Park
L.P. (an affiliate of Sandelman Partners L.P.), has directed the
trustee to pay down the class A, B, C, and D notes by exercising
the special amortization provisions in the transaction's
indenture.  S&P believes that the proceeds from the special
amortization may not pay the class E notes in full.

The special amortization provision in the transaction's
indenture conditionally allows the collateral manager, during the
reinvestment period, to designate all or a portion of principal
collections to pay down the notes.  The collateral manager can
only exercise the special amortization provision if the manager
determines that it cannot find collateral it believes is
appropriate for reinvestment during a period of at least 30
consecutive days.  The reinvestment period for this transaction
ends on April 15, 2011.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its
view, the rating currently assigned to the class E notes remains
consistent with the credit enhancement available to support them
and will take rating actions as it deems necessary.  "We may take
additional rating actions after we receive the April 15, 2011
trustee report," S&P added.

Rating Action

Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Rating
Class             To                 From
E                 BB (sf) Watch Neg  BB (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Class          Rating
A-1A           AAA (sf)
A-1B           AAA (sf)
A-2            AAA( sf)
B-1            AA+ (sf)
B-2            AA (sf)
C              A (sf)
D              BBB (sf)


SASCO AMORTIZING: Moody's Downgrades $9 Million of Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
from SASCO Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-BC5.  The collateral backing
this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

In addition, Moody's has corrected the rating history of the Class
A1 tranche.  It has come to our attention that this class did not
benefit from the financial guarantee by Radian and the ratings are
based on the intrinsic credit quality without consideration of the
guarantee.  The correct rating history is as follows: 8/30/2001 --
Aaa rating assigned; 6/5/2009 -- Aaa (sf) rating downgraded to
Baa2 (sf); 4/8/2010 -- Baa2 (sf) rating put on watch for possible
downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

   Issuer: SASCO Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage
   Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-BC5

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
      Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF242956

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237255


SLC STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Subordinate Note
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior notes issued by SLC Student Loan
Trust series 2007-2 at 'AAAsf' and the subordinate student loan
note at 'BBsf'.  The Rating Outlook remains Stable for both the
senior and subordinate bonds.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement to cover the
applicable basis factor stress.

Credit enhancement consists of subordination,
overcollateralization, and the projected minimum excess spread.
Additionally, the class A notes benefit from subordination
provided by the lower priority notes.

The loans are serviced and originated by SLM Corp.  SLM Corp.
provides funds for educational loans, primarily federal guaranteed
student loans originated under the FFELP.  SLM Corp. and its
subsidiaries are not sponsored by or are agencies of the U.S.
government.  Fitch has assigned SLM Corp. a long- and short-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BBB-' and 'F3', respectively.

SLC Student Loan Trust Series 2007-2:

   -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


STONE TOWER: Moody's Upgs Rating on US$8MM Class D Notes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Stone Tower CLO II Ltd:

   -- US$12,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes, Due 2013,
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 1, 2010 Upgraded
      to Baa1 (sf);

   -- US$8,000,000 Class D Notes Floating Rate Notes, Due 2013,
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 31, 2009
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 and Class A-2
Notes, which have been paid down by approximately $28.8 million
since the rating action in October 2010.  As a result of the
delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased since
the rating action in October 2010.  As of the latest trustee
report dated March 15, 2011, the Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 150.64% and 119.59%,
respectively, versus September 2010 levels of 126.34% and 111.40%,
respectively.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in October 2010.  Based on the March 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is 2514 compared to 2882 in
September 2010, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up
approximately 5.51% of the underlying portfolio versus 8.33% in
September 2010.

While the transaction has benefited from delevering, Moody's noted
that the portfolio includes a number of investments in securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes.  Based on the
trustee report dated March 15,2011, securities that mature after
the maturity date of the notes make up approximately 30.85% of the
underlying portfolio versus 20.5% in July 2009.  These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $46.2 million, defaulted par of less than $1
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.43%
(implying a WARF of 3070), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 43.94%, and a diversity score of 16.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Stone Tower CLO II Ltd, issued in August 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009. In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.8 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2456)

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: +1

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3684)

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012
and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   1. Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
      proceeds will continue and at what pace.  Delevering may
      accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
      and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
      significant impact on the notes' ratings.

   2. Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an
      asset's terminal value upon liquidation at maturity to be
      equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value
      (depending on the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
      that of the liabilities) and the asset's current market
      value.

   3. Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
      portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions
      of a few large obligors, especially when they experience
      jump to default.  Due to the deal's low diversity score and
      lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its typical
      Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
      default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and/or
      individual scenario analysis.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Lowers Certificates Rating to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the
certificates from Structured Asset Receivables Trust Series 2004-1
(START 2004-1).  "At the same time, we removed our rating from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The transaction is
collateralized by insurance settlement payments from various
American International Group Inc. (AIG) insurers," S&P stated.

S&P noted, "The downgrade reflects our current view regarding the
potential for the transaction to make its full principal payment
by its stated maturity date."

As of the most recent trustee report, dated Jan. 21, 2011, the
START 2004-1 certificates' outstanding principal balance is
$5,146,873.45.  Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc. (LBHI) in September 2008, Lehman Bros. Special Finance
(LBSF), the original interest rate swap counterparty, withheld
the transaction's January 2009 payment.  This missed payment has
not been made up and remains outstanding, and as a result, the
transaction may not make its full principal payment by its stated
maturity date.  While Goldman Sachs Bank USA replaced LBSF as the
swap counterparty in August 2010, it remains unclear if the
certificates will receive the withheld payment prior to the stated
legal final maturity on April 21, 2011.  "We have lowered our
rating on the certificates twice previously: initially on
Sept. 22, 2008, and again on Aug. 26, 2010," S&P stated.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Action

Structured Asset Receivables Trust Series 2004-1
                    Rating
Class           To          From
Certificates    CCC (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg


TIERS BRISBANE: Moody's Withraw Rating of Series 2007-34
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawN its rating on the
following certificates issued by TIERS Brisbane Floating Rate
Credit Linked Trust, Series 2007-34, a synthetic collateralized
debt obligation transaction referencing a portfolio of corporate
loans.

Issuer: TIERS Brisbane Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust, Series
2007

   -- U.S. $75,000,000 Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
      Certificates, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 4, 2011 Confirmed
      at Caa3

The credit rating has been withdrawn because Moody's Investors
Service believes it has insufficient or otherwise inadequate
information to support the maintenance of the credit rating.

Moody's explained that the rating withdrawal is the result of the
withdrawal of the insurance financial strength rating of Ambac
Assurance Corporation on April 7, 2011.  AAC acts as Guarantor
under the Investment Agreement in the transaction.  The credit
risk from the reference portfolio on the rated tranche is
negligible compared to the credit risk from the Investment
Agreement securing the repayment of the certificates.


TRAINER WORTHAM: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-1 note from Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed
primarily by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and
other asset-backed securities (ABS) including CDOs, managed by
Trainer Wortham & Co.  "We also removed it from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where we placed it Jan.3, 2011.  At the
same time, we affirmed the ratings of the other classes," S&P
noted.

S&P related, "We previously lowered the class A-1 rating in May
2010. As of March 2011, the balance of the class A-1 note had
decreased to $56.411 million (28.93% of original balance) from
$70.228 million (36.01% of original balance) in February 2010.
The transaction continues to pay down the class A-1 note balance
because it is failing the class A/B overcollateralization (O/C)
test."

Despite the reduced note balance, the trustee reports that the
class A/B O/C ratio had declined to 49.65% in March 2011 from
61.41% in February 2010.  The lower O/C ratio was primarily due to
two reasons: (a) an increase in default levels ($39.65 million in
March 2011 compared with $31.86 million in February 2010) and (b)
the trustee's use of haircuts, or discounts to par, to calculate
the transaction's O/C.

When calculating the O/C ratios, the trustee haircuts the portion
of the collateral with ratings that exceed the percentages
specified in the transaction documents.  Though the dollar amount
of haircuts did not increase significantly during this period
(the trustee deducted $7.77 million in March 2011 compared with
$7.48 million in Feb 2010), the deduction has been magnified
because the denominator of the O/C calculation continues to
decrease as the underlying collateral amortizes.  Accordingly,
the March 2011 haircut, as a percentage of performing collateral,
increased to 13.54% from 8.91% in February 2010.

Even without the haircut, and excluding the class A-2 and B note
balances, the adjusted class A-1 O/C ratio declined to 124.81% in
March 2011 from 136.50% in February 2010 due to higher defaults.

In addition, the credit quality of the collateral supporting the
note has also deteriorated.  According to the March 2011 trustee
report, 62.48% of the transaction's collateral is rated 'CCC+' and
below (including 'CC' and defaults), up from 47.42% in February
2010.

These factors have reduced the credit support available to the
class A-1 note, resulting in downgrade.  "We affirmed the other
ratings because the notes have adequate credit support at their
current ratings," S&P related.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Action

Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-1               B (sf)      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III Ltd.
Class             Rating
A-2               CC (sf)
B                 CC (sf)
C                 CC (sf)
D                 CC (sf)
Preferred shares  CC (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Cuts Ratings of Wachovia 2007-C30 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 12 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-C30, due to increased modeled loss
expectations and Fitch loans of concern.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
and/or significant lease rollover risk indicative of a higher
probability of default.  Fitch modeled losses of 14.7% (15.2%
cumulative transaction losses which includes losses realized to
date).  As of April 2011, there are cumulative interest shortfalls
in the amount of $26.2 million currently affecting classes E
through S.

As of the April 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 1.1% to $7.81 billion from
$7.90 billion at issuance.  Fitch has identified eight of the top
15 loans (40.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes two
specially serviced loans (21.6%).  There are no defeased loans in
the pool.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Peter Cooper
Village/Stuyvesant Town (PCV/ST) loan (19.2% of the pool), which
remains in special servicing.  Collateral for the PCV/ST loan
consists of 56 multi-story buildings situated on 80 acres with a
total of 11,227 apartments.  The special servicer gained control
of the property by acquiring the mezzanine debt of the borrower.
The special servicer is working to stabilize the asset and engaged
Rose Associates as property manager.  The special servicer intends
to renovate 570 vacant units in 2011 at a cost of approximately
$48 million.  Property performance continues to be below what is
needed to service the debt; however, the securitized loan balance
per unit ($267,213) is low relative to other New York City
multifamily properties.  The most recent servicer-reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 0.66 times (x) as of June 2009
and occupancy was reported at 94% as of Feb. 28, 2011.

The second largest contributor to losses is 350 Park Avenue
(5.5%).  The interest-only loan is secured by a 538,424 square
foot (sf) office property located in New York City.  As of Jan. 1,
2011, the building's occupancy is at 91% with approximately 28% of
the total NRA rolling over in the next five years.  The September
2010 year-to-date (YTD) OSAR reflects a DSCR of 0.89x.  The loan
remains a concern due to the lack of structural cash reserves to
fund debt service shortfalls, and the likelihood that the original
plan for the borrower to re-sign leases at higher than in-place
rents as leases roll will not occur.

The third largest contributor to losses is Five Times Square
(6.9%).  The interest-only loan is secured by the leasehold
interest in a 1.1 million sf office property in New York City.
The September 2010 YTD OSAR reflects a DSCR of 1.0x with occupancy
at 100%.  The property is 96.7% leased to Ernst & Young through
2022 with two 10-year extension options.  The loan is highly
leveraged, with the A-note at $973 per sf and total debt at $1,095
per sf.

In total, there are currently 16 assets (23.6%) in special
servicing which consists of eight assets (20.1%) that are REO, one
loan (2.4%) that is current, four loans (0.6%) that are 90 days
delinquent, two loans (0.5%) that are 60 days delinquent, and one
loan (0.1%) in foreclosure.  At Fitch's last review there were 18
loans (21.6%) in special servicing.

Fitch has downgraded these classes, assigned Recovery Ratings
(RRs) and revised Loss Severity Ratings:

   -- $540.3 million class A-M to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AAA/LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $250 million class A-MFL to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AAA/LS3';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $671.8 million class A-J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS4';

   -- $49.4 million class B to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';

   -- $79 million class C to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';

   -- $69.2 million class D to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $59.3 million class E to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B/LS5';

   -- $69.2 million class F to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $98.8 million class G to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $79 million class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $88.9 million class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

   -- $79 million class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised the Loss Severity
Ratings:

   -- $88.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $908.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $195.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $126.9 million class A-PB at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1.8764 billion class A-5 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2.2885 billion class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest only classes X-P, X-C
and X-W.

Class A-1 is paid in full. Fitch does not rate classes L through
S.


WELLS FARGO: Moody's Cuts Ratings of 281 Tranches From Jumbo Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 281
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 44 tranches from 53 prime
jumbo deals issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
Trust.  The collateral backing these deals consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate prime jumbo residential
mortgages.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of prime
jumbo pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The rating methodology has been updated to account for the
deteriorating performance and outlook.  The principal methodology
used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the
cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include fifty four different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, three loss timing
curves and three prepayment curves.  For ratings implied Aa3 and
above, an additional prepayment curve is run to assess resilience
to a high prepayment scenario.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
varies from 3% to 5% on average.  The baseline rates are higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for
the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. in addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 10%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-11 Trust

Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-15 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-2 Trust

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 16, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 16, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 16, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 16, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-4 Trust

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun. 23, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun. 23, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-6 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun. 23, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-7 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-8 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-B Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-E Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-WIO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-F Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-G Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-H Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-I Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust

Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-L Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-N Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2003
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2004
Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-15, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-17, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-21, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-22, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-23, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-28, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-31, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-33, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-35, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-36, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-37, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-WIO, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-3 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-4 Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-5 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-6 Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-15, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-A Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-AA Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-B Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-BB Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-C Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-CC Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-D Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-5, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-E Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-EE Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-F Trust

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-G Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-H Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-I Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-J Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-K Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-9, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-L Trust

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-M Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-O Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-P Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-T Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-U Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-W Trust

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr. 15, 2010 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ZAIS INVESTMENT: S&P Puts 'D' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
A-1A and A-1B notes from Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII, a U.S.
cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The CreditWatch placements follow notice we received from the
trustee indicating that certain senior noteholders filed an
involuntary bankruptcy petition with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court,
District of New Jersey, on April 1, 2011.  It is our understanding
that an involuntary bankruptcy petition does not automatically
result in the commencement of a bankruptcy case.  The involuntary
bankruptcy petition is a request by the petitioning creditors
asking the court to place the debtor, in this instance the CDO,
into bankruptcy.  The court is expected to decide whether to
accept the bankruptcy case or dismiss the request.  The bankruptcy
court issued a summons requiring the CDO to file a motion or an
answer within 21 days," S&P related.

"We also received notice of a proposed prepackaged plan of
reorganization prepared on behalf of the petitioning creditors.
According to the proposed plan, the petitioning senior noteholders
seek to gain control of the right to liquidate the CDO assets
through the bankruptcy process.  Under the terms of the
transaction documents, a vote of each class of noteholders
controls liquidation," S&P noted.

The transaction experienced an event of default in March 2009, and
the senior noteholders directed acceleration in June 2009.  "We
previously downgraded the class A-2 and A-3 nondeferrable classes
of notes to 'D (sf)' after they missed interest payments.  We also
previously downgraded the class B-1A and B-1B deferrable notes to
'CC (sf)' after receiving the acceleration notice," according to
S&P.

S&P continued, "Under our criteria, we will most likely assign a
'D (sf)' rating to all of the notes in the event that the CDO is
placed into bankruptcy."

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the CDO notes remain consistent
with the credit enhancement available to support them and will
take rating actions as it deems necessary.

CreditWatch Actions

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII
                   Rating
Class      To                     From
A-1A       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)
A-1B       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)

Other Ratings Outstanding

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII

Class       Rating
A-2         D (sf)
A-3         D (sf)
B-1A        CC (sf)
B-1B        CC (sf)


* Fitch Cuts Ratings on 14 Bonds in 12 US CMBS Transactions to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 bonds in 12 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds were all
previously rated 'CCC' or 'C', which indicates that Fitch expected
a default.

Fitch's rating action is limited to just the bonds with write-
downs.  The remaining bonds in these transactions have not been
analyzed as part of this review.  Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as
part of the ongoing surveillance process and will continue to
monitor these transactions for additional defaults.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions is available on Fitch's website at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for: 'Fitch
Downgrades 14 Bonds in 12 U.S. CMBS Transactions'.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's Recovery Ratings (RRs)
assigned to the transactions.  The RR scale is based upon the
expected relative recovery characteristics of an obligation.  For
structured finance, RRs are designed to estimate recoveries on a
forward-looking basis while taking into account the time value of
money.


* S&P Downgrades Five Tranches From Five CDOs Ratings to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
tranches from five synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.  Two tranches are
backed by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and three
are backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The downgrades follow a number of write-downs in the transactions'
underlying reference portfolios that caused the tranches to incur
principal losses.

Rating Actions

ABSpoke 2005-I Ltd.
               Rating
Class       To        From
ABSpoke     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)

ABACUS 2005-5 Ltd.
               Rating
Class       To        From
A-1         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)

ABACUS 2006-NS2 Ltd.
               Rating
Class       To        From
O           D (sf)    CCC- (sf)

SCORE SPC acting for the account of MSC 2006-SRR1-BIG Segregated
Portfolio
               Rating
Class       To        From
L           D (sf)    CCC- (sf)

SPGS SPC
Series MSC 2007-SRR3
               Rating
Class       To        From
O           D (sf)    CCC- (sf)


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Classes From Two CMBS Deals to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from two
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
"We lowered our ratings on 11 of these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P
noted.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
"We lowered our ratings on 11 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the interest shortfalls to continue," S&P stated.

According to S&P, "Ten of the 11 classes that we downgraded to 'D
(sf)' have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
four or more months.  The remaining class has had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for one month."  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the certificates are primarily due to one
or more of the factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P noted.

The servicer implements ARAs and the resulting ASER amounts
according to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due, and an appraisal or other valuation is not
available within a specified timeframe.  "We primarily considered
ASER amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when
deciding which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade
to 'D (sf)' because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals," S&P stated.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

                     CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust

S&P lowered its ratings on the class E, F, G, H, J, K, L,
and M certificates from CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust due to
interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to
eight ($290.8 million, 10.5%) of the 16 ($714.2 million, 25.3%)
loans that are currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners
LLC, including the second- and fifth-largest loans in the pool,
the Valley View Center loan ($125.0 million, 4.5%) and Rock Pointe
Corporate Center loan ($65.0 million, 2.3%), respectively, as well
as special servicing fees.  "We lowered our rating on class D
because we believe the recurring interest shortfalls have reduced
liquidity support available to this class.  As of the March 17,
2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $165.0 million were
in effect for 10 loans.  The total reported ASER amount was
$822,976, excluding an ASER recovery of $4,106, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $5.4 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered seven ASER amounts, all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $934,771 and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class E. Classes F, G, H, J, K, L, and M have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding between one and nine months,
which we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on these six classes to 'D
(sf)'," S&P elaborated.

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1

"We lowered our ratings on the class D, E, F, G, H, and J
certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Series 2008-C1 due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to seven ($109.9 million, 12.6%) of the 10
($157.4 million, 18.1%) loans that are currently with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services, including the third-largest loan
in the pool, the 1100 Executive Tower loan ($89.5 million, 10.3%),
as well as special servicing fees, and other interest adjustments
relating to the modification of the 1100 Executive Tower loan.
The modification terms called for a split of the $89.5 million
loan into an A note ($62.0 million) and B note ($27.5 million)
and only requires the borrower to pay debt service on the A note.
As of the March 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$59.5 million were in effect for seven loans," S&P noted.  The
total reported ASER amount was $277,609, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $3.3 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered four ASER amounts, all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, and other
interest adjustments ($126,798) resulting from the modification of
the 1100 Executive Tower loan, in determining its rating actions.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $453,854 and
accumulated interest shortfalls have affected all of the classes
subordinate to and including class D.  Classes F, G, H, and
J have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for nine
months, which we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on these four
classes to 'D (sf)'.

Rating Actions

CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit             Reported
          Rating        enhancement        interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From         (%)        Current  Accumulated
D      B+(sf)     BB+(sf)     9.25               0            0
E      CCC-(sf)   BB(sf)      7.46          10,952       10,952
F      D (sf)     BB-(sf)     5.95         191,223      191,223
G      D(sf)      B+(sf)      4.57         173,840      559,819
H      D(sf)      B(sf)       3.33         156,456      768,621
J      D(sf)      B-(sf)      2.09         156,456    1,106,238
K      D(sf)      B-(sf)      1.54          64,817      453,718
L      D(sf)      CCC(sf)     1.13          48,617      340,318
M      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)    0.71          48,613      340,288

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit            Reported
          Rating        enhancement       interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From          (%)       Current  Accumulated
D      B-(sf)     BB(sf)       9.92         60,952       60,952
E      CCC-(sf)   B+(sf)       8.77         51,664      314,054
F      D(sf)      B(sf)        8.01         34,439      313,516
G      D(sf)      B-(sf)       6.99         45,919      418,021
H      D(sf)      CCC+(sf)     5.33         74,619      679,284
J      D(sf)      CCC-(sf)     4.56         34,439      313,516


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 16 Classes From Six CMBS Deals to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 26
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from six
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
"We lowered our ratings on 16 of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Fifteen of the 16
classes that we downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for three or more months," S&P
stated.  The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective
certificates are primarily due to one or more of these factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P related.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts according
to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms
call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of
the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  "We primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which
classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'
because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly
subject to change, or even reversal, once the special servicer
obtains the MAI appraisals," according to S&P.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt
shortfalls due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery
of previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure
to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have
been determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not limited
to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

                  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
                   Securities Corp.'s series 2001-CF2

"We lowered our ratings on the classes G, H, J, and K certificates
from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2001-CF2.  We lowered our ratings on classes J and K to 'D (sf)'
to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between
seven and ninth months, resulting from ASER amounts related to two
loans ($11.5 million, 8.3% of the pooled trust balance) of the 19
loans ($81.4 million, 58.4%) that are currently with the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), as well as
special servicing fees, and nonrecoverable determinations.  We
downgraded class G to 'BB+ (sf)' and class H to 'CCC (sf)' due to
reduced liquidity support available to these classes, and the
potential for these classes to experience shortfalls in the future
relating to the specially serviced assets.  As of the March 17,
2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $3.2 million were in
effect for two loans and the total reported ASER amount on these
two loans was $21,485.  The master servicer, also Berkadia, made a
nonrecoverability determination on two other specially serviced
assets.  This resulted in the servicer not advancing interest
totaling $78,754 according to the March 2011 trustee remittance
report.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $127,315
and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class J.  The class H certificate has had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for three months and received $105,272 of
past interest due reducing the accumulated interest shortfall to
$57,969 according to the March 2011 trustee remittance report,"
S&P stated.

            LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5

"We lowered our ratings on the classes E, F, and G
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5.
We lowered our ratings on classes J and K to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between three and
five months, resulting from ASER amounts related to eight assets
($59.8 million, 38.0% of the pooled trust balance) of the nine
assets ($69.1 million, 44.0%) that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), as well as special servicing
fees, and nonrecoverable determinations.  We downgraded class E
to 'B+ (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support available to this
class, and the potential for this class to experience shortfalls
in the future relating to the specially serviced assets.  As of
the March 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$19.3 million were in effect for seven loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $163,357.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), made a nonrecoverability determination on
three of the specially serviced assets.  This resulted in Wells
Fargo not advancing interest totaling $42,220 (per the March 2011
trustee remittance report), which Standard & Poor's believes will
continue for the foreseeable future.  The master servicer is also
recouping approximately $75,000 a month of previous advances
totaling $1.9 million related to the Bank Atlantic Building loan.
It is our understanding from the master servicer that this will
continue until there is a note sale or the advancing balance is
deemed acceptable.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $227,190 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class G," S&P elaborated.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2

S&P stated, "We lowered our ratings on the classes L, M, N, P, and
Q certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2.  We
lowered our ratings on the classes P and Q to 'D (sf)' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for four months that
we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future. We
downgraded class L to 'BB+ (sf)', class M to 'B- (sf)', and class
N to 'CCC+ (sf)', due to reduced liquidity support available to
these classes, and the potential for these classes to experience
shortfalls in the future relating to the specially serviced
assets.  The lowered ratings reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to two loans
($14.2 million, 1.7% of the pooled trust balance) of the four
loans ($18.3 million, 2.2%) that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees."  The trust had
also experienced an increase in interest shortfalls due to the Oak
Creek Apartments asset liquidating with a loss greater than 100%,
causing the servicer to recover their outstanding advances monthly
since December 2010.  "It is our understanding that all of the
outstanding advances for this loan have been collected as of the
March 2011 trustee remittance report.  As of the March 17, 2011
trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $4.1 million were in
effect for two loans and the total reported ASER amount was
$30,660.  In addition, the master servicer, Wells Fargo, recouped
$91,705 in remaining previous advances related to the Oak Creek
Apartments asset, which liquidated at a loss above 100%, according
to the March remittance report.  Based on our discussion with
Wells Fargo, this recouping is not expected to continue.  The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $126,426 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class M.
Classes L, M, N, P, and Q have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for four months due to the interest shortfalls created
by the liquidation of the above mentioned loan and will begin
paying back in sequential order from interest available to
subordinate classes," S&P continued.

          LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C4

We lowered our ratings on the class K and L certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage trust 2004-C4.  We lowered our rating on
class L to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for 13 months, resulting from ASER amounts related to
two loans ($38.2 million, 4.7% of the pooled trust balance) that
are currently with the special servicer, LNR, as well as special
servicing fees.  We downgraded class K to 'CCC- (sf)' due to
reduced liquidity support available to this class, and the
potential for this class to experience shortfalls in the future
relating to the specially serviced assets.  As of the March 17,
2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $20.1 million were
in effect for the two specially serviced loans and the total
reported ASER amount was $98,202.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $112,069, and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class L," S&P said.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3

"We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, and K certificates from
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3.  We lowered our ratings
on classes J and K to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding between five and 12 months, resulting from
ASER amounts related to six assets ($75.6 million, 4.0% of the
pooled trust balance) of the 12 loans ($119.9 million, 6.4%,
including two that were transferred subsequent to the March 2011
trustee remittance report) that are currently with the special
servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc., as well as special servicing
fees, nonrecoverable determinations, and loan modifications.  We
downgraded class H to 'CCC- (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support
available to this class, and the potential for this class to
experience shortfalls in the future relating to the specially
serviced assets.  As of the March 17, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $17.7 million were in effect for six loans,
and the total reported ASER amount was $76,840.  In addition,
the master servicer, Wells Fargo, made a nonrecoverability
determination on three specially serviced assets.  This resulted
in a Wells Fargo not advancing interest totaling $153,592
(according to the March remittance report), which Standard &
Poor's believes will continue for the foreseeable future.  The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $263,059 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class J,"
S&P stated.

           LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3

"We lowered our ratings on the classes H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, and
S certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3.  We
lowered our ratings on classes K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S to 'D (sf)'
to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting outstanding
between four and 13 months, from ASER amounts related to eight
($46.5 million, 2.9% of the pooled trust balance) of the 14 loans
($299.6 million, 18.5%) that are currently with the special
servicers, LNR, as well as special servicing fees and interest
rate modification on one loan ($124,692).  We expect these classes
to continue experiencing interest shortfalls for the foreseeable
future.  We downgraded class H to 'CCC+ (sf)' and class J to 'CCC-
(sf)' due to reduced liquidity support available to these classes,
and the potential for these classes to experience shortfalls in
the future relating to the specially serviced assets.  The class J
also has experienced accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for three months.  As of the March 17, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $23.9 million were in effect for eight loans
and the total reported ASER amount was $106,388.  The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $294,344 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class K," S&P added.

Ratings Lowered

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CF2

                             Credit           Reported
          Rating         enhancement   Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From              (%)    Current  Accumulated
G      BB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)      41.44           0           0
H      CCC (sf)  BB (sf)       29.57   (105,272)      57,969
J      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     13.76    124,216      643,664
K      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)      7.83     46,577      363,418

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                              Credit           Reported
          Rating         enhancement   Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From            (%)     Current  Accumulated
E      B+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)    34.72            0            0
F      D (sf)    B- (sf)      26.80       (5,550)      95,430
G      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    20.46       64,818      233,855

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Credit           Reported
          Rating         enhancement   Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
L      BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)    4.92     (64,284)     114,442
M      B- (sf)     BB+ (sf)     3.44      57,327      229,309
N      CCC+ (sf)   BB (sf)      2.70      28,661      114,645
P      D (sf)      B+ (sf)      2.15      21,496       85,984
Q      D (sf)      CCC (sf)     1.22      35,831      143,325

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                            Credit           Reported
          Rating         enhancement   Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From           (%)     Current  Accumulated
K      CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)     3.10           0            0
L      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)     2.67      15,267       84,960

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                             Credit           Reported
          Rating         enhancement   Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From           (%)     Current  Accumulated
H      CCC- (sf)   B (sf)        4.20            0           0
J      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     3.09       39,222     197,437
K      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)     1.98       90,140     718,272

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                              Credit          Reported
           Rating         enhancement  Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From            (%)    Current  Accumulated
H      CCC+ (sf)   B (sf)         5.60          0            0
J      CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)        4.25    (12,498)      15,060
K      D (sf)      B- (sf)        3.04     92,811      342,734
L      D (sf)      B- (sf)        2.50     37,923      264,126
M      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)      1.96     37,923      264,933
N      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)      1.42     37,927      264,965
P      D (sf)      CCC (sf)       1.02     28,441      238,977
Q      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)      0.62     28,441      363,929
S      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)      0.35     18,964      246,264


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 58 Classes From 17 Re-REMIC Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today lowered its ratings on 58
classes from 17 residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions issued in 2004-2010, which all have pro rata interest
payment structures.  "At the same time, we removed 32 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, we affirmed
our ratings on 41 classes from six of the downgraded transactions,
as well as three other transactions.  At the same time, we removed
15 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.  We also
withdrew our ratings on three interest-only classes from three of
the downgraded transactions, one of which was previously on
CreditWatch negative," S&P stated.

"On Dec. 15, 2010, we placed our ratings on 48 classes from the
20 transactions within this review on CreditWatch negative along
with ratings from a group of other RMBS re-REMIC securities.
Additionally, on April 1, 2011, we provided an update on the
CreditWatch placements and clarified our analysis of interest
payment amounts within re-REMIC transactions," S&P said.

"Our ratings on the re-REMIC classes are intended to address
the timely payment of interest and principal.  We reviewed the
interest and principal amounts due on the underlying securities,
which are then passed through to the applicable re-REMIC classes.
When performing this analysis, we applied our loss projections,
incorporating, where applicable, our recently revised loss
assumptions to the underlying collateral in order to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses.  We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories in
order to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand the
stressed losses associated with their ratings while receiving
timely payment of interest and principal consistent with our
criteria," S&P noted.

S&P continued, "We incorporated, where applicable, our recently
revised loss assumptions as outlined in "Revised Lifetime Loss
Projections For Prime, Subprime, And Alt-A U.S. RMBS Issued In
2005-2007," published March 25, 2011, when we applied our loss
projections in our review.  Such updates pertain to the 2005-2007
vintage prime, subprime, and Alternative-A (Alt-A) transactions,
some of which are associated with the re-REMICs we reviewed."

Table 1
Lifetime Loss Projections For Prime And Subprime RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
           Prime RMBS      Subprime RMBS
            Aggregate        Aggregate
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005         5.5   4.00      18.25  15.40
2006        9.25   6.60      38.25  35.00
2007       11.75   9.75      48.50  43.20

Table 2
Lifetime Loss Projections For Alternative-A RMBS
(Percent of original balance)
                               Fixed/
           Aggregate         long-reset
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005       13.75  11.25      12.75   9.60
2006       29.50  26.25      25.25  25.00
2007       36.00  31.25      31.75  26.25
           Short-reset
             hybrid          Option ARM
Vintage  Updated  Prior    Updated  Prior
2005       13.25  14.75      15.50  13.25
2006       30.00  30.50      34.75  26.75
2007       41.00  40.75      43.50  37.50

"As a result of this review, we lowered our ratings on certain
classes based on our assessment of whether there were principal
and/or interest shortfalls from the underlying securities that
would impair the re-REMIC classes at the applicable rating
stresses.  The affirmations reflect our assessment of the
likelihood that the re-REMIC classes will receive timely interest
and principal under the applicable stressed assumptions. We also
withdrew our ratings on three interest-only classes based on our
criteria regarding interest-only classes," S&P noted.

S&P further related, "We based each of the downward rating actions
within this review on our projections of principal loss amounts,
as opposed to interest shortfalls, allocated to the re-REMIC
classes under the applicable ratings stress scenarios."

In general, the underlying collateral for these transactions
consists of classes of securities backed primarily by prime,
subprime, and Alt-A mortgage loans originated between 1996 and
2007.  The performance of this collateral has generally declined
in recent years.  "As a result, we have revised our U.S. RMBS
default and loss assumptions over the past several years-and
consequently our projected losses-to reflect our view of the
continuing decline in U.S. residential mortgage loan performance,"
S&P added.

Rating Actions

Alternative Loan Trust Resecuritization 2004-31T1R
Series      2004-31T1R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12667FYA7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        12667FYB5   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Alternative Loan Trust Resecuritization 2005-12R
Series      2005-12R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        12667GAQ6   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        12667GAR4   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        12667GAS2   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-5        12667GAT0   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-6        12667GAU7   B+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Funding 2007-R1 Trust
Series      2007-R1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        05953BAA9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Funding 2010-R5 Trust
Series      2010-R5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A-3      05956DAR5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
4-A-1      05956DAX2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-4      05956DAS3   B (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-1      05956DAF1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-1      05956DAP9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
3-A-2      05956DAQ7   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Banc of America Funding 2010-R6 Trust
Series      2010-R6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      05956EAA0   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-2      05956EAB8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      05956EAG7   B (sf)               B (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-1      05956EAE2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      05956EAF9   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

BCAP LLC 2008-RR1 Trust
Series      2008-RR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        05531DAA6   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        05531DAB4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-3        05531DAC2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-4        05531DAD0   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-5        05531DAE8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-7        05531DAG3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-8        05531DAH1   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
A-9        05531DAJ7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-11       05531DAL2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-12       05531DAM0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
A-13       05531DAN8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-11
Series      2007-11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      17313RAA4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-2      17313RAB2   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
I-A-3      17313RAC0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
I-A-4      17313RAD8   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
I-A-5      17313RAE6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A-3     17313RAH9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC Series
2008-2R
Series      2008-2R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      225492AA5   CC (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
Series 2007-RS8
Series      2007-RS8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-1      25156WAD0   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-2      25156WAE8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2-A-X      25156WAF5   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      25156WAG3   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Resecuritization Trust 2006-1R
Series      2006-1R
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        406373AB6   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        406373AC4   CCC (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-R1
Series      2006-R1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        45662JAA0   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        45662JAB8   CC (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        45662JAC6   CC (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2008-R3
Series      2008-R3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A1       47232AAA6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
I-A2       47232AAB4   B (sf)               AA (sf)
I-A3       47232AAC2   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
I-A4       47232AAN8   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
I-A5       47232AAP3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
II-A1      47232AAD0   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
II-A2      47232AAE8   BB (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
III-A1     47232AAG3   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
III-A2     47232AAH1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-3
Series      2008-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         52520UAA3   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4
Series      2008-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         52524UAA9   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A2         52524UAB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-2
Series      2008-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        55292GAA3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-3
Series      2008-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        57643EAA0   CC (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        57643EAB8   CC (sf)              BB (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        57643EAC6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-4
Series      2008-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        55292FAA5   CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        55292FAB3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RALI Series 2004-QR1 Trust
Series      2004-QR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        76110HB57   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        76110HB65   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        76110HB73   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        76110HB81   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-5        76110HB99   NR                   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

RBSGC Structured Trust Pass Through Certificates, Series 2008-A
Series      2008-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         74928AAA9   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A2         74928AAB7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-R2
Series      2004-R2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        45660NW43   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2        45660NW50   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        45660NW68   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        45660NW76   BBB- (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-5        45660NW84   NR                   AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Alternative Loan Trust Resecuritization 2004-31T1R
Series      2004-31T1R
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        12667FYC3   AAA (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2007-R1 Trust
Series      2007-R1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        05953BAB7   CCC (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2010-R5 Trust
Series      2010-R5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
4-A-3      05956DAZ7   BBB (sf)
4-A-2      05956DAY0   AA (sf)
2-A-2      05956DAG9   AA (sf)
4-A-4      05956DBA1   B (sf)
2-A-4      05956DAJ3   B (sf)
2-A-3      05956DAH7   BBB (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2010-R6 Trust
Series      2010-R6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
3-A-1      05956EAL6   A (sf)
4-A-1      05956EAU6   AA (sf)
3-A-3      05956EAN2   BB (sf)
3-A-4      05956EAP7   B (sf)
4-A-3      05956EAW2   A (sf)
4-A-4      05956EAX0   BBB (sf)
4-A-2      05956EAV4   AA (sf)
3-A-2      05956EAM4   BBB (sf)

BCAP LLC 2008-RR1 Trust
Series      2008-RR1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-6        05531DAF5   CCC (sf)
A-10       05531DAK4   CCC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-11
Series      2007-11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A-5     17313RAK2   CCC (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC Series
2008-2R
Series      2008-2R
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-1      225492AE7   CCC (sf)
2-A-4      225492AL1   CCC (sf)
3-A-1      225492AN7   CCC (sf)
3-A-2      225492AQ0   CC (sf)
2-A-2      225492AG2   CC (sf)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Resecuritization Trust 2006-1R
Series      2006-1R
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        406373AA8   AAA (sf)

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2008-R3
Series      2008-R3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-A3      47232AAF5   B (sf)


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 95 Classes on 40 CDO Transactions to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 95 classes from 40 collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of
asset-backed securities (CDO of ABS) transactions, following the
nonpayment of timely interest to these classes.  The classes with
the lowered ratings have an initial issuance amount of
$16.645 billion.

Twenty-nine of the transactions are mezzanine structured finance
(SF) CDOs (backed substantially by residential mortgage-backed
securities {RMBS} initially rated 'A' or 'BBB'), six are high-
grade SF CDOs (backed substantially by RMBS initially rated 'AA'
or 'A'), four are CDO of CDOs, and one is a CDO of commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

"The rating actions reflect our criteria for ratings on CDO
transactions that have triggered an event of default (EOD) and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation," S&P related.

Rating Actions

ACA ABS 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1J                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A1S                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A2                  D (sf)              CC (sf)

Acacia Option ARM 1 CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1S                D (sf)              CC (sf)

Adams Square Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  D (sf)              CC (sf)
A2                  D (sf)              CC (sf)
A3                  D (sf)              CC (sf)
S                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Anderson Mezzanine Funding 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1b                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Bering CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1J                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1S1               D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1S2               D (sf)              CC (sf)

Camber 5 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Charles Fort CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Duke Funding XI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Sr Swap             D (sf)              CC (sf)

Duke Funding High Grade VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1LB               D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2L                D (sf)              CC (sf)

Duke Funding V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
II                  D (sf)              CC (sf)
III                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Fort Point CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2b                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3a                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3b                D (sf)              CC (sf)

Fourth Street Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)
C                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Grand Avenue CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1B                D (sf)              CC (sf)

Grand Avenue CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1B                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

GSC ABS CDO 2006-4u Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-S1VF              D (sf)              CC (sf)

HSPI Diversified CDO Fund II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
S                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Knollwood CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2J                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2S                D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Laguna Seca Funding I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Libertas Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Libertas Preferred Funding V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)
X                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Longshore CDO Funding 2007-3 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Longstreet CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)
C                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Neptune CDO V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA-1             D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1LA2              D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1LB               D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2L                D (sf)              CC (sf)
X                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Newcastle CDO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
I-A                 D (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
I-B                 D (sf)              B- (sf)/Watch Neg
II                  D (sf)              CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

North Cove CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

NovaStar ABS CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Orion 2006-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                D (sf)              CC (sf)

Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

RFC CDO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Sharps CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Sharps CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

Sorin CDO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-1LB               D (sf)              CC (sf)

South Coast Funding III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3A                D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3B                D (sf)              CC (sf)

TAHOMA CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

TAHOMA CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
I                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Tremonia CDO 2005-1 PLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

Vertical ABS CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-S1VF              D (sf)              CC (sf)

Vertical CDO 2004-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   D (sf)              CC (sf)
B                   D (sf)              CC (sf)

West Trade Funding CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)              CC (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)              CC (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

Adams Square Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
C                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
D                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
E                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)

Laguna Seca Funding I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CC (sf)             CC (sf)
B                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
C                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
D                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)

Longstreet CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)

Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
UnfunSuper          CC (sf)             CC (sf)

Sharps CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CC (sf)             CC (sf)
A-2                 CC (sf)             CC (sf)
C                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
D                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)
E                   CC (sf)             CC (sf)


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 111 Classes of 40 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 111
classes from 35 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent mortgage
loan collateral issued from 2001 through 2007.  "We removed 17 of
the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
We affirmed our ratings on 135 classes from 32 of the same
transactions and four other transactions, and removed nine of
the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative," S&P stated.

S&P noted, "Our review of these transactions incorporates our
current and projected losses, which we based on the dollar amounts
of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure,
and real estate owned (REO) pipelines, as well as our projection
of future defaults.  We also incorporated cumulative losses to
date in our analysis when assessing rating outcomes."

"We derived our loss assumptions using our criteria listed in the
'Related Criteria And Research' section.  As part of our analysis,
we considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For example,
our view of the risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools
influences our default projections, while our outlook for housing
price declines and the health of the housing market influence our
loss-severity assumptions.  Furthermore, we adjusted our loss
expectations for each deal based on upward trends in
delinquencies," S&P explained.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in our assessment of the risk characteristics,
servicing, and the ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration.  In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we
assessed whether, in our view, a class could absorb the base-case
loss assumptions we used in our analysis.  In order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', we assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding the base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 150% for an
'AAA' rating.  For example, in general, we would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 110% of our base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while we would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 120% of
our base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in our view, withstand
approximately 150% of our base-case loss assumptions under our
analysis," S&P explained.

According to S&P, "The downgrades reflect our opinion that
projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover projected losses at the previous rating
levels due to increased delinquencies".

"The affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to cover our
projected losses associated with these rating levels," S&P
related.

Subordination, overcollateralization (prior to its depletion), and
excess spread provide credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
predominantly of re-performing first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-
rate, residential mortgage loans secured by first liens
on one- to four-family residential properties.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        004421QG1   B (sf)               BBB+ (sf)
M-4        004421QH9   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
M-5        004421QJ5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

C-BASS 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        124860FC6   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
M-3        124860FD4   B- (sf)              A- (sf)
B-1        124860FE2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
B-2        124860FF9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

C-BASS 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        124860GK7   BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
M-2        124860GL5   B- (sf)              A (sf)
M-3        124860GM3   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-1        124860GN1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        124779AD1   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
M-2        124779AE9   B- (sf)              A (sf)
M-3        124779AF6   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
B-1        124779AG4   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2        124779AH2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

C-BASS 2006-RP2 Trust
Series 2006-RP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        1248M3AB9   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3        1248M3AC7   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        126673FL1   A (sf)               AA+ (sf)
M-2        126673FM9   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
M-3        126673FN7   CC (sf)              B (sf)
B-1        126673FP2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust Series 2005-SEA1
Series 2005-SEA1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        36242DL68   BB- (sf)             A (sf)
B-1        36242DL76   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
B-2        36242DL84   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)
B-3        36242DL92   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
Series 2005-RP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         36242DXP3   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
B2         36242DXQ1   B- (sf)              A (sf)
B3         36242DXR9   CC (sf)              B (sf)
B4         36242DXS7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Lake Country Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE1
Series 2006-HE1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        50820TAC3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-4        50820TAD1   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-1        50820TAE9   AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
M-2        50820TAF6   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-3        50820TAG4   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
M-8        50820TAM1   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-01
Series 2004-01
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        576436AC3   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
M-3        576436AD1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-02
Series 2005-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        576436CG2   B (sf)               BB (sf)
M-4        576436CH0   B- (sf)              B (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        59020UJ30   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-SD1
Series 2003-SD1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        61746RCF6   B+ (sf)              AA (sf)
M-2        61746RCG4   CC (sf)              B (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          61744CBG0   B- (sf)              B (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD2
Series 2004-SD2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        61744CEB8   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)
B-1        61744CEC6   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
B-2        61744CED4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        61744CGQ3   B- (sf)              BB (sf)
B-1        61744CGR1   CC (sf)              B (sf)
B-2        61744CGS9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-SEA1
Series 2007-SEA1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      61757MAA6   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A-2      61757MAB4   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
1-A-3      61757MBC1   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
2-A-1      61757MAC2   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-2      61757MAD0   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-3      61757MAE8   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-4      61757MAF5   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-5      61757MAG3   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-6      61757MAH1   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-7      61757MAJ7   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-8      61757MAK4   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
2-A-9      61757MAL2   CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1        61757MBD9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
M-3        61757MAV0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-4        61757MAW8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        76112BXR6   B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
M-4        76112BXS4   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
M-5        76112BXT2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
M-6        76112BXU9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust
Series 2005-RP3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        76112BP87   BBB+ (sf)            A (sf)

RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2005-RP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-B-1     74927UAL2   AA (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg
I-B-2      74927UAE8   BBB- (sf)            A (sf)/Watch Neg
II-B-2     74927UAM0   A (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
II-B-3     74927UAN8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R2
Series 2003-T-056
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669UBU3   CC (sf)              AA (sf)
B-1        12669UBV1   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R4
Series 2003-R4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          12669FFT5   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)
B-1        12669FFU2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Neg

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Series 2005-R1
Series 2005-R1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1A-F1      12669GWN7   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
1A-F2      12669GXD8   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
1A-S       12669GWP2   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
2A-1       12669GXE6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
2A-2       12669GXF3   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
2A-PO      12669GXG1   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
2A-IO      12669GXH9   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)

C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Notes Series 2001-CB4
Series 2001-CB4

                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IA-1       12489WDY7   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
IM-1       12489WDZ4   CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
IM-2       12489WEA8   CC (sf)              A (sf)
IB-1       12489WEB6   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL2
Series 2004-GEL2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M3         80382UAM5   BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
M4         80382UAN3   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL3
Series 2004-GEL3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M2         80382UAT0   BBB (sf)             A (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-GEL1
Series 2005-GEL1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M3         86359BX30   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       81441XAA2   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-SB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86358REA1   A (sf)               AA (sf)
B2         86358REB9   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
B3         86358REC7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2004-GEL1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M4         86359BMU2   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          86359DBW6   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
AIO        86359DBX4   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1         86359DBY2   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
B2         86359DBZ9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86359DEZ6   B+ (sf)              AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        86359DMC8   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
1-AIO      86359DMD6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
2-A        86359DME4   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
B1         86359DMF1   B (sf)               A (sf)
B3         86359DMH7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B1         86359DRV1   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B3         86359DRX7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          86359DWH6   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
AIO        86359DWJ2   BBB+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
B1         86359DWK9   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B2         86359DWL7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B3         86359DWM5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          86359DWT0   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
AIO        86359DWU7   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
B1         86359DWV5   CCC (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
B2         86359DWW3   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)/Watch Neg
B3         86359DWX1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        004421QE6   AA (sf)
M-2        004421QF3   A (sf)

C-BASS 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AF-3       124860FG7   AAA (sf)
AV         124860FA0   AAA (sf)
M-1        124860FB8   AA (sf)

C-BASS 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AF-3       124860GG6   AAA (sf)
AV-2       124860GJ0   AAA (sf)
B-2        124860GP6   CC (sf)

C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        124779AB5   AAA (sf)
B-3        124779AJ8   CCC (sf)
B-4        124779AK5   CCC (sf)

CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        126673FJ6   AAA (sf)
A-2        126673FK3   AAA (sf)

GSAMP Trust Series 2005-SEA1
Series 2005-SEA1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          36242DL35   AAA (sf)
M-A        36242DL43   AAA (sf)
M-1        36242DL50   AA (sf)

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1AF        36242DJQ7   AAA (sf)
1AS        36242DJR5   AAA (sf)
1A2        36242DJS3   AAA (sf)
1A3        36242DJT1   AAA (sf)
1A4        36242DJU8   AAA (sf)
AX         36242DJV6   AAA (sf)
2A1        36242DJW4   AAA (sf)

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
Series 2005-RP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1AF        36242DXG3   AAA (sf)
1AS        36242DXH1   AAA (sf)
1A2        36242DXJ7   AAA (sf)
1A3        36242DXK4   AAA (sf)
1A4        36242DXL2   AAA (sf)
AX         36242DXM0   AAA (sf)
2A1        36242DXN8   AAA (sf)

GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
Series 2003-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        36228FWH5   AAA (sf)
M-1        36228FWJ1   AA (sf)
M-2        36228FWK8   B (sf)
B-1        36228FWL6   CC (sf)

Lake Country Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE1
Series 2006-HE1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-4        50820TAH2   AA- (sf)
M-5        50820TAJ8   A+ (sf)
M-6        50820TAK5   A (sf)
M-7        50820TAL3   A- (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-01
Series 2004-01
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        576436AA7   AAA (sf)
A-2        576436AG4   AAA (sf)
M-1        576436AB5   AA (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-02
Series 2004-02
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          576436AK5   AAA (sf)
M-1        576436AL3   AA (sf)
M-2        576436AM1   A (sf)
M-3        576436AN9   BBB (sf)
M-4        576436AP4   BBB- (sf)
B          576436AQ2   B (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-02
Series 2005-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        576436CD9   AAA (sf)
M-1        576436CE7   AA+ (sf)
M-2        576436CF4   AA (sf)
M-5        576436CJ6   CCC (sf)
M-6        576436CL1   CCC (sf)
B          576436CK3   CCC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        59020UJ22   AAA (sf)
M-2        59020UJ48   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-SD1
Series 2003-SD1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        61746RCE9   AAA (sf)
A-2        61746RCK5   AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          61744CBD7   AAA (sf)
M-1        61744CBE5   AA (sf)
M-2        61744CBF2   A (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD2
Series 2004-SD2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        61744CDZ6   AAA (sf)
M-1        61744CEA0   AA (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        61744CGN0   AAA (sf)
M-1        61744CGP5   AA (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-SEA1
Series 2007-SEA1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        61757MAT5   CCC (sf)
M-2        61757MAU2   CCC (sf)

Quest Trust 2002-X1
Series 2002-X1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-1        748351AC7   AAA (sf)
M-2        748351AD5   CC (sf)

RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          76112BXN5   AAA (sf)
M-1        76112BXP0   AA (sf)
M-2        76112BXQ8   A (sf)

RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust
Series 2005-RP3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        76112BP79   AAA (sf)
M-2        76112BP95   CCC (sf)
M-3        76112BQ29   CC (sf)
M-4        76112BQ37   CC (sf)

RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-F        74927UAA6   AAA (sf)
I-SF       74927UAB4   AAA (sf)
I-SB       74927UAC2   AA (sf)
II-A       74927UAK4   AAA (sf)
I-B-1      74927UAD0   AA (sf)
II-B-4     74927UAP3   CCC (sf)
II-B-5     74927UAQ1   CC (sf)

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R2
Series 2003-T-056
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        12669UBW9   CC (sf)

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R4
Series 2003-R4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1A-PO      12669FFQ1   AAA (sf)
1A-IO      12669FFR9   AAA (sf)
2A-IO      12669FJB0   AAA (sf)
1A-4       12669FFP3   AAA (sf)
2A         12669FFS7   AAA (sf)

C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Notes Series 2001-CB4
Series 2001-CB4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
IIM-2      12489WEE0   A (sf)
IIB-1      12489WEF7   BBB (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL2
Series 2004-GEL2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         80382UAJ2   AAA (sf)
A2         80382UAQ6   AAA (sf)
M1         80382UAK9   AA (sf)
M2         80382UAL7   A (sf)
B          80382UAP8   CC (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL3
Series 2004-GEL3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          80382UAR4   AAA (sf)
M1         80382UAS2   AA (sf)
B          80382UAU7   CC (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-GEL1
Series 2005-GEL1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          86359BW80   AAA (sf)
M1         86359BW98   AA (sf)
M2         86359BX22   A (sf)
M4         86359BX48   CCC (sf)

Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A2       81441XAB0   BB (sf)
1-A3       81441XAC8   CCC (sf)
2-A        81441XAD6   CCC (sf)
M-1        81441XAE4   CC (sf)
M-2        81441XAF1   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-SB1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A2         86358RDU8   AAA (sf)
A4         86358RDW4   AAA (sf)
A5         86358RDX2   AAA (sf)
AIO        86358RDY0   AAA (sf)
APO        86358RDZ7   AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2004-GEL1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          86359BMQ1   AAA (sf)
M1         86359BMR9   AA (sf)
M2         86359BMS7   A (sf)
M3         86359BMT5   BBB (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B3         86359DCA3   CC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          86359DEX1   AAA (sf)
AIO        86359DEY9   AAA (sf)
B2         86359DFA0   CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B2         86359DMG9   CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        86359DRS8   AAA (sf)
1-AIO      86359DRT6   AAA (sf)
2-A        86359DRU3   AAA (sf)
B2         86359DRW9   CCC (sf)
B4         86359DRY5   CC (sf)


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 377 Classes From 267 RMBS Deals to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 377 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 267 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1997 and 2009.

Approximately 72.68% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) or subprime mortgage
loan collateral.  The 377 defaulted classes consisted of:

    * 200 classes from Alt-A transactions (53.05% of all
      defaults);

    * 84 from prime jumbo transactions (22.28%);

    * 74 from subprime transactions (19.63%);

    * Five from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit (re-REMIC) transactions;

    * Four from reperforming transactions;

    * Two from a risk-transfer transaction;

    * Two from closed ended second lien transactions;

    * Two from document deficient transactions;

    * One from an outside-the-guidelines transaction;

    * One from a RMBS first-lien high loan-to-value (LTV)
      transaction;

    * One from a seasoned loans transaction; and

    * One from an RMBS small balance commercial transaction.

"The 377 downgrades to 'D (sf)' reflect our assessment of
principal write-downs on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  Two of the downgraded classes are bond-
insured by Ambac Assurance Corp. (Ambac; not rated)," S&P stated.

All of the ratings were rated 'CC (sf)' or 'CCC (sf)' before the
downgrades.  "We will continue to monitor our ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and we will
adjust the ratings as we consider appropriate in accordance with
our criteria," S&P said.

A list of the U.S. CMBS Classes affected by April 19 rating
actions is accessible for free at:

      http://bankrupt.com/misc/April_19_RMBS_RatingList.pdf


* S&P Lowers Ratings on Eight Classes of CMBS Certificate to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from four
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
"We lowered our ratings on eight of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the interest shortfalls to continue," S&P
related.

"Seven of the eight classes that we downgraded to 'D (sf)' have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 or more
months," S&P stated.  The remaining class had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for four months.  The recurring interest
shortfalls for the certificates are primarily due to one or more
of the factors:

    * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced loans;

    * A lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
      has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

    * Special servicing fees; and

    * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
      modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered trust expenses, servicer nonrecoverable advance
declarations, and special servicing fees that are likely, in our
view, to cause recurring interest shortfalls," S&P noted.

Five of the 14 downgraded classes have experienced interest
shortfalls for four months or less and are at an increased risk of
experiencing shortfalls in the future.  "If these shortfalls
continue, we may downgrade these classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

The master servicer implements ARAs and the resulting ASER amounts
according to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  "We primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when
deciding which classes from the affected transactions to
downgrade.  We used this approach because ARAs based on automatic
implementation are highly subject to change, or even reversal,
once the special servicer obtains the MAI appraisals," S&P
related.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt interest
shortfalls due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery
of previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure
to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have
been determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited
to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

S&P details the 14 downgraded classes from the four CMBS
transactions.

                 Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
                  Securities Trust 2006-PWR14

"We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-PWR14 due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to nine ($11.1 million, 4.7%) of the 17 ($176.0
million, 7.4%) loans that are currently with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III), as well as a
reduction in interest available to the trust due to loan
liquidations, other interest adjustments, and special servicing
fees.  As of the March 11, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs
totaling $61.7.5 million were in effect for 14 loans.  The total
reported ASER amount was $210,299, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $2.3 million.  Standard & Poor's considered nine
ASER amounts, all of which were based on MAI appraisals, current
special servicing fees, and the impending liquidation of three of
the specially serviced loans in determining its rating actions.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $284,179
and accumulated interest shortfalls have affected all of the
classes subordinate to and including class H.  The shortfalls
affecting classes H and J have been outstanding for one and four
months, respectively.  If these accumulated shortfalls remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time, we may lower their
outstanding ratings to 'D (sf)'. Classes K, L, M, and N have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 or more
months, which we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  Consequently, we lowered our ratings on these four
classes to 'D (sf)'," S&P elaborated.

                Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
                   Securities Trust 2007-TOP26

"We lowered our ratings on the class F, G, and H certificates from
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26 due
to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to five
($109.5 million, 5.4%) of the seven ($142.6 million, 7.0%) loans
that are currently with the special servicer, C-III, as well as
other interest adjustments and special servicing fees.  As of the
March 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $50.8
million were in effect for six loans.  The total reported ASER
amount was $238,713, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2.0 million.  Standard & Poor's considered five ASER amounts, all
of which were based on MAI appraisals, current special servicing
fees, and the pending modification on one of the loans currently
giving rise to monthly ASER amounts in determining its rating
actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$266,459, and accumulated interest shortfalls have affected all of
the classes subordinate to and including class F.  The shortfalls
affecting classes F and G have been outstanding for one and two
months, respectively.  If these accumulated shortfalls remain
outstanding for a prolonged period of time, we may lower their
outstanding ratings to 'D (sf)'.  Class H has had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 months, which we expect to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future. Consequently, we
lowered our ratings on this class to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

                          COMM 2005-LP5

"We lowered our ratings on the class M, N and O certificates from
COMM 2005-LP5 due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to two ($36.3 million, 3.4%) of the five ($72.5
million, 6.7%) loans that are currently with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital), as well as other
interest not advanced due to nonrecoverability determinations,
workout fees, and special servicing fees. As of the March 10,
2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $13.7 million were
in effect for four loans.  The total reported ASER amount,
excluding an ASER recovery of $15,575, was $54,519, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $467,605.  Standard &
Poor's considered two ASER amounts, both of which were based on
MAI appraisals, and current  special servicing fees in determining
its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $99,573, and accumulated interest shortfalls have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class M.
The shortfalls affecting classes M and N have been outstanding for
two and four months, respectively.  If these accumulated
shortfalls remain outstanding for a prolonged period of time, we
may lower the outstanding ratings to 'D (sf)'.  Class O has had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for four months,
which we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on this class to 'D (sf)'."
S&P related.

    GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2003-C1

"We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on the class O and P
certificates from GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s
series 2003-C1.  The lowered ratings on these classes reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to two ($18.4 million, 2.2%) of the four assets ($30.4
million, 3.7%) that are currently with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), as well as interest
not advanced due to nonrecoverability determinations, and special
servicing fees.  As of the March 10, 2011, trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $20.6 million were in effect for three
loans.  The total reported ASER amount was $26,690 and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $226,864. In addition, the
master servicer did not advance $12,661 of interest due to
nonrecoverable advance declarations.  Standard & Poor's considered
two ASER amounts, both of which were based on MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, interest not advanced in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $55,330, and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class N-1.  The shortfalls affecting classes N-1 and N-2 have been
outstanding for four months each.  If these accumulated shortfalls
remain outstanding for a prolonged period of time, we may lower
the outstanding ratings to 'D (sf)'.  Classes O and P have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 11 months, which
we expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, we lowered our ratings on these two classes to 'D
(sf)'," S&P added.

                          Rating Actions

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-PWR14
                             Credit          Reported
          Rating        enhancement     interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From             (%)         Current
                                              Accumulated
H      CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)         2.19          68,856
                                                 68,856
J      CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)       1.80          38,343
                                                125,273
K      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)       1.54          25,559
                                                144,643
L      D (sf)      CCC (sf)        1.15          38,343
                                                406,243
M      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)       1.02          12,780
                                                166,135
N      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)       0.76          25,559
                                                332,270

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-TOP26
                                 Credit         Reported
          Rating              enhancement       interest
                                              shortfalls ($)
Class  To          From              (%)       Current
                                              Accumulated
F      CCC+ (sf)   B+ (sf)          2.93         (4,705)
                                                  2,925
G      CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)        2.02         86,560
                                                173,502
H      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        1.12         86,556
                                                260,208

COMM 2005-LP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LP5
                                Credit          Reported
              Rating         enhancement     interest shortfalls
                                                 ($)
Class  To          From              (%)       Current
                                              Accumulated
M      CCC+ (sf)   B (sf)           2.41        (3,491)
                                                 2,925
N      CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)          1.83        25,165
                                                75,963
O      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)        1.43        16,775
                                                 67,101

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1
                                  Credit          Reported
          Rating             enhancement     interest shortfalls
                                                 ($)
Class  To          From              (%)       Current
                                             Accumulated
O      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        1.42         10,946
                                                108,018
P      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)        0.78         21,896
                                                240,854

* S&P Takes Action on 247 Classes From 39 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 117
classes from 37 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions backed by subprime mortgage loans issued in 2002-
2004.  "In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 130 classes
from the downgraded transactions and two other transactions," S&P
related.

"The downgrades reflect our opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover projected
losses at the previous rating levels due to increased
delinquencies," S&P explained.

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics and the ability to
withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to maintain
a 'B' rating on a class, we assessed whether, in our view, a
class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions we used in our
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', we
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding our
remaining base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to
each rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example,
in general, we would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of our remaining base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while we would assess whether a different
class could withstand approximately 120% of our remaining base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with
an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in our view, withstand approximately
150% of our remaining base-case loss assumptions under our
analysis," S&P stated.

S&P continued, "The affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the
amount of projected credit enhancement available for these classes
is sufficient to cover projected losses associated with these
rating levels."

Subordination, overcollateralization (prior to its depletion),
and excess spread provide credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans secured
by first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

Rating Actions

Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        00253CHS9     CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        00253CHY6     BB- (sf)             A+ (sf)
M-3        00253CHZ3     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

ABFC 2002-SB1 Trust
Series 2002-SB1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        04542BAS1     CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT1 Trust
Series 2004-OPT1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        04542BFB3     A- (sf)              A (sf)
M-3        04542BFC1     B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
M-4        04542BFD9     B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
M-5        04542BFE7     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
M-6        04542BFF4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT4 Trust
Series 2004-OPT4
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        04542BHD7     A- (sf)              AA (sf)
M-2        04542BHE5     CCC (sf)             A+ (sf)
M-3        04542BHF2     CCC (sf)             A (sf)
M-4        04542BHG0     CC (sf)              BB (sf)
M-5        04542BHH8     CC (sf)              B (sf)
M-6        04542BHJ4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        000759CR9     CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)

ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3
Series 2002-3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        000759CV0     CCC (sf)             A (sf)

ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-4
Series 2002-4
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        000759DB3     B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2003-OP1
Series 2003-OP1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        004427BN9     A (sf)               A+ (sf)
M-3        004427BP4     BB- (sf)             A (sf)
M-4        004427BQ2     B- (sf)              BB (sf)
M-6        004427BS8     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-4        03072SGS8     BB+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-12
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        03072SMZ5     BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
M-4        03072SNA9     B- (sf)              B (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2004-R6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        03072SSP1     B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
M-4        03072SSQ9     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2004-R9
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        03072SUQ6     BB- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
M-4        03072SUR4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE6
Series 2003-HE6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M2         04541GGC0     BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
M3         04541GGD8     B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M4         04541GGE6     CCC (sf)             B (sf)
M5         04541GGF3     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2003-
HE7
Series 2003-HE7
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M4         04541GGV8     BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
M5         04541GGW6     B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)
M6         04541GGX4     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE6
Series 2004-HE6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        073879CV8     B- (sf)              AA- (sf)
M-3        073879CW6     CC (sf)              BB (sf)
M-4        073879CX4     CC (sf)              B- (sf)
M-5        073879CY2     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-6        073879CZ9     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE7
Series 2004-HE7
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        073879EV6     CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)
M-3        073879EW4     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
M-4        073879EX2     CC (sf)              B- (sf)
M-5        073879EY0     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-6        073879EZ7     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-B
Series 2003-B
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        152314HE3     B (sf)               BBB- (sf)

CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
MF-2       17306UBL1     A- (sf)              A (sf)
MF-3       17306UBM9     CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-4        17307GJL3     BB- (sf)             AA- (sf)
M-5        17307GJM1     B- (sf)              A+ (sf)
M-6        17307GJN9     CCC (sf)             A (sf)
M-7        17307GJP4     CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
M-8        17307GJQ2     CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M-9        17307GJR0     CC (sf)              B (sf)
M-10       17307GJS8     CC (sf)              B- (sf)
M-11       17307GJT6     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-12       17307GJU3     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CWABS Inc.
Series 2003-5
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
MF-2       126671R57     B- (sf)              A+ (sf)
MF-3       126671R65     CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
MF-4       126671R73     CC (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
MF-5       126671R81     CC (sf)              BBB (sf)
BF         126671R99     CC (sf)              BB- (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF5
Series 2004-FF5
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        32027NJW2     BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
M-3        32027NJX0     B+ (sf)              A+ (sf)
M-4        32027NJY8     B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)
M-5        32027NJZ5     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
M-6        32027NKA8     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA2
Series 2003-SEA2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-1        36228FYU4     B- (sf)              BB (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-HE1
Series 2004-HE1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        36228FR40     CC (sf)              B- (sf)
M-3        36228FR57     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-NC1
Series 2004-NC1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        36228FP67     A+ (sf)              AA (sf)
M-2        36228FP75     B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M-3        36228FP83     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
B-1        36228FP91     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-2        36228FQ25     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-OPT
Series 2004-OPT
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        36242DNV1     B+ (sf)              AA (sf)
M-3        36242DNW9     B- (sf)              A- (sf)
B-1        36242DNX7     CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
B-2        36242DNY5     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-3        36242DNZ2     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3
Series 2003-3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-1        542514EA8     B (sf)               BBB (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        57643LCK0     BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
M-4        57643LCL8     B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
M-5        57643LCM6     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
M-6        57643LCN4     CCC (sf)             B (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2
Series 2004-OPT2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        57643LEY8     AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
M-4        57643LEZ5     BBB (sf)             AA+ (sf)
M-5        57643LFA9     BB- (sf)             AA (sf)
M-6        57643LFB7     B- (sf)              AA (sf)
M-7        57643LFC5     B- (sf)              A (sf)
M-8        57643LFD3     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
M-9        57643LFE1     CC (sf)              B- (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-WMC3
Series 2004-WMC3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-1        59020UCR4     CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC1
Series 2004-NC1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-2        61744CBA3     BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC7
Series 2004-NC7
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        61744CFR2     A (sf)               AA- (sf)
M-4        61744CFS0     B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M-5        61744CFT8     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
B-1        61744CFU5     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-2        61744CFV3     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC8
Series 2004-NC8
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        61744CHR0     A (sf)               AA- (sf)
M-4        61744CHS8     BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
M-5        61744CHT6     B (sf)               A (sf)
M-6        61744CHU3     CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
B-1        61744CHV1     CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
B-2        61744CHW9     CC (sf)              BB- (sf)
B-3        61744CHX7     CC (sf)              B- (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC4
Series 2003-NC4
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        61746WF62     B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)
M-3        61746WF70     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

Park Place Securities Inc.
Series 2004-MHQ1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-3        70069FCX3     A+ (sf)              AA- (sf)
M-4        70069FCY1     B- (sf)              B (sf)

Park Place Securities Inc.
Series 2004-WWF1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
A-IO-S     70069FEB9     AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
M-4        70069FDM6     B- (sf)              BB (sf)
M-6        70069FDP9     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RASC Series 2004-KS6 Trust
Series 2004-KS6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-I-1      76110WZU3     BBB (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
M-II-1     76110WZX7     B- (sf)              BBB- (sf)
M-I-2      76110WZV1     CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-3        00253CHQ3     AAA (sf)
A-4        00253CHR1     AAA (sf)

Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        00253CHV2     AAA (sf)
A-2        00253CHW0     AAA (sf)
M-1        00253CHX8     AA+ (sf)
B          00253CJA6     CC (sf)

ABFC 2002-SB1 Trust
Series 2002-SB1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
AII-1      04542BAQ5     AAA (sf)
M-2        04542BAT9     CC (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT1 Trust
Series 2004-OPT1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        04542BFA5     AA (sf)

ABFC 2004-OPT4 Trust
Series 2004-OPT4
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        04542BHB1     AAA (sf)
A-2        04542BHC9     AAA (sf)

ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3
Series 2002-3
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A          000759CY4     AAA (sf)

ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-4
Series 2002-4
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A          000759CZ1     AAA (sf)

ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2003-OP1
Series 2003-OP1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        004427BJ8     AAA (sf)
A-2        004427BK5     AAA (sf)
A-3        004427BL3     AAA (sf)
M-1        004427BM1     AA+ (sf)
M-5        004427BR0     CCC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-2        03072SGQ2     A (sf)
M-3        03072SGR0     A- (sf)
M-5        03072SGT6     CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-12
Class      CUSIP         Rating
AV-1       03072SMT9     AAA (sf)
AF         03072SMV4     AAA (sf)
M-1        03072SMX0     AA (sf)
M-2        03072SMY8     A (sf)
M-5        03072SNB7     CCC (sf)
M-6        03072SNC5     CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2004-R6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        03072SSH9     AAA (sf)
M-1        03072SSM8     A- (sf)
M-2        03072SSN6     BBB+ (sf)
M-5        03072SSR7     CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2004-R9
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        03072SUW3     AAA (sf)
M-1        03072SUN3     AA+ (sf)
M-2        03072SUP8     AA (sf)
M-5        03072SUS2     CC (sf)
M-6        03072SUT0     CC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE6
Series 2003-HE6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A1         04541GFX5     AAA (sf)
A2         04541GFY3     AAA (sf)
A3-B       04541GGM8     AAA (sf)
M1         04541GGB2     AA (sf)
M6         04541GGG1     CC (sf)

Asset Backed Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2003-
HE7
Series 2003-HE7
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M1         04541GGS5     AA (sf)
M2         04541GGT3     A (sf)
M3         04541GGU0     A- (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE6
Series 2004-HE6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        073879CU0     AA+ (sf)

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE7
Series 2004-HE7
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        073879EU8     AA+ (sf)
M-7B       073879FB9     CC (sf)

Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-B
Series 2003-B
Class      CUSIP         Rating
AF-4       152314GZ7     AAA (sf)
AF-5       152314HA1     AAA (sf)
AF-6       152314HB9     AAA (sf)
M-1        152314HD5     AA+ (sf)
M-3        152314HF0     CC (sf)
B          152314HG8     CC (sf)

CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-3
Class      CUSIP         Rating
AF-4       17306UBH0     AAA (sf)
AF-5       17306UBJ6     AAA (sf)
MF-1       17306UBK3     AA (sf)
MV-3       17306UBS6     CCC (sf)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1A       17307GJE9     AAA (sf)
A-1B       17307GJF6     AAA (sf)
A-2        17307GJG4     AAA (sf)
M-1        17307GJH2     AAA (sf)
M-2        17307GJJ8     AA+ (sf)
M-3        17307GJK5     AA (sf)

CWABS Inc.
Series 2003-5
Class      CUSIP         Rating
AF-5       126671R24     AAA (sf)
AF-6       126671R32     AAA (sf)
MF-1       126671R40     AA+ (sf)
MV-2       126671S72     CC (sf)
MV-3       126671S80     CC (sf)
MV-4       126671S98     CC (sf)

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF5
Series 2004-FF5
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        32027NJT9     AAA (sf)
A-2        32027NJU6     AAA (sf)
A-3C       32027NKU4     AAA (sf)
M-1        32027NJV4     AA+ (sf)
M-7        32027NKB6     CC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA2
Series 2003-SEA2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        36228FYS9     AAA (sf)
M-1        36228FYT7     A (sf)
B-2        36228FYV2     CC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-HE1
Series 2004-HE1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        36228FR32     AA+ (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-NC1
Series 2004-NC1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
B-3        36228FQ33     CC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2004-OPT
Series 2004-OPT
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        36242DNQ2     AAA (sf)
A-4        36242DNT6     AAA (sf)
M-1        36242DNU3     AA+ (sf)

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3
Series 2003-3
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-2        542514EB6     CC (sf)
M-3        542514EC4     CC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT1
Series 2004-OPT1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        57643LCH7     AA (sf)
M-2        57643LCJ3     A (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2
Series 2004-OPT2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        57643LFG6     AAA (sf)
A-2        57643LEV4     AAA (sf)
M-1        57643LEW2     AA+ (sf)
M-2        57643LEX0     AA+ (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-WMC3
Series 2004-WMC3
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-2        59020UCP8     AA (sf)
M-3        59020UCQ6     A+ (sf)
B-2        59020UCS2     CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE2
Series 2004-HE2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        61744CCV6     CCC (sf)
M-2        61744CCW4     CCC (sf)
M-3        61744CCX2     CC (sf)
B-1        61744CCY0     CC (sf)
B-2        61744CCZ7     CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC1
Series 2004-NC1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        61744CAW6     AA (sf)
M-2        61744CAX4     A (sf)
M-3        61744CAY2     A- (sf)
B-1        61744CAZ9     BBB+ (sf)
B-3        61744CBB1     B+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC7
Series 2004-NC7
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        61744CFP6     AA+ (sf)
M-2        61744CFQ4     AA (sf)
B-3        61744CFW1     CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC8
Series 2004-NC8
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        61744CHP4     AA+ (sf)
M-2        61744CHQ2     AA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC4
Series 2003-NC4
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        61746WF54     AA+ (sf)
B-1        61746WF88     CC (sf)
B-2        61746WF96     CC (sf)
B-3        61746WG20     CC (sf)

Park Place Securities Inc.
Series 2004-MHQ1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-1        70069FCV7     AA+ (sf)
M-2        70069FCW5     AA (sf)
M-5        70069FCZ8     CCC (sf)
M-6        70069FDA2     CC (sf)

Park Place Securities Inc.
Series 2004-WWF1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M-2        70069FDK0     AA (sf)
M-3        70069FDL8     AA- (sf)
M-5        70069FDN4     CCC (sf)
M-7        70069FDQ7     CC (sf)
M-8        70069FDR5     CC (sf)

RASC Series 2004-KS6 Trust
Series 2004-KS6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-I-4      76110WZM1     AAA (sf)
A-I-5      76110WZN9     AAA (sf)
A-I-6      76110WZP4     AAA (sf)

Terwin Mortgage Trust Series TMTS 2003-6HE
Series 2003-6HE
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        881561CE2     AAA (sf)
A-3        881561CG7     AAA (sf)
M-1        881561CH5     AA+ (sf)
M-2        881561CJ1     BBB (sf)
M-3        881561CK8     B- (sf)
M-4        881561CL6     CC (sf)

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G.
Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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