TCR_Public/110327.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, March 27, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 85

                            Headlines

ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
AMMC CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
ARC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches
ARES VIR: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches

BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 22 CMBS Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine Certificates
CAPTEC FRANCHISE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2005-1 Certs.

CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 91 Tranches
CENTURION CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2005-C2 Certificates
CHRYSLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
CIT GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New Secured Notes

COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 88 Tranches
CS FIRST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 206 Tranches
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-CG2 Certs.
DLJ MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B-3OC Certs.
E*TRADE ABS: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B'

FAIRBANKS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
FAIRFIELD STREET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
FALCON AUTO: Fitch Gives Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
FFCA SECURED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
FIRST 2004-I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-C3 Certs.
FIRST UNION-LEHMAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 1998-C2 Certs.
FMAC LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 71 Tranches
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-C2 Notes

GS MORTGAGE: DBRS Assigns Provisional Rating of Class E at 'BB'
GSMCS 2011-GC3: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 10 2011-GC3 Certs.
GULF STREAM-COMPASS: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
HALCYON 2005-2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 118 Tranches

HIGHLAND LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
INDEPENDENCE I: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
IXIS REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 Series 2002-C3 Certs.
JP MORGAN: S&P Assigns Ratings on 2011-C3 $1.49 Bil. Certs.

JPMCC 2011-C3: Fitch Assigns Ratings on Various Certificates
KINGSLAND III: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
LORAIN COUNTY: S&P Cuts Long-Term Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B'
MARATHON CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MARQUETTE US/EUROPEAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Notes

MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-KEY1 Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 80 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Certificates
METROPOLITAN ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999-RM1 Certs.

N-45 FIRST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Tranches
NYLIM FLATIRON: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches
OWNIT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches

PACIFIC SHORES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
PARK PLACE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 42 Tranches
PEOPLE'S CHOICE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
PHOENIX CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
PHOENIX INDUSTRIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'

POPULAR ABS: Moody's Corrects Press Release on Note Ratings
REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on 6 Classes of Certs.
REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 Classes of Certs.
RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-1 Certificates
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2004-CF2 Certs.

SKY LAKES: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
SLATE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2003-1 Units to 'Ba1'
TERWIN MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-1B From 'CCC'

TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on $42 Mil. Bonds
TOPIARY CAPITAL: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
UNITED ARTISTS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 1995-A Certs. to 'B3'
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-C28 Certificates
WHITEHORSE I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

YONKERS INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Rating to Housing Bonds

* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 18 Bonds From 10 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 133 Classes From 44 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 450 Certs. From 286 RMBS Transactions

                            *********

ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 17
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 1 tranche from 13 Subprime
deals issued by ABFS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated in 2004 and prior).  The baseline rate is generally
higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are
made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2)
the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-3

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  --Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2001-4

  -- Cl. A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)


AMMC CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AMMC CLO VI, Limited:

  -- US$63,250,000 Class A-1-B Notes due 2018, upgraded to
     Aa2(sf); previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to A1(sf);

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Notes due 2018, Upgraded to
     Aa2(sf); previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Notes due 2018, Upgraded to A2(sf);
     previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1(sf);

  -- US$28,750,000 Class C Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Baa2(sf);
     previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2(sf);

  -- US$35,000,000 Class D Notes due 2018, Upgraded to B2(sf);
     previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3(sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the July 2009 rating action.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  As of the trustee report dated
February 15, 2011, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2488 (excluding Modifier) compared to 2915 (excluding Modifier) in
the June 2009 report.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $5million of the underlying portfolio compared to $24million
in 2009.  Securities rated Caa and below also declined to 7% from
15%.

The overcollateralization ratio of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action.  The Senior
Overcollateralization Ratio Test is reported at 118.24% versus
114.49%.  It is currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance of
$475million, defaulted par of $5million, a weighted average
default probability of 23% (implying a WARF of 3510, excluding
Modifier), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43%
and a diversity score of 83.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

AMMC CLO VI, Limited, issued in June 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2808)

  -- Class A1R: 0
  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: +1
  -- Class A2: +1
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +3
  -- Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4212)

  -- Class A1R: 0
  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: -2
  -- Class A2: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.


ARC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 36
tranches from 10 Subprime deals issued by ARC Mortgage Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated in
2004 and prior).  The baseline rate is generally higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once the
baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the
number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current
delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2002-BC8

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-SIO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2002-BC9

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-BC6

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-BC1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-BC2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC3

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC4

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC5

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC6

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ARES VIR: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C-1, C-2, and D notes from Ares VIR CLO Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation transaction managed by Ares Management LLC.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B,
A-1C, and A-2 notes, and S&P removed its rating on the class A-1A,
A-1C, A-2, and B notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them
with positive implications on Jan. 3, 2011.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since S&P lowered its ratings on
most of the notes on March 26, 2010, following the application of
S&P's September 2009 corporate CDO criteria.  As of the Feb. 3,
2011 trustee report, the transaction had $7.01 million of
defaulted assets and approximately $17.36 million in assets from
obligors with ratings equal to or lower than 'CCC+'.  This was
down from $15.59 million in defaults and approximately
$54.93 million in assets from obligors with ratings equal to or
lower than 'CCC+' noted in the Feb. 3, 2010, trustee report, which
S&P referenced for its March 2010 rating actions.  In addition,
since S&P's last rating action, approximately $17.57 million in
excess interest proceeds have been deposited into the principal
collection account to cover losses that the deal has experienced.

The transaction has benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes.  The
trustee reported these par value (O/C) ratio in the Feb. 3, 2011
monthly report:

* The class A/B par value ratio was 124.76%, compared with a
  reported ratio of 118.44% in February 2010.

* The affirmations on the ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C,
  and A-2 notes reflect S&P's opinion of the availability of
  sufficient credit support at the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                        Ares VIR CLO Ltd.

                          Rating
                          ------
            Class     To           From
            -----     --           ----
            A-1A      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-1C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-2       AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            B         AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            C-1       A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
            C-2       A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
            D         BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                        Ares VIR CLO Ltd.

                      Class         Rating
                      -----         ------
                      A-1B          AAA (sf)


ARGENT SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 131
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 5 tranches from 22 Subprime
deals issued by Argent Securities Inc. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W1

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2006
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2003
     Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2003
     Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W10

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2003
     Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W3

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2003
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W5

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W6

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2004
     Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W9

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-PW1

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W10

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W5


  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W8

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W9

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 17 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-2.  The downgrades are due to further
performance deterioration, which includes an increase in expected
losses on the specially serviced loans as well as other loans in
the pool.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 12.5% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 11.5%,
including losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated
57 loans (43.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 27
specially serviced loans (29.9%).  At Fitch's last review, there
were 15 specially serviced loans (4.7%).  Currently, Fitch expects
classes K through S may be fully depleted from eventual losses
associated with the specially serviced loans.

As of the March 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 9.8% to $2.86 billion from
$3.17 billion at issuance.  The pool paid down by over 8% at the
March 2011 remittance as a result of the $187.5 million One Park
Avenue loan paying off in full (less the liquidation fee) and the
Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio paying down by $68 million following
the sale and release of the Market Square property.  No loans have
defeased since issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced 575 Lexington Avenue loan (5.6%), which is secured by an
approximately 640,000 square foot office building located in
Midtown Manhattan.  The current balance of the seven year,
interest-only loan is $160.3 million.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2010 for imminent default.  Performance
has lagged the property's stabilization schedule.  Foreclosure was
filed at the end of January 2011.  However, the loan has been kept
current via funds swept from a hard lockbox.  In addition, the
loan was paid down by $2.2 million in January through the
application of reserve funds.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Palm Beach Gardens Marriott loan (1.7%), which
is secured by a 279-key full service Marriott in Palm Beach
Gardens, FL (north of West Palm Beach).  The loan has been in
special servicing since October 2009, having transferred for
imminent default.  The borrower and special servicer are nearing
completion of a discounted payoff of the loan, with substantial
losses expected.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio (11.4%), which was
originally secured by 16 properties, the pledge of the mortgage
and the borrower's ownership interest in one property (Market
Square), as well as the pledge of cash flows from three properties
(Reston Town Center, 1300 North Seventeenth Street, and Washington
Mutual Tower).  In the aggregate, the 20 properties comprised
approximately 9.8 million sf of office space.  The loan has been
in special servicing since April 2010, having transferred for
imminent default.

The loan remained current as the borrower was negotiating a
modification, which closed in December 2010.  Key modification
terms included a five-year extension of the loan to May 2017, a
deleveraging structure that provides for the release of properties
over time, and an interest rate reduction.  The largest property
by allocated loan amount, Market Square in Washington D.C.,
recently sold in March 2011 with proceeds used to pay down the
loan, build up a new reserve account, and repay prior interest
shortfalls.  In addition, a sale of the 1300 North 17th Street
property is expected to close shortly.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and revised Loss Severity
ratings and Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $153.8 million class A-J to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'BBB-sf/LS4',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $100 million class A-JFL to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'BBB-sf/LS4',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class B to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $47.6 million class C to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $31.7 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $15.9 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $27.8 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $27.8 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $43.6 million class H to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $35.7 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $35.7 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $15.9 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $7.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $15.9 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $11.9 million class Q to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and their respective Rating
Outlooks:

  -- $532.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $38.9 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $162.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $61 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $602 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $521.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $317.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the $30.9 million class S.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the IO class XW.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 22 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 22 CMBS classes
of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XW, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MF, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's LTV
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Two notable credit positive events have occurred since last
review: the migration of loans out of special servicing and the
payoff of the pool's third largest loan, One Park Avenue.
Currently there are 14 loans representing 7% of the deal in
special servicing compared to 24 loans representing 27% of the
pool at last review.  The One Park Avenue Loan ($187.5 million),
was a pari passu interest in a $375 million first mortgage.  At
last review the loan was in special servicing and Moody's had
estimated a significant loss for this loan.  In March 2011 Vornado
Realty Trust purchased a 95% stake in One Park Avenue.  The sale
proceeds were used to retire the debt.  Due to fees, advances and
expenses the loan payoff resulted in a minimal ($1.9 million or
1%) loss.  The deal was originally over-collateralized, so the
realized loss to the certificates ($398,000) is less than the loss
from the One Park Avenue Loan payoff.  One Park Avenue is the only
loan in the pool that has paid off or been liquidated.

The previously mentioned credit positive events did result in a
lowered base expected loss estimate than at last review.  However,
the overall pool quality does not warrant any upgrades at this
time.  While the conduit LTV has only increased marginally to 128%
from 127% at last review, the pool LTV has increased to 157% from
127% at last review.  Even after excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, loans representing 85% of the pool have a stressed
DSCR of less than 1.0X.  Additionally, most of the loans that
migrated out of special servicing remain on the servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.2% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 15.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
24.6% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 29 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated January 26, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6% to $3.3 billion
from $3.5 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 150 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
52% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with credit estimates.

Thirty loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

There are 14 loans, representing 7% of the pool, in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Metropolis
Shopping Center Loan ($86 million -- 3% of the pool), which is
secured by Phase I of a suburban power center located southwest
of Indianapolis, Indiana.  The property is also encumbered by a
$9 million B-Note.  The property is currently in foreclosure and
the servicer has recognized a $38 million appraisal reduction for
this loan.  The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured
by a mix of commercial and multifamily properties.  The servicer
has recognized a $153 million aggregate appraisal reduction for 12
of the 14 specially serviced loans and one troubled loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans representing 28% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $140 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 46%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 96% and 83% of the pool's loans,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 128% compared to 127% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.35X and .85X, respectively, compared to
1.34X and .86X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Presidential Towers Loan
($325.0 million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by four
connected 50-story apartment buildings (2,346 units) located in
the Intown submarket of downtown Chicago, Illinois.  As of January
2010 the multifamily units were 92% leased compared to 96% at last
review.  The property's 87,000 square foot retail component is
undergoing renovations, which is believed to have contributed to
the decline in occupancy.  The retail space was only 41% leased as
per the January 2011 rent roll.  Property performance is expected
to improve as the retail space is leased up.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.65X, which is the same as at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Renaissance Mayflower Hotel Loan
($200 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 657-unit
hotel located in Washington, D.C.  The loan was being specially
serviced at last review.  The loan term was extended by 12 months
and the loan was transferred out of special servicing in October
2010.  The loan is current.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR is 155%
and .75X, respectively, compared to 167% and .68X at last review

The third largest loan is the Pacific Shores Building 9 & 10 Loan
($184 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by two Class A
office buildings located in a suburban office park in Redwood
City, California.  The property serves as Facet Biotech's
corporate headquarters.  Abbott Laboratories (A1, stable outlook)
acquired Facet Biotech in April 2010.  The property is 100%
leased, which is the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 145% and .71X, compared to 160% and .65X at last
review.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-2:

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
42.1% ($42.5 million) of the current balance.  At last review,
Moody's cumulative base expected loss was 21.8% ($53.7 million).
Moody's current cumulative base expected loss is higher than at
last review as a percentage of the current outstanding balance
because of the significant deleveraging of the pool due to loan
amortization and payoffs.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 43.2%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 15 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 30, 2010.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to
$101.10 million from $889.00 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 73% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

One loan, representing 5% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $21.8 million loss (15%
loss severity on average).  Nine loans, representing 79% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Towngate Community Shopping Center Loan
($20.2 million -- 20.0%), which is secured by 286,729 square foot
retail complex located in Moreno Valley, California.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in December 2009 for maturity
default and is in process of foreclosure.  The borrower continues
to make full debt service payments post maturity while the special
servicer continues with the foreclosure process.

The second largest loan is special servicing is the SCI Portfolio
- 1401 Elm St.  Loan ($18.1 million - 18.0%), which is secured by
428,884 square foot condominium unit in a 1.3 million square foot
office property located in downtown Dallas, Texas.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in December 2008 after the Bank
of America, which leased the entire building, vacated.  The
property is 100% vacant and became real estate owned (REO) in
April 2009.  The servicer has recognized a $17.7 million appraisal
reduction for this loan.

The third largest loan in special servicing is the Rio Apartments
Loan ($11.5 million -11.4%), which is secured by a multifamily
property located in Miami, Florida.  The borrower was unable to
pay off the loan at maturity in April 2010 and the loan is in
foreclosure.  The remaining six specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $42.2 million loss (52% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.  The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $61.7 million appraisal reduction for eight of the
specially serviced loans.

As of the most recent remittance statement date, the transaction
has experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$4.0 million affecting Classes J through P.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and interest payment reductions due
to loan modifications.  Moody's expects interest shortfalls to
increase due to the pool's high exposure to specially serviced
loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
100% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 81% compared to 66% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
1.59X and 1.17X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Gateway Village Shopping Center
Loan ($6.8 million -- 6.7%), which is secured by a 126,285 square
foot retail property located in Glendale, Arizona.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.30X, respectively, compared to 87%
and 1.44X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 500 South Sepulveda Boulevard Loan
($5.1 million -- 5.0%), which is secured by a 43,722 square foot
office property located in Los Angeles, California.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.51X, respectively, essentially the
same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the GTEC Center Loan ($2.4 million --
2.4% of the pool), which is secured by 46,880 square foot office
property located in the Montgomery, Alabama.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.57X, respectively, essentially the
same as at last review.


CAPTEC FRANCHISE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded three classes of
certificates from Captec Franchise Trust 1999-1.  The certificates
are backed by franchise loans made to fast-food and casual dining
restaurants.  The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Captec Franchise Trust 1999-1

  -- Class A-IO, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2004
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The rating action was prompted by high levels of credit
enhancement available to protect certificate holders from
collateral losses.  In the month of January, five loans prepaid
totaling about $2.4 million, which completely repaid the remaining
balance of the Class A-2 certificate which had been on review for
possible upgrade and also a portion of the Class B certificate.
As of the February 15th payment date, subordination now provides
credit enhancement of 91% to the Class B certificate and 33%
enhancement to the Class C certificate, as a percentage of the
current pool.

The transaction has only two loans in special servicing which
comprise 7% of the current pool balance.  There is less obligor
concentration risk in this pool relative to other franchise loan
securitizations, with the largest borrower representing 14%
percent of the current pool.  The new rating reflects the
underlying risks in the transaction as well as Moody's view on
future performance of the collateral properties.

The primary source of uncertainty for the transactions is the
current macroeconomic environment and its impact on the restaurant
and fast food industry.  Moody's current outlook on the restaurant
industry is stable but weak as many fast food restaurants remain
under financial pressure.

In order to estimate losses on the collateral pool, Moody's
calculates the expected loss given default of the obligors that
have become nonperforming, and also estimates future losses on the
performing portion of the pool, all as a percentage of the
outstanding pool balance.  In evaluating the nonperforming loans,
key factors include collateral valuations and expected recovery
rates, volatility around those recovery rates, historical obligor
performance, time until recovery or liquidation on defaulted
obligors, concessions due to restructuring which may negatively
impact the overall cash flow of the trust and/or the collateral,
and future industry expectations.  In evaluating the performing
portion of the pool, Moody's estimate default rates based on
industry outlook and credit quality of underlying concepts and/or
borrowers, with additional stress applied for concentrated pools,
such as the Captec pool related to this action.  Moody's then
apply a stressed loss severity that accounts for historical loss
experience as well as possible future deterioration of the
underlying collateral.  Moody's total losses are then evaluated
against the available credit enhancement provided by
overcollateralization, subordination, and excess spread if
available.  Sufficiency of coverage is considered in light of
remaining borrower concentrations and concepts, remaining bond
maturities, and economic outlook.

Moody's Investor Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2005-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CBA
Commercial Assets 2005-1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrades reflect Standard & Poor's analysis of the
transaction and potential losses that S&P expects to be generated
by the specially serviced assets, debt service delinquent loans,
and loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P
downgraded the class M-3 certificate to 'D (sf)' due to a realized
principal loss of $148,163 (5.5% of the initial class balance)
following the liquidation of an asset, as reflected in the
Feb. 25, 2011 trustee remittance report.

S&P's analysis of the specially serviced assets, delinquent loans,
and loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired mainly
considered recent appraisal values and broker's opinions of value
to arrive at loss estimates for the collateral.  S&P's estimates
also factored in expenses and fees required to complete the
liquidation process.  S&P's analysis of the remaining loans in the
pool considered the performance of the collateral to date, as well
as the impact that current economic stress and liquidity
conditions may have on future performance.

As of the Feb. 25, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool consisted of 228 loans and four real estate owned (REO)
assets with an aggregate trust balance of $81.4 million, compared
with 572 loans totaling $214.9 million at issuance.  As of the
February remittance report, there were 30 assets totaling
$11.0 million (13.5%) with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc. (Midland).  The status of the 30 specially serviced
assets and 23 delinquent loans in the pool ($18.5 million,
22.7%) is: four are REO ($1.3 million, 1.5%), 13 are in
foreclosure ($4.1 million, 5.0%), 12 are 90-plus-days delinquent
($4.2 million, 5.2%), seven are 60-plus-days delinquent
($1.7 million, 2.2%), six are 30-plus-days delinquent
($1.8 million, 2.3%), nine are in bankruptcy ($2.7 million, 3.3%),
one is in its grace period ($1.7 million, 2.1%), and one is
current ($1.0 million, 1.1%).  S&P also ran various stress
scenarios.  S&P's base-case losses assumed that 59.1% of specially
serviced loans would experience a loss with a weighted average
loss severity of 57.1%.  To date, the trust has experienced 75
losses totaling $20.8 million.  S&P previously downgraded five
subordinate classes to 'D (sf)' as a result of principal losses.

Standard & Poor's stressed the remaining loans in the pool as part
of its analysis and S&P believes the resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the lowered ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

                  CBA Commercial Assets 2005-1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-1

               Rating
               ------
    Class    To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----           ----------------------
    A        BB (sf)   BBB (sf)                        19.29
    M-1      CCC+ (sf) B+ (sf)                         10.05
    M-2      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)                        3.12
    M-3      D (sf)    CCC (sf)                         0.00


CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 91 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 91
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from 11 Subprime
deals issued by ABFS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated in 2004 and prior).  The baseline rate is generally
higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are
made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-B

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-A

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-D

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-A

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-B

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-C

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-B

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-C

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHEC Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CENTURION CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Centurion CDO III, Limited:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class II Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2013, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2010
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$27,500,000 Class III Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2013, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2010
     Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$1,000,000 Class IV-A Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2013, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- US$16,000,000 Class IV-B Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2013, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class I Senior Notes, which
have been paid down by approximately $56.9 million, since the
rating action in June 2010.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in June 2010.  As of the latest trustee report dated
February 22, 2011, the Senior, Class III Mezzanine, and the Junior
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 262.4%, 141.1% and
109.77%, respectively, versus June 2010 levels of 159.2%, 121.6%
and 106.12%, respectively.  Additionally, the deal has accumulated
enough principal proceeds from asset sales and unscheduled
amortizations to fully collateralize the outstanding principal
balance of the Class I Senior Notes, the Class II Senior Notes,
and the Class III Mezzanine Notes, as well as a significant
portion of the Class IV-A Mezzanine Notes and the Class IV-B
Mezzanine Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $80.92 million, defaulted par of $5.65
million, a weighted average default probability of 22.65%
(implying a WARF of 4686), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 32.89%, and a diversity score of 11.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Centurion CDO III, Limited, issued in March 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds and senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.  This publication incorporates rating criteria that
apply to both collateralized loan obligations and collateralized
bond obligations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.  In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.6 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months.  In addition, Moody's applied a
1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated
between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.  For each
CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3% of the
collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed
downgrade (but only on the CEs representing in aggregate the
largest 30% of the pool) in lieu of the aforementioned stresses.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in all cases the lowest assumed
rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (3749)

  -- Class I: 0
  -- Class II: 0
  -- Class III: 0
  -- Class IV-A: +1
  -- Class IV-B: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (5623)

  -- Class I: 0
  -- Class II: 0
  -- Class III: 0
  -- Class IV-A: 0
  -- Class IV-B: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the bond and loan markets and/or
   collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
   impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors, especially when they experience jump to
   default.  Due to the deal's low diversity score and lack of
   granularity, Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial
   Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated default
   distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and/or individual
   scenario analysis.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2005-C2 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corporation,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C2:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.2% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 14.1%.  The current cumulative
base loss plus realized losses is 16.8%, essentially the same as
at last review.  Realized losses increased approximately $48
million since last review due to the recent modification of the
Washington Mutual Irvine Campus Loan ($55.4 million -- 4.3% of the
pool).  The modification included a $48 million dollar principal
write-off that eliminated Classes H through L and a portion of
Class G.  The loan is in the process of being returned to the
master servicer.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 19.3% of the
current balance

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 24, the same as at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated August 26, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to
$1.29 billion from $1.61 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 153 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 47% of the pool.  Eleven loans, representing
5.9% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  No loans have investment grade credit
estimates.

Thirty-four loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $90.3 million loss
(49% loss severity on average).  At last review the pool had
an aggregate realized loss of $42.4 million.  Currently 12
loans, representing 19% of the pool, are in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is The Tri-County Mall
Loan ($141.1 million -- 11.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 1.1 million square foot regional mall located in Cincinnati,
Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in August
2009 due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $107.2 million appraisal reduction for six of the
specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
loss of $101.5 million (59% expected loss on average) for all of
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$11.5 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 96% and 100%, respectively, of the non-
defeased performing pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 100%, compared to
101% at last full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 9% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 1.04X, respectively, compared to
1.33X and 1.03X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 20% of the pool
balance.  The largest performing loan is the 390 Park Avenue
Loan ($105.6 million -- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
234,000 square foot office building located in New York City.  The
property was 100% leased as of December 2010, compared to 97% at
last review.  Net income has increased slightly since last review
and performance is stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110%
and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.79X at last
review.

The second largest performing loan is the Spectrum Office
Portfolio Loan ($82.2 million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is
secured by six office properties located in the North Rivers
submarket of Chicago, Illinois.  The portfolio was 89% leased as
of year-end 2010 compared to 86% at last review.  Portfolio
performance has declined due to decreased rental revenues.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 106% and 0.97X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the 65 Broadway Loan
($70.5 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 342,000
square foot office building located in New York City in the
Battery Park submarket.  The property was 86% leased as of year-
end 2010, compared to 85% at last review.  Property performance
has declined due to decreased rental income.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.81X, respectively, compared to 103%
and 0.95X at last review.


CHRYSLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded nine tranches from three prime auto loan
securitizations and three tranches from three re-securitizations
sponsored and serviced by Chrysler Financial Services Americas
LLC.  Eight tranches continue to remain on review for possible
upgrade.

                             Ratings

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-A

  -- Cl.A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-B

  -- Cl. A-4a, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. A-4b, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Re-securitizations

Issuer: CFAST 2007-A B Note Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CFAST 2008-A B Note Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CFAST 2008-B B Note Trust

  -- CFAST 2008-B B Note Trust Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and
     Remains On Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 21,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions were prompted by the buildup of credit
enhancement relative to remaining losses, short remaining life of
the securities, as well as by a downward revision of Moody's
lifetime cumulative net loss expectations due to further
stabilization of performance since Moody's placed these
securitizations on review.  The affected securitizations benefit
from non-declining reserve accounts and overcollateralization, as
well as additional credit enhancement in the form of cash
contributed by the sponsor to the 2007-A and 2008-A transactions
in November 2008.

The rating actions do not take into account the pending
acquisition of Chrysler Financial by TD Bank Group, as details
about the acquisition are yet to be finalized.  In Moody's
opinion, the proposed acquisition should benefit the outstanding
securitizations by providing longer term stability to Chrysler
Financial's servicing operations as it restructures and explores
future business prospects.  This should mitigate the risk of
servicing disruption during the life of the longer maturing
securities.  Following an agreement in 2009 between Chrysler LLC
and GMAC Inc. (now Ally Financial Inc.) to provide wholesale and
retail financing for Chrysler vehicles, Chrysler Financial is no
longer the captive finance arm of Chrysler LLC.  The company has
since had to rely predominantly on originating standard (non
subvented) loans and has reduced its staff to facilitate
restructuring and realignment of its business.

Despite the uncertainty relating to the pending acquisition, the
class A4 senior securities were upgraded to Aaa (sf).  This rating
is higher than that achievable for senior classes of new Chrysler
Financial auto loan securitizations with the present servicing
arrangements due to the shorter term to maturity of these well
seasoned transactions and the much higher levels of absolute
credit enhancement relative to their respective remaining pool
losses.  Moody's consider these seasoned senior tranches to be
less affected by the uncertainties associated with servicing.  The
longer maturing securities, which are more exposed to the
diminishing scale of the servicing platform, and hence stand to
gain more from the acquisition, remain on review for further
possible upgrade.  Credit enhancement for all tranches has
increased substantially due to the sequential pay structure and
non-declining reserve accounts, as evidenced by the ratio of total
credit enhancement to the remaining expected losses.  Credit
support (without giving benefit to excess spread or yield
supplement overcollateralization ranges between 42% to 51% of the
outstanding collateral balance, which provides approximately 10 to
13 times coverage against remaining expected losses of
approximately 4% of the remaining collateral balance adjusted for
YSOC.  Key performance metrics and credit assumptions are provided
later in this release.

The re-securitization trust notes are secured by the Class B notes
issued by Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2007-A,
Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-A, and Chrysler
Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-B transactions.  The
trust notes benefit solely from the credit enhancement available
to the underlying notes in the underlying trusts and are therefore
assigned the same ratings as the underlying notes given the pure
pass-through transaction structure.

Below are key performance metrics and credit assumptions for each
affected transaction.  Credit assumptions include Moody's expected
lifetime CNL expectation which is expressed as a percentage of the
original pool balance; and Moody's lifetime remaining CNL
expectation and Aaa levels which are expressed as a percentage of
the current pool balance (adjusted for YSOC).  The Aaa level is
the level of credit enhancement that would be consistent with a
Aaa rating for the given asset pool.  For the affected
securitizations, additional qualitative factors such as remaining
life of the securities and risk of servicer disruption were also
considered in determining the ratings.  Performance metrics
include pool factor which is the ratio of the current collateral
balance and the original collateral balance at closing; total
credit enhancement (expressed as a percentage of the outstanding
collateral pool balance adjusted for YSOC) which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve
fund; YSOC; and per annum excess spread.  The YSOC compensates for
the lower APR on the subvened loans.

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2007-A

* Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.5%, prior expectation (December
  2010) was 6.5% to 7.0%

* Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 4%

* Aaa level -- Approximately 16%

* Pool factor -- 21%

* Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC): Class
  A-4 -- 49%; Class B -- 27%; Class C -- 19%

* Excess spread -- Approximately 1% per annum

* YSOC -- Approximately 2%

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-A

* Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.0%, prior expectation (December
  2010) was 6.5% - 7.0%

* Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 4%

* Aaa level -- Approximately 16%

* Pool factor -- 22%

* Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC): Class
  A-4 -- 51%; Class B -- 26%; Class C -- 16%

* Excess spread -- Approximately 2% per annum

* YSOC -- Approximately 2%

Issuer: Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-B

* Lifetime CNL expectation - 5.75%, prior expectation (December
  2010) was 6.25% - 7.75%

* Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 4.2%

* Aaa level -- Approximately 16%

* Pool factor -- 25%

* Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC): Class
  A-4 -- 42%; Class B -- 18%

* Excess spread -- Approximately 1% per annum

* YSOC -- Approximately 3%

Ratings on the affected securities could be upgraded (where
applicable) if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or downgraded
if the lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to remain at elevated levels, and strength
in the used vehicle market.  Moody's currently views the used
vehicle market as much stronger now than it was at the end of 2008
when the uncertainty relating to the economy as well as the future
of the U.S auto manufacturers was significantly greater.  Overall,
Moody's expect a sluggish recovery in the U.S. economy, with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent, high unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CIT GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New Secured Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a rating of B3 to CIT Group
Inc.'s new Series C Second Priority Secured Notes due 2014 and
2018.  CIT's other ratings, including its B3 corporate family
rating, are not affected by the new transaction.  The outlook for
CIT's ratings is stable.

Proceeds from the new Series C notes will be used by CIT to redeem
a portion of the company's Series A second priority secured notes,
also rated B3, that mature in 2013 and 2014.  The Series C notes
are expected to have a lower interest rate than the 7% coupon on
the Series A notes, which will reduce CIT's interest expense.  In
the past year, CIT has redeemed or refinanced over $10 billion of
high cost debt.  The new transaction reduces CIT's weighted
average cost of debt, extends its debt maturity profile, and
improves its liquidity runway.

The Series C notes have the same guarantors, collateral, and
priority as the Series A notes.  The notes are guaranteed by
nearly all direct and indirect material domestic restricted
subsidiaries of CIT.  The notes are secured on a second lien basis
by substantially all U.S. assets owned by CIT not otherwise
pledged to other secured debts and securitizations, as well as
stock pledges of certain foreign CIT subsidiaries.  The asset
pledges and guarantees are subordinated to the CIT's $3 billion
first lien credit facility.

The Series C notes include customary restrictions regarding liens,
mergers, and asset sales, but the new notes don't include the cash
sweep provision that exists in the Series A notes.  Additionally,
the collateral pledges and guarantees of the notes will be
automatically released when the Series A notes are fully repaid,
in essence converting the Series C notes to unsecured notes.  In
Moody's view, these differences in features do not warrant a
notching distinction between the Series C and Series A notes.
Moody's rates both series of second lien notes at the same level
as CIT's corporate family rating because, at about $21 billion
outstanding (pro forma), they represent a significant proportion
of the firm's total debt and deposits of about $40 billion
(proforma).

In its last CIT rating action on August 13, 2010, Moody's assigned
a rating of B1 to CIT's senior secured term loan facility.

CIT Group, Inc., is a bank holding company with headquarters in
New York City and Livingston, New Jersey.


COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 88 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 88
tranches and confirmed the ratings of nine tranches from 17 Alt-A
deals issued by Countrywide.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued before 2005.  The principal methodology used in these
ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published
in January 2011.

The rating on the IO tranche Cl. M-IO in the deal CWALT, Inc.
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, Series 2004-J8, is tied to
the credit profile of the bonds referenced by this IO tranche.
Because Moody's expect a majority of the bonds referenced by
this IO tranche to be written down, the tranche is rated C.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service published credit rating methodologies
allow for the withdrawal of a credit rating if the size of the
pool outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen below a
specified level.  Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies
apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of greater
than 5%.  As a result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the
pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool
declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features
allow for monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit
enhancement floor).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Alternative Loan Trust 2004-J9

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J13

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J4

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J5

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J7

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2002-12

  -- Cl. A-8, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. PO, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-16

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-33

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-38

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-J11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-J12

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CS FIRST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 206 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 206
tranches, confirmed the rating of 18 tranches and withdrawn the
ratings of 11 tranches from 30 Alt-A deals issued by CSFB.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service published credit rating methodologies
allow for the withdrawal of a credit rating if the size of the
pool outstanding at the time of the withdrawal has fallen below a
specified level.  Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies
apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of greater
than 5%.  As a result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the
pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool
declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features
allow for monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit
enhancement floor).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp 2001-1

  -- Cl. A-IO, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 15, 2009
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-26

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-28

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-10

  -- II-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- II-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- II-B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- I-M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- I-M-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- I-B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-18

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-PP, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-22

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-24

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-26

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-A-28, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- I-A-34, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- I-A-35, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-P, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2003
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2005
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded
     to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. IV-B-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. IV-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-29

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-30

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-5

  -- Cl. IV-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. P-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-1

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-17

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-P, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-P, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-21

  -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-8

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR2

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR26

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR28

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR30

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR5

  -- Cl. III-M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-4

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. 11-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. 11-M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-CG2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes of
DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-CG2:

  -- Cl. B-4, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the
existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.8% of the current balance.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
15.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 95 at Moody's prior full
review.  The decline in Herf has been partially offset by
increased subordination due to loan payoffs and amortization.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 10, 2007.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to
$89.7 million from $1.55 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 37 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top
ten non-defeased loans representing 63% of the pool.  Two loans,
representing 1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.

Twelve loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $53.7 million loss (33%
loss severity on average).  Seven loans, representing 26% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $6.8 million loss (31% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated a
$941,709 loss (15% expected loss based on a 30% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B-6
through C have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $4.6 million.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, extraordinary trust expenses
and non-advancing by the master servicer based on a determination
of non-recoverability.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will
continue to experience interest shortfalls due to the pool's high
exposure to specially serviced loans and low aggregate bond
balance.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 99% and 84%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased performing loans.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 71% compared to
79% at Moody's prior full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects
a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available
net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.79X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.48X at Moody's prior full review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Pines of Westbury Loan
($10.8 million -- 12.0%), which is secured by a 940-unit
multifamily property located in Houston, Texas.  Property
performance has declined due to the soft Houston multifamily
market.  The property was 72% leased as of January 2011.  The
loan is currently on the watchlist due to low DSCR.  The loan
passed its anticipated repayment date of December 2008 is
amortizing on a 360-month schedule.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 119% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 124% and
0.87X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the Hazelcrest Place Loan ($7.5 million
-- 8.4%), which is secured by a 241-unit multifamily property
located in suburban Detroit, Michigan.  The property was 98%
leased as of June 2010 and performance is stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.53X, respectively, compared to 73% and
1.37X at last full review.

The third largest loan is a portfolio of three supermarket
anchored retail properties ($6.7 million -- 7.5% of the pool),
totaling 151,658 square feet.  Two properties are located in
Massachusetts with the remaining property is in Rhode Island.  Two
of the three loans are on the watchlist; one due to low DSCR and
the other for tax issues.  Portfolio performance has deteriorated
due to increased expenses but the loan is benefiting from
amortization and has paid down 8% since Moody's last full review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.26X, respectively,
compared to 86% and 1.22X at last full review.


DLJ MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B-3OC Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating
on the class B-3OC commercial mortgage pass-through certificate
from DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.'s series 1997-CF2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

The affirmation reflects S&P's analysis of the transaction's
remaining collateral, the deal structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.  While the current credit enhancement
level for class B-3OC has increased since S&P's last review, which
occurred in March 2007, due to the deleveraging of the collateral
and paydown of the pool, S&P's affirmation considers the overall
performance of the five remaining assets in the transaction.  S&P
also considered the reduced liquidity and credit support available
to the trust upon the eventual liquidation of the one specially
serviced asset and the one asset S&P deemed credit-impaired.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral had
a principal balance of $37.7 million, which is 5.7% of the balance
at issuance.  The remaining collateral includes four loans and one
real estate owned asset that is with the special servicer, down
from 128 loans at issuance.  Eleven loans in the transaction have
experienced $32.4 million in principal losses.  Details on the
five remaining assets are:


The West Ridge Market loan ($22.6 million; 59.8%), the largest
exposure in the trust, is secured by a 257,046-sq.-ft. retail
center, built in 1996, in Minnetonka, Minn.  According to the
Sept. 30, 2010 rent roll, the retail center had a reported
occupancy of 97.8%, and is anchored by Dick's Sporting Goods
(101,216 sq. ft.) and Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (34,124 sq. ft.).
The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank),
reported a debt service coverage of 1.63x for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2010.

The Fox River Commons Shopping Center loan ($10.4 million; 27.6%),
the second-largest exposure in the trust, is secured by a 222,175-
sq.-ft. retail center, built in 1991, in Naperville, Ill.
According to the Sept. 30, 2010, rent roll, the retail center had
a reported occupancy of 93.2%, and is anchored by Bed Bath &
Beyond Inc. (32,744 sq. ft.) and Office Depot Inc. (27,333 sq.
ft.).  KeyBank reported a DSC of 1.53x for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2010.

The Meadow Green Shopping Center ($3.7 million; 9.7%), the third-
largest exposure in the trust, is with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The 136,620-sq.-ft. retail
shopping center in Eden, N.C., was transferred to the special
servicer on Jan. 29, 2009, due to imminent default and became REO
on April 26, 2010.  KeyBank reported a DSC of 0.16x and an
occupancy of 44.5% as of Dec. 31, 2009.  CWCapital stated that it
is pursuing leasing prospects while the property is listed for
sale.  An appraisal reduction amount of $2.0 million (based on an
updated March 2010 appraisal value of $2.8 million) is in effect
against the total exposure of $4.8 million.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Revco Drug Store loan ($629,102; 1.7%), the fourth-largest
exposure in the trust, is secured by a 9,600-sq.-ft. retail
building, built in 1997, in Tullahoma, Tenn.  According to the
June 30, 2010, rent roll, the retail property was 100% occupied by
CVS Caremark Corp. under a lease that expires in 2017.  KeyBank
reported a DSC of 1.03x for the six months ended June 30, 2010.

The Alta Vista Apartments loan ($434,344; 1.2%), the smallest
exposure in the trust, is secured by a 252-unit multifamily
apartment property in San Antonio, Texas.  The loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to delinquency.  According to
KeyBank, the borrower did not make the March 1, 2011 payment.
KeyBank reported a low DSC of 0.07x for the six months ended
June 30, 2010.  The reported occupancy at the property was 73.3%
according to the June 30, 2010 rent roll.  S&P determined this
loan to be credit-impaired due to its delinquent payment status
and low DSC.

                         Rating Affirmed

                  DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-CF2

       Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    ------              ----------------------
       B-3OC    B- (sf)             19.47


E*TRADE ABS: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed three classes
of notes issued by E*Trade ABS CDO III, Ltd./LLC, as a result of
continued deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating
action in March 2010.  The rating actions are:

  -- $14,062,340 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS5' from
     'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37,750,000 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $37,900,000 class B notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $13,305,867 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs', for the class A-
1 notes.  Fitch also considered additional qualitative factors in
its analysis, as described below, to conclude the rating actions
for the notes.

Since the last rating action in March 2010, the credit quality of
the collateral has declined with approximately 46.4% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 2.8 notches.
Approximately 97.7% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 78.5% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 90.9% and 72.8% respectively, at
last review.

The credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio has increased
the need for principal proceeds to cover shortfalls in interest
collections.  At the time of the previous review, principal
proceeds were needed to cover a portion of class B accrued
interest.  Starting on the April 2010 distribution date, interest
was insufficient to cover the total class A-2 accrued interest
amount.  On top of this gradual erosion of credit enhancement,
there have also been writedowns in the portfolio.  Principal
amortization of the class A-1 notes has helped to offset some of
deterioration, but a downgrade is still warranted to reflect the
additional risk to the class.

Fitch maintains a Negative Outlook on the class A-1 notes due to
weakness in rising interest rate scenarios and the potential for
negative migration in the underlying portfolio, with 6.6% and 4.3%
of the portfolio having a Negative Outlook and being on Rating
Watch Negative, respectively.  Fitch does not maintain outlooks
for tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

The Loss Severity rating of 'LS5' for the class A-1 notes
indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches
rated 'CCC' and below.

Breakeven levels for the class A-2, class B and class C notes were
below SF PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults
projected by SF PCM.  For these classes, Fitch compared the
class's respective credit enhancement levels to expected losses
from the distressed and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated
'CCsf' or lower).  This comparison indicates that default
continues to appear inevitable for the three classes at or prior
to maturity.

The class A-2 and class B notes are rated to the timely receipt of
interest and continue to receive their accrued interest each
payment period.  The class C notes are rated to the ultimate
receipt of interest, and are not expected to receive any interest
or principal distributions going forward.

E*Trade III is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 22, 2004.  The static portfolio was
originally selected by E*TRADE Global Asset Management, Inc and is
now monitored by Vertical Capital LLC.  The portfolio is comprised
of 76% residential mortgage-backed securities, 20.7% SF CDOs, 2.3%
commercial mortgage-backed securities and 1% commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities from 2002 through 2004 vintage
transactions.


FAIRBANKS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches three Subprime deals issued by Faribanks and United
Companies.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities wrapped by
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company are rated at their underlying
rating without consideration of Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fairbanks Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: UCFC Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
1998-C

  -- A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: UCFC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-D

  -- MF-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- BF-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MV-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MV-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- BV-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FAIRFIELD STREET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 11 classes of Notes issued by Fairfield
Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations due to
the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, and increase in Defaulted Securities since last
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Fairfield 2004-1 Ltd. is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (67.6%),
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations (13.1%),
REIT debt (10.2%), CMBS Rake Bonds (4.8%), and grantor trust loans
(4.3%).  As of the February 28, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $497.1 million
from $515.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the
Class A-1 and Class A-2a Notes, as a result of amortization due to
the end of the reinvestment end period in November 2009.

There are 25 assets with par balance of $112.3 million (19.0% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the February 28, 2011 Trustee report.  Twenty-two of these
assets (87.7% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS, two assets
(7.1%) are CRE CDO, and one asset (5.2%) is a grantor trust loan.
While there have been no realized losses to date, Moody's does
expect significant losses to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated assets.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 3,483 compared to 1,951 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(10.7% compared to 18.3% at last review), A1-A3 (10.4% compared to
8.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (15.7% compared to 17.4% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (20.4% compared to 31.4% at last review), B1-B3
(8.4% compared to 11.2% at last review), and Caa1-C (34.5%
compared to 13.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.7
years compared to 6.3 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 25.1% compared to 32.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.9% compared to 17.3% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 25% to 15% or up to 35% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 2 to 3 notches downward and 1 to
3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment
and varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


FALCON AUTO: Fitch Gives Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
The substitution of collateral for cash for two loans in Falcon
Auto Dealership, LLC Series 2001-1 & 2003-1 is unlikely to result
in a withdrawal, downgrade, or suspension of ratings on two Falcon
Auto Dealership trusts, according to Fitch Ratings.

Fitch currently rates Falcon Auto Dealership, LLC:

Series 2001-1

  -- Class A-2 notes 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class D notes 'CCCsf/RR5';
  -- Class E and F notes 'Dsf/RR6'.

Series 2003-1

  -- Class A-1 notes 'BBsf'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- Class A-2 notes 'BBsf'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- Class B notes 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- Class C, D, E, and F notes 'Csf/RR6';


FFCA SECURED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Class C-1 and D-1 fixed
rate and the Class C-2 and D-2 floating rate notes from FFCA
Secured Franchise Loan Owner Trust 1999-1.  The fixed and floating
rate notes are backed by fixed and floating rate franchise loans,
respectively, made to gas and convenience store operators.  The
complete rating action is:

Issuer: Franchise Secured Franchise Loan Grantor Trust 1999-1

  -- Class C-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class C-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class D-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class D-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The rating actions were prompted by the high levels of credit
enhancement available to protect noteholders from collateral
losses.  As of the February 18th payment date, subordinated notes
provide credit enhancement of 82% to the Class C-1 and Class C-2
notes, and 65% to the Class D-1 and D-2 notes.  While the
transaction is exposed to significant obligor concentrations risks
in Go-Mart (50%) and United Dairy (17%), both of these obligors
have remained current throughout the life of the deal.  Moody's
expect future cash flows from the pool to remain steady as
formerly distressed obligors have been made current on payments
through loan restructurings and modifications.  As of the February
18th payment date, less than 1% of the collateral pool is in
special servicing.  The new ratings reflect the underlying
concentration and default risks in the transaction as well as
Moody's view on future performance of the collateral properties.

The primary source of uncertainty for the transactions is the
current macroeconomic environment and its impact on gas stations
and convenience stores.  The prolonged recovery may lead to future
defaults as borrowers continue to suffer from cash flow
constraints.

In order to estimate losses on the collateral pool, Moody's
calculates the expected loss given default of the obligors that
have become nonperforming, and also estimates future losses on the
performing portion of the pool, all as a percentage of the
outstanding pool balance.  In evaluating the nonperforming loans,
key factors include collateral valuations and expected recovery
rates, volatility around those recovery rates, historical obligor
performance, time until recovery or liquidation on defaulted
obligors, concessions due to restructuring which may negatively
impact the overall cash flow of the trust and/or the collateral,
and future industry expectations.  In evaluating the performing
portion of the pool, Moody's estimate default rates based on
industry outlook and credit quality of underlying concepts and/or
borrowers, with additional stress applied for highly concentrated
pools, such as the FFCA pool related to this action.  Moody's then
apply a stressed loss severity that accounts for historical loss
experience as well as possible future deterioration of the
underlying collateral.  Moody's total losses are then evaluated
against the available credit enhancement provided by
overcollateralization, subordination, and excess spread if
available.  Sufficiency of coverage is considered in light of
remaining borrower concentrations and concepts, remaining bond
maturities, and economic outlook.

Moody's Investor Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


FIRST 2004-I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded ratings
of these notes issued by First 2004-I CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$13,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to Aaa(sf); previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1 (sf);

  -- US$245,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Notes Due 2016
     (current outstanding balance of $168,192,830), Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf); previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Interest Deferrable
     Notes due 2016, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 31,
     2009 confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Interest Deferrable
     Notes due 2016, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 31,
     2009 Confirmed at B1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-3
Notes, which have been paid down by approximately $40 million and
$75 million, respectively, since the rating action in July 2009.
As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios
have increased since the rating action in July 2009.  As of the
latest trustee report dated February 15, 2011, the Class A, Class
B and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 137.3%,
118.2% and 113.1%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of
120.2%, 108.5% and 104.7%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the
rating action in July 2009.  Improvement in the credit quality
is observed through an improvement in the average credit rating
(as measured by the weighted average rating factor) and a decrease
in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.
In particular, as of the latest trustee report dated February 15,
2011, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2533
compared to 2882 in the July 2009 report, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 9.6% of the underlying
portfolio versus 17.9% in July 2009.  Additionally, defaulted
securities total about $2.7 million of the underlying portfolio
compared to $42 million in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global
CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score,
and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $353 million, defaulted par of
$2.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.88%
(implying a WARF of 3341), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45%, and a diversity score of 50.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

First 2004-I CLO, Ltd., issued in July 27, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (2673)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2: 0
  -- Class A-3: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4009)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2: -1
  -- Class A-3: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-C3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of First Union National
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, 2001-C3, commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates due to an increase in Fitch expected losses,
most of which involves increased losses on the specially serviced
loans.

As of the March 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 64.8% to $288.4 million
from approximately $818.8 million at issuance.  Of the remaining
57 loans, 10 (22.5%) have defeased, two (10.3%) have anticipated
repayment dates in 2011, and 37 (63.1%) non-defeased loans mature
in 2011.

There are four specially serviced loans in the pool (5.7%) Fitch
expects unrated class P to be fully depleted from losses
associated with the specially serviced assets.  Interest
shortfalls currently affect classes O and P.

The largest specially serviced asset (2%) is an office building
located in Wheaton, IL.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in December 2010, and the special servicer is reviewing options to
restructure the loan while continuing to pursue foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.4%) is a
multifamily property located in LaPorte, TX.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in March 2011 due to maturity default.

The third largest specially serviced asset (1.3%) is an office
building located in Addison, TX.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2008, and foreclosure was completed in May
2009.  The loan is real estate owned.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns Loss Severity and
Recovery Ratings:

  -- $6.1 million class L to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;

  -- $4.1 million class M to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.1 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';

  -- $4.1 million class O to 'C/RR4' from 'B-/LS5'.

Fitch also affirms these classes:

  -- $115.3 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class IO-II at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.3 million class G at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.3 million class H at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.4 million class J at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $14.3 million class K at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $2.2 million class P.  Classes A-1 and A-2
have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class IO-I.


FIRST UNION-LEHMAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 1998-C2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of ten classes
of First Union-Lehman Brothers-Bank of America Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-
C2:

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2003
     Confirmed at B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.3%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
9.7% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and the CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0.  Conduit model
results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a pay down analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying
ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into
an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 21 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to derive credit enhancement levels for CTL
component.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 18, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 83% to $588.39
million from $3.41 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 163 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1%
to 13% of the pool.  The pool includes one loan with a credit
estimate, representing 8% of the pool and a credit tenant lease
component, representing 22% of the pool.  Twenty-two loans
representing 13% of the pool have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-three loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Eighty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate $53.17 million realized loss (17% loss severity on
average).  At last review the pool had an aggregate $43.29 million
realized loss.  Currently there are 14 loans, representing 19% of
the pool, in special servicing.  The largest loan in special
servicing is the Broadmoor Austin Loan ($77.8 million -- 13.2%),
which is secured by an eight-building, 1.2 million square foot
office complex located in Austin, Texas.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in January 2011 due to imminent default.  The
property is 100% leased to International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM; Moody's senior unsecured rating Aa3 - stable
outlook).  Approximately 70% of the net rentable area expires in
March 2011 while the remaining 30% of the NRA expires in March
2016.  IBM has indicated that it wants to renew the space expiring
in 2011 but at a rate significantly lower than it is currently
paying.  The special servicer is currently negotiating lease terms
with the borrower.  The loan has an anticipated repayment date in
April 2011 with a final maturity in 2023.  Moody's is not
recognizing a loss on this loan at this time.

The remaining 13 loans are secured by a mix of property types.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $15.2 million loss (49%
expected loss on average) for 12 of the specially serviced loans.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $8.0 million
appraisal reduction for seven of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$8.9 million aggregate loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2010 operating
results for 91% of the pool, excluding the CTL and defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 66% compared to 75% at last review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 2.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.72X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the IBM Corporate Office
Complex Loan ($44.3 million -- 7.5%), which is secured by a five-
building, 1.1 million square foot office complex located in
Somers, New York.  The property is 100% leased to IBM under a
triple net lease that is coterminous with the loan maturity in
October 2013.  The loan fully amortizes during the term and has
amortized by approximately 15% since last review.  Property
performance has been stable.  Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 3.68X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and
2.56X at last review.

The top three performing loans represent 12% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the First Union Plaza Loan ($54.4 million --
9.2%), which is secured by a 612,000 square foot office building
located in Atlanta, Georgia.  The property was 77% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 74% at last review.  Major tenants
include Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan, LP (41% of the NRA; lease
expiration April 2015) and Heery International (13% of the NRA;
lease expiration September 2017).  The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to high vacancy.  Performance has declined since
last review because of decreased rental revenues.  The loan
matures in May 2013.  Moody's is concerned about the re-finance
risk associated with this loan and has classified it as a troubled
loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.7X,
respectively, compared to 97% and 1.03X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Clearwater Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($9.5 million -- 1.6%), which is secured by a 124,700 square
foot retail center located in Indianapolis, Indiana.  The property
was 86% leased as of September 2010 compared to 93% at last
review.  Major tenants include Babies 'R' Us, Barnes & Noble and
Office Max.  Performance has declined due to increased vacancy.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.19X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.25X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Cineplex Odeon Movie Theater Loan
($8.6 million -- 1.5%), which is secured by a movie theater
located in Hodgkins, Illinois.  The property is 100% leased to
Plitt Theaters, Inc. through February 2023.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 96% and
1.21X at last review.

The CTL component includes 58 loans ($114.7 million -- 22.8%)
secured by properties leased to 14 tenants under bondable leases.
The largest exposures are Brinker International, Inc. (40% of the
CTL component; Moody's LT senior unsecured rating Ba1 -- stable
outlook), CVS Corp. (17%; Moody's LT senior unsecured rating
Baa2 -- stable outlook) and Walgreen Co. (11%; Moody's LT senior
unsecured rating A2 -- stable outlook).  The bottom-dollar
weighted average rating factor for the CTL pool is 1,357,
essentially the same as at last review.  WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of the default probability within the pool.


FMAC LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Class A-3 and Class B
certificates from FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 1998-C.  The
certificates are backed by franchise loans made to fast-food and
casual dining restaurants.  Credit enhancement for the
certificates consists of subordination and overcollateralization
of the certificates by the loans.  The rating action was prompted
by high levels of credit enhancement available to protect
certificate holders from collateral losses.  The complete rating
action is:

Issuer: FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 1998-C

  -- Class A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 C
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

As of the March 15th payment date, the Class A-3 and Class B
certificates benefit from credit enhancement of 81 % and 37%
respectively as a percentage of the current pool balance.
However, the transaction has 9 loans in special servicing which
comprise 23% of the current pool balance and the largest borrower
represents 25% percent of the current pool, creating some obligor
concentration risk in the pool, and therefore the upgraded
certificates are still non-investment grade.  The new ratings
reflect the underlying risks in the transaction as well as Moody's
view on future performance of the collateral properties.

The primary source of uncertainty for the transactions is the
current macroeconomic environment and its impact on the restaurant
and fast food industry.  Moody's current outlook on the restaurant
industry is stable but weak as many fast food restaurants remain
under financial pressure.

In order to estimate losses on the collateral pool, Moody's
calculates the expected loss given default of the obligors that
have become nonperforming, and also estimates future losses on the
performing portion of the pool, all as a percentage of the
outstanding pool balance.  In evaluating the nonperforming loans,
key factors include collateral valuations and expected recovery
rates, volatility around those recovery rates, historical obligor
performance, time until recovery or liquidation on defaulted
obligors, concessions due to restructuring which may negatively
impact the overall cash flow of the trust and/or the collateral,
and future industry expectations.  In evaluating the performing
portion of the pool, Moody's estimate default rates based on
industry outlook and credit quality of underlying concepts and/or
borrowers, with additional stress applied for highly concentrated
pools, such as the FMAC pool related to this action.  Moody's then
apply a stressed loss severity that accounts for historical loss
experience as well as possible future deterioration of the
underlying collateral.  Moody's total losses are then evaluated
against the available credit enhancement provided by
overcollateralization, subordination, and excess spread if
available.  Sufficiency of coverage is considered in light of
remaining borrower concentrations and concepts, remaining bond
maturities, and economic outlook.

Moody's Investor Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 71 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 71
tranches from 14 Subprime deals issued by Fremont.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 1999-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Ser.  2003-1 Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser.  2003-1 Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     May 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-A

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2003-B

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 27, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 27, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2008
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-A

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-B

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-C

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2004-D

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-C2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2002-C2.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from
the same transaction.

The ratings actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate certificates reflect credit support erosion S&P
believes will occur upon the resolution of the specially serviced
asset in the transaction, as well as its analysis of the
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.44x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 82.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.15x and an LTV
ratio of 103.5%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 16.6% and 33.5%, respectively.  The DSC and
LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude one ($3.6 million; 0.7%)
specially serviced asset and 33 defeased loans ($210.7 million;
39.9%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced asset, and included it in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures.

S&P's rating actions are tempered by the volume of non-defeased,
non-specially serviced loans that are scheduled to mature through
July 2012 (56 loans, $299.2 million, 56.7% of the trust balance).
While these loans have a weighted average DSC of 1.41x, S&P
believes that some of these loans could face refinancing
challenges given current market conditions.  If these loans are
not able to be refinanced at maturity, they could potentially be
transferred to the special servicer, resulting in additional trust
fund expenses.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest only certificate
based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 2011 remittance report, one asset ($3.6 million,
0.7%) was with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC.  The Courtyard Apartments loan transferred to CWCapital on
Feb. 5, 2010, due to imminent monetary default.  The loan was
foreclosed on Sept. 15, 2010, and the underlying property is
currently real estate owned by the trust.  The property is an 82-
unit multifamily complex in Broomfield, Colo.  As of Jan. 30,
2011, the property was 91.5% occupied.  Reported DSC as of Dec.
31, 2009, was 0.71x.  An appraisal reduction amount of $890,364 is
currently in effect for this asset.  S&P anticipate a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 2011 trustee remittance report, the transaction
had an aggregate trust balance of $527.8 million (91 loans),
compared with $737.7 million (109 loans) at issuance.  The master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, provided financial
information for 97.7% of the nondefeased trust balance, all of
which was full-year 2009, partial-year 2010, or full-year 2010
data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.44x for the nondefeased
loans in the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.44x and 82.3%, respectively, and exclude the
specially serviced asset and 33 defeased loans.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced asset and included
them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures.  Twenty-two loans ($109.3 million, 20.7%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Nine ($48.6 million, 9.2%) loans
have a reported DSC below 1.1x, and seven ($43.0 million, 8.2%) of
these loans have a reported DSC below 1.0x.  To date, the pool has
experienced principal losses totaling $11.3 million in connection
with seven loans.

               Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $136.6 million (25.9%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.47x the top 10 loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for
the top 10 loans were 1.44x and 76.0%, respectively.  Three of the
top 10 real estate loans are on the master servicer's watchlist,
and are discussed below.

The Northway Mall loan ($18.4 million, 3.5%) is the second-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by a 209,066-sq.-ft. anchored
retail center in Albany, N.Y.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  Reported DSC as of Dec. 31,
2009 was 0.93x.  However, this has increased to 1.09x as of the
six months ended June 30, 2010.  Per the master servicer, the
borrower has recently leased all previously vacant space at the
property, including an anchor tenant space, which S&P anticipate
will have a positive effect on property's cash flow.  As of Oct.
1, 2010, the property was 100% occupied.

The Bernal Shopping Center loan ($13.6 million, 2.6%) is the
third-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 203,340 sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in San Jose, Calif.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a major tenant's lease
expiration.  The borrower has indicated that the tenant, Save Mart
(65,062 sq.-ft., 31.8% of gross leasable area), is on a month-to-
month lease and will remain so for the foreseeable future.  As of
Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC for the property was 1.96x with
99.1% occupancy.

The Pierside Pavilion loan ($13.5 million, 2.6%) is the fourth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 78,784 sq.-ft.
unanchored retail property in Huntington Beach, Calif.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to an occupancy
decrease.  Reported occupancy as of Dec. 31, 2009, was 63.6%.
However, according to the master servicer, a new tenant signed a
lease for a previously vacated 26,000 sq.-ft. space comprising
33.0% of the property's gross leasable area.  Reported DSC as of
Dec. 31, 2009, was 1.17x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria and the resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

                Rating
                ------
   Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
   -----  --              ----          ----------------------
   J      BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)                          7.65
   K      BB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)                          5.20
   L      BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)                           4.15
   M      B (sf)       BB- (sf)                           3.11
   N      CCC+ (sf)    B (sf)                             1.36
   O      CCC (sf)     B- (sf)                            0.66

                        Ratings Affirmed

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

            Class    Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----    ------    ----------------------
            A-3      AAA (sf)                  28.44
            B        AAA (sf)                  23.02
            C        AAA (sf)                  21.45
            D        AAA (sf)                  17.08
            E        AA+ (sf)                  15.69
            F        AA (sf)                   13.94
            G        A+ (sf)                   11.49
            H        A- (sf)                    9.75
            X-1      AAA (sf)                    N/A

                      N/A -- not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE: DBRS Assigns Provisional Rating of Class E at 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2011-GC3.  The trends are
Stable.

  -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
  -- Class X at AAA (sf)
  -- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
  -- Class C at A (high) (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (sf)
  -- Class E at BB (sf)
  -- Class F at B (sf)
  -- Class G at NR (sf)

The collateral consists of 57 fixed-rate loans secured by 111
multifamily, mobile home parks and commercial properties.  The
portfolio has a balance of $1,400,625,368.  The pool benefits from
low leverage financing with a DBRS weighted- average Term DSCR and
debt yield of 1.57x and 10.6%, respectively, based on the trust
amount.  The pool also benefits from strong amortization as 12.3 %
of the pool amortizes down by maturity.

DBRS shadow-rates two loans, representing 5.8% of the pool,
investment grade.  The investment-grade shadow-rated loans
indicate the long-term stability of the underlying assets.

GSMCS 2011-GC3: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 10 2011-GC3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional to ratings ten
class of CMBS securities, issued by GSMCS 2011-GC3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC3.

  -- US$86M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$399M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$128M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$532.011M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$59.526M Cl. B Certificate, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)
  -- US$54.275M Cl. C Certificate, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  -- US$59.526M Cl. D Certificate, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  -- US$24.511M Cl. E Certificate, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)
  -- US$19.259M Cl. F Certificate, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)
  -- Cl. X Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 57 fixed rate loans secured
by 111 properties.  The ratings are based on the collateral and
the structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis.  Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis.  Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses.  Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:

1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
   largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment
   of the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven
   by each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.71X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X.  The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.22X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 89.6% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.  Moody's Total LTV
ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 92.0% is also considered
when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
Herfindahl Index is 23.  The score is within the band of
Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower transactions issued
since 2009.  With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl Index is 34.  The transaction's property
diversity profile is higher than the indices calculated in most
multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment.  The factors considered include property age,
quality of construction, location, market, and tenancy.  The
pool's weighted average property quality grade is 2.25, which is
in the band of average grades found in previously rated conduit
and fusion securitizations.

The transaction benefits from four loans, representing
approximately 6.0% of the pool balance in aggregate, assigned an
investment grade credit estimate.  Loans assigned investment grade
credit estimates are not expected to contribute any loss to a
transaction in low stress scenarios, but are expected to
contribute minimal amounts of loss in high stress scenarios.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S.  Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination.  The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings.  V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, or 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa2, A1, respectively.  Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed.  The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


GULF STREAM-COMPASS: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2005-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation of leveraged loans
transaction managed by Gulf Stream Asset Management LLC.  At the
same time, S&P removed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B
notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction since its last rating action in November 2009 and
a reduction in the outstanding balance of the class A-1 and A-2
notes.

According to the Feb. 8, 2011 trustee report, the transaction held
approximately $3 million in defaulted assets, down from
$25 million noted in the Oct. 5, 2009 trustee report.  In
addition, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were
approximately 9% of the collateral pool in February 2011, compared
with 11% in October 2009.  The senior overcollateralization ratio
improved to 124.3% in February 2011 from 114.6% as of October
2009.  The class A-1 and A-2 notes have paid down $123.6 million
and $12.4 million, respectively, since the transaction's
reinvestment period ended in May 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

               Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

           Class       To          From
           -----       --          ----
           A-1         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           A-2         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           B           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           C           A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
           D           BBB (sf)    BB (sf)


HALCYON 2005-2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded all classes of Notes issued by Halcyon
2005-2, Ltd.  Two of the key indicators of the expected loss
within CRE CDO transactions, weighted average rating factor and
weighted average recovery rate, are performing worse than at prior
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Halcyon 2005-2, Ltd., is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a reference portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (100.0% of the pool).  As of February 25,
2011, the aggregate rated Notes balance of the transaction is
EUR64.2 million and $15.8 million, the same as at issuance.  As
of the last payment period, there is a nominal interest shortfall
outstanding on the Class C Notes.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of
the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is
a measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 238 compared to 65 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa3 (26.7% compared to 76.7% at last review), A1-A3 (46.7%
compared to 20.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (23.3% compared to
3.3% at last review) and B1-B3 (3.3% compared to 0.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.0
years compared to 4.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled
a fixed WARR of 46.3% compared to 54.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 48.1% compared to 59.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  In general, the rated Notes are
particularly sensitive to rating changes within the collateral
pool.  Holding all other key parameters static, stressing all of
the reference obligations by 1 notch downward, the resulting
impact negatively affects the model results between 1 to 2 notch
downward on average.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment
and varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 118 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 118
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from 13 Alt-A
and Option-ARM deals issued by HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A and Option-ARM residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A and
Option-ARM pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these
pools have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are
affected by the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain
under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A and
Option-ARM pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal
methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HIGHLAND LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.:

  -- US$33,000,000 Class A-II-A Floating Rate Senior Notes due
     2014, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on September 14, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-II-B Fixed Rate Senior Notes due
     2014, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on September 14, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$24,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
     Notes due 2014 (current balance of $24,822,304), Downgraded
     to Ca (sf); previously on September 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
     Notes due 2014 (current balance of $24,033,395), Downgraded
     to C (sf); previously on September 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Senior Subordinate Notes
     due 2014 (current balance of $5,226,972), Downgraded to C
     (sf); previously on September 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf);

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Subordinate Notes due
     2014 (current balance of $9,043,903), Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on September 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the
notes are a result of credit deterioration on the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in September 2009.
Such credit deterioration is observed through an increase in
the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an increase in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and
failure of the Principal Coverage Tests.  Based on the January
2011 trustee report, securities rated Caa1 and below make up
approximately 7.1% of the underlying portfolio versus 4.1% in
July 2009.  The deal also experienced an increase in defaults.
The dollar amount of defaulted securities has increased to
$70.5 million, accounting for approximately 23.0% of the
underlying portfolio, from approximately $64 million in July 2009,
accounting for approximately 13.6% of the underlying portfolio in
July 2009.  Moody's also notes that the overcollateralization
ratios of the rated notes have deteriorated.  As of the January
2011 trustee report, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 112.27%, 102.21%,
92.50%, and 89.80%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of
117.13%, 109.96%, 102.87%, and 100.98%, respectively.  Interest
payments on the Class B, Class C, and Class D Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class A Principal
Coverage Test.

Additionally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number
of investments in securities that mature after the maturity date
of the notes.  As of the January 2011 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes make up
approximately 28% of the underlying portfolio versus 4.5% in July
2009.  These investments potentially expose the notes to market
risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated
concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized
Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global
CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score,
and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $231.6 million, defaulted par of
$70.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 29.3%
(implying a WARF of 5010), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 39.7%, and a diversity score of 29.  These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in Moody's cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., issued in August of 2001, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (4008)

  -- Class A-I: +1
  -- Class A-II-A: +2
  -- Class A-II-B: +2
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (6012)

  -- Class A-I: -2
  -- Class A-II-A:-1
  -- Class A-II-B: -1
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012
and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


INDEPENDENCE I: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded one and affirmed two classes of Notes
issued by Independence I CDO, Ltd., due to the rapid pace of
amortization of the senior class of Notes as a result of the
senior overcollateralization tests combined with the maturity of
an interest rate swap on the transaction providing for an increase
in interest proceeds each payment period which are applied to
amortize the Class A Notes.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 (sf)

  -- Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca (sf)

  -- Class C Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at C
      (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2005 Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Independence CDO I, Ltd., is a static CDO a potfolio of asset back
securities (52.7% of the pool balance), commercial mortgage backed
securities (33.7%), and collateralized debt obligations (13.6%).
As of the February 28, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate Note
balance of the transaction has decreased to $124.3 million from
$288.5 million at issuance, with paydown directed to the Class A
Notes.  The paydown results from the failure of the senior
overcollateralization tests.

There are seven assets with par balance of $15.5 million (13.3% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the February 28, 2011 Trustee report.  All of these assets
are ABS securities.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated assets.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF, excluding defaulted securities, of 3,342.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(16.2%), A1-A3 (9.8%), Baa1-Baa3 (16.4%), Ba1-Ba3 (12.7%), B1-B3
(12.8%), and Caa1-C (32.1%).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the assets in the
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.2 years.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 27.5%.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 5.5%.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 27.5% to 17.5% or up to 37.5% does not result in any
ratings movement on the rated tranches.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


IXIS REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches
from 1 Subprime deal issued by IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2004-HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 Series 2002-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C3:

  -- Cl. X-1 Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.7% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 31, essentially the same as at Moody's prior
full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 9, 2010.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to
$523.75 million from $745.33 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 74 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 30% of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 35% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.

Sixteen loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $43.0 million loss (56% loss severity on
average).  Five loans, representing 7% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $16.5 million appraisal reduction for the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $18.5 million
loss (52% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.7 million aggregate loss (24% expected loss based on a 40%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance statement date, the transaction
has experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$2.9 million affecting Classes G through NR.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and interest payment reductions due
to loan modifications.  Moody's expects interest shortfalls to
increase due to the pool's high exposure to specially serviced
loans.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2010 operating
results for 80% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 79%, essentially
the same as at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
1.45X and 1.32X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Anderson Mall Loan
($26.6 million -- 5.1%), which is secured by a 393,236 square foot
(SF) mall located in Anderson, South Carolina.  As of September
2010 the property was 94% leased compared to 90% at last review.
Anchor tenants include Belk, Dillard's, JC Penny and Sears.  This
loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to
decline in in-line vacancy and increased operating expenses.  The
loan matures in October 2012.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
106% and 1.02X, respectively, essentially the same as at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Crossways Shopping Center Loan
($20.2 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 378,645
SF retail center located in Chesapeake, Virginia.  As of April
2010 the property was 96% leased, essentially the same as at last
review.  Tenants include Value City Furniture (15% of the of the
net rentable area; lease expiration April 2016), DSW Shoes (10% of
the NRA; lease expiration July 2011) and Ross Dress for Less (8%
of the NRA; lease expiration January 2013).  The loan matures in
September 2012.  Performance is stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 61% and 1.75X, respectively compared to 61% and 1.7X as
at last review.

The third largest loan is the 276 Fifth Avenue Loan ($19.7 million
-- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by 166,017 SF Class B
office building located in the Penn Station submarket of New York
City.  As of February 2011 the property was 89% leased compared to
80% at last review.  The loan matures in December 2012.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 59% and 1.75X, respectively, compared to
65% and 1.57X at last review.


JP MORGAN: S&P Assigns Ratings on 2011-C3 $1.49 Bil. Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C3's
$1.49 billion commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the subordinate
classes of certificates, the liquidity provided by the trustee,
and the underlying loans' economics, geographic diversity, and
property type diversity.  In its analysis, S&P determined that, on
a weighted average basis, the pool has a debt service coverage
ratio of 1.31x based on a weighted average Standard & Poor's loan
constant of 7.75%, a beginning loan-to-value ratio of 82.6%, and
an ending LTV ratio of 72.3%.

Following S&P's publication of the presale (see "Presale: J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C3,"
published on Feb. 18, 2011), the issuer revised the deal's senior
class of certificates.  Accordingly, classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3FL,
and A-4 have replaced classes A-1, A-2, A-2FL, and A-3.

                        Ratings Assigned

       J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C3

            Class       Rating              Amount ($)
            -----       ------              ----------
            A-1         AAA (sf)            81,337,000
            A-2         AAA (sf)           318,728,000
            A-3         AAA (sf)           228,561,000
            A-3FL       AAA (sf)           125,000,000
            A-4         AAA (sf)           485,440,000
            X-A(i)      AAA (sf)     1,239,066,000(ii)
            X-B(i)      NR             253,785,610(ii)
            B           AA (sf)             41,054,000
            C           A+ (sf)             52,250,000
            D           A- (sf)             35,455,000
            E           BBB+ (sf)           41,053,000
            F           BBB (sf)             9,331,000
            G           BBB- (sf)            9,330,000
            H           BB+ (sf)            16,794,000
            J           BB (sf)              3,733,000
            NR          NR                  44,785,610

   (i)Interest-only class.  (ii)Notional amount.  NR--Not rated.


JPMCC 2011-C3: Fitch Assigns Ratings on Various Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings to JPMCC 2011-C3
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates with a Stable Rating
Outlook:

  -- $81,337,000 class A-1 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $318,728,000 class A-2 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $228,561,000 class A-3 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $125,000,000 class A-3FL 'AAAsf/LS1'#; Outlook Stable;
  -- $485,440,000 class A-4 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,239,066,000 class X-A* 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41,054,000 class B 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52,250,000 class C 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35,455,000 class D 'BBB+sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41,053,000 class E 'BBB-sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9,330,000 class G 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16,794,000 class H 'Bsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3,733,000 class J 'B-sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.
  * Notional amount and interest only
  # Floating Rate

Fitch does not rate the $253,785,610 interest only class X-B, the
$9,331,000 Class F or the $44,785,610 class NR.

Since publication of the presale, three loans have been impacted
by the Borders Group bankruptcy.  Borders Books has announced it
will be closing numerous stores including one in Holyoke Mall (the
largest loan in the pool) one at Clearwater Mall in the IAC
Portfolio (fourth largest loan) and one at Medina Grande Shops
(34th largest loan).  The Borders space makes up approximately
1.6% of the total net rentable area at Holyoke Mall, 1.7% of the
NRA in the IAC Portfolio and 15.3% of NRA at Medina Grande Shops.
The decline in cash flow at the properties did not result in any
adjustment to Fitch's enhancement levels.


KINGSLAND III: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, A-3, B, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes from Kingsland III Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Kingsland
Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings
on the class A-2 and A-3 notes from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with positive implications on Jan. 3, 2011.  S&P also
affirmed its rating on the class A-1 notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed
in the transaction since S&P's last rating action on March 26,
2010.  According to the Feb. 14, 2011 trustee report, the
transaction held $3 million in defaulted assets, down from
$15 million noted in the Feb. 14, 2010 trustee report.  In
addition, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category
were approximately $14 million in February 2011, compared with
$23 million in February 2010.  The class A overcollateralization
ratio test improved to 126.02% in February 2011 from 122.57% in
February 2010.  In addition, the class C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2
ratings were capped by the application of the largest obligor
default supplemental test at the time of S&P's last rating action.
As of February 2011, classes C-1 and C-2 had sufficient credit
enhancement to withstand the combinations of underlying asset
defaults specified by the largest obligor default supplemental
test at the 'BB+ (sf)' rating level.  Classes D-1 and D-2 had
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand the combinations of
underlying asset defaults specified by the largest obligor default
supplemental test at the 'BB (sf)' rating level.

The affirmation of the rating on the class A-1 notes reflects
S&P's view that there is sufficient credit support available to
the class at the current rating level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and will take
rating actions as it deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                        Kingsland III Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
           Class       To          From
           -----       --          ----
           A-2         AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
           A-3         AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           B           BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
           C-1         BB+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
           C-2         BB+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
           D-1         BB (sf)     CCC- (sf)
           D-2         BB (sf)     CCC- (sf)

                        Rating Affirmed

                       Kingsland III Ltd.

                Class                   Rating
                -----                   ------
                A-1                     AAA (sf)


LORAIN COUNTY: S&P Cuts Long-Term Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Lorain County Elderly Housing Corp., Ohio's (International Plaza
and Harr Plaza projects) multifamily housing refunding revenue
bonds series 1993A to 'B' from 'BBB'.  The outlook is stable.

The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion of the decline in debt
service coverage ratio to 0.85x maximum annual debt service (MADS)
for the fiscal year ended 2010; debt service reserve fund funded
at seven months' MADS; and decline in incomes leading to a
deterioration in the expenses ratio.

The above weaknesses are partly offset by S&P's opinion of the
increase in occupancy levels at the property to 98% and annual
rental increases received by the project in 2010.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion of coverage levels
sufficient for the current rating of the property," said Standard
& Poor's credit analyst Renee J. Berson.

International Plaza is located in Lorain, Ohio.  Harr Plaza is
located in Elyria, Ohio.  Both projects are similar in structure
and construction.  Each project contains 99-one bedroom units, and
one two-bedroom unit.


MARATHON CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Marathon CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$273,000,000 CLASS A-1b Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Notes, Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
     $257,687,836.2), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 18,
     2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$12,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     Due 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Deferrable
     Interest Secured Notes, Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$22,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Deferrable
     Interest Secured Notes, Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf);

  -- US$10,200,000 Class D Floating Rate Subordinated Deferrable
     Interest Secured Notes, Due 2019, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily due to an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios, and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action in
June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
primarily due to decrease in the proportion of securities rated
Caa1 and below, since the rating action in June 2009.  As per the
February 2011 trustee report, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 124.3%,
116.0%, 108.6%, and 104.9% respectively, versus April 2009 levels
of 112.3%, 105.0%, 98.4%, and 95.1% respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  In
addition, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are no longer
deferring interest, and the deferred interest had been repaid.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based on the
February 2011 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor
is 2889 compared to 3641 in April 2009, and securities rated Caa1
and below make up approximately 13.6% of the underlying portfolio
versus 21.2% in April 2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease
in defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased to approximately $2.6 million from
$14.8 million in April 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $392 million, defaulted par of $2.6 million,
weighted average default probability of 31.0% (implying a WARF of
4145), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.9%, and
a diversity score of 49.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Marathon CLO II Ltd., issued on December 22, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.  A summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (3316)

  -- Class A-1b: +2
  -- Class A-2: +1
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4974)

  -- Class A-1b: -1
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


MARQUETTE US/EUROPEAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Marquette US/European CLO,
P.L.C.:

  -- US$103,905,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Dollar Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A1(sf); previously on
     August 21, 2009 Downgraded to A2(sf);

  -- US$11,545,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Dollar Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on
     August 21, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3(sf);

  -- EUR86,151,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro
     Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3(sf); previously on August 21,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa1(sf);

  -- US$2,550,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar
     Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on August
     21, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3(sf);

  -- EUR7,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro
     Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on August
     21, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3(sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class C-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes
     Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2(sf); previously on November 23,
     2010 Caa2(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- EUR7,937,000 Class C-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Ba2(sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Caa2(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes
     Due 2020, Upgraded to B3(sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Ca(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- EUR7,540,000 Class D-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to B3(sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Ca(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class E-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes
     Due 2020, Upgraded to Caa3(sf); previously on November 23,
     2010 C(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- EUR2,381,000 Class E-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Caa3(sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     C(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Marquette US/European CLO, P.L.C., issued in July 2006, is a
multi-currency collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans denominated in U.S. dollars,
Euros, and pounds sterling.  All par amounts cited are in U.S.
dollar equivalent.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in August 21,
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of sale proceeds (including higher than previously
anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated February 11, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is 2514 compared to 2615 in the
July 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up
approximately 6.98% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.09% in
July 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about $1.25
million of the underlying portfolio compared to $18.17 million in
July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 126.50%, 116.62%, 108.56% and 106.24%, respectively,
versus July 2009 levels of 118.40%, 109.27%, 101.81% and 99.66%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $309.8 million, defaulted par of $1.25
million, a weighted average default probability of 28.89%
(implying a WARF of 3810), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.25%, and a diversity score of 55.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the double binomial approach
within the Binomial Expansion Technique framework, as described in
Sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.3.7 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology
published in August 2009.

For European obligors whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates, Moody's applied a 0.25 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade to account for lack of credit indicators such as
ratings reviews and outlooks.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (3050)

  -- Class A-1A: +1
  -- Class A-1B: +2
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class B-1: +2
  -- Class B-2: +2
  -- Class C-1: +2
  -- Class C-2: +2
  -- Class D-1: +2
  -- Class D-2: +3
  -- Class E-1: +3
  -- Class E-2: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4574)

  -- Class A-1A: -2
  -- Class A-1B: -1
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B-1: -1
  -- Class B-2: -1
  -- Class C-1: -2
  -- Class C-2: -2
  -- Class D-1: -3
  -- Class D-2: -2
  -- Class E-1: 0
  -- Class E-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue
loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a possible
extension of the actual weighted average life in its analysis.

Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest
and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral
quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels.
Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower of reported and
covenanted values for weighted average rating factor, weighted
average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity score.

The deal has significant exposure to non-US$ denominated assets.
Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact on
interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction,
which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-KEY1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2003-KEY1.  The downgrades are due to further deterioration
in performance relative to the previous full transaction review.
A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this
release.

The downgrades follow increases in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 5.77% for the remaining pool;
expected losses of the original pool are 4.83%, including losses
realized to date.  Approximately 10% of the pool is considered to
be a Fitch Loan of Concern and includes the three specially
serviced loans (6.7%).  At Fitch's last review there were three
loans (5.7%) in special servicing.  Fitch expects classes K
through P to be fully depleted by realized losses on the specially
serviced loans and class J to be significantly impacted.

As of February 2011 distribution date, the transaction, including
the non rated rake bonds, has paid down 22.7% since issuance to
$835.4 million from $1.1 billion.  Seven loans are defeased
(8.2%).

The largest specially serviced loan and largest contributor to
modeled losses is Anchor Bay (4.6%) which is the fourth largest
loan in the transaction.  The loan is secured by a manufactured
housing community in Fair Haven, MI, which is approximately 40
miles northeast of Detroit.  Occupancy has declined to 43.7% as of
year end 2010 and the special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.1%) is the Coast
Savings Building, an office property located in Los Angeles, CA.
The loan has past its maturity date; however, the borrower is
negotiating a sale of the property.

Fitch has downgraded these ratings, amending Loss Severity
ratings, and Recovery Ratings where applicable:

  -- $10.6 million class H to 'CCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $5.3 million class J to 'Csf/RR5' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $5.3 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR5';
  -- $4 million class L to 'Csf/RR6'from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $6.6 million class M to 'Csf/RR6'from CCsf/RR6';
  -- $2.6 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- $1.3 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings and Rating
Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $132.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $50.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $482.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $34.3 million class B at 'AAsf/LS4';
  -- $15.8 million class C at 'Asf/LS5; Outlook Stable';
  -- $25.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf/LS5; Outlook Stable';
  -- $10.6 million class E at 'BBsf/LS5; Outlook Negative';
  -- $11.9 million class F at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.9 million class G at'B-sf/LS5; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $9.1 million class Q, $2.6 million class
WW-1, $4.1 million class WW-2, $12.7 million class W-3, and
interest-only class WW-X.  Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.

Fitch has also withdrawn the rating on the IO class XC.  Class XP
has paid in full.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 80 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 80
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 15 Subprime
deals issued by Merrill Lynch.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC1

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2003-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2002-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2004-FM1

  -- 2004-FM1-M2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 27,
     2007 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- 2004-FM1-M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2002-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-BC4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2003
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC3

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2003
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC2

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC4

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC5

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 2002-AFC1

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes and
affirmed seven classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-Canada
8:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to an increase in subordination from payoffs
and amortization, an increase in defeasance and overall
improvement in the credit quality of underlying portfolio.  The
pool has paid down 45% since securitization and 5% since last
review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.5% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 1.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 4.6% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs, the credit enhancement
level for investment grade classes could decline below the current
levels.  If future performance materially declines, the expected
level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow
waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 23 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 1, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 45% to
$255.86 million from $468.33 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 51 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 48% of the pool.  Seven loans, representing 15% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities, compared to 10% at last review.

Four loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization and
currently there are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results 75% of
the performing pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV is 63% compared
to 72% at last full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual DSCR is 1.49X compared to 1.35X at last full
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and
the loan's actual debt service.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Crosswinds Apartments Loan
($22.5 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 347-
unit, 26-story apartment building located in Ottawa, Ontario.  The
property was 97% leased as of October 2009 compared to 99% at last
full review.  The loan has paid down 12% since securitization and
3% since last full review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67%
and 1.37X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.08X at last full
review.

The second largest loan is the Galeries des Sources Loan
($18.3 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 330,500
square foot community shopping center located in Dollard-Des-
Ormeaux, Quebec, a suburb of Montreal.  As of the December 2009
rent roll, the property was 99% leased.  The loan has paid down
17% since securitization and 4% since last full review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.70X, respectively, compared to
80% and 1.38X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Shaughnessy Station Loan
($13.5 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 121,000
square foot anchored retail/office strip center located in Port
Coquitlam, a suburb of Vancouver.  The property was 96% leased as
of December 2009 compared to 92% at last full review.  The loan
has paid down 17% since securitization and 4% since last full
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.57X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.42X at last review.


METROPOLITAN ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 5 Subprime deals
issued by Metropolitan Asset Funding.  The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II Series, 1998-A

  -- X, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 1998
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- B-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-B

  -- B-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1999-A

  -- X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 1999
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1999-B

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Metropolitan Mortgage Funding, Inc., Series 2000-B

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2003
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999-RM1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed three classes of Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-RM1:

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 10, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool performance and
increased credit subordination levels due to loan payoffs and
amortization.  The pool has amortized 29% since last review.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8.1% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 12.9%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
10.6% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 18 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 9, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to
$51.5 million from $859.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 61% of the pool.  Two loans, representing
17% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  At last review, defeasance represented
6% of the pool.

Nine loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $11.5 million realized loss (20% loss severity on
average).  At Moody's last review the pool had realized an
aggregate loss of $9.9 million.  Currently there is one loan
in special servicing.  The Comfort Suites Loan ($4.0 million --
7.7%) is secured by a 120-key limited service hotel located
in Lexington, North Carolina.  The property has had a poor
performance for the past six years.  The loan was transferred
to special servicer in December 2009 due to monetary default and
has become real estate owned.  The most recent appraisal (January
2010) valued the property at $1.9 million.  Moody's estimates a
loss of $2.6 million for this specially serviced loan (65%
expected loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $1.0 million loss (33% expected loss based on a 65%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 91% and 70% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 63% compared to 88% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 17%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.87X, respectively, compared to
1.16X and 1.51X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 25% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Green Ridge Heights Apartments
Loan ($5.5 million -- 10.7%), which is secured by a 309-unit
apartment complex located in Cleveland, Ohio.  The property was
92% leased as of September 2010 compared to 97% at last review.
Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
81% and 1.27X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.19X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Arbors of Wooster Apartments Loan
($3.9 million -- 7.6%), which is secured by a 118-unit apartment
complex located in Wooster, Ohio.  The property was 88% leased as
of September 2010 compared to 91% at last review.  Performance has
been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 83% and 1.17X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Minaret Village Retail and Office
Center Loan ($3.7 million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 70,000 square feet retail/office center located in Mammoth
Lakes, California.  The center was 100% leased as of December
2009, compared to 99% at securitization.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.46X,
respectively, compared to 47% and 2.43X at last review.


N-45 FIRST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity
ratings to N-45 First CMBS Issuer Corporation, series 2003-1:

  -- $125.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.4 million lass B at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.8 million class C at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.6 million class D at 'Asf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14 million class E at 'BBB-sf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.1 million class F at 'B+sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $13.3 million class G.

Affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance and low
future expected losses following Fitch's prospective review of
potential stresses to the transaction.  Fitch expected losses
are 1.9% of the outstanding balance.  As of the March 2011
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down
63% to $206.3 million from $559.7 million at issuance.  The pool
is concentrated, as 18 of the original 63 loans remain.

There are no specially serviced loans as of the March 2011
remittance report.  One loan (0.2% of the pool) has a debt service
coverage ratio below 1.0 times.  The loan is collateralized by a
retail center in Terrebone, QC.  As of year end 2009, occupancy
had fallen to 50% and the reported DSCR was 0.67x.

Fitch withdraws the interest-only, IO class.


NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 97
tranches from 16 Subprime deals issued by New Century Home Equity
Loan Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: New Century Asset-Backed Floating Rate Certificates,
Series 1998-NC6

-- A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2006
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-5

  -- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-6A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-A

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-B

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-A

  -- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-9, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-II-7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-II-8, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-II-9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-II, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-I, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-II, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-III, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-III, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


NYLIM FLATIRON: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes from NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1 Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation transaction, managed by New York
Life Investment Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Jan. 19, 2011.  S&P also affirmed its 'BB- (sf)'
rating on the class D notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio, as well as a roughly
$80.12 million paydown on the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 note
balances.  As of the Feb. 28, 2011 trustee report, the
transaction did not have any defaulted assets, compared with
the $19.31 million noted in the Nov. 30, 2009 trustee report,
which S&P referenced for its December 2009 rating actions.
Additionally, the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 note balances were
paid down from $300.00 million to $219.88 million over the
same time period.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes.  The
trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Feb. 28, 2011 monthly
report:

* The class B O/C ratio was 130.46%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 122.54% in November 2009;

* The class C O/C ratio was 117.31%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 113.11% in November 2009; and

* The class D O/C ratio was 105.82%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 104.46% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                  NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

                          Rating
                          ------
            Class     To          From
            -----     --          ----
            A-1       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-2       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-3       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            B         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
            C         A+ (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos

                         Rating Affirmed

                  NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

                      Class        Rating
                      -----        ------
                      D            BB- (sf)

  Transaction Information
  -----------------------
Issuer:              NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateral manager:  New York Life Investment Management LLC
Underwriter:         Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Trustee:             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 92
tranches and confirmed the ratings of three tranches from 16
Subprime deals issued by Option One Mortgage Loan Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate Subprime residential mortgages.

In addition, Moody's has withdrawn the ratings of three tranches
from two Subprime deals from the same issuer.  Moody's Investors
Service has withdrawn the credit rating pursuant to published
credit rating methodologies that allow for the withdrawal of the
credit rating if the size of the pool outstanding at the time of
the withdrawal has fallen below a specified level.

Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to pools
with at least 40 loans or a pool factor of greater than 5%.  As a
result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops
below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40 loans
or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005 ).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Woodbridge Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2002
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One/CTS ARM Trust 1996-1

  -- A-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2009 Confirmed at
     A2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)


OWNIT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 5 tranches
from 1 Subprime deal issued by Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on
1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PACIFIC SHORES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on four classes and revised
the Outlook on one class of notes issued by Pacific Shores CDO,
Ltd./Inc.  The rating actions are:

  -- $117,640,305 class A notes affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3''; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative;

  -- $96,000,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

  -- $16,000,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

  -- $25,014,905 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs', for the class A
notes.  Fitch also considered additional qualitative factors into
its analysis to conclude the rating affirmation for the notes.

Since the last rating action in March 2010, the credit quality of
the collateral has remained relatively stable with approximately
15.6% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 3.7
notches and 9.2% upgraded a weighted average of 3.1 notches.
Approximately 66.4% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 36.4% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 63.3% and 35% respectively, at last
review.

While the magnitude of downgrades in the portfolio is greater than
upgrades, amortization of the class A notes sufficiently offsets
the moderate deterioration in the portfolio.  Since the previous
review, the class A notes have received approximately $31.3
million of principal repayment from excess spread and principal
collections due to the failing class A/B overcollateralization
test.

Fitch has revised the Outlook on the class A notes to Stable
reflecting its view that the performance of the underlying
portfolio will remain relatively stable over the next one to two
years.  Fitch does not maintain outlooks for tranches rated 'CCC'
and below.

The Loss Severity rating of 'LS3' for the class A notes indicates
the tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced
by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be
considered in conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.
Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches rated 'CCC' and
below.

Breakeven levels for the class B-1 and B-2 (together, class B) and
class C notes indicated ratings below SF PCM's 'CCC' default
level, the lowest level of defaults projected by SF PCM.  For
these classes, Fitch compared the class's respective credit
enhancement levels to expected losses from the distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower).  This
comparison indicates that default continues to appear probable for
the class B notes and inevitable for the class C notes at or prior
to maturity.

The class B notes are rated to the timely receipt of interest and
continue to receive their accrued interest each payment period.
The class C notes are rated to the ultimate receipt of interest,
and are not expected to receive any interest or principal
distributions going forward.

Pacific Shores is a cash flow structured finance collateralized
debt obligation that closed on June 27, 2002, and is managed by
Pacific Investment Management Co.  The portfolio is comprised of
63.4% residential mortgage-backed securities, 16.3% commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities, 11.6% corporate debt, 7.7%
commercial mortgage-backed securities and 1% SF CDOs from
primarily 1995 through 2004 vintage transactions.


PARK PLACE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 42 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 42
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 7 Subprime
deals issued by Park Place Securities, Inc. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-MCW1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-MHQ1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WHQ1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WHQ2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WWF1

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PEOPLE'S CHOICE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches from 2 Subprime deals issued by People's Choice Home Loan
Securities Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2008
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PHOENIX CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Phoenix CLO III, Ltd.:

  -- US$336,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Notes (Current
     Balance of $320,905,338), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$37,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Notes, Upgraded to Aa3
     (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$33,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Notes, Upgraded to A3
     (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$24,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Notes,
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Notes,
     Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$13,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Notes,
     Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 C (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- US$3,000,000 Class F Combination Notes Notes (Current Rated
     Balance of $2,390,707), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated February 7, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2459 compared to 2740
in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 5.75% of the underlying portfolio versus
12.57% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $9.4 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$27.0 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in June 2009.  The Class AB,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
117.9%, 111.1% and 106.2%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels
of 111.3%, 105.1% and 100.5%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's
also notes that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer
deferring interest and that all previously deferred interest has
been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $456.4 million, defaulted par of $11.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 29.07%
(implying a WARF of 3730), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 42.88%, and a diversity score of 65.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Phoenix CLO III, Ltd., previously known as Avenue CLO VI, Ltd.,
and issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.  This is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (2984)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3
  -- Class F: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4476)

  -- Class A-1: -2
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -3
  -- Class F: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


PHOENIX INDUSTRIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-' on the Phoenix Industrial Development Authority,
Ariz.'s education revenue bonds (Career Success Charter Schools
Project), series 2009.  The rating outlook is stable.

"The rating action reflects S&P's view of the charter school's
weak coverage of maximum annual debt service in fiscal 2010,
leading to a bond covenant violation," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Kenneth Gacka.

Enrollment was 829 in fiscal 2007 but dropped to 752 in fiscal
2008 due to the loss of a lease at one of the schools.  Since
fiscal 2008, enrollment rose consistently to 775 in fiscal 2009
and 866 in fiscal 2010.  The current enrollment in fiscal 2011 has
grown to 1,098, which is what S&P considers good growth from the
prior year, but is substantially less than management's budgeted
estimate of 1,585.  The lower-than-expected enrollment was partly
due to the school's Jefferson Campus opening six weeks late,
according to management.  In order to increase enrollment, school
officials are focusing on enhancing marketing, offering summer
school programs, and growing enrollment in the cosmetology
program.

Fiscal 2010 was a challenging year financially as the school had
the costs associated with its new buildings but not the enrollment
that it expected.  The school posted a $496,000 operating loss
in fiscal 2010, which excluded a $175,000 write-off of prior
bond issuance costs.  Based on these results, Standard & Poor's
calculates lease-adjusted maximum annual debt service coverage to
be 0.4x, which S&P considers very thin.  Coverage cited in the
audit is 0.9x, which is still thin, in S&P's opinion, and below
the school's covenanted ratio.  Liquidity was also impacted in
fiscal 2010, declining to about $277,000, or what S&P considers a
limited 17 days' cash on hand.  Unrestricted net assets were
negative $654,000 in fiscal 2010 compared to negative $114,000 in
fiscal 2009.  The school's fiscal 2011 budget assumed much higher
enrollment than was actually realized, so S&P expects actual
revenues and expenditures to be substantially different at year-
end.  S&P understand that the school adjusted staffing levels in
response to the lower-than-anticipated enrollment.

Unaudited year-to-date results through Jan. 31, 2011 (seven months
ended), show improved overall results for the school, with an
operating surplus of $300,000 and lease-adjusted MADS coverage
equal to 1.4x, according to S&P's calculations.  S&P is concerned
that revenues are likely somewhat overstated for this period,
however, as the year-to-date revenues are based on estimated
enrollment of 1,183 submitted to the state prior to the start of
the school year, rather than the school's actual enrollment.  It
is typical in the state for payments to be made initially based on
estimated enrollment figures and then subsequently adjusted at
different points in the year based on actual enrollment.  S&P
understands that these adjustments have not yet been initiated by
the state.  As such, S&P believes that results, while better, are
likely less than the improvement indicated in the year-to-date
financials.


POPULAR ABS: Moody's Corrects Press Release on Note Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected a March 18 press release
on the 17 tranches from 2 Subprime deals issued by Popular ABS.
According to Moody's, the March 18 release provided an incorrect
link to the list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity
analysis.  The revised release is:

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 17
tranches from 2 Subprime deals issued by Popular ABS.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on 6 Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 0.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
5.0% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the
world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 21 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 8, 2010.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to
$263.0 million from $396.2 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 64% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with
investment-grade credit estimates that represent 20% of the pool.
At Moody's prior review, there were four loans with credit
estimates.  The Lawson Height --ASC-SAS Loan recently paid off and
the Inn Vest Portfolio no longer has a credit estimate due to
increased leverage.  Two loans, representing 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with Canadian Government
securities.

To date, the pool has not experienced any losses and there are no
loans in special servicing.  Currently, there are ten loans,
representing 16% of the pool, on the master servicer's watchlist.
The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 for 82% of the non-
defeased loans in the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV is 76%
compared to 73% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.49X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.50X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with an investment-grade credit estimate is the
Crombie Portfolio ($44.6 million -- 17.0% of the pool), which is
secured by seven cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans
secured by seven retail and mixed use properties located in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland.  As of December 2009,
the portfolio was 89% leased compared to 88% at last review.
Performance remains stable.  Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.41X, essentially the same as at
Moody's prior review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is the Royal Centre
Loan ($9.4 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
163,844 square foot office building with ground floor retail
located in Vaughan, Ontario.  The largest tenant is the Royal Bank
of Canada, which leases 25% of the NRA through May 2020.  As of
March 2011, the property was 92% leased compared to 95% at last
review.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.31X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.12X at last review.

The loan that previously had a credit estimate is the InnVest Loan
($14.7 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by two
hotels located in London and Scarborough, Ontario.  The Delta
Armoires London hotel is a 245-key full service hotel in downtown
London proximate to the convention center and hockey rink.  The
Holiday Inn Scarborough is a 140-key limited service hotel
approximately 15 miles north of Pearson International Airport.
For the 12-month period ending December 2009, the portfolio's
occupancy and revenue per available room were 57% and $64.55,
respectively, compared to 66% and $77.51, at year-end 2008.  The
portfolio's performance has continued to decline and the loan is
on the watchlist.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.4X,
respectively, compared to 64% and 2.15X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is The Landing Loan ($28.6 million --
10.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 183,058 square foot
office building located in the historic Gastown district of
downtown Vancouver, British Columbia.  The largest tenant is
Intrawest, which leases 20% of the net rentable area through
December 2012.  As of January 2010, the property was 92% leased,
essentially the same as at Moody's prior review.  The loan has
amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
88% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.13X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Dominion Square Loan
($27.99 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $54.9 million first mortgage loan.  The loan
is secured by a 374,402 square foot mixed-use building on St.
Catherine Street in downtown Montreal.  As of March 2010, the
property was 96% leased, the same as at last review and 72% at
securitization.  The largest tenants are The Montreal Gazette (21%
of the NRA; lease expiration in December 2018), Travaux Publique
du Canada (20% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2018) and
Societe Immobiliere du Quebec (9% of the NRA; lease expiration in
January 2011).  Approximately 32% of the NRA is leased to local
and provincial government agencies.  While the property's
occupancy has improved since securitization, rental rates have
declined since last review.  Based on the March 2010 rent roll,
total income is 15% lower than at last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.89X, respectively, compared 91% and
1.07X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sandman Portfolio Loan
($15.8 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by four
full service hotels located in British Columbia (3) and Alberta
(1).  All four hotels are operated and managed by Sandman Hotels.
Performance remain stable.  As of December 2009, the portfolio's
occupancy and RevPAR were 53% and $53.03, respectively, compared
to 59% and $56.20 in 2008.  The loan has amortized 4% since last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.9X,
respectively, compared to 46% and 2.78X at last review.


REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 18 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-2:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.6% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 5%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 19 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 4th, 2010.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $360 million
from $412 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 60% of
the pool.  Three loans, representing 2% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by Canadian Government securities.  The pool
contains five loans with investment grade credit estimates,
representing 30% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $30,000 (1% loss
severity).  One loan, representing less then 1% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing, the same at last review.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $170,000 loss (50% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$2 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 68%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 78% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.32X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 1.22X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

There are five loans with credit estimates that make up 30% of the
pool.  The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Crombie Pool
A Loan ($33.4 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by
five retail centers located throughout the provinces of Nova
Scotia, Newfoundland and New Brunswick.  The portfolio totals
579,000 square feet with County Fair Mall, 260,000 SF, as the
largest property.  As of December 2009, the portfolio was 84%
leased, compared to 90% at last review and 95% at securitization.
The portfolio's largest tenants are Sobey's (25% of the net
rentable area; lease expirations vary); Zellers (18% of the NRA;
lease expiration in March 2020) and Sears Canada (5% of the NRA;
lease expiration in October 2029).  The decline in net operating
income from securitization has been partially offset by principal
amortization.  The loan is structured with a 25-year amortization
schedule and has amortized 10% since securitization.  The loan
sponsor is Crombie Development which is a subsidiary of the Empire
Company and owns Sobeys.  Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.34X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.29X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Trinity Crossing
Orleans Loan ($29.7 million -- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 191,000 SF shopping center located in the Ottawa suburb of
Orleans, Ontario.  The center is shadow-anchored by Loblaws
Supermarket, which is not part of the collateral.  As of February
2010, the property was 100% leased, essentially the same as last
review and at securitization.  The largest tenant's are Winners
(24% of the NRA; lease expiration in May 2016); Value Village
(15% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2019) and Michael's
(11% of the NRA; lease expiration in August 2016).  The loan was
previously on the watchlist due to the bankruptcy of Linen 'N
Things which occupied 15% of the NRA at securitization.  The space
formerly occupied by Linen 'N Things has been leased to Value
Village at the same rental rate previously paid by Linen 'N
Things.  Property's performance has been stable and the loan
benefits from principal amortization.  The loan has amortized 7%
since securitization.  The loan is full recourse to RioCan REIT,
the sponsor.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.07X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 0.99X at
last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Sandman Vancouver
Hotel Loan ($22.5 million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 302-room full service hotel located in downtown Vancouver,
British Columbia.  For the 12-month period ending December 2009,
revenue per available room and occupancy were $56 and 53%
respectively, compared with $68 and 64% at last review, and $67
and 65% at securitization.  Performance has declined due to lower
occupancy levels for 2009.  The loan is structured on a 20-year
amortization schedule and has amortized 15% since securitization.
The loan is full recourse to Northland Properties, the sponsor.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.50X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.72X at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the Merivale Market
Shopping Center Loan ($13.9 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 79,000 SF grocery-anchored shopping center located in
the Ottawa suburb of Nepean, Ontario.  As of February 2010, the
property was 100% leased, similar at last review, compared to 95%
at securitization.  The largest tenants are Food Basics (44% of
the NRA; lease expiration in May 2026) and Shopper's Drug Mart
(22% of the NRA; lease expiration in October 2016).  Performance
has been stable.  The loan has amortized 7% since securitization.
The loan is full recourse to RioCan REIT, the sponsor.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and .99X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.00X at last review.

The fifth loan with a credit estimate is the Abbey Plaza Loan
($8.3 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000
SF grocery-anchored shopping center located in Oakville, Ontario.
As of April 2010, the property was 100% leased, essentially the
same as at last review and securitization.  The largest tenant is
Sobey's (47% of the NRA; lease expiration in September 2015).
Performance has been stable.  The loan is structured on a 20-year
amortization schedule and has amortized 14% since securitization.
The loan is full recourse to RioCan REIT, the sponsor.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 1.94X,
respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.78X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 23% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest conduit loan is the Distillery District
Loan ($30.6 million -- 8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
328,434 SF mixed-use property that is an historic landmark located
in downtown Toronto, Ontario.  As of December 2009, the property
was 96% leased compared to 98% at securitization.  Performance has
been stable.  The largest tenant is Toronto Artscape (15% of the
NRA; lease expiration in August 2022).  The loan is structured
with a 25-year amortization schedule and has amortized 10% since
securitization.  The loan is full recourse to Dundee REIT, the
sponsor.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.32X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Dominion Square Loan
($27.4 million -- 7.6% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $54.8 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by a 12-story, 374,402 SF mixed-use building located on
St. Catherine Street in downtown Montreal, Quebec.  As March 2010,
the property was 96% leased compared to 72% at securitization.
The largest tenants are The Montreal Gazette (21% of the NRA;
lease expiration in December 2018); Travaux Publique du Canada
(20% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2018) and Societe
Immobiliere du Quebec (9% of the NRA; lease expiration in January
2011).  Approximately 32% of the NRA is leased to local and
provincial government agencies.  While the property's occupancy
levels have improved since securitization, rental revenue has
decreased by 15% due to lower rental rates for new and renewing
tenants.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.89X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.07X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Crombie Pool B Loan
($25 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a three
anchored retail centres and one mixed-use property located in
Novia Scotia and New Brunswick.  The portfolio totals 800,000
square feet, with properties ranging in size from 71,000 SF to
386,000 SF with the largest property being Aberdeen Shopping
Centre.  As December 2009, the property was 82% leased compared to
90% at securitization.  The sponsor is Crombie Developments, which
is a subsidiary of the Empire Company, owner's of Sobey.  Loan
maturities range from April 2014 to April 2018.  Performance has
declined due to drop in revenues and increased operating expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.17X, respectively,
compared to 80% and 1.28X at securitization.


RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-1 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of Rite Aid Pass-
Through Trust Certificates, Series 1999-1:

  -- Class A-1, Affirmed at B3; previously on Nov 29, 2000
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Class A-2, Affirmed at B3; previously on Nov 29, 2000
     Downgraded to B3

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the Certificates are affirmed at B3 based on the
value of the collateral supporting the Certificates and the
current rating of Rite Aid (senior unsecured debt rating Caa3/Ca,
stable outlook).

This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the
rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on the
senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of
the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined; the dark value must be sufficient, assuming a
bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of the lease, to support
the expected loss consistent with the certificates' rating.
Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the possibility of lease
affirmations by the tenant and for the landlord's claim for lease
rejection damages in bankruptcy.  Moody's also may give credit for
some amortization of the debt, depending upon the rating of the
credit tenant.  In addition, Moody's considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction.  The
certificates' rating may change as the senior unsecured debt
rating (or the corporate family rating) of the tenant changes.

There were no models used in the review of this transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's prior
full review is summarized in a press release dated May 12, 2010.

                        Deal Performance

The Certificates are supported by a portfolio of 53 drug stores
located in 14 states and the District of Columbia.  Each property
is subject to a fully bondable, triple net lease guaranteed by
Rite Aid.  Residual insurance covers 51 of the 53 properties and
is provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company (senior unsecured
debt rating of A2, stable outlook).  The two properties not
covered by the residual insurance secure loans that fully amortize
by the lease expiration.

Rite Aid is headquartered in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.  Rite Aid
provides pharmacy services as well as over-the-counter medication
and household items.  As of February 27, 2010, the company
operated 4,780 retail drugstores located in 31 states and the
District of Columbia.


SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2004-CF2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
Schooner Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-CF2:

  -- A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004 Definitive
     Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004 Definitive
     Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004 Definitive
     Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2004 Definitive
     Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
5.8% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 18 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 8, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to $283.8
million from $363.3 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 52 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
58% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with investment
grade credit estimates that represent 13% of the pool.  Six loans,
representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with Canadian Government securities.

Three loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization.  There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 85%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV is 71% compared to 77%
at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.36X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Daimler Chrysler
Building Loan ($26.2 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 197,000 square foot Class A office and retail
building located in Windsor, Ontario.  The property was 88% leased
as of April 2010 compared to 100% as of March 2009 and 100% at
securitization.  The largest tenant is Chrysler Canada which
leases approximately 67% of the property's net rentable area
through August 2022.  Although occupancy has decreased,
performance remains stable and the loan benefits from
amortization.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.14X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.11X at
last review.

The second loan with credit estimate rating is the Confederation
Mall Loan ($10.5 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by
a 327,000 SF retail center located in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
The property was 94% leased as of November 2010 compared to 90% as
of December 2009.  Wal-Mart vacated its space (148,647 SF -- 45%
of the NRA) prior to its January 2011 lease expiration.  Canadian
Tire has leased most of the space vacated by Wal-Mart (129,600
SF -- 40% of the NRA) as of March 2011 through March 2026.
Moody's does not anticipate the co-tenancy clauses pertaining to
Wal-Mart to have a material impact on the property's performance.
The loan is structured with a 25-year amortization schedule and
has amortized 6% since the last review.  The loan is 100% recourse
to the borrower.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Baa3 and 1.56X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.46X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the PD Kanco Multifamily Portfolio
($36.4 million -- 12.8% of the pool), which is secured by seven
multifamily properties totaling 736 units located in Ontario.  The
portfolio was 97% leased as of December 2009 compared to 94% as of
December 2008.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.01X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Westmount Square Loan ($26 million
-- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 330,000 SF Class A
office and retail complex located in Montreal, Quebec.  The
complex is approximately 75% office space and 25% retail space.
The property was 95% leased as of February 2010 compared to 93% at
securitization.  The loan is structured with a 25-year
amortization schedule and is 100% recourse to the borrower.
Performance has improved since securitization due to increasing
base rents.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.54X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.32X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Stillwater Creek Retirement
Community Loan ($15.3 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 204-unit facility offering independent living,
assisted living and retirement care services located in Nepean,
Ontario.  The property was 87% leased as of March 2010 compared to
95% as of March 2009 and 98% at securitization.  Despite the
decline in occupancy, performance remains stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.88X, respectively, compared to 63% and
1.79X at last review.


SKY LAKES: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Sky Lakes Medical
Center, Oregon as part of its continuous surveillance effort:

  -- Approximately $39.3 million Klamath Falls Intercommunity
     Hospital Authority (Oregon) revenue and refunding bonds
     (Merle West Medical Center Project), series 2006, upgraded
     to 'BBB-' from 'BB';

  -- Approximately $12.8 million Klamath Falls Intercommunity
     Hospital Authority (Oregon) revenue and refunding bonds
     (Merle West Medical Center Project), series 2002, upgraded
     to 'BBB-' from 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The rating upgrade to 'BBB-' from 'BB' reflects the sharp
     improvement in Sky Lakes' financial profile since fiscal year
     end 2009 which has produced operating, debt and liquidity
     metrics that are now in line with the low end of Fitch's
     'BBB' category medians.

  -- Sky Lakes posted operating EBITDA margins of 14.3% and 9.2%
     in fiscal 2010 and 2009, respectively, which exceed the 2010
     'BBB' category median of 8.7% and reflect management's tight
     cost control and revenue cycle initiatives.

  -- Sky Lakes unrestricted cash and investments position at Dec.
     31, 2010 is double the level at fiscal year end 2008.  As a
     result, days cash on hand, cushion and cash to debt ratios
     all exceed the respective 'BBB' category medians.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Fitch expects operating profitability to be tempered by the
     effects of the recession on utilization and a deterioration
     in payor mix.

  -- With Medcaid payors accounting for 15.1% of gross revenues in
     2010, the Oregon State legislature's proposed 19% reduction
     in Medicaid rates could materially depress operating
     performance.

Security:

Debt payments are secured by a pledge of the gross revenues of Sky
Lakes, a mortgage, and a debt service reserve fund.

Credit Summary:

The rating upgrade to 'BBB-' from 'BB' is supported by Sky
Lakes' sharp improvement in financial profile, which exhibits
profitability and liquidity metrics consistent with the 'BBB'
rating category.  Over the last two fiscal years, Sky Lakes has
implemented a performance improvement plan focused on tight
expense control, improved productivity, reduced capital spending,
and strong revenue cycle management.  With strong growth in net
patient revenues and better expense control measures, Sky Lakes
posted operating and operating EBITDA margins of 7.4% and 14.3% in
fiscal 2010, respectively, which exceed the respective Fitch 'BBB'
category medians of 1.9% and 8.7%.

Further, Sky Lakes' balance sheet has been strengthened by strong
cash flow generation and improved revenue collection which has
produced liquidity measures that are consistent with the current
rating.  As of Sept. 30, 2010, Sky Lakes had $41.4 million in
unrestricted cash and investments, equating to 115.1 DCOH, 9.0
times cushion ratio, and a 79.2% cash-to-debt which are consistent
with Fitch's 'BBB' category medians.  Fitch also notes that Sky
Lakes investment portfolio is anchored by a revised investment
policy that has capped equity exposure to no more than 45%, unlike
prior years when Sky Lakes' unrestricted investments were solely
in equities.  Fitch believes that the revised policy will lessen
Sky Lakes' balance sheet volatility providing more stability to
its currently adequate liquidity position.  Sky Lakes' debt
profile includes $52.1 million in revenue bonds outstanding, all
of which are in fixed rate mode.  Maximum annual debt service
requirement totals $4.6 million and coverage by EBITDA in fiscal
year 2010 was a very strong 5.6x.

Credit concerns reflect a challenging operating environment as
evidenced by flat patient utilization and potential reductions in
Medicaid reimbursement rates.  Management reports that a weak
economy has led to a shift in payor mix to Medicaid and away from
commercial payors.  In addition, utilization trends have been
flat.  While Sky Lakes has been successful in enhancing
productivity through tight labor expense control, profitability is
likely to decline from 2010 performance absent gradual improvement
in the local economy and patient volume growth.  In addition, the
Oregon legislature has proposed a 19% reduction in Medicaid
reimbursement rates.  While this remains preliminary, Sky Lakes
operations are likely to be challenged by some measure of
reimbursement reduction, which should further suppress
profitability.  Management believes that its FY 2011 results
remain ahead of budget (3.5% operating margin), and it will
address any rate reductions in its 2012 budget through further
labor expense reductions and productivity enhancements.

The Stable Rating Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that
management will continue to post good operating results, maintain
sound liquidity measures, meet its budget targets, and be able to
adapt to a challenging operating/payor mix environment.

Sky Lakes Medical Center (formerly Merle West Medical Center) is
located in Klamath Falls, Oregon, and operates a 100 staffed-bed
general acute-care community hospital and several clinics.  In
fiscal 2010, Sky Lakes generated approximately $168.2 million in
total operating revenues.  Sky Lakes covenants to provide annual
and quarterly disclosure through the Municipal Rule Making Board's
EMMA system.


SLATE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded two
and affirmed five classes of Slate CDO 2007-1, Ltd.  The classes
affected by the action is a result of an Event of Default and the
subsequent direction of the Trustee to liquidate the pool of
reference obligations and cash collateral as a post-event-of-
default remedy.  Moody's has been notified by the Trustee that a
final distribution of liquidation proceeds has taken place; with
the exception of retention of a small amount of reserve funds.
The ratings on the transaction will be subsequently withdrawn.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A1SA, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Class A1SB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Class A1J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Class A2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Class A3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Class B1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Class B2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action taken reflects the changes in severity of loss
associated with certain tranches and reflect the final liquidation
distribution.

Moody's Investors Service will withdraw the credit ratings
pursuant to published credit rating methodologies that allow for
the withdrawal of the credit rating if an obligation is no longer
outstanding.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 131
tranches and confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from 20 Alt-A
deals issued by Structured Asset Securities Corp.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

Moody's is also reinstating the rating on Class 3-A2 from
Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-35.  The rating on
this tranche was previously withdrawn due to an administrative
error.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was the "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.1%.  In addition,
if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-32

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AP, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-33H

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-34A

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-35

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Reinstated to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AP, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-37A

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-I, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-38

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AP, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-40A

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-12H

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AP, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AP, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A8, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-18H

  -- Cl. A4, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-22

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-2AC

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-5H

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-16H

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BX-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BX-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-3

  -- Cl. CAX, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-4H

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AP, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts Ratings on 2003-1 Units to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these units issued by Structured Asset Trust Unit
Repackaging CBT Series 2003-1:

  -- CBT Series 2003-1 Units Trust of US$24,000,000 Units,
     Upgraded to Ba1; previously on January 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

                        Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
ratings of the pool of Underlying Securities and the legal
structure of the transaction.  The rating action is a result of
the improvement of the average credit quality of the Underlying
Securities which are comprised of 24 corporate bonds.  The
Underlying Securities include debts of General Motors Acceptance
Corp, upgraded on February 7, 2011 from a B3 to B1, and Limited
Brands, upgraded on March 7, 2011 from Ba3 to Ba2.  Currently
87.5% of the portfolio's securities have investment grade ratings,
and the lowest security rating is B1.  The current expected loss
of the portfolio is consistent with the expected loss implied by a
Ba1 rating.


TERWIN MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-1B From 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
A-1B to 'AAA (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' from Terwin Mortgage Trust
2007-2ALT.  In addition, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on
class A-1A and removed it from CreditWatch negative.

On Oct. 27, 2008, as part of a larger review of U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities backed by Alternative-A collateral,
S&P incorrectly lowered its rating on class A-1B to 'CCC (sf)'
from 'BBB (sf)' and removed it from CreditWatch negative.  The
corrected rating reflects S&P's view of the allocation of losses
based on the relevant transaction documents.

S&P placed its rating on class A-1A on CreditWatch with negative
implications on Jan. 18, 2011, due to potential counterparty risk
associated with this transaction.  Based on S&P's analysis of
the transaction cash flows incorporating S&P's projected stress
scenarios, S&P believes that the transaction can meet scheduled
payments of interest and principal without relying on payments
from the hedge.  The affirmation of the rating on class A-1A and
its removal from CreditWatch negative also reflects S&P's belief
that there is sufficient credit enhancement to cover its projected
losses under S&P's stress scenarios associated with this rating
level.

The collateral backing this transaction consists of closed-end,
fixed and adjustable-rate, first-lien, Alt-A mortgage loans
secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                        Rating Corrected

                 Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-2ALT
                        Series 2007-2ALT

                                 Rating
                                 ------
  Class  CUSIP      Current   Oct. 27, 2008  Pre-Oct. 27, 2008
  -----  -----      -------   -------------  -----------------
  A-1B   88157JAL8  AAA (sf)  CCC (sf)       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Rating Action

                 Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-2ALT
                        Series 2007-2ALT

                                 Rating
                                 ------
    Class  CUSIP        To                  From
    -----  -----        --                  ----
    A-1A   88157JAA2    AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg


TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on $42 Mil. Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'D' ratings on
TIERS Corporate Bond-Backed Certs Trust LUMB 1997-12's $42 million
amortizing (interest-only) and ZFT (principal) certificates.

S&P's ratings on the two certificate classes from the transaction
are dependent on S&P's rating on the underlying security,
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.'s 8.45% surplus notes due Dec. 1,
2097 (not rated).

The rating actions follow the rating withdrawal on the underlying
security.


TOPIARY CAPITAL: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'BB+ (sf)'
rating on Topiary Capital Ltd.'s series 2008-1 notes on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the issuer's submission of an
activation notice to Risk Management Solutions related to the
March 11, 2011, earthquake in Japan.  If RMS determines that the
earthquake is an activation event, then the noteholders will be at
risk for losses of principal and interest for subsequent covered
events that occur from March 11 through July 31.

When S&P assigned a rating on the notes in 2008, S&P indicated
that, upon the occurrence of the initial activation event, S&P
could lower its rating on the notes to 'CCC (sf)', depending on
when the activation event occurred.  Slightly more than four
months remain until the notes are no longer at risk for a covered
event, so S&P does not expect to lower the rating to 'CCC (sf)'.
As S&P receive updated information, S&P will take the appropriate
rating action.  If the March 11 quake is not an activation event,
S&P will remove the rating from CreditWatch negative, and the
notes will remain rated 'BB+ (sf)'.

                          Ratings List

                       CreditWatch Action

                      Topiary Capital Ltd.

                             To                     From
                             --                     ----
    Series 2008-1 notes      BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BB+ (sf)


UNITED ARTISTS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 1995-A Certs. to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc. 1995-A Pass Through Trust 9.3% Pass Through
Certificates, Series 1995-A:

  -- 1995-A, Upgraded to B3; previously on Apr 11, 2000 Downgraded
     to Caa3

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating of the Certificates is upgraded due to a significant
decline in the dark loan to value value of the underlying
collateral due to principal amortization as well as the credit
quality of the credit tenant.  As of the January 2011 distribution
date, the Certificate balance has paid down by approximately 74%
to $31 million from $117 million.

The underlying collateral was originally leased to United Artists
Theatre, which declared bankruptcy in September 2000.  The
Anschutz Corporation purchased controlling interests in Regal
Cinemas, United Artists and Edwards Theatres out of bankruptcy.
The three companies were consolidated into Regal Entertainment
Group, which went public in May 2002.  The current senior
unsecured rating of Regal Entertainment Group is B3, stable
outlook.

This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the
rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on the
senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of
the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined; the dark value must be sufficient, assuming a
bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of the lease, to support
the expected loss consistent with the certificates' rating.
Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the possibility of lease
affirmations by the tenant and for the landlord's claim for lease
rejection damages in bankruptcy.  Moody's also may give credit for
some amortization of the debt, depending upon the rating of the
credit tenant.  In addition, Moody's considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction.  The
certificates' rating may change as the senior unsecured debt
rating (or the corporate family rating) of the tenant changes.

There were no models used in the review of this transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's prior
full review is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2000.

                        Deal Performance

As of the January 2011 distribution date the Certificate
balance has paid down by approximately 74% to $31 million from
$117 million.  The transaction is supported by a portfolio of
movie theatres that are subject to fully bondable, triple net
leases to Regal.  The lease payments are sufficient to pay all
principal and interest for the Certificates.  However, the
Certificates are not obligations of, nor guaranteed by Regal
Entertainment Group.

Regal is headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee.  Regal operates
the largest and most geographically diverse theatre circuit in the
United States, consisting of 6,683 screens in 537 theatres in 37
states and the District of Columbia as of February 24, 2011, with
over 244 million annual attendees for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2009.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-C28 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative 15
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-
C28 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, primarily due
to an increase in specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default.  Fitch modeled
losses of 10.8% (10.8% cumulative transaction losses which
includes losses realized to date).  Fitch expects losses on
specially serviced loans to deplete classes G through P and a
portion of class F.  As of February 2011, there are cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $11.2 million currently
affecting classes H through Q.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 2.03% to $3.5 billion from
$3.6 billion at issuance.  There are no defeased loans in this
transaction.

Fitch has identified 68 loans (32.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 27 specially serviced loans (18.3%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Four Seasons
Resort and Club - Dallas loan (4.97%) which is collateralized by
a full-service hotel property located in Irving, TX.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due to monetary
default and is more than 90 days delinquent.  Property performance
has deteriorated as NOI declined 16% from YE2009 to YE2010.  There
has also been a decrease in DSCR to 0.46 times at YE2010 from
0.55x at YE2009.  The property is currently REO and the strategy
for resolution is to hold the asset until property renovations are
complete and market conditions improve.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the Montclair
Plaza loan (5.39%) which is collateralized by a 1.4 million square
foot regional mall located in Montclair, CA, approximately 30
miles east of Los Angeles anchored by Macy's, JC Penney and Sears.
The property transferred to special servicing in June 2010 due to
monetary default.  The latest servicer-reported occupancy was 80%
as of December 2009, and the corresponding DSCR was 0.99x.  The
mall faces increased competition with a nearby outlet mall and
lifestyle center and completed renovations in 2008 to better
position itself against the competing centers.  Negotiations on
the resolution of this loan are ongoing with a deed-in-lieu as a
potential outcome.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the Westin
Falls Church loan (1.82%) which is collateralized by a full-
service hotel property in Falls Church, VA, approximately 12 miles
west of Washington DC.  Occupancy for the property is at 64% as of
June 2010 which is in-line with performance at YE2009.  The DSCR
is 1.14x as of June 2010 where DSCR at YE2009 was 1.16x.  The loan
is current, and the servicer continues to monitor the performance
of the loan.

In total, there are currently 27 loans (18.3%) in special
servicing which consists of 13 loans (9.08%) in foreclosure, four
loans (0.8%) that are 90 days delinquent, and 10 loans (8.43%)
that are REO.

At Fitch's last review there were eight loans (3.7%) in special
servicing consisting of one loan (1.07%) that was 90 days
delinquent, three loans (1.55%) in foreclosure and four loans
(1.86%) that are REO.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings, Loss Severity
ratings and Outlooks to these classes as indicated:

  -- $278.6 million class A-J to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'BBBsf/LS3';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.5 million class B to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $58.4 million class C to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $31.5 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $49.4 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR6' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $40.4 million class F to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $40.4 million class G to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $40.4 million class H to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $44.9 million class J to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $18 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $9 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $13.5 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4.5 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $9 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR1';

  -- $9 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR4'.

Prior to the downgrades the above classes were on Rating Watch
Negative.

Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings and Outlooks to these classes
as indicated:

  -- $417.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $168.4 million class A-PB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $215 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $802.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $591 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $250 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $359.5 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Prior to the affirmation class A-M was on Rating Watch Negative.

Class A-1 has been paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the ratings of
the interest only class IO.


WHITEHORSE I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by WhiteHorse I Ltd.:

  -- Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due September 2016, Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
     (sf);

  -- Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2016, Upgraded
     to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf);

  -- Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2016, Upgraded
     to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1
     (sf);

  -- Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due September 2016, Upgraded
     to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1
     (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1LA Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 70% or $84.2 million since the
rating action in August 2009.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved.
The Senior Class A, Class A, and Class B-1L overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 126.24%, 113.39%, and 107.90%,
respectively, versus August 2009 levels of 115.56%, 108.92%, and
104.71%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has improved moderately since the last rating action.
Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2516 compared to 2562 in August 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 3.7% of the
underlying portfolio versus approximately 8.9% in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $109 million, defaulted par of
$6.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 23.2%
(implying a WARF of 3665), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45.0%, and a diversity score of 46.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

WhiteHorse I Ltd., issued in July 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes of various default probabilities.  This is a
summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2932)

  -- Class A-1LA: 0
  -- Class A-1LB: 0
  -- Class A-2L: +3
  -- Class A-3L: +2
  -- Class B-1L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4398)

  -- Class A-1LA: 0
  -- Class A-1LB: 0
  -- Class A-2L: -1
  -- Class A-3L: -2
  -- Class B-1L: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level
of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties
of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1.  Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
    is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
    continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
    high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
    sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
    notes' ratings.

2.  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
    defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
    be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
    overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
    recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
    selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
    Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
    the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
    potential volatility in market prices.

3.  Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
    the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
    risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
    value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
    an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
    the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
    asset's current market value.


YONKERS INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Rating to Housing Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed the Ba1 rating on Yonkers Industrial
Development Agency, NY Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (Herriot
Street Housing, L.P. Project), Series 2004 which removes it from
Watchlist following a review of cash flow and parity sufficiency
for the life of the bonds, and assuming a 0% reinvestment rate.
This action affects $13.6 million in debt.

The bonds are secured by a mortgage that is guaranteed by a Fannie
Mae Stand-by Credit Enhancement Instrument and were structured
without a Guaranteed Investment Contract that assures a fixed rate
of return on invested cash.  This subjects the transaction to
interest rate risk on retained revenues.  As a result, revenue
from the monthly mortgage receipts, interest earned on those
receipts from money market funds or other short-term Investments,
and monthly mortgage payments need to be sufficient to support
debt service on the bonds.  Additionally, at all times the ratio
of the value of the assets held by the trustee, consisting of the
amortized value of the credit enhanced mortgage and funds pledged
to bondholders, to the bonds outstanding and accrued interest to
any redemption date, should exceed 100%.

Based on information Moody's have received, Moody's believes that
estimated future cash flow breaks and declines in the parity ratio
are primarily due to the failure to redeem bonds as directed under
the indenture.  Also contributing to the projected shortfalls are
the very low investments earnings over the past few years.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

A contribution of funds by the borrower to correct the likelihood
of a future debt service shortfall.

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

A further deterioration in asset to liability ratio


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 18 Bonds From 10 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 18 bonds in 10 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D', as the bonds have
incurred a principal write-down.  In addition, Fitch has assigned
class N of BAMC 2005-1 a Recovery Rating of 'RR1'.  The bonds were
all previously rated 'B-', 'CCC', 'CC', or 'C', which indicates
that Fitch expected a default.

The action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.  Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the
ongoing surveillance process and will continue to monitor these
transactions for additional defaults.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 133 Classes From 44 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 133
classes from 44 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by prime jumbo mortgage loans issued in 1998-
2003.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 386 classes from
43 of the downgraded transactions and 11 other transactions.  S&P
also withdrew its ratings on six interest-only classes and six
other classes from seven transactions.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies.

The rating affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

S&P withdrew its ratings on six interest-only classes based on its
current criteria, which can be found in "Global Methodology For
Rating Interest-Only Securities," published on April 15, 2010.
S&P also withdrew its ratings on an additional six classes because
they have received their full amount of scheduled principal and
currently have a zero balance.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class.  In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assess whether the class can withstand the additional base-case
loss assumptions S&P use in its analysis.  To maintain an 'AAA'
rating, S&P assess whether the class can withstand approximately
235% of its additional base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors applied to specific
transactions.  To maintain a rating in categories between 'B'
(the base case) and 'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can
withstand losses exceeding the additional base-case assumption at
a percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for a
'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would assess whether one class
could withstand approximately 130% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 155% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                         Rating Actions

                     ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
                          Series 2003-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        00077B7L1   BBB+ (sf)            AA (sf)
      B-2        00077B7M9   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

              Banc of America Funding 2003-1 Trust
                          Series 2003-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-4        05946XCC5   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
      B-5        05946XCD3   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)

              Banc of America Mortgage 2003-D Trust
                          Series 2003-D

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        05948XCA7   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
      B-2        05948XCB5   BB- (sf)             AA- (sf)
      B-3        05948XCC3   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
      B-4        05948XCD1   CC (sf)              B (sf)

              Banc of America Mortgage 2003-E Trust
                          Series 2003-E

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        05948XEF4   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
      B-2        05948XEG2   BB- (sf)             A+ (sf)
      B-3        05948XEH0   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
      B-4        05948XEL1   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-1
                          Series 2002-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      III-A      07384MJK9   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      B-1        07384MJM5   BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      B-2        07384MJN3   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-4
                          Series 2003-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        07384MVW9   A (sf)               AA+ (sf)
      B-2        07384MVX7   B- (sf)              AA- (sf)
      B-3        07384MVY5   CC (sf)              B (sf)


                  Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
                         Series 2003-S1


                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M          16162T2N5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      B-1        16162T2P0   BBB- (sf)            AA (sf)
      B-2        16162T2Q8   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

                  Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
                          Series 2003-S4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      IA-9       16162T4M5   NR                   AAA (sf)
      B-1        16162T5A0   BBB (sf)             A (sf)
      B-2        16162T5B8   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
      B-3        16162T5D4   CC (sf)              BB (sf)
      B-4        16162T5E2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-19
                         Series 2002-19

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        12669DBX5   BB+ (sf)             AA- (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-26
                         Series 2002-26

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M          12669DGC6   BBB (sf)             AAA (sf)
      B-1        12669DGD4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
      B-2        12669DGE2   CC (sf)              A- (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-27
                         Series 2002-27

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        12669DGU6   BB (sf)              AA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-14
                         Series 2003-14

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      A-1        12669EER3   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      A-3        12669EET9   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-4        12669EEU6   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-5        12669EEV4   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-6        12669EEW2   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-8        12669EEY8   NR                   AAA (sf)
      A-9        12669EEZ5   NR                   AAA (sf)
      A-12       12669EFC5   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-13       12669EFD3   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-14       12669EFE1   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-15       12669EFF8   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-16       12669EFG6   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
      A-17       12669EFH4   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-18       12669EFJ0   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-22       12669EFN1   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-23       12669EFP6   NR                   AAA (sf)
      A-24       12669EFQ4   NR                   AAA (sf)
      PO         12669EFS0   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-15
                         Series 2003-15

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      1-A-1      12669EEG7   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      1-A-2      12669EEH5   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      2-A-1      12669EEJ1   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      2-A-2      12669EEK8   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      PO         12669EEL6   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      M          12669EEN2   B (sf)               AA (sf)
      B-1        12669EEP7   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
      B-2        12669EEQ5   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)
      B-3        12669EED4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21
                         Series 2003-21

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      A-1        12669ECD6   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      A-3        12669ECW4   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
      M          12669ECY0   B (sf)               BB (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27
                         Series 2003-27

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M          12669EHP4   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)
      B-1        12669EHQ2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2
                         Series 2003-HYB2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      1-A-1      12669D2Y3   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      1-X        12669D3A4   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      M          12669D3C0   BB- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
      B-1        12669D3D8   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J1
                         Series 2003-J1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        12669DZT8   BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
      B-3        12669DF52   B- (sf)              AA- (sf)
      B-4        12669DF60   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J5
                         Series 2003-J5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      1-A-9      12669EJU1   NR                   AAA (sf)
      M          12669EKE5   A (sf)               AA+ (sf)
      B-1        12669EKF2   BB- (sf)             AA (sf)
      B-2        12669EKG0   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
      B-3        12669EPN0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-30

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      D-B-2      22541NUB3   BB- (sf)             BBB (sf)
      II-X       22541NTX7   NR                   AAA (sf)


                 Fannie Mae Remic Trust 1998 W6
                         Series 1998-W6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        31359UVL6   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      B-2        31359UVM4   B+ (sf)              A+ (sf)

                 Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1998-W7
                          Series 1998-W7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        31359UZX6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      B-2        31359UZY4   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)

           First Horizon Mtg Pass-Through Trust 2000-H
                          Series 2000-H

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      V-B-2      32051DCY6   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      D-B-3      32051DCL4   BB- (sf)             A (sf)

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3F
                          Series 2003-3F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-4        36228FQB5   A+ (sf)              AA+ (sf)
      B-5        36228FQC3   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)

              HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
                         Series 2003-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        41161PBQ5   BBB (sf)             AA- (sf)
      B-3        41161PBR3   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)
      B-4        41161PBS1   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

    Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-B
                          Series 2003-B

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        589929K72   A- (sf)              AA- (sf)
      B-3        589929L30   B+ (sf)              A- (sf)
      B-4        589929L48   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
      B-5        589929L55   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

    Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-HYB1
                        Series 2003-HYB1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        61746WC32   BBB- (sf)            AA+ (sf)
      B-2        61746WC40   B- (sf)              A+ (sf)
      B-3        61746WC57   CC (sf)              BB+ (sf)
      B-4        61746WC81   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
      B-5        61746WC99   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                   RFMSI Series 2003-S2 Trust
                         Series 2003-S2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M-3        76111JR55   BB (sf)              A (sf)
      B-1        76111JR63   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)

                   RFMSI Series 2003-S3 Trust
                         Series 2003-S3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M-1        76111JN59   BBB (sf)             AA+ (sf)
      M-2        76111JN67   CCC (sf)             BB+ (sf)
      M-3        76111JN75   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                   RFMSI Series 2003-S6 Trust
                         Series 2003-S6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      M-1        76111JY99   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
      M-2        76111JZ23   B- (sf)              A+ (sf)
      M-3        76111JZ31   CC (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
      B-1        76111JZ49   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)
      B-2        76111JZ56   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                          Series 2002-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B1         86358RA23   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
      B2         86358RA31   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
      B3         86358RA49   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-17

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B3         86358R7C5   BB (sf)              BB+ (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-21A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B1-I       86359ACA9   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
      B2-I       86359ACG6   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
      2-A2       86359ABT9   NR                   AAA (sf)
      B2-II      86359ACD3   BB- (sf)             BB+ (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-27A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B1         86359AGS6   CC (sf)              BBB- (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                          Series 2003-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      1-A7       86359ALK7   NR                   AAA (sf)
      B2         86359ALT8   BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
      B3         86359ALU5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-2A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B2-I       86359AKU6   CC (sf)              BB- (sf)
      B2-II      86359AKX0   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
      B3         86359AKY8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2002-AR18 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-2        929227ZF6   BB (sf)              AA- (sf)
      B-3        929227ZG4   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2002-AR19 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        929227ZX7   BBB (sf)             A+ (sf)
      B-2        929227ZY5   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2002-AR6 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-1        929227QC3   AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)
      B-2        929227QD1   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
      B-3        929227QE9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2003-AR5 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B2         929227S31   BB+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
      B3         929227S49   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      B4         929227S56   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2003-S1 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-5        929227K62   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
                      Series 2003-S2 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      B-4        929227N36   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
      B-5        929227N44   B (sf)               BB (sf)

                  WaMu Mortgage Securities Corp.
                      Series 2001-AR3 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      I-A        929227EL6   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)
      II-A       929227EM4   A+ (sf)              AAA (sf)

    Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2003-MS4 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      IIA-3      939336YA5   NR                   AAA (sf)
      IIA-4      939336YB3   NR                   AAA (sf)
      IIA-5      939336YC1   NR                   AAA (sf)
      C-B-3      939336YT4   A (sf)               AA (sf)
      C-B-4      939336UB7   BB (sf)              A (sf)
      C-B-5      939336UC5   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

  Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2003-MS5 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class      CUSIP       To                   From
      -----      -----       --                   ----
      C-B-4      939336UU5   BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
      C-B-5      939336UV3   B (sf)               BB (sf)

NR--not rated.

                        Ratings Affirmed

                     ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
                         Series 2003-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        00077B7D9   AAA (sf)
                 A-3        00077B7F4   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        00077B7G2   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        00077B7H0   AAA (sf)
                 A-X        00077B7J6   AAA (sf)
                 M          00077B7K3   AAA (sf)

              Banc of America Funding 2003-1 Trust
                          Series 2003-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        05946XBV4   AAA (sf)
                 A-WIO      05946XBX0   AAA (sf)
                 A-PO       05946XBY8   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        05946XBZ5   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        05946XCA9   AAA (sf)
                 B-3        05946XCB7   AAA (sf)

              Banc of America Mortgage 2003-D Trust
                          Series 2003-D

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-1      05948XBN0   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-2      05948XBP5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      05948XBS9   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-2      05948XBT7   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-3      05948XBU4   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-4      05948XBV2   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-5      05948XBW0   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-6      05948XBX8   AAA (sf)
                 3-A-1      05948XBY6   AAA (sf)
                 AP         05948XBZ3   AAA (sf)
                 WIO        05948XCH2   AAA (sf)
                 B-5        05948XCE9   CC (sf)

              Banc of America Mortgage 2003-E Trust
                          Series 2003-E

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-1      05948XDW8   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-2      05948XDX6   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-3      05948XDY4   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      05948XEB3   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-2      05948XEC1   AAA (sf)

                 3-A-1      05948XED9   AAA (sf)
                 4-A-1      05948XEE7   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        05948XEP2   AAA (sf)
                 B-5        05948XEM9   CC (sf)

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-1
                          Series 2002-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A        07384MHZ8   AAA (sf)
                 II-A       07384MJA1   AAA (sf)
                 B-3        07384MJP8   CC (sf)

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-4
                          Series 2003-4

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A-1      07384MVM1   AAA (sf)
                 I-X-A-1    07384MVN9   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-1     07384MVP4   AAA (sf)
                 II-X-A-1   07384MVQ2   AAA (sf)
                 III-A-1    07384MVR0   AAA (sf)
                 III-X-A-1  07384MVS8   AAA (sf)
                 B-4        07384MVZ2   CC (sf)

                  Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
                         Series 2003-S1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 IA-1       16162T2F2   AAA (sf)
                 IA-P       16162T2G0   AAA (sf)
                 IA-X       16162T2H8   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-1      16162T2J4   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-P      16162T2K1   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-X      16162T2L9   AAA (sf)

                  Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
                         Series 2003-S3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        16162T2U9   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        16162T2X3   AAA (sf)
                 A-X        16162T3F1   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        16162T3G9   AAA (sf)
                 M          16162T3J3   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        16162T3K0   AA (sf)
                 B-2        16162T3L8   A (sf)

                  Chase Mortgage Finance Trust
                         Series 2003-S4

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 IA-1       16162T4D5   AAA (sf)
                 IA-5       16162T4H6   AAA (sf)
                 IA-10      16162T4N3   AAA (sf)
                 IA-P       16162T4S2   AAA (sf)
                 IA-X       16162T5C6   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-1      16162T4T0   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-3      16162T4V5   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-P      16162T4W3   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-X      16162T4X1   AAA (sf)
                 M          16162T4Z6   AA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-19
                         Series 2002-19

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-1      12669DBA5   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-13     12669DBN7   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-3      12669DBR8   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-4      12669DBS6   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DBT4   AAA (sf)
                 M          12669DBV9   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669DBW7   AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-25
                         Series 2002-25

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-14     12669DHT8   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-15     12669DHU5   AAA (sf)
                 1-X        12669DHV3   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      12669DHX9   AAA (sf)
                 2-X        12669DHW1   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DHY7   AAA (sf)
                 M          12669DJA7   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669DJB5   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        12669DJC3   AA+ (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-26
                         Series 2002-26

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        12669DFV5   AAA (sf)
                 A-2        12669DFW3   AAA (sf)
                 A-3        12669DFX1   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        12669DFY9   AAA (sf)
                 A-5        12669DFZ6   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DGA0   AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-27
                         Series 2002-27

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        12669DGF9   AAA (sf)
                 A-6        12669DGL6   AAA (sf)
                 A-8        12669DGN2   AAA (sf)
                 A-9        12669DGP7   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DGQ5   AAA (sf)
                 M          12669DGS1   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669DGT9   AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-J5
                         Series 2002-J5

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-13     12669DWJ3   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-15     12669DWL8   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-16     12669DWM6   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-17     12669DWN4   AAA (sf)
                 1-X        12669DWP9   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      12669DWQ7   AAA (sf)
                 2-X        12669DWR5   AAA (sf)
                 3-A-1      12669DWS3   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DWT1   AAA (sf)
                 M          12669DWV6   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669DWW4   A+ (sf)
                 B-2        12669DWX2   B+ (sf)
                 B-3        12669DXF0   CCC (sf)
                 B-4        12669DXG8   CC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-14
                         Series 2003-14

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-10       12669EFA9   AAA (sf)
                 A-11       12669EFB7   AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-15
                         Series 2003-15

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 B-4        12669EEE2   CC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21
                         Series 2003-21

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-2        12669ECV6   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669ECZ7   CC (sf)
                 B-2        12669EDA1   CC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27
                         Series 2003-27

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        12669EHN9   AAA (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2
                         Series 2003-HYB2

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 2-A-1      12669D2Z0   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        12669D3E6   CC (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J1
                         Series 2003-J1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-12     12669DZJ0   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-13     12669DZK7   AAA (sf)
                 1-X        12669DZL5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      12669DZM3   AAA (sf)
                 2-X        12669DZN1   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669DZP6   AAA (sf)
                 M          12669DZR2   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        12669DZS0   AA+ (sf)

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-J5
                         Series 2003-J5

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-2      12669EJM9   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-6      12669EJR8   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-7      12669EJS6   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-10     12669EJV9   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-11     12669EJW7   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-12     12669EJX5   AAA (sf)
                 1-X        12669EJZ0   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-1      12669EKA3   AAA (sf)
                 2-X        12669EKB1   AAA (sf)
                 PO         12669EKC9   AAA (sf)
                 B-4        12669EPP5   CC (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-30

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A-1      22541NTQ2   AAA (sf)
                 I-P        22541NTY5   AAA (sf)
                 I-X        22541NTW9   AAA (sf)
                 II-P       22541NTZ2   AAA (sf)
                 D-B-1      22541NUA5   AAA (sf)

                 Fannie Mae Remic Trust 1998 W6
                         Series 1998-W6

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M          31359UVK8   AAA (sf)

                 Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1998-W4
                         Series 1998-W4

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M          31359UQG3   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        31359UQH1   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        31359UQJ7   AA+ (sf)

                 Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1998-W7
                         Series 1998-W7

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M          31359UZW8   AAA (sf)

           First Horizon Mtg Pass-Through Trust 2000-H
                         Series 2000-H

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-B-1      32051DCJ9   AAA (sf)
                 II-B-1     32051DCN0   AAA (sf)
                 III-B-1    32051DCR1   AAA (sf)
                 IV-B-1     32051DCU4   AAA (sf)
                 V-B-1      32051DCX8   AAA (sf)
                 I-B-2      32051DCK6   AAA (sf)
                 II-B-2     32051DCP5   AAA (sf)
                 III-B-2    32051DCS9   AAA (sf)
                 IV-B-2     32051DCV2   AAA (sf)

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3F
                         Series 2003-3F

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 IA-1       36228FNZ5   AAA (sf)
                 IA-2       36228FPA8   AAA (sf)
                 IA-4       36228FPC4   AAA (sf)
                 IA-6       36228FPE0   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-1      36228FPF7   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-2      36228FPG5   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-1     36228FPK6   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-2     36228FPL4   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-3     36228FPM2   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-6     36228FPQ3   AAA (sf)
                 IVA-1      36228FPR1   AAA (sf)
                 IVA-2      36228FPS9   AAA (sf)
                 IVA-3      36228FPT7   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        36228FPU4   AAA (sf)
                 A-X1       36228FPV2   AAA (sf)
                 A-X2       36228FPW0   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        36228FPX8   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        36228FPY6   AAA (sf)
                 B-3        36228FPZ3   AAA (sf)

             HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
                          Series 2003-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A          41161PBM4   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        41161PBP7   AA+ (sf)

             MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2002-8
                         Series 2002-8

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A-1      55265KNJ4   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-2      55265KNK1   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-3      55265KNL9   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-4      55265KNM7   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-5      55265KNN5   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-11     55265KNU9   AAA (sf)
                 1-PO       55265KNV7   AAA (sf)
                 1-A-X      55265KNW5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-5      55265KPB9   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-6      55265KPC7   AAA (sf)
                 2-PO       55265KPD5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A-X      55265KPE3   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        55265KPG8   AAA (sf)
                 B-2        55265KPH6   AAA (sf)
                 B-3        55265KPJ2   AA+ (sf)

             Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
                       Series MLCC 2003-B

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        589929K56   AAA (sf)
                 A-2        589929L71   AAA (sf)
                 X-A-1      589929K80   AAA (sf)
                 X-A-2      589929L89   AAA (sf)
                 X-B        589929K98   AA+ (sf)
                 B-1        589929K64   AA+ (sf)

    Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-HYB1
                        Series 2003-HYB1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        61746WB74   AAA (sf)
                 A-2        61746WB82   AAA (sf)
                 A-3        61746WB90   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        61746WC24   AAA (sf)


                   RFMSI Series 2003-S2 Trust
                         Series 2003-S2

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-5        76111JP73   AAA (sf)
                 A-6        76111JP81   AAA (sf)
                 A-9        76111JQ31   AAA (sf)
                 A-11       76111JQ56   AAA (sf)
                 A-12       76111JQ64   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        76111JQ72   AAA (sf)
                 A-V        76111JQ80   AAA (sf)
                 M-1        76111JR30   AA+ (sf)
                 M-2        76111JR48   AA (sf)
                 B-2        76111JR71   CC (sf)

                   RFMSI Series 2003-S3 Trust
                         Series 2003-S3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-3        76111JM68   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        76111JM76   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        76111JN26   AAA (sf)
                 A-V        76111JN34   AAA (sf)

                   RFMSI Series 2003-S6 Trust
                         Series 2003-S6

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        76111JX33   AAA (sf)
                 A-2        76111JX41   AAA (sf)
                 A-3        76111JX58   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        76111JX66   AAA (sf)
                 A-8        76111JY24   AAA (sf)
                 A-9        76111JY32   AAA (sf)
                 A-10       76111JY40   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        76111JY57   AAA (sf)
                 A-V        76111JY65   AAA (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 2-A2       86358RWE3   AAA (sf)
                 2-AP       86358RWF0   AAA (sf)
                 CAX        86358RWN3   AAA (sf)
                 A4         86358RWQ6   AAA (sf)
                 PAX        86358RXT9   AAA (sf)
                 AP         86358RWS2   AAA (sf)
                 AX         86358RWT0   AAA (sf)
                 B1         86358RWU7   AA (sf)
                 B2         86358RWV5   A (sf)
                 B3         86358RWW3   CCC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-6

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A5       86358RZK6   AAA (sf)
                 2-A2       86358RZM2   AAA (sf)
                 AP         86358RZY6   AAA (sf)
                 AX         86358RZZ3   AAA (sf)
                 PAX        86358RZX8   AAA (sf)
                 IAX        86358RZW0   AAA (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2002-17

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A7       86358R6N2   AAA (sf)
                 1-AP       86358R6P7   AAA (sf)
                 1-AX       86358R6Q5   AAA (sf)
                 1-PAX      86358R6R3   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86358R6S1   AAA (sf)
                 2-A2       86358R6T9   AAA (sf)
                 2-A3       86358R6U6   AAA (sf)
                 2-AX       86358R6Z5   AAA (sf)
                 B1         86358R7A9   AAA (sf)
                 B2         86358R7B7   AA (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                        Series 2002-21A

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A1       86359ABP7   AAA (sf)
                 1-A3       86359ABR3   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86359ABS1   AAA (sf)
                 4-A1       86359ABW2   AAA (sf)
                 B1-II      86359ACC5   BBB- (sf)
                 B3         86359ACE1   CC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                        Series 2002-27A

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A        86359AGG2   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86359AGJ6   AAA (sf)
                 3-A1       86359AGL1   AAA (sf)
                 4-A1       86359AGN7   AAA (sf)
                 5-A1       86359AGQ0   AAA (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A3       86359ALF8   AAA (sf)

                 1-AX       86359ALL5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86359ALM3   AAA (sf)
                 3-A1       86359ALN1   AAA (sf)
                 4-A1       86359ALP6   AAA (sf)
                 AP         86359ALQ4   AAA (sf)
                 AX         86359ALR2   AAA (sf)
                 B1         86359ALS0   AA+ (sf)
                 B4         86359ALW1   CC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-2A

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A1       86359AKJ1   AAA (sf)
                 3-A1       86359AKN2   AAA (sf)
                 4-A1       86359AKQ5   AAA (sf)
                 B1-I       86359AKS1   A+ (sf)
                 B1-II      86359AKW2   BB+ (sf)
                 B4         86359ALA9   CC (sf)
                 B5         86359ALB7   CC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-10

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A          86359AQS5   AAA (sf)
                 AP         86359AQT3   AAA (sf)
                 AX         86359AQU0   AAA (sf)
                 B1         86359AQV8   AA (sf)
                 B2         86359AQW6   A (sf)
                 B3         86359AQX4   BB- (sf)
                 B4         86359AQZ9   CCC (sf)
                 B5         86359ARA3   CC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-9A

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A1       86359ARC9   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86359ARE5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A2       86359ARF2   AAA (sf)
                 2-A3       86359ARG0   AAA (sf)
                 B2-I       86359ARL9   CCC (sf)
                 B1-II      86359ARN5   CCC (sf)
                 B2-II      86359ARP0   CCC (sf)
                 B3         86359ARQ8   CC (sf)
                 B4         86359ARS4   CC (sf)
                 B1-I       86359ARJ4   CCC (sf)

                Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                         Series 2003-17A

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A1       86359AXD0   AAA (sf)
                 2-A1       86359AXF5   AAA (sf)
                 2-A2       86359AXG3   AAA (sf)
                 2-A3       86359AXH1   AAA (sf)
                 3-A1       86359AXL2   AAA (sf)
                 3-A2       86359AXM0   AAA (sf)
                 3-A3       86359AXN8   AAA (sf)
                 4-A        86359AXQ1   AAA (sf)
                 4-AX       86359AXR9   AAA (sf)
                 4-PAX      86359AXS7   AAA (sf)
                 B1-I       86359AXT5   CCC (sf)
                 B2-I       86359AXV0   CC (sf)
                 B1-II      86359AXX6   CCC (sf)
                 B2-II      86359AXY4   CC (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2002-AR18 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        929227ZC3   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        929227ZE9   AAA (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2002-AR19 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-6        929227ZS8   AAA (sf)
                 A-7        929227ZT6   AAA (sf)
                 A-8        929227ZU3   AAA (sf)
                 B-3        929227ZZ2   CC (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2002-AR6 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A          929227QB5   AAA (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2003-AR5 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A6         929227R57   AAA (sf)
                 A7         929227R65   AAA (sf)
                 B1         929227S23   AA+ (sf)
                 B5         929227S64   CC (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2003-S1 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-4        929227H74   AAA (sf)
                 A-5        929227H82   AAA (sf)
                 A-6        929227H90   AAA (sf)
                 X          929227J72   AAA (sf)
                 P          929227J80   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        929227J98   AA+ (sf)
                 B-2        929227K21   AA- (sf)
                 B-3        929227K39   A- (sf)
                 B-4        929227K54   BBB- (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                       Series 2002-S7 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A-4      929227YE0   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-1     929227YF7   AAA (sf)
                 III-A-1    929227YG5   AAA (sf)
                 IV-A-4     929227YL4   AAA (sf)
                 II-P       929227YT7   AAA (sf)
                 IV-P       929227YU4   AAA (sf)

             WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2003-S2 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-1        929227N69   AAA (sf)
                 A-3        929227N85   AAA (sf)
                 A-4        929227N93   AAA (sf)
                 A-5        929227P26   AAA (sf)
                 A-11       929227P83   AAA (sf)
                 X          929227Q25   AAA (sf)
                 P          929227Q33   AAA (sf)
                 B-1        929227Q41   AA+ (sf)
                 B-2        929227Q58   AA (sf)
                 B-3        929227Q66   A+ (sf)

    Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2002-MS7 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A-4      939336FP3   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-10     939336FV0   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-11     939336FW8   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-15     939336GA5   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-1     939336GB3   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-2     939336GC1   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-3     939336GD9   AAA (sf)
                 II-A-4     939336GE7   AAA (sf)
                 I-X        939336GF4   AAA (sf)
                 II-X       939336GG2   AAA (sf)
                 I-P        939336GH0   AAA (sf)
                 II-P       939336GJ6   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-1      939336GK3   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-2      939336GL1   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-3      939336GM9   AAA (sf)

    Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                     Series 2003-MS4 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 IA-1       939336XW8   AAA (sf)
                 IA-2       939336XX6   AAA (sf)
                 IIA-6      939336YD9   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-1     939336YJ6   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-2     939336YK3   AAA (sf)
                 IIIA-3     939336YL1   AAA (sf)
                 II-X       939336YM9   AAA (sf)
                 III-X      939336YN7   AAA (sf)
                 I-P        939336YP2   AAA (sf)
                 A-P        939336YQ0   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-1      939336YR8   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-2      939336YS6   AA+ (sf)

    Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                      Series 2003-MS5 Trust

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 I-A-1      939336UE1   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-2      939336UF8   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-3      939336UG6   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-4      939336UH4   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-5      939336UJ0   AAA (sf)
                 I-A-6      939336UK7   AAA (sf)
                 II-A       939336UL5   AAA (sf)
                 III-A      939336UM3   AAA (sf)
                 C-X        939336UN1   AAA (sf)
                 C-P        939336UP6   AAA (sf)
                 C-B-1      939336UQ4   AA+ (sf)
                 C-B-2      939336UR2   AA (sf)
                 C-B-3      939336US0   A (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 450 Certs. From 286 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on 450 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 286 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued between
2002 and 2008.  In addition, S&P placed its rating on class 2-B-1
from Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-18SL on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

Approximately 72.44% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A or subprime mortgage loan
collateral.  The 450 defaulted classes consisted of these:

* 259 classes from Alt-A transactions (57.56% of all defaults);

* 67 from subprime transactions (14.89%);

* 91 from prime jumbo transactions (20.22%);

* 10 from risk-transfer transactions;

* Nine from reperforming transactions;

* Six from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
  (re-REMIC) transactions;

* Four from outside-the-guidelines transactions;

Three from closed-end second-lien transactions; and One from a
document-deficient transaction.

The downgrades to 'D (sf)' reflect S&P's assessment of principal
write-downs on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.

The CreditWatch placement is on a class that is within a loan
group that includes a class that defaulted from a 'B-' rating or
higher.  All of the ratings were speculative-grade before the
downgrades, and S&P lowered approximately 99.78% of the ratings
from the 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' rating categories.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements after S&P
complete its review of the underlying credit enhancement.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and S&P will
adjust the ratings as S&P considers appropriate in accordance with
its criteria.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G.
Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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