TCR_Public/110320.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 20, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 78

                            Headlines

AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
ABACUS 2006-13: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2006-NS2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2007-18: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes

ABSC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 91 Tranches
ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches
AEGIS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches
AIRPLANES REPACKAGED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A to 'BB+'
ALLY FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 24 Tranches

ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds 'B' Rating on $24MM Tranche
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
ARMY HAWAII: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
AVENUE CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2006-BIX1 Certs.

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 297 Tranches
BANKBOSTON HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-TOP16 Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 128 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 142 Tranches

BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-TOP8 Notes
BIRMINGHAM-SOUTHERN: Moody's Junks Rating on $28.3 Mil. Bonds
CANNINGTON FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 33 Tranches
CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-CD5 Certs.

CENT CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
CHARITABLE LEADERSHIP: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002A Bonds to 'Ca'
CHARLES RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes to 'D'
CHURCHILL FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Nine 2006-FL2 Notes

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 77 Tranches
CITYSCAPE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
COMM 2006-FL12: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 31 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 109 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certificates

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-C4 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 2006-TFL2 Notes
CREST 2002-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches
CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series A-2 Certificates

CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 318 Tranches
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
DLJ MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1996-CF1 Certificates
DOWLING COLLEGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B3'
EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A-1 Notes

FIELDSTONE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 73 Tranches
FLINT HOSPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating to Four Classes
GALAXY III: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Tranches

GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2003-C2 Certs.
GLOBAL TOWER: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 17 2006-GG8 Notes
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Rates Various Series 2011-ALF Certificates
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

GSAA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 58 Tranches
GSAA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class 3A4 2005-11 Notes
GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratingso on 96 Tranches
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches

IDAHO HOUSING: S&P Raises Rating on Revenue Bonds From 'BB+'
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-PNC1 Certificates
KATONAH VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Note Classes
LANDMARK VII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-C1 Notes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2000-C3 Certs.
LEASE INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 42 Tranches
MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 66 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-HQ12 Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 213 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating to $3 Mil. Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Certificates
NOB HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
PITTSBURG REDEVELOPMENT: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Notes

PRIMA CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-C2 Certs.
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: S&P Raises Ratings on Three 1998-C1 Notes
RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings in Nine Tranches

REVE SPC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
RICHLAND TOWERS: Fitch Expects to Rate Class B Notes at 'BB-'
SAGAMORE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
SRRSPOKE 2007-IA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

SRRSPOKE 2007-IB: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating to Class I Notes
SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Rates $15.3 Mil. Class C Notes at 'BB-sf'
SIERRA TIMESHARE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
SPARKS REGIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Lease Deals
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes

TERWIN MORTGA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2004-13ALT Tranches
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches
TIERS RIVA: S&P Withdraws Rating on Trust Certificate Notes
UBS INVESTMENT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-03-17 Notes
UNITED AIR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class B Certs. to 'Ba3'

VERTICAL CRE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Certificates
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class X Notes
WELLS FARGO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
WF-RBS 2011-C2: Moody's Assigns Ratings on Various Classes

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 214 Classes From 68 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes From Three CDO Deals

                            *********

AAMES MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches totaling $136 million and confirmed the ratings of 4
tranches totalling $36 million from 7 Subprime deals issued by
Aames Mortgage Trust.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ABACUS 2006-13: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Abacus 2006-
13, Ltd.  The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated March 26, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-13, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a reference portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (100% of the pool).  As of February 18,
2011, the aggregate rated Notes balance of the transaction has
decreased to $236.2 million from $307.1 million at issuance,
due to Optional Redemption in the amount of approximately
$70.9 million to the Class B and E through M Notes.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,867 compared to 4,026 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (10.8% compared to 31.8% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (8.3% compared to 13.1% at last review), B1-B3 (12.5%
compared to 20.8% at last review), and Caa1-C (68.4% compared to
34.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.9
years compared to 6.0 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 3.7% compared to 8.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 18.9% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Abacus 2006-
NS1, Ltd. The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated March 26, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-NS1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a reference portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (84.8 % of the pool) and CRE CDO collateral
(15.2% of the pool).  As of February 18, 2011, the aggregate Notes
balance of the transaction has decreased to $192.4 million from
$225.8 million at issuance, due to Optional Redemption in the
amount of approximately $33.4 million to the Class A, F, J and K
Notes.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,996 compared to 3,923 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 13.1% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (7.4% compared to 18.9% at last review), B1-B3 (13.4%
compared to 36.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (79.2% compared to
31.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.4
years compared to 6.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 1.4% compared to 6.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 23.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


ABACUS 2006-NS2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Abacus 2006-
NS2, Ltd. The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated March 26, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-NS2, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a reference portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (84.8 % of the pool) and CRE CDO collateral
(15.2% of the pool).  As of February 18, 2011, the aggregate Notes
balance of the transaction has decreased to $24.6 million from
$54.2 million at issuance, due to losses in the amount of
approximately $29.6 million to the Class O, P, Q and FL Notes.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,996 compared to 3,923 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 13.1% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (7.4% compared to 18.9% at last review), B1-B3 (13.4%
compared to 36.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (79.2% compared to
31.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.4
years compared to 6.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 1.4% compared to 6.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 23.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


ABACUS 2007-18: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Abacus 2007-
18, Ltd.  The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE
CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated March 17, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. B Series 2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 17,
     2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2007-18, Ltd., is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a reference portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (90.9% of the pool) and CRE CDO collateral
(9.1% of the pool).  As of February 18, 2011, the aggregate rated
Notes balance of the transaction has decreased to $109.0 million
from $247.5 million at issuance, due to Optional Redemption in the
amount of $138.5 million to the Class A-2, A-3 and B Notes.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,550 compared to 5,471 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 7.5% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to 6.0% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0%
compared to 31.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (100% compared to
55.1% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.0
years compared to 7.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 0.0% compared to 3.8% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 99.9% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


ABSC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 91 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 91
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from 22 Subprime
deals issued by ABSC.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprimeresidential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABSC Home Equity Loan Trust Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Sec Corp Home Equity Loan Tr 2004-HE8

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
1999-LB1

  -- A-3A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-5A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-1F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- B-1A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE2

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE4

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE5

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE6

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE7

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 26, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE10

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE2

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE3

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE4

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE5

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE6

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE7

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE9

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series 2001-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Long Beach Home
Equity Loan Trust 2000-LB1, Home Equity Loan Pass-Through
certificates, Series 2000-LB1

  -- Cl. AF5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2V, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Series 2002-HE1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Series 2002-HE2

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE3

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 101
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 23 Subprime
deals issued by ACE.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan 1999-LB2

  -- A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2001-
AQ1 Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
FM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
HS1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
OP1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
TC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2003
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
FM1

  -- 2004-FM1-M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004-FM1-M6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
FM2

  -- 2004FM2-M1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004FM2-M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004FM2-M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004FM2-M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2004FM2-M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 29, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2005
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HS1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
IN1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
OP1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
RM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
RM2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust.  Series 2001-
HE1

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


AEGIS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 28
tranches totaling $484 million and confirmed the rating of 2
tranches totaling $10 million from 9 Subprime deals issued by
Aegis ABS Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A2-B, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


AIRPLANES REPACKAGED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A notes from Airplanes Repackaged Transferred Securities
Ltd.'s series 2004-1 and series 2004-2 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AA-
(sf)'.

The ARTS series 2004-1 and 2004-2 class A notes are backed by
$186 million of Lease Investment Flight Trust class A-1 and A-2
notes, and $186 million face value of zero-coupon treasury
securities.  The downgrades of the class A notes primarily reflect
S&P's view of ongoing value declines in the LIFT portfolio.  S&P
believes this is an indicator of potential declines in future
lease revenue.  In S&P's view, the lower expected payments on the
LIFT class A-1 and A-2 notes may increase the reliance on the zero
coupon securities to meet the future payment obligations on the
ARTS class A notes.

While S&P does expect potential declines in future lease revenue
in the LIFT transaction, S&P's analysis considered the existence
of certain liquidity enhancements that S&P views as sufficient to
service short-term payment requirements to the LIFT class A notes,
and by extension, the ARTS class A notes.  As of January 2011, the
liquidity reserve account in the LIFT transaction, which supports
expenses, certain swap payments, and interest paid to the LIFT A
notes, had a balance of $33 million.  Based on the January 2011
monthly servicer report, payments senior to the first collection
top-up totaled approximately $2.1 million.

In its analysis, S&P projected the cash flows by stressing each of
the aircraft's future depreciated value and lease rate in the LIFT
transaction; the repossessed aircraft's time off-lease; the
lessees' default frequency and default pattern; the remarketing,
reconfiguration, and repossession costs; the maintenance expenses;
and the interest rate risk.  These cash flows are allocated
according to the LIFT payment sequence, and are then redistributed
to the ARTS notes according to their payment priority and holdings
of the LIFT class A-1 and A-2 notes.

S&P will continue to monitor the transactions and take rating
actions as S&P determine appropriate.


ALLY FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 24 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade 24 tranches from
11 transactions sponsored by Ally Financial Inc. (formerly known
as GMAC inc.) and Ally Bank.  Ally Bank is a wholly owned indirect
subsidiary of Ally Financial Inc., and is the sponsor of
transactions issued since 2009.  All transactions are serviced by
Ally Financial Inc.

                             Ratings

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. D, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. D, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. C, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-B

  -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-1

  -- Class B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Class C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Class D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-2

  -- Class B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Class C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

  -- Class D, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-A

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Sep 1, 2010 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2009-B

  -- Class B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 19, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

  -- Class C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 19, 2009 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-1

  -- Class B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Mar 29, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
      (sf)

  -- Class C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Mar 29, 2010 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The reviews for upgrades were prompted by the further accretion of
credit enhancement due to the non-declining reserve account and
overcollateralization, and in some cases, a downward revision of
collateral loss expectations.  Moody's revised expected cumulative
net Loss range for the affected CARAT transactions is between
2.45% and 4% of the original pool balance.  This range is similar
to Moody's expectations that were published when these securities
were last upgraded on August 30th 2010.  The expected CNL range of
the Ally Bank sponsored transactions, which are now sufficiently
seasoned, was lowered significantly to a range of 50 basis points
to 1.25%.  The improvement can be attributed to a combination of
stronger underlying credit (as compared to prior transactions),
healthy used vehicle market, and stabilizing economy that has
persisted through the early term of these transactions.  The
weighted average FICO scores in the two Ally transactions is 758
and 763 while the FICO scores in the CARAT transactions were
between 700 and 715.  Additionally, the weighted average loan to
value ratio in the two Ally transactions is under 100% while the
LTV on the CARAT transactions was approximately 105%.

Moody's expected CNL range as a percentage of the original pool
balance, total hard credit enhancement (which may consist of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund) as a
percentage of the outstanding collateral pool balance adjusted for
yield supplement overcollateralization, and pool factor
information for each transaction is listed below.  The YSOC
compensates for the lower APR on the subvened loans.

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-1

* Pool factor -- 9.9%

* CNL Range - 2.45% to 2.65%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  2.50%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class D -- 7.1%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 4.7%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-2

* Pool factor -- 12.9%

* CNL Range - 2.45% to 2.65%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  2.50%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class D -- 5.4%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 3.8%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-3

* Pool factor -- 15.4%

* CNL Range - 2.80% to 3.00%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.10%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class C -- 7.6%, Class D -- 4.6%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 3.00%

* Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-4

* Pool factor -- 19.3%

* CNL Range - 3.50% to 4.00%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.75%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 14.8%, Class C -- 7.4%, Class D -- 5%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 3.30%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-A

* CNL Range - 2.45% to 2.65%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  2.50%

* Pool factor -- 12.8%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class C -- 9.15%, Class D -- 5.50%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 3.60%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-B

* Pool factor -- 16.5%

* CNL Range - 3.10% to 3.40%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.25%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class C -- 7.2%, Class D -- 4.30%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 2.60%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-1

* Pool factor -- 23.7%

* CNL Range - 3.50% to 4.00%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.75%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 12%, Class C -- 6%, Class D -- 4%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 4.30%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-2

* Pool factor -- 28.7%

* CNL Range - 2.50% to 3.00%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.00%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 9.8%, Class C -- 4.9%, Class D -- 3.3%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 6.40%

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-A

* Pool factor -- 30.8%

* CNL Range - 3.25% to 3.75%, prior expectation (August 2011) was
  3.75%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 11.5%, Class C -- 9.9%, Class D -- 5.4%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 6.30%

Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2009-B

* Pool factor -- 61.5%

* CNL Range - 0.50% to 1.25%, prior expectation (origination) was
  2.25%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 9.1%, Class C -- 5.9%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 10.20%

Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2010-1

* Pool factor -- 67.8%

* CNL Range - 0.50% to 1.25%, prior expectation (origination) was
  3.00%

* Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread & YSOC):
  Class B -- 14.9%, Class C -- 11.2%

* Yield Supplement OC -- Approximately 6.70%

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2011; Moody's expect overall a
sluggish recovery in most of the world largest economies,
returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and
persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transactions in the past 6 months.


ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Holds 'B' Rating on $24MM Tranche
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) (sf) for the
Commercial Paper (CP) issued by Alpine Securitization Corp.
(Alpine), an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) vehicle
administered by Credit Suisse, New York branch.  In addition, DBRS
has confirmed the ratings and revised the tranche sizes of the
aggregate liquidity facilities (the Liquidity) provided to Alpine
by Credit Suisse.

The $7,870,478,847 aggregate liquidity facilities are tranched as:

  -- $7,537,239,625 rated AAA (sf)
  -- $67,328,798 rated AA (sf)
  -- $41,966,180 rated A (sf)
  -- $65,823,963 rated BBB (sf)
  -- $58,529,603 rated BB (sf)
  -- $24,502,453 rated B (sf)
  -- $75,088,225 unrated (sf)

The ratings are based on November 30, 2010 data.

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio.  The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is
based on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-
wide credit enhancement (PWCE).  The rationale for the CP rating
is based on the updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as
DBRS' prior and ongoing review of legal, operational and liquidity
risks associated with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality
of Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses
each transaction to a term standard.  The tranching of the
Liquidity reflects the credit risk of the portfolio at each rating
level.  The tranche sizes are expected to vary each month based on
changes in portfolio composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS'
simulation methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse
ABCP conduit portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS CDO Toolbox
simulation model, with adjustments to reflect the unique structure
of an ABCP conduit and its underlying assets.  DBRS determines
attachment points for risk based on an analysis of the portfolio
and models the portfolio based on key inputs such as asset
ratings, asset tenors and recovery rates.  The attachment points
determine the portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA, A through B
as well as unrated.

DBRS models the portfolio on an ongoing basis to reflect changes
in Alpine's portfolio composition and credit quality.  The rating
results are updated and posted on the DBRS website.

The applicable public methodology is the Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Criteria Report: U.S. & European ABCP Conduits, which can be
found on DBRS's Web site under Methodologies.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 29
tranches and confirmed the rating of four tranches from three Alt-
A deals issued by American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MH-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ARMY HAWAII: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on Army
Hawaii (Credit-Linked Trust Certificates Series 2005-I through
2005-T), a collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The CSO tranches, issued in 2005, references a portfolio of
corporate synthetic senior unsecured bonds.  The Trust
Certificates Series 2005-E through 2005-J ("2005-E to J") are
exposed to the Dow Jones CDX.IG.4 portfolio and the Trust
Certificates Series 2005-R through 2005-T ("2005-R to T") are
exposed to the Dow Jones CDX.HY.4 portfolio.

Issuer: Army Hawaii (Credit-Linked Trust Certificates Series 2005-
I through 2005-T)

  -- US$41.7M CLC Trust 2005-I-E Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$33.5M CLC Trust 2005-I-F Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$21.3M CLC Trust 2005-I-G Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$14.8M CLC Trust 2005-I-H Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$30.7M CLC Trust 2005-I-I Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$37.2M CLC Trust 2005-I-J Certificates, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on Aug 14, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- US$9.9M CLC Trust 2005-I-R Certificates, Upgraded to Aa1;
     previously on Jun 28, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2

  -- US$20.6M CLC Trust 2005-I-S Certificates, Upgraded to Aa1;
     previously on Jun 28, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2

  -- US$24.8M CLC Trust 2005-I-T Certificates, Upgraded to Aa1;
     previously on Jun 28, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating actions on Trust Certificates 2005-E to J and 2005-
R to T are the result of the shortened time to maturity of the CSO
tranches, the level of credit enhancements remaining in the
transaction and the credit improvement of the underlying
portfolio.

The remaining life of the outstanding tranches are 0.1, 0.6, 1.1,
1.6, 2.1, 2.6 year respectively for the Trust Certificates 2005-E
to J.  Since the last rating review in August 2010, the 10-year
weighted average rating factor of the portfolio improved from 1448
to 1419, equivalent to Ba3.  There are seven reference entities
with a negative outlook compared to 10 that are positive, and no
entities on watch for downgrade compared to four on watch for
upgrade.

The remaining life of the outstanding tranches are 1.6, 2.1, 2.6
year respectively for the Trust Certificates 2005-R to T.  Since
the last rating review in August 2010, the 10-year weighted
average rating factor of the portfolio improved from 3512,
equivalent to Caa1 to 3441, equivalent to B3.  There are 11
reference entities with a negative outlook compared to eight that
are positive, and three entities on watch for downgrade compared
to one on watch for upgrade.  The credit risk associated with the
underlying portfolio is minimal compared to the credit risk
associated with the collateral securing the Certificates of these
three tranches.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are given in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where
higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-
versa:

* Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
  of the CSO by 6 months, keeping all other parameters constant.
  The result of this run is comparable to that of the base case
  for Trust Certifictaes 2005-E to J and one notch higher than in
  the base case for Trust Certificates 2005-R to T.

* Market Implied Ratings are modeled in place of the corporate
  fundamental ratings to derive the default probability of the
  reference entities in the portfolio.  The gap between an MIR and
  a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an indicator of the
  extent of the divergence in credit view between Moody's and the
  market. The result of this run is comparable to that of the base
  case for Trust Certificates 2005-E to J and 2005-R to T.

* Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting all
  entities rated Caa1 and below.  The result of this run is one
  notch lower for Trust Certifcates 2005-E to J and comparable to
  the base case for Trust Certifcates 2005-R to T.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomics conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario, such as a double dip recession,
the CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent that depends
on the expected severity of the worsening conditions.


AVENUE CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-1L, A-2L, A-3L, B-1F, and B-1L notes from Avenue CLO
Fund Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction backed
by corporate loans and managed by Avenue Capital Management II
L.P.  In addition, S&P removed its ratings on classes A-1L, A-2L,
and A-3L from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Jan. 3, 2011.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class B-2L and P1 notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since its last rating
action in December 2009.  As of Jan. 6, 2011, $18.5 million of the
aggregate par amount in the collateral portfolio had defaulted,
compared with $54.5 million defaults as of Nov. 4, 2009.  Over the
same period, $12.8 million of the portfolio collateral rated in
the 'CCC' range, which has decreased from $30.2 million.  The
class A overcollateralization ratio improved to 132.6% in January
2011 from 106.9% as of November 2009.  The class A-1L notes were
paid down by $112.8 million since S&P's last rating action.  The
class B-2L notes have paid down approximately $1 million since
S&P's last rating action due to a turbo feature that diverts
interest to pay down the class B-2L principal following the
failure of the additional collateral deposit requirement.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that there is sufficient
credit enhancement available to support the ratings at their
current levels.  Standard & Poor's will continue to review the
ratings assigned to the notes to asses whether they remain
consistent with the credit enhancement available to support them;
S&P will take rating actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                       Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.
                           Rating
                           ------
           Class       To          From
           -----       --          ----
           A-1L        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           A-2L        AA (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           A-3L        A- (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           B-1F        BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)
           B-1L        BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                      Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.

                Class                   Rating
                -----                   ------
                B-2L                    CCC- (sf)
                P1                      AAA (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2006-BIX1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three non-
pooled, or rake, classes of Banc of America Large Loan, Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-BIX1.
Moody's also affirmed the ratings of four pooled classes and three
rake classes.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. J-CP, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K-CP, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L-CP, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J-CA, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K-CA, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L-CA, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the decline in performance of
the CarrAmerica-Pool 3 (National Portfolio) Loan that was
transferred to special servicing on February 1, 2011, due to
imminent maturity default.  The final extended maturity date of
the loan is August 9, 2011.  The borrower indicated that the
national economic recession has hurt the performance of the
properties that secure the loan.

The affirmations of the pooled and non-pooled classes were due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio remaining
within an acceptable range.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large
Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single
borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool to
allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that loans in the pool default with
an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 9, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2011 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 71% to $357.4 million from
$1.2 billion at securitization due to the payoff of ten loans
originally in the pool; payment of release premiums associated
with four loans, the CarrAmerica-Pool 3 (National Portfolio) Loan
($153.1 million - 46% of the pool), the JER Denver Office
Portfolio Loan ($38.6 million - 12%), the CarrAmerica -- Pool 2
(CAR Portfolio) Loan ($20.3 million -- 6%) and the Lodgian Airport
Hotels Loan ($9.4 million - 3%); and loan amortization associated
with the Bassett Place Mall Loan ($31.3 million -- 9%).  The
Certificates are collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in
size from 3% to 45% of the pool.  All of the loans in the pool,
with the exception of the Ballantyne Village Loan, that is a non-
performing matured balloon loan, have final maturity dates during
2011.

To date the pool has not experienced any losses.  Four loans are
currently in special servicing, including the CarrAmerica-Pool 3
(National Portfolio) Loan, the One Pepsi Way Loan ($40 million --
12%), the Ballanytne Village Loan ($31.5 million- 9%) and the
Lodgian Airport Hotels Loan.  There currently are no loans on the
master servicer's watchlist.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is 94%
compared to 89% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio is 1.07x compared to 1.25x at last review.

The largest loan is the CarrAmerica-Pool 3 (National Portfolio)
Loan ($153.1 million -- 46% of the pool) which is the 40% portion
of a pari passu split loan structure that is securitized in COMM
2006-FL-12 (52.5%) and CGCMS 2006-FL2 (7.5%).  There is also
$20.4 million of non-pooled, or rake, trust debt (Classes J-CP,
K-CP and L-CP), a $179 million non-trust junior secured component,
and $150 million of mezzanine debt.  The total outstanding loan
balance is $763.1 million.  The loan is secured by 29 office and
research and development properties.  Twenty-two properties
containing approximately 4.9 million square feet are subject to
first mortgage liens.  The borrower's joint venture interests in
seven properties are secured by pledges of refinance and sale
proceeds.  The outstanding trust balance has decreased by 72%
since securitization from the payment of loan collateral release
premiums.  At securitization the loan was secured by 73
properties.  The remaining portfolio has geographic concentration
in California's Silicon Valley with 17 properties representing 80%
of the mortgage collateral by net rentable area (NRA) located in
San Jose (12 properties -55%), Santa Clara (2 properties -- 11%),
Sunnyvale (1 property - 9%), Fremont (1 property - 3%) and Palo
Alto (1 property - 2%).  The other five properties are located in
Dallas (2 properties -- 10%), Los Angeles (2 properties -- 8%) and
Seattle (1 property -- 2%).

As of the September 2010 rent rolls, the current loan collateral
secured by first mortgage liens had a weighted average occupancy
rate of 79% compared to 82% at Moody's last review and 89% at
securitization.  Additionally, the 77,944 square foot Casey Family
Building in Seattle became vacant in January 2011 when its single
tenant, Casey Family Programs, vacated upon its lease expiration.
Including the Casey Family Building vacancy, the current occupancy
for the mortgaged collateral is approximately 77%.

The San Jose office and R&D markets ended 2010 with vacancy
rates exceeding 20%.  Although the market experienced positive
absorption in the 4th quarter it was preceded by several quarters
of negative absorption that resulted in an increase in the vacancy
rate.  Although the market is beginning to show some improvement,
Moody's expects that it will be some time before real estate
fundamentals recover to pre-recession levels.  Portfolio vacancy
has increased since securitization and Moody's expects that for
the next several quarters market fundamentals will put downward
pressure on rental rates for new leases and lease renewals.  The
loan sponsor is the Blackstone Group.  Moody's credit estimate for
the pooled debt is Ba2 compared to Baa3 at last review.

The One Pepsi Way Loan ($40.0 million -- 12%) was transferred to
special servicing in April 2010.  The loan is secured by a 520,000
square foot office building in Somers, New York.  The building was
built in 1987 for the Pepsi Bottling Group (Pepsi) who leased 70%
of the building through December 2010.  Prior to Pepsi signing a
five-year lease commencing in January 2011 for the entire
building, the property was 79% leased to two tenants, Pepsi and
General Motors.  General Motors had not intended to renew its
lease upon expiration in February 2011.  Although the property is
now 100% leased to Pepsi, the current rent is less than the
previous rent paid by Pepsi and General Motors.  The $55.0 million
whole loan includes a $15.0 million non-trust junior component.
There is also $22.0 million of mezzanine debt.  The loan sponsor
is Murray Hill Properties.  Moody's LTV is greater than 100%, as
it was at the last review.

The JER Denver Office Portfolio Loan ($38.6 million -- 12%) is
secured by four office properties with a total of 726,240 square
feet located in southeast suburban Denver, Colorado.  Since
securitization two properties containing 185,957 square feet were
released from the loan collateral.  Release premiums from the
partial release have resulted in a 24% reduction in the
outstanding loan balance.  As of December 2010 the portfolio was
84% leased compared to 92% at securitization.  The largest three
tenants, Comcast, Time Warner Cable and Bellco Credit Union lease
48% of the total NRA.  All three of these leases expire in 2015.
Lease rollovers in 2011 account for 18% of total NRA.  As of the
4th Quarter 2010 the Class A office market vacancy was 15%,
projected to decline slightly over the next several years.  The
$66.6 million whole loan includes a $28.0 million non-trust junior
component.  The loan sponsor is JER Real Estate Partners III, L.P.
and JER Real Estate Qualified Partners III, L.P.  Moody's LTV is
96%, the same as at the last review.

The Bassett Place Mall Loan ($31.3 million -- 9%) is a modified
loan that was extended to September 2011.  The terms of the
modification included a $750,000 principal pay down, a monthly
excess cash reserve and a deferred management fee reserve.  The B-
Note holder was charged a 0.5% workout fee.  The loan is secured
by a 507,003 square foot regional retail mall located in El Paso,
Texas.  The mall is anchored by Target and Kohl's plus an 18-
screen Premiere movie theater.  The center is shadow anchored by
Costco.  As of December 2010 the in-line space was 77% leased, the
same as at securitization.  In-line sales for calendar year 2010
were $304 per square foot, compared to $273 per square foot at
securitization.  The $54.7 million whole loan includes a
$23.4 million non-trust junior component.  The loan sponsor
is Christopher C. Maguire.  Moody's LTV is 75% compared to 79%
at last review.

The Ballantyne Village Loan ($31.5 million -- 9%) was transferred
to special servicing in July 2009.  The loan is a non-performing
matured balloon loan.  The loan was not extended since the last
maturity date in January 2010.  A forbearance structure has been
approved subject to the Servicer's due diligence.  The loan is
secured by a lifestyle type shopping center containing 166,041
square feet, located in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The two
largest tenants are the Village Theater (5-screens) and the YMCA
occupying 10,600 square feet.  In-line space is approximately 77%
leased compared to 75% at securitization.  A large percentage of
the tenants are in arrears on their rent.  The $50.0 million whole
loan includes a $31.5 million non-trust junior component.  The
loan sponsor is Robert Bruner.  Moody's LTV is greater than 100%,
the same as at last review.

The Lodgian Airport Hotels Loan ($9.4 million -- 3%) was
transferred to special servicing in January 2011 due to imminent
default.  The loan matured on March 9, 2011.  A pre-negotiation
letter is in place with the borrower.  The loan is secured by two
airport hotels with a total of 492 rooms.  The two hotels are the
Crown Plaza Phoenix Airport (299 rooms) and the Crowne Plaza
Pittsburgh International Airport (193 rooms).  A partial release
effective March 8, 2011 of the Radisson Phoenix Airport Hotel (159
rooms) resulted in a principal curtailment of $8.0 million.
RevPAR for the year-to-date period ending November 2010 was $50
compared to $56 for the same period in 2009, an 11% decline.
There is a $2.3 million non-trust junior secured component.  The
loan sponsor is Lodgian Hotels.  Moody's LTV is greater than 100%,
the same as last review.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 297 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 297
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from 25 Alt-A
deals issued by Banc of America.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.  .

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-WIO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2004
     Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-7, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-WIO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-WIO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-WIO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-WIO, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-5

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-WIO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-6

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-NC-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-WIO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-WIO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-PO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-WIO, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-8

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2-NC-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-WIO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-WIO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-9

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-NC-WIO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-WIO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-IO, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. NC-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-C Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANKBOSTON HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2.  The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2

  -- A-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-7, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-TOP16 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP16 due to further
deterioration in performance relative to the previous full
transaction review.

The downgrades are the result an increase in Fitch projected
losses across the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 1.97% for the
remaining pool; expected losses of the original pool are 0.73% and
include the losses incurred to date.  Approximately 5.2% of the
pool is considered to be a Fitch loan of concern and includes the
three loans (2.71%) in special servicing.  At Fitch's last review,
there were two loans (1.58%) in special servicing.  Fitch expects
the non rated class P to be fully depleted by losses on the
specially serviced loans, and class O to be significantly
impacted.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the transaction has
paid down 18.3% since issuance to $944.3 million from $1.16
billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently impacting
the non rated class P.  Approximately 11.2% of the pool has
defeased.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Marlin Cove
Shopping Center (1.42%) which is the largest loan in special
servicing.  The loan is secured by a 73,547 square foot shopping
center located in Foster City, CA.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in December 2009 due to payment default.  The
borrower and special servicer continue to discuss workout options,
including a discounted payoff or a foreclosure of the loan.

The second largest contributor to losses is the Phoenix West Plaza
(0.95%), which is a real estate owned retail property in Phoenix,
AZ.  The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2009
after a major tenant vacated the property.  A sale of the property
is currently being finalized.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns Rating Outlooks, LS
ratings, and Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $10.1 million class H to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $5.8 million class L to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4.3 million class K to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5'.


In addition Fitch has affirmed, assigned Rating Outlooks and LS
ratings:

  -- $71.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $80 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $676.1 million class A-6 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.2 million class B at 'AA+sf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class C at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class D at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.9 million class E at 'A-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10.1 million class F at 'BBB+sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $11.6 million class G at 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.9 million class J at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.4 million class M at 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $1.4 million class N at 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- $2.9 million class O at 'Csf/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate the $4.2 million class P.  Classes A-1, A-2,
and A-3 have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-1.
Class X-2 has been affirmed because both referenced classes A-6
and B maintain high investment grade ratings.  In addition, as of
May 2011 the only referenced class will be class A-6, currently
rated 'AAAsf'.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 128 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 128
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 24 Subprime
deals issued by Bear Stearns.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated in 2004 and prior.  The baseline rate is generally
higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are
made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ABS Trust Certificates, Series 2001-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-FR1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2004
     Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-FR3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE10

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2005
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE11

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE8

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE9

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-1

  -- A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-ABF1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2008
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE6

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Series 1999-2

  -- AF-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MF-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- BF, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Series 2000-2

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Securities I Trust 2004-FR2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2004
     Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 142 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 142
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 11 tranches from 16 Alt-A
deals issued by Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust.  The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable rate Alt-
A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.  .

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. IV-A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6a, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6b, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Apr 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-TOP8 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP8.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and liquidity
available to the trust.  The downgrades reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the resolution of
three of the five specially serviced assets.  S&P's rating
actions also consider the volume of non-specially serviced and
non-defeased loans that have scheduled maturities in 2011 or
2012 (82 loans, $407.8 million, 60.1% of the trust).

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of all of the remaining loans in the transaction using its
conduit/fusion criteria.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.65x and an adjusted loan-to-value ratio
of 68.2%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.30x and an LTV
ratio of 79.7%.  The implied default rate and loss severity under
the 'AAA' scenario were 18.4% and 24.6%, respectively.  The DSC
and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude 16 defeased loans
($196.6 million, 29.0%) and three ($16.7 million, 2.5%) of the
transaction's five ($28.7 million, 4.2%) specially serviced loans.
S&P separately estimated losses for the excluded specially
serviced loans and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect liquidity support and subordination levels
that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed
its rating on the class X-1 interest-only certificate based on
S&P's current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 15, 2011 remittance report, five ($28.7 million,
4.2%) loans in the pool were with the special servicer, C-III
Asset Management.  The reported payment status of the specially
serviced loans is: three ($16.7 million, 2.5%) are 90-plus days
delinquent; one ($4.0 million, 0.6%) is 30 days delinquent; and
one ($8.0 million, 1.2%) is in its grace period.  Appraisal
reduction amounts totaling $1.6 million were in effect for two
of the specially serviced loans.

The Commerce Center Office ($9.7 million trust balance, 1.4% of
the total trust balance, $10.1 million total exposure) is the
largest specially serviced loan.  It is secured by a 233,953-sq.-
ft. office building in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in September 2010 and is
reported as 90-plus days delinquent.  According to the special
servicer, as of June 2010, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.40x
and 63.0%, respectively.  The special servicer also indicated that
a transfer of interests or sale of the property are both under
review.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Macy's - Sacramento, CA ($8.0 million, 1.2%, $8.1 million) is
the second-largest specially serviced loan.  The loan is secured
by a 205,000-sq.-ft. retail property in Sacramento.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in September 2010 and is
reported as being in its grace period.  Current performance
information was not available.

The remaining three loans with the special servicer have trust
balances that individually represent 0.6% or less of the total
trust balance.  One of the loans was reported as 30 days
delinquent, while the remaining two loans were reported as 90-
plus days delinquent.  S&P estimated losses for the two loans
that are 90-plus days delinquent, arriving at a forecasted
weighted-average loss severity of 35.1%.  The loan that was 30
days delinquent as of June 2010 had debt service coverage and
occupancy of 1.54x and 88%, respectively, according to the master
servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 15, 2011 trustee remittance report, the aggregate
trust balance was $678.9 million, which represents 80.6% of the
aggregate trust balance at issuance.  There are 111 loans
remaining in the pool.  The master servicer provided full-year
2009, interim 2010, or full-year 2010 financial information for
92.5% of the non-defeased loans in the pool.  Using the reported
figures, S&P calculated a weighted-average DSC of 1.80x for the
pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.65x and 68.2%,
respectively.

Twenty-three loans ($101.1 million, 14.9%) were on the master
servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans, which
S&P discuss below.

Excluding the transaction's 16 defeased loans and five specially
serviced assets, 82 loans ($407.8 million, 60.1% of the trust)
have final maturity dates through year-end 2011 and year-end 2012.
Standard & Poor's considered this large volume of loans with near-
term maturities in its rating actions.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $165.7 million (24.4%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted-average DSC
of 1.74x for the top 10 non-defeased loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures were 1.46x and 76.0%, respectively.

The St. Andrews Apartments - Phase II loan ($10.7 million, 1.6%)
is the eighth-largest non-defeased loan in the pool and the
largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is
secured by 236 of the 472-unit apartment complex in Pearland,
Texas, which is part of the St.  Andrews Phase I & II community.
The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due its being
affected by Hurricane Ike in 2008.  According to the master
servicer, borrower payments for casualty insurance and repairs for
damages from Hurricane Ike have negatively impacted the property's
cash flow.  As of September 2010, reported DSC and occupancy were
1.18x and 94.5%, respectively.  The master servicer has indicated
that the loan will be removed from the watchlist.

The Peppertree Industrial Park loan ($10.4 million, 1.5%) is the
ninth-largest non-defeased loan in the pool and the second-largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a
484,458-sq.-ft. industrial property in Hayward, Calif.  The loan
appears on the watchlist because two of the largest tenants,
occupying 149,057 sq. ft. (32.0% of net rentable area), had lease
expirations on Dec. 31, 2010.  Updated information regarding the
lease statuses is not available.  According to the master
servicer, reported DSC and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2010, were
3.06x and 100.0%, respectively.

The St. Andrews Apartments - Phase I loan ($10.3 million, 1.51%)
is the 10th-largest non-defeased loan in the pool and the third-
largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is
secured by 236 of the 472-unit apartment complex in Pearland,
Texas, which is part of the St.  Andrews Phase I & II community.
The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due its being
affected by Hurricane Ike in 2008.  According to the master
servicer, borrower payments for casualty insurance and repairs for
damages from Hurricane Ike have negatively impacted the property's
cash flow.  As of September 2010, reported DSC was 1.16x.  The
master servicer has indicated that the loan will be removed from
the watchlist.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria and the analysis is consistent with S&P's lowered and
affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
   Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
   -----     --          ----           ----------------------
   L         B (sf)      B+ (sf)                          1.53
   M         CCC+ (sf)   B (sf)                           1.07
   N         CCC (sf)   CCC+ (sf)                         0.76

                        Ratings Affirmed

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Class  Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
       -----  ------                ----------------------
       A-1    AAA (sf)                               16.89
       A-2    AAA (sf)                               16.89
       B      AA+ (sf)                               13.16
       C      A+ (sf)                                 8.98
       D      A (sf)                                  7.58
       E      BBB+ (sf)                               5.88
       F      BBB (sf)                                4.95
       G      BBB- (sf)                               4.33
       H      BB+ (sf)                                3.08
       J      BB (sf)                                 2.62
       K      BB- (sf)                                2.00
       X-1    AAA (sf)                                 N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BIRMINGHAM-SOUTHERN: Moody's Junks Rating on $28.3 Mil. Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa2 from B1 the
rating on the Tuition Revenue Bonds of Birmingham-Southern
College issued through the Private Education Building Authority
of the City of Birmingham.  The rating applies to the College's
$28.3 million of outstanding Series 1996, 1997 and 2002 Revenue
Bonds.  The rating outlook is negative as the rating has been
removed from Watchlist for potential downgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects the expected difficulty in moving out
of deep structural operating deficits, the $38 million of Regions
Bank debt with stronger legal security than the Tuition Revenues
Bonds through an agreement entered into in November 2010, lack of
unrestricted funds, and expected potential near term stress from
reduced enrollment.  While the board and management team are
focused on building student tuition revenue and attracting
unrestricted gifts, Moody's believe the College has a heightened
chance of being unable to meet its debt payment obligations across
the next few years if those plans are unsuccessful.  With pro
forma debt to Moody's adjusted operating revenue of 1.5 times, the
College has considerable amount of debt to service relative to its
size.

                           Challenges

* Record of deep structural operating deficits with Moody's
  calculation of operating performance at negative 31% in fiscal
  year 2010, assuming a 5% endowment draw on the three-year
  average of cash and investments.  However, endowment draws have
  been well beyond the traditional 5% range, although management
  plans to move to an approximately 5% spending rate in FY 2012.
  The spending rate in the FY 2011 budget is approximately 7% of
  beginning of year total cash and investments.  The ongoing cash
  flow deficits led the College to end FY 2010 with not only a
  fully drawn $15 million operating line but also an additional
  $2.3 million overdraft.

* Moody's believes the college's past operating deficits and
  feeble financial controls were symptoms of weak governance.
  Birmingham-Southern has had an uncommonly large board, naming 70
  board directors in their Internal Revenue Service Form 990
  filing for tax year 2008.  The large board size helped foster a
  culture of weak internal controls.  Financial reporting to the
  board lacked several best practices, including providing no
  clear mapping of the operating budget results to the financial
  statements.  This lack of clarity helped obfuscate a practice of
  weak financial aid budgeting and reporting to the extent of
  effectively over-awarding aid and losing potential net tuition
  revenue. While the audited financial statements have not been
  called into question, Moody's believes they're trying to oversee
  a college relying largely on erroneous internal reports.  In
  some years, the college's operating weakness was masked by large
  unrestricted gifts revenue and no real discipline in designating
  outsized unrestricted gifts as quasi-endowment as some colleges
  do.  Controls around capital spending also displayed weakness as
  evidenced by cost overruns for projects in FY 2008 and FY 2009.
  The weak governance also left the college with limited ability
  to strategically respond to evolving competitive threats, as
  when the public universities in the region began attracting more
  honors students and some potential students were more attracted
  to larger private universities.  In addition to more immediate
  concerns noted elsewhere in this report, the current trustees
  are focused on diagnosing past issues and building a more
  effective governance structure over time.

* Elevated bank debt with $38.5 million of pro forma debt with
  Regions Bank (rated Ba1/NP) subject to acceleration and renewal
  risk.  Through a Promissory Note and Security Agreement entered
  into in November 2010 with a three-year term, the College
  granted Regions Bank a secured and perfected interest its
  physical property, its deposits, Pledgeable Endowment Assets
  (now zero since all endowment assets are subject to donor
  restriction) and other assets not subject to the prior claim
  on the Tuition Revenue Bonds rated by Moody's.  This enhanced
  security applies both to the new consolidated loan of
  $16.8 million as well as the $21.7 million of prior Series 2009A
  and 2009B Student Housing Revenue Bonds backed by Regions. While
  the Tuition Revenue bonds have a first lien on revenue, Moody's
  believes the enhanced security Regions Bank now enjoys could
  impact expected recovery in the event of default. The book value
  of the real estate, net of depreciation and construction-in-
  progress, was $117 million as of May 31, 2010.  Regions Bank's
  Student Housing agreements include two financial covenants: a
  Debt Service Coverage Ratio for the project and Total Endowment
  Balance for the college of not less than $45 million for the
  first two years and $50 million thereafter.  Total Endowment
  Balance for this purpose includes life income and other funds
  that totaled $66 million as of February 28, 2011.  The Debt
  Service Coverage test for the Series 2009-B bonds was 2.4 times
  in FY 2010; the Series 2009-A project was not subject to the
  test as it was still under construction.

* Deep decline in expendable financial resources (negative $16
  million as of May 31, 2010) through extraordinary endowment
  draws & investment losses in 2008 & 2009. Moody's calculation of
  Monthly Days Cash on Hand for FY 2010 was just 6 days, showing a
  precarious position little margin for error and extraordinarily
  little cushion to absorb additional losses and retain operating
  flexibility.  The College no longer has an operating line of
  credit to rely on as it was closed when the consolidated loan
  with Regions was executed.  With underwater donor restricted
  endowment funds of $27 million and pooled endowment assets of
  $54 million, Moody's believes a move to positive resources
  will require both an extended period of investment returns in
  excess of endowment spending and substantially increased
  unrestricted gift revenue.

* Fiercely competitive student market, with increasing pressure
  from public universities in Alabama and wealthier private
  universities in the region.  With net tuition per student of
  $10,046 in FY 2010, the College's ability to pass on net tuition
  increases remain unproven. Management will increased tuition for
  the upcoming 2011-2012 academic year and hope to maintain a 50-
  52% discount rate, which is in line with recent results.
  Applications for the Fall 2011 entering class are down from the
  prior year, with the steepest decline in the core Birmingham
  metropolitan area.  Management believes negative local media
  coverage has hampered the application volume.

                            Strengths

* History of substantial donor support with average gift revenue
  of $7.4 million per year over from FY 2008 through FY 2010.
  Maintaining donor support, and unrestricted gifts in particular,
  will be crucial in the coming years for the college's continued
  financial viability.  While the board and other closely aligned
  donors have responded to the College's extraordinary near term
  needs, future credit quality will depend on guarding against
  donor fatigue and maintaining perception of positive momentum in
  through the multi-year recovery plan.

* Clear resolve and commitment of BSC board and management to
  address and correct the structural operating deficits by making
  material payroll expense cuts (51 staff layoffs and14 unfilled
  positions on a pool of 400 full-time employees, as well as a
  faculty reduction of 24.8 full-time equivalents in FY 2011),
  elimination of certain majors, stopping defined contribution
  retirement plan contributions, and tiered salary reductions. The
  interim management team and a group of seven focused board
  members are meeting frequently to chart a course for the
  college's future and closely monitor the cash position and near-
  term cash flow projections.  The working budget holds endowment
  spending to $4 million for FY 2011, sharply down from the prior
  year's spending of $18.4 million.  Around $2.5 million of one-
  time expenditures predominately related to the executive
  transition will be absorbed in FY 2011, but will lead to
  approximately $10 million run rate reduction in expenditures as
  compared to operating expenses of $58 million in FY 2009.

* Release of donor restrictions will aid near-term flexibility in
  FY 2011. The College has secured the dissolution of just over
  $6 million of previously donor restricted funds with board
  members involved either directly or indirectly in 85% of the
  dissolution of the prior restrictions. Birmingham-Southern has
  also received approval from the State Attorney General's office
  to release restrictions on numerous small gifts totaling
  approximately $393,000, based on their small size and the age of
  the gifts.

* Student market identity as small liberal arts college (1,529
  full-time equivalent students in fall 2010) within the United
  Methodist tradition resulting from a merger in 1918.  The
  reputation has been aided by small class sizes and the success
  of the college's graduates in entering professional programs.
  For the entering freshman class of fall 2010, the College
  accepted 67% of applicants and yielded 25% of those admitted.
  Geographic diversity has been improving with approximately 45%
  of the fall 2010 entering class from out of state.  The market
  position continues to be aided by the decision to switch the
  College's intercollegiate athletics to Division III from
  Division I.

                    Detailed Credit Discussion

Legal Security: Security on the Tuition Revenue Bonds is provided
by a pledge on the College's gross tuition revenues.  There is an
additional bonds test requiring that recent pledged tuition
revenue be at least 300% of prospective Maximum Annual Debt
Service.  There is no debt service reserve fund requirement.

Interest Rate Derivatives: The College has entered into two
interest rate swaps with Regions Bank with a current notional
amount of $21.6 million as hedges associated with its Series 2009-
A and 2009-B Regions Bank debt.  The swaps terminate August 7,
2016 and August 7, 2014, respectively.  In addition to standard
termination events, an Event of Default could trigger a
termination event in any agreements related to borrowed money.  As
of January 31, 2011 the two agreements were a combined liability
of $1.47 million to the College.

                   Recent Developments/Results

The pooled endowment had an 12.2% fiscal year to date return
through the end of January.  Net of spending the endowment was
reduced from the beginning of year, down to $55.4 million from
$58.9 million as of May 31, 2010.  The asset allocation as of
managed portion as of January 31, 2011 was 58% equity, 17% fixed
income, 16% hedge funds, 3% cash, 6% direct real estate.

Birmingham-Southern is conducting a search for a new president.
In the interim, the provost is serving as the interim president
and working closely with the Board to implement the measures
mentioned above.

                             Outlook

Our negative outlook at the Caa2 level reflects the paucity of
unrestricted funds to manage through any uncertainty, the senior
claim on college assets enjoyed by Regions Bank, the unproven
ability reduce the structural operating deficits, and the
continued need to raise substantial unrestricted gifts across the
next few years.  The outlook also reflects the need for renewal of
bank agreements with the consolidation loan balloon payment of
$14.9 million on November 5, 2013, providing little time to
establish creditworthiness or build flexible reserves.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

The rating could move up or the outlook stabilize through, earned
revenue growth, a successful move to operating stability,
continued ability to raise unrestricted gifts and the relative
strengthening of the Tuition Revenue Bond security.

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Inability to meet tuition revenue targets, inability to maintain
unrestricted donor support, or material decline in financial
resources.  The presence of the bank borrowings could accelerate
downward pressure.

Key Indicators (Fall 2010 enrollment and Fiscal Year 2010
financial data)

  -- Full-time equivalent enrollment: 1,529 students

  -- Freshman applicants accepted: 94%

  -- Accepted students enrolled: 25%

  -- Net tuition per student: $10,046 (down 1.8% from $10,227 in
     FY 2009)

  -- Total pro forma direct debt: $69 million

  -- Pro forma debt to operating revenues: 1.5 times

  -- Total financial resources: $69 million

  -- Expendable financial resources: -$16 million

  -- Unrestricted financial resources: -$32 million

  -- Expendable resources to pro forma direct debt: -0.23 times

  -- Total financial resources per student: $43,587

  -- Annual operating margin: -31.4%

  -- Average operating margin: -32.1%

  -- Average debt service coverage: -0.84 times

  -- Reliance on tuition and auxiliaries: 63%

                            Rated Debt

* Private Educational Building Authority of the City of Birmingham
  Series 1996, 1997 and 2002: Caa2


CANNINGTON FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Cannington Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$337,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     2020 (current balance of $313,705,314), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 15, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 15, 2009
     Downgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
     on June 15, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
     on June 15, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes Due 2020 (current balance of $13,729,460), Upgraded to
     Caa1 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the rated notes since the rating action in June 2009.  As of the
latest trustee report dated January 19, 2011, the Class A, B, C,
and D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 121.35%,
112.72%, 106.78%, and 103.2%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels
of 112.75%, 105.22%, 100.8%, and 96.78%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
The increase in overcollateralization is largely driven by
delevering of the Class A Notes due to prior overcollateralization
ratio failures, sales of defaulted securities at recoveries higher
than previously anticipated, and lower overcollateralization
haircut amounts from discount obligations and excess securities
rated Caa1 and below.  The deal also experienced a decrease in
defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased to about $5 million from approximately
$25 million in May 2009.  Furthermore, Moody's observes that
recent credit quality of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches held in
the underlying portfolio have stabilized or improved.

Moody's notes that its analysis takes into account the current
constraints around reinvesting in additional collateral
obligations relating to the failure to satisfy certain
reinvestment criteria.  As a result, the deal has been
accumulating cash since September 2009.  As of the latest trustee
report dated January 2011, the principal collections account
balance is $156,053,731.  In its analysis, Moody's assumed that
the portfolio is static and that the current outstanding principal
collections along with future amortizations are held in a reserve
account until the end of the reinvestment period.  After the end
of the reinvestment period, the cash is released from the reserve
account for application in accordance to the priority of payments.
Should circumstances change in the future and the deal is allowed
to reinvest, Moody's will reconsider its modeling assumptions
accordingly.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance of
$261 million, principal proceeds balance of $156 million,
defaulted par of $5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 31.3% (implying a WARF of 4440), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 39%, and a diversity score of 38.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in Moody's cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily
on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each
case, historical and market performance trends and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Cannington Funding Ltd. issued on November 16, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3552)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5328)

  -- Class A1: -2
  -- Class A2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Reinvestment of cash: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether cash will be used for future
   reinvestments or redemption of the notes.  Currently, pursuant
   to Section 12.2 of the indenture, the deal is prohibited from
   reinvesting due to a failure to meet certain reinvestment
   criteria. As a result, the deal holds $156 million in principal
   collections. Due to the constraints around reinvesting, Moody's
   assumed that the portfolio is static and that the current
   outstanding principal collections along with future
   amortizations are held in a reserve account earning Libor until
   the end of the reinvestment period.  After the amortization
   period, the cash is released from the reserve account for
   application in accordance to the priority of payments.  Should
   circumstances change in the future that will allow the deal to
   reinvest, Moody's will reconsider its modeling assumptions
   accordingly.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value and the asset's current market value.


CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 33 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 33
tranches from five Subprime deals issued by Carrington and
Soundview.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-2

  -- Cl. AF, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2004-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-CD5 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades 17 classes of CD Commercial Mortgage
Trust, series 2007-CD5 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, primarily due to an increase in expected losses from
specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default.  Fitch modeled
losses of 9.2% (9.3% cumulative transaction losses which includes
losses realized to date).  Fitch expects losses on specially
serviced loans to deplete classes K through S and a portion of
class J.  As of February 2011, there are cumulative interest
shortfalls in the amount of $4.94 million affecting classes C
through S.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 1.8% to $2.06 billion from
$2.09 billion at issuance.  There are no defeased loans.

Fitch has identified 42 loans (22.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 20 specially serviced loans (11.9%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Georgian Towers
loan (2.8%) which is collateralized by an 890-unit multifamily
property located in Silver Spring, MD, within the Washington,
D.C.  beltway.  Total debt consists of a $185 million whole loan
and $30 million in mezzanine debt.  The whole loan is split into
a $125 million senior loan and a $60 million B note.  The senior
loan includes the trust loan, a $58 million A-2 note, and a
$67 million pari passu A-1 note included in the COMM 2007-C9
trust (not rated by Fitch).  The senior loans were transferred
to special servicing in December 2009, following the borrower's
notification to the servicer of its inability to make future debt
service payments.  The loan is more than 90 days delinquent and a
recent appraisal indicates significant losses.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the 1150
18th Street NW asset (2.3%) which is collateralized by the
leasehold interest in a 166,518-sf office property located in
the Washington, D.C. CBD.  The original loan transferred to
special servicing in August 2009 for monetary default.  The
special servicer commenced the foreclosure process in November
2009 and by year end had obtained title to the property.  The
property is currently on the market with no asking price, and
the most recent appraisal indicates significant losses.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the CGM RRI
Portfolio loan which is secured by 52 Red Roof Inn hotels,
totaling 6,030 rooms, located in 22 different states, generally
concentrated in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions.  The
senior debt consists of eight pari passu A-notes with a current
balance totaling approximately $280 million.  The trust portion
includes the $31.7 million A-1 note.  The trust loan was
transferred to special servicing in May 2009 for imminent default.
The sponsor had reportedly been seeking a restructuring of the
loan due to economic conditions.  The trust had taken title to 6
of the properties.  A combined note and REO sale of 45 loans and 3
REO assets closed in March 2011.  The special servicer is
negotiating the sale of the remaining three REO assets.

In total, there are currently 20 assets (11.9%) in special
servicing which consists of four assets (3.2%) that are REO, seven
in foreclosure (3.2%), six loans (5.2%) that are 90 days or more
delinquent and three loans (0.3%) that are current.

At Fitch's last review there were 20 loans (8.7%) in special
servicing consisting of 10 loans (2.2%) that were current, nine
loans (6%) that were 30 to 90 days delinquent and one loan (0.5%)
in foreclosure.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
Rating Outlooks and revises LS Ratings on these classes as
indicated:

  -- $111.8 million class AJ to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $27 million class A-JA to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $20.9 million class B to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $20.9 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'A/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $20.9 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.3 million class E to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
Recovery Ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $18.3 million class F to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';
  -- $20.9 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB/LS5';
  -- $23.6 million class H to 'CC/RR3' from 'B/LS5';
  -- $23.6 million class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
  -- $20.9 million class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
  -- $26.2 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
  -- $7.9 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
  -- $5.2 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
  -- $5.2 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';
  -- $5.2 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';
  -- $2.6 million class Q to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

  -- $12.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $958.9 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $284.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $168.7 million class AM at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.7 million class A-MA at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

Prior to the affirmations, classes AM and A-MA were on Rating
Watch Negative.  Fitch does not rate the $39.2 million class S.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest only classes XP and
XS.


CENT CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Cent CDO 15 Limited:

  -- US$61,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$39,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$39,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3 (sf);

  -- US$33,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009
     Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated February 4, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2670 compared to 2880
in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 5.5% of the underlying portfolio versus 15.4% in
June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about $8.1
million of the underlying portfolio compared to $43.5 million in
June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Class A, Class
B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 120.84%, 113.10%, 108.34%, and 104.70%, respectively, versus
June 2009 levels of 119.79%, 112.12%, 107.39%, and 103.78%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  Furthermore, Moody's adjusted
overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have increased
more than trustee reported ratios since the rating action in July
2009 due to a decrease in the percentage of securities with Ca or
C ratings.  Moody's treated these Ca or C-rated securities as
defaulted securities in the rating action in July 2009 but is
currently treating them as performing securities as they are no
longer Ca or C-rated following corporate ratings upgrades.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $584 million, defaulted par of $13.0 million,
a weighted average default probability of 28.0% (implying a WARF
of 3572), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.9%,
and a diversity score of 80.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Cent CDO 15 Limited, issued in July 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (2749)

  -- Class A-1: +1
  -- Class A-2A: 0
  -- Class A-2B: +2
  -- Class A-3: +3
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4124)

  -- Class A-1: -2
  -- Class A-2A: -1
  -- Class A-2B: -2
  -- Class A-3: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2. Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


CHARITABLE LEADERSHIP: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002A Bonds to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating to Ca from
Caa2 on Charitable Leadership Foundation's $48.2 million of fixed-
rate Series 2002A bonds (Center for Medical Science Project) which
were issued through the City of Albany Industrial Development
Agency.  The rating has been removed from watchlist and the
outlook is negative at the lower rating level.  Bond proceeds were
used to construct a biomedical research facility in the University
Heights district of Albany, with Charitable Leadership Foundation
ultimately providing a guaranty of debt service payments.  The
Center for Medical Science is a New York state not-for-profit
corporation, which was formed by CLF to own and operate the bond-
financed research facility.

Summary Rating Rationale:

The rating reflects the suspension of rental payments from Ordway
Research Institute, Inc., a primary tenant in the research
facility, since July 2010.  The trustee (Bank of New York Mellon)
used a portion of the debt service reserve fund to pay the January
1, 2011 debt service payment, and there is not a clear expectation
for when rental payments from Ordway will resume and adequately
cover future debt service requirements.  The rating also reflects
very weak governance and management oversight in Moody's opinion,
the precipitous decline in CLF's cash or liquid investments and
resulting lack of value of the guaranty on the bonds provided by
CLF, as well as the presence of a mortgage lien on the leasehold
interest in the research facility.

Detailed Credit Discussion:

LEGAL SECURITY: Obligations under the Installment Sale Agreement
are a general obligation of the Foundation, further secured by a
partially funded debt service reserve fund (Citigroup Guaranteed
Investment Contract, $4.386 million remaining in the reserve fund
according to CLF management, following partial use of the reserve
fund to pay the January 2011 debt service payment).  The bonds are
further secured by a mortgage lien on the leasehold interest in
the research facility and a security interest in the equipment.
The research facility is located on land ground leased from
University Heights Association, a not-for-profit corporation,
for a period of 49 years for an annual rent amount of $150,000.

Pursuant to the Assignment of Rents, the Foundation and the
Issuer (City of Albany IDA) pledge and assign to the Trustee
all right, title, and interest to all Leases.  Ordway Research
Institute, a not-for-profit research organization created by the
Foundation, occupies approximately 43% of the facility's space.
Health Research Inc., a not-for-profit corporation, occupies
approximately 45% of the space.  The Wadsworth Center, a large New
York State Department of Health laboratory, occupies the portion
leased by HRI.  The New York State Department of Health Division
of Lab Quality and Control leases the remaining 11% of space.  The
two HRI leases, unless renewed, are scheduled to terminate in 2019
and 2023, prior to the maturity of the bonds.  Despite the pledge
of lease payments to the trustee, lease payments are currently
first being used to pay operating and maintenance expenses of the
building.

The Foundation also entered into a Guaranty Agreement with the
Trustee.  Under this agreement, which is unconditional and remains
in effect for the life of the bonds, the Foundation guarantees
debt service on the bonds.  CLF management reports that it does
not currently have adequate liquid investments to make installment
purchase payments.  Due to the occurrence of an event of default
(CLF did not make installment purchase payment in January 2011),
pursuant to the Indenture the Trustee may, upon written request of
holders of not less than 51% of the aggregate principal amount of
bonds, declare the entire principal amount of outstanding bonds
and accrued interest immediately due and payable.  CLF management
reports that to-date they have not received notice of plans for
the debt to be accelerated.

Debt-Related Derivatives And Debt Structure: The bonds are fixed-
rate with a final maturity of 2026, with no debt-related interest
rate swap agreements outstanding.

Recent Developments/Results:

The Bank of New York Mellon Default Administration Group has
confirmed that the Foundation drew $1.26 million of the debt
service reserve fund in order to make the January 1, 2011 debt
service payment on the Series 2002A bonds.  The January 2011
payment was interest only, and the full scheduled payment was
$1.4 million.  The next debt service payment on the Series 2002A
bonds is scheduled for July 1, 2011, includes principal and
interest components, and totals $3.293 million according to CLF's
management and data provided in the official statement for the
bonds.  The subsequent debt service payment is scheduled for
January 1, 2012, and totals nearly $1.4 million.

Since Moody's last issuer comment published on CLF on February 15,
2011, Moody's have resumed communication with the management team.
Lease payments from Ordway have not resumed, and there is no clear
projected timeframe for when they will resume.  Management reports
that the other building tenants are current on all required lease
payments.  As a result, Moody's currently expect that CLF will
need to use at least a portion of the remaining debt service
reserve fund to make its July 2011 debt service payment.

CLF's management reports that the Foundation currently has little
cash or liquid investments.  The Foundation, which provides a
guaranty of the bonds and whose President is also the sole member
of the board, would not be able to cover any shortfall in upcoming
debt service payment if one is needed.  The last year of audited
financial statements that Moody's has received for CLF or CMS is
FY 2009.  Both organizations have a December 31 fiscal year end,
and FY 2010 audited financial statements are not yet finalized.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the uncertainty for when Ordway's
lease payments will resume, the potential for payment default in
the next year, the possibility of acceleration of the bonds, and
uncertainty about recovery and value of the leasehold interest in
the mortgage.

                 What could change the rating -- Up

Significant growth of the Foundation's liquid reserves through the
sale of private investments and collection of loans payable
coupled with evidence that Ordway and other tenants can fully
support lease and debt service payments on an ongoing basis
without support from CLF.

                What could change the rating -- Down

Depletion of debt service reserve fund and payment default;
acceleration of the bonds as a result of an event of default
within the guaranty agreement or bond documents; weak recovery
should bondholders chose to foreclose on mortgage lien on the
leasehold interest in the research facility

Key Indicators For Charitable Leadership Foundation: (Audited FY
2009 financial data unless otherwise noted; CLF has a 12/31 fiscal
year end):

* Total cash, cash equivalents, and publicly traded equity
  securities: $46,000

* Total Net Assets: $18.67 million, including $3.7 million of
  loans receivable and $12.78 million of program related
  investments

* Amount of Series 2002A bonds outstanding: $48 million

Rated Debt:

* Series 2002A Civic Facility Revenue Bonds: Ca

Rating Methodology:

The rating on the Series 2002A bonds was assigned by evaluating
factors believed to be relevant to the credit profile of
Charitable Leadership Foundation such as 1) the business risk and
competitive position of the issuer versus others within its
industry or sector, ii) the capital structure and financial risk
of the issuer, iii) the projected performance of the issuer over
the near to intermediate term, iv) the issuer's history of
achieving consistent operating performance and meeting budget or
financial plan goals, v) the nature of the dedicated revenue
stream pledged to the bonds, vi) the debt service coverage
provided by such revenue stream, vii) the legal structure that
documents the revenue stream and the source of payment, and
vii) the issuer's management and governance structure related to
payment.


CHARLES RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D
(sf)' from 'CC (sf)' on the class A-2V and A-2F notes from Charles
River CDO I Ltd.; the class A1-LB, A-2L, and X notes from Ischus
Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-2 Ltd.; and the class A-2 notes from Summer
Street 2005-HG1 Ltd. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CC (sf)'
ratings on 14 classes of notes from the same transactions.

The downgrades are a result of defaults on the interest payments
due on the transactions' nondeferrable classes.

S&P's rating affirmations reflect both the credit support
available to the notes and the ability for the notes to defer on
its interest payments.

                         Ratings Lowered

                     Charles River CDO I Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                 Class       To          From
                 -----       --          ----
                 A-2V        D (sf)      CC (sf)
                 A-2F        D (sf)      CC (sf)

               Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-2 Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                 Class       To          From
                 -----       --          ----
                 A-1LB       D (sf)      CC (sf)
                 A-2L        D (sf)      CC (sf)
                 X           D (sf)      CC (sf)

                   Summer Street 2005-HG1 Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                 Class       To          From
                 -----       --          ----
                 A-2         D (sf)      CC (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                    Charles River CDO I Ltd.

                       Class       Rating
                       -----       ------
                       A-1A        CC (sf)
                       A-1B        CC (sf)
                       B-F         CC (sf)
                       B-V         CC (sf)
                       C           CC (sf)
                       Comb Sec    CC (sf)

               Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-2 Ltd.


                      Class       Rating
                      -----       ------
                      A-1LA       CCsrp (sf)
                      A-3L        CC (sf)
                      B-1L        CC (sf)
                      B-2L        CC (sf)

                   Summer Street 2005-HG1 Ltd.

                       Class       Rating
                       -----       ------
                       A-1         CC (sf)
                       B           CC (sf)
                       C           CC (sf)
                       D           CC (sf)


CHURCHILL FINANCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D-1, D-2, and E notes from Churchill
Financial Cayman Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
transaction managed by Churchill Financial LLC.

The upgrades mainly reflect an improvement in the performance of
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio, as well as relief
from the additional modeling stresses S&P applied due to the
cancellation of subordinate notes since the time of S&P's last
rating action on April 26, 2010.  At that time, S&P downgraded all
of the notes that S&P rate following its review of transactions
which had experienced subordinate debt cancellations without
payment, applying additional cash flow stresses to the transaction
to address the risk of potential further subordinate note
cancellations and the resulting impact on the credit enhancement
provided by the transaction's coverage tests.  In 2009, from June
through December, the transaction cancelled a total of $1 million
in class B notes, $2 million in class C notes, and $6 million in
class D-1 notes then outstanding, after the collateral manager
surrendered the notes to the trustee.

In December 2010, an amendment to the transaction's indenture was
executed that, in S&P's view, effectively mitigates the risk of
future subordinate note cancellations.  As a result, S&P is no
longer applying the additional modeling stresses in its cash flow
analysis of the transaction.

As of the January 2011 trustee report, the transaction had
$46.47 million of defaulted assets.  This was down from
$60.20 million noted in the February 2010 trustee report, which
S&P referenced for its April 2010 rating actions.  Furthermore,
assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at
$177.60 million in January 2011, compared with $203.31 million in
February 2010.

The transaction has further benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes.  The
trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Jan. 14, 2011, monthly
report:

* The class A/B O/C ratio was 137.4%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 134.0% in February 2010;

* The class C O/C ratio was 123.7%, compared with a reported ratio
  of 120.3% in February 2010;

* The class D O/C ratio was 115.1%, compared with a reported ratio
  of 111.6% in February 2010; and

* The class E O/C ratio was 110.1%, compared with a reported ratio
  of 106.5% in February 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                         Rating Actions

                 Churchill Financial Cayman Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
                Class     To           From
                -----     --           ----
                A-1       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
                A-2       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
                A-3       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
                B         AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
                C         A+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)
                D-1       BBB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)
                D-2       BBB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)
                E         BBB- (sf)    B- (sf)

Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:             Churchill Financial Cayman Ltd.
Collateral manager: Churchill Financial LLC
Underwriter:        IXIS Capital Markets
Trustee:            U.S. Bank National Association
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Nine 2006-FL2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed nine classes and downgraded the
ratings of two pooled classes and ten non-pooled, or rake, classes
of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-FL2.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. X-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2006
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. RAM-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. RAM-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. DSG-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. DSG-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. DHC-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. DHC-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. SRL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. CAC-1, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. CAC-2, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. CAC-3, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf).

  -- Cl. CAN-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. CAN-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. CAN-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the deterioration in the performance of
the assets in the trust and the refinancing risk associated with
loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  All seven
remaining loans are scheduled to mature in the next six months or
have already matured.  The affirmations of nine pooled classes
were due to key paramaters, including Moody's loan to value ratio
remaining within an acceptable range.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying performance in
the commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's
expects to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Large Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and
single borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool
to allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that all loans in the pool default
with an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.  Moody's ratings are determined by a committee
process that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 21, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 86% to $164 million
from $1.19 billion at securitization due to the payoff of nine
loans.  The Certificates are collateralized by seven floating-rate
loans ranging in size from 2% to 31% of the pooled trust mortgage
balance.  The largest three loans account for 64% of the pooled
balance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There are currently three loans in special servicing which are the
CarrAmerica -- Pool 3 (National Portfolio) Loan ($28.7 million,
18% of the pooled balance); the H Street Loan ($26 million --
16%); and the Snake River Lodge & Spa Loan ($13.1 million -- 8%).
All loans are in the process of negotiating a resolution including
loan extensions.

Moody's weighted average LTV ratio for the pooled trust mortgage
balance is 93% compared to 90% at last review on July 21, 2010,
and 61% at securitization.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio for the pooled trust mortgage balance is 0.95X, compared to
0.98X at last review and 1.66X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.
Large loan transactions generally have a Herf of less than 20.
The pool has a Herf of 5, the same as last review.

The largest pooled exposure is the Radisson Ambassador Plaza
Hotel and Casino Loan ($50 million - 30% of the pooled balance)
which is secured by a 233 room full-service hotel with a 15,000
square feet casino located in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  There is
also $4.4 million of non-pooled trust debt and $35.6 million in
mezzanine debt.  Casino revenue, which continues to represent
more than 50% of the total revenue from the property, has
declined since securitization.  Year end 2005 casino revenue
of $19.6 million declined to $13.7 million as of the trailing
twelve month period ending September 2010.  Due to the decline in
property performance, Moody's LTV for the trust debt is over 100%
and Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.15X.  Moody's current underlying
rating for the pooled balance is Caa3 compared to B3 at last
review.

The largest loan is the CarrAmerica-Pool 3 (National Portfolio )
Loan ($28.7 million -- 45% of the pooled balance) which is the
7.5% portion of a pari passu split loan structure that is
securitized in COMM 2006-FL-12 (52.5%) and BALL 2006-BIX (40%).
There is also $3.8 million of non-pooled, or rake, trust debt, a
$179 million non-trust junior secured component, and $150 million
of mezzanine debt.  The total outstanding loan balance is
$763.1 million.  The loan is secured by 29 office and research and
development (R&D) properties.  Twenty-two properties containing
approximately 4.9 million square feet are subject to first
mortgage liens.  The borrower's joint venture interests in
seven properties are secured by pledges of refinance and sale
proceeds.  The outstanding trust balance has decreased by 72%
since securitization from the payment of loan collateral release
premiums.  The remaining portfolio has geographic concentration in
California's Silicon Valley with 17 properties representing 80% of
the mortgage collateral by net rentable area located in San Jose
(12 properties -- 55%), Santa Clara (2 properties -- 11%),
Sunnyvale (1 property -- 9%), Fremont (1 property -- 3%) and Palo
Alto (1 property - 2%).  The other five properties are located in
Dallas (2 properties -- 10%), Los Angeles (2 properties -- 8%) and
Seattle (1 property -- 2%).  As of the September 2010 rent rolls,
the current loan collateral secured by first mortgage liens had a
weighted average occupancy rate of 79%, compared to 82% at Moody's
last review and 89% at securitization.  The San Jose office and
R&D markets ended 2010 with vacancy rates exceeding 20%.  Although
the market experienced positive absorption in the 4th quarter it
was preceded by several quarters of negative absorption that
resulted in an increase in the vacancy rate.  Although the market
is beginning to show some improvement, Moody's expects that it
will be some time before real estate fundamentals recover to pre-
recession levels.  Moody's credit estimate for the pooled debt is
Ba2, compared to Baa3 at last review.

The third largest pooled exposure is the Doubletree Suites
Galleria Loan ($26 million -- 15.8% of pooled balance) which is
secured by a 355-room full service hotel located in the Galleria
submarket in Houston, Texas.  There is also $2.4 million of rake
trust debt, and $25.3 million of non-trust junior secured debt.
Revenue per available room has decreased 20% from a high of $113
in 2008 to $91 for the trailing twelve month period ending
September 2010.  Due to the decline in property performance,
Moody's LTV for the trust debt is over 89% and Moody's stressed
DSCR is 1.34X.  Moody's current underlying rating for the pooled
balance is Ba3 compared to Baa3 at last review.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 77 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 77
tranches from six Alt-A deals issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan
Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2005
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. S-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IO-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. S-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IO-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB4

  -- Cl. A-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. W-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM1

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM2

  -- Cl. IA-CB1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-CB-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-CB-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-CB-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XS-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IVA-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IVA-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. XS-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CITYSCAPE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8 tranches
from 3 Subprime deals issued by various financial institutions.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on
1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition,
if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Cityscape Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-2

  -- A-5, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: CPT Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-EC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HomeGold Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)


COMM 2006-FL12: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 31 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 31 classes,
including seven pooled classes and 24 non-pooled, or rake, classes
of COMM 2006-FL12 Commercial Pass-Through Certificates.  Moody's
also affirmed 20 classes, includiing eight pooled classes and 12
rake classes.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-3-BC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-3-DB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-3-SG, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-5-BC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-5-DB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-5-SG, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. CN1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. CN2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. CN3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. KR1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. KR3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. IP1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. IP2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. IP3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. FSH1, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. FSH2, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. FSH3, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. CA1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. CA2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. CA3, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. CA4, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. AN3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. FG1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. FG2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. FG3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. FG4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. FG5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. LS1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. LS2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. LS3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. TC1, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. TC2, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. LB1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. LB2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. LB3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. ES1, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. ES2, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. ES3, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. AH1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. AH2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. AH3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. AH4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the deterioration in the performance of
the majority of assets in the trust, refinancing risk associated
with loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment and
risks specific to the Independence Plaza Loan, the third largest
loan in the trust, relating to a court decision that favored the
tenants in a rent stabilization lawsuit.  The affirmations of the
pooled and non-pooled classes were due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio remaining within an
acceptable range.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large
Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single
borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool to
allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that loans in the pool default with
an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 18, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2011 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance decreased by approximately 40% to $1.8 billion
from $3.0 billion at securitization due to the payoff of one
loan (the Strategic Hotels & Resorts Portfolio Loan) and the
liquidation of two loans (the Hotel del Coronado Loan and the
Charleston Marriott Loan) and the payment of release premiums
associated with seven loans (Kerzner International Portfolio Loan,
Blackstone/Carr America National Portfolio Loan, Blackstone CAR
Portfolio Loan, Four Seasons Hualalai Loan, Albertson's Portfolio
Loan, the Avenue at Tower City Loan and the Legacy Bayside Loan).
The certificates are collateralized by 13 floating-rate loans
ranging in size from 2% to 35% of the pooled trust balance.

The pool has experienced a $2.8 million loss as the result of the
special servicer's workout fee related to the Hotel del Coronado
Loan.  The loss was applied to Class J and Class H-DC.  There are
currently four loans in special servicing, the Blackstone/Carr
America National Portfolio Loan ($201.4 million - 14%), the Ft.
Lauderdale Marina Marriott Loan ($37.0 million - 3%), the Legacy
SoCal Portfolio Loan ($48.4 millin 3%) and the Legacy Bayside Loan
($21.9 million - 2%).  Special serviced loans account for 22% of
the pooled trust balance.

There are currently four loans on the master servicer's watchlist
equal to 33% of the pooled trust balance.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.  Watchlisted loans are loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.

Moody's weighted average pooled LTV ratio is 82%, the same as at
last review.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is
1.28x, compared to 1.26x at last review.

The largest loan is the Kerzner International Portfolio Loan
($512.0 million -- 35% of the pooled balance), a 50% portion of a
pari passu split loan structure that is securitized in CSFB 2006-
TFL2.  There is also $154.2 million of non-pooled, or rake, trust
debt (Classes KR1, KR2 and KR3) and a $1.3 billion non-trust
junior secured loan component.  The loan is secured by
substantially all of the Kerzner family's real estate assets
located on Paradise Island, Bahamas, including the Atlantis Hotel
(2,917 keys) and the One & Only Ocean Club Hotel and golf course
(106 keys, located one mile from the Atlantis), a marina and
vacant and improved land.  The resort features the largest casino
and ballroom in the Caribbean and water-themed attractions,
including the world's largest open-air marine habitat.  The loan
is also supported by a pledge of Kerzner's 100% interest in
management agreements and fees relating to the properties, a right
to receive Kerzner's 50% interest in excess net cash flow and/or
sales proceeds generated from the One & Only Palmilla Hotel in
Mexico, Harborside timeshare units, and the Residences at Atlantis
and Ocean Club condos.

Revenue per available room, calculated by multiplying the average
daily rate by the occupancy rate, for the trailing 12-month period
ending December 2010 was $195 at the Atlantis and $719 at the One
& Only Ocean Club.  Although combined RevPAR for the two hotels
increased 5% from the trailing 12-month period ending in December
2009, it remains 18% less than at securitization.  Casino revenue,
which represents 17% of total revenue, decreased 8% from 2009 and
approximately 25% from securitization.

A concern is the additional competition from the $3.4 billion Baha
Mar resort complex that just broke ground in March 2011 on
Nassau's Cable Beach.  Baha Mar is a single-phase project backed
by the Chinese government that is scheduled to open in late 2014.
The resort will feature four hotels with a total of approximately
2,250 rooms, a golf course, convention center, a casino that is to
be the largest in the Caribbean and a 10-acre Eco Water Park.  In
overall size and amenities it is expected to be very similar to
the Atlantis.  Although scheduled completion is four years away,
the project is expected to be future competition for the Atlantis
and complicate the re-financing of the current debt that has a
final maturity date in September 2011.  Moody's credit estimate
for the pooled debt is Ba3, compared to Ba1 at last review.

The Independence Plaza Loan ($236.0 million -- 16%) is secured by
a 1,322 unit rental apartment complex located in the Tribeca
neighborhood of New York City.  There is also $29.0 million of
non-pooled trust debt (Classes IP1, IP2 and IP3), a $160.0 million
non-trust junior secured component and $150.0 million in mezzanine
debt.  In addition to the residential units, the property contains
74,915 square feet of commercial space and a 230,000 square foot
parking garage.  The largest commercial tenants include the New
York City Board of Education (18,600 square feet, lease expiration
in 2015) and Shopwell Supermarket (21,862 square feet, lease
expiration in 2013).  As of November 2010 the complex was
approximately 99% leased.

Independence Plaza exited the Mitchell-Lama Housing Program, a
form of housing subsidy in the state of New York, in 2004 but
continued to receive J-51 tax breaks for two years while rents
were raised at the complex by deregulating stabilized apartments.
In August 2010 a state Supreme Court judge reversed the state's
Department of Housing and Community Renewal's earlier decision and
ruled that rents had been illegally destabilized after taxes at
Independence Plaza were reduced from a J-51 tax abatement.  As of
November 2010 approximately 35% of the total residential units in
Independence Plaza were rented at fair market rents.
Additionally, approximately 37% of the units were rented with
Section 8 vouchers which allow the borrower to receive full market
rents.  If the court ruling holds it would mean that the federal
government should have been paying lower stabilized rents.
Laurence Gluck, the borrower, is appealing the court decision.
Moody's credit estimate for the pooled debt is Ba3 compared to
Baa3 at last review.

The Blackstone/Carr America National Portfolio Loan
($201.4 million -- 14% of the pooled balance) which is the 52.5%
portion of a pari passu split loan structure that is securitized
in BALL 2006-BIX1 (40%) and CGCMS 2006-FL2 (7.5%).  There is also
$26.8 million of non-pooled, or rake, trust debt (Classes CN1, CN2
and CN3), a $179 million non-trust junior secured component, and
$150 million of mezzanine debt.  The total outstanding loan
balance is $763.1 million.  The loan is secured by 29 office and
research and development (R&D) properties.  Twenty-two properties
containing approximately 4.9 million square feet are subject to
first mortgage liens.  The borrower's joint venture interests in
seven properties are secured by pledges of refinance and sale
proceeds.  The outstanding trust balance has decreased by 72%
since securitization from the payment of loan collateral
release premiums.  At securitization the loan was secured by 73
properties.  The remaining portfolio has geographic concentration
in California's Silicon Valley with 17 properties representing 80%
of the mortgage collateral by net rentable area (NRA) located in
San Jose (12 properties -55%), Santa Clara (2 properties -- 11%),
Sunnyvale (1 property - 9%), Fremont (1 property - 3%) and Palo
Alto (1 property - 2%).  The other five properties are located in
Dallas (2 properties -- 10%), Los Angeles (2 properties -- 8%) and
Seattle (1 property -- 2%).

The loan was transferred to special servicing on February 1, 2011,
due to imminent maturity default.  The final fully-extended
maturity date is August 9, 2011.  The borrower indicated that the
national economic recession has hurt the performance of the
properties that secure the loan and that it will not be able to
pay off the loan at maturity.

As of the September 2010 rent rolls, the current loan collateral
secured by first mortgage liens had a weighted average occupancy
rate of 79% compared to 82% at Moody's last review and 89% at
securitization.  Additionally, the 77,944 square foot Casey Family
Building in Seattle became vacant in January 2011 when its single
tenant, Casey Family Programs, vacated upon its lease expiration.
Including the Casey Family Building vacancy, the current occupancy
for the mortgaged collateral is approximately 77%.

The San Jose office and R&D markets ended 2010 with vacancy
rates exceeding 20%.  Although the market experienced positive
absorption in the 4th quarter it was preceded by several quarters
of negative absorption that resulted in an increase in the vacancy
rate.  Although the market is beginning to show some improvement,
Moody's expects that it will be some time before real estate
fundamentals recover to pre-recession levels.  Moody's expects
that for the next several quarters market fundamentals will put
downward pressure on rental rates for new leases and lease
renewals.  The loan sponsor is the Blackstone Group.  Moody's
credit estimate for the pooled debt is Ba2, compared to Baa3 at
last review.

The Four Seasons Hualalai Loan ($151.6 million -- 10%) is secured
by a luxury resort located on the Kona-Kohala Coast on Hawaii's
Big Island.  There is also $24.3 million of non-pooled trust debt
(Classes FSH1, FSH2 and FSH3) and a $100.2 million non-trust
junior secured component.  Loan collateral includes a 243 room
luxury resort hotel operated by Four Seasons Hotel Limited that
has amenities typical of luxury resort hotels, including two
golf courses.  The collateral also includes a residential land
component with the potential to build more than 510 residential
units.  The loan has paid down approximately 13% since
securitization (unchanged from Moody's previous review) from
the sale of land parcels.  At securitization, a 115-key expansion
to the hotel was expected to commence in 2008.  Due to the
economic downturn, the expansion plans were abandoned for the near
to mid-term.  Instead, the hotel underwent a major renovation that
included converting 20 existing hotel rooms into suites.  Revenue
per available room improved by 37% to $557 for full year 2010,
compared to $408 for full-year 2009.  RevPAR in 2010 was 10% lower
than at securitization when it was $617.  Hawaii's tourism
industry which has been hurt by the economic recession has seen
improvement over the past several months.  Reasons for concern are
higher airfares resulting from increases in oil prices and the
expectation that fewer Japanese tourists will visit Hawaii due to
the Japanese earthquake and Tsunami.  The Four Seasons Hualalai is
temporarily closed due to water damage from the Tsunami that also
hit Hawaii.  The hotel plans to reopen on March 21, 2011.  Moody's
credit estimate for the pooled debt is B1, the same as last
review.

The Fort Lauderdale Grande Loan ($37.0 million -- 3%) was
transferred to special serving on December 20, 2010 when the
borrower expressed an inability to pay off the loan on the
February 9, 2011 maturity date.  There is also $29.0 million of
non-pooled trust debt (Classes FG1, FG2, FG3, FG4 and FG5) and a
$39.0 million non-trust junior secured component.  Additionally,
there is $105.0 million of mezzanine debt.  Loan collateral is a
579 room hotel that underwent a renovation in 2008 and is
currently operating as the Hilton Ft.  Lauderdale Marina Hotel.
The hotel is located on the Intercoastal Waterway in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida.  RevPAR for the trailing 12-month period
ending November 2010 was $86, a 14% increase from RevPAR of $75
during the same period in 2009, although a 24% decrease from
RevPAR at securitization.  Moody's credit estimate is Ba1,
compared to Baa2 at last review.  The loan sponsor is the
Blackstone Group.  The special servicer is in the process of
determining the best workout strategy.

The Legacy SoCal Loan ($48.4 million - 3%) was transferred to
special servicing on February 15, 2011, because the borrower
does not anticipate being able to pay off the loan by the May 9,
2011 final maturity date.  There is also $7.8 million of non-
pooled trust debt (Classes LS1, LS2 and LS3) and a $33.3 million
non-trust junior secured component.  The loan is secured by
852,249 square feet of office/R&D space located in two business
parks, Heritage Corporate Center located in Santa Fe Springs,
California and Waterside Technology Park located in Sorrento Mesa,
California.  As of September 2010 the properties were 82% leased.
The largest tenants is the County of Los Angles that occupies 13%
of total net rentable area with a lease expiration in February
2014.  Moody's current credit estimate is B3 compared to B1 at
last review.

The Legacy Bayside Loan ($21.9 million -- 2%) was transferred to
special servicing in June 2010.  The loan is in payment default
and the special servicer is proceeding with foreclosure.  There is
also $4.1 million of non-pooled trust debt (Classes LB1, LB2 and
LB3) and a $6.7 million non-trust junior secured component.  The
loan is secured by three office/research & development (R&D)
buildings with a total of 233,740 square feet located in Fremont,
California.  The loan collateral was appraised in August 2010 for
$13.0 million.  At the time of the appraisal the property was 20%
leased.  Market rents for office/R&D properties in Fremont have
declined significantly since securitization.  Moody's credit
estimate for the trust balance is C, compared to Ca1 at last
review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 109 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 109
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from 32 Subprime
deals issued by Credit Suisse First Boston.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 2002-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 2002-HE4

  -- Cl. A-F, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-F-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-F-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-HE25

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-HE30

  -- Cl. A-F, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-F-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-F-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. B-F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE11

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE-16

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2003-8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2008
     Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-FRE1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 27, 2007
     Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB ABS Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-HE20

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE16

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE22

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-8

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-HE17

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed five classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1998-C2:

  -- Cl. AX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 20, 1998
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 8, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. I, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2006
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool performance and
increased credit subordination due to loan payoffs and
amortization.  The pool has amortized 12% since last review.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 10.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
18.1% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions " published in
April 2005, " CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
Transactions" published in July 2000, and " CMBS: Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions" published
in October 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 14 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its
public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8 to generate a portfolio
loss distribution to derive credit enhancement levels for
CTL component.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing
the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's
credit rating is the key factor in determining the probability
of default on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is
"bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease, yielding
fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box, sufficient under
all circumstances to pay in full all interest and principal of the
loan.  The leased property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote,
special purpose borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and
assignment of rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value
of the collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark",
is then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's
default.  Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal
integrity of the transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 21, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $269.1
million from $1.92 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
67% of the pool.  The pool includes a credit tenant lease (CTL)
component, representing 51% of the pool.  One loan, representing
20% of the pool, has an investment grade credit estimate.  Four
loans, representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Nine loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate $49.6 million realized loss (48% loss severity on
average).  At Moody's last review the pool had realized an
aggregate loss of $46.0 million.  Currently there is one loan,
representing 12% of the pool, in special servicing.  The Camco
Portfolio Loan ($31.9 million -- 11.8%) is secured by two retail
properties and one industrial property totaling 547,000 square
feet.  The properties are located in North Richland Hills (2) and
Irving, Texas.  The portfolio was 76% leased as of September 2010
compared to 85% at last review.  Performance has declined since
securitization due to lower rental revenues and increased
operating expenses.  The loan has passed its October 11, 2008 ARD
and was transferred to special servicer in December 2009.  The
loan has been modified to decrease the interest rate and extend
the term and is being monitored by the servicer.  Moody's
estimates a loss of $3.5 million for this specially serviced loan
(based on 50% probability default).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $4.1 million loss (34% expected loss based on a 68%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 87% and 28% of the pool, respectively,
excluding the CTL and defeased loans.  Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 86%
compared to 130% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.17X and 1.62X, respectively, compared to
0.83X and 0.93X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the 180 Water Street Loan
($53.7 million -- 19.9%), which is secured by a 505,000 square
foot office building located in the Financial District submarket
of New York City.  The property is 100% leased to the City of New
York Department of Citywide Administrative Services under a long-
term lease which expires in June 2018.  The loan amortizes on a
20-year schedule and matures in August 2013.  Performance has been
stable.  The loan has amortized by 12% since last review.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.53X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.36X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 9% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the St. Landry Plaza Shopping Center
Loan ($8.8 million -- 3.3%), which is secured by a 222,000 square
foot retail center located in Opelousas, Louisiana.  The center's
major tenant, Wal-Mart (55% of NRA; lease expiration June 2011)
vacated its space in 2004 but subsequently subleased 68% of its
space.  The center was 84% leased as of March 2010, the same at
last review.  The loan has passed its July 2008 Anticipated
Repayment Date (ARD) and is now in an extended term.  The loan is
on the servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.  The master servicer's
most recently reported DSCR is 0.72x.  Moody's has recognized this
loan as a troubled loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 160%
and 0.64X, respectively, compared to 208% and 0.49X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Jewelry Theatre Building loan
($8.5 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by a 72,000 square foot
retail property located in the Jewelry District of Los Angeles,
California.  Performance has declined due to low occupancy.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.94X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 1.05X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Agawan Stop & Shop Loan
($6.6 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 66,500
square foot retail property located in Agawam, Massachusetts.  The
property is 100% leased to the Stop & Shop Supermarket under a
lease which expires in January 2014.  Performance has been stable.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.36X, respectively,
compared to 82% and 1.26X at last review.

The CTL component includes thirty five loans ($137.5 million --
51.1%) secured by properties leased to seven tenants under
bondable leases.  The largest exposures are Motel 6/Accor SA (55%
of the CTL component), CVS/Caremark Corp. (20%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook) and United Artists (9%).
The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor for the CTL pool
is 2,199 compared to 2,018 at last review.  WARF is a measure of
the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within the
pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-C4 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes,
affirmed 17 classes and confirmed three classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C4:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2011 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

On February 19, 2011, Moody's placed eight classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations and confirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the existing rating.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.7% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 9.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
25.3% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the
transaction's aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3%
to $4.132 billion from $4.273 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 344 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 46% of the pool.  The pool includes 47 residential
cooperative loans, representing 3% of the pool, which have Aaa
credit estimates.  One loan, representing less than 1% of the has
defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Ninety-two loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $47.7 million loss
(88% loss severity on average).  At last review the pool had
experienced less than $2.8 million in realized losses.  Fifty-
three loans, representing 21% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Babcock & Brown FX 3 Loan ($195.1 million --4.7% of the pool),
which is secured by 14 multifamily properties located in six
states.  The collateral consists of older vintage Class B
properties and totals 3,719 units.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in February 2009 due to the borrower's
request for a loan modification.  As of February 2011, the
loan was 90+ days delinquent.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Dream Hotel Loan
($99.4 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 220-
room hotel located in New York City.  The loan is encumbered by a
ground lease that expires in 2103.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in April 2009 when the borrower indicated it
could no longer support debt service.  The decline in business and
tourist travel due to the economic recession has significantly
impacted property performance.  In July 2010, the master servicer
recognized an appraisal reduction of $41.5 million.  As of
February 2011, the loan was 90+ days delinquent.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Carlton Hotel on
Madison Loan ($98.5 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 316-room hotel located in New York City.  The property has
never achieved the performance originally anticipated at
securitization.  The property has reported a negative NOI since
2009.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in December
2010 as the result of imminent default.  The borrowers have
requested a loan modification of the current loan terms.  As
of January 2011, the loan was current.

The remaining 50 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$161.2 million appraisal reduction for 42 of the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $316.8 million
loss (36% expected loss on average) for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
$59.1 million loss (23% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 96%
of the conduit pool and partial year 2010 financials for 100% of
the conduit pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 115% compared to 118% at
last review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 7.8% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.23X and 0.92X, respectively, compared to
1.20X and 0.88X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 31% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the 11 Madison Avenue Loan
($806.0 million -- 19.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
2.2 million square foot (SF) Class A office building located in
the East Midtown South office submarket in New York City.  The
property was virtually 100% leased as of September 2010, the same
as last review.  The building serves as the global headquarters
location for Credit Suisse AG, which leases 81% of the NRA through
May 2017.  The loan is interest-only for the entire term.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.74X, respectively, compared
to 134% and 0.69X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 280 Park Avenue Loan
($300.0 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $440 million loan.  The loan is secured by
a 1.2 million SF Class A office building located in the Plaza
District office submarket in New York City.  The loan is also
encumbered by a $670 million mezzanine loan.  The property was
70% leased as of March 2011 compared to 96% at last review.  In
February 2011, Deutsche Bank Trust Companies (28% of net rentable
area (NRA)) vacated the property at the expiration of its lease.
The loan sponsors are currently seeking new tenants.  The three
largest tenants are the National Football League (17% of the NRA;
lease expiration February 2014), Credit Suisse (8% of theNRA;
lease expiration March 2014) and General Electric Corp. (4% of the
NRA; lease expiration January 2014).  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 89% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.06X at
Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Ritz Carlton South Beach Loan
($181.0 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
376-room full-service luxury hotel located in Miami Beach,
Florida.  The loan was placed on the master servicer's watchlist
in October 2009 as the result of declining performance.  The
property has never achieved the performance originally anticipated
at securitization.  Because of the hotel's poor performance and
concerns about the Miami hotel market, Moody's has classified this
loan as a troubled loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 213%
and 0.52X, respectively, compared to 213% and < 0.40X at last
review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 2006-TFL2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 19 classes,
including 11 pooled classes and eight non-pooled, or rake, classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Series
2006-TFL2.  Moody's also affirmed the ratings of two pooled
classes and 14 rake classes.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. BEV-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. NHK-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. KER-F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. MW-A, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2008
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. MW-B, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2008
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-A1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-A2, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-B, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-D, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-E, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-H, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-K, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. SV-AX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the deterioration in performance of
five hotel properties that account for 98% of the trust balance
and refinance risk associated with loans approaching maturity in
an adverse environment.  The affirmations of the pooled and non-
pooled classes were due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio remaining within an acceptable range.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large
Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single
borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool to
allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that loans in the pool default with
an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 18, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 15, 2011 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 45% to $1.9 billion from
$3.4 billion at securitization due to the payoff of eight loans
originally in the pool and the payment of release premiums
associated with the Kerzner International Loan ($372.8 million --
52% of the pooled balance).  The Certificates are collateralized
by six floating-rate loans ranging in size from 2% to 52% of the
pooled trust balance.

There currently are two loans on the master servicer's watchlist
equal to 46% of the outstanding trust principal balance.  As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.  Watchlisted loans are loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.

Moody's weighted average pooled LTV ratio is 77% compared to 76%
at last review.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is
1.72X compared to 1.49X at last review.

The pool has experienced $211,774 in losses since securitization.
The losses were due to the special servicer's workout fee
associated with the Sheffield condo conversion loan.  One loan,
the JW Marriott Starr Pass Loan ($78.0 million--11%) is currently
in special servicing.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 and is a performing matured balloon loan.

The Sava Portfolio and Fundamental Healthcare Loans ($842.7
million -- not pooled) consist of two non-pooled mortgage loans
that are partially cross collateralized and cross defaulted.  The
larger of the two loans has a first mortgage balance of
approximately $735.0 million and is collateralized by the Sava
Healthcare Portfolio.  The smaller of the two loans has a first
mortgage balance of approximately $107.7 million and is
collateralized by the Fundamental Healthcare Portfolio.
Collectively these loans secure the non-pooled Sava rake bonds.
The Sava Portfolio loan collateral includes 169 healthcare
facilities located in 19 states, containing 20,667 beds and the
Fundamental Portfolio collateral includes 27 healthcare facilities
located in nine states, containing 2,822 beds.  Skilled nursing
facilities account for 93% of properties across the two
portfolios.  The largest state concentrations across the two
portfolios are in Texas (24.8%), North Carolina (13.3%) and
Colorado (10.3%).

The portfolio has enjoyed strong operating performance since
securitization exhibiting consecutive positive growth.  However,
one of the assumptions at securitization was that refinancing of
these loans would be done through new Housing and Urban
Development loans.  A letter issued from HUD on June 22, 2006,
states that the borrower would be allowed to submit an application
for up to $1.055 billion on the portfolio.  It is not expected
that the loans will be paid off on the June 9, 2011 maturity date.
To reflect increased refinance risk, Moody's downgraded the rake
bonds associated with these two loans at Moody's review on
March 19, 2009.

On February 26, 2010, Sava Senior Care Administrative LLC, as well
as their principals, agreed to pay the United States and several
states $14 million as a settlement arising from allegations made
by the United States that the defendants received kickbacks from a
pharmaceutical vendor.  As part of the settlement, the Office of
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services (OIG-HHS) reserved its rights to seek exclusions of Sava
and its principals from participation in Medicare, Medicaid and
all other federal health care programs.  If OIG-HHS were to
exclude the borrower and its principals from participation in
federal health care programs, the borrower's ability to meet its
loan obligations could be significantly impaired and could result
in a change in control of the borrower.  Moody's has taken this
into consideration in its analysis and has identified several
large and experienced healthcare operators that could replace the
borrower, if necessary, and continue the successful operation of
the properties.

Additionally, members of the ownership structure are currently in
mutual litigation regarding the operations of the properties and
the distribution of funds within the ownership organization.  To
date the properties and cash flows have not been hurt by the
litigation and the litigants have indicated that future debt
service payments are not in jeopardy.

Given the solid performance of the underlying collateral, Moody's
is affirming the current rating of the rake bonds (Classes SVA-1,
SVA-2, SVA-X, SV-B, SV-C, SV-D, SV-E, SV-F, SV-G, SV-H, SV-J, and
SV-K).

The largest pooled loan is the Kerzner International Portfolio
Loan ($372.7 million -- 52% of the pooled balance), a 50% portion
of a pari passu split loan structure that is securitized in COMM
2006-FL12.  There is also $293.5 million of non-pooled, or rake,
trust debt (Classes KERA, KERB, KERC, KERD, KERE and KERF) and a
$1.3 billion non-trust junior secured loan component.  The loan is
secured by substantially all of the Kerzner family's real estate
assets located on Paradise Island, Bahamas, including the Atlantis
Hotel (2,917 keys) and the One & Only Ocean Club Hotel and golf
course (106 keys, located one mile from the Atlantis), a marina
and vacant and improved land.  The resort features the largest
casino and ballroom in the Caribbean and water-themed attractions,
including the world's largest open-air marine habitat.  The loan
is also supported by a pledge of Kerzner's 100% interest in
management agreements and fees relating to the properties, a right
to receive Kerzner's 50% interest in excess net cash flow and/or
sales proceeds generated from the One & Only Palmilla Hotel in
Mexico, Harborside timeshare units, and the Residences at Atlantis
and Ocean Club condos.

Revenue per available room, calculated by multiplying the average
daily rate by the occupancy rate, for the trailing 12-month period
ending December 2010 was $195 at the Atlantis and $719 at the One
& Only Ocean Club.  Although combined RevPAR for the two hotels
increased 5% from the trailing 12-month period ending in December
2009, it remains 18% less than at securitization.  Casino revenue,
which represents 17% of total revenue, decreased 8% from 2009 and
approximately 25% from securitization.

A concern is the additional competition from the $3.4 billion Baha
Mar resort complex that just broke ground in March 2011 on
Nassau's Cable Beach.  Baha Mar is a single-phase project backed
by the Chinese government that is scheduled to open in late 2014.
The resort will feature four hotels with a total of approximately
2,250 rooms, a golf course, convention center, a casino that is to
be the largest in the Caribbean and a 10-acre Eco Water Park.  In
overall size and amenities it is expected to be very similar to
the Atlantis.  Although scheduled completion is four years away,
the project is expected to be future competition for the Atlantis
and complicate the re-financing of the current debt that has a
final maturity date in September 2011.  Moody's credit estimate
for the pooled debt is Ba3 compared to Ba1 at last review.

The Beverly Hilton Loan ($155.0 million -- 22%) is secured by
a 569 room hotel in Beverly Hills, California.  Total debt
includes $11.0 million of non-pooled trust debt (Class BEVA) and a
$98.0 million non-trust junior secured component.  There is also
$36.0 million of mezzanine debt.  The hotel was built in 1965 and
underwent an $80 million renovation in 2004.  The loan sponsor is
Oasis West Realty.  RevPAR for the trailing 12-month period ending
September 30, 2010 was $153, a slight decrease from RevPAR for
full year 2009.  The hotel has not performed up to expectations.
RevPAR at securitization was $248.  Moody's credit estimate for
the pooled debt is Caa3, compared to B3 at last review.

The JW Marriott Starr Pass Loan ($78.0 million -- 11%) was
transferred to special servicing in April 2010.  The loan matured
in August 2010.  Principal and interest payments are current
through March 2011, however, the borrower did not make a required
seasonality deposit.  Total debt includes a $67.0 million non-
trust junior secured component and $20.0 million in mezzanine
debt.  Security for the loan is a 575 room hotel located in
Tucson, Arizona that was constructed in 2005.  RevPAR has been
declining for the past several years and for the trailing 12-
month period ending in June 2010 it was $88 compared to $137 at
securitization.  The special servicer is formulating a work-out
plan.  The property was re-appraised in October 2010 for
$111.0 million.  Moody's credit estimate is Caa3 compared to
B3 at last review.


CREST 2002-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes issued by Crest 2002-1
Ltd./Corp as a result of negative credit migration and increased
interest shortfalls on the underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in June 2010, approximately 38%
of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 65.8% has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 33.3% has a rating
in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 46% and 9.1% at
last review.  The class A notes have received $62.3 million in
paydowns since the last review.  As of the Feb. 28, 2011 trustee
report, 33.6% of the collateral is experiencing interest
shortfalls, compared to 6.7% at last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'.  Based on this
analysis, the class A notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the rating assigned below.

For the class B and C notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity
to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given
the high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class B
notes have been downgraded to 'CCCsf', indicating that default is
possible.  Similarly, the class C notes have been downgraded to
'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable.  As of the Feb. 28,
2011 trustee report, the class B and C notes are receiving
interest paid in kind whereby the principal amount of the notes is
written up by the amount of interest due.  Fitch notes that the
interest rate swap notional will step down beginning the next
payment period.  If LIBOR remains the same, the payment to the
swap counterparty will be significantly lower.

The Negative Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that the underlying CMBS loans will continue to face
refinance risk and the breakeven rates' sensitivity to Fitch's
LIBOR UP scenario.  The Loss Severity rating indicates a tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for the
collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss
Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the probability of default for tranches.  Fitch
does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and
below.

Crest 2002-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation that
closed on March 27, 2002.  The current portfolio consists of 31
bonds from 22 obligors, of which 26.9% are real estate investment
trust (REIT) debt securities and 73.1% are commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) from the 1999 through 2002 vintages.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $82,420,172 class A notes to 'Asf/LS4' from AAsf/LS3; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $57,288,134 class B-1 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBB-sf/LS3';

  -- $33,040,192 class B-2 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBB-sf/LS3';

  -- $35,612,500 class C notes to 'Csf' from 'Bsf/LS4'.


CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 60
tranches and confirmed the ratings of six tranches from five
Alt-A deals issued by CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series A-2 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of CVS Credit Lease
Backed Pass-Through Certificate, Series A-2:

Issuer: CVS Credit Lease Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
A-1 and Series A-2

  -- Series A-2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2007
     Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The transaction is supported by CVS/Caremark (CVS) lease
obligations on 96 single tenant buildings.  The rating of the
A-2 Certificate is affirmed at Ba1 based on CVS's rating (senior
unsecured debt rating Baa2, stable outlook) as well as the balloon
risk at the certificate's final distribution date.

This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
(CTL) financing rating methodology.  Under Moody's CTL approach,
the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on
the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating)
of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing
the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's
credit rating is the key factor in determining the probability
of default on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is
"bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease, yielding
fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box, sufficient under
all circumstances to pay in full all interest and principal of the
loan.  The leased property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote,
special purpose borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and
assignment of rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value
of the collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark",
is then examined; the dark value must be sufficient, assuming a
bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of the lease, to support
the expected loss consistent with the certificates' rating.
Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the possibility of lease
affirmations by the tenant and for the landlord's claim for lease
rejection damages in bankruptcy.  Moody's also may give credit
for some amortization of the debt, depending upon the rating
of the credit tenant.  In addition, Moody's considers the
overall structure and legal integrity of the transaction.  The
certificates' rating may change as the senior unsecured debt
rating (or the corporate family rating) of the tenant changes.

There were no models used in the review of this transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's prior
full review is summarized in a press release dated May 12, 2010.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance was $125 million.  The Certificates
are supported by 96 single-tenant, stand-alone retail buildings
leased to CVS.  Each building is subject to a fully bondable
triple net lease guaranteed by CVS.  Payments on the leases are
sufficient to pay all interest and 44% of the principal of the
Class A-2 Certificate by the January 10, 2023 final distribution
date.  The remaining principal of the A-2 Certificate is insured
under residual value insurance policies issued by Financial
Structures Limited and reinsured by Royal Indemnity Company
(Royal).  On September 28, 2006, Moody's downgraded Royal's
financial strength rating to B2 from Ba3 and subsequently withdrew
the rating.  The rating on the A-2 Certificates is notched down
from CVS's rating due to the size of the loan balance at maturity
relative to the value of the collateral assuming the existing
tenant is no longer in occupancy (the dark value).

CVS, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, is the largest
provider of prescriptions in the United States.  The company fills
or manages more than 1 billion prescriptions annually through
about 7,000 CVS pharmacy stores, its pharmacy benefits management
operation, its mail order and specialty pharmacy division,
Caremark Pharmacy Services, and its on-line pharmacy.


CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 318 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 318
tranches and confirmed the rating of 13 tranches from 39 Subprime
deals issued by CWABS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprimeresidential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. AF-5A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-7

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-9

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC5

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-ECC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-ECC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2008
     Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-BC1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-BC3

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-5

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BV, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-6

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-1

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-5

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. BF, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2003-2

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-BC2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-BC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2002
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches and confirmed the rating of three tranches issued by
Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2004-4.  The collateral backing the deal primarily consists of
adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.  .

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. III-AR-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-AR-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-AR-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, \
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-AR-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-AR-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-AR-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-AR-3, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DLJ MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1996-CF1 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1996-CF1:

  -- $11.2 million class B-4 at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1A through B-3 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the $2.8 million class C certificates.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool has paid down
97% to $14.04 million from $470.1 million at issuance.

There are currently two loans remaining in the pool.  The
remaining loans are located in Southfield, MI (96.3% of the pool,
matures in 2016) and Bloomington, IN (3.1%, matures in 2012).  The
Southfield property's debt service coverage ratio and occupancy
are at 1.81 times and 96% and the Bloomington property's are at
1.96x and 100%.


DOWLING COLLEGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating to B3 from
B1 on Dowling College's Series 1996 and 2002 bonds.  The Series
2002 bonds were issued through the Town of Brookhaven Industrial
Development Agency, and the Series 1996 bonds were issued through
the Suffolk County Industrial Development Agency.  The College has
$14.76 million of rated debt outstanding.  The rating remains on
watchlist for possible downgrade.

We expect to conclude Moody's review of the rating within 90 days.
Moody's review will include additional reviews of the College's
student market position, liquidity, current and planned enrollment
management efforts and operating and cash flow information for FY
2011 YTD.

Summary Rating Rationale: The downgrade reflects the College's
thin resources level ($2.69 million of unrestricted financial
resources in FY 2010), reliance on bank line of credit for
seasonal operating cash requirements, enrollment declines
including a sharp decline in fall 2010, and thin operating margins
and debt service coverage.  The rating remains on watchlist for
further possible downgrade reflecting concerns related to
College's declining enrollment, operating deficits, thin
liquidity, and reliance on operating line of credit for seasonal
cash flow.

                           Challenges

* Very thin liquidity and reliance on $2 million line of credit
  for operating cash requirements.  Expendable financial resources
  provide a thin 0.11 times coverage of debt in FY 2010.  Balance
  sheet continues to be weak due to consecutive years of operating
  deficits, based on Moody's calculations (a 5% endowment spending
  draw and depreciation is included as an operating expense) and
  past investment losses.  Dowling College's FY 2010 unrestricted
  cash and investments, that could be liquidated within a month,
  were at $4.5 million resulting in 22.3 days cash on hand.

* Weak operating performance and heavy reliance on unusually high
  level of unrestricted gifts from the board in FY 2010 ($4.1
  million) in order to cover expenses and build liquidity. Moody's
  notes that without the $4.1 million contribution from the board,
  the College would have had an operating deficit of 3.3%.
  Operating cash flow is thin and provides a 1.67 times (0.86
  times without the contribution from the board) annual debt
  service coverage in FY 2010.

* Concentrated revenue base, with tuition and auxiliary revenue
  comprising over 90% of operating revenue, is a credit concern
  given challenges to the College's student market position and
  recent enrollment declines (10.6% in FY 2010).  The operating
  performance is highly reliant upon the successful recruitment
  and retention of students and deterioration in the market
  position could severely affect the operations.

                            Strengths

* Large enrollment base of 3,963 full-time equivalent students in
  fall 2010 and diversified program offerings including degrees in
  arts, sciences, business administration, and education.  Located
  in Long Island, New York, the College also has a School of
  Aviation through which it offers degrees in aerospace systems
  technology and aviation management.

* Net tuition revenue and net tuition per student have grown in
  each of the past three years driven by tuition increases.  In FY
  2010, the College generated $14,763 of net tuition per student,
  an 11% increase over FY 2007.The management is evaluating
  tuition increase for fall 2011 and reports a 3.6% decline from
  the budgeted tuition revenue for the period between July 1,2010
  and January 31, 2011.

* In response to the ongoing operating pressures, management is
  focused on expense containment and more frequent interim
  financial reporting to the board throughout the year.  The
  management has started monthly reporting of operations to the
  board as well as to the bank providing the line of credit. There
  is also a focus on cost containment and the preliminary year-to-
  date data (July 1,2010 to January 31, 2011) suggests expenses to
  be 2.8% lower than the budget.  Management reports no near-term
  additional borrowing plans or major capital needs.

                   Detailed Credit Discussion

Legal Security: The Series 1996 and 2002 bonds are general
obligations of the College and feature debt service reserve funds.
The Series 2002 bonds are further secured by a first leasehold
mortgage and security interest in the financed facility, a
residence hall on the Shirley (Brookhaven) campus.  The College's
$38.5 million of Series 2006 bonds (not rated by Moody's) are a
general obligation of the College and also have a debt service
reserve fund.  They are secured by a first mortgage lien and
security interest in the College's Oakdale and Shirley campuses
and property, excluding the residential facility financed with the
Series 2002 bonds.  The Series 2006 bonds have a subordinate
mortgage lien and security interest in the Series 2002 facility.
The Series 2006 bonds are insured by ACA.

Per the Series 2006 Sublease between the College and the issuing
authority, under certain circumstances (defined as Triggering
Events in the Sublease), the College's Gross Revenues, excluding
2002 Facility Revenues pledged to the Series 2002 Trustee to
secure the principal amount of the Series 2002 Bonds, would be
directed to the Series 2006 trustee.  Debt service on the Series
2006 bonds would first be paid from Gross Revenues, before other
operating costs of the College.  In Moody's opinion, the Series
1996 and 2002 bonds have a weaker legal security than the Series
2006 bonds.

Debt-Related Rate Derivatives: None

Student market: The College's management reports that it
experienced a significant decline in the enrollments in fall 2010.
Fall 2010 enrollment, at 3,963, was down by 472 full time
equivalent students from fall 2009.  The drop in FTE was due to
inadequate recruitment (matriculation rate of 23.7 % versus 29.1%
in fall 2009) and weak retention.  Preliminary application
(2/28/2011) data suggest a lower number of freshman applications
and higher transfer student applications versus the applications
at same period last year, and the management is expecting a
possible enrollment shortfall in fall 2011 versus fall 2010.

Operating Performance: Operating margins were positive in FY
2010 for the first time after FY 2006 due to the $4.1 million
contribution by the board.  Although the College is anticipating a
similar amount of gifts in FY 2011, Moody's believes that reliance
on contributions from board is not a sustainable operational model
and is a sign of the College's financial distress and need for
liquidity.  Moody's also notes that without this contribution, the
operating cash flows available to pay the debt service would have
been $4.425 million, by Moody's calculation, versus the debt
service amount of $5.12 million.  The College's management reports
that it is targeting to match the FY 2011 performance with the
year's budget.  Moody's notes that the FY 2011 budget has a lower
revenue base ($74.47 million versus $78.5 million in FY 2010)
primarily due to not accounting for the contributions
($1.4 million budgeted versus $4.1 million in FY 2010).

The uncertainty over the contributions from the board and the fact
that student enrollment could decline further in fall 2011 will
create operational challenges.

Financial covenants: The College has a $2 million line of credit
(expiring on October 31, 2011) with TD Bank ("The Bank" which
the College utilized fully as on June 30, 2009 and 2010).  The
agreement for the line of credit contains two financial covenants;
the College should not report a decrease in net assets (excluding
the losses from investments) and the College should have a minimum
debt service coverage of 1.0.  The College was not in compliance
with these two covenants as of June 30, 2009 and obtained a waiver
of non-compliance from the Bank.  The management reports that the
line of credit was extended by one year and the College was in
compliance with the covenants as on June 30, 2010.

The Series 2006 bonds are insured by ACA Financial Guaranty Corp.
and there are some additional covenants associated with the
insurance agreement.  Tested on September 30 and March 31 of each
year, the financial covenants require the College to maintain
Unrestricted Liquid Funds (excluding DSRF) equal to at least
$4 million.  The management reports that the Unrestricted Liquid
Funds were $11 million as on September 30, 2010, and $12.2 million
as on March 9, 2011.

Senior Management: The College's senior management experienced
some changes in fiscal 2010.  President Robert J. Gaffney took
early retirement (May 2010) and Scott Rudolph, chairman of the
board, stepped in as an interim president.  Additionally, Erik
Paulson, Associate Vice President for Business and Finance, left
in June 2010 and Ralph Cerullo, a board member, stepped in as an
interim Chief Financial Officer.  The management reports that the
presidential search has been narrowed to three candidates.

                             Outlook

The rating remains under watchlist for possible downgrade
reflecting Moody's concerns about the College's market position,
in light of trend of declining enrollment, and heavy reliance on
net tuition revenue, reliance on external sources for cash flow
coupled with thin liquidity.  The watchlist also reflects Moody's
expectation that the College could again generate negative
operating performance in the absence of contributions from the
board.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

Unlikely in the near term.  In the long term, significant growth
in liquidity, coupled with strengthening of operating performance
and stabilization of enrollment.

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Additional borrowing without commensurate growth of financial
resources; further deterioration of student market position,
inadequate annual debt service coverage.

Key Indicators (Fall 2010 enrollment data and FY 2010 audited
financial data):

  -- Total Enrollment: 3,963 full-time equivalent Students

  -- Freshmen Selectivity: 81.4%

  -- Freshmen Matriculation: 23.7%

  -- Debt: $62.65 million

  -- Total Financial Resources: $8.3 million

  -- Total Cash and Investments: $12.8 million (including $4.29
     million of debt service reserve funds)

  -- Expendable financial resources to debt: 0.11

  -- Expendable financial resource to operations: 0.09

  -- Monthly liquidity: $4.5 million

  -- Monthly days cash on hand: 22.3 days

  -- Monthly liquidity to demand debt: 227%

  -- Three-Year Average Operating Margin: -1.0%

  -- Three-Year Average Debt Service Coverage: 1.21 times

  -- Reliance on Student Charges (as a % of operating revenue):
     90.1%

Rated Debt:

  -- Series 1996 and 2002: B1 rating


EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded one class of pooled
aircraft lease-backed notes (as the Notes) issued by Embarcadero
Aircraft Securitization Trust, Series 2000-1.  GATX Capital Corp
is the sponsor, and Macquarie Aircraft Leasing Limited is the
servicer.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Embarcadero Aircraft Securitization Trust (EAST 2000),
Series 2000-1

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 10,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The Notes were downgraded because of note balances which appear to
exceed aircraft value, and Moody's view that values are unlikely
to rebound significantly because the aircraft are older and in
less demand.  At closing in 2000 the certificates were backed by a
pool of 34 aircraft.  As of January 2011, the portfolio had only
16 aircraft with an average appraised base value of approximately
$136 million, comprised of all old-vintage aircraft; these
aircraft have experienced accelerated decline in demand and lease
rates as a result of the global recession; this is evident as four
of the aircraft in the pool are off-lease.  Additionally, given
the lower desirability of the aircraft in the remaining pool
compared with their newer generation counterparts, Moody's expect
future cash flows generated by the pool to remain weak, with
limited prospect for rebound.

In assessing value, Moody's considered two sources, the most
recent base appraised value, and indicative market value by
type according to published aircraft values by another ISTAT
certified independent appraiser.  Base value is the underlying
economic value of an aircraft in a stable market environment
with a balanced supply and demand.  Market value is the most
likely trading price under the current market circumstances.
Due to the sharply reduced demand in the old vintage aircraft,
the market value is significantly lower than the base value for
this portfolio.  The current LTV ratio of the Class A-1 is
approximately 120%, using the appraisal base value, while the
LTV calculated using the market value is significantly higher;
both indicate the distinct possibility that noteholders may
suffer a loss.

Moody's also considered the portfolio rental income and the
reserve account.  The amount generated by rental income is
insignificant comparing to the outstanding balance of the Class
A notes.  Since the last of the recent sales of aircraft in
September 2010, the monthly rents are running in the $1.5 million
range.  In addition, there is a $15 million collateral account for
Class A.  The rental income and the reserve account are relatively
small compared to the current outstanding balance of $163 million
Class A-1 notes.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


FIELDSTONE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches, and upgraded the
ratings of 2 tranches from 3 Subprime deals issued by Fieldstone.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. M4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. M2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 73 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 73
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from 23 Subprime
deals issued by First Franklin.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on
1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FF2, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2001-FF2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF3

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF4

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFH1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFH2

  -- Cl. M-1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF11

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF6

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF7

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH4

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FLINT HOSPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating to Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance review process, Fitch Ratings
has affirmed the 'BB+' rating on these fixed rate bonds issued on
behalf of Hurley Medical Center by Flint Hospital Building
Authority (Michigan):

  -- $11,315,000 revenue refunding bonds, series 1998A;
  -- $16,290,000 revenue rental bonds, series 1998B;
  -- $29,675,000 hospital revenue bonds, series 2003;
  -- $35,215,000 revenue rental bonds, series 2010.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The 'BB+' reflects Hurley Medical Center's position in
     a challenging service area with a high Medicaid population,
     weak operating profile, and a relatively low and manageable
     debt burden with adequate debt service coverage.

  -- HMC's main credit strength is its strong liquidity for the
     rating category.

  -- HMC continues to execute its financial turnaround plan, which
     has resulted in a positive trend of improvement in its
     operating performance.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Potential changes to Medicaid funding will impact HMC's
     ability to continue to improve profitability.

  -- Fitch expects HMC to maintain its strong liquidity and
     stabilized operations.

Security:

Debt payments are secured by cash rentals (net revenues of the
Medical Center) made to the authority, acting through its Board of
Hospital Managers, on behalf of HMC as agreed under the sixth
amended and restated contract of lease dated March 1, 2010.  In
addition, bondholders will benefit from a fully funded debt
service fund.

Credit Summary:

The 'BB+' rating reflects HMC's position in a difficult market
with a high Medicaid population, weak operating profile, and
adequate debt metrics.  However, HMC has improved its operating
performance over the last four years.  In fiscal 2006, HMC lost
$13.5 million from operations and had a negative operating margin
of 3.9%.  Since then, HMC has shown a steady trend of improvement
with breakeven operations in fiscal 2009 and posting a modest 0.6%
operating margin in fiscal 2010 ($2.2 million in operating
income).  The operational improvement reflects management's
successful implementation of a turnaround plan that included
expense controls and revenue enhancements, as well as improved
support from state disproportionate share programs.  This has
resulted in stabilized financial performance at the current rating
level.  The six months ended Dec. 31, 2010 interim results
(interim period) show a slight weakening in operating performance
with a negative 0.4% operating margin compared to 0.5% for the
prior year period.  Management is budgeting $3.8 million operating
income (1.1% operating margin) for the full fiscal 2011 year,
which is still expected to be met.

HMC's solid balance sheet metrics continue to be a key credit
strength, providing some financial flexibility.  As of Dec. 31,
2010, unrestricted cash and investments equaled $85.7 million, up
4% from the same time period the prior fiscal year, equaling 92.1
days cash on hand.  A cushion ratio of 9.1 times and cash to debt
of 103.2% are both strong for the rating level.

HMC's debt profile is manageable with all fixed rate debt and
maximum annual debt service (MADS) comprising just 2% of revenue.
MADS coverage by EBITDA for the interim period was 2x, adequate
for the rating category.  HMC has a high average age of plant at
16 years for the interim period but is in the process of
completing a $30 million expansion and renovation of its emergency
department (funded from series 2010 bond proceeds).  However,
given HMC's competitive operating environment, Fitch believes HMC
may need to make other capital investments that could restrict
liquidity growth or pressure debt metrics should HMC borrow
additional funds.

The primary credit risks include the inconsistent operating
performance, a challenging economic environment and reliance on
state DSH revenues.  Located in Flint, Michigan, HMC operates in
an economically distressed service area.  Although the
unemployment rate as of December 2010 was 9.6%, a two year low,
its payor mix remains challenging.  A high 38.2% of gross revenues
were derived from Medicaid and 27.8% from Medicare in fiscal 2010.
HMC's high level of Medicaid payors, results in a heavy reliance
on DSH payments to support operations ($62 million in fiscal 2010,
$57 million in fiscal 2009).  Uncertainty over the continuation of
current Medicaid funding levels, given the state's budget distress
and national budget pressures is a credit risk.  Material funding
reductions would have a significant impact on HMC's ability to
continue to improve profitability.

The Stable Outlook reflects the expectation of stabilized
operations and maintenance of strong liquidity.

HMC is a 443-bed acute care teaching hospital with safety-net
provider status located in Flint, Michigan.  HMC had approximately
$396.4 million of total revenue in fiscal 2010.  HMC covenants to
provide annual and quarterly disclosure to the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board's EMMA system.


GALAXY III: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Galaxy III CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$40,833,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf); previously on May 17, 2010 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  -- US$7,750,000 Class E-1Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2016
     (current balance of $7,075,451), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Nov 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class E-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016
     (current balance of $14,150,901), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Nov 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$4,750,000 Class E-3 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016
     (current balance of $4,336,567), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Nov 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$20,500,000 Combination Securities Due 2016 (current rated
     balance of $13,680,542), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     May 17, 2010 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes,
which have been paid down by approximately 10.2% or $21.7 million
since the rating action in May 2010.  As a result of the
delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the rating action in May 2010.  As of the latest trustee
report dated February 7, 2011, the Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 120.44%, 112.63% and
103.13%, respectively, versus April 2010 levels of 119.00%,
111.43% and 102.19%, respectively and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in May 2010.  Based on the February 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is 2405 compared to 2506 in
April 2010.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $1 million from approximately $8 million in
April 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $304 million, defaulted par of $3 million, a
weighted average default probability of 18.02% (implying a WARF of
3145), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.71%,
and a diversity score of 62.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Galaxy III CLO, Ltd., issued in August 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2516)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +3
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E1: +1
  -- Class E2: +1
  -- Class E3: +1
  -- Combo: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3774)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E1: -1
  -- Class E2: -1
  -- Class E3: -1
  -- Combo: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of the recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap
termination in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
relates to the extent to which the manager will elect to use
unscheduled principal proceeds to reinvest into substitute
collateral in lieu of delevering the rated notes after the end of
the reinvestment period.  Delevering may also accelerate due to
high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
by the manager, which may have a significant impact on the notes'
ratings.

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.


GE CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 16
tranches and confirmed the rating of 3 tranches from 7 Subprime
deals issued by GE Capital.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. Series 1998-HE1

  -- A6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- S, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Series 1998-HE2

  -- A6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- S, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1997-HE1

  -- A4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- S, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1997-HE4

  -- A6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- S, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2

  -- B1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2003-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
affirmed twelve classes and downgraded eight classes of GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-C2:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2008
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. BLVD-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 25,
     2010 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. BLVD-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 25,
     2010 Confirmed at A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. BLVD-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
     Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. BLVD-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
     Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. BLVD-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2010
     Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to an increase in subordination from payoffs
and amortization.  The pool has paid down 27% since last review.
.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

The downgrades of three pooled classes are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans.  The pool contains
five non-pooled or rake classes which are supported by a B-note on
the Boulevard Mall, a 1.2 million square foot regional mall
located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The downgrades of the rake classes
are due to a decline in the performance of the property supporting
the rake classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.0% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 2.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 7.0% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 38 compared to 53 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 7, 2007.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the March 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to
$811.26 million from $1.18 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 114 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 44% of the pool.  Twenty five loans, representing
31% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities, compared to 35% at last review.  At last
full review, the Boulevard Mall Loan ($41.7 million -- 5.1% of the
pool) had an investment grade credit estimate.  Due to declined
performance and increased leverage the loan is now analyzed as
part of the conduit pool.

Thirty-two loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $7.8 million loss (37%
loss severity on average).  Currently two loans, representing 3%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $12.0 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss
of $12.6 million (57% expected loss on average) for all of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 1.1% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.7 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 92% and 66% of the performing pool,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 81% compared to 82% at last full
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
DSCR is 1.55X compared to 1.31X at last full review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Boulevard Mall Loan
($41.7 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is a 50% participation
interest in a $83.5 million A Note secured by a 1.2 million square
foot (SF) regional mall located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The
shopping center is anchored by Sears and Macy's, which are not
part of the collateral, and J.C.  Penney.  At securitization the
center had a fourth anchor, Dillards, which vacated the center in
2008.  The center was 75% leased as of September 2010 compared to
96% at last full review.  The in-line was space 68% leased as of
that date.  Performance has declined with the drop in leasing.
The loan is also encumbered by a $19.3 million B Note, which
secures non-pooled classes BLVD-1, BLVD-2, BLVD-3, BLVD-4, and
BLVD-5.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR for the A note is 82% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 59% and 1.70X at last full
review.

The second largest loan is the Prosperity Office Park Loan
($31.8 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 180,000
SF medical office building located in Fairfax, Virginia.  The
largest tenants include Commonwealth Orthopedic and Rehabilitation
(14% of net rentable area (NRA), lease expiration August 2016),
AOR Management Company of Virginia (13% of the NRA, lease
expiration August 2016), and Children's Hospital (11% of the NRA,
lease expiration June 2012).  Property performance has improved
since last review with occupancy remaining at 100% as of September
2010.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.53X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.15X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Charleston Commons Loan
($30.3 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a power
center located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The largest tenants are
Walmart (36% of the NRA, lease expiration October 2015), Office
Max (9% of the NRA, lease expiration December 2015), and 99 Cent
Only Store (9% of the NRA, lease expiration January 2015).  Other
non-collateral tenants include Target and Home Depot.  As of
September 2010, the property was 97% leased, compared to 99% at
last full review.  Property performance has remained stable.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.39X, respectively,
compared to 91% and 1.01X at last full review.


GLOBAL TOWER: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Outlooks to the Global
Tower series 2007-1, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

  -- $77,750,000 class A-FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $120,000,000 class A-FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45,200,000 class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45,200,000 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45,200,000 class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16,950,000 class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $56,500,000 class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $73,450,000 class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

This affirmation is inclusive of the execution of a $70 million
add-on securitization.  The new 2011-1 securitization will be
issued out of the existing securitization trust and will be pari
passu with outstanding senior notes (series 2007-1 class C).
Fitch does not rate the $70 million add-on series 2011-1, class C
notes.

The affirmations are due to the strong performance of the
collateral since issuance.  In addition, inclusive of the $70
million add-on, all classes are in-line with Fitch's leverage
parameters.  Specifically, the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rating
affirmations reflect strong performance since issuance, low
leverage multiples, and the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated debt would
amortize in less than five years following the anticipated
repayment date using Fitch's net cash flow.  The 'Bsf' rating is
affirmed because overall leverage inclusive of the $70 million
add-on is reflective of 'BBsf' leverage multiples; however, it
will not be upgraded because of the ability to issue additional
debt in the future.  The Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
ratings changes over the next one to two years.  All classes are
privately placed pursuant to rule 144A of the Securities Act of
1933.

The collateral for the notes consists of a portfolio of 2,027
tower sites and related tenant leases and contracts secured by
mortgages on sites representing more than 90% of annualized run
rate net cash flow and with a perfected security interest in all
personal property and fixtures and a pledge of the equity
interests in the Issuer and each of its subsidiaries.  As of the
February 2011 distribution date, the aggregate principal balance
of the notes remains unchanged at $480.25 million since issuance.
The notes are interest only for the entire five-year period.

As part of its review, Fitch analyzed the financial statements of
the issuer, GTP Acquisition Partners I, LLC, as well as updated
collateral data provided by the issuer.  As of March 1, 2011,
aggregate annualized run rate revenue increased to $104.8 million,
a 31.4% increase from issuance.  Over the same period, the Fitch
adjusted net cash flow increased 36.6% since issuance.  The actual
debt service coverage ratio, exclusive of the add-on was 2.60
times, compared to 1.84x at issuance.

The tenant type concentration is stable.  As of March 10, 2011,
total revenue contributed by telephony tenants was 90.1% compared
to 85.6% at issuance.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 17 2006-GG8 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 17 classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2006-GG8, due to an increase in
expected losses on the specially serviced loans and further
deterioration of collateral performance.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses
across the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in
special servicing and on performing loans with declines in
performance indicative of a higher probability of default.
Fitch modeled losses of 11.4% of the current pool balance
based on expected losses on the specially serviced loans and
loans that could not refinance at maturity; expected losses
of the original pool are 11.7%.

As of the March 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 6.4% to $3.97 billion from
$4.24 billion at issuance.  The fifth largest loan in the pool
at issuance, Village of Merrick Park, paid in full in March 2011.
As of March 2011, there are cumulative interest shortfalls in the
amount of $25.6 million, affecting classes F through S.

In total, there are 21 loans (11.6% of the pool, of which two
loans are split into A/B notes) in special servicing including
eight loans (4%) that are real estate owned (REO).  At Fitch's
last review, there were 12 loans (9.7%) in special servicing.

The largest contributor to expected loss of the assets in
special servicing Ariel Preferred Portfolio (2.3% of the pool
balance) is secured by a six cross-collateralized retail outlet
center portfolio located in various states.  The asset transferred
to special servicing in June 2009 for imminent default.  The most
recent occupancy reported from the servicer for the portfolio is a
combined 66% as of February 2011, compared to the overall
portfolio occupancy of 82.7% at issuance.

The second largest contributor to expected loss of the assets in
specially servicing is Tower Place 200 (1.3%), a REO office
building located in Atlanta, Georgia.  The Tower Place 200 loan
transferred to the special servicer in July 2009 and is
approximately 61% occupied per the latest remittance report.

The largest contributor to expected loss of the loans not in
special servicing is Pointe South Mountain Resort (combined A&B
note is 4.8% of the pool balance), now called the Arizona Grand
Resort, a 640-key resort complex located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The
loan has been modified and returned to the master servicer after
the original loan was split into an A/B note structure.  The
property does not generate sufficient cash flow to service its
total debt.

Fitch has downgraded, revised Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity
ratings, and assigned or maintained Recovery Ratings to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $302.3 million class A-J to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'BBB-sf/LS4';
     Outlook to Stable from Negative;

  -- $26.5 million class B to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     to Stable from Negative;

  -- $53 million class C to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $37.1 million class D to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $37.1 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $42.4 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $53 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $47.7 million class H to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $42.4 million class K to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $26.5 million class L to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $15.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6';

  -- $15.9 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

  -- $10.6 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

  -- $10.6 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';

  -- $15.9 million class Q to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and maintained
Rating Outlooks or Recover Ratings as indicated:

  -- $787.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $111.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.6 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $194.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53 million class J remains at 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Fitch affirms and revises the LS Rating and Rating Outlook for
this class:

  -- $424.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook to Stable
     from Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $10.9 million class S.  Class A-1 is paid
in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only class X.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Rates Various Series 2011-ALF Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has rated GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2011-ALF:

  -- $195,000,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195,000,000* class XA-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195,000,000* class XA-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40,000,000 class B notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27,000,000 class C notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $38,000,000 class D notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25,000,000 class E notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.
  * Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the interest only classes XB-1 and XB-2.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded three and affirmed eight classes of
Certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR3 due
to the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, and a decrease in the weighted average recovery
rate.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A1-S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A1-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

GSMS 2006-RR3 is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (100.0% of the
pool balance).  All of the CMBS assets were securitized between
2004 and 2006.  As of the February 18, 2011 Trustee report, all
classes of certificates were experiencing interest shortfalls
totaling approximaltey $8.5 million, and further shortfalls in
interest payments are expected due to interest shortfalls on the
underlying collateral portfolio.  The aggregate Certficate balance
of the transaction is $727.8 million, the same as at issuance.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated assets.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  The current bottom-
dollar WARF is 7,067 compared to 3,832 at last review.  Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,307 compare to 1,959 at last
review, which is the WARF excluding defaulted collateral (rated Ca
or C by Moody's, or collateral with interest shortfalls).  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: A1-A3
(3.2% compared to 7.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (15.5% compared
to 19.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (23.9% compared to 26.0% at last
review), B1-B3 (0.7% compared to 11.1% at last review), and Caa1-C
(56.7% compared to 36.2% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the assets in the
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL (excluding defaulted
collateral) of 5.0 years compared to 6.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
(excluding defaulted collateral) of 7.0% compared to 14.8% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 31.3% at last review.
The high MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 7.0% to 0% or up to 14% would no result in any rating
movement on the rated tranches.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


GSAA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 58 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 58
tranches from 9 Alt-A deals issued by GSAA.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued before 2005.  The principal methodology used in these
ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published
in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Trust 2004-CW1

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GSAA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class 3A4 2005-11 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of Class 3A4,
issued by GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-11.  The collateral backing
the transaction is primarily first-lien, Alt-A residential
mortgages.

The action is a result of conflicting language in the
transaction's documents regarding the principal payments to the
classes 3A4 and 3A5.  In February 2011, the issuer amended the
pooling and servicing agreement to conform with the prospectus
supplement: After the credit support depletion date, in the event
of a sequential trigger event, Class 3A1 and 3A2 from the group 3
senior certificates will receive payments sequentially; Class 3A4
and Class 3A5 will receive principal pro rata.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-11

  -- Cl. 3A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratingso on 96 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 96
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 3 tranches from 20 Subprime
deals issued by GSAMP Trust and GSAA Home Equity Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of subprime
residiential mortgage pools securitized before 2005.  Although
most of these pools have paid down significantly, the remaining
loans are affected by the housing and macroeconomic conditions
that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Trust 2004-NC1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-HE

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-HE2 (wholesale;25% fixed/75% ARMs)

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Apr 8, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-WF

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-FM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3C, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-AHL

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-AR1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-AR2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-FM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2004
     Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-FM2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-HE1

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-OPT

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2005
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-WF

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2005
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14.  The collateral
backing the deal primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable rate
Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.
The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued before 2005.  The principal methodology used in these
ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published
in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AX, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2AX, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3AX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5AX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1BX, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches from two Alt-A deals issued by HomeBanc Mortgage Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.  In addition, Moody's publishes a
weekly summary of structured finance credit, ratings and
methodologies, available to all registered users of Moody's
website, at www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.
To account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied
by a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


IDAHO HOUSING: S&P Raises Rating on Revenue Bonds From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+' on Idaho Housing and Finance Association's 2008A and
2008B nonprofit facilities revenue bonds, issued for the Idaho
Arts Charter School.  The outlook is stable.

"The raised rating reflects S&P's opinion of the school's improved
financial performance and demonstrated sufficient demand," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Carlotta Mills.

The school's financial performance to date has been strong, in
S&P's view, as demonstrated by operating surpluses approaching 10%
of expenditures in fiscals 2006 through 2008.  State funding has
decreased, and the school is managing these cuts with expense
controls, including restructuring insurance and modest staffing
reductions.  In addition, it is increasing class size by one, or a
net of 30 students.  In fiscal 2009, net revenues, before lease
payments, depreciation, and large one-time expenses, fell to a low
of $433,000; in fiscal 2010 adjusted net revenues improved to what
S&P views as a good $767,000.  Management anticipates a break-even
fiscal 2011.  According to S&P's calculations, net revenues in
audited year 2010 covered debt service by 1.37x, up from 0.85x in
fiscal 2008.  At the end of fiscal 2010, the school recorded an
unreserved ending fund balance of $704,701 and about $850,000 (or
93 days' expenditures) in cash and investments on hand.

Maximum annual debt service is about $580,000 and is level through
maturity (2039).  Coverage of MADS in fiscal 2010 was, in S&P's
view, a good 1.37x.  Carrying costs for MADS were moderate, in its
opinion, at 14.7% of total revenues in fiscal 2010.

The Idaho Arts Charter School operates a single K-12 public
charter school in the City of Nampa (population about 80,000),
roughly 20 miles east of Boise.  Fiscal 2011 enrollment for the K-
12 school totals 653 students.  As of June 30, 2010, there was
$7.2 million of debt outstanding.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-PNC1 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed 14 classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2004-
PNC1, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
associated with loans currently in special servicing as well as
losses for loans with cashflow declines which are no longer
sufficient to meet debt service.  Fitch modeled losses of 5.0% of
the remaining pool.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 23.6% to $838.9 million
from approximately $1.1 billion at issuance.  Sixteen loans
(25.4%) have defeased since issuance.  Losses incurred to date of
approximately $27.3 million (2.5% of the original transaction
balance) have fully depleted classes M through NR and a portion of
class L.

Fitch has designated 17 loans (14.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
including two specially serviced loans (3.9%).  Fitch expects
classes L through J may be fully depleted from future losses
associated with the specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls
currently affect classes E through L.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is secured by a
177,968 square foot office property located in Melville, NY.  The
loan (2.8% of the outstanding pool) is currently with the special
servicer.  As of the February 2011 rent roll, the property is
48.8% occupied and the largest tenant (11.2% of net rentable area)
is expected to vacate by the end of 2011.  The special servicer is
considering various options to liquidate the loan.

The next largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is a Fitch
Loan of Concern, which is secured by a 236-unit multifamily
property in Arlington, TX.  As of year end 2010, the borrower
reported occupancy of 38.1%, down from 47.5% at year end 2009.  In
addition, several deferred maintenance items, including building
settlement issues, were observed at the property at an inspection
in August 2010.  As of February 2011, the loan (0.8% of the
outstanding pool) was current.

Fitch downgrades these classes, and assigns and revises Recovery
Ratingss,:

  -- $11 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS3';
  -- $20.6 million class H to 'C/RR5' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch also affirms these classes, and revises Rating Outlooks and
Loss Severity ratings, or affirms RRs, as indicated:

  -- $71.3 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $426.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $209.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.8 million class B to 'AA/LS4' from 'AA/LS2'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;

  -- $13.7 million class C to 'BBB/LS5' from 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;

  -- $17.8 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB/LS3'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative;

  -- $11 million class E at 'B/LS5' to 'B/LS3'; Outlook to Stable
     from Negative;

  -- $16.5 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'B-/LS3'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2.7 million class J at 'C/RR6';

  -- $6.9 million class K at 'C/RR6'.

Classes L, M, N and P remain 'D/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class NR and classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in
full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class X.


KATONAH VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.:

  -- $300,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2018 (current
     outstanding balance of $290,983,109), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
     previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- $18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2018, Upgraded to
     A3 (sf); previously on May, 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- $21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 (sf);

  -- $28,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2018
     (current outstanding balance of 25,282,986), Upgraded to B3
     (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in May 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated February 14, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2404 compared to 2705
in the April 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 6.9% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.8% in
April 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$13 million of the underlying portfolio compared to $44 million in
April 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in May 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
118.12%, 110.61%, and 102.74%, respectively, versus April 2009
levels of 110.31%, 103.42%, and 95.69%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
Moody's also notes that the Class P Notes are no longer covering
interest shortfall on the Class D Notes and that all previously
Advanced Amounts have been paid back to the Class P Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $362 million, defaulted par of $15 million, a
weighted average default probability of 26.43% (implying a WARF of
3526), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.57%,
and a diversity score of 64.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Katonah VIII CLO, Ltd., issued in June of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2821)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4231)

  -- Class A: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


LANDMARK VII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Landmark VII CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-3L Due 2018, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
     previously on August 18, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-1L Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on August 18, 2009 Confirmed at B1 (sf);

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-2L Due 2018 (current outstanding
     balance of $13,475,026), Upgraded to Caa2(sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the rating action in August 2009.  Improvement in
the credit quality is observed through an improvement in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor) and a decrease in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, as of the latest
trustee report dated February 3, 2011, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 2914 compared to 3162 in the July 2009 report,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 12.9% of
the underlying portfolio versus 15.6% in July 2009.  In addition,
there are currently $11.2 million of defaulted securities based on
the February 2011 trustee report, compared to $27 million in July
2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have
remained stable since the rating action in August 2009.
The Class A (Senior), Class A, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 124.33%, 113.70%,
108.07% and 103.16%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of
125.20%, 114.40%, 108.80% and 101.60%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as
par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $302.4 million, defaulted par of
$11.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 31.9%
(implying a WARF of 4166), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 42.80%, and a diversity score of 65.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Landmark VII CDO Ltd., issued in April 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3333)

  -- Class A-1L: +2
  -- Class A-2L: +2
  -- Class A-3L: +3
  -- Class B-1L: +3
  -- Class B-2L: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4999)

  -- Class A-1L: -2
  -- Class A-2L: -2
  -- Class A-3L: -1
  -- Class B-1L: -1
  -- Class B-2L: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of Moody's assumed defaulted assets: Market value
   fluctuations in assets which were assumed to be defaulted by
   Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Moody's analyzed defaulted
   recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the
   recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
   market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-C1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 2006-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  In addition, Fitch removes 11 classes from Rating
Watch Negative, revises Loss Severity ratings and assigns Ratings
Outlooks and Recovery Ratings as applicable.

The downgrades reflect Fitch expected losses across the pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 5.42% of the remaining pool; expected
losses based on the original pool size are 7.26%, reflecting
losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated 46 loans
(29.58%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which include nine specially
serviced loans (9.31%).  Six of the Fitch Loans of Concern
(15.52%) and two specially serviced loans (6.40%) are within the
transaction's top 15 loans by unpaid principal balance.  Fitch
considers the Loans of Concern to have a high probability of
defaulting during the term, with losses ranging from $6,000 to
$36.2 million.  Fitch expects that classes J thru M may be fully
depleted from losses associated with loans currently in special
servicing.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 11.5% (including 2.5% of realized
losses) to $2.17 billion from $2.46 billion at issuance.  Classes
N through T have been reduced to zero due to realized losses.
Interest shortfalls are affecting classes K through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Chapel
Hills Mall loan (5.14%), the fourth largest loan in the pool.
The loan is secured by 507,757 square feet of a 1.2 million sf
regional mall located in Colorado Springs, CO.  The loan had
transferred to special servicing in April 2009 after the loan
Sponsor, General Growth Properties, filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection.  The loan matured on Oct. 11, 2010.
With the lenders consent, GGP has been marketing the asset for
sale.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the DHL
Center loan (2.57%), collateralized by a 490,000 sf distribution
facility, 100% leased by DHL Express (USA), Inc. On Nov. 10, 2008,
DHL announced that it would stop shipping within the United States
effective Jan. 30, 2009.  DHL no longer occupies this property;
however, there is a 20-year lease in place that commenced in 2006.
The lease is also guaranteed by Deutsche Post AG.  The property
has remained current as DHL continues to pay rent, as well as
provide onsite security and maintenance.  The servicer reported
year to date September 2010 debt service coverage ratio was 1.20
times.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
Prospect Hill Office Park loan (2.07%) secured by a three-
building, 480,428 sf office park located in Waltham, MA.  The
December 2010 rent roll reported occupancy at 56%.  The servicer
reported YTD September 2010 DSCR was 1.19x.

Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative, downgrades and assigns
Outlooks, Loss Severity ratings or Recovery Ratings on these
classes as indicated:

  -- $221 million class AJ to 'BBBsf/LS3' from 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $15.4 million class B to 'BBB-sf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $27.6 million class C to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $24.6 million class D to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class E to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21.5 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $21.5 million class G to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $24.6 million class H to 'CCsf/RR3' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $18.4 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $24.6 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $12.3 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

In Addition, Fitch removes from rating watch negative and affirms:

  -- $245.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and LS ratings, and
revises the RR ratings as indicated:

  -- $172.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $92 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $90.1 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,143.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1 million class M at 'Dsf/RR6' from 'Dsf/RR1'.
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf/RR6' from 'Dsf/RR2'.

Fitch also affirms these classes, LS ratings and Stable Outlooks:

  -- $6.4 million class IUU1 at 'BBB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.6 million class IUU2 at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.6 million class IUU3 at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.9 million class IUU4 at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.3 million class IUU5 at 'BB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $0.9 million class IUU6 at 'BB-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1 million class IUU7 at 'B+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1 million class IUU8 at 'B/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.1 million class IUU9 at 'B-/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has repaid in full.  Class N has been reduced to zero
due to realized losses.  Fitch does not rate classes P through T,
which have also been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Fitch does not rate the $6.9 million class IUU10.  The IUU classes
represent the crossed B-note rakes of three separate loans, Intel
Corporate Building, U Haul 26 Portfolio, and U Haul SAC Portfolio.
The A-notes of all three loans are included in the pooled portion
of the trust.  Both the U-Haul 26 and U Haul SAC portfolio loan's
are current.  The Intel Corporate Building notes matured on
Jan. 11, 2011.  The loans have been transferred to the special
servicer and are under review; Fitch did not model any losses.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-CP and
X-CL.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2000-C3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed seven classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-
C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3:

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2000
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2006
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2006
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 12, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to increased credit subordination due to loan
payoffs and amortization and overall improved performance.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
22% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 26%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 24%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 10 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.  Under Moody's CTL approach,
the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on
the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating)
of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing
the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's
credit rating is the key factor in determining the probability of
default on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is
"bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease, yielding
fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box, sufficient under
all circumstances to pay in full all interest and principal of the
loan.  The leased property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote,
special purpose borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and
assignment of rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value
of the collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark",
is then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's
default.  Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal
integrity of the transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 12, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to
$97.6 million from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 24% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 87% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 5% of the pool.

The pool includes a credit tenant lease component, which
represents 6% of the pool.  The CTL's are supported by single
tenant, stand-alone retail buildings leased to CVS/Caremark
(senior unsecured rating Baa2, stable outlook; 3 loans) and
Walgreen Company (senior unsecured rating A2, stable outlook; 1
loan).

Three loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-six loans has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $18.5 million (18% loss severity).  Additionally,
the pool has assumed a $10.6 million principal write down on the
270 Peachtree Loan that is currently in special servicing.  At
last review the pool had experienced a $5.4 million aggregate
loss.  Nine loans, representing 70% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 270
Peachtree Loan ($23.0 million -- 23.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 336,000 square office building located in downtown
Atlanta, Georgia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in November 2006 when the building lost its largest tenant,
Southern Company Service.  The special servicer and the borrower
executed a modification to the loan agreement in July 2010.  Major
terms of the modification include an extension of the maturity
date to July 2011 with a twelve month option to extend, a
$10.6 million write down of the loan (conditional waiver given
that the borrower does not trigger an event of default), 3%
interest only payments, and additional capital infusion into the
TI/LC reserve escrow.  The borrower continues to perform under the
modified loan agreement.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Five Points
Plaza Loan ($11.6 million -- 11.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 125,000 square foot office building located in downtown
Atlanta, Georgia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in 2009 when the borrower was unable to secure financing when its
sole tenant, GSA-HUD would not commit to a long term lease
extension.  Subsequent to the loan's transfer to special
servicing, GSA-HUD executed a short term lease extension through
July 2012.  The loan became real estate owned (REO) in September
2009 and the servicer is currently marketing the property for
disposition.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of office, industrial, retail, self storage, and multifamily
properties.  Moody's estimates a $19.0 million aggregate loss for
all the specially serviced loans (39% loss severity on average).
The special servicer has recognized an aggregate $13.4 million
appraisal reduction for four of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 50%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 74% compared to 78% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.13X and 1.44X, respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.37X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Mooresville Festival Shopping
Center Loan ($6.2 million -- 6.3% of the pool) which is secured by
a 160,000 square foot shopping center located in a northern suburb
of Charlotte in Mooresville, North Carolina.  The loan is an ARD
loan with a final maturity of January 2030.  The shopping center
is anchored by Belk (not part of the collateral), Kohl's, and
Harris Teeter and was 96% leased as of September 2010 compared to
99% at the prior review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71%
and 1.53X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.37X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Valley Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($3.3 million -- 3.3% of the pool) which is secured by a 48,000
square foot shopping center located in Aurora, Colorado.  The loan
is an ARD loan with a final maturity of January 2030.  The
shopping center is located in a retail corridor of Aurora and
shares a parking lot with Target (not part of the collateral).
The property is anchored by Petco.  The property was 85% leased as
of September 2010 compared to 64% at the prior review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to
110% and 0.91X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Whitney Hotel Loan ($2.1 million --
2.2% of the pool) which is secured by a 74 key, three-star hotel
located in Columbia, South Carolina.  The loan is an ARD loan with
a final maturity of January 2030.  The hotel has one and two
bedroom style suites and is located minutes from the heart of
Columbia's restaurant and entertainment district.  Performance has
declined since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72%
and 1.7X, respectively, compared to 38% and 3.4X at last review.


LEASE INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A-1 and A-2
notes of pooled aircraft lease-backed notes issued by Lease
Investment Flight Trust.  GE Capital Aviation Services is the
sponsor and servicer.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT), Series 2001-1

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The Notes were downgraded because of note balances which appear to
exceed aircraft value.  At closing in 2001, the notes were backed
by a pool of 39 aircraft.  As of January 2011, the portfolio had
29 aircraft with an average appraised base value of approximately
$613million.  Approximately half of the remaining portfolio are
old-vintage and/or old generation (i.e. "classic") aircraft.  Such
aircraft have experienced accelerated decline in demand and lease
rates as a result of the global recession along with a greater-
than-expected decline in value.  Given the lower desirability for
such aircraft compared with their newer generation, Moody's expect
future cash flows generated by the pool to remain relatively weak,
with limited prospect for rebound.

In assessing value, Moody's considered two sources, the most
recent base appraised value, and indicative market value by type
according to published aircraft values by other ISTAT certified
independent appraiser.  Base value is the underlying economic
value of an aircraft in a stable market environment with a
balanced supply and demand.  Market value is the most likely
trading price under the current market circumstances.  Due to the
sharply reduced demand in the old vintage aircraft, the market
value is significantly lower than the base value for this
portfolio.  Normally, Moody's final rating is based on the two
approaches, using base value and market value.  In this case, the
deal has a better mix of aircraft comparing with the other
aircraft deals Moody's reviewed at the same time.  These aircraft
have better chance to rebound in their values.  Therefore, Moody's
believe the base value from appraisal reflected the quality of
this portfolio better than the current market value.  The final
rating is mostly based on the base value for this portfolio..

At this time, the combined balances of the Classes A-1, A-2, and
A-3 Notes result in an overall Class A Loan-to-Value ratio of
roughly 118%.  Given the current revenue generated by the pool and
the LTV ratio it is foreseeable that noteholders will suffer a
loss.

Moody's also considered the portfolio rental income and the
reserve account.  The amount generated by rental income is
insignificant comparing to the outstanding balance of the Class A
notes.  In the last six months, the average monthly rent income
was approximately $7.6 million.  Due to average swap payment of
$1.1 million per month in the last six months, the average
principal payment was $5.4 million per month.  There is a
$33 million reserve account for Class A, which is also
insignificant comparing to the $660 million Class A notes.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 42 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 42 tranches issued in
five securitizations of small business loans and one tranche in
one net interest margin securities transaction.  Additionally,
Moody's confirmed seven tranches issued in two securitizations of
small business loans and three tranches in three net interest
margin securities transactions.  The deals are serviced by Aurora
Bank FSB, formerly known as Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB.  The small
business loans are secured primarily by commercial real estate.

                        Rating Rationale

The downgrades are due to a significant rise in 60 days or more
delinquencies, including amounts in foreclosure and REO, from a
range of 10%-13% of the current pool balance in February 2009 to
20%-25% as of the February 2011 distribution date.  In contrast,
the 2005-1 deal experienced an increase in 60 days or more
delinquencies from 4% to 8% of the current pool balance and has
incurred cumulative net losses of approximately 1% of the original
pool balance as of the February 2011 distribution date.

The methodology used in these rating actions included projections
of the expected losses and analysis of the available credit
enhancement.  Because typical small business securitizations have
either a long-dated or no hard charge-off policy, they may build
up significant delinquency pipelines.  In projecting expected
losses, Moody's used representative delinquency roll rates and an
assumed loss severity of 60%.  The projected lifetime net losses
are 4.50%, 19.00%, 23.50%, 20.75%, 23.25%, and 22.50% of the
original pool balance for the 2005-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2007-1,
2007-2, and 2007-3 deals, respectively.  The Aaa volatility
proxies are 30%, 46%, 48%, 48%, 48%, and 46% for the 2005-1, 2006-
2, 2006-3, 2007-1, 2007-2, and 2007-3 deals, respectively.
Determining factors for the Aaa volatility proxies were the credit
quality of the collateral pool, the historical variability in
losses experienced by the issuer, the servicer quality as well as
the industrial, geographical and obligor concentrations.

The methodology used for the net interest margin securities
included evaluating the likelihood of paying interest and
principal from excess cash and prepayment fees from the respective
underlying small business loan transaction.  The potential cash
inflow was considered in relation to accumulated interest
shortfalls and reserve account deficits.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.  If the expected losses
used in determining the ratings were increased by 10%, the initial
model-indicated ratings for the Class A tranches would be
downgraded.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certficates, Series 2006-3

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-3

  -- Cl. AM, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AJ, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: LBSBC Net Interest Margin Securities, Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. N2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: LBSBC Net Interest Margin Notes, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. N1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: LBSBC Net Interest Margin Securities, Series 2006-2

  -- Cl. N1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2011 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets in
this transaction and the due diligence reports had a neutral
impact on the rating.


MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 66 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 66
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 14 Subprime
deals issued by MASTR.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.
Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-OPT1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2005
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2003
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-FRE1

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2004
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2004
     Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-HE1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2005
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2002-NC1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2003-NC1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2003
     Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2003
     Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-HQ12 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital
Trust I, 2007-HQ12 due to further deterioration of performance,
most of which involves increased loss expectations on the
specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 17.43% of the remaining pool;
expected losses of the original pool are at 17.15%, including
losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated 24 loans
(62.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes fifteen
specially serviced loans (48%).  Fitch expects classes L thru S
may be fully depleted from losses associated with the specially
serviced assets and class K will also be impaired.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by approximately 6.5% to
$1.83 billion from $1.96 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes A-J thru S.

The largest contributors to modeled losses are four of the top 15
loans in the transaction, Columbia Center (20.7%) of the
transaction, Parkoff Portfolio (9.3%), Beacon Seattle & D.C.
Portfolio (6%), and Douglas Entrance (5.6%).

Columbia Center (20.7%) consists of a 1.5 million square foot, 76-
story office building located in the Seattle downtown CBD.  The
property is the tallest office building in the Pacific Northwest.
The three largest tenants at the property are Amazon (11.7% of
NRA), The United States Government (GSA) (10.7%) (rated 'AAA' by
Fitch), and Dorsey & Whitney LLP, (5%).  These tenants have leases
that expire in 2011, 2015, and 2019, respectively.

Columbia Center was transferred to special servicing in February
2010 due to imminent default.  The loan was modified in September
2010 and the maturity date was extended to May 8, 2015 with two
one-year extension options.

Rollover remains a concern as the property will experience a high
level of lease expirations over the next four years.
Approximately 24% of the NRA has or will expire through the full
year of 2011, 6% in 2012, and 9% in 2014, largely due to Amazon's
lease expiration in May 2011.  It is anticipated that Amazon will
vacate their space, since they recently signed a new lease for
460,000 sf at a downtown Seattle office building within close
proximity to their new headquarters.  Occupancy as of December
2010 declined to 82% from 89% at issuance.  The Seattle office
market vacancy rate as of YE 2010 is 14%, and average asking rents
are $26.77 psf, compared with the property's average in-place rent
of $25.91 psf.

Per the special servicer, there has been some preliminary interest
in portions of the Amazon space and the borrower is currently
market the space.

The Parkoff Portfolio (9.3%) is secured by a 312 unit, six-
property portfolio of multifamily buildings located on the upper
east side of Manhattan.  Two of the buildings include retail
stores with frontage on Madison Avenue, and another building is in
close proximity to Central Park.

Property stabilization remains behind schedule as the borrower has
been unable to convert rent-stabilized units to market as quickly
as they had anticipated at issuance.  At issuance, the portfolio
included 87 rent-stabilized units that the borrower planned to
convert to market rate units through renovations and capital
investments.  As of January 2011, there are currently 78 rent
stabilized units remaining.

As of the January 2011 rent roll, the property was 97% occupied.
Although, the most recent servicer-reported DSCR as of Sept.  30,
2010 was 0.73 times, the loan remains current.  At issuance, the
borrower had posted a $5 million letter of credit as additional
collateral.  Fitch has been unable to confirm whether the letter
of credit has or will be renewed.

The Beacon Seattle & D.C. Portfolio (6%) was transferred to
special servicing in April 2010 for imminent default.  The loan
remained current as the borrower was negotiating a modification.
The loan was modified in March 2011.  The modification terms
include the release of properties over time, interest rate
reduction, and some forgiveness of debt.

At issuance, the Beacon Seattle & D.C. Portfolio was secured by 16
properties, the pledge of the mortgage and the borrower's
ownership interest in one property (Market Square), as well as the
pledge of cash flows from three properties (Reston Town Center,
1300 North Seventeenth Street, and Washington Mutual Tower).  In
the aggregate, the 20 properties comprise approximately 9,848,859
sf of space.

The largest property by allocated loan amount, Market Square
located in Washington, DC recently sold in March 2011, and the
proceeds were allocated to the paydown of the loan and interest
shortfalls.  With the release of the Market Square property the
most recently servicer-reported occupancy as of September 2010
would decrease from 86.3% to 85.6%.

Douglas Entrance (5.6%) is secured by five office buildings
totaling 465,474 sf located in Coral Gables, FL.  The largest
tenants are Mastec Inc. (11%), AECOM Technology Corp (7%), and
Univision Radio Florida (6%).  These tenants have lease
expirations in 2017, 2019, and 2015, respectively.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to
imminent default as the borrower requested a modification of the
loan due to cash flow issues.  Negotiations between the borrower
and special servicer are on-going.  As of the December 2010 rent
roll, the consolidated occupancy for the properties was 74.2% with
average in-place rent of $27.60 sf which is below the current
market vacancy for the Coral Gables submarket of 15.9% and market
rents of $32.61 sf.

Fitch downgrades, assigns Recovery Ratings (RR), revises Loss
Severity ratings and assigns Outlooks to these classes as
indicated:

  -- $170.9 million class A-M to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA/LS4';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $25 million class A-MFL to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $53 million class A-J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $91.4 million class A-JFL to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-/LS4';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $41.6 million class B to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22 million class C to 'B-/LS5' from 'B/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $14.7 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $4.9 million class K to 'CC/RR3' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $7.3 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $4.9 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $4.9 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $4.9 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';

  -- $4.9 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $4.9 million class Q to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Fitch also affirms, revises LS ratings, and assigns Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $318.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $282 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $231.1 million class A-2FL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $154.2 million class A-2FX at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $131.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $66.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $83 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS3' Outlook Stable;
  -- $24.5 million class D at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $14.7 million class E at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $24.5 million class F at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $22 million class G at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 certificates have been paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate class S.  Prior to the rating actions classes B-Q and A-M, A-
MFL, A-J, and A-JFL were on Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class X.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 213 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 213
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 7 tranches from 52 Subprime
deals issued by Morgan Stanley ABS Capital.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Mortgage Loan Asset-
Backed Certificates, Series 2001-WF1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-HE3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC10

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2007
     Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE9

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 23, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC7

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-OP1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 3, 2005
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-NC6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010

     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC4

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2001-AM1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-AM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-AM2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-AM3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2008
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     Jul 7, 2008 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-NC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-NC4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-NC5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-OP1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating to $3 Mil. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating
on Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's $3 million class A-10 secured fixed-
rate series 2006-8 notes and removed it from CreditWatch, where it
was placed with negative implications on Nov. 18, 2010.

S&P's rating on the class A-10 notes is dependent on the lowest of
its ratings on (i) the reference obligation, Mediacom LLC's senior
unsecured rating ('B-'); (ii) the swap payments guarantor, Morgan
Stanley (A/Negative/A-1); and (iii) the underlying security, BA
Master Credit Card Trust II's class A floating-rate asset-backed
certificates series 2001-B due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA (sf)').

The rating action follows S&P's March 7, 2011 affirmation of its
'B-' rating on the reference obligation and its removal from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P may take subsequent
rating actions on the class A-10 notes due to changes in its
ratings assigned to the reference obligation, the swap guarantor,
or the underlying security.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 24
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
three Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transactions due to interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its ratings on 16 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
S&P expects the interest shortfalls will continue.  Of the 16
classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)', 13 have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for three or more months.  The
recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are
primarily due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts in effect
  for specially serviced loans;

* The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer has
  made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

* Special servicing fees; and

* Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
  modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent
Member of the Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered
servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing
fees that are likely, in its view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts according
to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms
call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of
the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)' because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the
MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

S&P detail the 24 downgraded classes from the three CMBS
transactions below.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11

S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' the class M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11
primarily due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to 10 ($75.4 million, 3.2% of the pooled trust balance) of
the 22 loans ($433.0 million, 18.4%) that are currently with the
special servicer, C-III Asset Management.  S&P also considered
special servicing fees, shortfalls due to interest rate
modifications, and nonrecoverable advance declarations.  S&P also
downgraded the class K and L certificates to 'CCC- (sf)' because
the classes have shorted interest for one month and S&P believes
these classes are susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  S&P
downgraded class J to 'CCC+ (sf)' due to reduced liquidity
available to the trust.

As of the Feb. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$51.1 million were in effect for 13 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $168,672, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1.65 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 10 ASER amounts,
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, interest rate modifications on two loans
($42.8 million; 1.8%) and nonrecoverable advance declarations on
two loans ($9.7 million; 0.4%) in determining its rating actions.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $281,160 million
and affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class
K.  Classes M, N, and O have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for the past month, and classes P and Q have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for the past 11
months.  S&P expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ15

S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' the class G, H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from  Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ15 due to
interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to six
($158.5 million, 7.9% of the pooled trust balance) of the 10 loans
($224.7 million, 11.2%) that are currently with the special
servicer, C-III, as well as special servicing fees and an interest
rate modification on one loan ($20.0 million; 0.9%).  S&P also
downgraded the class F certificates to 'CCC- (sf)' because the
class has shorted interest for one month, and S&P believes it is
susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  S&P downgraded the
class E certificates to 'CCC+ (sf)' due reduced liquidity
available to the trust.

As of the Feb. 11, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$111.1 million were in effect for eight loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $501,498, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $3.73 million.  Standard & Poor's considered six ASER amounts,
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees and an interest rate modification on one
loan ($20.0 million; 0.9%) in determining its rating actions.  The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $764,150 million and
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class D.
Classes G, H, J, K, L, M, and N have had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding between three and eight months, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16

S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' the class N, O, P, and Q certificates
from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16 due to interest
shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to eight
($74.7 million, 2.9%) of the 20 loans ($282.6 million, 11.1%)
that are currently with the special servicers, C-III, as well
as special servicing fees and an interest rate modification on
one loan ($37.0 million; 1.5%).  S&P also downgraded the class L
and M certificates to 'CCC- (sf)' because each of these classes
has shorted interest for one month, and S&P believes these classes
are susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  In addition, S&P
downgraded class K to 'CCC (sf)' due to reduced liquidity
available to the trust.

As of the Feb. 14, 2011, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$118.7 million were in effect for 15 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $253,405, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1.35 million.  Standard & Poor's considered eight ASER
amounts, all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees and an interest rate modification
on one loan ($37.0 million; 1.5%) in determining its rating
actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$299,037 and affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class L.  Classes N, O, P, and Q have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding between three and five months, and
S&P expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.

                         Ratings Lowered

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ11

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                   Interest Shortfalls
Class  To         From        Credit enhancement   Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----        ------------------   -------  -----------
J      CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)     3.95                    N.A.          N.A.
K      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)   2.53                  23,456       23,456
L      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)   2.15                  39,226       39,226
M      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   1.89                  26,150       26,150
N      D (sf)     CCC (sf)    1.50                  39,226       39,226
O      D (sf)     CCC (sf)    1.37                  13,075       13,075
P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   0.99                  39,226      346,863
Q      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   0.60                  39,230      431,529

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ15
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ15

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                   Interest Shortfalls
Class  To         From        Credit enhancement   Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----        ------------------   -------  -----------
E      CCC+ (sf) B- (sf)      6.70                 75,413       75,413
F      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)    5.17                150,826      150,826
G      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     4.02                113,821      256,979
H      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    3.00                101,539      303,263
J      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.49                 51,208      241,748
K      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    2.23                 25,768      154,486
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.85                 38,652      231,729
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.60                 25,952      192,329
N      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.34                26,025      207,304

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                   Interest Shortfalls
Class  To         From        Credit enhancement   Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----        ------------------   -------  -----------
K      CCC (sf)  B (sf)       3.23                    N.A.          N.A.
L      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)      2.85                  18,363       18,363
M      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)      2.46                  37,735       37,735
N      D (sf)    B- (sf)      2.08                  37,735       96,712
O      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)    1.44                  62,895      237,848
P      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     1.19                  25,160      125,798
Q      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    0.81                  37,735      188,677

                       N.A. -- Not available.


NOB HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Nob Hill CLO, Limited:

  -- US$210,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018 Notes (current balance of $203,750,942.95), Upgraded
     to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
      (sf);

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$11,350,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$14,145,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     June 5, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$13,580,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$11,300,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June 2009.
Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2846 compared to 3241 in May 2009, and securities
rated Caa1/CCC+ or below make up approximately 13.4% of the
underlying portfolio versus 21% in May 2009.  The deal also
experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $6.9 million
from approximately $21.4 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D
and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 121.5%,
114.7%, 108.9 and 104.4%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of
113.2%, 107.0%, 101.6 and 97.4%, respectively.  Moody's also notes
that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring
interest and that all previously deferred interest has been paid
in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $276.2 million, defaulted par of $8.9 million,
a weighted average default probability of 30.5% (implying a WARF
of 4000), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.5%,
and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Nob Hill CLO, Limited, issued in July 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -20% (3200):

  -- Class A1: +1
  -- Class A2: +3
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4800):

  -- Class A1: -2
  -- Class A2: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
   the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information, and
confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors Service
information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, Moody's is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


PITTSBURG REDEVELOPMENT: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings withdraws its 'BB+' unenhanced rating on these
letter of credit-supported tax allocation bond series issued by
the Pittsburg Redevelopment Agency, California:

  -- $117 million subordinate TABs (Los Medanos Community
     Development Project), series 2004A.

The rating of this debt instrument is no longer considered by
Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage.  Fitch continues to
rate similarly secured obligations of the issuer 'BB+' with a
Negative Outlook.


PRIMA CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Prima Capital
CDO 2005-1, Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations.  The key
indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF,
weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's
asset correlation are all performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated March 20, 2009.  Please see the ratings tab on the
issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and
the ratings history.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Confirmed at B2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Prima 2005-1 is a static CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio, commercial mortgage backed securities (66.6% of
the pool balance), whole loans (25.9%), and B-Notes (7.4%).
As of the February 18, 2011 Trustee report, the aggregate Note
balance of the transaction has decreased to $134.5 million from
$406.6 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class
A Notes.

As of the of the February 18, 2011 Trustee report, there are no
defaulted or impaired assets in the underlying collateral pool of
the transaction.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated assets.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 1,869 compared to 810 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(51.5% compared to 51.5% at last review), A1-A3 (4.9% compared to
7.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (6.0% compared to 12.4% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.3% compared to 14.5% at last review), B1-B3
(5.0% compared to 9.1% at last review), and Caa1-C (15.3% compared
to 5.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the assets in the
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.0 years compared to
4.9 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 51.2% compared to 52.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 2.5% compared to 6.4% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 51% to 41% or up to 61% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches downward and 0 to
3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Primus CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$8,500,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 22, 2010
     Upgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$31,500,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     July 22, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$10,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating

     Rate notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021 (current balance US$14,645,606), Upgraded to Caa3
     (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July
2010.  The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have
improved since the rating action in July 2010 and are currently
in compliance.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 122.687%, 110.949%,
107.520% and 103.076%, respectively, versus June 2010 levels of
120.56%, 109.025%, 105.656 % and 101.472%, respectively.  As of
the February 2011 trustee report, defaulted and deferred interest
assets totaled $1.49 million versus $12.2 million in June 2010.
Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the July 2010 rating
action.  Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the weighted
average rating factor is 2315 compared to 2329 in June 2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $365 million, defaulted par of $1.49 million,
a weighted average default probability of 26.97% (implying a WARF
of 3488), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.79%,
and a diversity score of 65.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Primus CLO II Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2790)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4185)

  -- Class A: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -4
  -- Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
   the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-C2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes of
Prudential Securities Secured Financing, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2:

  -- Cl. A-EC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-EC2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)
                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 12.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.1% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 15 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 26, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                        Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to
$87.7 million from $869.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 50% of the pool.  Six loans,
representing 19% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities.  Although the weighted average
maturity for the pool is 56 months, loans representing 36% of the
pool mature within the next six months.

Thirteen loans, representing 27% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $15.8 million loss (14%
loss severity on average).  Four loans, representing 8% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $12.2 million loss (59% expected loss on average)for
three of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $967,700 loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 100% and 98%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased loans.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 65%, the same as at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.97X, respectively, compared to
1.40X and 1.94X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top two performing conduit loans represent 24% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is Dudley Farms Plaza Loan
($14.9 million -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a
263,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail center located in
South Charleston, West Virginia.  The property was 85% leased
as of December 2010.  Performance has declined due to a decrease
in base rent.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.35X,
respectively, compared to 71% and 1.52X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Desert Star Apartments Loan
($6.3 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 437-
unit apartment complex located in Phoenix, Arizona.  This loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy.
The property was 77% leased as of June 2010.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 74% and
1.39X at last review.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: S&P Raises Ratings on Three 1998-C1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Prudential
Securities Secured Financing Corp.'s series 1998-C1.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the classes.  The upgrades also reflect the
deleveraging of the pool.

Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the transaction's collateral pool
using S&P's U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage of 1.54x and an adjusted loan-to-value ratio
of 65.7%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.34x and an LTV
ratio of 83.1%.  The implied default rate and loss severity under
the 'AAA' scenario were 31.4% and 33.3%, respectively.  The DSC
and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude the transaction's two
defeased loans ($13.0 million; 10.3%) and two specially serviced
loans ($6.9 million; 5.3%).  S&P separately estimated losses for
the excluded specially serviced loans and included them in the
'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-EC interest-only
certificate based on its current criteria.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
transaction had an aggregate trust balance of $129.5 million
(45 loans), down from $1.15 billion (271 loans) at issuance.
Excluding the pool's two defeased loans ($13.0 million; 10.3%),
the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, provided
interim/full-year 2009 financial information for 11.8% of the pool
and interim/full-year 2010 financial information for 83.9% of the
pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.67x for the pool
based on the servicer-reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV ratio were 1.54x and 65.7%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted
figures exclude the pool's two defeased loans and two specially
serviced loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced loans and included them in the 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.  There are nine loans
($32.5 million; 25.1%) on the master servicer's watchlist,
including three of the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P discuss
these three loans below.  To date, the trust has experienced
$20.8 million of principal losses on 15 assets.

                    Specially Serviced Loans

As of the Feb. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, two loans
($6.9 million; 5.3%) were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC.  LNR reported that the larger of these two loans
($4.9 million; 3.7%) is in foreclosure and the other loan
($2.0 million; 1.6%) is late, but less than 30-days delinquent
in its payments.

The Willow Brook Village Shopping Center loan is the seventh-
largest loan in the pool and the larger of the two loans with the
special servicer.  The loan has a total exposure of $5.7 million
(4.4%), which includes $845,527 of advancing and interest thereon.
The collateral property, which is in foreclosure, is a 179,741-
sq.-ft. retail property in Coldwater, Mich., built in 1992.  This
loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 6, 2010, due
to an imminent payment default.  Recent financial performance
information was not available for this loan.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The other specially serviced loan, the Kelly Plaza Shopping Center
loan ($2.0 million; 1.6%), is secured by an 86,439-sq.-ft.
anchored retail property in Edmond, Okla., built in 1984.  This
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 8, 2010, also
due to an imminent payment default.  LNR reported that the loan
was late, but less than 30-days delinquent.  The reported DSC was
1.53x as of December 2009.  According to the special servicer,
they are dual tracking a foreclosure and a note sale.  S&P expects
a minimal loss upon the resolution of this asset.

               Summary Of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $63.0 million (48.6%).  Using
servicer-reported information, S&P calculated a weighted-average
DSC of 1.72x for these loans.  One of these loans is specially
serviced (discussed above) and three appear on the master
servicer's watchlist.

The Aberfeldy III loan ($11.6 million; 9.0%), the largest
nondefeased loan in the pool and on the master servicer's
watchlist, is secured by a portfolio of seven properties
consisting of 371,766 square feet in Texas.  This loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.  As of
September 2010, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.09x and 80.4%,
respectively.

The Aberfeldy I loan ($9.3 million; 7.2%), the second-largest
nondefeased loan in the pool and on the master servicer's
watchlist, is secured by a portfolio of eight properties
consisting of 272,667 square feet in Texas.  This loan is also on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC.
Reported DSC and occupancy were 1.00x and 79.3% as of September
2010 and June 2010, respectively.

The Center of New Hampshire Holiday Inn loan ($3.9 million; 3.0%),
the eighth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and the third-
largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist, is secured by a
250-room hotel in Manchester, N.H., that was built in 1984 and
renovated in 1997.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low reported DSC.  For the twelve months ending
June 30, 2010, reported DSC, occupancy, and revenue per available
room were 0.78x, 68.0%, and $53.83, respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The raised and affirmed ratings are consistent
with S&P's analysis.

                         Ratings Raised

          Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C1

                  Rating
                  ------
Class        To          From               Credit enhancement (%)
-----        --          ----               ----------------------
F            AA (sf)     A+ (sf)             65.99
G            A (sf)      A- (sf)             43.81
H            BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)            37.16

                        Ratings Affirmed

          Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C1

            Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------   ----------------------
            D         AAA (sf)                  99.26
            E         AAA (sf)                  85.95
            J         BB+ (sf)                  28.29
            K         B+ (sf)                   14.98
            A-EC      AAA (sf)                    N/A


                       N/A - Not applicable.


RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings in Nine Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from two Alt-A
deals issued by Residential Asset Securitization Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien
and adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.  .

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-IP2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust Series 2004-
IndyPort1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1X, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on April 13, \
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


REVE SPC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on REVE
SPC Dryden XVII, a collateralized debt obligation transaction.
The CSO, issued in 2007, references a portfolio of corporate
synthetic senior unsecured bonds.

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-11 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 10)

  -- US$25M US$25,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes of Series 2007-1,
     Class B-2 due September 20, 2014 Notes, Upgraded to Caa2;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-1 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 11)

  -- EUR10M EUR10,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes, Series 2007-1 Class
     B-2 due September 20, 2014 Notes, Upgraded to Caa2;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-2 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 12)

  -- EUR5M EUR5,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes, Series 2007-2 Class C-
     2 due September 20, 2014 Notes, Upgraded to Caa3; previously
     on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-1 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 23)

  -- US$80M US$80,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes of Series 2007-1,
     Class JSS due September 20, 2014 Notes, Upgraded to B2;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Synthetic CDO Variable Spread Notes
of Series 2008-3 (Segregated Portfolio Series 35(b))

  -- US$10M US$10,000,000 Dryden XVII Synthetic CDO Variable
     Spread Notes of Series 2008-3, Class C-2 due March 20, 2017
     Notes, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref. #37585711 (DRYDEN XVII)

  -- US$25M US$25,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference
     Number 37585711 (DRYDEN XVII) Notes, Upgraded to B1;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref. #37613894 (DRYDEN XVII)

  -- US$60M US$60,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference
     Number 37613894 (DRYDEN XVII) Notes, Upgraded to B1;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref. #37613929 (Dryden XVII)

  -- US$15M US$15,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference
     Number 37613929 (DRYDEN XVII) Notes, Upgraded to B1;
     previously on Oct 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating action is the result of the improving credit
profile of the underlying portfolio, the level of credit
enhancements remaining in the transaction and the shortened time
to maturity of the CSO tranches.

Since the last rating review in October 2009, the 10-year
weighted average rating factor of the portfolio improved from
1235, equivalent to B1, to 953, equivalent to Ba2.  There are 22
reference entities with a negative outlook compared to eight that
are positive, and two entities on watch for downgrade compared to
two on watch for upgrade.  At the time of the last rating action
there were 34 entities on negative outlook compared to two on
positive outlook and two entities on watch for downgrade as
opposed to two for upgrade.  The portfolio has experienced six
credit events, equivalent to approximately 2.8 percent of the
portfolio.

Since the last rating action in October 2009, the portfolio has
experienced three additional credit events from Ambac Assurance
Corporation, Syncora Guarantee Inc, and CIT Group.  In addition,
the portfolio is exposed to Residential Capital, LLC, which has
not been subject to a credit event, but nonetheless is modeled as
defaulted based on its rating.  The tranches with an original WAL
of seven years have a remaining life of 3.5 years, the tranches
with an original WAL of 10 years have a remaining life of 6.0
years.

Moody's rating actions factor in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are given in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where
higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-
versa:

  -- Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the
     maturity of the CSO by 6 months, keeping all other things
     equal.  The result of this run is comparable to the base case
     for all rated tranches.

  -- Market Implied Ratings are modeled in place of the
     corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
     probability of the reference entities in the portfolio.  The
     gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating
     is an indicator of the extent of the divergence in credit
     view between Moody's and the market.  The result of this run
     is comparable to that of the base case for all tranches.

  -- Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting
     all entities rated Caa1 and below.  The result of this run
     varies from comparable to the base case to two notches below
     the base case.

  -- Moody's conducts a sensitivity analysis consisting of
     notching down by one the ratings of reference entities in the
     Banking, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors.  The
     result from this run varies from 1.5 notches below to
     comparable to the base case scenario.

  -- Removing the notch-down adjustment on ratings of all
     reference entities on negative outlook and/or on watch for
     downgrade generates a result ranges from comparable to the
     base case to one notch above.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model.

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over
time in default rates for instruments with a given rating,
(b) variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomics conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario, such as a double dip recession,
the CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent that depends
on the expected severity of the worsening conditions.


RICHLAND TOWERS: Fitch Expects to Rate Class B Notes at 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Richland Towers, LLC
Secured Multi-Use Communication Tower Revenue Notes, Series 2011-
1.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction:

  -- $143,000,000 class A notes, 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $45,000,000 class B notes, 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 16, 2011.

The transaction is an issuance of notes backed by assets and
ownership interests in 37 multi-use communication tower sites and
nine other interests used to transmit broadcast signals for
television, FM radio, land mobile radio, wireless communication
equipment, and other related purposes.  The notes are issued by
the direct owners of the asset entities, and are secured by
mortgages on properties representing approximately 92% of the
annualized run rate net cash flow.  The notes are guaranteed by
the direct and indirect owners of the asset entities and are
secured by a pledge and first priority perfected security interest
in 100% of the equity interest of the issuers and the asset
entities.  Both the direct and indirect parents of the asset
entities are special purpose entities.

Hearst Television is a tenant in occupancy at three of the
collateral tower site assets and represents approximately 2.2% of
the annualized run rate revenue.  Hearst Television is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Hearst Corporation.  The Hearst Corporation
also owns a 40% interest in the parent company of Fitch Ratings.


SAGAMORE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Sagamore CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-1 Delayed Drawdown Note Rights Due
     2015 (current outstanding balance of $35,949,589), Upgraded
     to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$161,000,000 Class A-2 Note Rights Due 2015 (current
     outstanding balance of $82,684,054), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class A-3 Zero Coupon Accreting Note Rights
     Due 2015 (current outstanding balance of $2,567,828),
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to
     A2 (sf);

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Deferrable Note Rights Due 2015,
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to
     Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class 1 Participation Notes Due 2015 (current
     rated balance of $2,567,828), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class 2 Participation Notes Due 2015 (current
     rated balance of $2,635,548), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
     previously on May 7, 2010 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Note
     Rights Due 2015, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Note Rights Due
     2015, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class D Junior Mezzanine Deferrable Note
     Rights Due 2015, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the upgrade actions result primarily from an
increase in the overcollateralization of the notes since the
rating action in May 2010.  The notes benefited from the
delevering of the Class A-1, A-2 and A-3 Notes, which have been
paid down by approximately $68 million or 36% since May 2010.
Based on the latest trustee report dated February 7, 2011, The
Class A, Class B, and Class C overcollateralization ratios
increased to 138.14%, 120.19%, and 107.40%, respectively, from
121.98%, 112.39%, and 104.84% in April 2010.  Additionally, the
deal experienced a decrease in defaulted securities, which
currently total about $5.2 million, compared to $13.4 million of
defaulted collateral reported in April 2010.

Despite significant delevering of the transaction, Moody's noted
that the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
deteriorated since the rating action in May 2010, which is
observed through an increase in the average credit rating (as
measured by the weighted average rating factor) and an increase in
the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor is currently
3038 compared to 2791 in April 2010, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 18.1% of the underlying
portfolio versus 12% in April 2010.

Moody's confirmed the ratings of the Class C-1, Class C-2, and
Class D Notes, due to the deal's significant exposure to
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  Many of such investments are in CLO tranches with low
speculative-grade ratings, which Moody's assumes in its analysis
to be liquidated at very low values at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $169.6 million, defaulted par of $6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 24.43% (implying a WARF of
3875), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.53%,
and a diversity score of 49.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Sagamore CLO, Ltd., issued in October 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009 and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3100)

  -- Class A-1: +2
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class A-3: +2
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class C-2: 0
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class 1: +2
  -- Class 2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4650)

  -- Class A-1: -1
  -- Class A-2: -1
  -- Class A-3: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C-1: -1
  -- Class C-2: -1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class 1: -1
  -- Class 2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value and the asset's current market value.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust 4.  The collateral
backing the deal primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable rate
Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.  The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities wrapped by
Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their underlying rating
without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr
     13, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SRRSPOKE 2007-IA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed two classes of Notes issued by SRRSpoke 2007-
IA.  The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 6, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class I Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Affirmed at C
     (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Subordinated Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Affirmed
     at C (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


SRRSPOKE 2007-IB: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating to Class I Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one class of Notes issued by SRRSpoke 2007-
IB.  The key indicators of the expected loss within CRE CDO
transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted average
recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated May 6, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the
issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and
the ratings history.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class I Variable Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Affirmed at C
     (sf); previously on May 6, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.


SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Rates $15.3 Mil. Class C Notes at 'BB-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Sierra Timeshare 2011-1 Receivables
Funding LLC:

  -- $184,950,000 class A notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49,750,000 class B notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- $15,300,000 class C notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


SIERRA TIMESHARE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Sierra Timeshare 2011-1 Receivables Funding LLC's
$250 million vacation timeshare loan-backed notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 14,
2011.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion of the credit
enhancement available in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and available excess
spread.  S&P's ratings also reflect its view of Wyndham Consumer
Finance Inc.'s servicing ability and experience in the timeshare
market.

                   Preliminary Ratings Assigned

          Sierra Timeshare 2011-1 Receivables Funding LLC

          Class             Rating        Amount (mil.  $)
          -----             ------        ---------------
          A                 A (sf)                 184.95
          B                 BBB- (sf)               49.75
          C                 BB (sf)                  15.3


SPARKS REGIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Lease Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three credit
tenant lease transactions supported by Sparks Regional Medical
Center Lease Certificates of Participation Series 2002:

* Term Certificates due June 15, 2012, $4,185,000; Affirmed at B1
  (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2010 Upgraded to B1

* Term Certificates due June 15, 2017, $14,570,000; Affirmed at B1
  (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2010 Upgraded to B1

* Term Certificates due June 15, 2022, $10,175,000; Affirmed at B2
  (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2010 Upgraded to B2

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the certificates are affirmed at B1 (sf) based
on the current rating of Health Management Associates, Inc.
(long term issuer rating B1; positive outlook), which acquired
substantially all of the assets of Sparks Regional Medical Center
(Sparks), the original lessee of the facilities supporting the
transaction with consideration given to the source of funds (lease
payments versus refinance proceeds) for the repayment of the three
certificates.  The (sf) indicator is being added to these ratings
pursuant to Moody's practice of differentiating ratings assigned
to structured finance obligations.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating
or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due
to realized losses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Backed Transactions"
published in October 1998.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating
of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined; the dark value must be sufficient, assuming a
bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of the lease, to support
the expected loss consistent with the certificates' rating.
Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the possibility of lease
affirmations by the tenant and for the landlord's claim for lease
rejection damages in bankruptcy.  Moody's also may give credit for
some amortization of the debt, depending upon the rating of the
credit tenant.  In addition, Moody's considers the overall
structure and legal integrity of the transaction.  The
certificates' rating may change as the senior unsecured debt
rating (or the corporate family rating) of the tenant changes.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's prior
full review is summarized in a press release dated March 31, 2010.

                        Deal Performance

As of March 8, 2011, the transaction's aggregate Certificate
balance was $28.9 million.  The transaction currently consists of
three Certificates which are due June 15, 2012, June 15, 2017,
and June 15, 2022, respectively.  The Certificates evidence
proportionate undivided interests in 19 medical facilities which
were originally leased to Sparks.  On December 1, 2009, HMA
acquired substantially all of Sparks assets, including the
assignment of Sparks' interest under the lease supporting this
transaction.  The lease expires on June 30, 2017, subject to a
five year extension option.

The scheduled lease payments are sufficient to completely pay off
the Certificates due June 2012 and June 2017.  Because there still
will be an outstanding balance for the Certificates due June 2022
at the end of the tenant's initial lease term, the transaction was
structured with a residual value insurance policy issued by R.V.I.
America Insurance Company.  The policy is for $10,750,000, which
is the principal amount of the Certificates due June 2022.  On
February 4, 2009, Moody's downgraded RVI's financial strength
rating to Baa3 from A3 and subsequently withdrew the rating.  The
rating on the Certificates due June 2022 is notched down from
HMA's rating due to the size of the loan balance at maturity
relative to the value of the collateral assuming the existing
tenant is no longer in occupancy (the "dark" value).


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of classes
6A1, 6A2 and 6A3 issued by Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust
2005-15 from Baa3 to B2.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-15

  -- Cl. 6-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are as a result of the bonds not having sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain the current ratings compared to the
revised loss expectation on the pool of mortgages backing the
underlying certificate.

The group six of this transaction is a resecuritization backed by
Class 5A1 (the "Underlying Certificate") issued by Structured
Asset Securities Corporation, Series 2005-10.  The underlying
certificate is backed primarily by first-lien, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.

The classes 6-A1 and 6-A2 issued in this resecuritization receive
principal and absorb losses from the underlying certificate on a
pro-rata basis.  The class 6-A3 is an interest only bond with
notional amount linked to Class 6-A2.

Moody's ratings on certificates in a resecuritization are based
on:

   (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing
       the underlying certificate and the updated rating on
       the underlying certificate.  Moody's current loss
       expectation on the pool backing Structured Asset
       Securities Corporation, Series 2005-10 is 11% expressed
       as a percentage of outstanding deal balance.  The current
       rating on the 5A1 bond is B2.

  (ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
       certificate, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pool
of mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificate) and then
arrived at updated rating on the underlying certificate.  The
rating on the underlying certificate is based on expected
recoveries on the bond under ninety-six different combinations of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment
curves.  For further details regarding Moody's approach to
estimating losses on Alt-A pools, please refer to the methodology
publication " Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: February 2010",
available on Moodys.com.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the ratings.


TERWIN MORTGA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2004-13ALT Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-PA-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-P-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010

     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 10
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from four Alt-A
deals issued by Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.  The principal methodology used in
these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. I-1A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


TIERS RIVA: S&P Withdraws Rating on Trust Certificate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
trust certificate notes from TIERS RIVA CDO ^2 Floating Rate
Credit Linked Trust Series 2005-4, a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the full redemption and subsequent
termination of the notes.

                        Rating Withdrawn

TIERS RIVA CDO ^2 Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Series 2005-4

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                 Class         To        From
                 -----         --        ----
                 Trust Cert    NR        B+ (sf)

                         NR -- Not rated


UBS INVESTMENT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-03-17 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on UBS
Investment AG's STERN 2006-03-17 Floating Rate Notes Due March 20,
2011, a synthetic collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The downgrade reflects credit events in the portfolio that have
caused losses to exceed the subordination level for the tranche.

                         Rating Lowered

                        UBS Investment AG
     STERN 2006-03-17 Floating Rate Notes Due March 20, 2011

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                Class         To        From
                -----         --        ----
                Notes         D (sf)    CCC- (sf)


UNITED AIR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class B Certs. to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Class B certificates
of United Air Lines' Series 2000-1 Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificates to Ba3 from B3.  The ratings reflect Moody's
expectation that the three remaining semi-annual payments on
the underlying equipment notes will be sufficient for the
Trustee to make timely payments of interest and principal on
the EETC through the scheduled final distribution date of
July 1, 2012.

Following United's bankruptcy filing in 2002 and rejection of two
aircraft in the Series 2000-1 EETC, the distribution of funds to
the various certificate classes for the Series 2000-1 EETC was
modified pursuant to the "post-triggering-event" waterfall.  This
meant that, in general, all payments made by United on the
underlying junior tranche equipment notes were used to pay
interest and principal on the Class A certificates, with interest
accruing on the junior classes of Series 2000-1 EETC.  The Class A
certificates were repaid during 2010, so the Class B certificates
are now the most senior tranche.  All accrued interest on the
Class B certificates was paid to certificate holders with the
January 1, 2011 distribution funded by the then scheduled payment
from United on the underlying equipment notes.  The special
distribution made to certificate holders on March 3, 2011
sufficiently reduced the B tranche certificate balance, such that
the remaining scheduled payments from United will cover the
remaining scheduled payments on the B tranche certificates.

Issuer: United Air Lines, Inc. EETC's Series 2000-1

  -- 2000-1B, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on Jul 27, 2006 Assigned
     B3

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating of Ba3 is two notches above the corporate family rating
of B2.  Moody's estimates the loan-to-value at about 40%.  While
there are diverse aircraft types in the 18 aircraft that comprise
the collateral, 7 of the tails are among the oldest aircraft in
United's fleet.  Moody's believes that this financing could be one
of the first to be disaffirmed by United under a bankruptcy
scenario, which leads to maintaining similar notching to other ETC
or EETC transactions that have significantly less over-
collateralization.  Additionally, there is no liquidity facility
to fund near-term interest payments under a default scenario.  The
revised terms of Series 2000-1 EETC do however; provide cross-
default and cross-collateralization of the equipment notes whose
payments fund the certificate payments.

The last rating action for United Air Lines occurred on September
29, 2010 when Moody's upgraded the corporate family rating of
United Continental Holdings, Inc. (parent of United) to B2, and
changed the outlook to stable.

United-Continental Holdings, Inc, is the parent of United Air
Lines, Inc., and Continental Airlines, Inc., and is the largest
global airline by revenue.


VERTICAL CRE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of notes issued by
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1 Ltd./Corp.

Since Fitch's last rating action in April 2010, approximately
55.6% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 81.5% has
a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 63.6% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 65% and
36.1%, respectively, at last review.  The class A notes have
received $45.9 million in pay downs since the last review from
both principal repayments, including the full recovery on a
distressed bond, and a de minimus amount from the diversion of
interest otherwise due to the junior classes.

On the Sept. 22, 2009 payment date, the Overcollateralization
Default Trigger fell below 105% which resulted in an Event of
Default.  On Oct. 8, 2009, the Holder of a majority in Aggregate
Principal Amount of the class A notes and the class B notes,
voting together as a single class, declared the principal of the
notes to be immediately due and payable.  As a result of the
acceleration, the class B notes have missed their interest payment
since the Oct. 22, 2009 payment date.  Fitch rates the class B
notes to the timely receipt of interest and has therefore affirmed
this class at 'Dsf'.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Based on this analysis, the credit
enhancement available to the class A notes falls below the 'CCC'
rating loss rate.  Nevertheless, Fitch has affirmed the class A
notes at 'CCCsf'.  While default is a real possibility, the
recovery prospects for the CDO's collateral, much of which
consists of bonds from large loan floating-rate transactions, has
been trending for the better.  For classes C through H, default
continues to appear inevitable for these classes due to their
junior position in the capital structure and that they rely on
collateral rated 'C' and 'D'.

Vertical 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation issued in May
2006.  The portfolio is composed of 65.4% commercial mortgage
backed securities, 24.8% of structured finance CDOs, and 9.8% of
commercial real estate loans.  In general, Fitch treats CMBS Rake
bonds and single-borrower CMBS as CREL.  There are 44 assets from
30 obligors.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $139,720,545 class A notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $29,000,000 class B notes at 'Dsf';
  -- $10,000,000 class C notes at 'Csf';
  -- $4,000,000 class D notes at 'Csf';
  -- $12,000,000 class E notes at 'Csf';
  -- $5,000,000 class F notes at 'Csf';
  -- $10,500,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
  -- $4,000,000 class H notes at 'Csf'.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C22 and
2006-C27, U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions,
due to interest shortfalls.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its ratings on 11 of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because S&P expects the interest shortfalls will continue.  The
accumulated interest shortfalls on the classes downgraded to
'D (sf)' have been outstanding for three or more months.  The
recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are
primarily due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts in effect
  for specially serviced loans;

* The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer has
  made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

* Special servicing fees; and

* Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
  modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent
Member of the Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered
servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing
fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and the resulting ASER amounts
according to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when it is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER
amounts based on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding
which classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D
(sf)'.  This is because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

S&P detail the 15 downgraded classes from the two CMBS
transactions below.

     Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2005-C22

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, O, and P
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Trust's series 2005-C22
to 'D (sf)' primarily due to interest shortfalls resulting from
ASER amounts related to 12 ($285.3 million, 12.0% of the pooled
trust balance) of the 18 loans ($412.1 million, 17.4%) that are
currently with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC.  S&P lowered its rating on class H to 'CCC- (sf)' due to
current interest shortfalls.  S&P also lowered its rating on class
G to 'B- (sf)' due to reduced liquidity support available to this
class.

As of the Feb. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$121.6 million were in effect for 14 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $481,570, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.82 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 12 ASER amounts,
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as interest
shortfalls due to a rate modification on one loan, and current
special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  The
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $748,613 and have
affected class G and all of the classes subordinate to it.  All
classes subordinate to and including class J have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding between three and 10 months, and
S&P expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.

     Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C27

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, and N certificates
from Wachovia Bank Commercial Trust's series 2006-C27 to 'D (sf)'
primarily due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to nine ($98.5 million, 3.5% of the pooled trust balance)
of the 20 loans ($225.0 million, 8.0%) that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  S&P lowered its rating on
class J to 'CCC- (sf)' due to current interest shortfalls.  S&P
also lowered its rating on class H to 'B- (sf)' due to reduced
liquidity support available to this class.

As of the Feb. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$60.5 million were in effect for 10 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $246,531, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.34 million.  Standard & Poor's considered eight of the nine
ASER amounts, all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well
as interest shortfalls due to a rate modification on one loan, and
current special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.
The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $390,123 and have
affected class J and all of the classes subordinate to it.
Classes K, L, M, and N have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for the past four months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

                         Ratings Lowered

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C22

                                                          Reported
          Rating                                     Interest Shortfalls
          ------                                     -------------------
  Class   To      From        Credit enhancement     Current  Accumulated
  -----   --      ----        ------------------     -------  -----------
G      B- (sf)   B+ (sf)      6.21                   116,823      116,823
H      CCC- (sf) B (sf)       5.01                   127,331      247,866
J      D (sf)    B- (sf)      3.54                   155,625      466,943
K      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)    2.87                    65,701      197,104
L      D (sf)    CCC (sf)     2.34                    52,564      157,691
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.81                    52,559      157,678
N      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.54                    26,284      167,524
O      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    1.27                    26,280      262,797
P      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)    0.87                    39,422      418,993

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C27

                                                          Reported
          Rating                                     Interest Shortfalls
          ------                                     -------------------
  Class   To      From        Credit enhancement     Current  Accumulated
  -----   --      ----        ------------------     -------  -----------
H      B- (sf)    B (sf)     2.97                    (61,322)           0
J      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)    1.74                    168,413      537,610
K      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)  1.06                     87,054      348,214
L      D (sf)     CCC (sf)   0.78                     34,823      139,293
M      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)  0.24                     69,647      278,586
N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)  0.10                     17,412       69,647


WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moodys Investors Service has downgraded the rating of an interest
only tranche, Class X issued by WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, WMALT Series 2007-3 Trust.  Due to an oversight,
this tranche was not reviewed when the rating action took place
for other securities issued by WMALT 2007-3 on September 1, 2010.
This tranche has now been reviewed, and the rating action is:

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series 2007-3
Trust:

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The action is a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The action reflects Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


WELLS FARGO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9 tranches
from Wells Fargo Home Equity Trust 2004-1.  The collateral backing
this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable
rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WF-RBS 2011-C2: Moody's Assigns Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
eleven classes of CMBS securities, issued by WF-RBS 2011-C2,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C2.

  -- Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. A-4, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  -- Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  -- Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  -- Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  -- Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 50 fixed rate loans secured
by 96 properties.  The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis.  Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis.  Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses.  Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans are determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.57X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X.  The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.16X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.  Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 87.9% is lower than
the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.  Moody's
Total LTV ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 88.3% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.  With respect
to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level Herfindahl score is
21.6.  With respect to property level diversity, the pool's
property level Herfindahl score is 22.4.  The transaction's
property diversity profile is within the band of Herfindahl scores
found in previously rated conduit and fusion securitizations.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment.  The factors considered include property age,