TCR_Public/110313.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 13, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 71

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2006-17: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
ABSC NIMS: S&P Corrects Ratings on 21 Classes From 20 RMBS Deals
ACCREDITED 2006-1: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A-3 to 'B+'
ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-4 From 'B'

ALLIANCE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes
ALLY FINANCIAL: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings to $2.67 Bil. Notes
AMERICAN TOWER: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes From BB+ (sf)
ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Downgrades Rating to Class A-3 to 'D'
ARES IX: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

ARES XVI: S&P Assigns Ratings on $356 Mil. Floating-Rate Notes
ARLO VII: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-CSTON-7B-1 Notes
ATRIUM IV: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Bonds
AVIATION CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
BABSON CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2004-4 Certs.
BEA CBO: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'Dsf' Rating on Class A-3 Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-TOP26 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 19 2004-PWR5 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Tranches

BLUE HERON: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
C-BASS 2002-CB2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 119 Tranches
C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
CDC COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 15 2002-FX1 Certificates
CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Rating to Class N Certs. to 'D'
CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches
CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 51 Tranches
CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 47 Tranches
CITIGROUP HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 43 Tranches
COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes

COMM 2003-LNB1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
COMM 2008-RS3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
CONTIMORTGAGE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
COUNTYWIDE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 162 Tranches

CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-CP3 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2003-CPN1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-C3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007-C1 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-8 Certs. to 'D'
CREST 2003-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
DELTA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 89 Tranches
DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches

DLJ ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three 1999-CG3 Certs.
DRYDEN V-LEVERAGED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
EAST LANE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Two Classes of Notes
EL PASO: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $4.85 Mil. Mortgage Bonds

EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 30 Tranches
EQUITY ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches
FALCON AUTO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
FIRST ALLIANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Maintains Negative Watch on All Classes

FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2001-C4 Certificates
FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Assigns Ratings to $350.6 Mil. Floating Notes
GATEWAY CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class B to 'Caa2'
GE CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-C3 Securities
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Two 1997-C2 Certs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 1999-C3 Certs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-C3 Notes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2005-C1 Notes

GOLDMAN SACHS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-GG8 Certs.
GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Tranches
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two 2006-GG7 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 2007-GG9 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-C1 Notes

GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Expects to Rate Various Classes of Notes
GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Notes
GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Ups Rating on Class D Notes to 'B1 (sf)'

HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Ups Rating on Class E Notes to Caa2 (sf)
HIPOCAT 14: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
HSBC BANK: S&P Affirms Rating on $10 Mil. Unfunded Credit Swap
IMC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
INDYMAC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches

INDYMAC RESIDENTIAL: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A Notes to 'D'
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-LDP4 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL1 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2007-FL1 Certificates
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CIBC14 Notes

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-LDP6 Notes
KINGLY SQUARE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Four CDO Transactions
KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Ups Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Ups Rating on Class F Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Raises Ratings on 1996-C2 Certs. to 'Caa1'

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C7 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2001-C7 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C7 Certs.
LEHMAN ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-LLF C5 Certs.

LOCAL INSIGHT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 84 Tranches
MACLAURIN SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class D & E Notes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes to 'C'

MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes to 'C'
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
MAX CMBS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Classes of Notes
MERITAGE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2002-MW1 Certs.

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-WMC1 Notes
MKP VELA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 26 Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five 2005-IQ9 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-TOP25 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 108 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Two Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Assigns Ratings on $1.55 Bil. Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Junks Rating to Class A-8 Notes From 'B-'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Raises Ratings on Class H Notes From 'BB+'

N-STAR REAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 54 Tranches
OHA INTREPID: S&P Assigns Ratings on $364 Mil. Floating Notes
OMEGA CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class C-1E Notes

PARK PLACE: Moody's Downgrades Rating to $306 Mil. Certs.
PEACHTREE FRANCHISE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Certificates
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Corrects Rating on $45 Mil. Certs. to B+
PUTNAM STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes

PUTNAM STRUCTURED: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
SATURNS LIMITED: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2005-3 Certs. To 'Ba2'
SAXON ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 77 Tranches
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

SEAWALL SPC: Moody's Junks Ratings on Series 2008-39 Notes
SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches
SIERRA KINGS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on GO Bonds From 'Ba2'
SOUTH COAST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SPECIALTY UNDERWRITING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches

ST JOSEPH: S&P Corrects Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB/B'
STRONGTOWER FINANCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Class A to 'B1'
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 13 2004-19 Notes
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 173 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 25 Tranches

STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 94 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 108 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 109 Tranches
SVG DIAMOND: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
TALCOTT NOTCH: Fitch Affirms 'Csf/RR2' Rating to Class B-2L Notes

TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 41 Tranches
TIERS BRISBANE: Moody's Confirms 'Caa3' Rating to US$75 Mil. Notes
TOYS R: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
TRIBUNE LTD: S&P Raises Rating on Palm2005SS Notes to 'BB'
TRITON AVIATION: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1 to 'Caa1'

TY COBB: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Hospital Revenue Bonds at 'BB-'
VERTICAL MILLBROOK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Note Classes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2004-C14 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-WHALE8 Certs. to 'D'
WACHOVIA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2002-C1 Notes

WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
WARNER CHILCOTT: S&P Raises Rating on $1.25B Notes to 'BB'
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-SL2 Certs.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-SL3 Certs.
WAVE SPC: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes

WELLS FARGO: Fitch Assigns Ratings on Various 2011-C2 Certs.
WMC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches

* Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating to California Municipal's Bonds
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches of European CDO Deals
* Moody's Puts Ratings on Irvington Township's $5.564 Mil. Bonds
* Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 52 Tranches From 11 RMBS Deals
* S&P Affirms Ratings on 36 Tranches From Five Hybrid CDO Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 109 Classes From 32 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 46 Classes From 32 CMBS Transactions

                            *********

ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded ten classes of Notes issued by Abacus 2006-
10, LTD., due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio of reference obligations as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor.  The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-1, LTD., is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit linked notes referencing
$3.7 billion notional amount of commercial mortgage backed
securities.  All of the CMBS reference obligations were
securitized in 2004 (26.7%) and 2005 (73.3%).  Currently, 74.1%
of the reference obligations are currently rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,452 compared to 356 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings is: Aaa-Aa3
(1.2% , same as last review), A1-A3 (21.5% compared to 45.6% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (38.9% compared to 43.2% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (14.2% compared to 7.6% at last review), B1-B3 (15.8%
compared to 2.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (8.4% compared to
0.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.4
years compared to 5.2 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 9.8%, compared to 25.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of
diversity).  Moody's modeled a MAC of 22.8%, compared to 43.6% at
last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  In general, the rated Notes are
particularly sensitive to rating changes within the collateral
pool.  Holding all other key parameters static, stressing the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations' credit estimates (nineteen
reference obligations; 25.9% of notional amount) by one notch
downward, the resulting impact negatively affects the model
results between 0.0 to 0.18 notch downward on average.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate
Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.  Primary sources of
assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic
environment and varying performance in the commercial real estate
property markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing
or stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a
slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity
for commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily
sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery
in the office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of
the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital continues
to improve with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's
central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish
recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ABACUS 2006-17: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded one and affirmed six classes of Notes
issued by Abacus 2006-17, Ltd., due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Abacus 2006-17, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit linked notes referencing
$584.4 million notional amount of commercial mortgage backed
securities (89.7% of notional amount) and CRE CDO debt (10.3%).
All of the reference obligations were securitized in 2004 (1.7%),
2005 (44.4%), and 2006 (53.9%).  Currently, 82.0% of the reference
obligations are currently rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,837 compared to 4,788 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings is: Baa1-Baa3
(0.0% compared to 5.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (3.4% compared to
9.2% at last review), B1-B3 (3.4% compared to 39.2% at last
review), and Caa1-C (93.2% compared to 45.8% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.9
years compared to 6.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 0.5%, compared to 4.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of
diversity).  Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, compared to 28.7% at
last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  In general, the rated Notes are
particularly sensitive to rating changes within the collateral
pool.  Holding all other key parameters static, stressing the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations' credit estimates (four
reference obligations; 2.6% of notional amount) by one notch
downward, the model results did not change.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate
Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.  Performance that falls
outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's credit
quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when
the related securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation
from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating
action nor does performance within expectations preclude such
actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a rating action is
dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.  Primary sources of
assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic
environment and varying performance in the commercial real estate
property markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing
or stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a
slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity
for commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily
sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery
in the office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of
the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital continues
to improve with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's
central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish
recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ABSC NIMS: S&P Corrects Ratings on 21 Classes From 20 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on 21
classes from 20 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities net
interest margin securities transactions issued between 2005 and
2007 by lowering them to 'CC (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'.

Radian Insurance Inc. (Radian; not rated) insures all of the
affected classes in this review.

S&P is correcting its ratings on the Radian-insured NIMS classes
following its withdrawal of S&P's financial strength rating of
Radian at the company's request on Aug. 2, 2010.  Due to an error,
S&P did not lower its ratings on the NIMS classes at the time of
the withdrawal.  The corrected ratings reflect the higher of the
rating on the insurer and Standard & Poor's underlying rating on
the securities.

                        Ratings Corrected

                    ABSC NIMs Trust 2007-HE1
                         Series 2007-HE1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A          00082VAA0   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-21N
                         Series 2006-21N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      12667QAB7   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-22N
                         Series 2006-22N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      12667WAB4   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-23N
                         Series 2006-23N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      12667RAB5   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-26N
                         Series 2006-26N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      12667UAB8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2007-1N
                         Series 2007-1N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      222393AB6   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2007-2N
                         Series 2007-2N

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Note       222395AA3   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                    Fremont NIM Trust 2006-B
                          Series 2006-B

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      357524AA5   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                 IndyMac NIM Trust INABS 2007-A
                          Series 2007-A

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       Notes      45669CAA8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

           Long Beach Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-WL2
                         Series 2006-WL2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-2        54240KAB8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               MASTR Alternative Loan NIM 2007-HF1
                         Series 2007-HF1

                               Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A          55291LAA3   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                           MASTR CI-13
                        Series 2006-FRE1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N2         57644RAB8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                    Park Place NIM 2005-WHQN2
                        Series 2005-WHQN2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       B          70070AAB1   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                    SASCO NIMS Trust 2007-WF1
                         Series 2007-WF1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A          80385XAA2   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-10
                         Series 2006-10

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-2 Notes  929306AB4   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-11
                         Series 2006-11

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-2 Notes  92933KAB0   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)


               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2007-WM1
                         Series 2007-WM1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-2 Notes  92933UAB8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2007-WM2
                         Series 2007-WM2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-1 Notes  92933VAA8   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
       N-3 Notes  92933VAC4   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                WM Asset Holdings Trust 2007-WM3B
                        Series 2007-WM3B

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       N-1 Notes  92933XAA4   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

                WM Asset Holdings Trust 2007-WM4
                         Series 2007-WM4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
        Class      CUSIP       To                   From
        -----      -----       --                   ----
        N1         92934LAA9   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)


ACCREDITED 2006-1: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A-3 to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on class
A-3 from Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1 to 'B+ (sf)' from
'B (sf)' and on class A-3 from Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-2 (Accredited 2006-2) to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)'.

On Oct. 22, 2009, S&P incorrectly lowered its ratings on class A-3
from both Accredited 2006-1 and Accredited 2006-2 to 'B (sf)' from
'AAA (sf)' and removed both ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, as part of a larger review of U.S. subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities.

The corrected ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the sequential
principal payment priority applicable to the senior notes of each
transaction, and S&P's view of the likelihood that these classes
will receive interest based on a minimum amount of one-month LIBOR
plus the applicable margin for the respective senior note
balances.

                      Principal Allocation

The transaction documents for Accredited 2006-1 and Accredited
2006-2 provide that principal is allocated sequentially to the
senior classes until each class' balance has been reduced to zero.
In certain other series issued by Accredited (not series 2006-1
and 2006-2), the occurrence of a trigger event allows principal
payments on the senior class A notes to be made pro rata, as
opposed to sequentially, at the time the "adjusted principal
balance" of all of the subordinate classes is reduced to zero (the
principal of the subordinate classes can not be written down in
the event of losses).

The transaction documents for Accredited 2006-1 and Accredited
2006-2 also include a trigger for switching the payments of
principal on the class A notes to pro rata from sequential.
However, the trigger in these transactions  provides that once the
overcollateralization has been reduced to zero, and the
"outstanding principal balance" of the class M notes has been
reduced to zero, principal on the class A notes will be paid on a
pro rata basis rather than sequential.  Because the principal of
the class M notes cannot be written down in the event of losses,
and the trigger to pay pro rata is based on the 'outstanding
principal balance' rather than the 'adjusted principal balance',
S&P believes the change in the payment priority will likely never
be triggered.

                          Interest Rate

The transaction documents for Accredited 2006-1 and Accredited
2006-2 provide that interest on Class A-3 from each of these
classes is paid on the class's outstanding  principal balance and
is equal to the outstanding principal balance multiplied by the
lesser of a) one-month LIBOR plus the applicable margin or b) the
available funds cap rate.  The available funds cap rate is defined
as the amount of interest received on the collateral in a given
month divided by the outstanding principal balance of the notes,
multiplied by 12.  In the event of credit losses, which reduce the
collateral amount, the interest received on the collateral will
decrease, and therefore the available funds cap rate will
decrease.  Accordingly, as credit losses increase, it becomes more
likely that the interest paid on these classes will be based on
the available funds cap rate rather than one-month LIBOR plus the
applicable margin.

S&P also lowered its ratings on three classes and affirmed its
ratings on seven other classes from these transactions.

                        Ratings Corrected

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                          Series 2006-1

                                   Rating
                                   ------
Class   CUSIP       Current    Oct. 22, 2009    Pre-Oct. 22, 2009
-----   -----       -------    -------------    -----------------
A-3      004375EW7   B+ (sf)    B (sf)           AAA(sf)/Watch Neg

               Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                          Series 2006-2

                                   Rating
                                   ------
Class   CUSIP       Current    Oct. 22, 2009    Pre-Oct. 22, 2009
-----   -----       -------    -------------    -----------------
A-3      00437NAC6   BB (sf)    B (sf)           AAA(sf)/Watch Neg


ACCREDITED MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-4 From 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on class A-
4 from Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust's series 2006-1 and 2006-2
(Accredited 2006-1 and Accredited 2006-2) to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B
(sf)', and on class M-4 from Accredited 2006-2 to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)'.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on seven other classes
from these transactions.

The downgrades on class A-4 from each of Accredited 2006-1 and
Accredited 2006-2 reflect S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support for these classes is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings, given S&P's current projected losses, which are
a function of its assessment of the performance of the pools.
Under its prepayment speed and loss assumptions for different
rating stresses, S&P believes these classes will likely not
receive their full payment of principal and interest at the rate
of one-month LIBOR plus the applicable margin under rating
stresses higher than that of S&P's previously assigned ratings.
As of the January 2011 distribution date, the Accredited 2006-1
transaction had incurred cumulative losses of $133,039,685 or
13.25% of the original pool balance, while the Accredited 2006-2
transaction had cumulative losses of $189,006,847 or 13.50% of the
original pool balance.  Total delinquencies for Accredited 2006-1
are currently $130,823,002 or 39.65% of the current outstanding
principal balance, $113,051,435 (34.26%) of which are severely
delinquent (90-plus-days delinquent), in foreclosure, or real
estate owned.  Total delinquencies for Accredited 2006-2 are
currently $222,713,310 or 37.12% of the current pool balance,
$190,256,766 (31.71%) of which are severely delinquent.  S&P's
lifetime expected loss projection for Accredited 2006-1 is 24.91%
of the original pool balance, while its lifetime expected loss
projection for Accredited 2006-2 is 29.98% of the original pool
balance.

S&P downgraded class M-4 from Accredited 2006-2 to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' due to a principal deficiency amount of $15,333,024 as
of the Jan. 25, 2011 distribution date, which resulted in a
failure of the class to receive scheduled interest on that amount.

S&P's affirmation of class A-2 (the most senior outstanding class)
from Accredited 2006-2 at 'AAA (sf)' reflects its belief that
under its prepayment speed and loss assumptions under the 'AAA'
stress scenario, the bonds will be paid in full within 12 months,
prior to the occurrence of any potential credit losses from the
pool that, in S&P's view, would be significant enough to impair
bond principal or interest payments.  As principal is allocated
sequentially to the senior notes until each class' balance has
been reduced to zero, class A-2 is currently receiving all
principal payments.

The remaining affirmations reflect S&P's view of the amount of
credit enhancement that is available to these classes relative to
its projected losses for these transactions.

Generally, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P considers whether a
bond will likely be able to withstand approximately 150% of its
remaining base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps
and qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions.  In
contrast, for a class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P
considers whether a bond is likely able to withstand S&P's
remaining base-case loss assumptions.  Other rating categories are
dispersed, approximately equally, between these two loss
assumptions.

Subordination, excess interest, and overcollateralization (prior
to depletion) provide credit support for the Accredited 2006-1 and
Accredited 2006-2 transactions.  The underlying pools of loans
backing these transactions originally consisted of fixed- and
adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that are secured by
first and second liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                      Allocation of Losses

The transaction documents for all series of Accredited Mortgage
Loan Trust transactions do not allow for the write-down of the
principal amount of the subordinate classes of notes if a loss
occurs.  Rather, when a loss occurs, the most subordinate note is
allocated a "principal deficiency amount" equal to the amount of
such loss, and the "adjusted principal balance" of such class is
its original principal balance minus any principal deficiency
amounts allocated to such class.  This process continues until the
principal deficiency amount for each subordinate note equals its
original principal balance.  Interest on the subordinate classes
is based on the class' adjusted principal balance.

The senior notes are also not allowed to be written down if a loss
occurs.  However, unlike the subordinated classes, the senior
notes are not allocated a principal deficiency amount.  As losses
occur and the collateral amount decreases, it becomes more likely
(under certain rating stresses) that the senior classes will not
receive their full payment of principal by the end of the
transaction's life.

                          Interest Rate

Interest on the senior notes is paid pro rata on their full
principal balances and is equal to the class' outstanding
principal balance multiplied by the lesser of a) one-month LIBOR
plus the applicable margin or b) the available funds cap rate.
The available funds cap rate is defined as the amount of interest
received on the collateral in a given month divided by the
outstanding principal balance of the notes, multiplied by 12.  In
the event of credit losses which reduce the collateral amount, the
interest received on the collateral will decrease, and therefore
the available funds cap rate will decrease.  Accordingly, as
credit losses increase, it becomes more likely that the interest
paid on these classes will be based on the available funds cap
rate rather than one-month LIBOR plus the applicable margin.

In a related release S&P corrected its ratings on class A-3 from
Accredited 2006-1 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'B (sf)' and on class A-3 from
Accredited 2006-2 to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)' (see "S&P Corrects
Ratings On Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1 And 2006-2,"
published March 9, 2011).

                         Rating Actions

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                          Series 2006-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP          To                   From
      -----      -----          --                   ----
      A-4        004375FG1      CCC (sf)             B (sf)

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                          Series 2006-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP          To                   From
      -----      -----          --                   ----
      A-4        00437NAD4      CCC (sf)             B (sf)
      M-4        00437NAH5      D (sf)               CC (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                          Series 2006-1

                Class      CUSIP         Rating
                -----      -----         ------
                M-1        004375EX5     CCC (sf)
                M-2        004375EY3     CCC (sf)
                M-3        004375EZ0     CCC (sf)

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                          Series 2006-2

                Class       CUSIP         Rating
                -----       -----         ------
                A-2         00437NAB8     AAA (sf)
                M-1         00437NAE2     CCC (sf)
                M-2         00437NAF9     CCC (sf)
                M-3         00437NAG7     CC (sf)


ALLIANCE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 25
tranches from 11 Subprime deals issued by Alliance Funding
Company.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Subprime residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificiates, Series 1997-
3

  -- 1A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2

  -- 1A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1998-1

  -- 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1998-3

  -- 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     June 16, 2008 Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     June 16, 2008 Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1999-2

  -- 1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 1999-3

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 1999-4

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2000-3

  -- Cl. 1A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mortgage loan Asset Backerd Certificates, 1998-4

  -- 2A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mtg Ln AB Notes 2000-4

  -- Cl. 1A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Certs 1997-04

  -- 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     June 16, 2008 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     June 16, 2008 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Certs 1999-1

  -- 1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Notes 2000-1

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Notes 2000-2

  -- Cl. 1A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


ALLY FINANCIAL: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings to $2.67 Bil. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B+' rating to Ally Financial Inc.'s
$2.67 billion trust preferred securities, series 2 issued out of
GMAC Capital Trust I.  The underlying junior subordinated
securities are cumulative, contain a five-year optional deferral
mechanism which is subject to the prior approval of the Federal
Reserve, and rank senior to existing preferred equity and common
equity securities.

The trust preferred securities were originally issued by Ally
Financial Inc. to the U.S. Treasury as a part of the capital
purchase plan on Dec. 30, 2009.  The proceeds from the series 2
issuance will be used solely to repay the U.S. Treasury.

This rating action does not constitute a full review of Ally and
its subsidiaries and therefore does not address every aspect of
Fitch's rating criteria.

Fitch assigns this rating:

GMAC Capital Trust I

  -- Trust Preferred Securities, Series 2 'B+'.


AMERICAN TOWER: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes From BB+ (sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from American
Tower Trust I's series 2007-1.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on two other classes from the same transaction.

The upgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's revaluation of the
underlying collateral, which considered improved portfolio
performance since issuance, the deal structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.  S&P also considered the tenant
concentration and the sponsor/operator's creditworthiness.
Furthermore, Standard & Poor's considers wireless communication
sites a relatively less stable property type due to the
concentration of the tenant base in the telecommunications
industry.

The mortgage loan collateralizing the transaction has a whole-loan
balance of $1.75 billion and is secured by 5,292 wireless
communication sites that are owned (in fee or under long-term
easements), ground leased, or owned by AT&T in 46 states and the
District of Columbia.  The loan bears a 5.608% interest rate based
on the component rates of the underlying tranches and has an
anticipated repayment date in April 2014.  After that date, the
loan will hyperamortize until the final maturity date in April
2037.

The transaction's collateral portfolio of 5,292 wireless
communication sites includes towers, rooftop sites, or other
structures that are leased to wireless communications companies,
broadcasters, and other users.  The sites are classified under
three categories: owned-land sites (295 sites, 7.6% of revenue run
rate), ground-lease sites (4,772 sites, 87.9% of RRR), and AT&T-
owned land sites (275 sites, 4.5% of RRR), for which the net
monthly ground rent is $0.

The tenant base is categorized by five major industry segments:
telephony, broadcast, paging, data, and other miscellaneous
applications.  Overall, the five-largest tenants are AT&T ('A-',
35.1% of RRR), Sprint Nextel ('BB-', 24.4%), T-Mobile (not rated,
10.6%), Verizon Wireless ('A-', 8.1%), and Clearwire Corp.
('CCC+', 4.4%).  While the tenants rated investment-grade ('BBB-'
or higher) by Standard & Poor's generate approximately 44.7% of
in-place revenues, compared to 83.5% at issuance, the overall
revenue increased resulting in a 46% increased S&P value since
issuance as noted below.

S&P revalued the entire portfolio using these assumptions:

* Gross income was based on the annualized RRR for leases in place
  as of Dec. 31, 2010, as well as credit for contractual rent
  steps through year-end 2011;

* Operating expenses were based on historical averages;

* The management fee was underwritten per the contractual amount
  of 7.5% of revenues;

S&P estimated replacement reserves for capital expenditures based
on historical data for the various tower types: cable-guyed at
$1,200 per tower, lattice at $1,000, monopole at $500, and all
others at $400.  The weighted average per tower estimated
replacement reserves were $805;Mortgage properties were valued by
a direct capitalization of net cash flow using rates ranging from
8.75% to 12.00%, depending on the creditworthiness of the tenants.
All other properties, including non-mortgaged and managed sites,
were valued by a direct capitalization of NCF using a rate of
12.0%.  This resulted in a weighted average cap rate of 10.78%.
All sites with management contracts or ground leases that contain
terms shorter than 10 years were valued by discounting the NCF
until lease expiration.

As of Sept. 30, 2010, Bank of New York, the master servicer,
reported a trust and whole-loan debt service coverage of 3.20x
based on NCF.  Standard & Poor's adjusted valuation for the loan
resulted in a 46% increase since issuance.  S&P also considered
the tenant concentration, with one tenant, AT&T ('A-'),
representing 35.1% of the portfolio's RRR, and the top five
tenants accounting for 82.5% of RRR.  S&P's rating on the sponsor,
American Tower Corp., is 'BB+' which has been maintained since
issuance.  Lastly, Standard & Poor's considered the volatility of
the asset type through more conservative capitalization rates and
capital structure assumptions.

                         Ratings Raised

                     American Tower Trust I
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-1

                                Rating
                                ------
                  Class     To         From
                  -----     --         ----
                  B         AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
                  C         AA+ (sf)   A (sf)
                  D         A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
                  E         A (sf)     BBB- (sf)
                  F         BBB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                     American Tower Trust I
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-1

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        A-FX     AAA (sf)
                        A-FL     AAA (sf)


ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Downgrades Rating to Class A-3 to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class A-3 certificates from ARCap 2005-RR5
Resecuritization Inc., a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit.  S&P also affirmed S&P's 'CCC- (sf)' ratings
on two additional classes from the same transaction.

The downgrade of class A-3 reflects a principal loss of
$9.9 million the class incurred as detailed in the Feb. 24, 2011,
remittance report.  Following the principal loss, the class A-3
had principal balance of $16.3 million, down from $26.2 million at
issuance.  Class B, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)',
lost 100% of its $21.9 million issuance principal balance
according to the February 2011 remittance report.

The affirmations of S&P's 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on classes A-1 and
A-2 reflect its analysis of the transaction and its underlying
collateral.

According to the most recent trustee report, the principal loss
was due to principal losses on the underlying commercial mortgage-
backed securities and re-REMIC collateral.  These CMBS and re-
REMIC classes experienced principal losses totaling $10.2 million
as noted in the trustee report:

* ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc. (classes K and L;
  $8.4 million loss); and

* DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp. 1999-CG1 (class B8; $1.8 million
  loss).

According to the remittance report, ARCap 2005-RR5 was
collateralized by one re-REMIC and 12 CMBS certificates
($68.5 million, 100%) from 11 distinct transactions issued
between 1999 and 2005.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2005-RR5 according to its current
criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

                         Rating Lowered

               ARCap 2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc.

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class    To                   From
             -----    --                   ----
             A-3      D (sf)               CCC- (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

               ARCap 2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc.

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        A-1      CCC- (sf)
                        A-2      CCC- (sf)


ARES IX: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1-A, A-1-C, A-2, B, C, D-1, and D-2 notes from Ares IX CLO Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Ares
Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed its ratings on the
class A-1-A, A-1-C, A-2, and B notes from CreditWatch, where S&P
placed them with positive implications on Jan. 19, 2011.  S&P also
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1-B notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit quality S&P has observed
in the deal's underlying asset portfolio as well as paydowns to
the class A-1-A, A-1-B, and A-2 notes since S&P's March 26, 2010,
rating actions.  At that time S&P downgraded most of the rated
notes following the application of its September 2009 corporate
collateralized debt obligation criteria.  As of the Feb. 3, 2011,
trustee report, the transaction had $4.1 million in defaulted
assets.  This was down from $27.7 million noted in the Feb. 3,
2010, trustee report, which S&P referenced for its March 2010
rating actions.  Additionally, assets from obligors rated in the
'CCC' category were reported at $10.8 million in February 2011,
compared with $58.7 million in February 2010.  Furthermore, the
paydowns on the class A-1-A, A-1-B, and A-2 note balances totaled
$125 million over the same period.

Partially due to the factors above, the transaction has also
benefited from an increase in overcollateralization available to
support the rated notes.  The February 2011 trustee report cited a
class A/B O/C ratio of 128.83%, up from a reported ratio of
117.28% in February 2010.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class A-1-B notes reflects
the availability of credit support at the current rating level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                        Ares IX CLO Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
            Class      To          From
            -----      --          ----
            A-1-A      AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-1-C      AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-2        AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
            B          AA+ (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
            C          A+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)
            D-1        BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)
            D-2        BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                         Ares IX CLO Ltd.

                      Class        Rating
                      -----        ------
                      A-1-B        AAA (sf)

Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:              Ares IX CLO Ltd.
Coissuer:            Ares IX CLO Corp.
Collateral manager:  Ares Management LLC
Underwriter:         Lehman Brothers Inc.
Trustee:             Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


ARES XVI: S&P Assigns Ratings on $356 Mil. Floating-Rate Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Ares
XVI CLO Ltd./Ares XVI CLO LLC's $356 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
subordination of cash flows that are payable to the subordinated
notes.  The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in
its corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, which
can withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO
Evaluator model.

The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans.
The asset manager's experienced management team.

The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the rated
notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.29%-
11.57%.  The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the rated
notes outstanding.  The transaction's interest reinvestment test,
a failure of which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
reclassification of excess interest proceeds that are available
prior to paying uncapped trustee, collateral manager, and
administrative expenses and fees; hedge payments; asset manager
incentive fees; and subordinate note payments to principal
proceeds for the purchase of collateral assets; or, at the asset
manager's discretion, to reduce the balance of the rated notes
outstanding sequentially.

                         Ratings Assigned

               Ares XVI CLO Ltd./Ares XVI CLO LLC

       Class                   Rating      Amount (mil. $)
       -----                   ------      ---------------
       A                       AAA (sf)                260
       B                       AA (sf)                  21
       C (deferrable)          A (sf)                   35
       D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 22
       E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                  18
       Subordinated notes      NR                       54

                          NR -- Not rated.


ARLO VII: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-CSTON-7B-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from ARLO VII Ltd.'s series 2007-CSTON-7B-1 and series 2007-
CSTON-7C-1 and Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-22 to 'D
(sf)'.

The lowered ratings follow a number of recent credit events within
the transactions' underlying portfolios that caused the notes to
incur full principal losses.

                         Ratings Lowered

                          ARLO VII Ltd.
                         2007-CSTON-7B-1

                                  Rating
                                  ------
              Class           To         From
              -----           --         ----
              CSTON-7B1       D (sf)     CCC- (sf)

                          ARLO VII Ltd.
                         2007-CSTON-7C-1

                                  Rating
                                  ------
              Class           To         From
              -----           --         ----
              CSTON-7C-1      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)

                     Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                          Series 2006-22


                                  Rating
                                  ------
              Class           To         From
              -----           --         ----
              Class II        D (sf)     CC (sf)


ATRIUM IV: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Atrium IV:

  -- US$387,000,000 Class A1-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2019
     (current balance: $381,251,692.88), Upgraded to Aa3(sf);
     previously on August 5, 2009 Downgraded to A1(sf);

  -- US$7,000,000 Class A1-b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2019 (current
     balance: $6,896,025.45), Upgraded to Aa3(sf); previously on
     August 5, 2009 Downgraded to A1(sf);

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A2 Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2019 (current balance: $98,514,649.32), Upgraded to
     Aa3(sf); previously on August 5, 2009 Downgraded to A1(sf);

  -- US$28,000,000 Class A3 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Upgraded to A3(sf); previously on August 5, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2(sf);

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Upgraded to Ba1(sf); previously on August 5, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2(sf);

  -- US$27,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Upgraded to B3(sf); previously on August 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2(sf);

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Upgraded to Caa3(sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca(sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$3,500,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
     to Caa3(sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca(sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the August 2009 rating action.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  As of the trustee report dated
January 25, 2011, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2766 compared to 2889 in the June 1, 2009 report.  Additionally,
defaulted securities total about $17.8million of the underlying
portfolio compared to $68.7million in June 2009.  The percentage
of securities rated Caa and below also declined to 5.37 from 9.57.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action.  The Class A, B, C and D Par
Value Tests are reported at 121.78%, 114.02%, 108.59% and
106.47%respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 115.06%, 107.78%,
102.68% and 100.69% respectively.  All overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance of
$622.6million, defaulted par of $18.3 million, a weighted average
default probability of 28% (implying a WARF of 3900), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 41.83% and a diversity score
of 75.  These default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily
on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each
case, historical and market performance trends, and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium IV, issued in June 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3120)

  -- Class A1-a: +2
  -- Class A1-b: +2
  -- Class A3: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +3
  -- Class D-1: +3
  -- Class D-2: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4680)

  -- Class A1-a: -2
  -- Class A1-b: -2
  -- Class A3: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -3
  -- Class D-1: 0
  -- Class D-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest until June 2011 and the manager has the ability to
   deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
   against the covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of
   assuming lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted
   average spread, weighted average coupon and diversity score.


AVIATION CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A-1 and B-1 of
pooled aircraft lease-backed notes issued by Aviation Capital
Group Trust, Series 2000-1.  The sponsor is Aviation Capital
Group.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Aviation Capital Group Trust, Series 2000-1

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The Class A-1 Notes were downgraded because of note balances which
appear to exceed aircraft value, and Moody's view that values are
unlikely to rebound significantly because the aircraft are older
and in less demand.  At closing in 2000 the Notes were backed by
a pool of 30 aircraft.  As of January 2011, the pool had 24
aircraft with an average appraised base value of approximately
$273 million, comprised mainly of old-vintage and old generation
(i.e. "classic") aircraft which have experienced accelerated
declines in demand and lease rates as a result of the global
recession.  Aircraft maintenance expenses have completely depleted
the Investment Agreement Account from $30 million to zero as of
early 2009.

In assessing value, Moody's considered two sources, the most
recent base appraised value, and indicative market value by type
according to published aircraft values by other ISTAT certified
independent appraiser.  Base value is the underlying economic
value of an aircraft in a stable market environment with a
balanced supply and demand.  Market value is the most likely
trading price under the current market circumstances.  Due to the
sharply reduced demand in the old vintage aircrafts, the market
value is significantly lower than the base value for this
portfolio.  The current Loan-to-Value ratio of Class A-1 Notes is
approximately 95% using the base appraisal value, while the LTV
calculated using the market value is significantly higher than
100% for the Class A-1; both indicate the distinct possibility
that noteholders may suffer a loss.

The Class B-1 Notes current LTV ratio is approximately 111% using
the base value.  The recovery rate is approximately 30% on the B-1
notes, indicates significant losses on the Notes.

Moody's also considered the portfolio rental income and the
reserve account.  Both are insignificant when comparing to the
outstanding note balance.  In the last two quarters, the average
monthly rental income is about $3 million, and also the principal
payment is about $3 million each month.  There is a $7 million
reserve account for Class A.  They are relatively small comparing
to the $259 million Class A-1 outstanding balance.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account third
party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a negative impact on the rating.


BABSON CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-3, B-1, B-2, C, D-1, and D-2 notes from Babson CLO Ltd. 2007-I,
a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Babson
Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-1, A-2a, and A-2b notes.  Concurrently, S&P
removed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2b, A-3, B-1, and B-2
notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Jan. 3, 2011.

The upgrades mainly reflect an improvement in the performance of
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio, since S&P's Nov. 9,
2009, rating action, when S&P downgraded some of the rated notes
following the application of its September 2009 corporate CDO
criteria.  As of the February 2011 trustee report, the transaction
had $8.01 million of defaulted assets.  This was down from
$33.74 million noted in the September 2009 trustee report, which
S&P referenced for its November 2009 rating actions.  Furthermore,
assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at
$52.32 million in February 2011, compared with $93.36 million in
September 2009.

The transaction has further benefited from an increase in the
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes.  The
trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Feb. 8, 2011, monthly
report:

* The class A O/C ratio was 123.45%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 113.34% in September 2009;

* The class B O/C ratio was 115.09%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 105.79% in September 2009;

* The class C O/C ratio was 110.68%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 101.80% in September 2009; and

* The class D O/C ratio was 106.59%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 98.02% in September 2009.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the class A-1, A-2a, and A-2b
notes reflect the availability of credit support at the current
rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                     Babson CLO Ltd 2007-I

                          Rating
                          ------
            Class     To           From
            -----     --           ----
            A-1       AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-2b      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-3       AA (sf)      AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
            B-1       A+ (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
            B-2       A+ (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
            C         BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
            D-1       BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)
            D-2       BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                      Babson CLO Ltd 2007-I

                Class                    Rating
                -----                    ------
                A-2a                     AAA (sf)

  Transaction Information
  -----------------------
Issuer:             Babson CLO Ltd. 2007-I
Coissuer:           Babson CLO Inc. 2007-I
Collateral manager: Babson Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:        Citigroup Global Markets Inc
Trustee:            State Street Bank and Trust Co.
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2004-4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class, upgraded four classes, and
affirmed 19 classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
2004-4, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, due to
paydown since issuance and further deterioration of performance,
most of which involves increased losses on the specially serviced
loans.

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement as a result
of paydown.  As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 32.2% to $878.6
million from approximately $1.3 billion at issuance.  Five loans
(9.6%) have defeased since issuance.  The downgrade of class J
reflects an increase in Fitch expected losses on specially
serviced loans.  Fitch modeled losses of 5.1% of the remaining
pool.

Fitch has designated 15 loans (13.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
including eight specially serviced loans (8.9%).  Fitch expects
classes M through P may be fully depleted from losses associated
with the specially serviced assets.  Interest shortfalls currently
affect classes J through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is secured by a
722,253 sf industrial/warehouse property in North Kingstown, RI.
The loan (2.2% of outstanding pool) transferred to special
servicing in October 2008.  The property is real estate owned
(REO), and the special servicer is working to retain existing
tenants and lease vacant space.

The next largest contributor to Fitch expected losses is a
159,327 sf retail property (1.3% of outstanding pool), located in
Pottstown, PA.  The largest tenant at the property, a 52,700 sf
grocery store (35.9% of NRA), has gone dark, but the tenant is
expected to continue paying rent through its lease expiration in
2014.  The property is REO.

Fitch upgrades these classes and assigns Rating Outlooks:

  -- $35.6 million class B to 'AAA/LS4' from 'A/LS4'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $11.3 million class C to 'AA/LS5' from 'A/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $21.1 million class D to 'BBB/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class E to ' BBB-/LS5' from 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative.

Fitch downgrades this class and assigns a Recovery Rating:

  -- $6.5 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from ' B-/LS5'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises Recovery Ratings and
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $213.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $107 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $272.2 million class A-6 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $117.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.2 million class F at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $11.3 million class G at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $16.2 million class H at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $6.5 million class K at 'CCC/RR1';

  -- $6.5 million class L at 'CC/RR4';

  -- $3.2 million class M at 'CC/RR6';

  -- $3.2 million class N at 'CC/RR6';

  -- $4.5 million class O at 'C/RR6';

  -- $2 million class DM-A at 'A+/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.3 million class DM-B at 'A/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.4 million class DM-C at 'A-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.7 million class DM-D at 'BBB+/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.9 million class DM-E at 'BBB/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.5 million class DM-F at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.3 million class DM-G at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $16.2 million class P or the $103 million
class BC.  Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid in full.
Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only classes X-C and X-
P.


BEA CBO: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'Dsf' Rating on Class A-3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating on these remaining class of
notes from BEA CBO 1998-2, LTD., and subsequently withdraws the
rating since the notes have matured:

  -- $20,000,000 class A-3 notes 'Dsf'.

At the stated maturity date on Dec. 15, 2010, the class A-3 notes
received approximately $2.8 million of interest, and did not
receive any principal payments.  The 'Dsf' ratings on the class A-
3 notes reflect the issuer's failure to redeem all principal and
interest due at the stated maturity date.

BEA CBO 1998-2 was a collateralized bond obligation that closed
Dec. 3, 1998, and was managed by Credit Suisse Asset Management.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-TOP26 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS 2007-TOP26) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.  The downgrades are due to further
deterioration of loan performance, a significant portion of which
involves increased losses on the specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 6.4% for the remaining pool
(expected losses of the original pool are at 6.2%).  Fitch has
designated 49 loans (19.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes seven specially serviced loans (7%).  At last review,
there were only three loans in special servicing (3.7%).  Fitch
expects classes H through P may be fully depleted from losses
associated with the specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has decreased by 3.1% to $2.04 billion from
$2.11 billion at issuance.  Realized losses incurred to date total
$14 million.  No loans are currently defeased.  Cumulative
interest shortfalls in the amount of $2.4 million are currently
affecting classes F through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a defaulted
loan (3.2%) secured by a 475,000 square foot (sf) office property
located in Phoenix, AZ.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2010 for imminent default after a major
tenant rejected its lease in bankruptcy.  Fitch expects a
significant loss upon liquidation based on a May 2010 appraised
value well below the outstanding loan balance.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan
(2.4%) secured by a 210,000 sf office property located in Tacoma,
WA.  The investment grade single tenant moved its headquarters to
Seattle and vacated the property in 2010.  The tenant is obligated
to make rental payments through November 2013; however, efforts to
sublease the property have not been successful to date.  A cash
flow sweep will be triggered in November 2011, which will collect
up to $193,340/month to cover costs associated with re-leasing the
property.

The third largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is secured
by a full service hotel (1.1%) located in Santa Maria, CA.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2010 after
payment default.  The most recent appraisal obtained by the
special servicer indicates a significant loss if the loan is
liquidated.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and revised Loss Severity and
Recovery Ratings where applicable:

  -- $160.6 million class A-J to 'BBB-/LS3' from 'AAsf/LS3';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.1 million class B to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class C to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBBsf/LS4';

  -- $15.8 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';

  -- $18.4 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $18.4 million class G 'to 'CCCsf/RR5' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $18.4 million class H to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $2.6 million class J to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf'/LS5;

  -- $2.6 million class K to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $5.3 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $2.6 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

  -- $5.3 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

  -- $2.6 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Fitch has also affirmed these classes and revised LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $25.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $177 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $991.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $147.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $210.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS3' from 'AAAsf/LS2';
     Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only classes X-1 and
X-2.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 19 2004-PWR5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 19 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-PWR5:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.3%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 7%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 28, 2010.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to
$990.4 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 41% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan
with an investment grade credit estimate that represents 1% of
the pool.  At the last full review, the New Hampshire Tower Loan
($5.5 million -- 1% of the pool) had an investment grade credit
estimate.  Due to decline in performance the loan no longer has
a credit estimate and is part of the conduit pool.  Ten loans,
representing 20% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.3 million (51% loss severity
overall).  One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized a $4.1 million appraisal reduction for the specially
serviced loan.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $4.3 million
loss (65% expected loss) for the specially serviced loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$3.8 million aggregate loss (19% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 89% and 76% of the pool's loans,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 81% compared to 82% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
1.52X and 1.29X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 35, the same level at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the New Castle Marketplace Loan
($10.8 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 300,000
square foot retail center located in New Castle, Delaware.  The
property was 100% leased as of October 2010, the same as at last
review.  The loan amortizes on a 15-year schedule and has
amortized 32% since last review.  Performance has been stable.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and
3.2X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.4X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 3941 Fairview Park Drive Loan
($69.0 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 353,000
SF Class A office building located in Falls Church, Virginia.  The
property was 99% leased as of September 2010, the same as at last
review.  The largest tenants are General Dynamics Corporation
which leases 48% of the net rentable area through March 2019 and
Howrey LLP, which leases 21% of the NRA through December 2016.
Performance has improved since securitization due to increasing
base rent.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.09X at last review.

The second largest loan is The Summit Louisville Loan ($54.8
million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 341,000 SF
retail complex located in Louisville, Kentucky.  The property was
98% leased as of September 2010, similar to last review.  This
loan is interest only for its entire seven year term.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 88%
and 1.11X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Reisterstown Plaza Loan
($45.8 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 792,000
SF office and retail center located in Baltimore, Maryland.  The
property was 82% leased as of September 2010, the same as at last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 96% and 1.01X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade six tranches in the Bear Stearns Small Balance
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 securitization.  Wells Fargo
Bank servicers the transaction.  The loans are secured primarily
by commercial real estate.

The complete rating actions are as followed:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-
1

  -- Cl. A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 2, 2007 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

                         Rating Rationale

The rating actions are due to an increase in 90 days or more
delinquencies, including amounts in foreclosure and REO, from 18%
to 28% of the current pool balance over the past year.

The methodology used in these rating actions included an analysis
of the loan level collateral to estimate lifetime losses.  The
estimated losses were then evaluated against the available credit
enhancement provided by overcollateralization and excess spread.
Sufficiency of coverage was considered in light of the credit
quality of the collateral pool, industry, geographical and loan
concentrations, historical variability of losses experienced by
the issuer, and servicer quality.

During the review period, Moody's will project expected defaults
and recoveries on the underlying pools of loans using a loan-by-
loan analysis of business types, property locations, past payment
histories, borrowers' creditworthiness, and most recent appraisals
or estimates of market values of the properties.  The Aaa
volatility proxies will also be determined.  Driving factors of
the Aaa volatility proxy for each deal are the credit quality of
the collateral pool, the historical variability in losses
experienced by the issuer, the servicer quality as well as the
industrial, geographical and obligor concentrations.  Based on
Moody's revised expected losses and Aaa volatility proxies,
Moody's will evaluate whether the available credit enhancement
adequately protects investors against future collateral losses for
given rating assignments.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.


BLUE HERON: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on seven classes of notes
issued by Blue Heron Funding II, Ltd.:

  -- $405,449,622 class A notes at 'Csf';

  -- $17,205,585 class B notes at 'Csf';

  -- $34,409,633 class C notes at 'Csf';

  -- $21,920,190 class D notes at 'Csf';

  -- $17,302,125 class E notes at 'Csf';

  -- $17,302,125 class E additional interest (interest only) at
     'Csf';

  -- $3,986,875 Certificates (principal only) at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The Structured
Finance Portfolio Credit Model and Fitch's cash flow model were
not used in this review because the transaction is
undercollateralized and structural features were determined to
have minimal impact in the context of the classes' ratings.

Since Fitch's last rating action in March 2010, the portfolio
balance has declined to $390.9 million from $534.2 million, a
difference of $143.3 million, while the class A notes have only
received $116.8 million of principal repayment.  Approximately
$23.3 million of writedowns in the portfolio have left the entire
capital structure of Blue Heron II with negative credit
enhancement levels.  Principal proceeds have been needed
intermittently to cover shortfalls in interest collections for
accrued interest to the class A, class B and class C notes, which
also contributed to the erosion of credit enhancement.

The class A, class B and class C notes are rated to the timely
receipt of interest and continue to receive accrued interest
distributions, from a combination of interest and principal
collections.  The class D and class E notes, and class E
additional interest are no longer receiving interest distributions
due to failing class A/B/C coverage tests.

Based on the current portfolio and the anticipated future loss of
additional principal proceeds to cover interest shortfalls, Fitch
believes default continues to appear inevitable for the classes A,
B, C, D and E notes and the class E additional interest.

The Certificates are rated to the ultimate receipt of principal,
where coupon payments received in the interest waterfall are
applied to reduce the outstanding rated balance.  While these
distributions are no longer being made due to failing coverage
tests and are not expected to resume in the future, the principal
of the Certificates is protected by a Certificate Protection
Asset, which is a zero coupon bond with a face value of $6 million
maturing in April 2030, that was issued by Resolution Funding
Corporation, a U.S. government agency.  As per the terms of the
transaction, no party to the transaction other than the
Certificate holders have claim against the Certificate Protection
Asset.  Therefore, the Certificates are affirmed at 'AAAsf' and
retain their Stable Outlook.

Because the ultimate receipt of the remaining rated balance is not
linked to the performance of the transaction's underlying
portfolio, Fitch is not assigning a Loss Severity Rating to the
Certificates.

Blue Heron II is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 22, 2005, and is managed by
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, New York Branch.  The
portfolio is composed of commercial mortgage-backed securities
(43.2%), residential mortgage-backed securities (38.3%), SF CDOs
(11.7%), corporate CDOs (3.5%), corporate debt (2.1%), and
commercial and consumer asset-backed securities (1.3%) from 1996
through 2007 vintage transactions.


BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Bristol CDO I Ltd.  The
classes of notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 Floating Rt. Notes (current balance of
     $25,761,903), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 29,
     2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

  -- Class A-2 Floating Rt. Notes (current balance of $2,362,948),
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 29, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the continuing amortization of the Class A-1 and
Class A-2 Notes, which have been paid off by 9.8 million since
April 2010.  The rating action also reflects an improvement in the
credit quality of the transaction's underlying portfolio.  Credit
improvement is observed through an increase in the average credit
rating (as measured by a decline in the weighted average rating
factor (WARF)).  According to the trustee, the WARF of the
portfolio has decreased to 2020 from 3234 since the last review in
April 2010.  The deal also benefits from the diversion of excess
interest to amortize the Class A Notes.

Bristol CDO I Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of CMBS, RMBS and ABS originated from
1999 to 2002.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account these: collateral
cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present).  The Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows.  The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


C-BASS 2002-CB2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 119 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 119
tranches and confirmed the rating of 5 tranches from 23 Subprime
deals issued by C-BASS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 31, 2002
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2007
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2007
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB4 Trust

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB5 Trust

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB6 Trust

  -- Cl. M-2V, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-CB2 Trust

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-CB3 Trust

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-CB4 Trust

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-CB6 Trust

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2001-CB4

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2001-CB3

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2002-CB1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2009
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2007
     Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB2

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB4

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2004
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB6

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 14, 2007
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
     Oct. 12, 2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB7

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB8

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 16, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-CB5, C-Bass
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2007
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-CB1

  -- Cl. AF, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2003 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2003
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2003
     Assigned Baa1 (sf)


C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on five classes of notes
and revised the Loss Severity rating on one class of notes issued
by C-BASS CBO IX, Ltd./Corp.  The rating actions are:

  -- $24,607,539 class A-1 notes at 'BBBsf', Outlook Negative; LS
     revised to 'LS5' from 'LS4';

  -- $20,000,000 class A-2 notes at 'CCCsf';

  -- $10,000,000 class B notes at 'CCsf';

  -- $12,000,000 class C notes at 'Csf';

  -- $7,227,634 class D notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs', for the class A-
1 and class A-2 notes.  Fitch also considered additional
qualitative factors into its analysis, as described below, to
conclude the rating affirmations for the rated notes.

Since the last rating action in March 2010, the credit quality of
the collateral has declined with approximately 14.9% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 6.4 notches.
Approximately 64.4% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 52.8% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 60% and 51% respectively, at last
review.

The affirmations on all the notes are due to principal repayment
of the class A-1 notes offsetting the effects of deterioration in
the portfolio.  The class A-1 notes have de-levered from both
principal receipts and excess spread, which has been diverted as a
result of the class A/B coverage ratios failing their covenants.
In total, approximately 46.1%, or $21 million, of the class A-1
balance has amortized in the past year, increasing credit
enhancement levels for the class A-1, class A-2, class B and class
C notes.

Fitch's Outlook remains Negative on the class A-1 notes due to the
potential for negative migration in the underlying portfolio, with
16.4% and 5.6% of the portfolio having a Negative Outlook and
being on Rating Watch Negative, respectively.  Fitch does not
maintain Outlooks for tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

The Loss Severity rating of 'LS5' for the class A-1 notes
indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches
rated 'CCC' and below.

Breakeven levels for the class B, class C and class D notes were
below SF PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults
projected by SF PCM.  For these classes, Fitch compared the
class's respective credit enhancement levels to expected losses
from the distressed and defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated
'CCsf' or lower).  This comparison indicates that default
continues to appear probable for the class B notes and inevitable
for the class C and D notes at or prior to maturity.

The class B notes are rated to the timely receipt of interest and
continue to receive their accrued interest each payment period.
The class C and class D notes are rated to the ultimate receipt of
interest, and are not expected to receive any interest or
principal distributions going forward.

C-BASS IX is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on March 23, 2004.  The portfolio is
currently monitored by NIC Management LLC, an affiliate of
Newcastle Investment Corp., who became the substitute collateral
manager for Credit-Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, LLC on
Feb. 10, 2011.  The portfolio is comprised of 84.9% residential
mortgage-backed securities, 8.8% commercial and consumer asset-
backed securities, and 6.3% SF CDOs from 2001 through 2004 vintage
transactions.


CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO VI,
Ltd.:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-1D Delayed Draw Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
     $23,819,109.56), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     September 30, 2010 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$279,000,000 Class A-1T Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021 (current balance of $265,821,262.68), Upgraded
     to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 30, 2010 Upgraded to A1
     (sf);

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 30,
     2010 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     September 30, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$20,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in September
2010.  Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the rating action
in September 2010 due to a decrease in the percentage of
securities with ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with
a "Negative Outlook." Based on the trustee report dated January
13, 2011, securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately
6.55% of the underlying portfolio versus 7.30% in August 2010.
The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular,
as of the January 2011 trustee report, there are no reported
defaulted assets versus $5.8 million in August 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in September 2010.  The Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 122%, 115.60%, 108.80% and 104.90%, respectively,
versus August 2010 levels of 120.50%, 114.10%, 107.40 % and
103.60%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $383 million, defaulted par of $0.6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 30.57% (implying a WARF of
3872), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 40.85%,
and a diversity score of 65.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd., issued in September 2007,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3098)

  -- Class A-1D: +2
  -- Class A-1T: +2
  -- Class A-2: +3
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4646)

  -- Class A-1D: -2
  -- Class A-1T: -2
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -3
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A and B notes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund II Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.  At the same time, S&P
removed S&P's rating on the class A notes from CreditWatch, where
S&P placed them with positive implications on Oct. 14, 2010.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class C-1 and C-2
notes.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in the performance of the
deal's underlying asset portfolio, as well as paydowns to the
class A notes since S&P's March 31, 2010, rating actions when S&P
downgraded the rated notes following the application of its
September 2009 corporate CDO criteria.  As of the Feb. 7, 2011,
trustee report, the transaction had $0.28 million in defaulted
assets.  This was down from $7.4 million, as reported in the Feb.
4, 2010, trustee report, which S&P referenced for its March 2010
rating actions.  Additionally, assets from obligors rated in the
'CCC' category were reported at $8 million in February 2011,
compared with $21 million in February 2010.

After taking into account the Feb. 15, 2011, distribution date,
the class A notes have been paid down by a total of $88 million
since S&P's March 2010 rating actions.  This has left the class A
notes with a remaining balance of 34.5% of their original amount.
Subsequently, the transaction has benefited from an increase in
the overcollateralization available to support the notes.  The
trustee reported a class A O/C ratio of 145.89% in the February
2011 monthly report, up from a reported ratio of 121.14% in
February 2010.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the class C-1 and C-2 notes
reflect the availability of credit support at the current rating
levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

             Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund II Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
             Class     To           From
             -----     --           ----
             A         AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
             B         AA (sf)      BBB+ (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

             Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund II Ltd.

                Class                    Rating
                -----                    ------
                C-1                      CCC- (sf)
                C-2                      CCC- (sf)

  Transaction Information
  -----------------------
Issuer:             Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund II Ltd.
Coissuer:           Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund II Inc.
Collateral manager: GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management
Underwriter:        Wachovia Securities Inc.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1PT, A-1B, B, C, and D notes from CapitalSource Commercial Loan
Trust 2006-2, a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed
by CapitalSource Finance LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed its
ratings on the class A-PT notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed
them with positive implications on Oct. 14, 2010.

The upgrades reflect a significant paydown to the senior classes
in the deal since S&P lowered its ratings on the class A-PT,
A-1B, C, D, and E notes on March 30, 2010, following the
application of its September 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria.  As of the Feb. 16, 2011, trustee report, the
class A-PT notes were paid down to $15.81 million, from a balance
of $165.61 million as reported in the Jan. 14, 2010, trustee
report, that S&P referenced in S&P's March 2010 rating actions.
In addition, the class A-1A notes were paid down in full on the
Sept. 20, 2010, payment date (at which time S&P withdrew its
rating) from a balance of $237.55 million in January 2010, and the
class A-1B notes have been paying down since September 2010 to a
current balance of $36.76 million after the February 2011
distribution date from their original issuance of $147.5 million.

The affirmations of the class E notes reflect S&P's opinion of the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

            CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-2

                          Rating
                          ------
            Class     To           From
            -----     --           ----
            A-PT      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
            A-1B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
            B         AAA (sf)     AA (sf)
            C         A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
            D         B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

            CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-2

                     Class         Rating
                     -----         ------
                     E             CCC- (sf)


CDC COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 15 2002-FX1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CDC
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-FX1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the transaction, the deal structure, and liquidity
available to the trust.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all the remaining assets in the transaction.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 0.97x and a loan-to-value ratio of 123.0%.
The DSC and LTV calculations exclude one ($1.3 million, 0.4%)
specially serviced asset, one ($3.7 million, 1.2%) loan that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired, and eight ($199.8 million,
62.1%) defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-CL interest-only
certificate based on its current criteria.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
principal balance was $321.5 million, which is 50.4% of the
balance at issuance.  The pool includes 16 loans, down from 56 at
issuance.  Eight ($199.8 million, 62.1%) loans are defeased.  The
master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, provided
financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool.  Of that information, 54.3% was full-year 2009 data, with
the balance reflecting interim 2010 reporting.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.17x for the remaining loans based on the
servicer-reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were
0.97x and 123.0%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted figures exclude
the one ($1.3 million, 0.4%) specially serviced asset, one
($3.7 million, 1.2%) loan that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired, and the eight defeased loans ($199.8 million, 62.1%).
Four ($47.7 million, 14.8%) loans are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Four ($45.4 million, 14.1%) loans have a reported DSC
below 1.00x.  The transaction has experienced a $756,881 principal
loss to date.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, one loan, the
Bedford Manor loan, was with the special servicer, also Berkadia.
The reported payment status for the loan is 90-plus-days
delinquent.  The Bedford Manor loan ($1.3 million, 0.4%) is the
smallest real estate loan in the transaction.  The loan is secured
by a 94-unit multifamily property in Forrest City, Ariz., and was
transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 18, 2010, due to
payment default.  Reported DSC was 0.96x as of December 2010, and
reported property occupancy was 90.4% as of July 2010.  Berkadia
indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure.  Standard & Poor's
anticipates a moderate loss upon the ultimate resolution of the
loan.

In addition to the specially serviced asset, S&P determined the
Carr-Gottstein Foods Building loan ($3.7 million, 1.2%) to be
credit-impaired.  The sixth-largest nondefeased loan, secured by a
47,706-sq.-ft. office property in Anchorage, Alaska, appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a decline in occupancy.
According to Berkadia, the two tenants that occupied 100% of the
office space vacated by their Dec. 31, 2010 lease expiration
dates.  Berkadia stated that the borrower is actively marketing
the vacant space.  As a result, S&P views this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss.

Details on the remaining three loans on the master servicer's
watchlist are:

The Marriot Islandia loan, the second-largest nondefeased loan
($23.6 million, 7.3%) in the transaction, appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.42x for the 12
months ended June 30, 2010.  The loan is secured by a 278-unit
hotel in Islandia, N.Y., and the reported occupancy at the
property was 59.2% as of June 2010.

The Richmond Avenue loan, the third-largest nondefeased loan
($18.4 million, 5.7%) in the trust, is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low reported DSC and occupancy for the nine
months ended Oct. 31, 2010, of 0.58x and 54.0%, respectively.  The
loan is secured by a 75,165-sq.-ft. retail property in Staten
Island, N.Y.  The low occupancy is due to the vacancy of a
bankrupt tenant occupying 44.0% of the gross leasable space.  The
loan has an optional prepayment date on April 11, 2011, and
according to Berkadia, the borrower has indicated its intention to
repay the loan on or before that date.

The Berkshire Pointe loan, the seventh-largest nondefeased loan
($2.0 million, 0.6%) in the trust, is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.86x for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2010.  The loan is secured by a 21,832-sq.-ft.
retail center in Reading, Pa., and the reported occupancy was
92.0% as of Sept. 30, 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria and the analysis is consistent with S&P's affirmed
ratings.

                        Ratings Affirmed

             CDC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-FX1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class    Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
          -----    ------        ----------------------
          A-2      AAA (sf)                       47.84
          B        AAA (sf)                       39.91
          C        AAA (sf)                       36.94
          D        AAA (sf)                       30.49
          E        AAA (sf)                       28.02
          F        AA+ (sf)                       25.54
          G        AA (sf)                        21.57
          H        AA- (sf)                       18.60
          J        A- (sf)                        14.14
          K        BBB (sf)                       10.17
          L        BB+ (sf)                        8.19
          M        BB (sf)                         6.70
          N        BB- (sf)                        5.46
          P        B+ (sf)                         4.47
          X-CL     AAA (sf)                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Rating to Class N Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CC (sf)' on the class N certificates from Centerline 2007-1
Resecuritization Trust, a commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed 11
'CC (sf)' ratings from the same transaction.

The downgrade reflects a principal loss of $23.3 million to class
N as detailed in the Feb. 23, 2011, remittance report.  As a
result of the principal loss, the class' principal balance was
$26.0 million, down from $49.3 million at issuance.  The class O
and P certificates, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)',
lost 100% of their issuance balances according to the February
remittance report.

The affirmed 'CC (sf)' ratings on classes B through M reflect
S&P's expectations that the interest payments on these classes
will be deferred for an extended period of time due to a
termination payment owed to the hedge counterparty.

According to the most recent trustee report, the principal loss
was due to losses on the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities collateral.  Ten distinct transactions experienced
aggregate principal losses in the amount of $34.8 million.  These
CMBS classes experienced principal losses in the current trustee
report:

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-TOP24
  (classes M through P; $15.7 million loss);

* J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
  CIBC18 (class P; $8.3 million loss);

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR12
  (class P; $3.4 million loss); and

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR14
  (class P; $3.1 million loss).

Per the February remittance report, Centerline 2007-1 was
collateralized by 103 CMBS and three resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit certificates ($749.4 million, 100%)
from 18 distinct transactions issued between 2000 and 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Centerline 2007-1 according to its
current criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

                         Rating Lowered

            Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                                Rating
                                ------
              Class    To                   From
              -----    --                   ----
              N        D (sf)               CC (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

             Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        B        CC (sf)
                        C        CC (sf)
                        D        CC (sf)
                        E        CC (sf)
                        F        CC (sf)
                        G        CC (sf)
                        H        CC (sf)
                        J        CC (sf)
                        K        CC (sf)
                        L        CC (sf)
                        M        CC (sf)


CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes, and affirmed three classes
of Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation Series 1999-2,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement and
defeasance in the pool.  As of the February 2011 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by
94.6% to $42.5 million from approximately $782.7 million at
issuance.  The remaining class affirmations are increasing loan
concentrations and Fitch expected losses following Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses to the transaction.

There are nine of the original 92 loans remaining in the
transaction, two of which have defeased (22.9%).  Two loans are
specially serviced (30.5%), of which both are real estate owned
(REO) assets.  Fitch expects losses from loans currently in
special servicing to be absorbed by the unrated class M.

The largest specially serviced asset (24.6%) is an industrial
warehouse facility located in Kirkland, WA.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in July 2009 for monetary default and
foreclosure was completed in August 2010.  As of December 2010,
the property was 66% occupied.

The second specially serviced asset (5.9%) is an industrial
warehouse property located in Henderson, NV.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in January 2010 for maturity default.

Fitch upgrades, assigns and revises Rating Outlooks on this class
as indicated:

  -- $6.4 million class H to 'AAA/LS-4' from 'A-/LS4; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $6.8 million class I to 'A/LS-4' from 'BBB+/LS-4'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $8.8 million class J at 'BB/LS-4'; Outlook to Positive from
     Negative;

  -- $6.8 million class K at 'B/LS-4'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $5.9 million class L at 'B-/LS-4'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $7.7 million class M.  Classes A-1, A-2,
B, C, D, E, F and G have been paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class X.


CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 131 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 131
tranches and confirmed the rating of five tranches from 16
Subprime deals issued by Chase.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2003-C1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2003-C2

  -- Cl. IA, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-P, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2004-AQ1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2004-OPT1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-2

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 24, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 23,
     2002 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-4

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-1

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-2

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser.  2003-2 Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
     May 9, 2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Ser. 2003-2 Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 16,
     2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-5

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2003-6

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 23,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 23,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 27,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIL, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: CHEC Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 51 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 51
tranches from seven Option ARM deals issued by Chevy Chase Funding
LLC from 2003 to 2004.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable rate negative
amortization residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Option
ARM pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools
have paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by
the housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Option
ARM pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology
used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on
1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr
     12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr
     12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     April 12, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade*

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-A

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2004-B

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr
     12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1I, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 47 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 47
tranches from five Subprime deals issued by Citifinancial.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools originated and
securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is generally higher
than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools.  Once
the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1)
the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of
current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in performance.
Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of
delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For
example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In addition, if
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging from less
than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2003-1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-PT, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2006
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2003-2

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2003-3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2003-4

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 5, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 5, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 5, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 5, 2004
     Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CitiFinancial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2004-1

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CITIGROUP HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 43 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 43
tranches from six Subprime deals issued by Citigroup.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,excess spread, time
tranching, and other structural features within the senior note
waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation, are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE3

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr
     8, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade*

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-CB3, C-Bass
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 21,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 21, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 21, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-RES1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes,
confirmed one class and affirmed ten classes of COMM 2003-LNB1,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to the increase of interest shortfalls from
specially serviced loans.  The confirmations and affirmations are
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On December 10, 2010, Moody's placed seven classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.7% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 7, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to
$678.2 million from $846.0 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 77 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 51% of the pool.  The pool includes four loans,
representing 34% of the pool, with investment grade credit
estimates.  Eleven loans, representing 15% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Fourteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.3 million loss (42%
loss severity on average).  Five loans, representing 4% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Quality Inn & Howard Johnson Plaza Loan
($11.4 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by two
limited service hotels, totaling 451 rooms, located in Hampton,
Virginia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in May
2007 due to imminent default and is currently in the process of
foreclosure.  Before both hotels were rebranded in 2010, this loan
was identified as the Hampton Inn & Holiday Inn.  On September 23,
2010, the master servicer declared the loan non-recoverable and
stoped advancing.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  The master servicer has recognized a $5.0
million appraisal reduction for one of the remaining specially
serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $22.7 million
loss (83% expected loss on average) for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $10.8 million loss (24% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.9 million.  Interest shortfalls previously reached Class F in
the January remittance statement.  The dramatic increase in
interest shortfalls is largely due to the master servicer
declaring the Quality Inn & Howard Johnson Plaza loan non-
recoverable.  The servicer is no longer advancing on this loan and
is also recouping advances previously made.  Moody's anticipates
that the pool will continue to experience interest shortfalls
because of this loan and other specially serviced loans.  Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, ASERs, loan modifications and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 96%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 85%, the same as at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11.4% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
1.49X and 1.22X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 24 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the 75 Rockefeller
Plaza Loan ($65.0 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 578,2000 square foot (SF) office building that is part of the
Rockefeller Center complex in New York City.  The property is 100%
leased to Time Warner Companies Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa2; stable outlook) under a 21-year triple net lease that
is coterminous with the loan's maturity (August 2014).  The loan
is interest only for its entire term.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.58X, respectively, the same as at last
review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Westfield
Shoppingtown Portfolio Loan ($52.9 million -- 7.8% of the pool),
which represents a 34% pari passu interest in a first mortgage
loan.  The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in two
regional malls located in California.  The loan sponsor is
Westfield America, Inc., a publicly traded REIT.  Westfield
Shoppingtown Galleria at Roseville Mall is a 1.0 million SF center
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, J.C. Penney and Sears.  Westfield
Shoppingtown Main Place Mall is a 1.1 million SF center that is
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom and J.C. Penney.  This loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to fire damage at
the Westfield Shoppingtown Galleria at Roseville Mall.  Moody's
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.26X, respectively,
the same as at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Chandler Fashion
Center Loan ($46.8 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which represents
a 49% pari passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million SF super-
regional mall located approximately 18 miles southeast of downtown
Phoenix in Chandler, Arizona.  The center is anchored by
Dillard's, Macy's, Nordstrom and Sears.  The center was 99% leased
as of July 2010, the same as at last review.  The loan sponsor is
the Macerich Company, a publicly traded REIT.  Moody's credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.48X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the 1669 Collins Avenue
Loan ($23.8 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by the
leased fee interest in the land under the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in
South Beach, Florida.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are Aa1 and 0.91X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Gateway Center BJ's Loan
($40.0 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 152,500
SF portion of a 640,000 SF community center located in Brooklyn,
New York.  The collateral is 100% leased to BJ's Wholesale Club
(85% of the gross leasable area; lease expiration 2027) and
several restaurant tenants.  The property is shadow anchored by
Home Depot, Target, Bed Bath & Beyond and Marshall's.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 81%
and 1.23X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Palladium at Birmingham Loan
($34.5 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by two
retail properties located in Birmingham, Michigan.  The
properties total 150,000 SF.  Palladium Retail is a 124,500 SF
entertainment/retail center.  Willits Retail consists of three
ground-floor condominium units that total 25,400 SF.  The
properties were 78% leased as of September 2010.  Performance
has declined since last review due to decreased occupancy.  This
loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist for low DSCR.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 133% and 0.75X, respectively,
compared to 131% and 0.76Xat last review.

The third largest loan is the Redland Center Loan ($24.8 million -
- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 134,000 SF office
condominium located in Rockville, Maryland.  The property is 100%
leased to the General Services Administration (Department of
Health and Human Services) through March 2013.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR 97% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 98% and
1.02X at last review.


COMM 2003-LNB1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from COMM 2003-
LNB1 and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from
the same transaction and removed two of them from CreditWatch
negative.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on six classes from COMM
2002-WFA, also a CMBS transaction.

The COMM 2003-LNB1 downgrades and rating affirmations follow
S&P's analysis of the remaining collateral in the pool, the deal
structure, the liquidity available to the trust, and the potential
for future interest shortfalls associated with several assets with
the special servicer.  The downgrades of the class F, G, H, and J
certificates primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the liquidity
available to the trust, interest shortfalls that have affected the
trust, and the susceptibility of these classes to future interest
shortfalls.  S&P lowered its rating on the class J certificate to
'D (sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls that S&P anticipate
will continue for the foreseeable future.  As of the February 2011
remittance report, the trust experienced a monthly interest
shortfall totaling $139,539, primarily relating to two specially
serviced assets.

S&P's analysis of COMM 2003-LNB1 included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated
an adjusted DSC of 2.37x and a loan-to-value ratio of 70.0%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA (sf)'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.61x and an LTV
ratio of 83.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under
the 'AAA (sf)' scenario were 27.8% and 31.8%, respectively.
The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude five
($27.3 million; 4.0%) specially serviced assets and 11 defeased
loans ($98.6 million; 14.5%).  S&P separately estimated losses
for the specially serviced assets, and included them in its 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures.  The DSC and
LTV calculations also include cash flow adjustments made in S&P's
analysis of the 75 Rockefeller Plaza loan ($65.0 million, 9.6%),
which is entirely leased to Time Warner Inc. ('BBB') at a rate
that is substantially below market rates.  If S&P remove the
effect of these adjustments, its adjusted DSC and LTV would be
1.75x and 77.6%, respectively.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest-only certificate
from COMM 2003-LNB1 based on S&P's current criteria.

The affirmed ratings on the COMM 2002-WFA certificates follow
S&P's analysis of the Westfield Shoppingtown Portfolio loan.  The
certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from a $49.4 million
portion of the whole loan, which consists of a $17.6 million
senior portion and a $31.8 million B note.  The whole loan
($187.7 million) is secured by two regional malls comprising
1.3 million sq. ft. in Santa Ana, Calif., and Roseville, Calif.
For the year ended Dec. 31, 2009, the reported whole-loan DSC was
2.43x.  As of Dec. 31, 2010, the collateral was 97.0% occupied.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the February 2011 remittance report, five assets
($27.3 million, 4.0%) were with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is as follows: two ($3.5 million, 0.5%) are real
estate owned by the trust; one ($6.4 million, 0.9%) is in
foreclosure; and two ($17.5 million, 2.6%) are more than 90 days
delinquent.  Details on the three largest assets with the special
servicer are as follows:

The Hampton Inn & Holiday Inn loan is the largest asset with the
special servicer and has a total exposure of $14.7 million, which
consists of $11.4 million of outstanding principal balance (1.7%)
and $3.3 million of advancing and interest thereon.  The loan is
secured by two lodging properties comprising 449 rooms in Hampton
City, Va.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in May
2007 for imminent monetary default, and the payment status is more
than 90 days delinquent.  According to the special servicer, the
properties have been listed for sale.  An appraisal reduction
amount (ARA) of $9.6 million is in effect against this loan and a
nonrecoverable advance determination has been made in respect of
the loan.  S&P anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The Waters Inlet Apartments loan has a total exposure of
$7.3 million, which consists of $6.4 million of outstanding
principal balance (0.9%) and $0.9 million of advancing and
interest thereon.  The loan is secured by a 205-unit multifamily
complex in Jacksonville, Fla.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Oct. 5, 2009, due to monetary default and is
in foreclosure.  Renovations are being performed on the property,
after which it will be marketed for sale, according to the special
servicer.  An ARA of $5.0 million is in effect against this loan
and a nonrecoverable advance determination has been made in
respect of this loan.  S&P anticipates a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Biltmore Station loan has a total exposure of $6.3 million,
which consists of $6.1 million of outstanding principal balance
(0.9%) and $0.2 million of advancing and interest thereon.  The
loan is secured by a 102,277-sq.-ft. mixed-use building in
Asheville, N.C.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on April 9, 2010, due to imminent monetary default and its payment
status is more than 90 days delinquent.  A modification had been
approved in July; however, a tenant vacated the premises shortly
thereafter, and a revised modification is currently under
negotiation.

The remaining two specially serviced assets ($3.4 million, 0.5%),
individually, represent less than 0.4% of the pool balance.  S&P
estimated losses for each of these assets, resulting in a weighted
average loss severity of 14.2%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the February 2011 trustee remittance report, the COMM
2003-LNB1 collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of
$678.2 million (76 loans and one REO asset), compared with
$846.0 million (92 loans) at issuance.  The master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, provided financial information
for 95.1% of the nondefeased trust balance, 100% of which was
full-year 2009 data, partial-year 2010, or full-year 2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.90x for the nondefeased
loans in the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 2.37x and 70.0%, respectively, and exclude the
five specially serviced assets and 11 defeased loans.  S&P
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced assets and
included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.  The figures also include the effects of cash
flow adjustments made to the 75 Rockefeller Plaza loan.  If S&P
excludes the effect of these adjustments, its adjusted DSC and
LTV would be 1.75x and 77.6%, respectively.  Thirteen loans
($88.5 million, 13.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Eleven ($76.7 million, 11.3%) loans have a reported DSC below
1.10x, and seven ($28.3 million, 4.2%) of these loans have a
reported DSC below 1.00x.  Two ARAs totaling $14.6 million are
in effect.  To date, the pool has experienced principal losses
totaling $6.3 million in connection with five loans.

               Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $344.5 million (50.8%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
2.16x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 2.95x and 64.0%,
respectively.  Excluding the effect of S&P's adjustments to the 75
Rockefeller Plaza loan, its adjusted DSC and LTV would have been
1.96x and 76.2%, respectively.  One of the top 10 real estate
loans is on the master servicer's watchlist, as discussed below.

The Palladium at Birmingham loan ($34.5 million, 5.1%) is the
fifth-largest real estate loan in the pool and is secured by a
148,873-sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Birmingham, Mich.  The
loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of
the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC was 0.86x,
and as of Dec. 31, 2010, it was 77.8% occupied.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans according to its criteria and
the resultant credit enhancement levels are consistent with the
lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                         COMM 2003-LNB1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Rating
           ------
Class  To           From                   Credit enhancement (%)
-----  --           ----                   ----------------------
F      BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg                       9.67
G      B- (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg                        8.42
H      CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Neg                        6.55
J      D (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                      4.06

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                          COMM 2003-LNB1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
               ------
Class      To          From                Credit enhancement (%)
-----      --          ----                ----------------------
D          A (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg                    12.79
E          BBB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg                 11.23

                        Ratings Affirmed

                         COMM 2003-LNB1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class    Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----    ------    ----------------------
            A-1      AAA (sf)                   21.68
            A-1A     AAA (sf)                   21.68
            A-2      AAA (sf)                   21.68
            B        AA+ (sf)                   17.47
            C        AA (sf)                    15.60
            X-1      AAA (sf)                     N/A

                          COMM 2002-WFA
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        A-3A     AAA (sf)
                        A-3B     AAA (sf)
                        B-1      AAA (sf)
                        B-2      AAA (sf)
                        B-3      AAA (sf)
                        B-4      AA+ (sf)

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes,
confirmed seven classes and affirmed eight classes of COMM 2005-
LP5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
LP5:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-P, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 Aa3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 A2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2011 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On February 16, 2011, Moody's placed 12 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.3%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
14.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 9, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to $1.1 billion
from $1.7 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 127 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 38%
of the pool.  The pool contains one loan with an investment grade
credit estimate that represents 1% of the pool.  Four loans,
representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Eighteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.7 million (3% loss severity
overall).  Eight loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$22.7 million loss (27% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$4.1 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 91% and 55% of the pool's loans,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 94% compared to 98% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.16X, respectively, compared to
1.50X and 1.10X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 33 compared to 32 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Chatham Ridge Shopping
Center Loan ($15 million -- 1.4%), which is secured by a 175,774
square foot shopping center located in Chicago, Illinois.  The
loan is interest only for its entire seven year term.  Performance
has been stable.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are A3 and 1.66X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.62X at
last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 21% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Bank of America Tower at Las
Olas City Centre Loan ($90 million -- 8.3%), which is secured by a
409,075 square foot Class A office and retail building located in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  The property was 85% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 97% at last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 101% and 0.99X, respectively, essentially the
same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Lakeside Mall Loan ($86.6 million -
8%), which is secured by a 643,375 square foot regional mall
located in Sterling Heights, Michigan.  The property was 90%
leased as of September 2010 compared to 92% at last review.  The
in-line stores were 73% leased compared to 81% at last review.
Performance has declined due to a decline in rental revenues.  The
loan sponsor is General Growth Properties (GGP).  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 90%
and 1.08X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Continental Park Plaza Loan
($53.7 million -- 4.9%), which is secured by three attached six-
story Class A office buildings totaling 476,852 square feet
located in El Segundo, California.  The property was 88% leased as
of September 2010 compared to 92% at last review.  Despite the
decline in occupancy, performance has improved since Moody's prior
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.66X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.31X at last review.


COMM 2008-RS3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded ten classes and affirmed one class of Notes
issued by COMM 2008-RS3 Commercial Mortgage Related Securities,
Series 2008-RS3 due to the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor.  The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 26,
     2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 26,
     2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 26,
     2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. X-W, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 26,
     2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

COMM 2008-RS3 is a direct pass-through of Class A-2A, Class A-2B,
Class X-W, Class X-B, Class C, Class E, Class F, Class G, Class H,
Class J and Class K (together the Underlying Classes) of the Max
CMBS I Ltd., Series 2008-1 transaction (Max Series 2008-1).  As of
the February 17, 2011 Trustee Report issued for Max Series 2008-1,
the aggregate balance of the Underlying Classes was $379 million,
the same as that at securitization.  This rating action is a
result of the downgrade of the Underlying Classes on March 2,
2011.

There is one asset with a par balance of $20 million (0.3% of the
current pool balance) that is considered a Defaulted Securtiy as
of the February 17, 2011 Trustee report, comparied to none at last
review.  Also, there are 5 assets with a balance of $152.1 million
(1.9% of the current pool balance) that have experienced interest
shortfalls comparied to no assets with interest shortfalls at last
review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 607 compared to 178 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(41.9% compared to 56.8% at last review), A1-A3 (14.5% compared to
25.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (23.4% compared to 12.3% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (8.1% compared to 4.9% at last review) , B1-B3
(11.2% compared to 1.0% at last review) , Caa1-C (0.9% compared to
0.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
assets in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.9
years compared to 6.9 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 47.6% compared to 56.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 26.4% compared to 34.3% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.0, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 47.6% to 37.6% or up to 57.6% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward
or 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment and
varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011.  The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


CONTIMORTGAGE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 17
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches from 14 Subprime
deals issued by ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities are insured by financial guarantors.  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-5

  -- B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

  -- B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1994-05

  -- A-4, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-01

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-6IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-7IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-02

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-03

  -- A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-04

  -- A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-13IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-01

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-9IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-2

  -- A-8, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-10IO, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-3

  -- A-7, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-9IO, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-4

  -- A-8, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-9, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-11IO, Current rating at B3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-1

  -- A-8, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-9, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-10IO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2

  -- A-8, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-9, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-11IO, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1F, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-4

  -- B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan trust 1998-4

  -- B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-2

  -- B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3

  -- B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


COUNTYWIDE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 162 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 162
tranches from 14 Alt-A deals issued by Countywide Home Loans Inc.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, adjustable rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3%
for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The
baseline rates are higher than the average rate of new
delinquencies for larger pools for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility in
performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  in
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-52

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-53

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 14-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 14-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 16-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 16-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-16

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3a, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3b, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4a, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4b, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-20

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-23

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-25

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-29

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-CP3 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes, upgraded one class, and
affirmed seven classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp. 2002-CP3.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Expected losses of the original pool are at 3.78%,
including losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has designated
30 loans (28%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes five
specially serviced loans (6.31%).  Fitch expects classes N and O
may be fully depleted from losses associated with the specially
serviced assets.  The upgrade of class F is the result of
additional paydown resulting in increased credit enhancement to
the class.

As of February 2011, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been paid down by approximately 18.86% to $726.8 million from
$895.7 million at issuance.  Twenty-five loans (32.9%) are
defeased.  Interest shortfalls are affecting classes M through O.

The largest contributor to the loss is a 91,917 square foot office
property in Troy, MI.  The loan (1.6% of pool balance) transferred
to special servicing in March 2010 due to monetary default.  The
special servicer is currently pursuing foreclosure.  The most
recent valuation of the property by the special servicer indicates
significant losses upon liquidation of the property.

The second largest contributor to the loss is a 390 unit
multifamily property located in Houston, TX.  The loan (2.72% of
pool balance) transferred to special servicing in December 2010
and is currently 90 days delinquent.  The special servicer has
been in contact with the borrower and is working to cure the
default.

The third largest contributor to the loss is a 257 unit
multifamily property also located in Houston, TX.  The loan (0.82%
of pool balance) transferred to special servicing in February 2009
and is currently greater than 90 days delinquent.  A receiver has
been appointed by the special servicer to manage and market the
property for sale.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises the Outlooks, Loss
Severity ratings, and Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $11.2 million class H to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'A-sf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $17.9 million class J to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $6.7 million class K to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'BBB-sf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $4.5 million class L to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; to
     Outlook Negative from Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.2 million class M to 'CCCsf/RR4' from 'B+sf/LS5';

  -- $4.5 million class N to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Fitch also upgrades this class and revises the LS rating as
indicated:

  -- $14.6 million class F to 'AAAsf/LS5' from 'AA+sf/LS4';
     Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms these classes and revises the LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $11.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $521.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34.7 million class B at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.3 million class C at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9 million class D at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.1 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.7 million class G at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class A-X.

Fitch does not rate class O.  Classes A-1 and A-SP have paid in
full.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-C1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 17 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-C1 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates due to further deterioration of
performance relative to the previous full transaction review, most
of which involves increased projected losses on the specially
serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 17.2% for the remaining pool;
expected losses as a percentage of the original pool balance are
at 18%, including losses already incurred to date.  Fitch has
designated 101 loans (63.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 40 specially serviced loans (37%).  (Note: Fitch
considers as one loan a multifamily portfolio concentration
consisting of three secured and three unsecured notes.) Fitch
expects classes C through S may be fully depleted from losses
associated with the specially serviced assets.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 3.2% to
$3.26 billion from $3.37 billion at issuance, due to a combination
of paydown (1.7%) and realized losses (1.5%).  Interest shortfalls
totaling $18.7 million are affecting classes A-J through T.

The largest contributor to modeled losses (6.5% of the pool) is
secured by a multifamily complex consisting of 1,802 units,
located in the Harlem neighborhood of New York, NY.  As of the
June 2010 rent roll, 67% of the units at the property were rent-
stabilized, while approximately 30% of the units were market units
(or units that are technically stabilized but produce market-level
rents) and the remaining 3% of the units were vacant.  The loan
transferred to special servicing on July 2, 2010 after the
borrower submitted a hardship letter to the master servicer.  The
property's operating cash flows have proven insufficient to
service the debt since issuance.  The year-end 2009 servicer-
reported debt service coverage ratio was 0.47 times (x) on a net
operating income basis, down from 0.57x as of YE 2008.  The
borrower has requested a loan modification.

Through the most recent full year of financial reporting -- 2009
-- units were converted at a pace such that the property continued
to generate revenues roughly on schedule with those expected by
Fitch at issuance; however, expenses remained significantly higher
than projected (114%) as of YE 2009.  As a result, the reported YE
2009 DSCR of 0.47x fell well shy of Fitch's 1.07x estimated
coverage for 2009.  The loan remained current as of the February
2011 remittance date.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses (5.5%)
transferred to the special servicer on April 17, 2009, due to
default on three related mezzanine loans totaling $68.2 million.
At the time of transfer, occupancy across the portfolio was 88%
and cash flows generated by the property serviced the debt for
several months on an approximately breakeven basis.  According to
the special servicer, portfolio occupancy was 94.6% as of YE 2010
and coverage had declined somewhat as of mid-year.  The loan
remained greater than 90 days delinquent with no reserves
remaining as of the February 2011 remittance.  Fitch was unable to
obtain an update as to the status of the mezzanine debt.

The loan is collateralized by 20 multifamily properties comprising
2,990 units, which are located across seven metropolitan areas,
including: Atlanta, GA (1); Austin, TX (3); Charleston, SC (2);
Denver, CO (2); Orlando, FL (1); Sacramento, CA (2); and Virginia
Beach, VA (9).

Collateral for the third-largest contributor to modeled losses
(4.8%) consists of four multifamily properties located in Austin,
TX (two properties) and Round Rock, TX (two) with a total of 1,417
units.  The loans transferred to the special servicer on March 6,
2009, following the borrower's request for transfer due to
increased competition in the submarkets.  The portfolio-wide
occupancy dropped to 64.6% (from 95% at issuance) and the reported
DSCR was 0.57x as of the time of the transfer.  The borrower filed
for bankruptcy protection on April 23, 2009.  A plan of
reorganization was confirmed on June 25, 2010, and the loans were
modified.

Pursuant to their modification agreements, two of the original
four individual loans were consolidated into one loan (as the
two properties were phases of the same apartment complex).
Additionally, the three remaining loans were divided into
secured and unsecured components, totaling in the aggregate
$140 million and $20 million, respectively.  The borrower paid
down $4 million on the secured notes, bringing the current
balances to $136 million in total (as of the February 2011
remittance).  The loans will remain interest-only for the
remainder of the loan term and the maturity dates remain
unchanged.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $125 million class A-MFL to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'Asf/LS4';
     Outlook to Stable from Negative;

  -- $212.1 million class A-M to 'BBsf/LS4' from 'Asf/LS4';
     Outlook to Stable from Negative;

  -- $286.6 million class A-J to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS4';

  -- $25.3 million class B to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $37.9 million class C to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $33.7 million class D to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $21.1 million class E to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $29.5 million class F to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $33.7 million class G to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $37.9 million class H to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $33.7 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $37.9 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $8.4 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $12.6 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $8.4 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $8.4 million class O to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';

  -- $8.4 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $134.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $98.3 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $758 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.312 billion class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $130,909 class Q at 'D/RR6'.

Class S, which remains at 'Dsf/RR6', and the unrated class T were
reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Class A-1 has repaid in
full.

Fitch has withdrawn the rating on the interest-only classes A-SP
and A-X.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2003-CPN1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed fourteen classes of Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-CPN1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 8, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects cumulative base expected and
stressed scenario loss estimates of 9.9% and 13.3% of the current
pooled balance, respectively.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss estimate was 8.2%.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 23, the same as last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 15, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased by 24% to $763.9 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 158 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
33% of the pool.  The pool contains 68 loans, representing 12% of
the pool, that are secured by residential cooperative properties
primarily located in New York City.  These loans have a Aaa credit
estimate, the same as last review.  Twenty-three loans,
representing 23% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Nineteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in a $14.5
million aggregate loss (60% severity on average).  There has also
been $3 million of principal forgiveness for one loan, which
brings the pool's cumulative realized losses to $17.4 million.
The pool had realized $12.6 million of losses at last review.
Eight loans, representing 17% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Northgate
Mall Loan ($73 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 1.1 million square foot (SF) regional
mall located in northwest Cincinnati, Ohio.  The property is not
the dominant mall in its trade area.  Property occupancy and
performance have deteriorated with the loss of several major
tenants including JC Penney, Dillard's and Northgate Cinema.
Additionally, the property's Borders store will be closing as part
of Border's recent Chapter 11 filing.  The servicer has recognized
a $31 million appraisal reduction for the Northgate Mall Loan,
which is currently 90+ days past due.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Michigan
Equities C Portfolio ($27 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is
secured by 16 properties located throughout Michigan and totaling
369,000 SF.  Most of the properties are office buildings and
individual properties range in size from 2,100 to 42,000 SF.  The
property's occupancy has declined from 90% at securitization to
60% as of June 2010.  The loan is currently 90+ days past due.
The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
retail, office and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $67 million loss (based on a 95% probability of default
and 54% loss given default on average) from the eight loans in
special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two of the
loans on the watchlist.  The troubled loans represent 1% of the
pool.  Moody's has estimated a $762,000 loss (based on a 50%
probability of default and 30% loss given default on average) from
the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial-year 2010
operating results for 100% and 66% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding troubled, specially serviced and co-op loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 81% compared to 82% at last full review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding troubled, specially serviced and co-op loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.33X, respectively,
compared to 1.48X and 1.30X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 9% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Fairfax Building Loan ($26
million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 210,000 SF
Class B office building located in Tyson's Corner, Virginia.  The
largest tenant is PNC Bank, N.A. (long term bank deposits rating
A2, positive outlook), which leases 9% of the space through June
2018.  The property's occupancy declined to 74% as of December
2010 from 83% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.21X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Willoughby Commons Loan
($25 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 354,000
SF power center located in Willoughby, Ohio.  The center is shadow
anchored by Target.  The collateral's largest tenant is BJ's
Wholesale Club, which leases 31% of the NRA through March 2020.
The property has maintained 98%+ occupancy since securitization.
As of December 2010, the property was 99% leased, with no lease
expirations in 2011-12.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.26X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.17X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 100 Middle Street Loan
($19 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by two
adjacent seven-story office buildings located at the northern edge
of Portland, Maine's CBD.  The property is 97% leased, which is
the same as at securitization.  Only one lease, totaling 2% of the
NRA, expires in 2011-12.  The U.S. government's General Services
Administration has expanded its space from approximately 14,000 SF
at securitization to 43,000 SF as of January 2011.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 85%
and 1.20X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-C3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed eight classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C3:

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans, as well as interest shortfalls that
are currently affecting the transaction.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action did not address the ratings of Classes A-3,
A-4, A-5, A-1A, A-X, and A-SP, which are all currently rated Aaa,
on review for possible downgrade.  These classes were placed on
review on January 19, 2011.  KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets,
Inc. is the master servicer on this transaction and deposits
collection, escrow and other accounts in KeyBank, National
Association.  Keybank no longer meets Moody's rating criteria for
an eligible depository account institution for Aaa and Aa1 rated
securities.  Moody's is reviewing arrangements that KeyBank has
proposed, and that it may propose, to mitigate the incremental
risk indicated by the lower rating of the depository account
institution, so as possibly to allow the classes on review to
maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 6.9%.  Although Moody's expected loss for
the outstanding pool is slightly less than at last review, the
pool has experienced additional losses since last review.
Realized losses since last review combined with expected losses
total 7.9% of the current outstanding balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 4th, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $1.2 billion
from $1.6 billion at securitization.  The collateral balance is
$2 million less than the bond balance due to WODRAs (workout
delayed reimbursements amounts) that occured over several periods
due to the Gwinnett Crossing Apartments loan modification.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 148 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 31% of the pool.  Twenty-three loans, representing
28% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.

Thirty-four loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of
$43 million (45% loss severity overall).  At last review the pool
had experienced an aggregate $16.4 million realized loss.

Seventeen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Centerpointe Mall Loan ($44.1 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which
is secured by a 774,000 square foot retail center located in Grand
Rapids, Michigan.  The largest tenants are Menard, Inc (11% of the
net rentable area (NRA), lease expiration July 2013), Toys "R" Us
(6% of the NRA, lease expiration January 2014), and Jo-Ann Fabrics
& Craft (5% of the NRA, lease expiration January 2020).  The
center was 70% leased as of October 2010, essentially the same as
last review, compared to 88% at securitization.  The loan
transferred into special servicing on February 17, 2011 due to the
borrower's inability to cover the debt service payments.  The
loan's decline in performance is attributed to several tenants,
including Klingman Furniture, Steve & Barry's and Linen 'N Things,
vacating the property in 2008.  The vacated space remains vacant.
The property's net operating income has declined more than 50%
since securitization.  Although the loan is current, Moody's has
assumed a loss for the loan based on the property's weak market
position.

The remaining 16 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $45 million
loss (33% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$6 million aggregate loss (12.5% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 86%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 88% compared to 90% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
1.41X and 1.19X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 24, compared to 26 at last review.

The top three loans represent 18% of the pool.  The largest loan
is the Pacific Design Center Loan ($145.0 million -- 11.1% of the
pool), which is secured by a 916,000 square foot office and design
showroom complex located in West Hollywood, California.  In
addition to the showroom and office space, the property also
houses a 384-seat theater and screening room, conference
facilities, a two-story gallery leased to the Museum of
Contemporary Art, a fitness facility and two restaurants.  The
property was 82% leased as of June 2009 compared to 89% at last
review.  Preformance has declined slightly since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.24X, respectively,
compared to 85% and 1.28X at last review.

The second largest loan is the BC Wood Portfolio Loan ($41 million
-- 3%), which is secured by four shopping centers located in
Louisville, Lexington and Paris, Kentucky, all built between 1951
and 1989.  The weighted average occupancy for the four properties
was 91% as of November 2010, compared to 88% at last review.  The
loan sponsor is Brain C. Wood.  Overall performance has declined
slightly from the prior two reviews and securitization, mainly
because of increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
100% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.1X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Private Mini Storage Portfolio Loan
($38 million - 3%), which is secured by nine self storage
properties located in seven different markets within the state of
Texas.  The portfolio's overall performance has declined since
last review.  A decline in net operating income of about 30% can
be attributed to an overall decline of 12% in revenues and an
increase in expenses by 11%.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
108% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.1X at last
review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed the ratings of 21 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-C1:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 3, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 23,
     2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on June 23, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 3, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 3, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
watchlisted loans, realized losses and interest shortfalls hitting
the A-J class.  The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio and stressed debt service
coverage ratio remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.  The significant decline in loan diversity, as measured
by the Herfindahl Index, has been mitigated by increased
subordination.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
17.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base loss was 17.7%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 24.0% of
the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 35 compared to 53 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 23, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $3.3 billion
from $3.4 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 248 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 38%
of the pool.  No loans have defeased and there are no loans in the
pool with investment grade credit estimates.

Eighty-three loans, representing 30.2% of the pool, including five
of the top ten loans in the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a $49.2 million loss (19% average
loss severity).  The pool had experienced an aggregate
$14.5 million loss at last review.  There are presently 42 loans,
representing 38% of the pool, in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Savoy Park Loan ($210.0 million --
6.5% of the pool), which is secured by seven adjacent apartment
buildings totaling 1,802 units located in the Harlem neighborhood
of New York City.  The property is also encumbered by a
$157.5 million mezzanine loan.  At securitization, the borrower's
plan was to increase property value through a comprehensive
renovation program and the deregulation of rent-stabilized units.
However, a slower than anticipated conversion pace coupled with
deteriorating market fundamentals have posed challenges to the
buyer's original investment strategy.  As of December 2009, 90% of
the units were rent stabilized compared to 91% at securitization.
The interest reserve was replenished since last review and now
stands at $4.6 million.  This loan was transferred to special
servicing July 2010 at the borrower's request in pursuit of a loan
modification and remains current.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the CVI
Multifamily Apartment Portfolio Loan ($178.8 million -- 5.5% of
the pool), which is secured by 20 multi-family properties totaling
2,990 units.  The properties range from 12 to 434 units and are
located in seven markets with the largest concentrations in
Austin, Texas and Sacramento, California.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing April 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Mansions
Portfolio Loan ($156.0 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is
secured by four multi-family properties totaling 1,417 units
located in Austin and Round Rock, Texas.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in March 2009 for imminent default and the
borrower declared bankruptcy in April 2009.  The original four
crossed loans were modified in July 2010 and now feature three
separate crossed secured and unsecured notes.  All notes will
remain interest only with a lower initial interest rate in years
one and two increasing in year three for the balance of the
secured notes.  The unsecured notes include an interest accrual
feature.  Property performance has improved since the loan
modification and the loans remain current.

The remaining 39 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$254.9 million appraisal reduction on 36 of the specially serviced
loans.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $443 million loss (overall
37% expected loss) for all specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 47 poorly
performing loans representing 20% of the pool and has estimated a
$54.9 million loss (9% expected loss based on a 25% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance statement date, the transaction
has experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$18.2 million affecting Classes A-J through T.  Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal
reductions, extraordinary trust expenses and interest payment
reductions due to loan modifications.  Moody's expects interest
shortfalls to increase due to the pool's high exposure to
specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 96% and 83%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased loans.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 109% compared to 121% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.02X, respectively, compared to
1.27X and 0.89X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Koger Center Loan
($115.5 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by an
850,000 SF office building located in Tallahassee, Florida.  The
largest tenant is the State of Florida which leases 69% of the net
rentable area through October 2019.  As of September 2010, the
property was 92% leased versus 89% at last review.  The property's
performance has remained stable since last review yet Moody's
stressed the cash flow to reflect the uncertainty surrounding
State of Florida budgetary issues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 148% and 0.66X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.67X at
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Trident Center Loan
($101.9 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
366,123 SF office complex located in Los Angeles, California.
The largest tenants are two large law firms, Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, which leases 57% of the NRA through April 2021 and
Mitchell, Silberberg and Knupp, which leases 35% of the NRA
through April 2019.  As of December 2010, the property was 99%
leased versus 100% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 119% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to 125% and 0.78X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the HGA Portfolio Loan
($92.5 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 1,538-
unit multi-family portfolio with eleven separate communities
located in Maryland and Texas.  The properties were 89% occupied
as of December 2010 versus 93% at last review.  Financial
performance has improved since last review due to fewer
concessions despite occupancy declines.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 102% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.67X
at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-8 Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-8 certificates issued by Credit Suisse International's reference
notes referencing Argent Securities Inc. asset-backed pass-through
certificates series 2004-W10 to 'D' from 'CC'.

S&P's rating on the reference notes is dependent on the lower of
S&P's ratings on (i) the reference obligation, Argent Securities
Inc. series 2004-W10's class M-8 certificates due 9/25/2034 ('D
(sf)') and (ii) the issuer, Credit Suisse International
(A+/Stable/A-1).

The rating actions follow S&P's Feb. 25, 2011, lowering of its
rating on the reference obligation to 'D' from 'CC'.


CREST 2003-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six and affirmed two classes issued
by Crest 2003-1, Ltd./Corp. as a result of significant negative
credit migration and increased interest shortfalls on the
underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in April 2010, approximately
47.3% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 41.3% has
a Fitch derived rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 24.3% at last review.  As of the Feb.  28, 2011
trustee report, defaulted securities, as defined in the
transaction's governing documents now comprise 32.9% of the
portfolio, compared to 10.6% at last review.  Additionally, 9.1%
of non-defaulted collateral are currently experiencing interest
shortfalls.  Currently, all overcollateralization tests are
failing their respective covenants.  As a result, interest
proceeds otherwise available to the class C and D notes are being
diverted to pay down the class A notes.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'.  Based on this
analysis, the class A-1 through B-2 notes' breakeven rates are
generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For classes C and D, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the
high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, the class C
notes have been downgraded to 'CCCsf', indicating that default is
possible.  Similarly, the class D notes have been downgraded to
'CCsf', indicating that default is probable.  As of the Feb. 28,
2011 trustee report, the class C and D notes are receiving
interest paid in kind whereby the principal amount of the notes is
written up by the amount of interest due.

The Negative Outlook on the class A-1 through B-2 notes reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to
face refinance risk.  The Loss Severity rating indicates a
tranche's potential Loss Severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance
Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with the probability of default for tranches.
Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated
'CCC' and below.

Crest 2003-1 is a static CDO which closed March 13, 2003.  The
collateral is composed of 72.9% of commercial mortgage backed
securities and 27.1% of real estate investment trusts.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $108,289,237 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2,495,144 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $24,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS5';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $36,000,000 class B-2 notes to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'AAsf/LS5';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $28,290,319 class C-1 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBBsf/LS4';

  -- $48,351,904 class C-2 notes to 'CCCsf' from 'BBBsf/LS4';

  -- $10,378,058 class D-1 notes to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $55,812,916 class D-2 notes to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf/LS5'.


CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd., a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
the termination of the interest rate swap contract for the
transaction, resulting in a payment to the hedge counterparty.
S&P lowered the rating on class A to 'D (sf)' because the
nondeferrable class did not receive full interest as noted in the
trustee remittance report dated Feb. 22, 2011.  The nondeferrable
class B, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)' on May 6,
2010, due to interest shortfalls, also did not receive an interest
payment.  S&P lowered the ratings of classes C through K to 'CC
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' because S&P expects the interest payments
on these classes to be deferred for an extended period of time due
to the termination payment.

According to the most recent trustee report, the hedge
counterparty previously terminated the interest rate swap
contract for the transaction following a payment default.  The
termination of the hedge triggered a termination payment totaling
$34.9 million to the counterparty.  Based on the transaction's
documents and payment waterfall, it is S&P's understanding that
the termination payments to the hedge counterparty are made pro
rata to interest and principal payments to class A and before any
interest or principal proceeds are made available to any classes
subordinate to class A.  S&P expects that the termination payments
may not be paid in full for several years, and full principal and
interest payments to deferrable classes will likely not be paid
for many years.

According to the Feb. 22, 2011 trustee report, Crystal River 2006-
1 was collateralized by 71 classes of commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS, $370.6 million, 100%) from 32 distinct
transactions issued from 2002 through 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Crystal River 2006-1 according to its
current criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered
ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class    To                   From
             -----    --                   ----
             A        D (sf)               CCC- (sf)
             C        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             D        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             E        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             F        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             G        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             H        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             J        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             K        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)


DELTA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 89 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 89
tranches and confirmed the ratings of five tranches from 17
Subprime deals issued by Delta Funding/Renaissance.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-2

  -- S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- A-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-3

  -- B-1F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

  -- Cl. A-6F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     June 18, 2008 Assigned Aa1 (sf)*

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     June 18, 2008 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-1F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     June 18, 2008 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     June 18, 2008 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: DFC HELTrust 2001-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 23, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-4

  -- A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 2, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 2, 2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-3

  -- M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-4

  -- A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- A-3, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- AV-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AV-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-IO-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 67
tranches, confirmed the rating of seven tranches, and withdrawn
the ratings of four tranches from nine Alt-A deals issued by
Deutsche Alt-A Securities.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small
pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the
overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.
To project losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's
first estimates a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies
for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of loan origination
(10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004, 2003 and 2002 and prior vintage
respectively).  The baseline rates are higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for larger pools for the respective
vintages.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  In
addition, if current delinquency levels in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust
Series 2003-1

  -- CL. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. A-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- CL. A-X, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust
Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-X, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2003-2XS

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2003-4XS

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-X, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-3

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-AR-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 26,
     2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-AR-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 26,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-MR-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 26,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-MR-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-MR-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-AR-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-AR-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-MR-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-MR-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-MR-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-5

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     April 13, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DLJ ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches from 3 Subprime deals issued by DLJ.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor,
the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1996-QB

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three 1999-CG3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-CG3:

  -- Cl. B-4, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. B-7, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the
existing rating.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
34.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 32.3%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
35.6% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 21 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2009.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to
$54.8 million from $899.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 91% of the pool.  Two loans representing 9% of the
pool have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 5% of the pool.
There are no loans with credit estimates.

Four loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $29.2 million loss (22%
loss severity on average).  At last review the pool had
experienced $22.2 million of losses.  Seven loans, representing
59% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Wyndham Garden Oklahoma City Loan
($7.3 million -- 13.2% of the pool), formerly known as the Holiday
Inn-Oklahoma City.  The loan is secured by a 246-unit hotel
property located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2009 for imminent
maturity default.  The special servicer has approved a one year
forbearance agreement that matures in October 2011.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Olympic
Corporate Center Building ($6.9 million -- 12.7% of the pool),
which is secured by an 89,000 square foot office building located
in Erlanger, Kentucky.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in May 2009 due to imminent maturity default.  Since
then the loan has become Real Estate Owned via a foreclosure on
December 12, 2010.  In November 2010 the master servicer
recognized a $2.5 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Rolling Meadows
Plaza Loan ($6.8 million -- 12.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 128,500 SF retail property located in Rolling Meadows,
Illinois.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2009 due to payment maturity default.  In January 2011 the
master servicer recognized a $5.2 million appraisal reduction on
this property.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by retail
and multifamily properties.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $10.6 million appraisal reduction for five of the
specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$17.3 million loss (54% expected loss on average) for all of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.4 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Excluding defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans there
are four conduit loans remaining in the conduit pool.  Moody's was
provided with full year 2009 operating results for 100% of the
conduit pool and partial year 2010 financials for 89% of the
conduit pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 72% compared to 70% at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10.4% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.06X and 1.46X, respectively, compared to
1.30X and 1.57X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is The Regency Apartments Loan
($7.2 million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 186-
unit multifamily property located in Fayetteville, North Carolina.
As of September 2010 the property was 97% leased.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.33X, respectively, compared 70% and
1.39X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Majestic Shopping Center Loan
($4.5 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 136,183
SF retail property located in Hampton, Michigan.  The property was
75% leased as of January 2011 and is currently on the watchlist
due to a decline in occupancy.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
89% and 1.15X, respectively, compared 75% and 1.37X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Kaiser Permanente Office Building
Loan ($2.1 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
31,300 SF office property located in Anaheim, California.  The
loan has benefited from amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 46% and 2.36X respectively, compared to 61% and 1.78X at
last review.


DRYDEN V-LEVERAGED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$6,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$7,500,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$4,500,000 Class D-3 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$8,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 22, 2015, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily due to an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
primarily due to amortization of the Class A Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately $52 million or 37% since the
rating action in June 2010.  As per the January 2011 trustee
report, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E,
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 145.4%, 128.3%,
113.7%, and 107.5% respectively, versus April 2010 levels of
128.9%, 118.0%, 108.1%, and 103.7%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

The credit quality of the portfolio has been relatively stable (as
measured by the weighted average rating factor) and proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, have decreased since
the rating action in June 2010.  Based on the January 2011 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is 2833 compared to
2826 in April 2010, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up
approximately 11.8% of the underlying portfolio versus 12.3% in
April 2010.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to approximately $3.0 million from $9.0 million in April
2010.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $169 million, defaulted par of $3.0 million,
weighted average default probability of 24.9% (implying a WARF of
4065), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.2%, and
a diversity score of 39.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003 Corp, issued on December 10,
2003, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3252)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B-1: +2
  -- Class B-2: +2
  -- Class C-1: +2
  -- Class C-2: +2
  -- Class D-1: +2
  -- Class D-2: +2
  -- Class D-3: +2
  -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4878)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B-1: -1
  -- Class B-2: -1
  -- Class C-1: -2
  -- Class C-2: -2
  -- Class D-1: -1
  -- Class D-2: -1
  -- Class D-3: -1
  -- Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


EAST LANE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'BB+(sf)'
and 'BB(sf)' ratings on the Series 2011-1 Class A and Class B
notes, respectively, issued by East Lane Re IV Ltd.

The notes will cover losses from hurricanes, earthquakes, severe
thunderstorms, and winter storms in the covered areas on a per-
occurrence basis.  East Lane IV is a newly incorporated special-
purpose Cayman Islands exempted company licensed as a Class B
insurer in the Cayman Islands.  All of its issued and outstanding
share capital will be held under a declaration of trust for
certain charitable purposes by Wilmington Trust (Cayman) Ltd. as
share trustee.

The ceding insurers, Federal Insurance Co. (AA/Stable/--) and
other intercompany pool members (collectively referred to herein
as Chubb), all subsidiaries of Chubb Corp., write personal and
commercial lines insurance.  The insurer financial strength
ratings on Federal Insurance Co. and its intercompany pool members
are based on the group's very strong competitive position in the
global property/casualty marketplace.  Chubb Corp. benefits from
very strong brand-name recognition globally, excellent
underwriting, and very strong consolidated capital.

                          Ratings List

                          New Ratings

                      East Lane Re IV Ltd.

          Series 2011-1 Class A Notes           BB+(sf)
          Series 2011-1 Class B Notes           BB(sf)


EL PASO: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $4.85 Mil. Mortgage Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 rating on $4,850,000
of outstanding El Paso Housing Finance Corporation, Multifamily
Mortgage Revenue Bonds (Las Lomas Apartments) Series 1999A.  The
outlook on the bonds remains stable.  The rating affirmation is
based on improving debt service coverage levels and stabilized
performance of Las Lomas Apartments, which are offset by a reduced
Debt Service Reserve Fund.

                          Rating Rationale

The bonds are secured by a pledge of all project revenues and
funds held pursuant to the program.  The Series 1999A bonds have a
first lien on all program funds and are paid first in the monthly
flow of funds.  Payment of senior bond principal and interest is
given priority in the flow of funds and is senior to the payment
of the Series 1999C bonds.  The Series 1999C bonds are not rated
by Moody's.

Strengths

* Debt Service Coverage levels have improved since 2008, primarily
  driven by the property's rent increases.

* Even with rental increases, Las Lomas Apartments offers units
  slightly below Fair Market Rents.

                            Challenges

* The Debt Service Reserve Fund is funded and sized in an amount
  well below the requirement of the original Indenture.

* Inherent risks associated with the volatility of the affordable
  multifamily housing sector.

                     Detailed Credit Discussion

According to year ending December 31 2009 financial audits,
Moody's-adjusted Maximum Annual Debt Service coverage increased to
1.29x from 1.24x in the year prior.  The increase was primarily
driven by the property's 7% increase in total lease revenues and -
1% decrease in overall operating expenses.  The property has
maintained consistent occupancy levels since at least 2004, and
only reported a 5% vacancy rate as of February 2011.

In November 2006, the owner of the project and the beneficial
owner of the Senior Lien Bonds jointly agreed to use up to
$300,000 of the Senior Lien Debt Service Reserve Fund to fund
various repairs to the project.  The reserve fund balance prior
to this $300,000 disbursement was $384,325.  The withdrawal
necessitated a reduction of the DSRF requirement to $89,472.  As
of 2/23/2011, the DSRF was funded at $111,369, an increase of only
$5,714 since Moody's last surveillance in 2010.  Moody's believe
the amount will still not adequately insulate bondholders from
operating risks, or risks associated with a particularly volatile
housing sector.

                              Outlook

What Could Make The Rating Go Up:

* Significant contributions to the Debt Service Reserve Fund that
demonstrate sufficient protection against aforementioned risks

What Could Make The Rating Go Down:

* Further withdrawals from the Debt Service Reserve Fund
* Material decline in Debt Service Coverage

                          Key Indicators

* DSRF: $111,369 (2/23/2011)
* 2009 MADS DSC: 1.29x
* Vacancy Rate: 5% (2/23/2011)


EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 30 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 30
tranches and confirmed the ratings of three tranches from five
Subprime deals issued by Equifirst.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 10, 2005
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 10, 2005
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


EQUITY ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 63
tranches and has confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches from 15
Subprime deals issued by Equity One.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Equity One ABS, Inc. 1998-1

  -- A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 1999-1

  -- A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2001-3

  -- AF-4, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- AV-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf) ; previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-3

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-4

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-5

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-1

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-2

  -- AV-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-3

  -- AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-4

  -- AV-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AV-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1

  -- AV-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AV-2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 24, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 24, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 24, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 28,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FALCON AUTO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these actions on Falcon Auto Dealership
LLC, series 2003-1:

  -- Class A-1 and A-2 notes downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Asf';
  -- Class B notes downgraded to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'Bsf';
  -- Class C notes downgraded to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCsf/RR6';
  -- Class D, E, and F notes affirmed at 'Csf/RR6'.

In addition, the class A-1 and A-2 notes remain on Rating Watch
Negative.  The class B notes are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCCsf'
or below.

The downgrades to the class A, B, and C notes reflect Fitch's
updated recovery expectations on outstanding defaults which have
worsened since last review, growing interest shortfalls on the
subordinate classes, the inability of the class A and B notes to
pass Fitch's stress cases at their current ratings, and the
anticipated default of the class C notes and all those
subordinate.

Over half the collateral pool is in special servicing.  Among the
current defaults are the two largest loans in the transaction.
Fitch's expected recoveries on the second largest loan, which
comprises approximately 19% of the collateral pool, have decreased
since last review.  The expected writedowns from the outstanding
defaults will leave all notes in the structure with less credit
support.  Future deterioration in Fitch's recovery expectations
for these loans may lead to additional negative rating actions.
As such, the Rating Watch Negative has been maintained for the
class A notes.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria,' dated Aug. 13, 2010.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted loans given anticipated sale prices reflecting
recent appraisals or contracted sales.  If no such data is
available, recovery expectations are based on historical
collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the franchise asset
backed securities sector since 1994.  The resulting anticipated
collateral losses were then applied to the transaction structure,
enabling Fitch to assess the impact on the securities and
available credit enhancement.

To assess the structure's ability to withstand additional loan
defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default based
on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under specific
scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an FCCR below a
defined level were assumed to default and realize a loss in the
near future.  If a class was able to withstand the assumed
defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to have
passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR hurdles for the
respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'Bsf' case to
approximately 1.5x for the 'Asf' case.  FCCR default levels were
based on an analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR
data from 2005-2009.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  Under this approach, Fitch expects each class in the
'Bsf' to 'Asf' rating categories to be able to withstand the
default of the top one to five obligors, respectively, without
defaulting.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor this transaction and may
take additional rating actions in the future as appropriate.


FIRST ALLIANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from 2 Subprime deals issued by First Alliance.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed rate
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005).  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is low,
future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-3

  -- A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 8, 2009
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-4

  -- A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)


FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Maintains Negative Watch on All Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings maintains the Rating Watch Negative on all
outstanding classes of First National Master Note Trust:

Series 2009-1

  -- Class A at 'AAAsf'; LS Rating revised to 'LS1' from 'LS2';
  -- Class C at 'BBBsf/LS4';
  -- Class D at 'BBsf'; LS Rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'.

Series 2009-3

  -- Class A at 'AAAsf', LS Rating revised to 'LS1' from 'LS2';
  -- Class C at 'BBBsf/LS4';
  -- Class D at 'BBsf', LS Rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5'.

The action follows Fitch's announcement on Feb.  25 that it
affirmed the long-term Issuer Default Rating of First National
Bank of Omaha (the bank) at 'BB+' and short-term IDR at 'B'.
Fitch also maintained the ratings of the Bank on Rating Watch
Negative.  The Rating Watch will be maintained on all outstanding
notes in the trust until the Watch is resolved on the bank's
ratings.

The trust was originally put on Rating Watch Negative after the
bank was downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' in August 2010.  The
bank's lower rating increases the risk associated with credit card
origination, ongoing receivables generation, and servicing.

Fitch has since revisited its assumptions and stresses applied to
the trust.  The purchase rate stress has increased to reflect the
bank's lower rating.  This would have resulted in downward
pressure on ratings; however, Fitch was also able to give credit
to positive performance trends by revising its performance
assumptions for the trust.  Specifically, improvements in Monthly
Payment Rates and Gross Charge-offs have been incorporated.  These
improvements have resulted in improved Loss Severity ratings for
the class A and class D tranches since Fitch's loss expectation
for the trust have decreased.


FIRST UNION: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2001-C4 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes of
First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-C4:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2005
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2005
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 9, 2007
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 9, 2007
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2006
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. IO-I, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 9%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated August 9, 2007.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 14, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $620 million
from $978 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 30%
of the pool.  Twenty-six loans, representing 25% of the pool has
defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
The pool has significant near-term refinance risk, as loans
representing 75% of the pool mature within the next 24 months.

Thirty-six loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

10 loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $4.8 million (9% loss
severity overall).  At last review the pool had realized a
$1.4 million loss.  One loan, representing less than 1% of the
pool, is currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 12% of the pool and has estimated a
$11 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 91%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 80% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.33X, respectively, compared to
1.31X and 1.35X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 39, compared to 45 at last review.

The top three loans represent 14% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Overlook at Great Notch Loan ($31 million --
5%), which is secured by a 415,000 square foot Class A office
building located in Little Falls (Passaic County), New Jersey.
Performance has declined considerably since last review.  This
decline can be attributed to a major tenant (ACS, 25% of net
rentable area) surrendering 10% of their lease and renewing the
remaining 25% at a reduced rate, as well as another tenant (7% of
of the NRA) delinquent on its rent.  The loan matures in 2011.
Moody's is concerned about refinance risk associated with this
loan due to its near-term maturity and decline in performance.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.81X respectively,
compared to 96% and 1.12X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Orland Park Place Loan ($30 million
-- 5%), which is secured by a 421,000 square foot power center
located approximately 25 miles southwest of Chicago in Orland,
Illinois.  Current occupancy is 98% which is in line with last
review, and the majority of tenants are on long term leases.
Overall financial performance is in line with the previous review
and securitization.  The loan matures in 2011.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR is 80% and 1.25X respectively, compared to 89% and
1.12X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Chesterbrook Office Building
Loan ($25 million -- 4%), which is secured by a 171,000 square
foot Class A office building located in Berwyn, Pennsylvania, 20
miles northwest of the Philadelphia central business district.
Property performance has declined since last review, largely due
to increased vacancy, lower rental levels for recent leases, and
increased expenses.  The previous majority tenant, Nationwide (58%
of the NRA) was replaced by True Position at a lower rental rate.
In addition, a tenant which leased 11% of the NRA was evicted in
2009 and the space is still vacant.  There are several lease
proposals under discussion.  The property was 80% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 100% at last review.  Repair and
maintenance costs have also increased over several winters due to
the increased costs for ice and snow removal, contributing to the
poor performance.  The loan matures in 2012.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR is 83% and 1.28X respectively, compared to 71% and
1.49X at last review.


FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Four Corners CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$232,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
     (current outstanding balance of $167,349929), Upgraded to Aa1
     (sf); previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$10,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$21,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in August
2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated February 5, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2530 compared to 2782
in the July 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 3.4% of the underlying portfolio versus 7.8% in
July 2009.  In addition, there are currently $1.48 million of
defaulted securities based on the February 2011 trustee report,
compared to $13.19 million in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in August 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 128.39%, 114.54%, 109.33% and 103.86%, respectively,
versus July 2009 levels of 118.78%, 109.11%, 105.32% and 101.24%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $228.2 million, defaulted par of $1.5 million,
a weighted average default probability of 25.5% (implying a WARF
of 3375), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.57%,
and a diversity score of 50.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Four Corners CLO II, Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2700)

  -- Class A: +1
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +3
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4050)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of Moody's assumed defaulted assets: Market value
   fluctuations in assets which were assumed to be defaulted by
   Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Moody's analyzed defaulted
   recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the
   recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
   market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Assigns Ratings to $350.6 Mil. Floating Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Fraser
Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V Corp.'s $350.6 million
floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans and a limited amount of senior
secured first-lien revolving loans, second-lien loans, and
unsecured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

* The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through the
  subordination of cash flows that are payable to the subordinated
  notes; The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
  Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in
  its corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria, which can
  withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO
  Evaluator model;

* The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
  bankruptcy remote;

* The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists primarily
  of speculative-grade senior secured term loans;

* The portfolio manager's experienced management team;

* The timely interest and ultimate principal payments that S&P
  expects on the rated notes, assessed using S&P's cash flow
  analysis and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings
  under various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR rates
  ranging from 0.29% to 5.16%; and

* The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
  tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of interest
  and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the rated notes
  outstanding.

                        Ratings Assigned

      Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V Corp.

       Class                   Rating      Amount (mil. $)
       -----                   ------      ---------------
       A-1                     AAA (sf)             273.00
       A-2                     AA (sf)               13.50
       B (deferrable)          A (sf)                30.10
       C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              15.00
       D (deferrable)          BB (sf)               19.00
       E                       NR                     6.80
       F                       NR                    13.20
       EF                      NR                    30.00

                         NR -- Not rated.


GATEWAY CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class B to 'Caa2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Gateway CLO Limited:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated January 25, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2497 compared to 2606
in the April 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 6.74% of the underlying portfolio versus
9.73% in April 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $2.3 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$29.2 million in April 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in June 2009.  The Class A and
Class B overcollateralization ratios are reported at 108.4% and
104.8%, respectively, versus April 2009 levels of 101.4% and
98.1%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.  Moody's notes that the Class B Notes
are no longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.  As a result of the significant
improvement in the Class A overcollateralization ratio level,
Moody's also notes that its concerns about a potential Event of
Default have receded.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $469.5 million, defaulted par of $7.3 million,
a weighted average default probability of 26.85% (implying a WARF
of 3400), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.83%,
and a diversity score of 60.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Gateway CLO Limited, issued in October 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2720)

  -- Class B: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4080)

  -- Class B: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2. Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3. Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
   the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.


GE CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GE Capital
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2001-3.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and liquidity
available to the trust.  S&P lowered its ratings on the E, F, G,
and H certificates primarily because S&P expects ongoing or
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the transaction.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage of 1.30x and an adjusted loan-to-value ratio
of 75.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average debt service coverage
of 1.04x and an LTV ratio of 92.4%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 32.2% and 28.9%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 32 defeased loans ($340.3 million, 35.2%), and eight
($57.4 million, 8.4%) specially serviced loans.  S&P separately
estimated a loss for the specially serviced loans and included
them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P's ratings actions also considered the volume of nondefeased,
nonspecially serviced loans that are scheduled to mature in
2011(66 loans, $373.3 Million, 54.7% of the trust balance).  While
many of these loans have reported DSCs ratios greater than 1.10x,
S&P believes the borrowers for these loans could face refinancing
challenges given current market conditions.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 10, 2011 trustee remittance report, eight assets
($57.4 million, 8.4%) in the pool, two of which are among the top
10 real estate exposures, were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc. The reported payment status of the specially
serviced assets are as follows: three ($33.3 million, 4.9%) are
real estate owned, four ($16.4 million, 2.4%) are 90-plus-days
delinquent, and one ($7.8 million, 1.1%) is in its grace period.
Five of the specially serviced assets ($40.5 million, 5.4%) have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $26.3 million.

The Arbors at Brookhollow ($12.6 million, 1.9%), the largest asset
with LNR and the seventh-largest real estate exposure in the pool,
is a 114,363-sq.-ft. office property in Arlington, Texas.  The
underlying mortgage loan was transferred to LNR on Nov. 14, 2008,
due to imminent default, and the property became REO on April 6,
2010.  According to special servicer, a new management and leasing
agent has been hired.  Since then an additional 2.7% of the NRA
has been leased and one renewal has been signed.  An ARA of
$8.2 million is in effect against the asset.  Standard & Poor's
anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The Highland Landing Apartments loan ($10.9 million, 1.6%), the
second-largest asset with the special servicer, and the eighth-
largest real estate exposure in the pool, is a 352-unit
multifamily property in Decatur, Ga.  The asset was transferred
to LNR on Nov. 16, 2008, due to payment default and became REO on
Oct. 6, 2009.  According to the special servicer, the property
manager has implemented a leasing program, and the property's
physical occupancy is currently 75% based on the February 2011
master servicer's comments.  An ARA of $9.5 million is in effect
against the asset.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The six remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 1.5% of the balance.  Standard &
Poor's estimated losses for six of these assets, resulting in a
weighted-average loss severity of 39.9%.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined one
loan ($5.9 million, 0.9%) to be credit-impaired.  The Executive
Center One Office Building loan ($5.9 million, 0.9%) is secured by
a 85,935-sq.-ft. property located in Englewood, Colo.  The loan's
payment status is 60-plus-days delinquent.  According to the
master servicer, the reported DSC as of the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2010 was 0.31x, and the reported occupancy as of Dec. 8,
2010, was 84.0%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 10, 2011 trustee remittance report, the aggregate
pooled trust balance was $683.0 million, which represents 70.9%
of the aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 110
assets remaining in the pool, down from 133 at issuance.  The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., provided financial
information for 89.2% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, 45.0%
of which was interim 2009 or full-year 2009 data, with the balance
reflecting interim or full-year 2010 reporting.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.32x for the pool based on the reported
figures, which excluded 32 defeased loans ($240.3 million, 35.2%).
Nineteen loans ($186.2 million, 27.3%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Twenty loans ($114.0 million, 16.7%) have
reported DSC below 1.10x, and 14 of these loans ($62.1 million,
9.1%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.  To date, the
transaction has realized eight principal losses totaling
$17.3 million.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $181.1 million (26.5%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.40x for eight of the top 10 exposures.  Two of the top 10
exposures are with the special servicer and are discussed above.
Six are on the master servicer's watchlist, five of which are
discussed below.

The Executive Tower loan ($39.0 million, 5.7%), is the largest
exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by a 122,930-sq.-ft.
office building located in Washington, D.C.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to lease expirations and
anticipated vacancies that will affect 16.2% of the net rentable
area, as well as additional vacancies affecting 9.7% of the NRA.
According to the master servicer, two tenants have signed leases
to replace the vacating tenants (16.2%).  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the
reported DSC was 1.72x.  The reported occupancy as of the Sept.
30, 2010, rent roll was 75%.

The Forest Avenue Shoppers Center loan ($24.3 million, 3.6%) is
the second-largest exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by a
177,116-sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Staten Island, N.Y.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a tenant
(National Wholesale) occupying 19.2% of the NRA vacating prior to
its lease expiration after filing for bankruptcy.  The three
largest tenants currently at the property are TJ Maxx, Michaels,
and CVS.  As of Dec. 14, 2010, property occupancy was 70%.  As of
Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.20x.

The Sienna Villas Apartments loan ($22.2 million, 3.3%) is the
third-largest exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by a 360-
unit multifamily property in Henderson, Nev.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The reported
DSC and occupancy as of the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, were
1.07x and 91%, respectively.

The Continental Park loan ($21.2 million, 3.1%) is the fourth-
largest exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by four
buildings totaling 203,727 sq. ft. and a four-level parking
structure in El Segundo, Calif.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  Three of the four properties
are 100% occupied, while the fourth is only 19% occupied.  Leasing
efforts are ongoing according to the master servicer.  The
reported DSC and occupancy for the 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2010,
are 1.09x and 78%, respectively.

The Palm Beach Park Centre loan ($17.4 million, 2.5%) is the
fifth-largest exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by a
67,389-sq.-ft. office property in Palm Beach, Fla.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a tenant
occupying 23% of the NRA vacating upon lease end, leaving the
property 75% occupied.  The reported DSC as of Dec. 31, 2010, was
1.82x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria and the analysis is consistent with its lowered and
affirmed ratings actions.

                         Ratings Lowered

               GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-3

                Rating
                ------
   Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
   -----  --              ----          ----------------------
   E      AA- (sf)        AA+ (sf)                       14.05
   F      A- (sf)         AA (sf)                        11.93
   G      B+ (sf)         A- (sf)                        10.17
   H      CCC- (sf)       B- (sf)                         6.11

                         Rating Affirmed

               GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-3

        Class  Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  ------              ----------------------
        A-1    AAA (sf)                             28.27
        A-2    AAA (sf)                             28.27
        B      AAA (sf)                             22.70
        C      AAA (sf)                             17.05
        D      AAA (sf)                             15.11
        I      CCC-(sf)                              4.88
        X-1    AAA (sf)                               N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-C3 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2004-C3.  In addition, S&P
raised its ratings on two other classes and affirmed its ratings
on 17 other classes from the same trust.

The rating actions on the pooled principal and interest
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The lowered ratings
reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon
the resolution of five of the transaction's six specially serviced
assets and also consider available liquidity support.

S&P upgraded the class C and D certificates to reflect increased
credit support levels due to the deleveraging of the transaction.
S&P's rating actions are tempered by the volume of nondefeased
and nonspecially serviced assets with anticipated repayment dates
(ARDs) or final maturities in 2011 ($133.8 million, 13.7%).  This
balance includes the previously specially serviced DDR-Macquarie
Portfolio loan ($39.4 million, 4.0%).  Pursuant to the transaction
documents, as long as this loan continues to perform and remains
with the master servicer, the special servicer is entitled to a
workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal and interest
payments on the loan (including the final balloon payment, which
is scheduled to be made in June 2011).

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.46x and a loan-to-value ratio of 84.9%.
S&P further stressed the assets' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.16x and an LTV
ratio of 105.4%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under
the 'AAA' scenario were 41.7% and 24.5%, respectively.  All
of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude nine
($158.4 million, 16.2%) defeased assets and five ($49.4 million,
5.1%) of the transaction's six ($55.5 million, 5.7%) specially
serviced assets.  S&P separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the "SHP" raked
classes reflect the timely payments of the Strategic Hotel
Portfolio whole loan, which has been defeased.  The "SHP" raked
classes derive 100% of their cash flows from a nonpooled portion
of the loan.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the February 2011 remittance report, six ($55.5 million,
5.7%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment status of the
specially serviced assets is: two ($18.4 million, 1.9%) are
real estate owned; one ($4.5 million, 0.5%) is in foreclosure;
one ($4.6 million, 0.5%) is 90-plus days delinquent; one
($21.9 million, 2.3%) is 60 days delinquent; and one
($6.1 million, 0.6%) is in its grace period.  Appraisal
reduction amounts totaling $2.4 million were in effect for
two of the specially serviced assets.

The Maspeth Industrial Center loan ($21.9 million, 2.3%) is the
ninth-largest nondefeased exposure in the pool and the largest
specially serviced asset.  The loan is secured by a 672,545-sq.-
ft. industrial property in Maspeth, N.Y.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in July 2010 due to imminent monetary default
and is classified as 60 days delinquent.  As of December 2009, the
reported DSC for the loan was 1.00x.  Reported occupancy at the
collateral property was 71.4%, as of June 2010.  According to the
special servicer, a loan modification and foreclosure are both
being pursued as resolution strategies.  S&P anticipate a moderate
loss upon the resolution of this asset if the loan is not
modified.

The Village Shoppes at East Cherokee asset ($15.8 million, 1.6% of
the pool balance) is the second-largest specially serviced asset.
The asset is secured by a 128,667-sq.-ft. retail property in Holly
Springs, Ga., and was transferred to special servicing in June
2010 for imminent monetary default.  The asset is classified as
REO.  As of December 2009, the reported DSC was 0.99x.  Standard &
Poor's expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The four remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 0.7% of the trust balance.  ARAs
totaling $2.4 million are in effect against two of these assets.
Standard & Poor's estimated losses for three of the assets to
arrive at a weighted-average loss severity of 27.2%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the February 2011 remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $977.2 million, down
from $1.41 billion at issuance.  The pool includes 98 loans
and two REO assets, down from 127 loans at issuance.  Nine
($158.4 million, 16.2%) loans are defeased.  The master servicer,
GEMSA Loan Services L.P., provided full-year 2009 or interim-2010
financial information for 99.4% of the nondefeased assets in the
pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.52x for the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
ratio were 1.46x and 84.9%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures exclude the defeased assets and five of the
transaction's six specially serviced assets.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced assets.
The master servicer reported a watchlist of 18 ($176.8 million,
18.1%) loans, including three of the top 10 loan exposures, which
S&P discusses in detail below.  Fifteen ($116.7 million, 11.9%)
exposures in the pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and
11 ($64.3 million, 6.6%) exposures have a reported DSC of less
than 1.00x.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $300.1 million (30.7%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.60x for the top 10 real estate exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio for the top 10 exposures are 1.43x and 83.1%,
respectively.  One of the top 10 exposures is with the special
servicer (discussed above) and three appear on the master
servicer's watchlist (discussed below).

The DDR-Macquarie Portfolio loan is the second-largest nondefeased
loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of $39.4 million (4.0%)
and is secured by a portfolio of retail properties comprising
1,757,802 sq. ft. across the U.S. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to upcoming tenant lease expirations.
The reported DSC and consolidated occupancy were 2.42x and 81.1%
as of December 2009 and June 2010, respectively.

The Sun Communities Portfolio 5 loan is the third-largest
nondefeased loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of
$38.3 million (3.9%) and is secured by a portfolio of manufactured
housing properties comprising 2,249-pads across the U.S. The loan
is on the master servicer's watchlist for low reported occupancy.
As of December 2009, the reported DSC and consolidated occupancy
were 1.82x and 72.9%, respectively.

The 180 Livingston Street loan is the sixth-largest nondefeased
loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of
$24.1 million (2.5%) and is secured by a 165,200-sq.-ft. office
property in Brooklyn, N.Y.  The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist for low reported DSC.  The reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.00x and 100% as of December 2009 and June 2010,
respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria, and the rating actions are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class     To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --          ----        ----------------------
     M         B (sf)      B+ (sf)                       2.61
     N         CCC (sf)    B (sf)                        2.06
     O         CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)                       1.52

                         Ratings Raised

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class     To          From        Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --          ----        ----------------------
     C         AA (sf)     AA- (sf)                     14.79
     D         A+ (sf)     A (sf)                       11.88

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C3

    Class             Rating          Credit enhancement (%)
    -----             ------          ----------------------
    A-3               AAA (sf)                         19.89
    A-4               AAA (sf)                         19.89
    A-1A              AAA (sf)                         19.89
    B                 AA+ (sf)                         16.43
    E                 A- (sf)                          10.25
    F                 BBB+ (sf)                         8.61
    G                 BBB (sf)                          7.34
    H                 BBB- (sf)                         5.34
    J                 BB+ (sf)                          4.61
    K                 BB (sf)                           3.88
    L                 BB- (sf)                          3.15
    SHP-1             AAA (sf)                           N/A
    SHP-2             AAA (sf)                           N/A
    SHP-3             AAA (sf)                           N/A
    SHP-4             AAA (sf)                           N/A
    X-1               AAA (sf)                           N/A
    X-2               AAA (sf)                           N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Two 1997-C2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of two classes and
affirmed two classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1997-C2:

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 23, 1997
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 11, 2008
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 31, 2003
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sept. 14, 2005
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to an increase in subordination from paydowns
and amortization and improved pool performance.  The affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.2% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 5.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.3% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  Due to the high level of credit subordination
and defeasance, it is unlikely that investment grade classes would
be downgraded even if losses are higher than Moody's expected
base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and the CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0.  Conduit model
results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a pay down analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying
ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into
an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of five, essentially the same as Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2008.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to
$71.0 million from $1.07 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1% to 24% of the pool.  Two loans representing 17% of
the pool have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist and
currently there are no specially serviced loans.  Sixteen loans
have been liquidated from the pool since securitization, resulting
in an aggregate $57.5 million loss (26% loss severity on average).

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H,
J and K have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $4.0 million.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions, extraordinary trust
expenses and non-advancing by the master servicer based on a
determination of non-recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 70% and 88% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV is 74% compared to 85% at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 19% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.16X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.35X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 60% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Fruitvale Shopping Center
Loan ($16.7 million -- 23.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
163,000 square foot retail center located in Oakland, California.
The complex is 97% leased compared to 100% at last review.  The
anchor tenants include Albertson's and Office Depot, which
collectively lease 57% of the premises on long term leases.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.83X, respectively,
compared to 62% and 1.66X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Clinton Hill Apartments Loan
($14.0 million -- 19.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 1,221-
unit cooperative apartment complex located in Brooklyn, New York.
The property was 99% leased as of September 2010, essentially the
same as last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and
1.28X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.19X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Boulevard Gardens Apartments Loan
($12.0 million -- 16.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 968
unit cooperative apartment complex located in Queens, New York.
The property was 100% leased as of October 2010 compared to 99% at
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.15X at last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 1999-C3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed three classes of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1999-C3 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. G, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 28, 2010 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 8, 2007 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 8, 2007 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to an
anticipated increase in interest shortfalls.  The master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, recently advised Moody's that it
will be begin recovering approximately $600,000 of outstanding
advances on a specially serviced loan, the Jewelry Building Loan
($6.5 million -- 11.6% of the pool), beginning with the March
remittance date.  Berkadia has indicated that it will recoup
outstanding advances from the interest and principal distributions
due to certificate holders for several months.  As of the February
remittance statement, the servicer had advanced approximately
$1.0 million on the Jewelry Building Loan.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 28, 2010.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the February 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to
$55.8 million from $1.15 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 72% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 28% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

One loans, representing 4% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $21.3 million loss
(14% loss severity on average).  The pool had experienced a
$19.7 million loss at Moody's prior review.  Currently seven
loans, representing 56% of the pool, are in special servicing.
All of the loans in special servicing were transferred due to
imminent maturity default.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the Lakeside Place Office Building Loan ($6.5 million - 11.7% of
the pool), which is secured by a 84,000 square foot office
building located in Cleveland, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in May 2009.  The servicer has recognized a
$4.0 million appraisal reduction on the loan.  The remaining six
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of office,
industrial and retail properties.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.8 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-C3 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2004-C3.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes
from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P lowered its
ratings on five certificate classes due to credit support erosion
that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of the
11 specially serviced assets as well as recurring interest
shortfalls affecting the trust.  S&P also considered the trust's
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls and a reduction in
the liquidity available to absorb future interest shortfalls.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage (DSC) of 1.74x and a loan-to-value ratio of
81.6%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.16x and an
LTV ratio of 106.4%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under
the 'AAA' scenario were 66.8% and 22.1%, respectively.  The DSC
and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude five fully defeased
loans ($63.4 million; 6.5%) and 11 specially serviced assets
($180.1 million; 18.5%), for which S&P separately estimated losses
and included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the six principal and
interest certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support
levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 10, 2011, trustee remittance report, 11
assets ($180.1 million; 18.5%) in the pool were with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The
reported payment status of the specially serviced assets is:
four are real estate owned ($61.5 million, 6.3%), two are in
foreclosure ($69.3 million, 7.1%), three are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($24.8 million, 2.6%), one is 30-days delinquent
($13.1 million, 1.3%), and one is in its grace period
($11.4 million, 1.2%).  Ten of the specially serviced
assets have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$45.1 million.  According to CWCapital, the $14.1 million ARA
for the International Tower loan noted in the Feb. 10, 2011
trustee remittance report has been updated to $23.0 million to
reflect an updated September 2010 appraisal and its current
exposure.  Three of the specially serviced assets are top 10
exposures, and details of these three assets are:

The Sawyer Portfolio loan is the third-largest nondefeased
exposure in the pool and is the largest asset with the special
servicer.  The loan has a pooled trust balance of $53.0 million
(5.5%) and a total exposure of $53.3 million.  The loan is secured
by six multifamily properties totaling 1,082 units in suburban
Maryland.  The loan, which is in foreclosure, was transferred to
the special servicer on Jan. 25, 2010, due to maturity default.
The loan matured on Dec. 1, 2009.  According to the special
servicer, the court-appointed receiver was replaced on Jan. 3,
2011.  CWCapital stated that it will continue to stabilize the
properties and develop a disposition strategy.  CWCapital
indicated to us that the existing ARA of $4.1 million, which is
currently in effect for this asset, is expected to be reversed as
early as in the March 2011 trustee remittance report.  Standard &
Poor's expects a minimal loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The International Tower asset is the sixth-largest nondefeased
exposure in the pool and the second-largest asset with the special
servicer.  The asset has a pooled trust balance of $33.4 million
(3.4%) and a total exposure of $34.7 million.  The 302,992-sq.-ft.
office building in Chicago was transferred to the special servicer
on April 20, 2009, due to a monetary default after the borrower
was unable to meet the additional payment increase for the
rollover reserve escrow account.  CWCapital indicated that the
asset recently became REO on Jan. 14, 2011.  A $23.0 million ARA,
based on a September 2010 appraisal value, is in effect for this
asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this asset.

The Fairfield Lakes Apartments loan is the 10th-largest
nondefeased exposure in the pool and the third-largest asset with
the special servicer.  The loan has a pooled trust balance of
$16.3 million (1.7%) and a total exposure of $17.3 million.  The
loan is secured by a 268-unit multifamily property in Pensacola,
Fla.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 9,
2009, due to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on
Nov. 1, 2009.  According to CWCapital, it is currently evaluating
various workout strategies, including a loan modification, with
the borrower, while pursuing foreclosure.  A $3.9 million ARA,
based on an August 2010 appraisal value, is in effect for this
asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the
resolution of this asset.

The remaining eight specially serviced assets ($77.4 million,
7.9%) have balances that individually represent less than 1.5% of
the total pool balance.  Standard & Poor's estimated losses for
all eight of these loans, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 33.5%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 10, 2011 trustee remittance report, the transaction
had an aggregate pooled trust balance of $972.2 million (73 loans
and four REO assets), compared with $1.25 billion (92 loans) at
issuance.  Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), the master
servicer, provided financial information for 82.1% of the pooled
trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial information
was full-year 2009, partial-year 2010, or full-year 2010 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.77x for the nondefeased
exposures in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.74x and 81.6%, respectively, and
exclude five defeased loans ($63.4 million, 6.5%) and 11 specially
serviced assets ($180.1 million; 18.5%), for which S&P separately
estimated losses.  Sixteen loans ($219.4 million, 22.6%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist, including four of the top 10
exposures.  Seven loans ($54.1 million, 5.6%) have a reported DSC
between 1.0x and 1.1x, and seven loans ($104.6 million, 10.8%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has experienced
$31.2 million of principal losses on seven loans to date.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $465.2 million (47.8%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
2.09x for seven the top 10 nondefeased exposures in the pool (the
remaining three are nonreporting, specially serviced assets).
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 real estate
exposures were 1.90x and 83.7%, respectively.  Three of top 10
real estate exposures are with the special servicer and are
discussed above.  Four of the top 10 real estate exposures
($143.4 million, 14.8%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
which S&P discuss below.

The Union Station loan ($54.2 million, 5.6%) is the second-largest
nondefeased exposure in the pool and is secured by the leasehold
interest in a 383,350-sq.-ft. retail and office complex that is
part of the Union Station Train Station in Washington, D.C.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to an
occupancy decrease.  According to Berkadia, the borrower is
considering a redevelopment and therefore has not re-leased spaces
upon tenants' vacancies.  The reported occupancy was 86.0%
according to the Aug. 1, 2010 rent roll, and reported DSC was
3.41x DSC for the six months ended June 30, 2010.

The Imperial Center Office loan ($46.3 million, 4.8%) is the
fourth-largest real estate exposure in the pool and is secured by
a 452,249-sq.-ft., seven-story, suburban office building with an
adjacent single-story cafeteria building in Norwalk, Calif.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.
The decline in DSC is primarily due to an occupancy decrease from
93.0% in June 2009 to 82.0% as of September 2010.  According to
Berkadia, the borrower is in discussion with two prospective
tenants for space totaling 53,000 sq. ft. For the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported occupancy and DSC were 82.0%
and 0.95x, respectively.

The 5th and Jackson loan ($26.4 million, 2.7%) is the eighth-
largest real estate exposure in the pool and is secured by a
144,981-sq.-ft. office complex in Seattle.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported occupancy and DSC were
98.0% and 1.06x, respectively.

The Lake Pointe Shopping Center loan ($16.5 million, 1.7%) is the
ninth-largest nondefeased exposure in the pool and is secured by a
174,437-sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Orem, Utah.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC and a
drop in occupancy.  According to Berkadia, the initial occupancy
decline was due to the bankruptcy of tenant, Circuit City (40,260-
sq.-ft., 23.0% of the net rentable area).  Berkadia indicated that
although the center had several tenants with lease expiration in
the first quarter of 2011, a majority of the tenants have renewed
their leases for a minimum of five years.  For the six months
ended June 30, 2010, the reported occupancy and DSC were 63.0% and
0.75x, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed
ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through securities series 2004-C3

                Rating
                ------
    Class     To            From        Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --            ----        ----------------------
    A-J       A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)                     14.01
    B         BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)                     10.79
    C         BBB (sf)      A+ (sf)                       9.34
    D         B+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                     7.25
    E         CCC- (sf)     B+ (sf)                       5.96

                        Ratings Affirmed

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through securities series 2004-C3

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                  22.53
             A-3      AAA (sf)                  22.53
             A-4      AAA (sf)                  22.53
             A-AB     AAA (sf)                  22.53
             A-5      AAA (sf)                  22.53
             F        CCC- (sf)                  4.36
             X-1      AAA (sf)                    N/A
             X-2      AAA (sf)                    N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2005-C1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2005-C1 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently,
S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P lowered its
ratings on six certificate classes due to credit support erosion
that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of 12
of the 14 specially serviced assets.  S&P also considered the
trust's susceptibility to future interest shortfalls and a
reduction in the liquidity available to absorb future interest
shortfalls.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.33x and a loan-to-value ratio of 105.5%.  S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.90x and an LTV ratio of
144.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 84.0% and 36.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude three fully defeased loans
($16.9 million; 1.8%) and 12 ($217.4 million, 22.5%) of the 14
specially serviced assets, for which S&P separately estimated
losses and included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss severity figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the five principal and
interest certificates reflect subordination and liquidity support
levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 10, 2011 trustee remittance report, 14 assets
($304.0 million; 31.5%) in the pool were with the special
servicers, Helios AMC LLC and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC.  The reported payment status of the specially serviced
assets is: one is real estate owned ($8.2 million, 0.9%);
one is in foreclosure ($13.0 million, 1.3%); nine are 90-plus-
days delinquent ($191.6 million, 19.8%); one is 60-days
delinquent ($3.5 million, 0.4%); and two are in their grace
period ($87.7 million, 9.1%).  Twelve of the specially serviced
assets ($232.9 million, 22.4%) have appraisal reduction amounts
in effect totaling $86.8 million.  Four of the specially serviced
assets are top 10 exposures, and details of the five largest
assets with the special servicer are:

The Windsor Hospitality Portfolio loan ($83.2 million, 8.6%) is
the largest exposure in the pool and is the largest asset with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by four hotel properties
(three Embassy Suites flags and one Renaissance flag) in Las
Vegas, North Carolina, California, and Georgia with a total of 902
rooms.  The loan was transferred to Berkadia on Sept. 24, 2010,
due to imminent loan maturity (on Nov. 1, 2010) default.  The loan
is currently in its grace period.  For the year ended Dec. 31,
2010, the reported occupancy and DSC were 76.0% and 0.95x,
respectively.  According to the special servicer, the borrower is
working to refinance the loan.

The 3301 N. Buffalo Drive loan ($57.7 million, 6.0%) is the
third-largest exposure in the pool and the second-largest asset
with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 321,041-sq.-
ft. office property in Las Vegas built in 1997.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on April 17, 2009, due to
imminent default.  As of the February 2011 remittance report, the
loan was 90-plus-days delinquent and a $30.6 million ARA was in
effect for this asset.  According to Helios, this loan was
modified in December 2010.  The modification terms called for a
hope note structure, where the $57.7 million loan was split into
an A-note ($38.0 million) and a B-note ($19.7 million).  In
addition, the loan's maturity date was extended to May 2020, the
pay interest rate was reduced and an interest-only term was
included.

The City Center Square loan ($40.5 million, 4.2%) is the fifth-
largest exposure in the pool and third-largest asset with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 650,097-sq.-ft. office
property in Kansas City, Mo., built in 1979.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on April 9, 2010, for imminent
default, and is currently 90-plus-days delinquent.  The reported
DSC was 0.96x for year-end 2009 and according to Helios, the
occupancy is currently at 52.0%.  Helios is currently working on a
potential loan modification with the borrower.  A $7.2 million ARA
is in effect for this asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate
loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Empirian at Winter Oaks loan ($22.2 million, 2.3%) is the
10th-largest exposure in the pool and fourth-largest asset with
the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 460-unit apartment
complex located in Winter Haven, Fla.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on Sept.  18, 2009, for payment default, and
is currently 90-plus-days delinquent.  According to Helios, the
property is currently being marketed for sale.  A $13.0 million
ARA is in effect for this asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The AviStar Parking-Hartford Bradley loan ($20.3 million, 2.1%) is
the 11th-largest exposure in the pool and fifth-largest asset with
the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 5,300-stall
parking facility located in Windsor Lock, Conn.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 25, 2010, for payment
default and is 90-plus-days delinquent.  According to the special
servicer, the single tenant, Parking Co. of America Airports,
filed for bankruptcy on Jan. 28, 2010, and subsequently rejected
the subject lease.  Helios indicated that the borrower has entered
into a management agreement with a new manager and is preparing
the 2011 budget.  According to Helios, the borrower has submitted
a request for loan modification.  A $13.0 million ARA is in effect
for this asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset, should a loan modification
not be reached between the borrower and special servicer.

The remaining nine specially serviced assets ($80.1 million, 8.3%)
have balances that individually represent less than 2.0% of the
total pool balance.  Standard & Poor's estimated losses for eight
of these nine loans, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity
of 41.4%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 10, 2011, trustee remittance report, the
transaction had an aggregate pooled trust balance of
$967.4 million (76 loans and one REO asset), compared with
$1.60 billion (91 loans) at issuance.  Berkadia, the master
servicer, provided financial information for 82.8% of the pooled
trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial information
was full-year 2009, partial-year 2010, or full-year 2010 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.35x for the nondefeased
exposures in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.33x and 105.5%, respectively,
and exclude three defeased loans ($16.9 million, 1.8%) and 12
specially serviced assets ($217.4 million; 22.5%), for which S&P
separately estimated losses.  Twenty-one loans ($207.8 million,
21.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist, including one top-
10 exposure.  Seven loans ($94.7 million, 9.8%) have a reported
DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and nine loans ($189.6 million, 19.6%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has experienced
$30.9 million of principal losses on five loans to date.

             Summary of Top-10 Real Estate Exposures

The top real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $444.7 million (46.0%).  Using servicer-reported
information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x
for eight of the top-10 real estate exposures in the pool (the
remaining two are nonreporting, specially serviced assets).  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top-10 real estate exposures
were 1.37x and 110.8%, respectively.  Four of top-10 real estate
exposures are with the special servicer and are discussed above.
One of the top-10 real estate exposures ($40.4 million, 4.2%) is
on the master servicer's watchlist, which S&P discuss below.

The NJ Industrial/Office Portfolios 1 & 2 loan ($40.4 million,
4.2%) is the sixth-largest exposure in the pool and is secured by
three industrial buildings and three office buildings totaling
467,186 sq. ft. in northern New Jersey.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC of 1.10x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2010.  The low DSC is primarily due to an
occupancy decrease from 100.0% in December 2009 to 78.0% as of
September 2010.  In addition, the loan began to amortize in May
2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
        Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

            Rating
            ------
Class     To            From               Credit enhancement (%)
-----     --            ----               ----------------------
A-J       BB+ (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Neg                  16.62
B         B+ (sf)       A- (sf)/Watch Neg                  13.11
C         B (sf)        BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg                11.87
D         CCC- (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg                  9.40
E         CCC- (sf)     B (sf)/Watch Neg                    7.74
F         D (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                 6.09

                        Ratings Affirmed

            GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
        Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                  46.35
             A-3      AAA (sf)                  46.35
             A-4      AAA (sf)                  46.35
             A-5      AAA (sf)                  46.35
             A-M      AAA (sf)                  29.84
             X-1      AAA (sf)                    N/A
             X-2      AAA (sf)                    N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-GG8 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five and
affirmed 19 classes of Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities
Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-GG8:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and higher credit quality dispersion.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10.3% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 9.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 24.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.  Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-
based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and
fusion transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model
results at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on
the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 46 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 25, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $4.1 billion
from $4.2 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 154 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5.1% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
39% of the pool.

Forty-two loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $36.4 million loss (69%
loss severity on average).  Currently twenty-three loans,
representing 11% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the Ariel Preferred Retail
Portfolio Loan ($90.9 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of six anchored retail outlet centers
located in suburban markets in California, Georgia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana and Nevada.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2009 due to monetary default and is
currently in foreclosure.  The servicer recognized a $36.2 million
appraisal reduction for this loan in February 2011.

The remaining 22 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$206.4 million appraisal reduction for 20 of the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $236.4 million
loss (51% expected loss on average) for 22 of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 14 poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated a
$43.8 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 41% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through S
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $23.9
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 80% and 81% of the performing pool,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 119% compared to 115% at last full
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.30X and 0.93X, compared to 1.29X and
0.94X, respectively, at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is One Beacon Street Loan
($210.0 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
premiere class A office building located in Boston, Massachusetts.
The total gross leasable area is 1 million square foot (SF) with
the largest tenants being Mass Housing Finance Agency (12% of the
net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration March 2015), JP Morgan
Chase (9% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2019) and Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (6% of the NRA; lease expiration
March 2014).  The property was 89% leased as of September 2010
compared to 93% at last review.  The property was also encumbered
by a $98 million mezzanine loan at securitization.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 81%
and 1.17X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the 222 South Riverside Plaza Loan
($202.0 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by two
Class A office buildings with a combined total of 1.2 million SF
located in Chicago, Illinois.  The largest tenants include Fifth
Third Bank (15% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2016),
Deutsche Investment Management (10% of the NRA; lease expiration
December 2016) and Trading Technologies (10% of the NRA; lease
expiration January 2013).  The property was 93% leased as of
September 2010, the same as at last review..Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 104%
and 0.93X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Arizona Grand Resort Loan, formerly
known as Pointe South Mountain Resort Loan, ($190.0 million --
4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 640-unit full-service
hotel located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The loan had previously been
in special servicing but was modified and subsequently returned to
the master servicer.  .  Under the loan modification agreement,
the original loan was split into an A Note ($100.0 million) and a
B Note ($90.0 million), both of which remain included in the
trust.  The A Note will remain interest only at 5.5% until March
2012 (at which point it will amortize on a 360 month schedule at a
6.68% interest rate through maturity), while the B Note will bear
no interest and is payable in full at maturity.  Due to the
decline in the hotel market in Phoenix, Arizona, Moody's has
assumed a high default probability on this loan.


GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible downgrade
two tranches in Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1.  The
loans are secured primarily by commercial real estate.  Wells
Fargo Bank is the master servicer in the transaction.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are caused by significant deterioration in
collateral performance as evinced by higher than anticipated
losses.  Since Moody's last rating action in January 2010, loans
totaling approximately $30 million (13% of the original pool
balance) were charged-off.  While Moody's expect future recoveries
on the defaulted loans, the recovery amount is highly uncertain.

The methodology used in these rating actions included an analysis
of the collateral performance to arrive at a range of estimated
lifetime net losses.  This range was then evaluated against the
available credit enhancement provided by subordination and excess
spread.  Sufficiency of coverage was considered in light of the
credit quality of the collateral pool, industry, geographical and
loan concentrations, historical variability of losses experienced
by the issuer, and servicer quality.

During the review period, Moody's will project expected defaults
and recoveries on the underlying pools of loans using a loan-by-
loan analysis of business types, property locations, past payment
histories, borrowers' creditworthiness, and most recent appraisals
or estimates of market values of the properties.  The Aaa
volatility proxy will also be determined.  Driving factors of the
Aaa volatility proxy are the credit quality of the collateral
pool, the historical variability in losses experienced by the
issuer, the servicer quality as well as the industrial,
geographical and obligor concentrations.

Based on Moody's revised expected losses and Aaa volatility proxy,
Moody's will evaluate whether the available credit enhancement
adequately protects investors against future collateral losses for
given rating assignments.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two 2006-GG7 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed 18 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp. Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-GG7:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb. 3, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 7.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
23% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 15, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to $3.3 billion
from $3.6 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 123 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 48%
of the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with credit estimates.

Twenty-one loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $119.9 million (86% loss severity
overall).  The pool had realized an aggregate $82 million loss at
last review.  Fifteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $142.4 million loss (51% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$15.2 million aggregate loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 93% and 64% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 109% compared to 110% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.94X, respectively, essentially
the same at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 32 compared to 35 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Investcorp Retail Portfolio Loan
($248.4 million -- 7.6%), which represents a pari passu interest
in a $257.9 million loan.  The loan is secured by 22 shopping
centers located in three Texas MSA's (Dallas, Houston and San
Antonio).  Since securitization, seven properties have been
released from the loan collateral reducing the total net rentable
area to 2.2 million square feet from 2.8 million square feet at
securitization.  As of June 2010, the portfolio was 91% leased
compared to 89% in March 2009 and 93% at securitization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.91X, respectively, compared
to 139% and 0.74X at last review.

The second largest loan is the One New York Plaza Loan ($192.8
million -- 5.9%), which represents a pari passu interest in a $386
million loan.  The loan is secured by a 2.4 million square foot
Class A office building located in downtown Manhattan.  The
property was 100% leased as of March 2010, similar to last review.
The largest tenants are Wachovia which leases 53% of the net
rentable area (NRA) through December 2014 and Goldman Sachs, which
leases 21% of the NRA through December 2014.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 81% and
1.13X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 55 Corporate Drive Loan
($190 million -- 5.8%), which is secured by three office buildings
totaling 670,000 square feet located in Bridgewater, New Jersey.
The property was 100% leased to Sanofi-Aventis (Moody's senior
unsecured debt rating -- A2; stable outlook) through June 2026.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.71X, respectively,
essentially the same at last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 2007-GG9 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 18 classes of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-GG9,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-GG9 on
review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 19, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from actual and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans and an increase in interest
shortfalls.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 10, 2009.

                    Deal And Performance Summary

As of the February 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $6.35 billion
from $6.58 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 196 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
41% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with investment
grade credit estimates that represent 8% of the pool.  The pool
does not contain any defeased loans.

Sixty-one loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly the Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $49.1 million (57% loss severity).
Twenty-four loans, representing 17% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The specially serviced loans are secured by a
mix of multifamily, retail, office, hotel and industrial property
types.  The master servicer has recognized appraisal reductions
totaling $165.6 million for fourteen of the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-C1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2003-C1.  S&P lowered
its rating on class O to 'D (sf)'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on nine other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria and its analysis of the
liquidity available to the trust.  The lowered ratings reflect the
credit support erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon the
eventual resolution of three of the four specially serviced assets
and the monthly interest shortfalls that are affecting the trust.
S&P downgraded the class O certificates to 'D (sf)' due to
recurring interest shortfalls that S&P expects to continue.  The
affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels and liquidity that are consistent
with the outstanding ratings.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.27x and a loan-to-value ratio of 91.5%.  S&P further stressed
the assets' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted-average DSC of 1.02x and an LTV ratio of 115.1%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
43.6% and 34.6%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude three of the four loans that are with the
special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC ($14.6 million;
1.9%), and nine defeased loans ($193.1 million; 25.5%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced
assets, and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures.

As of the Feb. 7, 2011 remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $48,816.  The shortfalls were
related to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts
($31,394) associated with two of the specially serviced assets, as
well as special servicing fees ($17,423).  The interest shortfalls
affected all classes subordinate to and including class O.  Class
O has experienced interest shortfalls for the past month, which
S&P expects to continue for the foreseeable future.  As a result,
S&P lowered this certificate rating to 'D (sf)'.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class XC interest-only certificate
based on its current criteria.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the Feb. 7, 2011 remittance report, four assets
($62.1 million; 8.2%) in the pool were with Berkadia.  The
reported payment status of these assets is: two ($11.2 million;
1.5%) are real estate owned; one ($3.3 million, 0.4%) is 90-plus-
days delinquent; and one ($47.5 million, 6.3%) is current in its
payments.  Appraisal reduction amounts totaling $5.7 million are
in effect for two of the specially serviced assets.

The Windsor Capital Portfolio loan ($47.5 million, 6.3%) is the
largest loan with the special servicer and the second-largest loan
in the pool.  A pari passu note of equal amount is held in the
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2003-C2 trust.
The loan is collateralized by a portfolio of seven hotels: six are
located in California and one is located in Michigan.  The hotels
operate under the Embassy Suites, Marriott, and Radisson Suites
flags, and have a combined total of 1,531 rooms.  The loan is
reported to be current in its payments, with reported DSC and
occupancy of 1.39x and 71.3%, respectively as of Dec. 31, 2009.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on May 25, 2010,
due to imminent maturity default.  The loan was subject to a
modification, which included a two-year maturity extension.  The
loan is expected to be returned to the master servicer, Wells
Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing.

The Nottingham Apartments ($7.0 million; 0.9%) is the second-
largest asset with the special servicer and is REO.  The asset is
a 283-unit apartment complex in Kalamazoo, Mich., that was built
in 1973.  A property inspection conducted on March 17, 2010,
characterized the property as being in "fair" to "poor" condition.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer on May 6, 2009,
and became REO on Feb. 4, 2010.  The reported occupancy was 92.9%
as of Dec. 31, 2010.  There is a $3.5 million ARA in effect
against the asset.  The property is currently listed for sale, and
S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The Plaza One Office Building ($4.2 million; 0.6%) is the third-
largest asset with the special servicer and is REO.  The asset is
a 44,226-sq.-ft. office building in Richmond, Calif., that was
built in 1982.  The asset was transferred to the special servicer
on July 15, 2009, and became REO on June 17, 2010.  The reported
occupancy was 73.9% as of Dec. 31, 2010.  There is a $2.2 million
ARA in effect against the asset.  The property is currently listed
for sale, and S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The University & Stapley loan ($3.3 million; 0.4%) is the smallest
loan with the special servicer.  The loan is 90-plus-days
delinquent and is secured by a 24,648-sq.-ft. retail property in
Mesa, Ariz., that was built in 1999.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on Oct. 15, 2010, due to a payment default.
The reported DSC was 1.10x as of Dec. 31, 2009, and the reported
occupancy was 62.0% as of August 2010.  The special servicer is in
discussions with the borrower while pursuing the trust's rights
and remedies.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual
disposition of this loan.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 7, 2011, remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $757.7 million (57 loans and two REO
assets), down from $1.2 billion (72 loans) at issuance.  Nine
loans ($193.1 million, 25.5%) are defeased.  Wells Fargo provided
full-year 2009, interim 2010, and full-year 2010 financial
information for 87.1% of the nondefeased assets in the pool.
Using the reported figures, S&P calculated a weighted-average DSC
of 1.47x for the pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.27x and
91.5%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
the defeased assets and three of the transaction's four specially
serviced assets.  S&P separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced assets.  The master servicer reported a
watchlist of 16 loans ($140.6 million, 18.6%), including one of
the top 10 real estate loans, which S&P discuss in detail below.
Seven ($52.5 million, 6.9%) loans in the pool have a reported DSC
of less than 1.10x, five ($41.0 million, 5.4%) of which have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

               Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $299.9 million (39.6%).  Using
servicer-reported information, S&P calculated a weighted-average
DSC of 1.24x for these loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
for the top 10 real estate exposures were 1.18x and 97.6%,
respectively.

The Oxmoor Center Mall ($55.3 million; 7.3%) is the largest
nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by the leasehold
interest in 531,458 sq. ft. of a 941,558-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Louisville, Ky., that was built in 1971.  The anchors are Von
Maui, Macy's, Sears, and Dick's Sporting Goods.  As of Sept. 30,
2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.83x and 97.5%,
respectively.  The loan was with the special servicer before being
returned to the master servicer following a loan modification,
which extended the maturity of the loan to Dec. 1, 2016.

The Tysons Office Center ($18.8 million; 2.5%) is the ninth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by a 148,467-
sq.-ft. office building in Vienna, Va., built in 1979.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a drop in DSC
from issuance.  As of Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.10x and 75.9%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with S&P's analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class    To        From        Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --        ----        ----------------------
      H        A- (sf)   A (sf)                       10.16
      J        BBB- (sf) A- (sf)                       7.76
      K        BB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)                     5.75
      L        B- (sf)   BBB- (sf)                     3.75
      M        CCC+ (sf) BB+ (sf)                      2.75
      N        CCC- (sf) BB (sf)                       1.94
      O        D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                     0.74

                        Ratings Affirmed

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

            Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------   ----------------------
            A-3       AAA (sf)                  28.40
            A-4       AAA (sf)                  28.40
            B         AAA (sf)                  22.99
            C         AAA (sf)                  20.99
            D         AA+ (sf)                  18.58
            E         AA (sf)                   16.18
            F         AA- (sf)                  14.77
            G         A+ (sf)                   12.77
            XC        AAA (sf)                    N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Expects to Rate Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2011-ALF.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction:

  -- $195,000,000 class A notes 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $195,000,000* class XA-1 notes 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $195,000,000* class XA-2 notes 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $40,000,000 class B notes 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $27,000,000 class C notes 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $38,000,000 class D notes 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $25,000,000 class E notes 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.
  * Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not expect to rate the interest only classes XB-1 and
XB-2.  The transaction represents a securitization in the form of
notes backed 29 senior living facilities sponsored by CNL
Lifestyle Properties and Sunrise Senior Living.

The transaction is expected to close March 17, 2011.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed two classes of
Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-1 Ltd./Corp.
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 23.4%, an
increase from last review that has been more than offset by
increased credit enhancement to the classes resulting from
repayments.

The transaction is primarily collateralized by subordinate
commercial real estate debt (74.9% of total collateral is either
B-notes or mezzanine loans).  Fitch has modeled significant losses
upon default for many of these assets, including two Fitch loans
of concern (20.4%), since they are generally highly leveraged debt
classes.  However, no loans in the pool are currently delinquent.
Further, two assets, representing 8.2% of the CDO collateral, are
CMBS bonds that carry a Fitch rating of 'AA'.

The transaction exited its reinvestment period in May 2010 and
as such all loan repayments, of which there have been over
$78 million since last review, have been used to amortize the
rated classes on a pro rata basis.  The preferred shares do not
receive principal payments until all rated notes have been paid in
full.  As a result, the credit enhancement to all classes has
increased significantly.  The class E credit enhancement, the most
junior rated class, is 90.5%.  The overcollateralization test and
interest coverage test are both passing their respective covenants
with substantial cushion.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 53.2% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 6.3%, generally from trailing 12 months
November or December 2010 cash flows.  Fitch estimates average
recoveries to be moderate (56.1%).

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation are
two B-notes (12.1%) secured by a 524,000 square foot regional
mall.  As of November 2010, the mall was 81.6% occupied.  Property
net cash flow for year-end 2010 declined 18% since year-end 2009.
Fitch modeled a term default and full loss on this loan in its
base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (21.9%) backed by partnership interests in a
portfolio of 108 select service and extended stay hotels (12,638
keys) located across 34 states in the U.S. Fitch modeled a
maturity default in its base case scenario on this loan.

Guggenheim 2005-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation that is
managed by Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Advisors and has
approximately $118 million of collateral.  The transaction's five-
year reinvestment period ended in May 2010.  As of the February
2011 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was
invested: B-notes (53%), whole loans/A-notes (24%), CRE mezzanine
loans (21.9%), and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS;
1.1%).  In general, Fitch models non-senior, single-borrower CMBS
as CRE B-notes.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
uses debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  Property cash flow stresses
have been updated to reflect more recently available CRE
performance and outlooks.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash
flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The transaction
was not evaluated in a cash flow model because of the significant
increase in credit enhancement compared to the modest increase in
base case expected loss.

The ratings and Outlooks for classes A through E reflect
expectations that the classes will be repaid in full under
investment grade stresses.  Due to the concentration of the pool
with only nine obligors remaining, the percentage of loans
considered Fitch loans of concern, and the concentration of loans
with near term maturities, high investment grade ratings are not
warranted.

Fitch has taken rating actions on, and revised LS Ratings as
indicated on these classes; the Outlooks are revised to Stable
from Negative:

  -- $4,943,021 class A, affirmed at 'Asf'; revised to 'LS5' from
     'LS3';

  -- $2,095,729 class B, affirmed at 'BBBsf'; revised to 'LS5'
     from 'LS4';

  -- $2,558,103 class C, upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; revised
     to 'LS5' from 'LS4';

  -- $1,173,718 class D, upgraded to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $476,053 class E, upgraded to 'BBBsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'.


GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1,
Ltd.:

  -- US$76,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3 (sf);

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$33,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf);

  -- US$31,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated , February 15, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2631 compared to 2948
in the May 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 10.4% of the underlying portfolio versus
18.7% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$1.0 million of the underlying portfolio compared to $28.6 million
in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 121.8%, versus May 2009
levels of 118%.  Moody's also notes that the Class D Notes are no
longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $487.9 million, defaulted par of $4.7 million,
a weighted average default probability of 28.25% (implying a WARF
of 3590), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.85%,
and a diversity score of 75.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued on May 24, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2872)

  -- Class A-1-R: 0
  -- Class A-1-A: 0
  -- Class A-1-B: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +3
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4308)

  -- Class A-1-R: 0
  -- Class A-1-A: 0
  -- Class A-1-B: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1b, A-2, B, and C notes from Halcyon Structured Asset Management
Long Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-2 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation transaction managed by Halcyon Asset Management LLC.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-1a notes.
S&P removed its ratings on the A-1a, A-1b, and A-2 notes from
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since February 2010.
At the time of S&P's last rating action in February 2010, S&P
lowered the ratings on the class A-1a, A-1b, A-2 and B notes, and
affirmed the class C notes, following a review using its updated
criteria for rating corporate collateralized debt obligations.

At the time of S&P's last rating action, the transaction held
approximately $19.5 million in defaulted obligations and $78.2
million in underlying assets from obligors with ratings in the
'CCC' range, according to the December 2009 trustee report.  As of
the January 2011 trustee report, the transaction held no defaulted
obligations and $49.1 million in assets from underlying obligors
with ratings in the 'CCC' range.

Since the time of S&P's last rating action, a number of defaulted
obligors held in the deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some
receiving proceeds that were higher than their carrying value in
the transaction's overcollateralization ratio test calculation.
This, in combination with a reduction in assets with ratings in
the 'CCC' range, benefited the transaction's O/C ratio.  The class
A O/C ratio increased to 124.8% as of the Jan. 19, 2011, report
from 120.0% as of Dec. 15, 2009, report.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in S&P's view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
                           2007-2 Ltd.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
     Class                   To           From
     -----                   --           ----
     A-1b                    AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
     A-2                     AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
     B                       A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
     C                       BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Positive

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
                           2007-2 Ltd.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
     Class                   To           From
     -----                   --           ----
     A-1a                    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Ups Rating on Class D Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded these
notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO VI, Ltd.:

  -- US$255,000,000 Class A-T First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due June 9, 2019 (current
     outstanding balance $231,262,519), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-R First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due June 9, 2019 (current
     outstanding balance $45,256,853), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$27,500,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due June 9, 2019, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due June 9, 2019, Upgraded to
     Baa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due June 9, 2019, Upgraded to
     B1 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due June 9, 2019 (current
     outstanding balance of $13,414,792), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating action in
June 2009.

Since the rating action in June 2009, the Class A notes have been
paid down by approximately 8% or $24.9 million.  In part, as a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased.  As of the latest trustee report dated February 2,
2011, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 118.20%, 112.46%,
107.26%, and 103.13%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of
108.83%, 103.93%, 99.45%, and 95.27% respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  In
particular, the Class E overcollateralization ratio has increased
due to the diversion of excess interest to delever the Class E
notes in the event of a Class E overcollateralization test
failure.  The Class E notes have also delevered due to the
diversion of excess interest following an interest diversion test
failure.  Since the rating action in June 2009, the Class E notes
have delevered by 15.1% or $2.4 million including outstanding
deferred interest.  Moody's notes that the Class D and Class E
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the rating
action in June 2009.  Based on the February 2011 trustee report,
the weighted average rating factor is 2361 compared to 2468 in May
2009, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up
approximately 6.9% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.4% in May
2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $8 million from approximately $33 million in
May 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $354 million, defaulted par of $11 million, a
weighted average default probability of 26.16% (implying a WARF of
3345), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.30%,
and a diversity score of 60.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO VI, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2676)

  -- Class A-T: +2
  -- Class A-R: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4014)

  -- Class A-T: -2
  -- Class A-R: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Ups Rating on Class E Notes to Caa2 (sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded these
notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO I-R, Ltd.:

  -- US$15,700,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due November 12, 2019, Upgraded to A3
     (sf); previously on September 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf);

  -- US$11,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 12, 2019,
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on September 10, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$9,900,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 12, 2019,
     Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on September 10, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$10,300,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 12, 2019 (current
     outstanding balance of $7,036,867), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in September
2009.

Based on the trustee report dated February 8, 2011, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 118.30%, 111.87%, 106.77%, and 103.41%, respectively,
versus September 2009 levels of 113.14%, 107.15%, 102.32%, and
98.38%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class E
overcollateralization ratio has increased due to the diversion of
excess interest to delever the Class E notes in the event of a
Class E overcollateralization test failure.  The Class E notes
have also delevered due to the diversion of excess interest
following an interest diversion test failure.  Since the rating
action in September 2009, the Class E notes have delevered by
22.7% or $2.1 million including outstanding deferred interest.
Moody's notes that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer
deferring interest and that all previously deferred interest has
been paid in full.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
The weighted average rating factor is 2336 in the February 2011
report compared to 2344 in September 2009, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 6.2% of the underlying
portfolio versus 6.1% in September 2009.  The deal also
experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $4.5 million
from approximately $24.4 million in September 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $231 million, defaulted par of $5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 25.98% (implying a WARF of
3457), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.78%,
and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO I-R, Ltd., issued in November 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  A summary of the
impact of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of
WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2766)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4148)

  -- Class A: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: -2


Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread and coupon levels higher than the covenant
   levels due to the large difference between the reported and
   covenant levels.


HIPOCAT 14: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded Classes
A, B and C issued by Hipocat 14 and all notes issued by Hipocat
16.

In June 2009 Moody's placed the ratings of all notes issued by
Hipocat 14 and Hipocat 16 on review for possible downgrade
following the rating action on Caixa Catalunya.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action concludes the review and takes into
consideration the exposure to Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya,
Tarragona i Man (CatalunyaCaixa) as well as revised assumptions
for the collateral portfolios in both transactions.  The
downgrades reflects the performance deterioration in the current
down cycle, the large exposure to flexible mortgages and Moody's
negative sector outlook for Spanish RMBS.

In summer 2010, Moody's noted that the share of written-off loans
reported in the Hipocat series managed by GestiOn de Activos
Titulizados had been understated.  For this review, Moody's
received final restated amounts of defaulted loans, as reported in
the latest investor reports of the time.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pools, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the lifetime losses (expected
loss), as well as the transaction structure and any legal
considerations as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The
expected loss and the Milan Aaa CE are the two key parameters used
by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution curve, used in the
cash flow model to rate European RMBS transactions.

Portfolio Expected Loss: Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss
expectation for Hipocat 14 and 16, taking into account the
collateral performance to date, as well as the current
macroeconomic environment in Spain.  In December 2011, cumulative
write-offs in Hipocat 14 and 16 rose to 0.89% and 0.13%,
respectively, of the original pool balance.  At the end of
December 2010, the share of 90+ day arrears stood at 0.36% of
current pool balance in Hipocat 14 and 0.03% in Hipocat 16.  The
reserve funds are currently at target level.  Moody's expects the
portfolio credit performance to be under stress, as Spanish
unemployment remains elevated.  The rating agency believes that
the anticipated tightening of Spanish fiscal policies is likely to
weigh on the recovery in the Spanish labour market and constrain
future Spanish households finances.  Moody's also has concerns
over the timing and degree of future recoveries in a weaker
Spanish housing market.  On the basis of Moody's negative sector
outlook for Spanish RMBS, the rating agency has updated the
portfolio expected loss assumption to 2.10% of original pool
balance in Hipocat 14 and Hipocat 16, up from 1.1%.

MILAN Aaa CE: Moody's has assessed the loan-by-loan information
for Hipocat 14 and Hipocat 16 to determine the MILAN Aaa CE.
Moody's has increased its MILAN Aaa CE assumptions for Hipocat 14
to 13.70%, up from 5.20% at closing.  The rating agency increased
the Milan Aaa CE for Hipocat 16 to 14.60%, up from 5.90%.  The
increase in the MILAN Aaa CE reflects the high concentration of
flexible loans and high geographical concentration in Catalonia.
Both transactions are secured by 100% flexible mortgages.  The
product in question, called "Cr‚dito Total" offers the possibility
of withdrawing additional funds when the loan has amortized below
the credit limit (first and subsequent draw-downs will never
exceed 80% of the original appraisal value) subject to specific
conditions.  These type of flexible loans are riskier than
traditional mortgage loans because as the mortgage loans amortize,
the debtor has the possibility of withdrawing additional funds, so
the LTV may increase to the lowest of the initial LTV or 80% .

Operational Risk: The rating of CatalunyaCaixa (A3/P-2) is on
review for possible downgrade.  CatalunyaCaixa is the servicer in
both transactions.  Moody's notes that operational risk in these
transactions is only partially mitigated as there are no trigger
in place to appoint a back-up servicer.  The operational risk is
not a driver in the rating action.  However a severe downgrade of
the servicer into the Baa3/Ba range will impact the ratings of the
senior notes.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

                      Transaction Features

Hipocat 14 and Hipocat 16 closed in March 2005 and June 2008,
respectively.  The transactions are backed by portfolios of first-
ranking mortgage loans originated by Caixa Catalunya, now part of
CatalunyaCaixa (A3/P-2 on review for possible downgrade) and
secured by residential properties located in Spain.  Their overall
balance at closing is EUR909 million and EUR1.0 billion,
respectively.  The new entity, CatalunyaCaixa, has been operative
since 1 July 2010.  Moody's has been informed that the servicing
of Caixa Catalunya's mortgage portfolio will remain on Caixa
Catalunya's servicing platform.

Hipocat 14 consists exclusively of securitization of additional
drawdowns of Caixa Catalunya's flexible mortgage loan (after the
initial drawdown, any additional drawdown not necessarily the
second in order of origination date).  The product, named Cr‚dito
Total offers the possibility of withdrawing additional funds up to
the minimum of the original loan-to-value ratio, or 80% LTV.
Hipocat 16 also securitizes flexible mortgages (first drawdown and
further drawdowns).  As of January 2011, the weighted average
current LTV in Hipocat 14 is 39% and 49% in Hipocat 16%.  The pool
concentration in Catalonia represented 85% and 59% of the current
pool balance in Hipocat 14 and Hipocat 16, respectively.
Currently, 2.91% of the portfolio balance in Hipocat 14 and 0.97%
in Hipocat 16 corresponds to loans granted to non-Spanish
nationals.

Some features in the deals have changed since closing:

Hedging agreement: CatalunyaCaixa has amended the swap agreements
to achieve substantial compliance with the requirements described
in Moody's report titled "the Framework for De-linking Hedge
Counterparty Risks from Global Structured Finance Cashflow
Transactions."These amendments included the insertion of
provisions to: (i) regulate the collateral arrangements (by way of
a market-standard "CSA"); and (ii) requirements for CatalunyaCaixa
to take steps to find a replacement counterparty or guarantor upon
the downgrade of its ratings below A3/P-2.

Treasury Bank Accounts: For both transactions, collections are
paid to CatalunyaCaixa (A3/P-2, on review for possible downgrade)
and then transferred every 24 to 48 hours to the treasury account.
CatalunyaCaixa has been replaced as the treasury account bank by
Banco Espa¤ol de Cr‚dito S.A (Aa3/P-1, on review for possible
downgrade) in Hipocat 14 and by Banco Sabadell S.A. (A2/P1 on
review for possible downgrade) in Hipocat 16.

Paying Agents: CatalunyaCaixa (A3/P2 on review for possible
downgrade) in Hipocat 14 and 16.  Caixa Catalunya was downgraded
on 15 June 2009 from A2/P-1 to A3/P-2.  CatalunyaCaixa has been
replaced as the paying agent by Banco Espa¤ol de Cr‚dito S.A
(Aa3/P-1 on review for possible downgrade) in Hipocat 14 and by
Banco Sabadell S.A. (A2/P1 on review for possible downgrade) in
Hipocat 16.

Reserve fund: The reserve funds in both deals are currently at
target level.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                     List of Ratings Actions

Issuer: HIPOCAT 14 FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

  -- EUR868.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR9M B Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 29,
     2009 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR22.5M C Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2009 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR9M D Notes, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 29,
     2009 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HIPOCAT 16 FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

  -- EUR956.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR25M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2009 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR18.5M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2009 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


HSBC BANK: S&P Affirms Rating on $10 Mil. Unfunded Credit Swap
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its rating on the
$10 million unfunded Credit Default Swap between the HSBC Bank USA
and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. due September 2014, a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The rating action follows S&P's synthetic rated
overcollateralization review and reflects rating stability
in the reference portfolio and an SROC ratio that was at or
above 100% at the current rating level.

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Positive

                       Credit Default Swap

   US$10 million HSBC Bank USA N.A. - The Hongkong and Shanghai
                        Banking Corp. Ltd.

                          Rating
                          ------
         Class       To            From
         -----       --            ----
         Tranche     BB-srp (sf)   BB-srp (sf)/Watch Pos


IMC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 20
tranches from 6 Subprime deals issued by IMC.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Owner Trust 1997-5

  -- A-9, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-10, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Owner Trust 1998-7

  -- A, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series
1998-5

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-6, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-3

  -- A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Aa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-3

  -- A-7, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- A-8, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     April 8, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


INDYMAC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40
tranches from 9 Subprime deals issued by IndyMac.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The above mentioned approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans to account for the volatile
nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become
delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies of 11% for pools
originated and securitized before 2005.  The baseline rate is
generally higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for
larger pools.  Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments
are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and
2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the
number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility
in performance.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the
rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than
75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2004 vintage,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 11.11%.  In
addition, if the current delinquency level in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.
To account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by
a factor ranging from 0.85 to 2.25 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 10% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series SPMD
2002-A

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD
2001-C

  -- Cl. AF-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2009
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD
2004-A

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series SPMD 2000-C

  -- Cl. AV, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2009 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2009
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2009
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series SPMD 2001-B

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series SPMD 2002-B

  -- Cl. AF, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, SPMD
2001-A

  -- AF-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AF-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- AV, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MF-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- MV-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, SPMD
2004-B

  -- Cl. A-I, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 27, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-II-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 27,
     2004 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, SPMD
2004-C

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


INDYMAC RESIDENTIAL: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
A from IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2005-L1 by
reinstating it at 'D (sf)' from 'NR'.

On March 19, 2010, S&P incorrectly affirmed its rating on class A
at 'BB (sf)' and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications instead of lowering it to 'CC (sf)'.  On June 25,
2010, the scheduled maturity date, class A had not been paid in
full, and S&P incorrectly withdrew the rating instead of lowering
it to 'D (sf)'.

All of the mortgage loans in this trust consist of residential lot
loans.  This class is bond insured by Financial Guaranty Insurance
Corp. (not rated).

                        Rating Corrected

        IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2005-L1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
Class   CUSIP        Current     6/25/10    3/19/10     Pre-3/19/10
-----   -----        -------     -------    -------     -----------
A       456606HF2    D (sf)      NR         BB (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg

                          NR - Not rated.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-LDP4 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades 10 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Series Corp., series 2005-LDP4 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, primarily due to an increase
in specially serviced loans.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch modeled losses across
the pool, which includes assumed losses on loans in special
servicing and on performing loans with declines in performance
indicative of a higher probability of default.  Fitch modeled
losses of 9.4% (9.7% cumulative transaction losses which includes
losses realized to date).  Fitch expects losses on specially
serviced loans to delete classes G through P and a portion of
class F.  As of February 2011, there are cumulative interest
shortfalls in the amount of $5.92 million currently affecting
classes G through P.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 21.7% to $2.10 billion
from $2.68 billion at issuance.  There are 4 defeased loans
representing 5.16% of the pool.

Fitch has identified 44 loans (28.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 14 specially serviced loans (18.4%).

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Silver City
Galleria loan (5.97%) which is collateralized by a regional mall
located in Taunton, MA, approximately 30 miles south of Boston.
The 714,898 square foot property is anchored by Sears, Macy's and
JC Penney.  The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2009 due to monetary default and is more than 90 days delinquent.
Occupancy for the property is at 82% as of YE 2010 which is in
line with the occupancy at YE 2009.  Steve & Barry's and Old Navy
which occupied 10.3% and 3.5% of the NRA respectively have vacated
their spaces.  Servicer-reported DSCR as of YE 2010 was 0.92
times, which is a slight decline from DSCR of 0.99x as of YE 2009.
The borrower and special servicer are discussing workout options
including a modification and a potential sale of the property.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the Creekside
Apartments loan (3.22%) which is collateralized by a 1,026-unit
multifamily property located in Bensalem, PA, approximately 17
miles northeast of Philadelphia.  The property transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 due to monetary default.  Occupancy
is currently at 86% as of December 2010 which is in line with
occupancy at YE 2009; however, DSCR has declined to 0.75x from
1.20x in the same period.  Rental rates remain weak with ongoing
concessions being offered in the market.  Negotiations on the
resolution of this loan are ongoing with foreclosure as a
potential outcome.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the Sterling
Pointe loan (1.84%) which is collateralized by a 129,020 sf
grocery-anchored retail shopping center loan located in Lincoln,
CA, approximately 30 miles northeast of Sacramento.  The loan
transferred to special servicing due to monetary default and is
more than 90 days delinquent.  Occupancy as of September 2010 was
87% which is in line with occupancy at YE 2009 of 85%.  DSCR from
September 2010 is 0.81x which is also in line with DSCR at YE 2009
of 0.76x.  Discussions to modify the loan with borrower equity
contribution are ongoing between the borrower and special
servicer.

In total, there are currently 14 loans (19%) in special servicing
which consists of four loans (1.53%) in foreclosure, seven loans
(15.7%) that are 60 to 90 days delinquent, two loans (0.95%) that
are current and one loan (0.89%) that is REO.

At Fitch's last review there were 10 loans (9.5%) in special
servicing consisting of six loans (8.29%) that were current, three
loans (1.07%) that were 30 to 90 days delinquent and one loan
(0.16%) in foreclosure.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these classes as
indicated:

  -- $23.4 million class E at 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $40.2 million class F to 'CCsf/RR5' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $26.8 million class G to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $30.1 million class H to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $10 million class J to 'CCsf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $13.4 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $13.4 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $6.7 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $3.3 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6';
  -- $10 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'CCCsf/RR6'.

Fitch affirms, assigns Loss Severity ratings and Outlooks to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $377.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $158.3 million class A-3A1 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $580.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $112.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $267.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $204.1 million class A-J at 'BBBsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50.2 million class B at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23.4 million class C at 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.8 million class D at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, and A-2FL have been paid in full.  Fitch
withdraws the ratings of the interest only classes X-1 and X-2.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes,
affirmed four classes and downgraded two pooled classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FL1.

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on November 14, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on August 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on August 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on August 4, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on August 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to payoffs of some of the larger loans
including the Holyoke Mall since last review.  The affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the current ratings.  The downgrades are
due to interest shortfalls, expenses associated with a loan in
special servicing and uncertainty of the outcome.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large
Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single
borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool to
allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that loans in the pool default with
an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated August 4, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 66%
to $293 million from $852 million at last review.  The
certificates are collateralized by four loans ranging in size from
2% to 62% of the trust balance.  The pool is heavily concentrated
in regional mall property type and sponsor, Robert J. Congel (98%
of trust balance).  The trust has experienced minimal losses since
securitization and currently the smallest loan (2% of trust
balance) is in special servicing.  The currently outstanding
interest shortfalls total $3,877 and cumulative bond loss totals
$24,250 to Class L.

Moody's LTV ratio for the pooled trust balance is 82% compared to
79% at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR ratio for the pooled
trust balance is 1.25X compared to 1.28X at last review.  The
overall credit metrics are similar to those at last review, and
Moody's anticipate continued deleveraging from amortization from
the three mall loans.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.
Large loan transactions have a Herf of less than 20.  The pool has
a Herf of two compared to six at last review.

The Crossgate Mall Loan ($181 million -- 62% of trust balance) is
secured by a 1.2 million square foot regional mall located in
Albany, New York.  This loan amortizes on a 30 year schedule and
its current maturity date is June 9, 2011.  The borrower has one
additional 12-month extension option remaining.  One anchor pad
space (143,676 SF) is dark.  The property's net cash flow for the
first nine months of 2010 was $19 million.  The previous full year
2009 NCF was $26 million.  Moody's 2011 review NCF is $22 million.
The loan's sponsors are Robert J. Congel and Madeira Associates.
Moody's current credit estimate is Ba1.

The Independence Mall Loan ($78 million -- 27% of the trust
balance) is secured by a 680,000 SF regional mall located in
Kingston, Massachusetts.  The property's NCF for the first nine
months of 2010 was $5 million compared to $9 million for 2009.
Moody's 2011 review NCF is $7 million.  This loan amortizes on a
20 year schedule and its current maturity date is February 9,
2012.  The borrower has one additional 12-month extension option
remaining.  The loan's sponsors are Robert J. Congel and Riesling
Associates (controlled by Robert Congel and family trust).
Moody's current credit estimate is Caa2.

The Centerpoint loan ($6 million -- 2% of the trust balance) was
transferred to special servicing on January 29, 2010 due to
imminent default.  The final maturity date is August 7, 2010.  The
combined $130.5 million loan was divided into two pari passu notes
consisting of fixed rate A-1 note with an original balance of
$117.45 million (securitized in JPM Chase 2006-CIBC14 transaction)
and a floating rate A-2 note with an original principal balance of
$13.05 million.  The A-2 note was included in this transaction.
This loan was originally secured by 16 industrial properties in
the Chicago MSA.  Since securitization two properties were
released and paid down the A-2 note per the loan documents.  The
current principal balance for the A-2 note is $6,065,000 and the
combined outstanding principal balance for the total loan is
$123,515,000.  The sponsor for this loan is CenterPoint Properties
Trust and JF US Industrial Trust.  The outstanding P& I advances
for this loan to date are $75,782.  Moody's current credit
estimate is Caa3.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2007-FL1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven pooled classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Co rp. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL1 on review for
possible downgrade.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. B, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes have been placed under review for downgrade due to an
anticipated increase in interest shortfalls.  The master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, recently advised Moody's that it
will be begin recovering outstanding advances on a specially
serviced loan, the 321 Ellis Loan ($17.7 million -- 1% of the
pool), beginning with the March remittance date.  As of the
February remittance statement, the servicer had advanced
approximately $459,000 on the 321 Ellis Loan.

As of the February 15, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $1.4 billion
from $1.6 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 17%
of the pool.  There are currently four loans in special servicing
(14% of pooled balance) which are the Resorts International loan
(9%), the Westin Chicago North Shore loan (3%), the Sofitel
Minneapolis loan (1%) and the 321 Ellis loan (1%).

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CIBC14 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from the
same transaction.

The rating actions on the principal and interest certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its U.S. conduit
fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of
the transaction using its U.S. conduit fusion CMBS criteria.  The
lowered ratings also reflect its analysis of interest shortfalls
that have affected the trust and credit support erosion that
S&P anticipate will occur upon the resolution of 35 of the 38
specially serviced assets and three loans that S&P has determined
to be credit-impaired.  S&P lowered its rating on class F to 'D
(sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls S&P expects to continue
for the foreseeable future.

As of the February 2011 remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $166,259 and cumulative
interest shortfalls of $12.5 million.  The monthly interest
shortfalls reflect items including appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts totaling $450,462 on 24 of the 38
specially serviced assets, interest not advanced of $213,203 for
four loans that Berkadia has deemed nonrecoverable, and special
servicing fees of $96,150.  The monthly interest shortfalls were
partially offset by a one-time ASER recovery of $669,990
associated with the Park Center loan liquidation.  S&P believes
the recurring interest shortfalls have reduced liquidity support
available to the downgraded classes.  Class F has experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls for the past four consecutive
months and S&P expects the shortfalls to continue for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered its rating on this
class to 'D (sf)'.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.51x and a loan-to-value ratio of 136.1%.  S&P further
stressed the assets' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 0.87x and an LTV of 170.5%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 76.3% and
40.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 35 ($550.6 million, 21.2%) specially serviced assets and
three ($18.8 million, 0.7%) loans deemed to be credit-impaired.
S&P separately estimated losses for these specially serviced and
credit-impaired loans and included them in its 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect credit enhancement and available liquidity
support levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the February 2011 remittance report, 38 ($566.7 million,
21.8%) assets were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC
(LNR).  The payment status of the specially serviced assets is:
three ($30.8 million, 1.2%) are real estate owned (REO); 11
($105.3 million, 4.0%) are in foreclosure; 15 ($153.3 million,
5.9%) are 90-plus days delinquent; one ($94.9 million, 3.7%) is 60
days delinquent; two ($17.7 million, 0.7%) are 30 days delinquent;
five ($155.9 million, 6.0%) are matured balloon loans; and one
($8.8 million,0.3%) is in its grace period.  Twenty-nine specially
serviced assets ($279.4 million, 10.8%) have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect totaling $124.2 million.

Details on the three largest assets with the special servicer are:

The CenterPoint I loan ($117.5 million, 4.5%) is the fifth-largest
asset in the pool and the largest exposure with the special
servicer.  The loan is secured by a portfolio of 16 industrial
properties in Illinois comprising 5,391,940 sq. ft. The loan was
reported as matured balloon and was transferred to the special
servicer in February 2010 for imminent default before its Aug. 7,
2010, maturity date.  As of June 30, 2009, the reported DSC was
1.61x.  Recent occupancy information is not available.  Standard &
Poor's anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The Avion Business Park Portfolio loan ($94.9 million, 3.7%)
is the sixth-largest asset in the pool and the second-largest
exposure with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a
portfolio of seven office properties in Chantilly, Va., comprising
586,466 sq. ft. The loan was reported as 60 days delinquent and
the loan was transferred to the special servicer in October 2010
due to imminent payment default.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the
reported DSC was 1.03x.  Recent occupancy information is not
available.  A November 2010 appraisal valued the property below
the total exposure of $96.4 million.  Standard & Poor's
anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.

The Concord Commons loan ($31.1 million, 1.2%) is the ninth-
largest asset in the pool and the third-largest exposure with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 306,250-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in Concord, N.C.  The loan was reported as
90-plus-days delinquent and transferred to the special servicer in
April 2009.  Recent DSC and occupancy information is not
available.  An ARA of $18.7 million is in effect against the loan.
Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The 35 ($323.2 million, 12.4%) remaining specially serviced assets
have balances that, individually represent less than 1.0% of the
total pool balance.  Three of these assets are real estate owned
(REO); 11 are in foreclosure; 14 are 90-plus days delinquent; two
are 30 days delinquent; four are matured balloon loans; and one is
in its grace period.  S&P estimated losses for 32 of these assets
to arrive at a weighted-average loss severity of 46.2%.  The
remaining three loans ($16.0 million, 0.6%) were recently
transferred to the special servicer or the special servicer is
evaluating potential modification or forbearance agreements.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined three
($18.8 million, 0.7%) loans to be credit-impaired.  The loans have
individual balances that represent less than 0.3% of the pool
balance and are secured by two retail properties and one office
property.  The loans all appear on the master servicer's watchlist
for major tenants expiring (from 34% to 58% of gross leasable area
[GLA]).  Using the available financial information for two of the
three loans, S&P calculated a weighed-average reported DSC of
1.37x as of year-end 2009.  S&P considers these loans to be at
increased risk of default and loss.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the February 2011 remittance report, the collateral balance
was $2.6 billion, which is 94.5% of the issuance balance.  The
collateral includes 190 loans and three REO assets, down from 198
loans at issuance.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), provided interim-2009, full-year 2009, or
interim-2010 financial information for 91.4% of the loans in the
pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.55x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV, which
exclude 35 of the 38 specially serviced and three credit-impaired
assets, were 1.51x and 136.1%, respectively.  S&P separately
estimated losses for 35 of the 38 specially serviced and three
credit-impaired assets and included them in its 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

Fifty-six ($523.4 million, 20.2%) loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Fifty-nine ($604.0 million, 23.3%) loans
have reported DSC below 1.10x, and 42 ($345.5 million, 13.3%) have
reported DSC below 1.00x.  Twenty-nine ARAs are in effect totaling
$124.2 million.  To date, the pool has experienced principal
losses totaling $29.9 million on 19 assets.

                   Summary of Top 10 Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $1.2 billion (44.5%) and include three ($243.5 million,
9.4%) assets with the special servicer (as discussed above)
and two ($58.2 million, 2.2%) loans on the master servicer's
watchlist, as discussed below.  Using servicer-reported numbers,
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.84x for nine the top
10 exposures.  Two of the top 10 exposures have reported DSC below
1.10x, while a third loan has no recent reported DSC.

The 510 Fifth Avenue loan ($32.1 million, 1.2%) is the eighth-
largest exposure in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 61,159-sq.-ft.
office building in New York, N.Y.  The loan appears on the
watchlist for decreased occupancy which, as of November 2010, was
61.0%, respectively.  According to Berkadia, JP Morgan Chase
vacated its space (24,000 sq. ft. net rentable area, 39%) when its
lease expired Oct.  31, 2010, and the borrower is in discussion to
re-lease the building's vacant space.  The reported DSC was 1.38x
as of year-end 2009.

The San Antonio Marriott Northwest loan ($26.1 million, 1.0%) is
the 10th-largest exposure in the pool and the second-largest loan
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 296-
room full-service hotel in San Antonio, Texas, and appears on the
watchlist for low reported DSC.  The reported DSC and occupancy as
of Sept. 30, 2010, were 0.57x and 50.0%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The rating actions are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------

        Class  To        From       Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  --        ----       ----------------------
        A-M    BBB- (sf) A+ (sf)                     20.01
        A-J    B+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                   11.94
        B      B (sf)    BBB- (sf)                    9.56
        C      CCC+ (sf) BB+ (sf)                     8.50
        D      CCC- (sf) BB (sf)                      6.92
        E      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)                    5.99
        F      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)                    4.67

                        Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Class  Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
         -----  ------            ----------------------
         A-2    AAA (sf)                           30.59
         A-3A   AAA (sf)                           30.59
         A-3B   AAA (sf)                           30.59
         A-4    AAA (sf)                           30.59
         A-SB   AAA (sf)                           30.59
         A-1A   AAA (sf)                           30.59
         X-1    AAA (sf)                             N/A
         X-2    AAA (sf)                             N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-LDP6 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6, two of which
S&P lowered to 'D (sf)'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
eight classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
remaining collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and
liquidity available to the trust using its U.S. conduit and fusion
CMBS criteria which was the primary driver of the rating actions.
The downgrades also reflect credit support erosion S&P anticipate
will occur upon the resolution of 15 of the transactions specially
serviced assets, and its concerns about two loans that S&P has
determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P lowered its ratings to 'D
(sf)' on classes G and H due to interest shortfalls that S&P
expects to continue.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.56x and a loan-to-value ratio of 100.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV ratio of 139.1%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 80.8% and
39.06%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude one ($4.3 million, 0.2%) defeased asset, 15
($123.9 million, 6.6%) of the transaction's 16 ($138.4 million,
7.4%) specially serviced assets, and two ($31.8 million, 1.7%)
loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the excluded specially serviced and credit-
impaired assets and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

As of the Feb. 15, 2011, remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls to the certificates totaling $214,582.
The shortfalls were primarily related to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts ($314,610) associated with the
specially serviced assets, as well as special servicing fees
($68,123).  S&P believes the trust will continue to be adversely
affected by interest shortfalls.  Class G has experienced
cumulative shortfalls for the past four months.  Class H has
experienced interest shortfalls for the past four months.  S&P
expects both classes to experience recurring shortfalls in the
future.  As a result, S&P downgraded classes G and H to 'D (sf)'.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels and liquidity that is
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class X1 and X2 interest-only certificates based on its
current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 15, 2011, remittance report, 16 ($138.5 million,
7.4%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc. The payment status of the specially serviced
assets is: six ($77.9 million, 4.2%) are real estate owned, one
($1.3 million, 0.07%) is in foreclosure, and nine ($59.4 million,
3.2%) are 90-plus-days delinquent.  Appraisal reduction amounts
totaling $69 million were in effect for all 16 specially serviced
assets.  The four largest specially serviced loans are:

The Richland Center ($18.6 million trust balance, 1.0% of the pool
balance; $18.9 million total exposure) is the largest specially
serviced asset.  It is secured by 231,000-sq.-ft. retail center in
North Richland Hills, Texas, and transferred to the special
servicer in August 2008.  The asset became REO as of August 2010.
An ARA of $12.6 million is currently in effect for this asset.
According to the special servicer, the asset is listed for sale.
S&P expects a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Harbor Grand Apartments asset ($18.5 million trust balance, 1%
of the pool balance; $21.4 million total exposure) is secured by a
192-unit apartment complex in Lake Eisenore, Calif., and was
transferred to the special servicer in September 2008.  The asset
has been REO since December 2010 and according to the special
servicer is currently being managed by a receiver.  This asset has
an ARA of $10.4 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this asset.

The Bell 28 Office Park asset ($15.3 million trust balance, 0.8%
of the pool balance; $16.1 million total exposure) is secured by
109,415-sq.-ft. office park in Phoenix, Ariz., and was transferred
to the special servicer in November 2009.  This asset has been REO
since September 2010.  According to the special servicer, Friedman
Real Estate Group has been hired as the portfolio manager and CBRE
has been hired as the leasing agent.  The asset has an ARA of
$9.3 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of this loan.

The Market Fair loan ($14.5 million trust balance, 0.8% of the
pool balance; $15.2 million total exposure) is secured by 136,989-
sq.-ft. retail center built in 1991.  It transferred to the
special servicer in July 2009.  While the loan payment status is
90-plus-days delinquent, this loan will be modified according to
the special servicer.  The terms of the modification include:

* The borrower will invest $1.4 million in equity;

* The existing note will be split into an A note of $9 million and
  a B note of $4.5 million; and

* Interest on A note will remain current at 5.77%, while interest
  of 5.77% on the B note will accrue.

The 12 remaining specially serviced assets have individual
balances that represent less than 0.6% of the balance.  Three of
the assets are REO, one is in foreclosure, and the remaining eight
are 90-plus-days delinquent.  ARAs totaling $30.9 million are in
effect against these 12 assets.  Standard & Poor's estimated
losses for 12 of these assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 48%.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined two
loans ($31.8 million, 1.7%) to be credit-impaired.

The Washington Plaza loan ($16.8 million, 0.9%) is secured by a
207,358-sq.-ft. office complex built in 1988 and located in Upper
Marlboro, Md.  The Board of Education terminated its lease
effective June 30, 2009.  The borrower was required to make an
initial deposit at loan inception into a debt service reserve
account of $2.46 million with an additional $2.6 million required
as a condition of above mentioned lease termination approval.
The current balance of the account is approximately $578,000.
According to the master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC, the property is currently being marketed for sale, while the
reported DSC and occupancy are -0.44x and 11% as of year-end 2010,
respectively.

The Sorrento Pines loan ($15.0 million, 0.8%) is secured by two
industrial properties encompassing 114,422 sq.  ft. in San Diego,
Calif.  The loan's payment status is 30-plus-days delinquent.
According to the master servicer, Midland Loan Services, one of
the collateral properties is vacant, while the reported DSC is
0.39x as of Dec. 31, 2010.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 15, 2011 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had a trust balance of $1.87 billion, down from $2.14 billion
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 141 loans and six real
estate owned assets.  One ($4.3 million, 0.2%) loan is defeased.
The master servicers, Midland Loan Services and Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC., provided interim-2009, full-year 2009,
interim-2010, or full-year 2010 financial information for 92.3%
of the nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.63x for the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.56x and 100.1%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the
defeased asset, 15 of the transaction's 16 specially serviced
assets, and the two loans that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for the excluded
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  The trust has
experienced $62 million in losses to date from the liquidation of
14 assets.

The master servicers' reported watchlist of 39 ($376.3 million,
20.0%) loans include two of the top 10 loan exposures discussed
below.  Thirty-three ($239.4 million, 12.7%) exposures in the pool
have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 22 ($155.7 million,
8.3%) exposures have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $898.8 million (47.8%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.92x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV ratio for the top 10 loans are 1.71x and 92.5%, respectively.

The 30 Broad Street Loan is the fifth-largest loan in the pool and
the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has
a trust balance of $81.4 million (4.3%) and is secured by a
427,568-sq.-ft. multi-tenant office building in downtown New York
City.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to reported low DSC
of 0.83x and 87% occupancy for six months ended June 30, 2010.
S&P's analysis considered the timing for expense reimbursements
reported for the asset.

Village Properties Crossed Portfolio is made up of three cross
defaulted and cross-collateralized loans.  Consolidating their
current balances makes the portfolio loan the seventh-largest loan
in the pool with a trust balance of $39.9 million (2.13%).  It is
the second-largest loan on the watchlist.  The portfolio is
secured by 10 retail centers located throughout Tennessee and
Kentucky with a total of 1,197,497 sq. ft. of retail space.  This
portfolio appears on the watchlist because two of the loans had
reported DSCs of 1.05x and 1.07x for Dec. 31, 2009.  However,
consolidated with the third loan, the reported aggregate DSC for
this portfolio is 1.42x as of Dec. 31, 2009.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-LDP6

                Rating
                ------
   Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
   -----  --              ----          ----------------------
   A-M    BBB+ (sf)       A (sf)                         19.51
   A-J    BB (sf)         BBB+ (sf)                      10.78
   B      B+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)                       8.21
   C      B (sf)          BB+ (sf)                        7.21
   D      B- (sf)         BB (sf)                         5.35
   E      CCC (sf)        BB- (sf)                        4.21
   F      CCC-(sf)        B   (sf)                        2.63
   G      D  (sf)         B- (sf)                         1.49
   H      D   (sf)        CCC (sf)                        0.34

                         Ratings Affirmed

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-LDP6

        Class    Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
        -----    ------            ----------------------
        A-2      AAA (sf)                           30.95
        A-3FL    AAA (sf)                           30.95
        A-3B     AAA (sf)                           30.95
        A-4      AAA (sf)                           30.95
        A-SB     AAA (sf)                           30.95
        A-1A     AAA (sf)                           30.95
        X1       AAA (sf)                             N/A
        X2       AAA (sf)                             N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KINGLY SQUARE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Four CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on four
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transactions: Kingly
Square No. 1 Ltd., ELM B.V.'s series 87, Credit Default Swap -
CRA600046, and Credit Default Swap - CRA600026.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete redemption of the notes
pursuant to the repurchase and termination notices received.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                  Kingly Square No. 1 (CDO) Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                   Class       To       From
                   -----       --       ----
                   B USDNotes  NR (sf)  CC (sf)
                   B EURNotes  NR (sf)  CC (sf)
                   B AUDNotes  NR (sf)  CC (sf)

                             ELM B.V.
                            Series 87

                              Rating
                              ------
                   Class    To       From
                   -----    --       ----
                   Tranche  NR (sf)  CCC (sf)

                 Credit Default Swap - CRA600046

                              Rating
                              ------
                   Class    To       From
                   -----    --       ----
                  Swap     NR (sf)  AA-srp (sf)

                 Credit Default Swap - CRA600026

                              Rating
                              ------
                   Class    To       From
                   -----    --       ----
                   Swap     NR (sf)  AA-srp (sf)

                          NR - Not rated.


KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Ups Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$1,849,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021 (current balance of $1,555,539,837), Upgraded to Aaa
     (sf); previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1
     (sf);

  -- US$220,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010
     Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$299,250,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously
     on June 8, 2010 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$340,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
     previously on June 8, 2010 Upgraded to B1 (sf);

  -- US$134,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously
     on November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$61,750,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization
ratios of the rated notes since the rating action in June 2010.
As of the latest trustee report dated February 4, 2011, the
Senior overcollateralization ratio, Class C/D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 180.58%, 132.75%,
and 125.77%, respectively, versus April 2010 levels of
177.52%, 130.16%, and 122.69%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  The
overcollateralization ratios have improved in part due to a
decrease in the number of defaulted CLO tranches.  A number
of CLO tranches were defaulted and carried at depressed market
values in the rating action in June 2010 but are currently
treated as performing securities due to improved credit qualities.
Furthermore, Moody's adjusted overcollateralization ratios of the
rated notes have increased more than trustee reported ratios since
the rating action in June 2010 due to a decrease in the percentage
of securities with Ca or C ratings.  Moody's treated these Ca or
C-rated securities as defaulted securities in the rating action in
June 2010 but is currently treating them as performing securities
as they are no longer Ca or C-rated following corporate ratings
upgrades.

Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has improved since the rating action in June 2010.
Based on the February 2011 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 3416 compared to 3548 in April 2010.  The deal
also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to $51 million
from approximately $122 million in April 2010.

Despite improvements in certain key portfolio metrics, the
transaction has exposure to securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
that make up approximately 19% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also noted that the portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities that are issued by affiliates of
the collateral manager, which Moody's views as potentially
exposing the notes to additional correlation risk.  Furthermore,
the transaction has large single obligor exposures to debt
relating to recent vintages of buyouts and other highly leveraged
financial transactions, which Moody's views to be particularly
vulnerable to credit deterioration in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $3.2 billion, defaulted par of $55 million, a
weighted average default probability of 42.32% (implying a WARF of
5365), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 36.7%, and
a diversity score of 30.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in Moody's cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

KKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued on May 22, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (4292)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2
  -- Class F: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (6438)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -1
  -- Class F: -4

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to
   the large difference between the reported and covenant levels.


KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Ups Rating on Class F Notes to 'B1 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$715,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$58,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2017, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     May 26, 2010 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$52,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization
ratios of the rated notes since the rating action in May 2010.
As of the latest trustee report dated January 14, 2011, the
Senior overcollateralization ratio, Class C/D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 132.07%, 114.83%,
and 112.93%, respectively, versus April 2010 levels of
130.38%, 113.37%, and 111.49%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  The
overcollateralization ratios have improved in part due to a
decrease in the number of defaulted CLO tranches.  A number
of CLO tranches were defaulted and carried at depressed market
values in the rating action in May 2010 but are currently
treated as performing securities due to improved credit qualities.
Furthermore, Moody's adjusted overcollateralization ratios of the
rated notes have increased more than trustee reported ratios since
the rating action in May 2010 due to a decrease in the percentage
of securities with Ca or C ratings.  Moody's treated these Ca or
C-rated securities as defaulted securities in the rating action in
May 2010 but is currently treating them as performing securities
as they are no longer Ca or C-rated following corporate ratings
upgrades.

Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has improved since the rating action in May 2010.  Based
on the January 2011 trustee report, the weighted average rating
factor is 2859 compared to 2972 in April 2010.  The deal also
experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to $2 million from
approximately $18.8 million in April 2010.  Despite improvements
in certain key portfolio metrics, Moody's noted that the portfolio
includes a material concentration in CLO securities that are
issued by affiliates of the collateral manager, which Moody's
views as potentially exposing the notes to additional correlation
risk.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $1 billion, defaulted par of $19 million, a
weighted average default probability of 25.67% (implying a WARF of
3625), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43%, and a
diversity score of 36.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in Moody's cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

KKR Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd., issued on March 30, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.  A summary of the
impact of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of
WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2900)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2
  -- Class F: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4350)

  -- Class A-1: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E:-1
  -- Class F: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value
   upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an
   assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's
   current market value.


LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Raises Ratings on 1996-C2 Certs. to 'Caa1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust II,
Multiclass Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1996-C2:

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 1996
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to overall improved pool performance.
Additionally, at last review, Moody's had estimated $3.4 million
in potential losses from seven poorly performing loans.  Of those
loans, four loans paid off, two loans remain in the pool and one
loan liquidated resulting in an actual loss of $303,072 -- a
difference of $3.1 million.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 29.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.5% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying performance in
the commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's
expects to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of
the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 26, 2010.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 25, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $4.4 million
from $397.2 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to
61% of the pool, with the top three non-defeased loans
representing 94% of the pool.  The weighted average maturity for
the pool is 22 months.  One loan, representing 61% of the pool,
has a balloon maturity while the remaining 39% of the pool is
fully amortizing.

One loans, representing 12% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $31.2 million loss (68%
loss severity on average).  Realized losses have resulted in the
elimination of classes G, H and J and a less than 1% principal
loss to class F.  Currently the pool does not contain any loans
that are in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 12% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $131,421 loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 100% and 100%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased loans.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 61% compared to 63% at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.31X and 2.53X, respectively, compared to
1.23X and 2.36X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 94% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is Mc Queen Village Loan ($2.7 million
-- 61.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 136-unit multifamily
complex located in Prattville, Alabama.  The property was 94%
leased as of December 2010.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78%
and 1.31X, respectively, the same as at last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C7 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative 14 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, series
2007-C7, commercial mortgage pass through certificates.  The
downgrades are due to further deterioration of performance, most
of which involves expected losses on loans in special servicing.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 11% for the remaining pool;
expected losses of the original pool are at 11.35%, including
losses already incurred to date.  Approximately 39.7% of the loans
in the pool are considered Fitch Loans of Concern, including 12
specially serviced loans (21.2%).  At Fitch's last review, there
were six loans (5%) in special servicing.  Fitch expects classes F
through T may be fully depleted from losses associated with the
specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 0.7% (including 0.35% of
realized losses) to $3.14 billion from $3.17 billion at issuance.
There are no defeased loans.  As of February 2011, there are
cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $5.7 million,
affecting classes E through NR.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the Innkeepers
Hotel Portfolio loan (14%), which is secured by 44 limited service
hotels and one full-service hotel totaling 5,683 rooms, located
across 16 states.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
April 2010 due to monetary default.  The portfolio had suffered
cash flow declines in 2009 due to the economic downturn.  The
servicer reported 2009 net operating income debt service coverage
ratio was 1.08 times (x), down from 1.43x in 2008.  The
portfolio's November 2010 trailing 12-month revenue per available
room and average daily rate were reported at $79.53 and $108.04,
respectively.  The borrowing entities, the Innkeepers USA Real
Estate Investment Trust, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in
July 2010.  Fitch modeled losses for this loan are based on the
servicer reported TTM NOI and a 10% capitalization rate.  The
subject portfolio is also secured by a $412 million pari passu
note securitized in the LBUBS 2007-C6 transaction.

The second largest contributor to expected loss of the loans in
specially servicing is Nashville Multifamily Portfolio (3.7%).
The loan is collateralized by a four-property, 1,593 unit,
multifamily portfolio located in the Nashville, TN MSA.  Property
performance has declined since issuance because of a decline in
occupancy along with lower rents and increased concessions.  The
loan has a lockbox in place and the loan remains current.

The largest contributor to expected loss of the loans not in
special servicing is the District at Tustin Legacy (6.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 985,684-square foot (521,694 sf
collateral) retail center in Tustin, CA.  The property was
constructed in 2006 and was 98% occupied as of September 2009.
Average rental rates and reimbursements at the property are below
underwritten levels.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity ratings and Stable Outlooks to these classes as
indicated:

  -- $269.5 million class A-J to 'Bsf/LS4' from 'AAsf/LS3';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $32.8 million class B to 'B-sf/LS5' from 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $35.7 million class C to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $23.8 million class D to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBB-sf/LS5';

  -- $27.7 million class E to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $15.9 million class F to 'CCsf/RR2' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $31.7 million class G to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBsf/LS5';

  -- $27.7 million class H to 'Csf/RR6' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $23.8 million class J to 'Csf/RR6' from 'Bsf/LS5';

  -- $27.7 million class K to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $19.8 million class L to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $11.9 million class M to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $11.9 million class N to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4 million class P to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4 million class Q to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5';

  -- $4 million class S to 'Csf/RR6' from 'B-sf/LS5'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes with a Stable Outlook
and removes class A-M from Rating Watch Negative and assigns it a
Stable Outlook as well:

  -- $9.6 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $194 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $74 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $1.7 billion class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $265.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $317 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- Interest-only class X-CL at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-CP at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-W at 'AAA'.

Fitch does not rate class T.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2001-C7 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has revised a release on LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-C7, substituting 15 for 13
classes in the heading and the first paragraph.  In the corrected
the list of affected ratings, Cl. X-CL was added and Cl. X-CP was
affirmed.

The revised release is:

Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four classes and
affirmed 15 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-C7:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2005
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 11, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2007
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-CP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool performance
and a significant increase in subordination levels since
Moody's last review.  Additionally, at last review, Moody's had
estimated $5.3 million in potential losses from three specially
serviced loans: The Pavilion Senior Residences, Huntington Lane
Apartments and Westpark Plaza.  All three loans paid off since
last review and actual losses were only $57,000 -- a difference
of $4.7 million.  The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base loss was 1.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 3.5% of the
current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying performance in
the commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's
expects to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 20 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 28, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

                         Deal Performance

As of the February 17, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to
$764.2 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 78 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool.  Twenty-nine loans, representing 47%
of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.  There are two loans in the pool with
investment grade credit estimates.

Twenty-five loans, representing 19.4% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an $11.2 million loss (51% loss severity).  The pool
had experienced an aggregate $4.7 million loss at last review.
There are presently three loans in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the Shadow Creek Apartments
Loan ($5.9 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
231-unit apartment complex located in Kansas City, Missouri.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing December 2010 due to
monetary default and is presently 90+ days delinquent.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by an
industrial facility and an apartment complex.  Moody's estimates a
$3.9 million aggregate loss for all of the specially serviced
loans (37% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 0.35% of the pool and has estimated a
$306,000 loss (16% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 59% and 55%, respectively, of the pool's
non-defeased loans.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 82% compared to 81% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12.0% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.55X, respectively, compared to
1.30X and 1.42X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Fashion Centre at
Pentagon City Loan ($145.9 million -- 19.1% of the pool), which is
secured by the borrower's interest in an 820,000 square foot
enclosed regional shopping mall located in Arlington, Virginia.
The center is anchored by Nordstrom and Macy's, which each own
their respective improvements.  The center is a dominant mall in
the Washington, D.C. metro area and has been nearly 100% leased
since securitization.

The loan sponsor is a joint venture between Simon Property Group
and CalPERS.  The loan has amortized 2% since last review.
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa and
2.76X compared to Aaa and 2.74X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Connell Corporate
Center I Loan ($14.5 million -- 1.9% of the pool) which is secured
by a 415,000 SF Class A suburban office building located in
Berkeley Heights, New Jersey.  The property is 100% leased to two
tenants -- American Home Assurance (85% of net rentable area
(NRA); lease expiration June 2018) and EMC Corporation (14% of the
NRA; lease expiration March 2013).  The loan fully amortizes over
its 11.75-year term, maturing June 2013 and has amortized 24%
since last review.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Aaa and 4.0X compared to Aaa and 3.81X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 8% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Torrance Executive Plaza East
and West Loans ($30.5 million -- 4.0% of the pool), two cross
collateralized loans which are secured by two office properties
located in Torrance, California.  The properties total 345,100 SF
and were 78% leased as of September 2010 versus 82% leased at last
review.  Property performance has remained stable yet Moody's
analysis incorporates a stressed cash flow due to the recent
occupancy declines at this asset which mirror current office
submarket conditions.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and
1.38X, respectively, compared to 98% and 1.16X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Meadows Corporate Park Loan
($15.7 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 165,000
SF Class A office complex located in Silver Spring, Maryland.  The
loan had been listed on the Master Servicer's Watchlist due to a
low DSCR.  Higher occupancy has yielded stronger financial
performance.  The property was 95% leased as of September 2010,
the same as at last review but above 81% leased as of December
2008.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 102% and 1.0X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Court Tower Office Building
Loan ($15.2 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
132,000 SF Class A office property located in Towson, Maryland.
The loan is currently on the Master Servicer's Watchlist due to
increased vacancy and low DSCR concerns.  The property was 72%
leased as of September 2010 compared to 62% leased as of November
2009.  Moody's analysis incorporates a stressed cash flow due to
vacancy and financial performance concerns.  The loan has an
anticipated repayment date of August 2011.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 144%
and 0.75X at last review.  Moody's anticipates a high probability
of maturity default for this loan.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C7 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 12 other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction and a
review of the transaction's remaining collateral, the deal
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the trust's
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls and the anticipated
reduction of liquidity available to absorb future interest
shortfalls.  S&P's analysis also considered that, excluding the
specially serviced and defeased loans, 49.7% of the pooled trust
balance (44 loans; $380.9 million) have anticipated repayment
dates or final maturities in 2011.

The affirmed ratings on the 10 principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class X-CL and X-CP interest-only (IO) certificates based
on its current criteria.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.90x and a loan-to-value ratio of 61.4%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 1.64x and an LTV ratio of 82.3%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
18.0% and 29.6%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude 28 defeased loans ($360.4 million, 47.0%), three
specially serviced loans ($10.5 million, 1.4%), and one loan that
S&P determined to be credit-impaired ($3.8 million, 0.5%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for these specially serviced and
credit-impaired loans and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Feb. 17, 2011 trustee remittance report, three loans
($10.5 million, 1.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The reported payment status of
the specially serviced loans is as follows: two are 90-plus days
delinquent ($7.3 million, 1.0%) and one is 30-plus days delinquent
($3.2 million, 0.4%).  Details on the three specially serviced
loans are as follows:

The Shadow Creek Apartments loan ($5.9 million, 0.8%), the
largest loan with the special servicer, is secured by a 231-unit
multifamily apartment complex in Kansas City, Mo.  The 90-plus-
day delinquent loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Dec. 20, 2010, due to a payment default.  Berkadia indicated that
it is currently evaluating various workout strategies with the
borrower while also pursuing foreclosure.  It is S&P's
understanding from Berkadia that the reported occupancy of 70.0%
as of Dec. 1, 2010, is due primarily to weak economic conditions.
An updated January 2011 appraisal valued the property below the
trust balance.  Accordingly, Berkadia informed us that an
appraisal reduction amount, which will reduce liquidity available
to the trust, is expected to be implemented as early as the March
2011 trustee remittance report.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Bryan Dairy Road Industrial Facility loan ($3.2 million, 0.4%)
is secured by an 111,874-sq.-ft. industrial/warehouse facility in
Largo, Fla.  The 30-plus-day delinquent loan was transferred to
Berkadia on Dec. 14, 2010, due to imminent payment default.  The
property is currently 100% vacant.  Berkadia stated that it is
currently evaluating various workout strategies with the borrower.
S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
loan.

The Oak Cluster West Apartments loan ($1.4 million, 0.2%) is
secured by a 44-unit multifamily apartment complex in Orlando,
Fla.  The 90-plus-day delinquent loan was transferred to Berkadia
on Nov. 10, 2009, due to monetary default.  Berkadia stated that
it is currently pursuing foreclosure.  The reported occupancy was
66.0% as of January 2011.  An updated February 2011 appraisal
valued the property below the trust balance.  Accordingly,
Berkadia indicated that an ARA, which will reduce liquidity
available to the trust, is expected to be implemented as early as
the March 2011 trustee remittance report.  S&P expects a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined the
Rockwest Corporate Park loan ($3.8 million, 0.5%) to be credit-
impaired.  The loan, secured by a 252,512-sq.-ft. industrial
warehouse property in Syracuse, N.Y., has a low reported DSC of
0.79x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, and 73.3%
occupancy as of December 2010.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., has indicated that the borrower has shorted its debt
service payments since October 2010 and is in the process of
sending a notice of default.  As a result, S&P views this loan to
be at an increased risk of default and loss.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the Feb. 17, 2011, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $766.3 million, which is 63.3% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 77 loans, down from 114 loans at
issuance.  Wells Fargo provided financial information for 99.7% of
the nondefeased loans in the pool, 97.8% of which was partial-2010
or full-year 2010 data, and the remainder was full-year 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.99x for the loans
in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.90x and 61.4%, respectively.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures excluded 28 defeased loans
($360.4 million, 47.0%), three specially serviced loans
($10.5 million, 1.4%), and one loan that S&P determined to be
credit-impaired ($3.8 million, 0.5%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for the specially serviced and credit-impaired loans and
included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.  The transaction has experienced $11.2 million
in principal losses to date.  Twenty-five loans ($116.5 million,
15.2%) in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including four of the top 10 real estate loans.  Fifteen loans
($78.4 million, 10.2%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, 10 of
which ($49.5 million, 6.5%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x.

               Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $284.5 million (37.1%).  Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
2.26x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio for the top 10 real estate loans are 2.06x and
58.7%, respectively.  Four of the top 10 real estate loans
($53.3 million, 7.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Court Tower Office Building loan ($15.2 million, 2.0%) is the
fourth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and the largest loan
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a
132,605-sq.-ft. office building in Towson, Md.  The loan is on
Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.61x for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, and occupancy was 71.5%
according to the Sept. 30, 2010, rent roll.

The Catonsville Plaza Shopping Center loan ($12.9 million, 1.7%),
the sixth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a
280,666-sq.-ft. retail shopping center in Cantonsville, Md.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
reported DSC of 1.04x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010,
compared with 1.21x for year-end 2009, and occupancy was 79.8%
according to the Dec. 31, 2010, rent roll.  The decline in DSC is
attributable to higher snow removal expenses in 2010.

The Wal-Mart Distribution Center & American Port Services
Warehouse loan ($12.7 million, 1.7%), secured by two
industrial/warehouse facilities totaling 1.3 million sq.
ft. in Savannah, Ga., is the seventh-largest nondefeased loan
in the pool.  The loan is on Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a
low reported physical occupancy (the amount of space occupied)
of 36.8% as of Sept. 30, 2010.  The economic occupancy (the amount
of rental income collected from tenants) at the property is 100%
according to the Sept. 30, 2010, rent roll.  Berkadia stated that
although the largest tenant (Wal-Mart Stores Inc.; comprising
63.2% of the gross leasable area) vacated the space in June 2008,
the tenant has continued to pay rent until its Feb. 28, 2011,
lease expiration.  Berkadia indicated that the borrower is
currently working with the tenant for a potential lease renewal.
The reported DSC for this loan was 1.33x for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2010.

The Interstate Office Park loan ($12.5 million, 1.6%), the ninth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by a 111,491-sq.-
ft. office building in San Diego, Calif.  The loan appears on
Wells Fargo's watchlist due to a low reported DSC of 0.67x for the
six months ended June 30, 2010, and occupancy was 84.9% according
to the Sept. 30, 2010, rent roll.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
S&P's current criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
   Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
   -----      --           ----        ----------------------
   J          BBB  (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                     5.64
   K          BB (sf)      BBB- (sf)                     3.67
   L          B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)                      2.88
   M          B- (sf)      BB (sf)                       1.89
   N          CCC+ (sf)    BB- (sf)                      1.30
   P          CCC (sf)     B+ (sf)                       0.90
   Q          CCC- (sf)    B (sf)                        0.51

                        Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    ------              ----------------------
       A-3      AAA (sf)                             26.96
       A-4      AAA (sf)                             26.96
       A-5      AAA (sf)                             26.96
       B        AAA (sf)                             20.44
       C        AAA (sf)                             18.27
       D        AA+ (sf)                             13.14
       E        AA (sf)                              11.56
       F        AA- (sf)                              9.98
       G        A (sf)                                8.40
       H        A- (sf)                               7.02
       X-CL     AAA (sf)                               N/A
       X-CP     AAA (sf)                               N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


LEHMAN ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches from two Alt-A deals issued by Lehman ABS Corporation.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien and fixed rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A
pools issued from prior to 2005.  The principal methodology used
in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The approach "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans to account for the volatile nature of small
pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent,
there could be a large increase in the overall pool delinquency
level due to the concentration risk.  To project losses on pools
with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline"
average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent
on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 5% and 3% for the 2004,
2003 and 2002 and prior vintage respectively).  The baseline rates
are higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger
pools for the respective vintages.  Once the baseline rate is set,
further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans
remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in
the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool,
the higher the volatility in performance.  Once the loan count in
a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2004 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  in addition, if current delinquency levels in a
small pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect
this trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 30%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman ABS Corpration 2003-1 Trust

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman ABS Corpration 2004-1 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-LLF C5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three rake, or
non-pooled classes, of Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-LLF C5.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. PR2 Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     December 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PR31 Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PR32 Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     December 17, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of the rake classes are due to interest shortfalls,
outstanding principal and interest advances, and uncertainty
surrounding the outcome and timing of the resolution.  On December
17, 2010 Moody's placed the three rake classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current sluggish
macroeconomic environment and varying performance in the
commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's expects
to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011.  The
hotel and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of
recovery, while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be
tied to recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt
capital continues to improve with terms returning toward market
norms.  Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an
overall sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 17, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

Praedium Rental Portfolio II ($28.6 million -- 4.1% of the pooled
balance) and Praedium Rental Portfolio III ($22.7 million -- 3.2%
of the pooled balance) were transferred to special servicing in
September 2010 due to imminent default.  As of February 15, 2011
distribution date, interest shortfalls totaling $39,307 have been
incurred by rake classes PR2, PR31 and PR32, up from $19,291 when
these classes were placed on review for possible downgrade.  Total
outstanding P&I Advances are $67,904 for Praedium Rental Portfolio
II and $53,118 for Praedium Rental Portfolio III, respectively.

Foreclosure complaints were filed on January 26, 2011, for both of
the loans.  According to the special servicer (TriMont Real Estate
Advisors), the anticipated resolution timing is early 2011.  Cash
management has been sprung for both of the loans.

Praedium Rental Portfolio II had a Net Operating Income (NOI) of
$1.9 million in 2010, which is slightly lower than what was
anticipated during last review.  Praedium Rental Portfolio III
achieved a NOI of $1.5 million during the same period, lower than
what was anticipated during last review.

The maturity date for Praedium Portfolio I ($18.3 million -- 2.6%
of the pooled balance) was extended to August 8, 2011.  There are
no interest shortfalls outstanding for the rake classes associated
with this portfolio (classes PR11 and PR12).


LOCAL INSIGHT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service concluded its review and downgraded two
classes of notes issued in two series of the Local Insight Media
securitization transaction.  The transaction is a securitization
of telephone directory publishing businesses (primarily Yellow
Pages) of three subsidiaries of Local Insight Media, Inc.; CBD
Media Finance LLC, a publisher of print and online directories in
the greater Cincinnati metropolitan area, ACS Media Finance LLC, a
publisher of print and online directories in Alaska, and HYP Media
Finance LLC, a publisher of print and online directories in
Hawaii.  Essentially all assets of CBD, ACS and HYP were
transferred to securitization entities, which issued fixed rate
notes supported by the assets.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Local Insight Media Finance LLC, Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 27, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously confirmed on Nov. 23, 2010)

  -- Underlying Rating: Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Local Insight Media Finance LLC/ACS Media Finance LLC/CBD
Media Finance LLC and HYP Media Finance LLC - Series 2008-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 27, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                   Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the declining collections, net
securitizable cash flow (collections after expenses available to
service debt) and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR).  On
December 31, 2010 a rapid amortization event occurred as a result
of DSCR declining to 1.43x, below the 1.5x trigger level.  In
addition, the leverage ratio (senior securitized debt divided by
the last 12 months net securitizable cash flow) has increased to
nearly 10x, significantly higher than the 7.4x leverage at
closing.  As of the latest quarterly reporting period ending on
December 31, 2010, 12-month collections were more than 20% lower
than for the same period in 2009, and the 12-month net
securitizable cash flow was over 25% lower.  During the rapid
amortization period all residual cash is allocated to repay senior
notes.

Moody's notes that LIM's business has come under increased
pressure in recent years due to competition from internet-based
search engines and recessionary conditions, which have
particularly effected the small and medium size businesses who are
the main users of print based advertising.  While LIM's assets
(CBD, ACS, HYP) are based in less competitive markets, Moody's
believe that these markets may now be experiencing pressures that
previously affected major markets dominated by larger players.

Principal methodology used in these rating actions includes cash
flow simulation analysis and the assessment of the ability of the
net cash flows to make timely interest payments on the notes and
ultimate repayment of the principal by the legal maturity date.
Moody's identified key drivers of the cash flow and estimated
their expected values over the course of the transaction as well
as the probability distribution around these values based on the
analysis of the historical collateral performance trends.  The
simulated revenues are then fed through the payment waterfall to
assess performance of the notes under different expected and
stressed scenarios.  A resulting loss of yield to investors, if
any, was calculated.

Parameters which were incorporated in projecting ongoing cash
flows for LIM included (i) annual growth/decline of print revenue
and expenses, (ii) Chapter 11 status of The Berry Company LLC, the
marketing agent, and the potential adverse impact on the
transaction's cash flows.  Revenue streams, were derived from
historical data and modeled using triangular distributions.

The main sources of uncertainty for this transaction include the
demand for advertising in Yellow Pages and the timing of economic
recovery, which can affect the demand for advertising by small and
medium-sized businesses.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 84 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 84
tranches and confirmed the rating of 4 tranches from 16 Subprime
deals issued by Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate Subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of deteriorating performance of Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.  Although most of these pools have
paid down significantly, the remaining loans are affected by the
housing and macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Subprime
pools securitized before 2005.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Pre-2005 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2011.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment levels remain
high, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in late 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4, Asset Backed
Certificates, Series 2001-4

  -- Cl. II-A1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. II-M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 19, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 5, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 28, 2004
     Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2001-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MACLAURIN SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded two classes of Notes issued by Maclaurin
SPC 2007-2 Segregated Portfolio due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average recovery
rate.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Maclaurin SPC 2007-2 Segregated Portfolio is a synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities reference obligations (100.0% of the pool balance).
All of the CMBS referenced obligations were securitized between
2005 and 2007.  The aggregate Note balance of the transaction is
$1.0 billion, the same as at securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,302 compared to 1,996 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 8.0% at last review), Baa1-
Baa3 (5.6% compared to 48.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (20.0%
compared to 22.8% at last review), B1-B3 (14.0% compared to 7.2%
at last review), and Caa1-C (60.4% compared to 14.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.5
years compared to 6.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 4.2% compared to 14.6% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 20.2% at last review.
The high MAC is due to high default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  In general, the rated Notes are
particularly sensitive to rating changes within the collateral
pool.  Holding all other key parameters static, stressing non-
Moody's rated reference obligations' credit estimates (twenty
assets; 26.0% of notional amount) by one notch downward , the
resulting impact negatively affects the model results between 0 to
0.06 notches downward on average.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current sluggish macroeconomic environment
and varying performance in the commercial real estate property
markets.  However, Moody's expects to see increasing or
stabilizing property values, higher transaction volumes, a slowing
in the pace of loan delinquencies and greater liquidity for
commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel and multifamily sectors
are continuing to show signs of recovery, while recovery in the
office and retail sectors will be tied to recovery of the broader
economy.  The availability of debt capital continues to improve
with terms returning toward market norms.  Moody's central global
macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall sluggish recovery
through 2012, amidst ongoing individual, corporate and
governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment, and government
budget considerations.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Class D & E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed all classes of Notes issued by Magnolia
Finance II Series 2007-2 The key indicators of the expected loss
within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average life, weighted
average recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation are all
performing within levels commensurate with the existing ratings
levels.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
March 17, 2010.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. D CMBS Portfolio Variable Rate Notes due November 2052,
     Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 17, 2010 Downgraded
     to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E CMBS Portfolio Variable Rate Notes due November 2052,
     Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 17, 2010 Downgraded
     to C (sf)

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
sluggish macroeconomic environment and varying performance in
the commercial real estate property markets.  However, Moody's
expects to see increasing or stabilizing property values, higher
transaction volumes, a slowing in the pace of loan delinquencies
and greater liquidity for commercial real estate in 2011 The hotel
and multifamily sectors are continuing to show signs of recovery,
while recovery in the office and retail sectors will be tied to
recovery of the broader economy.  The availability of debt capital
continues to improve with terms returning toward market norms.
Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects an overall
sluggish recovery through 2012, amidst ongoing individual,
corporate and governmental deleveraging, persistent unemployment,
and government budget considerations.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes to 'C'
------------------