TCR_Public/110123.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, January 23, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 22

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2007-1: S&P Withdraws CC Rating on Class B Notes
ALLEGHENY COUNTY: Good Progress Cues Fitch to Affirm 'BB-' Rating
ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Lowers Collateralized Debt Obligations Ratings
ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on Grantor Trust Certificates
ARCH ONE: S&P Withdraws B Rating on Series 2005-4 CDO Transaction

BABSON CLO: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Classes of Notes to Caa3
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on 3 Cl. of Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Eleven Classes of CMBS
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Four Classes of CMBS
BELHURST CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $12.5MM Cl. E Notes to Caa2

CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
CHESTERFIELD VALLEY: Fitch Affirms Rating on $18.7MM Bonds at 'BB'
CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 3 Classes of Certificates
CITIGROUP COMM: Moody's Cuts Rating on 6 Classes of Certs. to C

CONTRA COSTA: S&P Augments 2003 Tax Bonds Rating From 'B'
CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Rating on 2007 Series A Bonds to BB+
CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Revenue Bonds Underlying Rating to B
CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Tax Allocation Bonds Rating to B From BBB
CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Raises 'Ba2' Ratings on Certs. to 'Baa2'

CREDI SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Seven Class Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Cert. to BB (sf)
DEKANIA EUROPE I: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR15.4 Mil. Class D Notes
DEKANIA EUROPE II: Fitch Junks Rating on Four Classes of Certs.
DEKANIA EUROPE III: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Class Certificates

DYNASTY II: Credit Stability Prompts Moody's to Upgrade Ratings
EMPORIA PREFERRED: Fitch Holds Junk Rating on Class E Notes
EMPORIA PREFERRED FUNDING: Fitch Holds Junk Rating on Cl. E Notes
FIRST UNION: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Classes of CMBS
FM LEVERAGED: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes

GE CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Three Classes of Certs.
GECMC 2005-4: Moody's Reviews Junk Ratings for Likely Downgrade
GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Raises Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class J & K Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certificates

GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Ups Rating on Class OEA-B2 Certs. From BB+
HARRISBURG AUTHORITY: Fin'l Distress Cues Moody's Ba1 Bond Rating
HEWETTS ISLAND: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-3 Notes to Caa2
INNER HARBOR: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Four Classes of Certs.

JP MORGAN: Moody's Junks Rating on Three Classes of Certificates
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Junks Rating on Two Class Certificates
LB-UBS COMM: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Six Class Certificates
LEAF CAPITAL: DBRS Puts Low-B Ratings Class on E-1 & E-2 Notes
LEHMAN MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on Cl. 1-A1A Certs.

LEHMAN MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on 46 Classes of Certs.
MERRIL LYNCH: Moody's Keeps Junk Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of CMBS
MORGAN STANLEY: Interest Shortfalls Cue S&P to CMBS Ratings
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Two Class. Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Junks Rating on Class M Certificate
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Low-B Ratings on 5 Classes of Certs.
MSCI 2004-RR2: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Class Certs.
MT. WILSON: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+ (sf)'
NEWCASTLE IV: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 7 Classes of Certs.

NEWTON RE LIMITED: AM Best Downgrades Debt Rating to 'd'
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Ups $10MM Class E Note Rating to Caa2
PACIFIC INVESTMENT: S&P Up Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes From BB+
PAINE WEBBER: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certificate to Caa2
ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Ups Rating on $12.5MM Class E Notes to Caa3

STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts 'Ba2' Ratings of Certs. to 'Baa2'
TIERS CORPORATE: Moody's Upgrades 'Ba2' Rating of Cert. to 'Baa2'
TRALEE CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to B+ (sf)

* Payment Defaults Cues S&P to Cut Ratings on Notes Classes
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 323 Certificates From 114 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Places 11 Tranches of CDO Transactions on CreditWatch

                            *********

ABACUS 2007-1: S&P Withdraws CC Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CC (sf)' rating
on the class B notes from ABACUS 2007-18 Ltd., a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

S&P withdrew the rating following the redemption of the notes.


ALLEGHENY COUNTY: Good Progress Cues Fitch to Affirm 'BB-' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the rating on the $747,694,000 series 2007A
health system revenue bonds issued by Allegheny County Hospital
Development Authority for the benefit of West Penn Allegheny
Health System at 'BB-'.  The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

  * The affirmation is due to the substantial progress WPAHS has
    made in downsizing its operations and reducing its cost
    structure.  However, the Negative Outlook indicates that
    material bottom line benefits need to be realized before Fitch
    considers the rating to be stable.

  * Financial performance improved somewhat in fiscal 2010
    compared to the significant losses in fiscal 2008 and 2009,
    but continued to be negative due to low volumes related both
    to the economic forces in the service area and, more
    significantly, as a result of the reduction of the system's
    inpatient capacity and the expenses related to a major
    restructuring of its Pittsburgh presence.

  * The restructuring, which was launched in mid 2010, is designed
    to enable the system to return to profitable operations based
    on a downsized inpatient platform and an expanded outpatient
    presence in the suburban markets.  The consolidation includes
    the already implemented closure to inpatient care of the
    Suburban Campus of Allegheny General Hospital and the shifting
    of a significant portion of inpatient activity from the West
    Penn Hospital to the flagship Allegheny General Hospital.

  * Liquidity continues to be very thin, after funding $51 million
    towards the 2011 pension contribution unrestricted cash was
    reported at $186.6 million for the first quarter of 2011 ended
    Sept. 30, 2010, equal to 44 days cash on hand relative
    to expenses.


ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Lowers Collateralized Debt Obligations Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust (ARCap 2003-1).
In addition, S&P lowered one rating on a corresponding grantor
trust certificate from the same series.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on six additional classes from ARCap 2003-1
and on the corresponding grantor trust certificates from six
additional ARCap transactions from the same series.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the interest shortfalls affecting the transaction.  S&P also
considered the potential for additional classes to experience
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P's analysis considered the
underlying collateral, as well as the transaction's structure.

According to the Dec. 22, 2010 remittance report, cumulative
interest shortfalls to the transaction totaled $24.0 million,
which affected class J and all of the classes subordinate to it.
The interest shortfalls affecting the ARCap 2003-1 classes were
primarily caused by shortfalls that affected eight of the
transaction's underlying commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) transactions.  The interest shortfalls on the underlying
CMBS collateral were primarily due to the master servicer's
recovery of prior advances, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs), servicers' nonrecoverability determinations
for advances, and special servicing fees.

The downgrades and affirmations also reflect S&P's analysis of
ARCap 2003-1 following S&P's rating actions on the underlying CMBS
certificates.  The CMBS certificates are from five CMBS
transactions and total $128.8 million (32.7% of total asset
balance).

ARCap 2003-1 is a multitiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates.  Each note received cash flow from the underlying
CMBS collateral, which is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates.  Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent on the
ratings on the corresponding notes.

According to the Dec 22, 2010 trustee report, ARCap 2003-1 is
collateralized by 62 CMBS classes ($394.2 million, 100%) from 13
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2003.  ARCap 2003-1
has assets totaling $394.2 million, with liabilities totaling
$410.6 million.  ARCap 2003-1 has exposure to the following CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:


   * Bank of America First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage
     Trust's series 2001-3 (classes M, N, O, and P; $33.6 million,
     8.5%);
   * Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2002-2
     (classes L, M, N, and O; $32.6.0 million, 8.3%); and
   * Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2002-KEY2
     (classes M through S; $30.3 million, 7.7%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2003-1 and the corresponding
grantor trust certificates according to S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

Ratings Lowered

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
G        BB- (sf)             BB (sf)
H        B (sf)               BB- (sf)
J        CCC+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
K        CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class G
Grantor Trust certificate
        Rating
To                   From
BB- (sf)             BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Class    Rating
A        AA+ (sf)
B        AA (sf)
C        A+ (sf)
D        A- (sf)
E        BBB (sf)
F        BBB- (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
AA+ (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
AA (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
A+ (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
A- (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
BBB (sf)

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class F
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
BBB- (sf)


ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on Grantor Trust Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust (ARCap 2004-1)
and the corresponding grantor trust certificates from six
additional ARCap transactions.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed S&P's
'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the class A note from ARCap 2004-1
Resecuritization Trust and the corresponding grantor trust
certificate from the same series.  S&P also affirmed S&P's 'CCC-
(sf)' rating on two additional classes from ARCap 2004-1.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the interest shortfalls affecting the transaction.  S&P also
considered the potential for additional classes to experience
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P's analysis considered the
underlying collateral, as well as the transaction's structure.

According to the Dec. 20, 2010, remittance report, cumulative
interest shortfalls to the transaction totaled $6.0 million, which
affected class G and all of the classes subordinate to it.  The
interest shortfalls affecting the ARCap 2004-1 classes were
primarily caused by shortfalls that affected seven of the
underlying CMBS transactions.  The interest shortfalls on the
underlying CMBS collateral were primarily due to the master
servicer's recovery of prior advances, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees.

The downgrades and affirmations also reflect S&P's analysis on
ARCap 2004-1 following S&P's rating actions on the underlying
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) certificates.  The
CMBS certificates are from four CMBS transactions and total
$41.8 million (14.7% of total asset balance).

ARCap 2004-1 is a multitiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates.  Each note received cash flow from the underlying
CMBS collateral, which is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates.  Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent on the
ratings on the corresponding notes.

According to the Dec 20, 2010 trustee report, ARCap 2004-1 is
collateralized by 60 CMBS classes ($284.8 million, 100%) from 16
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004.  ARCap 2004-1
has assets totaling $284.8 million, with liabilities totaling
$333.9 million.  ARCap 2004-1 has exposure to the following CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

   * JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series
     2001-CIB2 (classes J and K; $19.2 million, 6.8%);
   * JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series
     2003-LN1 (class M; $9.5 million, 3.4%);
   * Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. series 2002-2
     (classes N and O; $7.0 million, 2.5%); and
   * Morgan Stanley Capital Trust series 2003-TOP11 (classes L and
     M; $7.0 million, 2.1%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2004-1 and the corresponding
grantor trust certificates according to S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

RAtings Lowered

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class    To                   From
B        A+ (sf)              AA (sf)
C        BBB+ (sf)            A- (sf)
D        BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
E        BB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)
F        B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
G        CCC+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
H        CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
A+ (sf)          AA (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
BBB+ (sf)        A- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
BBB- (sf)        BBB+ (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
BB- (sf)         BBB- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class F
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
B (sf)           BB+ (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class G
Grantor Trust certificate
      Rating
To               From
CCC+ (sf)        B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Class    Rating
A        AA+ (sf)
J        CCC- (sf)
K        CCC- (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor Trust certificate
Rating
AA+ (sf)


ARCH ONE: S&P Withdraws B Rating on Series 2005-4 CDO Transaction
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
notes from Arch One Finance Ltd.'s series 2005-4, a synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the repurchase and cancellation of
the notes, pursuant to the Oct. 6, 2010 repurchase agreement.

Rating Withdrawn

Arch One Finance Ltd.
Series 2005-4
                          Rating
Class                  To          From
Secured Fl Rate Nts.   NR          B (sf)/Watch Pos

NR--Not rated.


BABSON CLO: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Classes of Notes to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded these ratings of the notes
issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-II:

-- US$27,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Upgraded to
    Baa3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

-- US$11,500,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Upgraded
    to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
    Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

-- US$4,500,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Upgraded
    to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
    Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

-- US$5,000,000 Class Q-1 Combination Notes (current rated
    balance of $3,321,818), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
    June 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

-- US$10,000,000 Class Q-3 Combination Notes (current rated
    balance of $6,217,869), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
    June 23, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In Moody's
view, these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of
principal proceeds into substitute assets with higher par amounts
and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated December 10,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2812
compared to 2942 in the May 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 10.64% of the underlying portfolio
versus 12.77% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities
total about $8.2 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$42.7 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the last rating action.  The Class A, Class B,
Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
122.10%, 114.37%, 107.81% and 104.59%, respectively, versus May
2009 levels of 113.58%, 106.47%, 100.41% and 96.96%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class D-1 and Class D-2
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $488 million, defaulted par of
$10.4 million, weighted average default probability of 29.69%, a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.91%, and a
diversity score of 79.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-II, issued in July 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009, and "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate
CDO Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on 3 Cl. of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed 14 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-PB1 as follows:

-- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-2F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 30, 2002
    Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 2, 2006
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 13, 2006
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 13, 2006
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2008
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2008
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on July 3, 2008
    Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on July 3, 2008
Upgraded
    to A2 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on July 3, 2008
    Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. M, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.3% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 3.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 8.1% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating BACM 2001-PB1 was "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 41 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 3, 2008.

As of the December 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to
$667.9 million from $938.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 107 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool. Twenty-six loans, representing 37%
of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 38%
of the pool.  No loans have investment grade credit estimates.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.4 million loss.
Currently six loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$6.3 million appraisal reduction for three of the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of
$11.2 million for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.6 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 100% and 83% of the non-defeased performing
pool, respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 79% compared to 88% at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 11% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.31X and 1.46X, respectively, compared to
1.26X and 1.33X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 11% of the pool
balance.  The largest performing loan is the Milwaukee Center
Office Tower Loan, which is secured by a 374,000 square foot
office building located in downtown Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The
property was 89% leased as of June 2010.  Property performance has
improved since last review due to increased occupancy.  The loan,
which matures in June 2011, has been amortizing on a 360-month
schedule and has paid down 4% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 140%
and 0.75X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Pacific Professional Building Loan,
which is secured by a 111,000 square foot medical office building
located in San Francisco, California.  The building was 100%
leased as of June 2010, the same as at last review and
securitization.  Property performance has been stable.  The loan,
which matures in September 2011, has been amortizing on a 330-
month schedule and has paid down 5% since last review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.60X, compared to 78% and 1.53X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the Nokia Office Building Loan, which is
secured by a 135,000 square foot office/R&D facility located in
San Diego, California.  The building was built-to-suit for Nokia
Mobile Phones, Inc. and their lease expired in August 2010.  The
tenant has vacated the premises and a broker is actively marketing
the space.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan, which matures in June 2011, has been
amortizing on a 300-month schedule and has paid down 7% since last
review. Moody's analysis is based on current market rent and
operating expense levels.  Moody's is concerned about the
refinance risk associated with this loan due to the soft San Diego
office market.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.86X,
compared to 72% and 1.43X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Eleven Classes of CMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-1.

The lowered ratings reflect recurring interest shortfalls as well
as reduced liquidity available to absorb any future interest
shortfalls.  The lowered ratings on classes H through O reflect
interest shortfalls that have directly affected these classes. S&P
lowered its ratings the class M, N an O certificates to 'D (sf)'
due to recurring interest shortfalls that S&P expect to continue
for the foreseeable future.

According to the January 2011 remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling $274,773.
Interest shortfalls have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class H.  As a result, interest available to the
rated classes to absorb additional shortfalls has been reduced,
leaving them susceptible to future shortfalls.  The current
interest shortfalls were driven primarily by special servicing
fees, which totaled $20,162, and appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs) on five of the transaction's nine specially
serviced assets.  These five assets had appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) in the aggregate amount of $50.5 million in effect,
which generated aggregate ASERs of $254,610.  S&P lowered its
ratings on the class M, N, and O certificates to 'D (sf)' due to
recurring interest shortfalls that S&P expect will continue.
Classes M, N, and O have carried accumulated interest shortfalls
for three, eight, and 10 consecutive months, respectively.

As of the January 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool
comprised 93 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.01 billion, down from 113 loans totaling $1.33 billion at
issuance.  Nine assets, totaling $92.2 million (9.1%), are with
the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  The payment status of
the specially serviced assets is as follows: two ($23.9 million,
2.4%) are real estate owned (REO), three ($40.9 million, 4.0%) are
90-plus days delinquent, one ($16.3 million, 1.6%) is 30-days
delinquent, two ($7.4 million, 0.7%) are classified as matured
balloon loans, and one ($3.8 million, 0.4%) is in its grace
period.

The SBC Center (formerly known as Ameritech Center) loan
($26.8 million, 2.6%) is the largest loan with special servicer
and the ninth largest loan in the pool secured by real estate.
The loan is secured by a 294,255-sq.-ft. office property in Troy,
Mich.  The asset was transferred to the special servicer on
May 6, 2010, for imminent default following the decision by AT&T
(60.5% of net rentable area) to vacate at its lease expiration of
Aug. 31, 2010.  The property is currently 14% occupied.  As of the
January 2011 remittance report, a $23.1 million ARA is in effect
for this loan, and the reported ASER was $125,848.

Ratings Lowered

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-1
              Rating
Class      To         From          Credit Enhancement (%)
D          A- (sf)    A+ (sf)                    11.32
E          BBB- (sf)  A (sf)                     10.01
F          B+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                   8.21
G          B- (sf)    BBB (sf)                    7.06
H          CCC- (sf)  BBB- (sf)                   5.10
J          CCC- (sf)  BB (sf)                     4.45
K          CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                     3.79
L          CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)                    2.97
M          D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                   2.15
N          D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                   1.83
O          D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                   1.50


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Four Classes of CMBS
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-PWR2.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on 13 other classes from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the transaction, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the securities.  S&P lowered S&P's ratings
on four certificate classes due to potential interest shortfalls
and anticipated credit support erosion associated with the five
specially serviced loans.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on the class
X-1 and X-2 interest-only (IO) certificates based on S&P's current
criteria.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool using S&P's conduit/fusion criteria.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.65x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 70.2%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows
under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a S&Pighted average DSC of
1.26x and an LTV of 88.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 15.3% and 31.9%, respectively. The
DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude 15 defeased loans
($163.6 million, 20.6%) and five specially serviced assets
($27.8 million, 3.5%).  S&P separately estimated losses for all
five specially serviced assets and included them in S&P's 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

Credit Considerations

As of the December 2010 remittance report, five assets
($27.8 million, 3.5%) were with the special servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia).   One is a nonperforming
matured balloon loan ($2.4 million, 0.3%), two are real estate
owned (REO) ($6.2 million, 0.8%), and two are more than 90 days
delinquent ($19.2 million, 2.4%).  Three of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$2.7 million.  None of the specially serviced loans are top 10
loans.

The Circle Business Center loan ($14.6 million total exposure,
1.7%) is the largest loan with the special servicer.  The loan is
secured by two office buildings totaling 156,000-sq.-ft. in Long
Beach, Calif.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Dec. 23, 2009, due to payment default.  Berkadia has initiated the
foreclosure process while evaluating the borrower's modification
proposal. An ARA of $862,725 is in effect against the loan. As of
Dec. 31, 2008, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.36x and 55%,
respectively.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a minimal loss upon
the eventual resolution of this loan.

The west Deptford Self Storage loan ($5.5 million total exposure,
0.7%) is the second-largest loan with the special servicer.  The
loan is secured by an 816-unit self storage facility in west
Deptford, N.J.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on Sept. 28, 2010, following the loan's August 2010 maturity and
the borrower's inability to refinance due to lack of tenancy.
Berkadia will recommend foreclosure and appointment of a receiver.
As of June 30, 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.71x and
53%, respectively.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant
loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The Victory Creek Apartments, a 200-unit multifamily property in
Stone Mountain, Ga., is the third-largest asset with the special
servicer.  The asset has a total exposure of $5.1 million (0.6%).
The property became REO on Nov. 2, 2010, and as of Dec. 31, 2009,
the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.70x and 55%, respectively.
An ARA of $1.8 million is in effect for this asset.  Standard &
Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual resolution
of this loan.

The 2251 Rutherford Road loan ($2.4 million, 0.3%) is the
fS&P'sth-largest loan with the special servicer.  The loan is
secured by a 33,400-sq.-ft. office building in Carlsbad, Calif.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on June 16, 2010,
due to imminent maturity default. The lease of the subject's
single tenant expired in May 2010 and the building is vacant.
Berkadia approved an extension of the maturity date to allow the
borrower time to re-lease or sell the building.  Standard & Poor's
anticipates a minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this
loan.

The Twin Creeks Flex Building, a 45,000-sq.-ft. industrial
building in Columbus, Ohio, is the fifth-largest asset with the
special servicer.  The asset has a total exposure of $1.8 million
(0.2%).  The property became REO on July 9, 2010, and as of
Dec. 31, 2008, the reported DSC and occupancy were 0.83x and 83%,
respectively.  An ARA of $41,406 is in effect for this asset.
Standard & Poor's anticipates a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

Transaction Summary

As of the December 2010 remittance report, the collateral balance
was $796.4 million, which is 74.7% of the balance at issuance.
The collateral includes 91 loans, down from 100 loans at issuance.
Fifteen ($163.6 million, 20.6%) of the loans are defeased.  As of
the December 2010 remittance report, the master servicers, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A. and Prudential Asset Resources Inc., provided
financial information for 98.9% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, all of which was full-year 2008, partial or full-year 2009,
and partial-year 2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.70x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV, which
exclude 15 defeased loans ($163.6 million, 20.6%) and five
specially serviced assets ($27.8 million, 3.5%), were 1.65x and
70.2%, respectively.  S&P separately estimated losses for
all five specially serviced assets and included them in S&P's
'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

Seventeen loans ($126.7 million, 15.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Ten loans ($37.7 million, 4.7%) have a
reported DSC below 1.10x, and eight of these loans ($27.9 million,
3.5%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.  To date, the pool
has experienced principal losses totaling $1.0 million on one
loan.

Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $312.4 million (39.2%), none of which are currently
with the special servicer.  Two of the top 10 loans are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.76x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.57x and
70.0%, respectively.  Details regarding the three largest loans
and the two loans on the master servicer's watchlist are as
follows:

The 3 Times Square loan ($74.5 million, 9.4%) is the largest
loan in the pool and has a current whole-loan balance of
$221.5 million, which is split into a $126.6 million A note and
a $94.8 million B note.  The trust represents a $74.5 million pari
passu interest in the senior A note.  The loan is secured by an
883,400-sq.-ft. office building in midtown Manhattan.  The largest
tenants are Reuters (79.4%) and Bank of Montreal (11.8%), both
with lease expirations in November 2021.  As of June 30, 2010, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.61x and 99.5%, respectively.

The Plaza America Office Towers III and IV loan is the second-
largest loan in the pool and has a current whole-loan balance of
$76.2 million consisting of two pari passu notes, one of which is
included in the trust ($38.1 million, 4.8%).  The loan is secured
by two office buildings totaling 473,000-sq.-ft. in Reston,
Virginia.  The largest tenants are Unisys Corp (59.0%, expires
July 2018) and NCI Info (16.6%, expires June 2013).  As of June
30, 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.68x and 100%,
respectively.

The North Crescent Plaza loan ($33.8 million, 4.2%) is the third-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by two office buildings
totaling 124,000-sq.-ft. in Beverly Hills, Calif.  Two tenants
fully occupy the buildings, Platinum Equity LLC (71.0%) and
Paradigm Entertainment (29.0%), both of which have leases
expiring in March 2023.  As of June 30, 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 2.21x and 100%, respectively.

The First Union Plaza loan ($24.9 million, 3.1%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 236,000-sq.-ft.
office building in Durham, North Carolina.  Duke University is the
largest tenant in the building occupying approximately 73% of the
net rentable area with a majority of its leases expiring in
July 2014.  The loan was placed on the master servicer's watchlist
due to a DSC below the required threshold of 1.24x.  As of
Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.23x and 96%,
respectively.

The Motorola Office Building loan ($18.6 million, 2.3%) is the
ninth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 120,000-sq.-ft.
office building in Farmington Hills, Mich.  The loan was placed on
the master servicer's watchlist because the single tenant building
has been vacant for several years.  The Temic Automotive of North
America (not rated) lease has an expiration date of Dec. 31, 2016,
and a Dec. 31, 2011, early termination option.  The tenant
exercised its termination option and provided termination proceeds
of $6.8 million to be placed in a leasing reserve.  The borrower
is currently marketing the property through a national brokerage
firm.  The loan payments are current.  As of Sept. 30, 2010, the
reported DSC was 2.53x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to
S&P's U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed
ratings.

Ratings lowered

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-PWR2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PWR2

Class     Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
       To           From
K      B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)               2.89
L      B- (sf)      B+ (sf)                2.38
M      CCC+ (sf)    B (sf)                 1.71
N      CCC (sf)     B- (sf)                1.38


Ratings affirmed

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-PWR2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PWR2

Class  Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
A-2    AAA (sf)                           17.96
A-3    AAA (sf)                           17.96
A-4    AAA (sf)                           17.96
B      AA+ (sf)                           14.61
C      A (sf)                             11.09
D      A- (sf)                             9.92
E      BBB+ (sf)                           8.41
F      BBB (sf)                            7.07
G      BBB- (sf)                           5.90
H      BB+ (sf)                            4.23
J      BB (sf)                             3.56
X-1    AAA (sf)                             N/A
X-2    AAA (sf)                             N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


BELHURST CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $12.5MM Cl. E Notes to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded these ratings of these
notes issued by Belhurst CLO Ltd.:

-- $15,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
    A3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

-- $35,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
    Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded
    to Ba2 (sf);

-- $12,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
    Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded to
    B3 (sf);

-- $12,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
    Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated December 7,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2676
compared to 2843 in the June 2009 report, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 8.5% of the underlying
portfolio versus 13.6% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted
securities total about $4.2 million of the underlying portfolio
compared to $48.7 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since rating action in July 2009.  The Class A/B, Class C
and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 120.5%,
110.7% and 107.5%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels of
112.4%, 103.3% and 100.3%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's
also notes that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer
deferring interest and that all previously deferred interest has
been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review: Global CLOs," key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds of
$473 million, defaulted par of $8.6 million, weighted average
default probability of 29.24%, a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 43.62%, and a diversity score of 65.  These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Belhurst CLO Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.  In addition, due to the low
diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM 2.6 was used to simulate
a default distribution that was then applied as an input in the
cash flow model.


CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Raises Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-4, B, C, and D notes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO
Fund III Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by GSO Capital Partners L.P.  S&P removed S&P's ratings
on the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed S&P's
ratings on the class A-3 and E notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in November 2009.  The affirmations of the class A-3
and E notes reflect sufficient credit support available at the
current rating levels.

According to the Nov. 23, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
held $1.3 million in defaulted assets and $11.3 million in 'CCC'
rated assets, down from $12.9 million defaulted and $32.8 million
'CCC' assets as of the Oct. 6, 2009, trustee report.

The transaction has also benefited from paydowns to the class
A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes and the subsequent increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated
notes.  The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the
Nov. 23, 2010 trustee report:

   * The class A/B O/C ratio was 127.60%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 118.98% in October 2009;

   * The class C O/C ratio was 116.71%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 111.14% in October 2009;

   * The class D O/C ratio was 109.49%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 105.76% in October 2009; and

   * The class E O/C ratio was 106.20%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 103.26% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Ltd.
Class                                Rating
                                 To           From
A-1                              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4                              AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B                                AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                                A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                                BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund III Ltd.
Class                             Rating
A-3                               AAA (sf)
E                                 B+ (sf)


CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class J commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
series 2000-3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The downgrade of class J reflects S&P's analysis of the interest
shortfalls affecting the transaction. Interest shortfalls have
affected the class J certificates for nine months, and S&P expects
them to continue for the foreseeable future.  These shortfalls
stem from appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) in
effect for three assets, well as special servicing fees payable
for the eight assets currently with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC (LNR).

According the Dec. 17, 2010 remittance report, monthly interest
shortfalls were $93,898, which were caused by total ASERs of
$77,186, monthly special servicing fees of $13,271, and interest
paid on outstanding servicing advances of $3,442.  S&P anticipates
that recurring ASERs will decline to $53,536 following the
liquidation of the Roswell Business Center asset ($9.1 million,
11.3%), which S&P expects will occur at the end of February 2011.
The two assets causing the remainder of the ASERs are:

   * Two Bent Tree Tower ($16.6 million, 20.6%) is a 172,513-sq.-
     ft. office building in Addison, Texas. The loan was
     transferred to LNR on Jan. 13, 2010, due to payment default
     and became real estate owned (REO) on Aug. 3, 2010.  An
     appraisal dated Feb. 16, 2010, valued the property at
     $11.1 million and an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
     $7.1 million is currently in effect, resulting in a monthly
     ASER of $41,107.

   * The Regal Court I and II loan ($4.3 million, 5.4%) is a
     42,219-sq.-ft. office building in Warren, Mich. The loan was
     transferred to LNR on May 15, 2009, due to imminent default,
     and is currently in foreclosure.  An appraisal dated June 29,
     2009, valued the property at $2.6 million and an ARA of
     $2.1 million is currently in effect, resulting in a monthly
     ASER of $12,249.

As of the December 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 10 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$80.8 million, down from 95 assets totaling $767.5 million at
issuance. Eight assets, totaling $63.6 million (78.7%), are with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
totaling $8.7 million, on nine assets.


CHESTERFIELD VALLEY: Fitch Affirms Rating on $18.7MM Bonds at 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Chesterfield Valley
Transportation Development District, Missouri as part of its
continuous surveillance effort:

  * $18.7 million outstanding transportation sale tax revenue
    bonds, series 2006 affirmed at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Negative from Stable.

The Outlook revision reflects the continued decline in sales tax
revenues, the expectation of progressively larger debt service
reserve draws, and narrowing safety margin of potential future tax
declines before exhaustion of the debt service reserve.

The bonds are secured by an economically sensitive sales tax
pledge levied within a limited geographic area.

The cash-funded debt service reserve fund was tapped; however,
based on 2010 collections there should be adequate collections and
reserve funds available to repay all bonds.

The district, which consists of several hundred retail stores, is
advantageously located adjacent to a major interstate and within
an affluent community.

The transfer of sales tax revenues to the bond fund is subject to
annual appropriation; however, Fitch believes the district has
little incentive not to appropriate.

Legal covenants are liberal and loosely written.


CHEVY CHASE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 3 Classes of Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of
ten tranches from Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-B.  The collateral backing this
transaction consists primarily of first-lien, adjustable-rate,
negative amortization residential mortgages.

Rating actions are:

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-B

  * Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 30,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. A-1I, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 30,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. A-2I, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. A-NA, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 30,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. NIO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. B-1I, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. B-1NA, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of option arm pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions
that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on option arm pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Option ARM
RMBS Loss Projection Update: April 2010" published in April 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
option arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Certain securities, as noted above, are insured by financial
guarantors.  The Cl. A-1, Cl. A-1I and Cl. A-NA tranches,
contained in this rating action, are wrapped by Ambac Assurance
Corporation.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
on the security.  The principal methodology used in determining
the underlying rating is the same methodology for rating
securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.  RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance
Corporation are rated at their underlying rating without
consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.


CITIGROUP COMM: Moody's Cuts Rating on 6 Classes of Certs. to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of 14 classes
and affirmed 11 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C5:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2007
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
    A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 A3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
    Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Ba1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 B1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 B3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10, 2010 Caa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. AMP-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
    Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

-- Cl. AMP-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
    Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

-- Cl. AMP-3, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on March 25, 2010
    Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their current ratings.

On December 10, 2010, Moody's placed 14 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes our review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.9% of the current balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 4.6% Moody's stressed scenario
loss is 19.5% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship. The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 46 compared to 57 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated February 9, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to
$1.976 billion from $2.109 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 192 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool. One loan, representing 4% of the
pool, has an investment grade credit estimate.  At last full
review, the Tower 67 Loan also had an investment grade credit
estimate.  However, due to declined performance and increased
leverage, the loan is now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.

Fifty-five loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $54 million loss.  These
losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes L through P and
a 81% principal loss for Class K. At last review the pool had
realized an aggregate $4.9 million loss.

Currently 12 loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$25.7 million appraisal reduction for ten of the specially
serviced loans. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of
$43.2 million for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$16.6 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 89%
of the performing pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 111% compared to 107% at
Moody's last full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
1.26X and 0.96X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Ala Moana Portfolio Loan,
which is secured by a portfolio composed of two retail and two
office properties totaling 2 million square feet located in
Honolulu, Haiwaii.  The retail component is the dominant retail
mall in its market.  The loan represents an 80% interest in a
pari passu mortgage loan.  The portfolio is also encumbered by
$268 million non-pooled junior component which supports the rake
classes AMP1, AMP2 and AMP3.  The property was 96% leased as of
March 2010.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
A3 and 1.24X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.08X at last full
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17.3% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the IRET Portfolio Loan, which is a
comprised of nine office properties located in Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas.  The portfolio totals 936,720 SF.
The loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year term and matures
in October 2016.  The portfolio was 100% leased as of April 2010,
however 46% of the net rentable area expires within the next 12
months.  Although property performance has been relatively stable,
Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow because of concerns
about potential vacancy due to expiring leases.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 110%
and 0.89X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the 801 South Figueroa, which is
secured by a 443,271 SF office building located in Los Angeles,
California.  The loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year term
and matures in October 2016. Property performance has improved
since last review due to the rent commencement of Seven Licensing
Company.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.75X,
respectively, compared to 144% and 0.66X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Tower 67 Loan, which is secured by a
449-unit multifamily property located in New York City.  Property
performance has declined since last review due to a decrease in
occupancy and softer market conditions.  As of September 2010, the
property was 96% leased compared to 98% at last full review.  The
loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year term and matures in
July 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 64% and 1.39X at last review.


CONTRA COSTA: S&P Augments 2003 Tax Bonds Rating From 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'BBB+'
from 'B' on Contra Costa County Public Financing Authority,
Calif.'s outstanding series 2003A tax allocation bonds, issued for
Contra Costa County Redevelopment Agency.  The outlook is stable.
On Jan. 11, 2011, Standard & Poor's lowered the rating on the
authority's series 2003A tax allocation bonds to 'B' from 'BBB' in
error.
"The 'BBB+' rating reflects S&P's view of strong 1.42x coverage of
maximum annual debt service in fiscal 2011, increases in assessed
value each of the last five years, and Contra Costa County's very
strong median household and per capita effective buying incomes,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Bryan Moore.

The series 2003A bonds are secured by loan payments to the
authority from the agency; the loan payments are each severally
secured by a senior lien on tax increment revenues from the Contra
Costa Centre Project Area, net of housing set-aside payments and
statutory passthrough payments.  In addition, the project area's
loan is on parity with the loans issued for the series 1999,
2007A, and 2007A-T bonds.  The authority and agency are located in
Contra Costa County, which fully participates in the Bay Area
economy and employment base.


CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Rating on 2007 Series A Bonds to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
(SPUR) to 'BB+' from 'A-' on Contra Costa County Public Financing
Authority, Calif.'s outstanding 2007 series A and series A-T tax
allocation revenue bonds, issued for Contra Costa County
Redevelopment Agency.  The outlook is stable.

"The rating action reflects our view of a deterioration in the
regional real estate market that we calculate will substantially
reduce coverage of the senior lien to 1.03x," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Bryan Moore.  "In addition, the volatility
ratios of the project areas that generate pledged revenues are
moderately high, in our view, which suggests that even minor
further assessed value declines will likely have a proportionally
larger effect on pledged revenues."  Also limiting credit quality
is S&P's view of increased taxpayer concentration.

When the bonds were originally issued in 2007, each project area
had coverage of greater than 1.0x from its tax increment revenue
relative to its loan obligation payments.  However, since that
time, assessed value (AV) has dropped, in S&P's view,
significantly in fourof the five project areas and as a result,
the senior-lien coverage dropped to 1.03x in fiscal 2011.  As far
as the individual project areas, the Bay Point Project Area has
seen the most significant decline -- 44% of incremental AV in
fiscal 2010 from the previous year and an additional 11% in fiscal
2011.  The Bay Point project area has 0.41x coverage of maximum
annual debt service (MADS) in fiscal 2011.  The Montalvin Manor
project area also fell below 1x coverage of MADS in fiscal
2011 to 0.57x coverage.  Management reported that the agency plans
to use unspent bond proceeds in the individual areas to cover the
tax increment deficiencies in each respective area in fiscal 2011.
The other three areas are above 1x coverage of MADS in fiscal
2011.

On a combined basis, the 10 leading taxpayers have increased to
what S&P consider a concentrated 40.4% of total AV in fiscal 2011
from 25% in fiscal 2007 and to a concentrated 53.8% of incremental
AV in fiscal 2011 from 33% in fiscal 2007.  Taken together, the
project areas participating in the financing total $1.81 billion
in total AV and $1.36 billion in incremental AV in fiscal
2011.  For the five years through fiscal 2007, the aggregate AV
grew 76% and, on average, 12% per year.  The aggregate AV
continued to increase in fiscal 2008 by 8.6%.  However, as the
housing market began to soften, aggregate AV rose by only 0.3% in
fiscal 2009 and then dropped by 13.2% in fiscal 2010 and
another 2.8% in fiscal 2011.  In addition, the volatility ratio,
which measures the sensitivity of incremental revenues to overall
AV changes, worsened slightly to what S&P consider a moderate 0.25
in fiscal 2011 from 0.23 in fiscal 2007.

Series A bonds are secured by a senior-lien claim on loan
repayments to the authority from the Contra Costa Centre, North
Richmond, Bay Point, Rodeo, and Montalvin Manor project areas.
Each project area is severally (with no cross-collateralization)
pledging its tax increment revenue (excluding its 20%
housing set-aside requirement).

The series A-T bonds are secured by a senior-lien claim on the
pooled housing set-aside requirement tax increment revenue from
the North Richmond, Bay Point, Rodeo, and Montalvin Manor Project
Areas. Revenues collected by the authority from the loan
repayments of these fouragency project areas' tax increment
revenues are pledged in parity to the series A and series A-T
bonds on a senior-lien basis.  The bonds are being issued by the
authority under a Marks-Roos local bond pooling structure.


CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Revenue Bonds Underlying Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
(SPUR) to 'B' from 'BBB' on Contra Costa County Public Financing
Authority, Calif.'s outstanding 2007 series B subordinate-lien tax
allocation revenue bonds, issued for Contra Costa County
Redevelopment Agency.  The outlook is stable.

"The rating action reflects our view of a deterioration in the
regional real estate market that we calculate will substantially
reduce coverage of the subordinate lien to 0.85x," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Bryan Moore.

"In addition, the volatility ratios of the project areas that
generate pledged revenues are moderately high, in our view, which
suggests that even minor further assessed value declines will
likely have a proportionally larger effect on pledged revenues."
Also limiting credit quality is our view of increased taxpayer
concentration.

Under a senior-subordinate structure, when each project area makes
its loan obligation repayments to the authority, the series B
subordinate-lien bonds will have coverage of 1.0x.  When the bonds
were originally issued in 2007, each project area had coverage of
greater than 1.0x from its tax increment revenue relative to its
loan obligation payments.  However, since that time, assessed
value (AV) has dropped significantly in four of the five project
areas and as a result, the subordinate-lien coverage dropped to
0.85x in fiscal 2011.  The Bay Point project area has seen the
most significant decline -- 44% of incremental AV in fiscal 2010
from the previous year and an additional 11% in fiscal 2011. The
Bay Point project area has 0.41x coverage of maximum annual debt
service (MADS) in fiscal 2011.  The Montalvin Manor project area
also fell below 1x coverage of MADS in fiscal 2011 to 0.57x
coverage.  Management reported that the agency plans to use
unspent bond proceeds in the individual areas to cover the tax
increment deficiencies in each respective area in fiscal 2011.
The other three areas are above 1x coverage of MADS in fiscal
2011.

On a combined basis, the 10 leading taxpayers have increased to
what S&P consider a concentrated 40.4% of total AV in fiscal 2011
from 25% in fiscal 2007 and to, in S&P's view, a concentrated
53.8% of incremental AV in fiscal 2011 from 33% in fiscal 2007.
Taken together, the project areas participating in the financing
total $1.81 billion in total AV and $1.36 billion in incremental
AV in fiscal 2011.  For the five years through fiscal 2007,
aggregate AV grew by a cumulative 76% and, on average, 12% per
year.  Aggregate AV continued to increase in fiscal 2008 by 8.6%.
However, as the housing market began to soften, aggregate AV rose
by only 0.3% in fiscal 2009 and then dropped by 13.2% in fiscal
2010 and another 2.8% in fiscal 2011.  In addition, the volatility
ratio, which measures the sensitivity of incremental revenues
to overall AV changes, worsened slightly to what S&P considers a
moderate 0.25 in fiscal 2011 from 0.23 in fiscal 2007.

The series B bonds are secured by a subordinate-lien claim on loan
repayments to the authority from the Contra Costa Centre, North
Richmond, Bay Point, Rodeo, and Montalvin Manor project areas.


CONTRA COSTA: S&P Lowers Tax Allocation Bonds Rating to B From BBB
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'B' from 'BBB' on Contra Costa County Public Financing Authority,
Calif.'s outstanding series 1999 and series 2003A tax allocation
bonds, issued for Contra Costa County Redevelopment Agency. The
outlook is stable.

"The rating action reflects our view of credit quality of the Bay
Point Project Area and a deterioration in the regional real estate
market that we calculate will substantially reduce coverage of
maximum annual debt service to 0.41x in the Bay Point Project Area
during fiscal 2011," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Bryan
Moore.  "In addition, the volatility ratios of the project areas
that generate pledged revenues are moderately high, in our view,
which suggests that even minor further assessed value declines
will likely have a proportionally larger effect on pledged
revenues."  Also limiting credit quality is S&P's view of
increased taxpayer concentration.

Bay Point Project Area has what S&P views as the lowest credit
quality of all the project areas and, at 1,550 acres, is also the
largest participant.  The area has experienced what S&P considers
to be significant decreases in assessed value (AV) in fiscals
2009, 2010, and 2011.  In fiscal 2007, the area had a total AV of
$616.19 million and 1.59x coverage of maximum annual debt service
(MADS).  However, due to the softening in the local housing
market, total AV dropped by 8.3%, 31.4% and 6.1% in fiscal 2009,
fiscal 2010, and fiscal 2011, respectively, to a total value of
$396.7 million.  Incremental AV declined to $218.8 million in
fiscal 2011 from $438.3 million in fiscal 2007.  As a result,
the MADS coverage has dropped well below 1x to 0.41x.  Management
reported that the agency will likely meet its debt service
obligations in fiscal 2011 primarily through ongoing tax increment
and the use of unspent bond proceeds.  The project area's 10
leading taxpayers are, in S&P's view, diverse representing
23.0% of total AV but a concentrated 41.6% of incremental AV.  The
volatility ratio, which measures the sensitivity of incremental
revenues to overall AV changes, is moderately high, in S&P's
opinion, at 0.45.  The area does have an additional bonds test
(ABT) requiring 1.50x coverage of existing and proposed MADS.
Once the 1995, 1999, and 2003B loans are retired in 2028, the ABT
drops to 1.25x.

The series 1999 and 2003A bonds are secured by fourseparate loan
payments to the authority from the agency; the loan payments are
each severally secured by a senior-lien pledge of tax increment
revenues from each of the project areas, net of housing set-aside
payments and statutory passthrough payments.  The four project
areas are Contra Costa Centre (formerly the Pleasant Hill/Bay Area
Rapid Transit, or BART, Project Area), North Richmond, Bay Point,
and Rodeo.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Raises 'Ba2' Ratings on Certs. to 'Baa2'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following certificates issued by Corporate Backed Trust
Certificates, American General Institutional Capital A Capital
Securities-Backed Series 2002-17 Trust:

  * $73,991,000 aggregate certificate principal balance of
    Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, American General
    Institutional Capital A Capital Securities-Backed, Series
    2002-17 Class A-1 Certificates; Upgraded to Baa2; previously
    on November 15, 2010 Ba2, Placed on review for upgrade

* $73,991,000 aggregate notional amount of Corporate Backed Trust
   Certificates, American General Institutional Capital A Capital
   Securities-Backed, Series 2002-17 Class A-2 Certificates;
   Upgraded to Baa2; previously on November 15, 2010 Ba2, Placed
   on review for upgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction.  This rating actions are a result of the change
of the rating of the underlying securities which are the
$73,991,000 aggregate principal amount of 7.57% Capital Securities
Series A issued American General Institutional Capital A which
were upgraded to Baa2 by Moody's on January 12, 2011.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


CREDI SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Seven Class Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of four and
affirmed 18 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C5:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-M, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-J, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2006
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

-- Cl. C, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. D, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to B3 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.6% of the current balance.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
22.0% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating CSMC 2006-C5 was "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 52 compared to 55 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 16, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the December 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $3.31 billion
from $3.43 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 288 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37%
of the pool. One loan, representing 3.5% of the pool, has defeased
and is collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  No loans
have investment grade credit estimates.

Eighty-five loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $40.5 million loss.
Currently 26 loans, representing 13% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially-serviced loan is the Babcock &
Brown FX4 Loan, which is secured by 20 multifamily properties
located in Texas, South Carolina, and Georgia.  The collateral
consists of older vintage Class B properties and totals 4,958
units.  The largest geographic concentrations are Houston, Dallas,
and Columbia, South Carolina.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2009 due to the borrower's request for a
loan modification and is current.  Although the portfolio has
maintained a high occupancy level, performance has declined since
securitization due to a decline in rental rates and increased
expenses.

The remaining 25 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$79.0 million appraisal reduction for 18 of the specially serviced
loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $151.2 million
for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated a
$56.0 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 99% and 97%, respectively, of the non-
defeased performing pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 110%, the same as
at last full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 0.95X, respectively, the same as
at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance.  The largest performing loan is the Queens Multifamily
Portfolio Loan, which is secured by 31 multifamily properties
located in Queens, New York.  The borrower purchased the property
in 2006 for $277.5 million and planned to increase its value
through a comprehensive capital renovation program and conversion
of rent regulated units to market rents.  Progress has been slower
than expected and multifamily market conditions in the New York
City metropolitan area have deteriorated since securitization.  In
addition, operating expenses are significantly higher than
originally projected.  The loan is currently on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR. Due to its weaker than
expected performance, Moody's has assumed a high probability of
default for this loan.  The loan is interest-only for the entire
term and matures in December 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 136% and 0.64X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.60X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the 720 Fifth Avenue Loan, which is
secured by a 121,108 square foot mixed-use property located in New
York City.  The property was 93% leased as of September 2010
compared to 92% at last review.  The largest tenant is Abercrombie
& Fitch.  Property performance is inline with Moody's original
expectations.  The loan is interest-only throughout its entire
ten-year term and matures in November 2016.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 114%
and 0.78X at last review.

The third largest loan is the HGSI Headquarters Loan, which is
secured by a 635,000 square foot office property located in
Rockville, Maryland.  The property is 100% leased to Human Genome
Sciences, Inc.,  through May 2026 and serves as its corporate
headquarters.  Property performance is inline with Moody's
original projections.  The loan has a 60-month interest-only
period and will amortize on a 360-month schedule maturing in
September 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.93X,
respectively, the same as at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Cert. to BB (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
F, G, and H commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 1997-C1.

S&P's upgrades of these certificates reflect increased credit
enhancement levels, the pool's composition of defeased (51.6%) and
fully amortizing (48.4%) loans, as well as S&P's analysis of the
remaining collateral in the transaction and the transaction
structure.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the transaction.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage (DSC) of 0.99x and a loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 60.3%.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude four
($48.8 million, 51.6%) defeased assets.

Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 20, 2010, remittance report, none of the loans
were with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. Two loans
($3.1 million, 3.4%) were on the master servicer's watchlist.

Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 20, 2010 remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $94.5 million, which represents 7.3% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  Twelve assets are in
the pool, down from 160 at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., provided financial information
for 100.0% of the nondefeased assets in the pool.  To date, the
transaction has realized principal losses totaling $19.5 million
in connection with 16 assets.

Of the remaining assets in the pool, four (51.6%) are defeased,
six (45.0%) are CTL loans, and two (3.3%) are nondefeased, fully
amortizing loans.  The largest CTL loan ($16.8 million, 17.8%) is
an obligation of Bank of America Corp. ('A').  The second-largest
CTL loan ($11.4 million, 12.1%) is an obligation of RadioShack
Corp. ('BB').  Three of the remaining four CTL loans are
obligations of Bon-Ton Stores Inc. ('BB'), with the other an
obligation of Kohl's Corp. ('BBB+').  The aggregate amount of
defeased assets and CTL loans is $91.4 million, which represents
96.7% of the total pool balance.

The resultant credit enhancement levels support the raised
ratings.

Ratings Raised

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-C1

          Rating
Class  To        From   Credit enhancement (%)
F      AAA (sf)  A (sf)                  68.87
G      AAA (sf)  BBB (sf)                54.52
H      BB  (sf)  BB- (sf)                25.82


DEKANIA EUROPE I: Fitch Junks Rating on EUR15.4 Mil. Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these various rating actions on seven
classes
of notes issued by Dekania Europe CDO I Plc and revised the Rating
Outlook on three classes:

* EUR124,537,318 class A1 notes affirmed at 'Aasf/LS3'; Outlook
   to Negative from Stable;
* EUR11,500,000 class A2 notes affirmed at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook to
   Negative from Stable;
* EUR13,000,000 class A3 notes affirmed at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook to
   Negative from Stable;
* EUR35,000,000 class B1 notes downgraded to 'BBsf/LS4' from
   'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
* EUR15,000,000 class B2 notes downgraded to 'BBsf/LS4 from
   'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
* EUR29,500,000 class C notes downgraded to 'B-sf/LS5' from
   'B/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
* EUR15,461,821 class D notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'B'.

The rating actions are based on the performance of the portfolio
since Fitch's last review in July 2009. Since Fitch's last rating
actions, EUR12 million of the portfolio has defaulted while an
additional EUR12 million is now considered 'credit risk' by the
Collateral Manager.  Of the performing portfolio, EUR16.7 million
of the portfolio has experienced negative rating migration, net of
upgrades.  This is based upon publicly available ratings and
credit assessments provided by Fitch's Financial Institutions and
Insurance groups.  Currently, 40.38% of the portfolio is rated
non-investment grade with a portfolio weighted average rating in
the 'BB/BB-' category.

The impact of the credit quality migration on the class A1, A2, A3
notes is offset by the limited amortization from the EUR10 million
collateral redemption in December 2010. As of the December 2010
payment date, approximately 17% of the original A1 note balance
has amortized.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the Fitch
Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels on the
underlying portfolio.  The expected losses generated by the model
were compared to the credit enhancement available to each tranche.
Consistent with Fitch's 'Global Surveillance Criteria for Trust
Preferred CDOs', cash flow analysis was not used in the evaluation
of credit enhancement to the rated liabilities.  Excess spread is
currently being distributed as subordinate management fees and
payments to the subordinated noteholders and therefore does not
represent additional credit enhancement to the rated notes.

Presently, all classes are receiving their periodic interest
payments and all coverage tests are currently passing their
respective trigger levels.

The Negative Outlook on all classes of notes reflects Fitch's
concern regarding the possibility of a negative impact from the
continued weakness in various European credit markets and
uncertainty of the maturity profile which is exacerbated by a
highly concentrated nature of the portfolio.  At present, it
contains 29 performing obligors, with the largest 15 obligors
representing 64.3% of the total portfolio.  According to the
Manager, 84.5% of the portfolio is expected to be called before
the respective legal maturity dates.  The effective maturity has a
material impact on the expected default rates.  Fitch discussed
the possibility of calls with the collateral manager and Fitch's
European Financial Institutions and Insurance groups and
considered several scenarios in its analysis.  Fitch will continue
to monitor future amortization in the transaction and may revise
its assumptions in the future.

Loss severity ratings were assigned to the notes rated 'Bsf'
category or higher.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks
to classes rated in the 'CCC' and lower categories.  Currently,
Fitch does not assign recovery ratings to distressed classes of
notes of TruPS CDOs rated 'CCCsf' category or lower.

Dekania I is a collateralized debt obligation managed by Dekania
Capital Management, LLC, an affiliate of Cohen Brothers LLC.  The
notes are backed primarily by subordinate and hybrid instruments
issued by European banks, and insurers.


DEKANIA EUROPE II: Fitch Junks Rating on Four Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these various rating actions on eight
classes of notes issued by Dekania Europe CDO II Plc (Dekania II)
and assigned a Rating Outlook to one class:

* EUR157,005,056 class A1 notes rated 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook
   Negative;
* EUR25,000,000 class A2-A notes affirmed at 'BBBsf/LS5';
   Outlook Negative;
* EUR50,00,000 class A2-B notes affirmed at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
   Negative;
* EUR26,385,042 class B notes downgraded to 'Bsf/LS5' from
   'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
* EUR28,510,413 class C notes downgraded to 'CCCsf';
* EUR12,873,114 class D1 notes downgraded to 'CCsf';
* EUR2,143,723 class D2 notes downgraded to 'CCsf';
* EUR12,768,184 class E notes downgraded to 'Csf'.

The rating actions are based on the performance of the portfolio
since Fitch's last review in July 2009.  Since Fitch's last rating
actions, one obligor representing EUR12 million has defaulted,
which brings total portfolio defaults to EUR36.5 million.  Of the
performing portfolio, EUR58 million of the portfolio has
experienced negative rating migration.  This is based on publicly
available ratings and credit assessments provided by Fitch's
Financial Institutions and Insurance groups.  Currently, 51.22% of
the portfolio is rated non-investment grade with a portfolio
weighted average rating in the 'BB-' category.

The negative credit migration in the portfolio is somewhat offset
for classes A1, A2-A, and A2-B by the paydown to the class A1 of
approximately EUR6.5 million since last review.  This was
primarily funded by the excess spread redirected by the failing
overcollateralization tests.  However, Fitch does not expect
current and future levels of the excess spread to have a
meaningful impact on the ratings of the notes.

Presently, the class A notes are receiving periodic interest while
the class B through E notes are capitalizing interest payments.
According to the transaction documents, deferred interest for
classes B through E can be capitalized and remunerated as if it
were additional principal outstanding so long as the class A notes
are outstanding.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the Fitch
Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels on the
underlying portfolio.  The expected losses generated by the model
were compared to the credit enhancement available to each tranche.
Consistent with Fitch's 'Global Surveillance Criteria for Trust
Preferred CDOs', cash flow analysis was not used in the evaluation
of credit enhancement to the rated liabilities.  Instead, Fitch
evaluated the effect of excess spread that is redirected through
structural features such as coverage tests, and hedging strategies
employed in the transaction relative to the characteristics of the
portfolio on a qualitative basis.

The Negative Outlook on all classes of notes reflects Fitch's
concern regarding the possibility of a negative impact from the
continued weakness in various European credit markets and
uncertainty of the maturity profile which is exacerbated by a
highly concentrated nature of the portfolio.  At present, it
contains 31 performing obligors, with the largest 16 obligors
representing 63.04% of the total portfolio.  According to the
Manager, 96.06% of the portfolio is expected to be called before
the respective legal maturity dates.  The effective maturity has a
material impact on the expected default rates.  Fitch discussed
the possibility of calls with the collateral manager and Fitch's
European Financial Institutions and Insurance groups and
considered several scenarios in its analysis.  Fitch will continue
to monitor future amortization in the transaction and may revise
its assumptions in the future.

Loss Severity ratings were assigned to the notes rated 'Bsf'
category or higher.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks
to classes rated in the 'CCC' and lower categories.  Currently,
Fitch does not assign Recovery Ratings to distressed classes of
notes of TruPS CDOs rated 'CCCsf' category or lower.

Dekania II is a collateralized debt obligation managed by Dekania
Capital Management, LLC, an affiliate of Cohen Brothers LLC.  The
notes are backed primarily by subordinate and hybrid instruments
issued by European banks, insurers and real estate companies.


DEKANIA EUROPE III: Fitch Junks Rating on Five Class Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these various rating actions on eight
classes of notes issued by Dekania Europe CDO III Plc:

  * EUR163,301,346 class A1 notes affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook
    Negative;
  * EUR16,000,000 class A2-A notes affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook
    Negative;
  * EUR12,000,000 class A2-B notes affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook
    Negative;
  * EUR24,449,471 class B notes affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  * EUR18,958,106 class C notes downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
  * EUR12,575,165 class D notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  * EUR8,253,123 class E notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  * EUR3,971,980 class F notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.

The rating actions are based on the performance of the portfolio
since Fitch's last review in July 2009. Since Fitch's last rating
actions, one obligor representing EUR12 million has defaulted,
which brings total portfolio defaults to EUR39 million.  Of the
performing portfolio, EUR79 million of the portfolio has
experienced negative rating migration.  This is based upon
publicly available ratings and credit assessments provided by
Fitch's Financial Institutions and Insurance groups.  Currently,
68.1% of the portfolio is rated non-investment grade with a
portfolio weighted average rating in the 'B+/B' category.

This negative migration was somewhat offset for the classes A1,
A2-A, and A2-B by the paydown to class A-1 which received
EUR16.5 million as a result of a collateral redemption and
redirection of excess spread due to the failing
overcollateralization tests.  However, Fitch does not expect
current and future levels of the excess spread to have a
meaningful impact on the ratings of the notes.

Presently, the class A notes are receiving periodic interest while
the class B through F notes are capitalizing interest payments.
According to the transaction documents, deferred interest for
classes B through F can be capitalized and remunerated as if it
were additional principal outstanding so long as the class A notes
are outstanding.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' using the Fitch
Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels on the
underlying portfolio.  The expected losses generated by the model
were compared to the credit enhancement available to each tranche.
Consistent with Fitch's 'Global Surveillance Criteria for Trust
Preferred CDOs', cash flow analysis was not used in the evaluation
of credit enhancement to the rated liabilities.  Instead, Fitch
evaluated the effect of excess spread that is redirected through
structural features such as coverage tests, and hedging strategies
employed in the transaction relative to the characteristics of the
portfolio on a qualitative basis.

The Negative Outlook on all classes of notes reflects Fitch's
concern regarding the possibility of a negative impact from the
continued weakness in various European credit markets and
uncertainty of the maturity profile which is exacerbated by a
highly concentrated nature of the portfolio.  At present, it
contains 32 performing obligors, with the largest 15 obligors
representing 61.2% of the total portfolio.  According to the
Manager, 91.25% of the portfolio is expected be called before the
respective legal maturity dates.  The effective maturity has a
material impact on the expected default rates.  Fitch discussed
the possibility of calls with the collateral manager and Fitch's
European Financial Institutions and Insurance groups and
considered several scenarios in its analysis.  Fitch will continue
to monitor future amortization in the transaction and may revise
its assumptions in the future.

Loss Severity ratings were assigned to the notes rated 'Bsf'
category or higher.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks
to classes rated in the 'CCC' and lower categories.  Currently,
Fitch does not assign Recovery Ratings to distressed classes of
notes of TruPS CDOs rated 'CCCsf' category or lower.

Dekania III is a collateralized debt obligation managed by Dekania
Capital Management, LLC, an affiliate of Cohen Brothers LLC.  The
notes are backed primarily by subordinate and hybrid instruments
issued by European banks, insurers and real estate companies.


DYNASTY II: Credit Stability Prompts Moody's to Upgrade Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced rating actions on the CDSs
entered with Dynasty II Synthetic CLO, a collateralized debt
obligation transaction (the " Collateralized Synthetic Obligation"
or "CSO").

The CSO, issued in 2007, references a portfolio of corporate
synthetic senior secured loans.

Issuer: Dynasty II Synthetic CLO (Ref. No. NGZY0)

  * US$48.04 Million Original Swap Notional Amount Credit
    Default Swap with Morgan Stanley CapitalServices Inc.,
    Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan. 26, 2010 Downgraded to A1

Issuer: Dynasty II Synthetic CLO (Ref. No. NF8VQ)

  * US$9.608 Million Original Swap Notional Amount Credit
    Default Swap with Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc.,
    Upgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 26, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3

Issuer: Dynasty II Synthetic CLO (Ref. No. NGZXD)

  * US$9.608 Million Original Swap Notional Amount Credit
    Default Swap with Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc.,
    Upgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's rating action is the result of the credit stability of the
reference portfolio, the shortened time to maturity of the CSO and
the level of credit enhancement remaining in the transaction.

Since the last rating review in January 2010, the 10-year weighted
average rating factor of the portfolio remained unchanged at 3998,
equivalent to Caa1, including settled credit events.  There are
three reference entities with a negative outlook compared to eight
that are positive, and three entities on watch for downgrade
compared to none on watch for upgrade.

There have been no credit events in the portfolio since the last
rating action. Since closing, the portfolio has experienced 11
credit events, equivalent to 4.15 percent of the portfolio based
on the portfolio notional value at closing.  In addition, the
portfolio is exposed to MXEnergy Capital Corp., which has not
declared a credit event, but nonetheless is modeled at Ca.  The
CSO has a remaining life of 1.2 years.


EMPORIA PREFERRED: Fitch Holds Junk Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed these seven classes of notes issued by
Emporia Preferred Funding II, Ltd./Corp. and revised the Rating
Outlooks, Loss Severity and Recovery Ratings:

-- $87,978,657 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $29,003,953 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $116,015,811 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $30,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook to
    Stable from Negative;

-- $22,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to
    Stable from Negative; LS Rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5';

-- $22,000,000 class D notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative; LS Rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5';

-- $14,500,000 class E notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'; revised to
    'RR1' from 'RR2'.

The affirmations and Outlook revisions reflect the overall credit
quality improvements of the underlying loan portfolio.  Since
Fitch's last rating action in December 2009, the portfolio has
experienced an improved weighted average rating quality, positive
credit migration and reduced exposure to assets rated 'CCC+' or
below.  The amount of performing assets Fitch considers rated
'CCC+' or below has decreased to 16.7% from 26.6% at the last
review.  Fitch currently considers the weighted average rating of
the performing portfolio to be 'B/B-', improved from 'B-' in
December 2009.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 notes have been affirmed due to their
significant cushion over expected portfolio losses and should
continue performing in line with their current ratings.  The
performance of the underlying loan portfolio since Fitch's last
review has led to improved credit quality supporting these notes.
The class B and C notes have also benefited from the improved
credit quality, reflected in the Outlook revisions to Stable from
Negative.

The class D and E notes have similarly benefited from the improved
credit quality in the underlying portfolio, but remain supported
by assets primarily in the 'CCC' category and below.  At the time
of Fitch's last review, the U.S. economy was in the midst of a
severe economic downturn, experiencing near-record highs in
corporate default rates and record lows in recovery rates.  The
actively managed underlying portfolio in Emporia II has since
reflected the improved U.S. corporate performance, and Fitch
believes the credit quality of these classes has likewise
improved.  Fitch has affirmed these notes and revised the class D
Outlook to Stable to reflect their improved credit quality.

The Recovery Rating of the class E notes has been revised to 'RR1'
based on the total discounted future cash flows projected to be
available to these notes in a base-case default scenario.  These
discounted cash flows of approximately $14.2 million yielded an
ultimate recovery projection in a range between 91% and 100%,
which is representative of an 'RR1' on Fitch's Recovery Rating
scale.  Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.
The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
notes' long-term credit rating.

Emporia II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on June 21, 2006 and is managed by Ivy Hill Asset
Management, a portfolio company of Ares Capital Corporation.
Emporia II has a revolving portfolio primarily composed of U.S.
middle market loans, approximately 90% of which are senior secured
positions and approximately 9% of which are second lien loans.
Additionally, 36% of the performing portfolio has been purchased
since December 2009 and the transaction remains in its
reinvestment period through July 2012.


EMPORIA PREFERRED FUNDING: Fitch Holds Junk Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these seven classes of notes issued by
Emporia Preferred Funding III, Ltd./Corp. and revised the Rating
Outlooks, Loss Severity and Recovery Ratings:

-- $100,000,000 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $40,000,000 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $132,580,000 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $26,845,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook to
    Stable from Negative;

-- $37,170,000 class C notes affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to
    Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS3' from 'LS4';

-- $20,650,000 class D notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS5';

-- $18,585,000 class E notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'; revised to
    'RR1' from 'RR2'.

The affirmations and Outlook revisions reflect the overall credit
quality improvements of the underlying loan portfolio.  Since
Fitch's last rating action in December 2009, the portfolio has
experienced an improved weighted average rating quality, positive
credit migration and reduced exposure to assets rated 'CCC+' or
below.  The amount of performing assets Fitch considers rated
'CCC+' or below has decreased to 14.2% from 23.5% at the last
review.  Fitch currently considers the weighted average rating of
the performing portfolio to be 'B/B-', improved from 'B-' in
December 2009.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 notes have been affirmed due to their
significant cushion over expected portfolio losses and should
continue performing in line with their current ratings.  The
performance of the underlying loan portfolio since Fitch's last
review has led to improved credit quality supporting these notes.
The class B and C notes have also benefited from the improved
credit quality, reflected in the Outlook revisions to Stable from
Negative.

The class D and E notes have similarly benefited from the improved
credit quality in the underlying portfolio, but remain supported
by assets primarily in the 'CCC' category and below.  At the time
of Fitch's last review, the U.S. economy was in the midst of a
severe economic downturn, experiencing near-record highs in
corporate default rates and record lows in recovery rates.  The
actively managed underlying portfolio in Emporia III has since
reflected the improved U.S. corporate performance, and Fitch
believes the credit quality of these classes has likewise
improved. Fitch has affirmed these notes and revised the class D
Outlook to Stable to reflect their improved credit quality.

The Recovery Rating of the class E notes has been revised to 'RR1'
based on the total discounted future cash flows projected to be
available to these notes in a base-case default scenario.  These
discounted cash flows of approximately $17.2 million yielded an
ultimate recovery projection in a range between 91% and 100%,
which is representative of an 'RR1' on Fitch's Recovery Rating
scale.  Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.
The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
notes' long-term credit rating.

Emporia III is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on March 15, 2007 and is managed by Ivy Hill Asset
Management, a portfolio company of Ares Capital Corporation.
Emporia III has a revolving portfolio primarily composed of U.S.
middle market loans, approximately 91% of which are senior secured
positions and approximately 7% of which are second lien loans.
Additionally, 32% of the performing portfolio has been purchased
since December 2009 and the transaction remains in its
reinvestment period through April 2013.


FIRST UNION: S&P Lowers Ratings on Six Classes of CMBS
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from First
Union Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 1999-C1.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.17x
and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 68.7%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.02x and an LTV of 84.8%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 32.2% and
18.1%, respectively.

The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude 13 defeased
loans ($51.4 million, 23.3%), four ($23.1 million, 10.5%)
specially serviced assets, and three additional loans that S&P
deemed to be credit-impaired ($4.8 million, 2.2%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the seven specially serviced and credit-
impaired assets and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class IO-1 interest-only (IO)
certificates based on S&P's current criteria.

Credit Considerations

As of the December 2010 remittance report, four assets
($23.1 million, 10.5%) were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc. (LNR), including one top-10 loan.  Two are 90-plus-
days delinquent ($21.2 million, 9.6%), and two are 60-days
delinquent ($1.9 million, 0.9).

The Prince George's Metro Center loan ($22.1 million total
exposure, 10.0%) is the largest loan with the special servicer
and the largest loan in the pool.  The subject is a 374,061-sq.-
ft. office building in Hyattsville, Md.  The loan status is 90-
plus-days delinquent.  The reported DSC was 0.68x as of Dec. 31,
2008 and reported occupancy was 59.6% as of March 31, 2009.  The
loan was originally transferred to the special servicer on
June 17, 2009, due to imminent payment default.  Standard & Poor's
anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
loan.

The three remaining specially serviced assets ($2.9 million, 1.4%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.5% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for all three loans with
a weighted average loss severity of 20.0%. One of these loans is
90-plus-days delinquent and two are 60-plus-days delinquent.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P deemed three
loans ($4.8 million, 2.2%) to be credit-impaired.  These loans
are at increased risk of default and loss due to vacancy issues.
The largest credit-impaired loan, the Granville Apartments loan
($2.4 million, 1.1%) is secured by a 101-unit apartment complex
with 13 buildings, targeted toward lower-income tenants, per the
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo).  The
property was built in 1961 and is located in Charlotte, N.C.  Per
the master servicer watchlist comments, the property continues to
struggle with reported DSC decreasing to 0.65x as of Sept. 30,
2010, compared with 0.87x at year-end Dec. 31, 2009.  Occupancy
was 79% as of Sept. 30, 2010.  Per the master servicer's comments,
it has reduced rents to keep the property competitive and to
retain tenants.

The two remaining loans deemed to be credit-impaired
($2.4 million, 1.1%) have balances that individually represent
less than 0.6% of the total pool balance.  Both properties are
apartment complexes located in Charlotte, N.C.  One reported DSC
and Occupancy of 0.27x and 60% as of Sept. 30, 2010, and the other
reported DSC of 0.12x year-to-date as of the six months ended
June 30, 2010, and occupancy of 69% as of April 30, 2010.

Transaction Summary

As of the December 2010 remittance report, the collateral balance
was $221.2 million, which is 19.0% of the balance at issuance.
The collateral includes 71 loans, down from 238 loans at issuance.
Thirteen ($51.4million, 23.3%) of the loans are defeased.  As of
the December 2010 remittance report, the master servicer, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A., had provided financial information for 100.0% of
the nondefeased loans in the pool, all of which was full-year
2008, interim-2009, full-year 2009, or interim-2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.19x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV, which
excludes 13 defeased loans ($51.4 million, 23.3%), four specially
serviced assets ($23.1 million, 10.5%), and three additional loans
that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired ($4.8 million, 2.2%), were
1.17x and 68.7%, respectively.  S&P separately estimated losses
for the seven specially serviced and credit-impaired assets and
included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

Thirteen loans ($44.8 million, 20.3%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  fourteen loans ($54.4 million, 24.6%) have a reported
DSC below 1.10x and eleven of these loans ($49.9 million, 22.5%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.  This excludes 24
nondefeased credit tenant lease (CTL) loans in the pool.  To date,
the pool has experienced principal losses totaling $17.4 million
on 25 loans.

Summary of Top-10 Loans

The top-10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $80.2 million (36.2%) and include one specially
serviced loan ($22.1 million total exposure, 10.0%) discussed in
the Credit Considerations section above and three loans on the
master servicer's watchlist ($19.3 million, 8.7%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.21x for the top-10 loans.

The master servicer reported a watchlist of 13 loans
($44.8 million, 20.3%), including three of the top-10 loans.  The
third-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the
watchlist is the New Brighton Manor loan ($11.8 million, 5.3%).
This loan is secured by a 300-bed, licensed adult nursing facility
located in Staten Island, N.Y. The reported DSC for the six months
ended June 30, 2010, was 0.93x, and reported occupancy as of
Aug. 25, 2010, was 96%.

The 12 remaining loans on the watchlist ($33.0 million, 15.0%)
have balances that individually represent less than 2.7% of the
total pool balance.  Three are deemed-credit impaired and are
discussed in the Credit Considerations section above.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The affirmations are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

Ratings Affirmed

First Union Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

Class  Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
C      AAA (sf)                           88.27
D      AAA (sf)                           57.97
E      AA+ (sf)                           50.07
F      BBB (sf)                           26.36
G      B (sf)                              9.24
IO-1   AAA (sf)                             N/A

N/A--Not applicable.


FM LEVERAGED: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, and D notes from FM Leveraged Capital Fund I, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in December of 2005.  S&P removed the ratings on classes A, B, and
C from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed S&P's rating on the class E notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in March 2010.  The affirmations of the class E
notes reflect the availability of sufficient credit support at the
current rating levels.

According to the Dec. 8, 2010 trustee report, the transaction held
$24.9 million in defaulted assets and $56.4 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, down from $60.3 million defaulted and $95.7 million 'CCC'
assets as of the Dec. 11, 2009 trustee report.  The transaction
has also paid down the class C and D deferred interest that the
transaction had previously accumulated when it was failing the
class A/B and class C principal coverage tests.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported the following principal coverage ratios in
the Dec. 8, 2010, trustee report:

   * The class A/B ratio was 131.16%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 116.10% in December 2009;

   * The class C ratio was 115.70%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 105.60% in December 2009;

   * The class D ratio was 103.50%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 96.72% in December 2009; and

   * The class E ratio was 97.76%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 92.74% in December 2009.

The transaction has also paid down the class C and D deferred
interest that the transaction had previously accumulated when it
was failing the class A/B and class C principal coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                   Rating and CreditWatch Actions

FM Leveraged Capital Fund I           Rating
Class                             To           From
A                                 AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
(sf)
B                                 AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
(sf)
C                                 A (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
(sf)
D                                 B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

FM Leveraged Capital Fund I
Class                                 Rating
E                                     CCC- (sf)


GE CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Three Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of two classes,
downgraded three classes and affirmed nine classes of GE Capital
Commercial Mortgage Corporation Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, series 2001-1:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 17, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 17, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 7, 2005
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)


-- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

-- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to A1 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

-- Cl. I, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on July 29, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on July 14, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

The upgrades are due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool
performance.  The pool has paid down by 35% since Moody's last
review.

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.5% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published on April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 29, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the May 2, 2001 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 48% to $592 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 88 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 27% of
the pool.  The pool contains one loan with an investment grade
credit estimate, representing 7% of the pool.  Twenty-one loans,
representing 32% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 40% of the pool.

Forty-one loans, representing 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.9 million.  Fifteen loans,
representing 17% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The servicer has recognized appraisal reductions totaling $25.7
million for nine of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $50.2 million loss for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$5 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
72% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 108% compared to 101% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.55X, respectively, which is
similar to last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 30 compared to 37 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the 59 Maiden Lane Loan, which
is secured by 1.13 million square foot office building located in
lower Manhattan.  Performance has been strong since securitization
and the loan benefits from amortization.  The loan matures in
April 2011.  The property is 100% leased, the same as at last
review.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aaa
and 4.17X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 3.95X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Pescadero Apartments Loan, which
is secured by a 170 unit multifamily property located in Redwood
City, California.  The property was 97% leased as of August 2010,
which is similar to last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
124% and .79X, respectively, essentially the same as at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Information Resources Loan, which
is secured by a two Class B loft type offices totaling 252,000
square feet and located in the West Loop submarket of Chicago.
The property was 100% leased as of June 2010, similar to last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.93X,
respectively, compared to 63% and 1.72X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Juncos Plaza Loan, which is secured
by a 213,000 square foot retail property in Juncos, Puerto Rico.
The property was 82% leased as of September 2009.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 86% and
1.32X at last review.


GECMC 2005-4: Moody's Reviews Junk Ratings for Likely Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of GECMC 2005-C4,
Series 2005-C4 on review for possible downgrade as follows:

-- Cl. A-M, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- Cl. A-J, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

-- Cl. B, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

-- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

-- Cl. E, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
    previously on March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from actual and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a
comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 18, 2010.

As of the December 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to
$2.13 billion from $2.40 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 156 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 34% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 1.2% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $4.6 million.  Additionally, the trust has
incurred $1.0 million in realized losses through additional trust
fund expenses.  Three loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of multifamily, retail, office, hotel, and
industrial property types.  The master servicer has recognized
appraisal reductions totaling $89.7 million for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


GRANITE VENTURES: S&P Raises Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, and B notes from Granite Ventures I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Stone Tower Debt Advisors LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed
S&P's rating on the class A-1 notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.  S&P also affirmed S&P's ratings on the class C and
D notes.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last rating action
in December 2009, as well as paydowns to the class A-1 note
balance.

According to the December 2010 trustee report, the balance of
'CCC' rated obligations in the transaction was $7.7 million, down
from $21.1 million as of the November 2009 trustee report.  The
transaction has also paid down approximately $107 million to the
class A-1 notes since S&P's last rating action, including a
$29 million payment in the Nov. 24, 2010 distribution report,
which increased the overcollateralization (O/C) available to
support the rated notes.  The O/C ratios for the class A and B
notes was 131% and 118%, respectively, as of December 2010, up
from 117% and 110% according to the November 2009 trustee report.
Currently, both classes are passing their O/C and interest
coverage (I/C) tests.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings Raised

Granite Ventures I Ltd.
          Rating
Class   To         From
A-1     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2     AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
B       A+ (sf)    A- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Class    Rating
C        BB+ (sf)
D        CCC+ (sf)


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class J & K Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 11 classes,
affirmed nine classes and confirmed one class of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-GG3 as follows:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-J, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Aa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 A1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 A2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010
    Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Baa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Baa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. G, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Ba2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. H, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Ba3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 B3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Caa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 9, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2009
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2005
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and interest shortfalls.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On December 9, 2010, Moody's placed 12 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
10.6% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating GCCFC 2005-GG3 is "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated August 27, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21.1% to
$2.8 billion from $3.6 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 122 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 50.8% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan with
an investment grade credit estimate that represents 7.5% of the
pool.  Nine loans, representing 4.3% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-five loans, representing 11.8% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (monthly reporting package.  As part of
our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.9 million.  At Moody's last review
the pool had experienced an aggregate loss of $1.8 million.  Ten
loans, representing 4.4% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $55.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing less than 1% of the pool and has
estimated a $2.9 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 89%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 96% compared to 94% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12.4% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.11X, respectively, compared to
1.58X and 1.12X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 30 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Grand Canal Shoppes at the
Venetian Loan, which represents a 55.5% participation interest in
a first mortgage secured by a 536,890 square foot mall located
within the Venetian Casino Resort in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The mall
shop occupancy was 94% as of June 2010 compared to 99% at last
review.  The loan sponsor is GGP. As a result of GGP's emergence
from bankruptcy, the loan was modified and is expected to return
to the master servicer.  Performance has declined since last
review due to an increase in vacancy.  Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to A3 and 1.32X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23.2% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the North Star Mall Loan, which is
secured by a 493,706 square foot regional mall located in San
Antonio, Texas.  The property was 98% leased as of March 2010,
essentially the same at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 74% and 1.17X, respectively, essentially the same as at
last review.

The second largest loan is the 1440 Broadway Loan, which is
secured by a 741,915 square foot office building located in New
York City.  The property was 99% leased as of June 2010 compared
to 96% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and
1.0X, respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Crescent Loan, which is secured by a
1.3 million square foot office building located in Dallas, Texas.
The property was 94% leased as of December 2009, compared to 98%
at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99.4% and
0.98X, respectively, compared to 82.4% and 1.18X at last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Classes of Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrade of class P to 'D (sf)' follows a principal loss
sustained by the class, which was detailed in the January 2011
remittance report.  The class P certificate experienced reported
losses amounting to 7.3% of its $6.1 million opening certificate
balance.  To date, class Q, which is not rated by Standard
& Poor's, has lost 100% of its $24.3 million original certificate
balance.  The downgrade of the O class reflects credit support
erosion due to the principal losses incurred by classes P and Q.

The principal loss and corresponding credit support erosion
resulted from the liquidation of an asset that was with the
special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The Royal St.
Charles asset comprised a 143-unit limited service hotel property
in New Orleans.  The asset had a total exposure of $8.9 million
prior to liquidation.  The asset was transferred to the special
servicer in December 2006 due to payment default.  The trust
incurred a $2.9 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated this past reporting period.  Based on the January 2011
remittance report data, the loss severity for this asset was 36.1%
(based on the asset's balance at the time of disposition).

As of the January 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 60 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$761.0 million, down from 72 assets totaling $1.21 billion at
issuance. Four assets, totaling $62.3 million (8.2%), are with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
totaling $24.7 million, on three assets.  Based on the January
2011 remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for
these assets was approximately 57.3%.

Ratings Lowered

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1
            Rating
Class   To            From      Credit enhancement (%)
O       CCC- (sf)     B+ (sf)                     0.74
P       D (sf)        B (sf)                      0.00


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Ups Rating on Class OEA-B2 Certs. From BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two raked
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2004-GG1 to
'AAA (sf)'.

The upgrades reflect the full defeasance of the 111 Eighth Avenue
loan, which has a current whole-loan balance of $467.9 million.
The loan was participated into nine pieces, $163.3 million of
which serves as trust collateral.  The trust portion consists of a
senior $139.9 million pooled component and a subordinate
$23.4 million nonpooled component.  The subordinate component is
the sole source of cash flow for the upgraded classes.  On
Dec. 22, 2010, the real estate collateral securing the loan was
replaced with defeasance collateral that meets Standard & Poor's
criteria.

Ratings Raised

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-GG1
                   Rating
Class       To              From
OEA-B1      AAA (sf)        BBB- (sf)
OEA-B2      AAA (sf)        BB+ (sf)


HARRISBURG AUTHORITY: Fin'l Distress Cues Moody's Ba1 Bond Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from A1 The
Harrisburg Authority's $69.42 million in outstanding Water Revenue
Refunding Bonds, Series of 2008.  The rating has been removed from
Watchlist and a negative outlook has been assigned.  The bonds are
secured by net revenues of the authority's water system.  Moody's
does not maintain a rating on the City of Harrisburg's general
obligation debt.

The downgrade to Ba1 from A1 reflects the system's exposure
to the City of Harrisburg's financial distress given the city's
relationship as operator of the water system and the authority's
governance structure.  The results of this relationship include a
lack of timely financial disclosure, weakened debt service
coverage and late adoption of a 2010 budget.  The downgrade also
considers the risk to the system's liquidity and potential
disruption to financial operations if the city pursues a
bankruptcy filing under Chapter 9, an action that the city could
take having recently filed for distressed city status under Act
47.  The negative outlook incorporates the potential for
additional deterioration given the city's ongoing financial
crisis, although we believe bondholders have some protection given
that the authority is prohibited from conveying assets to the city
without impairing bondholder security.  Additionally, given the
system's function as an essential service, Moody's believes the
city is unlikely to take actions that would considerably disrupt
the water system's operations for an extended period of time.


HEWETTS ISLAND: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-R, A-T, B, C, and D notes from Hewetts Island CLO VI Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by CypressTree Investment Management Co. Inc.  At the same time,
S&P removed S&P's ratings on the A-R, A-T, and B notes from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Nov. 8, 2010.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed S&P's 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on the class E notes.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in the credit quality
available to support the notes since S&P downgraded them on
Oct. 23, 2009.  As of the Dec. 3, 2010, trustee report, the
transaction's collateral pool had $10.73 million in defaulted
assets, down from $24.95 million noted in the Sept. 2, 2009,
trustee report, which S&P referenced in S&P'sOctober 2009 rating
actions.  Furthermore, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category were reported at $24.32 million in December 2010, down
from $40.98 million in September 2009.

The transaction's improved performance is also reflected in the
increase in overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the
rated notes.  The class C, D, and E O/C ratios that were failing
their triggers in September 2009 have come back into compliance.
As of the Dec. 3, 2010 report all of the O/C tests were passing
their trigger levels.

The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the Dec. 3, 2010,
monthly report:

   * The class A/B O/C ratio was 118.19%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 110.63% in September 2009;

   * The class C O/C ratio was 112.45%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 105.52% in September 2009;

   * The class D O/C ratio was 107.25%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 100.83% in September 2009; and

   * The class E O/C ratio was 103.07%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 96.43% in September 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

                  Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Hewetts Island CLO VI Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-R           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-T           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)
D             B+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Rating affirmed

Hewetts Island CLO VI Ltd.
Class         Rating
E             CCC- (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer              Hewetts Island CLO VI Ltd.
Co-issuer           Hewetts Island CLO VI LLC
Collateral manager  CypressTree Investment Management Co. Inc.
Underwriter         Fortis Securities
Trustee             State Street Bank and Trust Co.
Transaction type    Cash flow CLO


INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-3 Notes to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three tranches
from the INDX 2006-FLX1 transaction.  The collateral backing this
transaction primarily consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate,
negative amortization residential mortgages.

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FLX1

-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of option arm pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions
that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on option arm pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Option ARM
RMBS Loss Projection Update: April 2010" published in April 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
option arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market. Moody's notes
an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could
cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall, Moody's
assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with stabilization in
early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in national employment
levels through that timeframe.


INNER HARBOR: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Four Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed all classes of notes issued by Inner Harbor
CBO 1999-1 Ltd./Corp. as follows:

-- $2,837,178 class A-4A affirmed at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $1,013,278 class A-4B affirmed at 'CCCsf/RR1';
-- $9,000,000 class B-1L affirmed at 'Csf/RR5';
-- $5,500,000 class B-2 affirmed at 'Csf/RR5'.

The affirmation of the class A-4A and A-4B (class A-4) notes
reflects the credit quality of the remaining assets and collateral
coverage provided by the underlying portfolio, while accounting
for the increased concentration risk in the portfolio and exposure
to long dated collateral.  In Fitch's opinion the class A-4 notes
have a real possibility of default and as such remain at 'CCCsf'.
The affirmation of the class B-1L and B-2 notes reflects the
ongoing undercollateralization of these notes.  Fitch expects
default of these notes to be imminent at the stated maturity.

The portfolio is comprised of four performing bonds with a total
par value of $6.3 million and approximately $4.5 million par value
of defaulted bonds.  The projected recovery value of the defaulted
collateral, based on current market prices, is less than $100,000
and as such no value was applied for defaulted and equity
securities.  The largest performing obligor is scheduled to mature
after the final maturity of the notes and the class A-4 notes will
be reliant on the proceeds from the sale or call of this bond.
Currently principal proceeds are being used to pay current
interest on the class B-1L and B-2 notes prior to making principal
distributions to the class A-4 notes, which has and could continue
to erode par coverage for the notes.  If this payment priority
continues in the same manner and the long dated bond is not sold
or called prior to the maturity date, the class A-4 notes may not
receive their full principal at the maturity date.  However, if
the long dated bond is sold or called or the portfolio is
liquidated prior to maturity, Fitch would expect the class A-4
notes to be paid in full.

This review did not utilize the Global Cash Flow model given the
one-year remaining tenor of the structure and the high obligor
concentration of the portfolio.  The transaction has a stated
maturity of Jan. 15, 2012 and only four performing assets
remaining in the portfolio.  Instead, the current principal cash
balance and the projected recovery estimates on defaulted
collateral were assumed to amortize the note principal balances.
An expected loss was assigned to the remaining performing assets
and the expected return was then used to determine the asset
coverage when considering their long-term credit rating.  The
structural features of the transaction were also factored into the
analysis.  Since principal proceeds are first used to address any
interest shortfall for the junior notes prior to distribution to
the class A-4A and A-4B notes in the principal waterfall, the
expected shortfall amount was netted out from the available
proceeds for the class A-4A and A-4B notes.

The Recovery Ratings (RR) of the class A-4A, A-4B, B-1L and B-2
notes were based on the total expected future cash flows projected
to be available to these bonds in a base case default scenario.
Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities.  Distressed securities are defined
as bonds that face a real possibility of default at or prior to
maturity and by definition are rated 'CCC' or below. For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

Inner Harbor 1999-1 is a collateralized bond obligation that
closed on Dec. 21, 1999 and is managed by T. Rowe Price
Associates, Inc.  The reinvestment period for this transaction
ended in January 2004 and the final maturity is Jan. 15, 2012.
The portfolio currently has seven total assets remaining.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Junks Rating on Three Classes of Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed 17 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-CIBC6 as follows:

-- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- Cl. D, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to A3 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. K, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

-- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

-- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

-- Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

-- Cl. AC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. AC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. AC-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. BM-1, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- Cl. BM-2, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- Cl. BM-3, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2007
    Upgraded to A2 (sf)

-- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2003
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 6.2%
of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels.  If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level
are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan
level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 23, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 10, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to
$903.5 million from $1.06 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 120 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 29% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan with an
investment grade credit estimate that represent 8.8% of the pool.
Twenty-five loans, representing 28% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at
last review represented 18% of the pool.

Thirty loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $4.6 million.  At last review the pool
had not experienced any losses.  Three loans, representing 3% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $9.8 million loss for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 1.4% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.6 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 80%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 83% compared to 85% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11.5% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.37X, respectively, compared to
1.21X and 1.21X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 32 compared to 45 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Battlefield Mall Loan,
which represents the senior component of a $97 million mortgage
loan secured by a 1.0 million square foot regional mall located
in Springfield, Missouri.  The property is also encumbered by a
$14.5 million subordinate note which is the security for the non-
pooled classes BM-1, BM-2 and BM-3.  The mall is anchored by J.C.
Penney, two Dillard's stores, Sears and Macy's.  Performance has
been stable since last review.  Moody's current credit estimate
and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 1.77X, respectively, compared to Aa1
and 1.63X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 8.7% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the International Paper Office Loan,
which is secured by a 214,060 square foot Class A office building
located in Memphis, Tennessee.  The property is 100% leased to
International Paper through April 2017.  The loan has amortized 6%
since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and
1.21X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shelbyville Road Plaza Loan, which
is secured by a 250,057 square foot community shopping center
located in Louisville, Kentucky.  The property was 65% leased as
of December 2009 compared to 93% at last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 77% and
1.30X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Tices Corner Retail Marketplace
Loan, which is secured by a 119,114 square foot retail center
located in Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey.  The property was 100%
leased as of March 2010, similar to the level at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and 1.62X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.24X at last review.


LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Junks Rating on Two Class Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of two classes,
downgraded two classes and affirmed two classes of LB Commercial
Mortgage Trust 1999-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C2:

-- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 13, 1999
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 3, 2010
    Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 21, 2006
    Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct. 13, 1999
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 3, 2010
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 3, 2010
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The upgrades are due to increased credit subordination levels
resulting from paydowns and amortization.  The pool has paid down
39% since Moody's prior review.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans and interest
shortfalls.

Moody's affirmed two classes because the current credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings based on our current base expected
loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.8% of the current balance.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
15.5% of the current balance.  Due to the high level of credit
subordination and defeasance, it is unlikely that investment grade
classes would be downgraded even if losses are higher than Moody's
expected base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in
the commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's
currently views the commercial real estate market as stressed with
further performance declines expected in the industrial, office,
and retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound,
albeit off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to
rebound reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most of the
world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were: "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Backed Transactions" published in
October 1998.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 9 compared to 17 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.6 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings. Under Moody's CTL approach,
the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on
the senior unsecured debt rating of the tenant, usually an
investment grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key
factor in determining the probability of default on the underlying
lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an
absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through
a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The credit enhancement levels are melded with the
large loan model credit enhancement into an overall model result.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated February 3, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to
$46.9 million from $892.4 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 73% of the pool.  Twelve loans,
representing 36% of the pool, are secured by credit tenant leases.
The conduit component consists of one performing loan,
representing 19% of the pool, and four specially serviced loans,
representing 32% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 13% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.  At last review defeasance represented 8% of the pool
balance

One loan, representing 19% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $21.5 million.  Due to realized
losses, classes L, M, N and P have been eliminated entirely and
class K has experienced a 1% principal loss.  At Moody's prior
review the pool had experienced an aggregate $10.2 million
realized loss.

Four loans, representing 32% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the White Rock
Marketplace Loan, which is secured by a 173,540 square foot retail
center located in Dallas, Texas.  The loan was recently
transferred back to special servicing after a forbearance
agreement expired and the borrower was not able to refinance the
loan.  The property lost its anchor grocery tenant in late 2008
and only a portion of that space has been released.  The property
is approximately 73% leased.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Hawk Ridge
Apartments Loan, which is secured by 168-unit multifamily property
located in Clemmons, North Carolina.  The property is real estate
owned.  The loan matured in August 2009 and the borrower was
unable to refinance the loan.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $1.0 million for two of the specially serviced
loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $5.5 million loss for
the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes P through
K have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.4 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure
to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused
by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs),
extraordinary trust expenses and non-advancing by the master
servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.

The current pool includes only one performing conduit loan, the
Corona Market Place Loan, which is secured by a 104,200 square
foot unanchored retail center located in Corona, California.  The
property was 77% leased as of September 2010 compared to 93% at
last review. Property performance has declined due to increased
vacancy.  The loan is on the master servicer watchlist.  The loan
matures in June 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and
1.82X, respectively, compared to 52% and 2.18X at last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the
loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The CTL component consists of 12 loans secured by properties
leased to five tenants.  The largest exposures are CVS/Caremark
Corp., Rite Aid Corporation, and Walgreen Corporation (Moody's
senior unsecured rating A2 -- stable outlook; 11% of the CTL
component).  All of the tenants are rated by Moody's.  The bottom-
dollar weighted average rating factor for this pool is 1,448
compared to 1,452 at last review.  WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of the default probability within the pool.


LB-UBS COMM: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Six Class Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed 13 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C8, as
follows:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-6, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X-CP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2004
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010
    Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Aa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010 A3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010 B3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Caa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool from
specially serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On December 17, 2010, Moody's placed seven classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
9.1% of the current pool balance.  At last full review, Moody's
cumulative base expected loss was 8.2%.  Depending on the timing
of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; we expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of
the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in these ratings were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in July
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 36 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
Excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated April 15, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $932 million
from $1.31 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37% of
the pool.  Three loans, comprising 23% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance
at last review represented 20% of the pool. The pool includes one
loan with an investment-grade credit estimate, representing 12% of
the pool.

Eleven loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of
$14.0 million.  At last review the pool had realized approximately
$50,000 in realized losses.

Fifteen loans, representing 22% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest exposure in special servicing is
the Lembi Portfolio, which consists of nine cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted loans secured by 29 multifamily properties
located in San Francisco.  The loans were transferred to special
servicing in May 2009 due to delinquency and are currently in
foreclosure.  Of the remaining specially serviced loans, five are
secured by retail properties and one is secured by a multifamily
property.  The master servicer has recognized appraisal reductions
totaling $25.9 million for five of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $68.8 million loss for all
loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loans, representing 9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $10.4 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 73% and 87% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding the troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 94%,
compared to 89% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12.6% to the most recently available
net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding the troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs
are 1.35X and 1.10X, respectively, compared to 1.63X and 1.35X at
last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is The Grace Building Loan, which
is secured by a 1.5 million square foot office building located in
the Midtown submarket of New York City.  The loan represents a 33%
pari-passu interest in a $334.9 million loan.  A $28.6 million B
Note, which is held outside the trust, also encumbers the
property.  The property is currently 100% leased compared to 88%
at last review.  Brookfield Office Properties and Swig Equities
are the loan sponsors.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.34X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.24X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 7% of the outstanding pool
balance. The largest loan is the North Haven Pavilion Loan, which
is secured by a 148,052 square foot shadow anchored retail center
located in North Haven, Connecticut.  As of September 2010, the
center was 98% leased, the same as at last review and
securitization.  Major tenants include Sports Authority and
Michael's Stores.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and
0.99X, respectively, compared to 111% and 0.88X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Parkridge Six Aurora Loan Services
Loan, which is secured by a 161,218 square foot office building
located in Littelton, a suburb of Denver, Colorado.  The property
is 100% leased to Aurora Loan Services through July 2016.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to
110% and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Rosemead Place Loan, which is
secured by a 340,583 square foot anchored retail property located
in the San Gabriel Valley section of Los Angeles County.  Major
tenants include Target and Bally's Total Fitness.  As of September
2010, the property was 88% leased compared to 95% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.15X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.13X at last review.


LEAF CAPITAL: DBRS Puts Low-B Ratings Class on E-1 & E-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned ratings to the following notes issued by LEAF
Capital Funding SPE A, LLC, Equipment Contract Backed Notes,
Series 2010-A:

-- Series 2010-A, Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2010-A, Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2010-A, Class C Notes rated 'A' (sf)
-- Series 2010-A, Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Series 2010-A, Class E-1 Notes rated BB (sf)
-- Series 2010-A, Class E-2 Notes rated B (low) (sf)


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on Cl. 1-A1A Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 5 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from 1 RMBS transaction,
backed by Option ARM loans, issued by GreenPoint Mortgage Funding
Trust in 2006.

Issuer: GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR5

  * Cl. 1-A1A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010
    Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 27,
    2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2A2U, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 27,
    2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 27,
    2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A3A1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A3A2U, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A3A2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, negative amortization, Alt-A
residential mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the
rapidly deteriorating performance of option arm pools in
conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain under
duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
option arm pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Option ARM
RMBS Loss Projection Update: April 2010" published in April 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
option arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on 46 Classes of Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 68
tranches and confirmed the ratings on 12 tranches from 3 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Lehman Mortgage
Trust in 2005, 2006 and 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Alt-A RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: February 2010" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination.  This baseline rate is higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small
pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the
overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.
Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  If
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively. Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress
in national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2005-2

  * Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. B1(1-3), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  * Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 6-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-3

  * Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-6

  * Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A6, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A12, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A13, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A14, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A16, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 4-A17, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AX2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-5

  * Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A7, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A9, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A10, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 1-A12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. AX1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Cl. PO1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRIL LYNCH: Moody's Keeps Junk Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of two classes,
confirmed one class and affirmed five classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, 2001-Canada 5:

-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 18, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
    Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. C, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2010 A1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2010 Ba2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2010 B2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on July 8, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from a specially serviced loan
and interest shortfalls.  The confirmation and affirmations are
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf) remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on our
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
confirmed and affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the
existing ratings.

On October 28, 2010, Moody's placed three classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes our review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.6% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.4%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
7.6% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used these ratings were were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" rating methodology published in
May 2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" rating methodology published in July 2000.
Both methodologies are available on moodys.com.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 14 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated September 2, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the December 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 49% to
$126.4 million from $248.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 63% of the pool.  Nine loans, representing 16% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with Canadian
Government securities. Defeasance at last review represented 21%
of the pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 50% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.7 million. The disposition of these
loans, which were secured by hotel properties located in Niagara
Falls, Canada, resulted in a 100% loss severity.  One loan,
representing 4% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.
This loan is the Skeena Mall Loan, which is secured by a retail
center located in Terrace, British Columbia.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in February 2009 due to
delinquency and is currently 90+ days delinquent.  The property
was 51% leased as of June 2010, the same as at last review.  The
servicer has recognized an appraisal reduction of $2.9 million for
this loan. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $4.0 million loss
for this specially serviced loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes F through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$600,800.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls caused by the specially serviced
loan.  In addition, Midland Loan Services, Inc., the transaction's
master servicer, has indicated that it still has outstanding
advances against the loans that were liquidated in May 2010.
Midland expects to recover these advances over the next several
months, resulting in an increase in interest shortfalls.  Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 64%
of the pool.  Excluding the specially serviced loan and defeased
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 50% compared to 52% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 13.9% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.75%.

Excluding the specially serviced loan and defeased loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.81X and 2.28X, respectively,
compared to 1.77X and 2.22X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 29% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the York Mills Gardens Loan, which
is secured by a 89,000 square foot retail center located in
Toronto, Ontario.  The largest tenants are Longo's, Shopper's Drug
Mart and Roger's Video.  The property was 97% leased as of August
2010, the same as the last review.  The loan has amortized 19%
since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and
1.6X, respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest loan is the Delta Bow Valley Loan, which is
secured by a 398 room full service hotel located in Calgary,
Alberta.  The property had an overall average occupancy of 63% for
2009.  The loan has amortized 24% since securitization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and 2.82X, respectively, compared to
43% and 2.78X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Robson Promenade Loan, which is
secured by a 30,488 square foot anchored shopping center located
in the West End submarket of Vancouver, BC.  The property was 100%
leased as of December 2009.  The loan has amortized 32% since
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 31% and 2.76X,
respectively, compared to 32% and 2.7X at the last review.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of CMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.'s series 1998-C2.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class F, G, H, and J
certificates reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining collateral in
the transaction, the transaction structure, and the liquidity
available to the certificates.

S&P's ratings on the class H and J certificates are 'D (sf)'.  S&P
lowered S&P's ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)' on
Oct. 14, 2004, and April 3, 2003, respectively, due to recurring
interest shortfalls.  These classes have since been affected by
principal losses.  As noted in the Dec. 16, 2010 remittance
report, the trust had incurred $50.7 million of principal losses.
As a result, the class J has lost 100% of its original principal
balance and the class H has lost 79.3% of its original principal
balance.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the transaction. Using servicer-
provided financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.38x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 69.1%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows
under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.07x and an LTV of 96.2%.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations
S&P noted above exclude four ($7.6 million, 19.0%) defeased loans
and one ($2.4 million, 6.1%) specially serviced loan.

Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 16, 2010, remittance report, two assets
($3.3 million, 8.4%) were with the special servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), both of which were among the
top 10 loans. One of these assets ($2.4 million, 6.1%) is in
foreclosure and the other ($0.9 million, 2.3%) is 60 days
delinquent.

The Arbor Oaks Apartments loan ($2.4 million, 6.1%) is the third-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 298-unit multifamily
complex in Houston, Texas.  The loan transferred to Berkadia on
Nov. 7, 2007, due to payment default and is currently in
foreclosure.  The property was 65.3% occupied as of Sept. 1, 2010.

The Holiday Inn Express - Columbia loan ($0.9 million, 2.3%) is
the ninth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 56-room
limited-service hotel in Columbia, Tenn. The loan transferred to
Berkadia on June 17, 2009, due to imminent default following a
franchise change that was made without the lender's prior consent.
The property is now operating as a Super 8.  In addition, the
borrower is making interest-only payments on the loan under a
forbearance agreement, which the special servicer has approved for
a one-year extension.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC for
the property was 0.31x.

One loan ($1.2 million, 3.0%) that was previously with the special
servicer has been returned to the master servicer. According to
the transaction documents, the special servicer is entitled to a
workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal and interest
payments on the corrected loan, provided that the loan continues
to perform and remains with the master servicer.

Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 16, 2010, remittance report, the collateral balance
was $39.9 million, which is 3.7% of the balance at issuance. The
collateral includes 26 loans, down from 401 loans at issuance.
four ($7.6 million, 19.0%) of the loans are defeased. The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), provided financial
information for 93.3% of the nondefeased loans in the pool,
52.6% of which was interim- or full-year 2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.38x and
64.8%, respectively.  These figures exclude one of the two
specially serviced loans.

Six loans ($4.8 million, 12.0%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Seven loans ($7.5 million, 18.7%) have a reported DSC
below 1.1x.  Six of these loans ($6.7 million, 16.7%) have a
reported DSC below 1.0x.  To date, the pool has experienced
principal losses totaling $50.7 million in connection with 23
loans.

Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding balance
of $25.3 million (63.5%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.38x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.28x and
67.6%, respectively.  These adjusted figures exclude the Arbor
Oaks Apartments loan, currently with the special servicer.  Two of
the top 10 loans are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Comfort Inn - Vicksburg loan ($1.2 million, 3.0%) is the
sixth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 80-room
limited-service hotel in Vicksburg, Miss.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low reported DSC.  The property
is currently operating as an Econo Lodge.  As of Dec. 31, 2009,
the reported DSC for the property was 0.40x.

The Best Western Anaheim Hills loan ($1.2 million, 3.0%) is the
seventh-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 118-room
full-service hotel in Anaheim, Calif.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low reported DSC.  As of the 12
months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported DSC for the property was
0.79x.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The affirmations are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

Ratings Affirmed

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C2

Class  Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
F      B- (sf)                           24.94
G      CCC (sf)                          11.31
H      D (sf)                             0.00
J      D (sf)                             0.00


MORGAN STANLEY: Interest Shortfalls Cue S&P to CMBS Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-HQ.  S&P lowered
its rating on class N to 'D (sf)' due to recurring interest
shortfalls that S&P expect to continue for the foreseeable future.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from
the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of interest shortfalls that
have affected the trust, which S&P expects to continue. As of the
Dec. 15, 2010 remittance report, the trust had experienced monthly
interest shortfalls totaling $29,916, primarily related to a
nonrecoverable determination related to the one asset with the
special servicer that is generating monthly shortfalls of $25,753.
The monthly interest shortfalls affected class M and all classes
subordinate to it.  S&P expects these shortfalls to continue for
the foreseeable future and as a result, S&P lowered its rating on
class N to 'D (sf)'.

The lowered ratings also reflect reduced liquidity available to
the remaining pooled classes as well as credit support erosion
that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of
the specially serviced asset and one loan that S&P determined to
be credit-impaired.  S&P also considered the volume of assets
maturing within the next year in the rating action.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.46x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 70.4%. S&P
further stressed the assets' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.23x and an LTV ratio of
94.5%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 17.5% and 30.4%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude the one asset that is with
the special servicer ($4.4 million; 1.0%), one loan that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired ($5.3 million; 1.2%), and 13
defeased loans ($120.7 million; 27.4%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for the specially serviced and credit-impaired assets,
which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario-implied default and loss
severity figures.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels and liquidity that are consistent
with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the
class X-1 interest-only (IO) certificates based on S&P's current
criteria.

Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 15, 2010 remittance report the Southwick Office
Building I asset ($4.4 million; 1.0%) was with the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The asset, which is
real estate owned (REO), is a 73,276-sq.-ft. suburban office
building in Matteson, Ill., that was built in 1988.  This loan was
originally transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 25, 2008,
due to an imminent payment default and there is no reported
financial information.

The special servicer is currently working on engaging a listing
broker to market the property for sale.  S&P expects a significant
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

In addition to the one specially serviced asset, S&P considers one
other asset to be credit-impaired.  The Interstate Business Park
loan ($5.3 million; 1.2%) is secured by a 175,493-sq.-ft.
industrial property in Tampa, Fla., that was built in 1985.  The
loan, which is current, appears on the master servicer's watchlist
due to a low DSC.  The reported DSC and occupancy were 0.58x and
67.4% for year-end 2009, respectively, and 0.01x and 50.0% for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, respectively.  As a result, S&P
consider this loan to be at increased risk of default and loss.
Excluding the transaction's 13 defeased loans and one specially
serviced asset, 19 loans ($220.2 million, 50.0%) have anticipated
repayment dates (ARDs) or final maturity dates through year-end
2011. Standard & Poor's considered this large volume of loans with
near-term ARDs/maturities in its rating actions.

Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 15, 2010 remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $440.5 million (52 loans),
compared with $845.9 million (78 loans) at issuance. Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC, the master servicer, provided financial
information for 99% of the pool balance.  Approximately 39% of
this financial information was full-year 2009 data and 61% was
partial-year 2010 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.64x for the nondefeased assets in the pool based on the
reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.46x and
70.4%, respectively, which exclude the one asset with the special
servicer ($4.4 million; 1.0%), one loan that S&P determined to be
credit-impaired ($5.3 million; 1.2%), and 13 defeased loans
($120.7 million; 27.4%). The trust has experienced three principal
losses totaling $6.8 million to date. fourteen loans are on the
master servicer's watchlist ($89.3 million; 20.3%). four loans
($31.1 million, 7.1%) have a reported DSC betS&Pen 1.0x and 1.1x,
and five loans ($19.0 million, 4.3%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.  S&P separately estimated a loss for the sole specially
serviced asset ($4.4 million; 1.0%) and for the one asset that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired ($5.3 million; 1.2%).

Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $235.4 million (53.4%).  Using
servicer-reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.74x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10
real estate exposures were 1.45x and 70.5%, respectively.  Two of
these loans are on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P discusses
these loans and the Woodfield Mall loan ($116.3 million; 26.4),
the largest asset in the pool.

The Woodfield Mall loan is the largest asset in the pool and is
secured by 1.12 million sq. ft. of the 2.24 million-sq.-ft.
Woodfield Mall in Schaumburg, Ill.  The whole-loan balance of
$268.4 million is split into a $230.0 million A note and a
$38.4 million B note.  The A note is split into three pari passu
pieces, including a $116.3 million note in the subject transaction
(26.4% of the pool).  The loan matures on April 1, 2012.  For the
12 months ended June 30, 2010, the master servicer reported a
whole-loan DSC of 1.80x and 91.0% occupancy.  Using the master
servicer's reported financial figures and the borrower's Oct. 11,
2010, rent roll, Standard & Poor's adjusted valuation for the
Woodfield Mall property was 14.2% below the levels S&P assessed at
issuance, resulting in a stressed whole-loan LTV ratio of 64.0%.
The CBL Portfolio loan ($35.0 million; 7.9%), the second-largest
asset in the pool, is secured by three retail properties
aggregating 417,711 sq. ft.  The largest property is in Houston,
Texas (292,654 sq. ft.) and was built in 2000.  The second-largest
property is in Fort Smith, Alaska (98,410 sq. ft.) and was built
in 1997 and renovated in 2001. Wal-Mart is the shadow anchor for
that property. The smallest property is in Vicksburg, Miss.
(26,947 sq. ft.) and was built in 1986 and renovated in 1997 with
Kroger as a shadow anchor.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For year-end 2009, the
portfolio's DSC and occupancy were 1.16x and 74%, respectively.
The portfolio remains 74% occupied and S&P currently estimate a
similar DSC.

The Armstrong Corporate Park 2 & 4 loan ($14.6 million; 3.3%), the
fourth-largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 151,786 sq.-ft.
property in Shelton, Conn. that was built in 1987 and 1989. The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC and
a low occupancy.  Life Care Inc. is the largest tenant at the
property and contributes approximately 55% of the base rent
pursuant to a lease maturing on Sept. 30, 2011.  For year-end
2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 70.6% and 0.98x,
respectively.  For the nine months ending on Sept. 30, 2010, the
reported DSC was 1.00x.  Based on a November 2010 rent roll and
considering the Life Care Inc. rollover, S&P estimates a current
DSC of 0.58x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed
ratings.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-HQ

            Rating
Class    To        From        Credit enhancement (%)
G        A (sf)     A+ (sf)                     10.94
H        BBB (sf)   A- (sf)                      7.58
J        BB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                    6.14
K        B (sf)     BBB (sf)                     4.70
L        CCC (sf)   BB (sf)                      2.78
M        CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                      1.34
N        D (sf)     B (sf)                       0.86

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-HQ

Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
A-3       AAA (sf)                  33.03
B         AAA (sf)                  25.59
C         AAA (sf)                  18.86
D         AA+ (sf)                  17.18
E         AA (sf)                   14.78
F         AA- (sf)                  12.86
X-1       AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Junk Rating on Two Class. Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of four classes
and affirmed seven classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-
IQ:

-- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 17, 2006
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 17, 2006
    Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2001
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- Cl. M, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

-- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
    Downgraded to C (sf)

The upgrades are due to increased credit subordination since last
review.  The affirmations are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.6% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.8%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
10.6% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a pay down analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit
estimates is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into
an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range
of credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 10, the same as at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels base on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated February 11, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the December 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to
$50.2 million from $713 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 78% of the pool.

Eight loans, representing 72% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in a $3.6 million loss.  There are no
loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 27% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.5 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 93%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 54% compared to 68% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 11.0% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 2.50X and 2.62X, respectively, compared to
1.329X and 1.87X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 43% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Horizon Center Loan, which is
secured by a 105,000 square foot Class A office building located
in Brentwood, Tennessee.  The property was 91% leased as of
December 2009 compared to 95% at securitization.  The loan has
amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
60% and 1.80X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.13X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Union Square Shopping Center Loan,
which is secured by a 267,875 SF shopping center located in New
Castle, Pennsylvania. The shopping center includes Wal-Mart,
Staples, Fashion Bug and numerous in-line retail tenants and was
99% leased as of December 2009, consistent with prior reviews and
at securitization.  The loan has amortized 12% since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 32% and 3.13X, respectively,
compared to 36% and 1.33X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Slater Nichols Industrial Park Loan,
which is secured by 161,000 SF in seven single-story industrial
buildings located in Huntington Beach, California.  Property
performance has declined since last review.  The property was 83%
leased as of December 2009 compared to 97% as of December 2008 and
99% at securitization.  The loan has amortized 3% since last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.06X,
respectively, compared to 41% and 2.18X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Junks Rating on Class M Certificate
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of three classes,
downgraded three classes and affirmed 11 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2004-TOP13, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-TOP13:

-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2004
    Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2004
    Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2004
    Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2004
    Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 14, 2007
    Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 14, 2007
    Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2004
    Assigned A2 (sf)

-- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at A3 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

-- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. L, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Downgraded to B1 (sf)

-- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- Cl. N, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

-- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The upgrades are due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and stable overall
performance.  The pool has paid down by 10% since last review.  In
addition, the pool benefits from 9% defeasance.

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
6.4% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply/demand relationship. The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; we expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of
the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press
release dated November 12, 2009. Please see the ratings tab on the
issuer/entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and
the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to
$826.5 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 153 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 40% of the pool.  The pool includes four loans with
investment grade credit estimates, representing 17% of the pool.
Twelve loans, representing 9% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at
last review represented 17% of the pool.

Thirty-one loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently seven loans, representing 3% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The master servicer has recognized a $1.2 million
appraisal reduction for one of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $10.9 million loss for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $5.3 million loss from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 99%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 74%
compared to 73% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs for the conduit component are 1.97X and 1.74X,
respectively, compared to 1.95X and 1.68X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 38 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the GIC Office
Portfolio Loan, which represents a pari passu interest in a
$683.7 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 12
office properties totaling 6.4 million square feet and located in
seven states.  The highest geographic concentrations are Chicago,
suburban Philadelphia and San Francisco.  As of January 2010, the
portfolio was 87% leased compared to 91% at last review.  The
portfolio's performance has declined since last review due to
decreased rental revenues and increased expenses.  The loan
matures in January 2014.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Baa3 and 1.45X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.44X
at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Gallup Headquarters
Loan, which is secured by a 296,000 SF office building located in
Omaha, Nebraska.  The property is 100% leased to Gallup, Inc.,
under a triple net lease that expires in October 2018.  The lease
expiration is coterminous with the loan maturity.  The loan is
fully amortizing and has amortized by approximately 7% since last
review.  Performance has improved since securitization due to
rental escalations and amortization.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 2.08X, respectively, compared to A2 and
1.90X at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Hudson Mall Loan,
which is secured by a 362,000 SF retail center located in Jersey
City, New Jersey.  The property was 93% leased as of September
2010 compared to 96% at last review.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.80X, respectively, the same as at last
review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the Renaissance Manor
Loan, which is secured by a 184-unit multifamily complex located
in North Brunswick, New Jersey.  The property was 93% leased as of
December 2009.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2
and 1.54X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.43X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool.
The largest loan is the U.S. Bank Tower Loan, which represents a
pari passu interest in a $260 million first mortgage loan.  The
loan is secured by a 1.4 million SF office tower and accompanying
parking garage in downtown Los Angeles, California.  The loan
sponsor is Maguire Properties.  The property was 57% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 88% at last review.  The property's
largest tenant, Latham & Watkins vacated the premises at its
December 2009 lease expiration.  Furthermore, the lease for the
second largest tenant, Sempra Energy expired in June 2010.  Even
with the substantial decline in cash flow from the dramatic rise
in vacancy, Moody's projects that the property will still generate
cash flow in excess of debt service.  However, given the softness
in the Los Angeles office market, it is anticipated that new
tenants will be paying lower rents than those currently in place.
In addition, due to Maguire's current financial issues, Moody's is
concerned about the availability of funds for leasing costs.  The
loan is interest-only for the entire term.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 135% and 0.74X, respectively, compared to 103%
and 0.97X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Lakeland Square Mall Loan, which
is secured by an 899,000 SF regional mall located in Lakeland,
Florida.  The center is anchored by JCPenney, two Dillard's stores
and Macy's.  JCPenny is the only anchor that is part of the
collateral.  As of June 2010, the center was 82% leased, compared
to 92% at last review.  The loan sponsors are General Growth
Properties, Inc. and NYS Common Retirement Fund.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR 98% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 91% and
1.09X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Galleria Plaza Shopping Center Loan,
which is secured by a 168,000 SF shopping center located in
Dallas, Texas.  The center was 100% leased as of September 2010
compared to 71% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 81%
and 1.27X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.08X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Low-B Ratings on 5 Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ2 (MSDW
2002-IQ2), a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from
the same transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its ratings on two
classes and affirmed S&P's rating on one other class of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Woodfield Mall Trust's
series 2002-WM (Woodfield Mall Trust 2002-WM), also a U.S. CMBS
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the MSDW 2002-IQ2
transaction and a review of the transaction's remaining
collateral, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available
to the trust.  The raised ratings on classes D and E from MSDW
2002-IQ2 reflect increased credit enhancement levels resulting
from the deleveraging of the collateral pool.

S&P's analysis of MSDW 2002-IQ2 included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.46x and a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 58.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a S&Pighted average DSC
of 1.27x and an LTV ratio of 74.1%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 7.7% and 16.4%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted above exclude
three fully defeased loans ($105.7 million, 34.6%) and one
specially serviced asset ($2.6 million, 0.9%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced asset and included it
in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmed ratings on the 11 principal and interest certificates
from MSDW 2002-IQ2 reflect subordination and liquidity support
levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P
affirmed S&P's rating on the class X-1 interest-only (IO)
certificate from MSDW 2002-IQ2 based on S&P's current criteria.

The lowered and affirmed ratings on Woodfield Mall Trust 2002-WM
follow S&P's revised valuation of the Woodfield Mall property,
which secures a subordinate B note that is the sole source of cash
flow for the Woodfield Mall Trust 2002-WM securities.

MSDW 2002-IQ2 Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report, the MSDW 2002-
IQ2 collateral pool balance was $305.3 million, which is 39.2% of
the balance at issuance.  The pool includes 40 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 105 loans at issuance.  The
master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank), provided
financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, all of which was full-year 2008, full-year 2009, and
partial-year 2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the loans in
the MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool based on the servicer-reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.46x and 58.3%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures excluded three
fully defeased loans ($105.7 million, 34.6%) and one specially
serviced asset ($2.6 million, 0.9%).  The transaction has
experienced $3.0 million in principal losses on three loans to
date.  Four loans ($5.9 million, 1.9%) in the MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Six loans ($10.4 million,
3.4%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, five of which ($9.6 million,
3.1%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the MSDW 2002-IQ2
pool according to S&P's current criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with S&P's raised and affirmed
ratings.

MSDW 2002-IQ2 Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 15, 2010 trustee remittance report, one asset
($2.6 million, 0.9%) in the MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool was with the
special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia).

The Meadowbrook Village asset was transferred to Berkadia on
Dec. 15, 2008, due to imminent default and became REO on Dec. 7,
2009.  Berkadia indicated that a portion of the asset
(approximately 66,720 sq. ft. of the 99,720-sq.-ft. retail strip
center in York, Pa.) was sold in December 2010.  The net proceeds
from the partial sale of the asset were used to repay $155,482 of
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts and
approximately $459,900 of servicer advances (according to the
December 2010 trustee remittance report).  In addition, the trust
balance was paid down to $2.6 million (0.9%) from $5.8 million
(per the Nov. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report), resulting from
a partial sale of the collateral property.  The partial sale
reflected a realized loss of $70,266 to the trust.  According to
Berkadia, the remaining collateral, which is approximately 33,000
sq. ft. of retail space, is mostly vacant.  Berkadia has listed
the property for sale.  S&P expect a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

Four loans in MSDW 2002-IQ2 totaling $9.6 million (3.1%) were
previously with the special servicer and have been returned to the
master servicer.  Pursuant to the transaction documents, the
special servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 1% of future
principal and interest payments if the loans perform and remain
with the master servicer.  According to KeyBank, the workout fee
will be collected on these four loans.

Summary of Top 10 MSDW 2002-IQ2 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 MSDW 2002-IQ2 real estate exposures have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $149.8 million (49.1%).  Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a S&Pighted average DSC of 1.68x
for the top 10 real estate exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
ratio for the top 10 real estate exposures are 1.44x and 63.3%,
respectively.  Details on the three largest top 10 exposures are:

The Woodfield Mall loan is the largest nondefeased loan in the
MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool and is secured by 1.12 million sq. ft. of a
2.24 million-sq.-ft. regional shopping mall known as the Woodfield
Mall in Schaumburg, Ill.  The whole-loan balance of $268.4 million
is split into a $230.0 million A note and a $38.4 million B note;
the B note is the sole asset of the Woodfield Mall Trust 2002-WM
transaction and provides 100% of the cash flow for the B-1, B-2,
and B-3 certificate classes.  The A note is split into three pari
passu pieces: a $116.3 million note in the Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust 2002-HQ transaction; a $55.5 million note
in MSDW 2002-IQ2 (18.2% of the pool), and a $58.2 million note in
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-TOP7.  The loan
matures on April 1, 2012.

For the 12 months ended June 30, 2010, the master servicer
reported a whole-loan DSC of 1.80x and 91.0% occupancy. Using the
master servicer's reported financial figures and the borrower's
Oct. 11, 2010, rent roll, Standard & Poor's adjusted valuation for
the Woodfield Mall property was 14.2% below the levels S&P
assessed at issuance, resulting in a stressed whole-loan
LTV ratio of 64.0%.  S&P's rating actions on the class B-1, B-2,
and B-3 certificates are consistent with S&P's revised valuation
of the Woodfield Mall property.

The Centre at Deane Hill loan ($23.8 million, 7.8%), the second-
largest nondefeased loan in the MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool, is secured by
a 389,200-sq.-ft. community shopping center in Knoxville, Tenn.
KeyBank reported a 1.30x DSC and 98.1% occupancy for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2010.

The Commerce Park Industrial Portfolio loan, the third-largest
nondefeased loan in the MSDW 2002-IQ2 pool, consists of fourcross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans totaling $18.6 million
(6.1%).  The portfolio loan is secured by fourflex industrial
properties totaling 600,370 sq. ft. in Stafford and Houston,
Texas.  KeyBank reported a 1.39x DSC and 87.2% occupancy for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010.

Ratings Raised

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-IQ2
                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
D          AA (sf)      AA- (sf)                     18.15
E          AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)                      15.60

Ratings Lowered

Woodfield Mall Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-WM
                Rating
Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
B-2        AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)                      N/A
B-3        AA- (sf)     AA (sf)                       N/A

Ratings Affirmed

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-IQ2
Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)                             36.96
B        AAA (sf)                             28.67
C        AA+ (sf)                             20.70
F        A (sf)                               13.05
G        BBB+ (sf)                            11.13
H        BBB (sf)                              7.95
J        BB+ (sf)                              6.03
K        BB (sf)                               4.76
L        B+ (sf)                               3.48
M        B (sf)                                2.53
N        B- (sf)                               1.57
X-1      AAA (sf)                               N/A

Woodfield Mall Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-WM
Class      Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
B-1        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A - Not applicable.


MSCI 2004-RR2: Fitch Affirms Junk Rating on Three Class Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded two and affirmed 10 classes issued by
MSCI 2004-RR2 as a result of negative credit migration.  Since
Fitch's last rating action in March 2010, the weighted average
rating of the portfolio has declined to 'BB/BB-' from 'BB'.

Currently, 56% has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 13.4% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 42.2% and 12.1% at last review.  The class A-2 notes
have paid down by $17.2 million since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The Rating Loss Rates were then
compared to the credit enhancement of the classes.  Based on this
analysis, the credit enhancement for the classes A-2 through M
notes are generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The Negative Outlook on the class A-2 through H notes reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage backed
security loans will continue to face refinance risk.  The Loss
Severity rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches.  Fitch does not assign LS
ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and below.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the rating of the interest-only
class X.

MSCI 2004-RR2 is a static Re-Remic backed by CMBS B-pieces that
closed June 29, 2004.  The transaction is collateralized by 14
CMBS assets from 12 obligors from the 1997-2000 vintages.

Fitch has taken these actions, including assigning LS ratings and
revising Outlooks for the following classes as indicated:

  * $55,978,680 class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
    to 'LS3' from 'LS2';
  * Interest-only, class X withdrawn;
  * $30,164,000 class B downgraded to 'BBBsf/LS4' from 'Asf/LS3';
    Outlook Negative;
  * $15,082,000 class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative; to
    'LS5' from 'LS4';
  * $5,299,000 class D affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative; to
    'LS5' from 'LS4';
  * $12,229,000 class E affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  * $3,261,000 class F affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  * $6,930,000 class G affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  * $3,668,000 class H affirmed at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  * $2,446,000 class J downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf/LS5';
  * $2,446,000 class K affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  * $2,446,000 class L affirmed at 'CCCsf';
  * $1,630,000 class M affirmed at 'CCCsf'.


MT. WILSON: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+ (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from Mt. Wilson CLO Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Western Asset
Management Co.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings on the
class A and B notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating actions reflect the improved performance S&P have
observed in the deal since November 2009, when S&P lowered S&P's
ratings on all of the classes of notes following a review of the
transaction under S&P's updated criteria for rating corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

At the time of S&P's last rating action, based on the Oct. 5,
2009, trustee report, the transaction was holding approximately
$20.05 million in defaulted obligations and more than
$21.64 million in underlying obligors with ratings in the 'CCC'
range.  Since that time, a number of defaulted obligors held in
the deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some receiving proceeds
that were higher than their carrying value in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio test calculations.   This, in
combination with a reduction in the 'CCC' range rated assets to
$6.87 million (as reported in the Dec. 6, 2010, trustee report),
benefited all O/C ratio tests.  The class A/B O/C ratio increased
to 124.90% as of Dec. 6, 2010, up from 120.67% as of Oct. 5, 2009.
The class E O/C test increased to 104.12% from 100.61% in the same
period.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                          Rating Actions

Mt. Wilson CLO Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To           From
A           AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C           BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)
E           CCC+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)


NEWCASTLE IV: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on 7 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed eight classes issued by Newcastle IV,
Ltd./Corp. as a result of increased credit enhancement to the
classes, despite continued negative credit migration.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2010, approximately
32.8% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 57.2% has
a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 26.7% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 52.7%
and 16.2%, respectively, at last review.  As of the Dec. 17, 2010
trustee report, 12.6% of the portfolio is experiencing interest
shortfalls.  The class I notes have paid down by $33.9 million
since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate CDOs'.  Based on this
analysis, the class I and II notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

For the class III through V notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets and assets
that are experiencing interest shortfalls.  Given the high
probability of default of these assets and the expected limited
recovery prospects upon default, the class III notes have been
affirmed at 'CCsf' and classes IV and V have been affirmed at
'Csf'.

While the class I notes are currently receiving interest, the
interest on the class II notes and below are being diverted
to pay principal on the class I notes due to the class I
overcollateralization (OC) failure.  The class II notes and below
are receiving interest paid in kind (PIK) whereby the principal
amount of the notes is written up by the amount of interest due.
Fitch does not expect classes IV and below to receive any future
payments as interest shortfalls and negative migration on the
underlying collateral continue to increase.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class I notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to face
refinance risk.  The Loss Severity (LS) rating indicates a
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance
Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with the probability of default for tranches. Fitch
does not assign LS ratings or Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and
below.

Newcastle IV is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), which
closed March 30, 2004. The portfolio is composed of 43.4%
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS); 24.4% real estate
investment trust securities (REIT); 19.9% commercial real estate
loans (CREL), including single borrower 'rake' classes of CMBS;
10.7 % residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS); and 1.5%
asset backed securities (ABS).

Fitch has affirmed and revised Loss Severity (LS) ratings on the
following classes as indicated:

-- $255,292,524 class I notes at 'Bsf'; to 'LS3' from 'LS2',
    Outlook Negative;
-- $13,162,059 class II-FL notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $7,688,835 class II-FX notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $7,658,518 class III-FL notes at 'CCsf';
-- $13,041,379 class III-FX notes at 'CCsf';
-- $8,325,213 class IV-FL notes at 'Csf';
-- $9,890,857 class IV-FX notes at 'Csf';
-- $15,354,636 class V-FX notes at 'Csf'.


NEWTON RE LIMITED: AM Best Downgrades Debt Rating to 'd'
--------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the debt rating to "d" from "c" on
the $150 million Series 2008-1, Class A Principal At-Risk Variable
Rate Notes (the notes) issued by Newton Re Limited (Cayman
Islands).  Concurrently, A.M. Best has withdrawn the debt rating.

This rating action reflects the confirmation from the
administrator, HSBC Bank (Cayman) Limited, that instead of
receiving full payment some note holders of Newton Re Limited
accepted an assignment of the collateral by the scheduled
redemption date of January 7, 2011.  A.M. Best has determined that
this constitutes a default, since Newton Re Limited did not meet
its financial obligations to security holders when due.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Ups $10MM Class E Note Rating to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Northwoods Capital VII, Limited:

  * U.S. $10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
    October 22, 2021, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
    November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Upgrade.


According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from an increase in the senior overcollateralization
ratio of the notes since the rating action in September 2009.  As
of the latest trustee report dated December 19, 2010, the senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 137.7% versus an August
2009 level of 126.0%.  In Moody's view, these positive
developments coincide with reinvestment of sale proceeds into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and higher ratings.
Additionally, the deal has benefitted from the diversion of excess
interest to the principal collection account as a result of
cumulative losses exceeding a $5 million threshhold.  The diverted
amount, called the loss replenishment amount, is calculated by
comparing cumulative losses on trading activity and defaults with
cumulative gains and prior amounts diverted in excess of the
threshold.  Although the Class E Notes are presently deferring due
to this diversion feature, Moody's expects the diversion of
interest to cease within the next few payment dates and current
interest payments on Class E Notes to resume.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the rating action in
September 2009.  Based on the December 2010 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 3106 compared to 3098 in August
2009, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately
13.6% of the underlying portfolio versus 14.9% in August 2009.
The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular,
the dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about
$20 million from approximately $48 million in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $501 million, defaulted par of $20 million, weighted
average default probability of 38.31%, a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 39.28%, and a diversity score of 35.  These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Northwoods Capital VII, Limited, issued in September of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described, Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact on
all rated notes, including the following:

  * Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

  * A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3873)

  * Class A-1: +2
  * Class A-2: +2
  * Class A-3: +1
  * Class A-4: +2
  * Class B: +2
  * Class C: +2
  * Class D: +2
  * Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5809)

  * Class A-1: -2
  * Class A-2: -2
  * Class A-3: -1
  * Class A-4: -2
  * Class B: -2
  * Class C: -2
  * Class D: -2
  * Class E: -4

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (41.28%)

  * Class A-1: 0
  * Class A-2: 0
  * Class A-3: +1
  * Class A-4: 0
  * Class B: +1
  * Class C: 0
  * Class D: +1
  * Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (37.28%)

  * Class A-1: -1
  * Class A-2: -1
  * Class A-3: 0
  * Class A-4: -1
  * Class B: -1
  * Class C: -1
  * Class D: 0
  * Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.


PACIFIC INVESTMENT: S&P Up Ratings on 2 Classes of Notes From BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B-1 and B-2 notes from Waveland-Ingots Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Pacific Investment
Management Co. LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed S&P's ratings
on both classes from CreditWatch with positive implications. S&P
also affirmed S&P's ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

The upgrades and affirmations reflect S&P'sobservation that
performance has improved in the transaction's underlying asset
portfolio, paydowns continued on the senior (class A-1 and A-2)
notes, and the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
also improved since S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class B-1 and
B-2 notes in February 2010.  At that time, S&P lowered S&P's
ratings after a review of the transaction under S&P's criteria for
rating corporate collateralized debt obligations.

According to the December 2010 trustee report, the balance of
defaulted obligations in the transaction was $1.0 million, down
from $8.4 million as of the January 2010 trustee report.
Additionally, the trustee reported balance of 'CCC' rated assets
has decreased to $5.2 million from $10.3 million since S&P's
last rating action.

The transaction has also paid down approximately $56 million to
the senior notes since S&P's last rating action, including a
$14 million payment in the Dec. 21, 2010 distribution, which
increased the O/C available to support the rated notes.  The O/C
ratio for the class B-1 and B-2 notes was 135% as of December
2010, up from 120% according to the January 2010 trustee report.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings Raised and Creditwatch Actions

Waveland-Ingots Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To         From
B-1           AA+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2           AA+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Waveland-Ingots Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)


PAINE WEBBER: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certificate to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of one class,
downgraded one class and affirmed four classes of Paine Webber
Mortgage Acceptance Corporation V, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1:

-- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 7, 1999
    Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2008
    Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2008
    Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. G, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2004
    Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

-- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2004
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and interest shortfalls.  The upgrade
is due to a significant increase in subordination from paydowns
and amortization.  The affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio remaining within acceptable ranges.  The
significant decline in loan diversity, as measured by the
Herfindahl Index, since last review but has been offset by
increased subordination.  Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.3% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.5% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  Due to the high
level of credit subordination and defeasance, it is unlikely that
investment grade classes would be downgraded even if losses are
higher than Moody's expected base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability
will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Backed Transactions"
published in October 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and the CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0.  Conduit model
results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade.
Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a pay down
analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 58 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.6 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.  Under Moody's CTL approach,
the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on
the senior unsecured debt rating of the tenant, usually an
investment grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key
factor in determining the probability of default on the underlying
lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an
absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through
a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The credit enhancement levels are melded with the
large loan model credit enhancement into an overall model result.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated February 28, 2008.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the December 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to
$89.6 million from $704.8 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 75% of the pool.  The pool includes five loans,
representing 34% of the pool, backed by credit tenant leases.
Five loans representing 6% of the pool have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $9.8 million loss.  Two loans,
representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is Heatherwood Apartments
Loan, which is secured by a 133 unit multifamily property located
in Houston, Texas.  The loan transferred into special servicing in
May, 2009 due to maturity default.  The loan is current.  The
other specially serviced loan is secured by an industrial
property.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $1.1
million appraisal reduction for one of the specially serviced
loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.1 million loss for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans representing 1% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $500,000 loss for the troubled loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H and
I have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.2 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions, extraordinary trust
expenses and non-advancing by the master servicer based on a
determination of non-recoverability.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 79%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced, troubled loans and
CTL's, Moody's weighted average LTV is 66% compared to 76% at last
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 20% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate
of 10.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans and CTLs, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 2.28X, respectively,
compared to 1.50X and 1.71X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow  and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The CTL component consists of five loans, totaling 34% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to five tenants.  The largest
exposures are Beckman Coulter Inc. and Regal Cinemas Corporation.
Four of the tenants have a Moody's rating and Moody's completed
updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's rated tenant.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor of
1,795 compared to 1,512 at last review. WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of the default probability within the pool.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Kelsey Hayes Loan, which is
secured by a 180,000 square foot industrial and R&D complex
located in Livonia, Michigan.  The complex was 100% leased as of
June 2010, the same as last review.  The single tenant is Kelsey
Hayes, which occupies the entirety of the property through April
2014. Kelsey Hayes is a subsidiary of TRW Automotive Inc.
The loan has passed its anticipated repayment date and is
hyperamortizing.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.23X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Heathermoor Loan, which is secured
by a 133 unit multifamily property located in Columbus, Ohio.  The
property was 91% leased as of November 2010 compared to 98% at
last review.  Despite the decline in occupancy, net operating
income has improved since last review.  The loan matures in June
2011.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 92% and 1.09X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Clinton Place Loan, which is secured
by a 133 unit multifamily property located in Clinton Township,
Michigan.  The property was 95% leased as of November 2010
compared to 97% at last review.  Net operating income has improved
since last review. The loan matures in June 2011.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 103%
and 1.00X at last review.


ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Ups Rating on $12.5MM Class E Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of the notes
issued by Rosedale CLO II Ltd.:

  * US$26,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured
    Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
    previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  * US$15,000,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
    Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
    previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  * US$13,400,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
    previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
    for Possible Upgrade;

  * US$12,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
    previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of the
notes since the last rating action in July 2009.  In particular,
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 119.57%, 112.53%, 106.91% and 102.14%,
respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 113.7%, 107.12%, 101.85%
and 97.38%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the
Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest and
that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
Based on the December 2010 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 2597 compared to 2605 in the June 2009
report.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$6.8 million of the underlying portfolio compared to $8.2 million
in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $285 million, defaulted par of $7.6 million, weighted
average default probability of 27.69%, a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 42.78%, and a diversity score of 60.  These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Rosedale CLO II Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lifts 'Ba2' Ratings of Certs. to 'Baa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following units issued by Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings
AIG Capital Security Backed Series 2002-11:

  * $39,332,000 of 6.000% Class A Callable Units; Upgraded to
    Baa2; previously on November 15, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Upgrade

  * $39,332,000 Notional Amount of Interest-Only 1.539% Class B
    Callable Units; Upgraded to Baa2; previously on November 15,
    2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction.  This rating actions are a result of the change
of the rating of the underlying securities which are the 7.507%
trust preferred capital securities due December 1, 2045 issued by
American General Institutional Capital A which were upgraded to
Baa2 by Moody's on January 12, 2011.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


TIERS CORPORATE: Moody's Upgrades 'Ba2' Rating of Cert. to 'Baa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
certificates issued by TIERS Corporate Bond-Backed Certificates
Trust AGC 1997-10:

  * $79,665,000 aggregate Certificate Principal Balance of
    Amortizing Class; Upgraded to Baa2; previously on November 15,
    2010 Ba2, Placed on review for upgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  This rating action is the result of the change of
the rating of the underlying securities which are the 8.125%
Capital Securities, Series B issued by American General
Institutional Capital B which which were upgraded to Baa2 by
Moody's on January 12, 2011.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


TRALEE CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to B+ (sf)
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2a, A-2b, B, C, and D notes from Tralee CDO I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Par IV
Capital Management LLC.  S&P removed three of those ratings from
CreditWatch with positive implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
the rating on the class A-1 notes from the same transaction.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P have observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since January 2010.
At that time, S&P lowered the ratings on all notes following a
review of the transaction under S&P's updated criteria for rating
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)

At the time of S&P's last rating action, the transaction held
approximately $24.7 million in defaulted obligations and
$42.2 million in underlying obligors with a rating in the 'CCC'
range, according to the Dec. 6, 2009, trustee report.  As a result
of the defaulted obligations and 'CCC' related haircuts applied to
the calculation of the transaction's coverage ratios, Tralee CDO I
Ltd. failed its class C and D overcollateralization (O/C) tests
and used interest proceeds to pay down the class A-1 notes to
bring the test back into compliance.  In addition, the class D
notes failed to withstand the specified combination of underlying
asset defaults at the 'CCC' rating level of the largest obligor
default test.

Over the past year, a number of defaulted obligors held in the
deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some receiving proceeds that
were higher than their carrying value in the O/C ratio test
calculation.  This, in combination with a reduction in the 'CCC'
range rated assets and $4.0 million in paydowns to the class A-1
notes, benefited the transaction's O/C ratios.  The class A O/C
ratio increased to 123.7% from 115.8% as of Dec. 6, 2009.

As of Dec. 6, 2010, Tralee CDO I Ltd. held $11.4 in defaulted
obligations and $20.4 million in assets from underlying obligors
with ratings in the 'CCC' range.  Also, the transaction passed all
class O/C tests.  The largest obligor default test continued to be
a constraining factor for the rating on the class D notes since
the D notes failed to withstand the specified combination of
underlying asset defaults at the 'BB' rating level of the largest
obligor
default test.

S&P will continue to review S&P's ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in S&P's view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Tralee CDO I Ltd.
                             Rating
Class                   To           From
A-2a                    AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2b                    AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                       A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                       BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)
D                       B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

Tralee CDO I Ltd.
Class            Rating
A-1              AA+ (sf)


* Payment Defaults Cues S&P to Cut Ratings on Notes Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on class A1
from Duke Funding IX Ltd. and class A-1 from Stockton CDO Ltd. to
'D (sf)'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed S&P's 'CC (sf)' ratings
on nine classes and S&P's 'D (sf)' ratings on four classes from
these transactions.

The downgrades were the result of a default in the payment of
interest due on these nondeferrable notes.

The rating actions are consistent with S&P's criteria for ratings
on collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions that have
triggered an event of default (EOD) and may be subject to
acceleration or liquidation.

Ratings Lowered

Duke Funding IX Ltd.

             Rating
Class    To          From
A1       D (sf)      CC (sf)

Stockton CDO Ltd.
             Rating
Class    To          From
A-1      D (sf)      CC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Duke Funding IX Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-2V          D (sf)
A-2F          D (sf)
A-3V          CC (sf)
A-3F          CC (sf)
B             CC (sf)

Stockton CDO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-2           D (sf)
A-3           D (sf)
B             CC (sf)
C             CC (sf)
D-1           CC (sf)
D-2           CC (sf)
D-3           CC (sf)
E             CC (sf)


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 323 Certificates From 114 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 323
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 114 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
following the recent downgrade of MBIA Insurance Corp. (MBIA).
S&P removed two of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
537 classes from 37 of the downgraded transactions and 53
additional transactions and removed one of them from CreditWatch
negative.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on 44 other classes.

The rating actions follow the Dec. 22, 2010, lowering of S&P's
insurer financial strength rating on MBIA to 'B' from 'BB+'.  The
outlook on the Company is negative.

Based on S&P's criteria, the current ratings on the bond-insured
classes reflect the higher of (i) the rating on the bond insurer;
and (ii) S&P's assessment of the stand-alone credit support of the
classes assuming no bond insurance.

S&P lowered its ratings on the noninsured classes in these deals
to reflect its opinion that projected credit support for the
affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous ratings,
given S&P's current projected losses.

S&P affirmed ratings on the noninsured classes to reflect S&P's
belief that the amount of projected credit enhancement available
for these classes is sufficient to cover projected losses under
S&P's stress scenarios associated with these rating levels.

In S&P's review of these transactions, S&P applied its loss
assumptions according to S&P's criteria.  S&P has updated its
lifetime projected losses for these transactions:

                               Orig. bal.          Lifetime
Transaction                      (mil. $)  expected loss (%)
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates    844.00              19.15
Trust 2005-7
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates  1,306.00              20.68
Trust 2005-7
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates    900.00              23.78
Trust 2005-12
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates  2,100.00              26.31
Trust 2005-14

The underlying collateral for these transactions consists of
Alternative-A, closed-end second-lien, document-deficient, home
equity line of credit, prime jumbo, and subprime mortgage loans,
as well as second-lien high loan-to-value loans, and re-REMIC
securities.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on all U.S.
RMBS classes that MBIA insures and take rating actions as S&P
deems appropriate based on S&P's criteria.


* S&P Places 11 Tranches of CDO Transactions on CreditWatch
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 11
tranches from 8 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions on CreditWatch with positive
implications.  At the same time, S&P placed its ratings on 3
tranches from 3 corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction and 24
tranches from 12 synthetic CDO transactions backed by commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on one tranche
from a corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction (Repacs Trust
Series: Bayshore I) and withdrew one rating from one synthetic CDO
transaction backed by CMBS.  The CreditWatch placements and
affirmation followed its monthly review of U.S. synthetic CDO
transactions.  S&P also lowered the ratings on five tranches from
four transactions backed by residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS).

The CreditWatch positive placements reflect seasoning of the
transactions, rating stability of the obligors in the underlying
reference portfolios over the past few months, and synthetic rated
overcollateralization (SROC) ratios that had risen above 100% at
the next highest rating level.  The CreditWatch negative
placements reflect negative rating migration in the respective
portfolios and SROC ratios that had fallen below 100% as of the
December month-end run.  The affirmation reflects stability in the
respective portfolio and an SROC ratio that stayed above 100% at
the tranches' current rating level.  The lowered ratings reflect
principal losses that have occurred on the respective tranches.
The rating withdrawal follows an early termination of the
tranche.

                          Rating Actions

Aphex Capital NSCR 2006-1 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    BB+/Watch Neg       BB+

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-3 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2F                     CCC/Watch Neg       CCC
A-2L                     CCC/Watch Neg       CCC
B                        CCC/Watch Neg       CCC
C-F                      CCC/Watch Neg       CCC
C-L                      CCC/Watch Neg       CCC

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-5 Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-2                      CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+
B                        CCC/Watch Neg       CCC
C                        CCC/Watch Neg       CCC

Archstone Synthetic CDO II SPC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A-1                      BBB/Watch Pos       BBB
A-2                      BBB-/Watch Pos      BBB-
D-2                      BB-/Watch Pos       BB-

Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund
Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Unf Cr Def               BBB+/Watch Pos      BBB+

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust Series 2007-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Units                    CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust, Series 2007-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
V Units                  CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+

Coliseum SPC
BALLISTA 2007-III
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    D                   CC

Coliseum SPC
BALLISTA 2007-II
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    D                   CC

Coliseum SPC
TACLS 2007-I
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Notes                    D                   CC

Coliseum SPC
NEOPOLITAN 2007-I
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
I                        D                   CC
Sub Nts                  D                   CC

Credit Default Swap
US$10 mil HSBC Bank USA NA - The Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Limited
227212/227229/227230
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche                  BB-srp/Watch Pos    BB-srp

HARBOR SPC
2006-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        B+/Watch Neg        B+
B                        B-/Watch Neg        B-
C                        CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+
D                        CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+

HARBOR SPC
2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B                        CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+
C                        CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+

Infiniti SPC Limited
US$20 mil Infiniti SPC Limited Acting on Behalf of and for the
Account of the
Potomac Synthetic CDO 2007-2 Segregated Portfolio, Series 10A-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
10A-2                    BB-/Watch Pos       BB-

Magnolia Finance II PLC
2007-2A
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  CCC-

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2007-6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIA                      B+/Watch Pos        B+
IIIA                     B-/Watch Pos        B-

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2007-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1                       B+/Watch Neg        B+

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2007-16
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IIB                      B+/Watch Neg        B+

Nomura International plc
US$1 bil NSCR 2006-1 Class A-1 Nomura Synthetic CMBS
Resecuritization
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche                  BB+/Watch Neg       BB+

Nomura International plc
US$1 bil NSCR 2006-2 2.75%-7% SCDO
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche                  BB-srp/Watch Neg    BB-srp

Nomura International plc
US$20 mil NSCR 2006-1 Class FL Nomura Synthetic CMBS
Resecuritization
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
First Loss               B-/Watch Neg        B-

PARCS-R Master Trust
2007-6                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Trust Unit               AA+/Watch Pos       AA+

REVE SPC
EUR35 mil, US$20 mil Reve SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A Seg 8                  B/Watch Neg         B

Rutland Rated Investments
LYNDEN 2006-1 (21)
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-L                     B+/Watch Pos        B+

SPGS SPC
2006-I
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        B-/Watch Neg        B-
B                        B-/Watch Neg        B-
C                        B-/Watch Neg        B-

SPGS SPC
MSC 2006-SRR1-A2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A2                       CCC+/Watch Neg      CCC+

Strata 2004-8, Limited
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Fltg Rt Nt               BB/Watch Pos        BB

Ratings Affirmed; Removed From CreditWatch With Negative
Implications

Repacs Trust Series: Bayshore I
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        BB-                 BB-/Watch Neg

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases by individuals and business entities estimating
assets and debts or disclosing assets and liabilities at less than
$1,000,000.  The list includes links to freely downloadable images
of the small-dollar business-related petitions in Acrobat PDF
format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                          *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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