TCR_Public/110116.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, January 16, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 15

                            Headlines

ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Keeps BB Rating on Liquidity Facility
AMERICAN GENERAL: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B-2 Notes
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Five Cert. Classes to Low B
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 117 Tranches
ATRIUM III: Moody's Lifts Rating on $5MM Notes to Caa2

BEAR STEARNS: S&P Affirms D on 5 Classes of CMBS Transaction
C-BAS RMBS: Fitch Holds Default Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs.
CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Raises Rating on $16 Mil. Notes to Caa3
CITIGROUP HELOC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
CITY OF PONTIAC: Fitch Puts 'B' Rating on 4 Series of Bonds

CRAFT 2005: Moody's Upgrades $6.1 Million Linked Notes to Ba2
CRATOS CLO: S&P Raises Rating of Class E Notes to BB- From CCC-
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 23 Classes of Certs.
CSFB MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on 2 Classes of Certificates
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 6 Classes of Certs.

DLSA MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on Two Class Certificates
DUANE STREET: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11.76 Mil. Notes to Caa3
FOUR CORNERS: S&P Removes Class Notes Ratings From CreditWatch
FRONTIER LEASING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to Caa3
GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-C1 Certs.

GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two 2005-HEL1 Tranches
I-PREFERRED TERM: AM Best Cuts Rating on 2 CDO's to 'c'
INTEGRAL FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Class D Notes
JWS CBO: Fitch Junks Rating on $21.9 Million Class D Notes
KINGSLAND I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Puts 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
LIME STREET: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
LUTHERAN SOCIAL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $17 Million Bonds
MBIA Insurance: S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Housing Bonds to B
MERIDIAN FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Rating on 3 Series of Term Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Lifts Rating on $5 Million Notes to Ba1
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades $5 Mil. Floating Notes to B2
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises BB+ Rating on $117MM Certs. to BBB
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1 Certs. From BB+
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises Rating on $44MM Certs. to BBB

NOMURA CORPORATE: S&P Raises Rating of Clydesdale CLO Note Classes
OPTEUM ALT-A: Moody's Junks Rating on Six Classes of Certs.
RACE POINT: Moody's Raises Rating of $31.2 Mil. Notes to Caa1
SACO RESIDENTIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Certificate
SAN GABRIEL: S&P Raises Ratings on All Classes of CLO Transactions

SAN JOAQUIN: Moody's Changes Ba2 Rating Outlook to Stable
STRUCTURED ASSETS: Moody's Junks Rating on Three Class Certs.
TIERS WOLCOTT: S&P Lowers CDO Floating Rate Certs Rating to D
TRIAXX PRIME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $1.5 Bil. Notes to Caa2
TROPIC CDO: Moody's Cuts Rating on $37.5 Million Notes to C

WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class O Certificates

* Fitch Holds CCCsf/RR1 Rating on Brascan $13.4MM Class E Notes
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 40 Classes From 26 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 64 Classes of Certificates
* S&P Withdraws 35 CAPCOs Medium-Term Note Issues

                            *********

ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Keeps BB Rating on Liquidity Facility
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) (sf) for the
Commercial Paper (CP) issued by Alpine Securitization Corp.
(Alpine), an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) vehicle
administered by Credit Suisse, New York branch.  In addition, DBRS
has confirmed the ratings and revised the tranche sizes of the
aggregate liquidity facilities (the Liquidity) provided to Alpine
by Credit Suisse.

The $ 7,664,127,118 aggregate liquidity facilities are tranched
as:

  -- $ 7,330,116,794 rated AAA (sf)
  -- $ 69,189,440 rated AA (sf)
  -- $ 40,258,127 rated A (sf)
  -- $ 63,770,136 rated BBB (sf)
  -- $ 57,414,276 rated BB (sf)
  -- $ 22,405,309 rated B (sf)
  -- $ 80,973,036 unrated (sf)

The ratings are based on September 30, 2010 data.

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio. The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is
based on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-
wide credit enhancement (PWCE).  The rationale for the CP rating
is based on the updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as
DBRS' prior and ongoing review of legal, operational and liquidity
risks associated with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality
of Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses
each transaction to a term standard.  The tranching of the
Liquidity reflects the credit risk of the portfolio at each rating
level.  The tranche sizes are expected to vary each month based on
changes in portfolio composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS'
simulation methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse
ABCP conduit portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS CDO Toolbox
simulation model, with adjustments to reflect the unique structure
of an ABCP conduit and its underlying assets.  DBRS determines
attachment points for risk based on an analysis of the portfolio
and models the portfolio based on key inputs such as asset
ratings, asset tenors and recovery rates.  The attachment points
determine the portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA, A through B
as well as unrated.

DBRS models the portfolio on an ongoing basis to reflect changes
in Alpine's portfolio composition and credit quality.  The rating
results are updated and posted on the DBRS website.


AMERICAN GENERAL: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and subsequently withdrawn the
ratings on these remaining class of notes from American General
CBO 1998-1 Ltd./Corp. since the notes have matured:

  -- $3,611,552 class B-2 notes to 'Dsf' from 'C/RR3'.

At the stated maturity date on Dec. 15, 2010, the class B-2 notes
received a total principal payment of approximately $166 thousand,
leaving an unpaid principal balance of approximately $3.6 million
compared to their original balance of $25 million.  The downgrade
of the class B-2 notes reflects the issuer's failure to redeem the
entire principal amount due at the stated maturity date.

Due to restrictions created by an ongoing event of default, the
manager has thus far been unable to sell the several remaining
assets in the portfolio, including a performing $1.7 million
senior secured bond, various equity holdings, and two defaulted
bonds with minimal expected recoveries.  The ultimate liquidation
of these assets may provide further value to the class B-2 notes
after the maturity date, although likely not enough to fully repay
the notes.

American General CBO was a collateralized bond obligation that
closed Nov. 5, 1998, and was managed by PineBridge Investments
(fka AIG Global Investment Corporation).


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Five Cert. Classes to Low B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches and
confirmed the ratings of 3 tranches from 1 RMBS transaction,
backed by Alt-A residential mortgage loans, issued by American
Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3.

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3

* Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Baa1
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba2
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Aaa
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Aa3
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba3
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba3
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Aa2
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba3
   Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3 Placed
   Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Alt-A RMBS Loss
Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on
the underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach is adjusted slightly when estimating
losses on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project
losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates
a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that
is dependent on the vintage of loan origination.  This baseline
rate is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied. Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies
ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 117 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 117
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 11 tranches from 17 RMBS
transactions issued by American Home Mortgage Asset Trust.  The
collateral backing these transactions primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgage and
negative amortization residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of option arm and Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on option arm and Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Alt-A RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010
and "Option ARM RMBS Loss Projection Update: April 2010" published
in April 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
option arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on
the underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress
in national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Asset Trust 2007-4

* Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
   2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

* Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Confirmed
   at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

* Cl. A-5, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
   2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

* Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Confirmed
   at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-1

* Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. X-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. X-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. X-C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ba2
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Caa3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-2

* Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. XBI, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. XBJ, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-3

* Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-3-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-3-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-4

* Cl. I-A-1-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-5

* Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-6

* Cl. A1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A1-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A1-C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A2-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A2-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. X-P, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-1

* Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-2

* Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-5

* Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. X-P, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Tr 2006-3

* Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-1A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   * Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010  Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

* Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 16,
   2008 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

* Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 19,
   2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

* Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

* Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

* Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on March 19,
   2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

* Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 19,
   2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

* Cl. VI-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

* Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 19,
   2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

* Cl. VII-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 19,
   2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

* Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
   2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. VIII-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
   2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-4

* Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
   2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-1

* Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-2

* Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-1C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. III-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-1

* Cl. A-1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-1-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-1-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ca
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. IO-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-2

* Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
   2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-1A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-3A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. I-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ATRIUM III: Moody's Lifts Rating on $5MM Notes to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Atrium III:

* US$373,000,000 Class A1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016 (current
   balance of $370,274,923), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
   August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

* US$13,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded
   to Baa1 (sf);

* US$13,500,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
   to A2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
   (sf);

* US$31,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
   to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
   (sf);

* US$16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
   to B2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed
   Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

* US$6,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
   to Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
   Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

* US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to
   Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under
   Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in August 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the last rating action primarily as a result of the
reinvestment of sale proceeds into substitute assets with higher
par amounts.  As of the latest trustee report dated November 2010,
the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 124.2%, 115.0%, 110.73%, and 108.06%,
respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 117.74%, 109.02%,
104.97%, and 102.39%, respectively.  Moody's also notes that the
Class D-1 and D-2 Notes are no longer deferring interest and that
all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.  Moody's
expects the rated notes to start delevering as a result of the end
of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2010.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based
on the November 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating
factor is 2731 compared to 2782 in June 2009, and securities rated
Caa1 and below make up approximately 5.3% of the underlying
portfolio versus 7.6% in June 2009.  Moody's adjusted WARF has
also declined since the last rating action due to a decrease in
the percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook.  The deal also experienced
a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to $13 million from
approximately $55 million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $491 million, defaulted par of $13 million, weighted
average default probability of 25.7%, a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 41.8%, and a diversity score of 72.  These
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Atrium III, issued on October 27, 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including the following:

1) Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2) A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3008)

* Class A1: +2
* Class A-2a: +2
* Class A-2b: +2
* Class B: +2
* Class C: +2
* Class D-1: +4
* Class D-2: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4512)

* Class A1: -1
* Class A-2a: -2
* Class A-2b: -2
* Class B: -2
* Class C: -3
* Class D-1: -2
* Class D-2: -2

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (43.8%)

* Class A1: 0
* Class A-2a:0
* Class A-2b: 0
* Class B: -1
* Class C: -1
* Class D-1: 0
* Class D-2: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (39.8%)

* Class A1: +1
* Class A-2a: 0
* Class A-2b: 0
* Class B: 0
* Class C: 0
* Class D-1:+1
* Class D-2: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Affirms D on 5 Classes of CMBS Transaction
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2000-WF1, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In
addition, S&P affirmed S&P's 'D (sf)' ratings on five other
classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and liquidity
available to the trust.  The raised ratings also reflect increased
credit enhancement levels and S&P's revised expectation regarding
the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P previously lowered S&P's ratings on six classes from the
transaction due to recurring or susceptibility to interest
shortfalls primarily from the nonrecoverable advance determination
made in June 2010 by the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
(Wells Fargo), on the Circuit City Corporate Headquarters (Circuit
City) asset.

The Circuit City asset has since liquidated at a $15.9 million
principal loss, which was in excess of the trust balance, as
reflected in the Oct. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report.

S&P affirmed S&P's 'D (sf)' ratings on classes H, I, J, K, and L.
S&P previously downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)' due to ongoing
interest shortfalls.  Per the December 2010 trustee remittance
report, classes I, J, K, and L have incurred principal losses to
date.  The class H certificate has accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for two consecutive months.

Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 15, 2010 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $47.7 million, which is 5.4% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 26 loans and one real estate owned
(REO) asset, down from 181 loans at issuance.  Wells Fargo
provided financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, 60.7% of which was full-year 2008, and 39.3% was
full-year 2009 or interim 2010 data.  S&P calculated a weighted
average debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.19x for the pool based on
the servicer-reported figures, which excluded nine defeased loans
($13.4 million, 28.2%).  Three loans ($5.7 million, 12.0%) in the
pool are on the master servicer's watchlist, including two of the
top 10 real estate exposures.  FS&P's loans ($11.9 million, 24.9%)
have a reported DSC below 1.10x, three of which ($8.8 million,
18.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

The transaction has experienced $27.8 million in principal losses
to date.

Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report, fS&P's assets
($18.6 million, 39.1%) in the pool, all of which are among the top
10 real estate exposures, were with the special servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia).  The payment status of the
specially serviced assets, as reported, is as follows: one is REO
($5.2 million, 11.0%) and three are matured balloon loans
($13.4 million, 28.1%).  Two of the specially serviced assets
($9.3 million, 19.6%) have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in
effect totaling $3.6 million.  Details on the fS&P's specially
serviced assets are:

The Tustin French Quarter loan ($6.2 million, 13.0%), the largest
asset with Berkadia, is the largest real estate exposure in the
pool.  The loan is secured by an 89,800-sq.-ft. anchored retail
strip center in Tustin, Calif.  The loan, which had an April 1,
2010 maturity date, was transferred to the special servicer on
March 29, 2010, due to imminent maturity default.  The reported
DSC was 1.13x for year-end 2008, and occupancy was 96.2% as of
year-end 2009.  Berkadia has indicated that it is currently in
discussions with the borrower to modify the loan. If a loan
modification or extension does not occur, S&P expect a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The IDC Petaluma asset ($5.2 million, 11.0%), the second-largest
asset with Berkadia, is the second-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The 86,500-sq.-ft. flex industrial/warehouse property
in Petaluma, Calif., became REO on July 15, 2010, following a
foreclosure auction.  According to Berkadia, the property has been
vacant since February 2007, and it is now listed for sale.  An ARA
of $3.2 million, based on a revised July 2010 appraisal of
$3.6 million, is in effect against the asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Nahatan Place loan ($4.1 million, 8.6%), the second-smallest
asset with Berkadia, is the third-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The loan is secured by a 46,600-sq.-ft. retail strip
center in Norwood, Mass.  The loan was transferred to Berkadia on
Nov. 19, 2009, after the borrower did not pay off the loan upon
its Nov. 1, 2009 maturity date.  The reported DSC was 1.00x for
year-end 2009 and occupancy was 58.7% as of September 2010.  An
ARA of $377,754, based on a revised May 2010 appraisal of
$4.2 million, is in effect against this loan. According to
Berkadia, the borrower is currently operating under a forbearance
agreement until Nov. 1, 2011.

The Northwest Executive Center loan ($3.1 million, 6.5%), the
smallest asset with Berkadia, is the fS&P'sth-largest real estate
exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by a 29,770-sq.-ft.
suburban office building in Las Vegas, Nev.  The loan was
transferred to Berkadia on Sept. 29, 2009, due to imminent
default.  Berkadia has stated that it is currently pursuing
foreclosure.  The property was 13.0% occupied as of December 2010.
S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.

            Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $29.1 million (61.0%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.08x for the
top 10 real estate exposures.  The servicer-reported numbers are
based on the last reported DSC figures, which include full-year
2008 financial information for five of the top 10 exposures (71.4%
of the top 10 exposures balance).  FS&P's of the top 10 exposures
($18.6 million, 39.1%) are with the special servicer as detailed
above, while the fifth- and sixth-largest exposures ($5.0 million,
10.6%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Loera Industrial Portfolio loan ($2.9 million, 6.1%), the
fifth-largest real estate exposure in the pool, is the largest
loan on Wells Fargo's watchlist.  This loan is secured by three
industrial (warehouse/distribution) properties totaling 273,200
sq. ft. in Brownsville and Los Indios, Texas.  The loan appears on
the watchlist due to a low combined DSC of 0.91x for year-end
2009.  The combined occupancy for the portfolio was 80.3% as of
July 2010.  According to Wells Fargo, the borrower is actively
marketing the vacant space.

The Rite Aid loan ($2.1 million, 4.5%), the sixth-largest real
estate exposure in the pool, is on the master servicer's watchlist
because it is a corrected mortgage loan.  The loan was transferred
to the special servicer on Nov. 3, 2009, due to a maturity
default, after the borrower did not pay off the loan by its
Nov. 1, 2009 maturity date.  The loan has since been modified and
the maturity was extended to Nov. 1, 2011.  The loan, which
returned to the master servicer in August 2010, is secured by a
16,700-sq.-ft. free-standing retail building in Las Vegas, Nev.
Although the property is currently vacant, according to Berkadia,
the former tenant, Rite Aid Corp. (rated B-/stable by Standard &
Poor's), which vacated in 2008, continues to pay rent under its
lease that expires in 2019.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to
S&P's criteria and the analysis is consistent with S&P's raised
and affirmed ratings.

Ratings Raised

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1

              Rating
Class     To            From         Credit enhancement (%)
E         AAA (sf)      B+ (sf)                       90.79
F         BBB- (sf)     B- (sf)                       72.15
G         B- (sf)       CCC- (sf)                     39.53

Ratings Affirmed

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1

Class     Rating         Credit enhancement (%)
H         D (sf)                        11.58
I         D (sf)                         0.00
J         D (sf)                         0.00
K         D (sf)                         0.00
L         D (sf)                         0.00


C-BAS RMBS: Fitch Holds Default Ratings on 3 Classes of Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings dowgraded five and affirmed six classes of one C-
Bass RMBS resecuritization trust as a result of actions taken on
the underlying classes.  Some of the underlying classes have taken
losses.  The affected trust represents a beneficial ownership
interest in a separate trust fund, which includes bonds that have
either been affirmed or downgraded.

The Underlying Deals consist of:
Wisconsin Avenue Securities Trust 1998-W2

-- Class B4 (cusip 31359UPK5);
-- Class B5 (cusip 31359UPL3).

Wisconsin Avenue Securities Trust 1998-W3

-- Class B4 (cusip 31359UPZ2).

Wisconsin Avenue Securities Trust 1998-W5

-- Class B4 (cusip 31359UWH4);
-- Class B5 (cusip 31359UWJ0).

Golden National Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Cert. 1998-GN3

-- Class M1 (cusip 589929SF6);
-- Class M2 (cusip 589929SG4).

Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Inc. 1992-A

-- Class B2_4 (cusip 743948H4);
-- Class B3_1 (cusip 743948AR2);
-- Class B3_2 (cusip 743948AJ0);
-- Class B3_3 (cusip 743948AK7);
-- Class B3_4 (cusip 743948AL5).

To review ratings on the Re-REMIC transactions, Fitch first
determined each collateral pool's group level projected base-case
and rating stressed default and loss severity assumptions for the
underlying transactions.  Updated loan-level data was not
available for these underlying transactions, so Fitch based its
projected default and loss severity assumptions on vintage and
product averages, which were adjusted based on pool-specific
performance.

After determining each underlying pools' projected base-case and
stressed scenario loss assumptions, Fitch performs cash flow
analysis to ascertain the amount of collateral loss that the Re-
REMIC transaction takes in the 'AAA-B' rating stresses.  Fitch's
cash flow assumptions are described in the April 28, 2010 report,
'U.S. RMBS Surveillance Criteria'.  Fitch's Cash flow Criteria is
described in the report 'U.S RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria'
published on June 28, 2010.

Following a review of Re-REMIC cash flows, Fitch either affirmed
or downgraded the Re-REMIC classes based on each bond's credit
risk.  While Fitch uses long-term credit ratings to reflect the
bond's risk of a single dollar of default, Fitch also provides
Recovery Ratings to provide guidance on the amount and timing of
the projected recoveries of distressed bonds, as described in the
report 'U.S. RMBS Criteria for Recovery Ratings', published
Dec. 16, 2009.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

C-Bass 1999-3 Re-Remic transaction:

-- Class A (cusip 124860CB1) downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB';
    removed from Rating Watch Negative; Outlook Negative;

-- Class M1 (cusip 124860CC9) downgraded to 'B' from 'BB';
    removed from Rating Watch Negative; Outlook Negative;

-- Class M2 (cusip 124860CD7) downgraded to 'B' from 'BB';
    removed from Rating Watch Negative; Outlook Negative;

-- Class M3 (cusip 124860CE5) downgraded to 'B' from 'BB';
    removed from Rating Watch Negative; Outlook Negative;

-- Class M4 (cusip 124860CF2) affirmed at 'CCC/RR2'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative;

-- Class M5 (cusip 124860CG0) affirmed at 'CCC/RR2'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative;

-- Class B1 (cusip 124860CH8) affirmed at 'CCC/RR3'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative;

-- Class B2 (cusip 124860CJ4) downgraded to 'CC/RR4' from
    'CCC/RR3'; removed from Rating Watch Negative;

-- Class B3 (cusip 124860CK1) affirmed at 'D/RR4';

-- Class B4 (cusip 124860CL9) affirmed at 'D/RR6';

-- Class B5 (cusip 124860CM7) affirmed at 'D/RR6'.


CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Raises Rating on $16 Mil. Notes to Caa3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Castle Garden Funding:

* US$15,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf)
   Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

* US$1,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
   to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
   Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the
notes result primarily from an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio since the rating action on July 23,
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of sale proceeds and prepayments into substitute
assets with higher par amounts and higher ratings.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in July 2009.  Based on the November 2010
trustee report, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 121.69%, 114.11%,
108.90% and 106.67%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels of
116.53%, 109.28%, 104.28% and 102.15%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action.
The weighted average rating factor in the November report was 2689
compared to 2950 in June 2009, and securities rated Caa1 and below
make up approximately 4.2% of the underlying portfolio versus 8.9%
in June 2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaulted
securities.  In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased to about $15 million from approximately
$77 million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $833 million, defaulted par of $15 million, a
weighted average default probability of 30.28%, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.00%, and a diversity score of 70.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Castle Garden Funding, issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by senior secured loans.

The principal methodologies used in rating the notes of this
transaction were "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in August 2009 and "Using the Structured
Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes," published in February
2004.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including the following:

1) Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio

2) A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3138)

* Class A-1: +2
* Class A-2: +2
* Class A-3a: +2
* Class A-3b: +2
* Class A-4: +3
* Class B-1: +2
* Class B-2: +2
* Class C-1: +3
* Class C-2: +3
* Class D-1: +2
* Class D-2: +3
* Class J: +2
* Class L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4708)

* Class A-1: -2
* Class A-2: -2
* Class A-3a: -2
* Class A-3b: -2
* Class A-4: -1
* Class B-1: -2
* Class B-2: -2
* Class C-1: -3
* Class C-2: -3
* Class D-1: 0
* Class D-2: 0
* Class J: -2
* Class L: -2

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.00%)

* Class A-1: 0
* Class A-2: 0
* Class A-3a: +1
* Class A-3b: 0
* Class A-4: +1
* Class B-1: +1
* Class B-2: +1
* Class C-1: +2
* Class C-2: +1
* Class D-1: 0
* Class D-2: 0
* Class J: +1
* Class L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.00%)

* Class A-1: -1
* Class A-2: -1
* Class A-3a: 0
* Class A-3b: -1
* Class A-4: 0
* Class B-1: 0
* Class B-2: 0
* Class C-1: -1
* Class C-2: -1
* Class D-1: 0
* Class D-2: 0
* Class J: 0
* Class L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of the recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap
termination in the Dante case.


CITIGROUP HELOC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 1 tranche and
confirmed the ratings of 3 tranches from 1 RMBS transaction issued
by Citigroup.  The collateral backing this deal primarily consists
of home equity lines of credit.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the stable performance in this second
lien pool despite home price and unemployment conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on second lien pools.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  All Classes issued by
Citigroup HELOC Trust 2006-NCB1 are wrapped by Ambac Assurance
Corporation (Segregated Account -- Unrated).  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the collateral pool were to increase by 10%,
model implied results indicate that most of the deals' ratings
would remain stable, with the exception of the Class 2A-1, for
which model implied results would be one notch lower (for example,
Ba2 versus Ba1, or Ca versus Caa3).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup HELOC Trust 2006-NCB1

    * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): Group 1 - 13%,
      Group 2 - 15%

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on April 16,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)


CITY OF PONTIAC: Fitch Puts 'B' Rating on 4 Series of Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed these ratings of the city of Pontiac, MI
on Rating Watch Negative:

-- Approximately $8 million Pontiac General Building Authority
    limited tax general obligation bonds, series 2002, rated 'B';

-- Approximately $4 million Pontiac Tax Increment Authority
    (TIFA), development area no. 2 bonds, series 2002, and
    approximately $25 million development area no. 3 bonds, series
    2002, rated 'B';

-- Approximately $2.4 million water revenue bonds, series 1995
    and 2002, rated 'B';

-- Approximately $3.5 million sewer revenue bonds, series 2002,
    rated 'B'.

The ratings are placed on Negative Watch pending receipt of
requested information from the city.  Fitch expects to resolve the
Rating Watch in the near future upon receipt of requested
information.


CRAFT 2005: Moody's Upgrades $6.1 Million Linked Notes to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said these rating action on CRAFT 2005-
3, Ltd., a collateralized debt obligation transaction.

Issuer: CRAFT 2005-3, Ltd.

* US$6.1M $6,100,000 Series M-2 Mezzanine Credit Linked Notes due
   2012 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on April 20, 2009
   Downgraded to Caa3

The CSO, issued in 2006, references a portfolio of corporate
synthetic senior unsecured loans.

Moody's rating action today is the result of the shortened time to
maturity, the improvement of the credit quality of the CSO and the
level of credit enhancement remaining in the transaction.

Since the last rating review in April 2009, the 10-year weighted
average rating factor of the portfolio dropped from 1515,
equivalent to Ba3, to 1263, equivalent to Ba2. The portfolio
continues to improve with four percent of the portfolio rated Caa1
or below, compared to seven percent from the last review.


CRATOS CLO: S&P Raises Rating of Class E Notes to BB- From CCC-
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from Cratos CLO I Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with positive implications.  Cratos CLO I Ltd. is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by JMP
Credit Advisors LLC.  In addition, S&P affirmed the ratings on the
class A-1 and A-2 notes from the same transaction.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since February 2010.
At that time, S&P lowered the ratings on the class E notes
following a review of the transaction under S&P's updated criteria
for rating corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

At the time of S&P's last rating action, based on the Jan. 1, 2010
trustee report, the transaction held approximately $60.5 million
in defaulted obligations and $101.4 million in underlying
obligors with a rating in the 'CCC' range.  As a result of the
$60.5 million in defaulted obligations, Cratos CLO I Ltd. failed
its class E overcollateralization (O/C) test and used interest
proceeds to pay down the class A-1 and A-2 notes to bring the test
back into compliance. In addition, the class E notes failed to
withstand the specified combination of underlying asset defaults
at the 'CCC' rating level of the largest obligor default test.

Over the past year, a number of defaulted obligors held in the
deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some receiving proceeds that
were higher than their carrying value in the O/C ratio test
calculation. This, in combination with $3.5 million in pro rated
paydowns to the class A-1 and A-2 notes to date, benefited the
transaction's O/C ratios.  The class A/B O/C ratio increased to
137.1% from 132.8% as of Jan. 1, 2010.

As of Dec. 1, 2010, Cratos CLO I Ltd. held $0 in defaulted
obligations and $37.5 million in assets from underlying obligors
with ratings in the 'CCC' range.  Also, the transaction passed all
class O/C tests and the largest obligor default test was no longer
a constraining factor for the rating on the class E notes.

S&P will continue to review S&P's ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in S&P's view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary.

                   Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Cratos CLO I Ltd.
                             Rating
Class                   To           From
B                       AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C                       AA- (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D                       BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E                       BB- (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Cratos CLO I Ltd.
Class            Rating
A-1              AAA (sf)
A-2              AAA (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 23 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 35
tranches, and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche, from CSMC 2006-9
issued by Credit Suisse First Boston.  This transaction consists
of two collateral pools, designated as Pool 1 and Pool 2.  The
collateral in Pool 1 primarily consists of first-lien, fixed-rate
Alt-A residential mortgage loans for properties located in Puerto
Rico.  The collateral in Pool 2 primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed rate Alt-A residential mortgages for properties located in
various regions of the U.S.

The actions are primarily the result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The principal methodology used in rating Pool 2 (Groups 5, 6 and
7) securities was "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: February
2010" rating methodology published in February 2010.  Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.  In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of
structured finance credit, ratings and methodologies.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Today's rating action also reflect a correction to the analysis of
collateral contained in Pool 1.  This pool was previously rated
using the Alt-A methodology without any adjustments to reflect the
geographic characteristics of the constituent loans.  Pool 1
mortgage loans are secured by properties in Puerto Rico.  The
updated rating incorporates certain adjustments in the Alt-A
methodology assumptions to account for the macro economic factors
pertaining to Puerto Rico, as outlined below.

Pool 1 is backed by fixed-rate residential mortgage loans for
properties located in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's economy has been
in recession for the past four years and the unemployment rate in
the region has increased to 16.0%.  Due to the deteriorating
economic environment, delinquencies on the underlying pools have
significantly increased over the past year. For loans underlying
CSMC 2006-9 Pool 1, delinquencies greater than 60 days have risen
to 10.25% from 6.11% over the prior 12 months as of September
2010. Historically, a large percentage of delinquent borrowers in
Puerto Rico were able to cure out of the delinquencies.  However,
the prolonged recession has increased the risk of default.
Moody's also expects delinquencies to continue to rise as the
unemployment rate in Puerto Rico increases through 2011.

In addition to the increased frequency of defaults, Moody's
actions are also based on concerns relating to expectations of
severity of loss given default.  Historically, Puerto Rico has
enjoyed modest house price appreciation -- however, slowdown in
the mainland US and the severity of the recession in Puerto Rico,
has started to adversely impact house prices on the island, as a
result loss severities on the deals are expected to rise.  Also,
the average foreclosure timeline in Puerto Rico is 24 months which
can further exacerbate severities through increased foreclosure
costs.

The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections.
Updated loss estimates for the transactions were arrived at using
a two-stage process.  First, the increase in the serious
delinquencies in the past 12 month was obtained using historical
performance to date.  This trend of increase in delinquencies was
then converted to projected losses using lifetime roll rates of
70%, 80%, 90% and 100% for loans that were 60 day delinquent, 90
or more days delinquent, in foreclosure, and for properties held-
for-sale (REO) respectively.  The loss upon default was assumed to
be 40%. The second step was to determine defaults and losses for
the remaining life of the deal following the projection period.
To calculate future defaults, Moody's applied a burnout factor to
the default rate calculated over the past 12-month period.  The
burnout accounts for the likely improvement in performance
subsequent to 2010 as the economy recovers. Future losses were
obtained by applying severity assumptions to future defaults.

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-9

-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 4-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-14, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 6-A-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CSFB MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on 2 Classes of Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of four
tranches issued by CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-AR18.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR18

-- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains on Review for
    Possible Downgrade; previously on April 15, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains on Review for
    Possible Downgrade; previously on April 15, 2010 A3 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The collateral backing the transaction consists of fixed-rate
prime mortgages originated by DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.;
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. and Fifth Third
Mortgage Company.

The Class C-B-1 bonds have been paid approximately 50% of the
interest due each month since October 2010 and has unpaid interest
shortfall aggregating $5,955 as of December, 2010.  The Class C-B-
2 and Class C-B-3 bonds have $15,659 and $5,131 unpaid interest as
of December 2010 and both bonds have not received interest over
the last 3 months.  The Class C-B-4 has been written off due to
losses and the Class C-B-3 has lost $434,317 and will be written
down as loans in the pipeline are liquidated.  The Class C-B-1 and
Class C-B-2 bonds remains on review direction down as Moody's
completes its review of this transaction.  Additional
sensitivities of losses will be a function of future actual
and projected losses that correspond to benchmarks provided in
Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Ratings on 6 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40 RMBS
tranches issued by Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage
Loan Trust, Series 2006-PR1 (2006-PR1) and 11 tranches issued by
Prime Mortgage Trust 2006-DR1 (2006-DR1) due to continued
deterioration in recent performance of these deals.

The deals are backed by fixed-rate residential mortgage loans
originated in Puerto Rico.  Puerto Rico's economy has been in
recession for the past four years and the unemployment rate in the
region has increased to 16.0%.  Due to the deteriorating economic
environment, delinquencies on the underlying pools have
significantly increased over the past year.  For loans underlying
2006-PR1, delinquencies greater than 60 days have risen to 7.54%
from 5.81% over the prior 12 months as of September 2010.  For
loans underlying 2006-DR1 delinquencies greater than 60 days have
risen to 9.36% from 6.82% a year ago as of September 2010.
Historically, a large percentage of delinquent borrowers in Puerto
Rico were able to cure out of the delinquencies.  However, the
prolonged recession has increased the risk of default.  Moody's
also expects delinquencies to continue to rise as the unemployment
rate in Puerto Rico increases through 2011.

In addition to the increased frequency of defaults, Moody's
actions are also based on concerns relating to expectations of
severity of loss given default.  Historically, Puerto Rico has
enjoyed modest house price appreciation -- however, slowdown in
the mainland US and the severity of the recession in Puerto Rico,
has started to adversely impact house prices on the island, as a
result loss severities on the deals are expected to rise.  Also,
the average foreclosure timeline in Puerto Rico is 24 months which
can further exacerbate severities through increased foreclosure
costs.

The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections.
Updated loss estimates for the transactions were arrived at using
a two-stage process.  First, the increase in the serious
delinquencies in the past 12-month period were obtained using
historical performance to date.  This trend of increase in
delinquencies were then converted to projected losses using
lifetime roll rates of 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% for loans that were
60 day delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in foreclosure and
properties held-for-sale (REO) respectively.  The loss upon
default was assumed to be between 40% to 45%.  The second step was
to determine defaults and losses for the remaining life of the
deal following the projection period.  To calculate future
defaults, Moody's applied a burnout factor to the default rate
calculated over the past 12-month period.  The burnout accounts
for the likely improvement in performance subsequent to 2010 as
the economy recovers.  Future losses were obtained by applying
severity assumptions to future defaults.

Three bonds issued by the Deutsche 2006-PR1 deal are insured by
Financial Security Assurance Inc.  The current ratings on these
insured securities are consistent with Moody's practice of rating
insured securities at the higher of (1) the guarantor's insurance
financial strength rating and (2) the underlying rating, based on
Moody's modified approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors.

In addition, no tranches showed sensitivity in ratings when run
with 110% of expected losses with their respective groups, except
for Cl. 1-A-1 tranche in Deutsche 2006-PR1.  The model implied
rating for the Cl. 1-A-1 Tranche is one notch lower when run with
110% of expected loss for Group 1 in Deutsche 2006-PR1.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2006-PR1

-- Group1 current expected loss: 6.5% of original balance; Group2
    current expected loss: 3.7% of original balance; Group3
    current expected loss: 5% of original balance

-- Group4 current expected loss: 4.7% of original balance; Group5
    current expected loss: 6.2% of original balance

-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 2-A-F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 2-A-S, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 3-A-F-1, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
    Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
    Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

-- Cl. 3-A-F-2, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
    Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
    Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

-- Cl. 3-A-I, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 3-A-S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 3-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-A-F-1, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
    Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

-- Cl. 4-A-F-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-A-I-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-A-I-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-A-S-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-A-S-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 4-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-F-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-F-2, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
    Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

-- Cl. 5-A-F-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-F-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-I-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-I-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-I-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-I-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-S-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-S-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-S-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-A-S-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. 5-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. CW-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

-- Cl. B-1A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- Cl. B-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to B3 (sf)

-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: PRIME Mortgage Trust 2006-DR1

GroupI current expected loss: 4.4% of original balance

GroupII current expected loss: 7.2% of original balance

-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to B3 (sf)

-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)

-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 8, 2009
    Downgraded to Ca (sf)


DLSA MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Rating on Two Class Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches issued by DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2.  The
collateral backing these transactions primarily consists of first-
lien, adjustable-rate, negative amortization residential
mortgages.

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2

* Cl. 1A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
   Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

* Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* Cl. 2A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A-1B2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A-1B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2A-1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
   Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)

* Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of option arm pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions
that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on option arm pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in rating these securities was
"Option ARM RMBS Loss Projection Update: April 2010" published in
April 2010.

The rating of Cl. 1A-1A takes into account the super senior
support provided by the Cl. 1A-1B. Although the Prospectus
Supplement for this transaction clearly states that Cl. 1A-1B is a
support class to Cl. 1A-1A, the loss allocation waterfall language
in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement is ambiguous.  The PSA
states that losses are allocated to the Cl. 1A-1A and Cl. 1A-1B
but does not specify any order of priority.  Both the issuer and
the trustee of this transaction have confirmed that the loss
waterfall is correctly described in the Prospectus Supplement and
our ratings reflect that.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
option arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves. The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on
the underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The Cl. 1A-1B and Cl. 2A-1C tranches are insured by Ambac
Assurance Corporation (Segregated Account -- Unrated).  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  However, RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.


DUANE STREET: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11.76 Mil. Notes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Duane Street CLO II, Ltd.:

* US$18,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa1(sf); previously on
   November 23, 2010, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade;

* US$11,750,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
   Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23,
   2010, C(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the rating action in June 2009.  In Moody's view,
these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of sale
proceeds into substitute assets with higher par amounts and higher
ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated November 11,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2481compared
to 2657 in the May 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or
lower make up approximately 4.8% of the underlying portfolio
versus 11.3% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities
total about $2million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$36.8 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in June 2009.  The Senior and
Mezzanine overcollateralization ratios are reported at121.7% and
108.1% respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 113.8% and 101.3%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class E
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $397.4 million, defaulted par of $6.0 million,
weighted average default probability of 27.7% (implying a WARF of
3680), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.72%,
and a diversity score of 50.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Duane Street CLO II, Ltd., issued in July 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including the following:

1) Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2) A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2944)

* Class A-1: +3
* Class A-2: +3
* Class B: +3
* Class C: +2
* Class D: +3
* Class E: 0
* Class Z: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4416)

* Class A-1: -1
* Class A-2: -1
* Class B: -1
* Class C: -2
* Class D: -2
* Class E: 0
* Class Z: -2

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.72%)

* Class A-1: +1
* Class A-2: +1
* Class B: +1
* Class C: 0
* Class D: 0
* Class E: 0
* Class Z: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.72%)

* Class A-1: 0
* Class A-2: 0
* Class B: 0
* Class C: -1
* Class D: -1
* Class E: 0
* Class Z: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.


FOUR CORNERS: S&P Removes Class Notes Ratings From CreditWatch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, and C notes from Four Corners CLO II Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Four Corners Capital
Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings on
the class A, B, and C notes from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with positive implications on Nov. 8, 2010.  S&P also
affirmed its rating on the class D and E notes.  The upgrades
reflect the improved performance S&P have observed in the
transaction since S&P's last rating action in January 2010.

According to the Dec. 5, 2010 trustee report, the transaction held
$4 million in defaulted assets, down from $7.5 million noted in
the Dec. 5, 2009 trustee report.  In addition, assets from
obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were $3 million of the
collateral pool in December 2010, compared with $11 million in
December 2009.  The class A/B overcollateralization test improved
to 127.34% as of December 2010 from 121.24% as of December 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review the ratings assigned to
the notes to asses whether they remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Four Corners CLO II Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C           A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Four Corners CLO II Ltd.
Class                   Rating
D                       BB+ (sf)
E                       CCC- (sf)


FRONTIER LEASING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to Caa3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Class A notes issued in the
Frontier Funding Company V securitization transaction.  The
sponsor of the transaction is Frontier Leasing Corporation.  The
securitized pool consist of equipment leases backed primarily by
coin laundry, car wash, and restaurant equipment.

The complete rating action:

Issuer: Frontier Funding Company V, LLC

* Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 29, 2010
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

The rating action was prompted by an increasing trend in
delinquencies and defaults in the underlying collateral pool, as
well as by an insufficient level of credit enhancement protecting
Class A noteholders from the potential future losses.  As a result
of high collateral losses the 1% reserve account and a 8%
overcollateralization were depleted and the Class A notes are
supported only by the 18% subordination of the Class B notes.  As
of the November 30th, 2010 reporting date, cumulative losses were
13.5% of the original pool balance.  In addition, approximately
23% of the current pool balance was 60-plus days delinquent.
Moody's  expects future cash flows generated by the current pool
to remain relatively weak, as more loans become delinquent and
eventually default.  Moody's projected cumulative net loss for the
transaction is 15.5%.  If the cumulative losses were to increase
to 17.0% of the original pool balance the notes would be
downgraded further.

The primary source of uncertainty in the performance of this
transaction is the current macroeconomic environment and its
impact on commercial businesses like laundromats, car washes, and
restaurants, which are the major concentrations in this
transaction.

The principal methodology used in rating the transaction was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Securities Backed by Equipment Leases
and Loans," published in April, 2007.


GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2004-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction and a
review of the transaction's remaining collateral, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its ratings on six certificate classes due to
anticipated credit support erosion upon the eventual resolution of
two of the three specially serviced loans and expected ongoing or
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls.

The affirmed ratings on the 10 principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination and liquidity support levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the remaining two classes X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.53x and a loan-to-value ratio of 81.4%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 1.23x and an LTV ratio of 100.1%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
37.6% and 24.0%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude 16 fully defeased and one partial defeased loans
($123.0 million, 16.1%), and two of the three specially serviced
assets ($9.8 million, 1.3%).  S&P separately estimated losses for
these two specially serviced assets and included them in S&P's
'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Dec. 10, 2010, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $765.9 million, which is 60.1% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 103 loans, down from 133 loans at
issuance.  The master servicer, Bank of America N.A., provided
financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, all of which was partial-year 2009, full-year 2009, and
partial-year 2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.61x for the loans in
the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV ratio were 1.53x and 81.4%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures excluded 16 fully defeased and one
partial defeased loans ($123.0 million, 16.1%), and two of the
three specially serviced assets ($9.8 million, 1.3%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for these two specially serviced
assets and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.  The transaction has experienced $17.4 million
in principal losses to date.  Sixteen loans ($119.6 million,
15.6%) in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including two of the top 10 exposures, which S&P discuss below.
Thirteen loans ($95.7 million, 12.5%) have reported DSC below
1.10x, six of which ($34.1 million, 4.5%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Dec. 10, 2010, trustee remittance report, three assets
($37.5 million, 4.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment status of the
specially serviced assets, as reported in the December 2010
trustee remittance report, is: one is 30-plus days delinquent
($27.7 million, 3.6%), one is in foreclosure ($6.5 million, 0.9%),
and one is a matured balloon loan ($3.3 million, 0.4%).  One of
the three specially serviced assets ($6.5 million, 0.9%) has an
appraisal reduction amount in effect totaling $3.1 million.
Details on the three specially serviced assets are:

The Hanford Mall loan ($27.7 million, 3.6%), the fifth-largest
nondefeased loan in the pool, is secured by 323,270 sq. ft. of a
481,020-sq.-ft. regional mall in Hanford, Calif.  The 30-plus days
delinquent loan was transferred to the special servicer,
CWCapital, on Sept. 22, 2010, due to imminent maturity default.
The loan matured on Dec. 1, 2010, and the borrower was not able to
payoff the loan.  CWCapital stated that an updated appraisal has
been ordered and that it is currently working on a loan
modification with the borrower.  The master servicer reported a
1.34x DSC and 95.1% occupancy for the six months ending on June
30, 2010.

The Northern Corporate Center loan ($6.5 million, 0.9%) is secured
by a 69,680-sq.-ft. suburban office building in Phoenix, Ariz.
The loan, which is in foreclosure, was transferred to CWCapital on
May 21, 2010, due to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured
on Sept. 1, 2010, and the borrower was not able to payoff the
loan.  An ARA of $3.1 million, based on a July 2010 appraisal of
$2.9 million, is in effect against the loan.  CWCapital reported a
14.2% occupancy as of December 2010.  CWCapital indicated that it
is currently exploring various resolution strategies.  S&P expects
a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.  The
Abbey Road & Pallazo Apartments loan ($3.3 million, 0.4%) is
secured by two student housing multifamily properties totaling 12
units in Los Angeles, Calif.  The matured balloon loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 15, 2010, due to
maturity default.  The loan matured on Sept. 1, 2010, and the
borrower was not able to payoff the loan.  CWCapital indicated
that the borrower plans to sell the property, which was 100%
occupied as of June 2010, and payoff the loan.  S&P expects a
minimal loss, if any, upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

Two loans totaling $7.0 million (0.5%) were previously with the
special servicer and have been returned to the master servicer.
Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee that is 1% of future principal and
interest payments if the loans perform and remain with the master
servicer.  According to BofA, the workout fee will be collected on
these two loans.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $272.4 million (35.6%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.69x for the
top 10 real estate exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio
for the top 10 real estate exposures are 1.42x and 87.1%,
respectively.  Two of the top 10 exposures ($39.4 million, 5.1%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Details on these two
loans are:

The Greens at Shawnee loan ($21.6 million, 2.8%) is the sixth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool and the largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 420-unit
multifamily apartment complex in Shawnee, Kan.  The loan appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The master
servicer reported a 1.04x DSC and 89.8% occupancy for the six
months ending on June 30, 2010.  The Greens at Springfield loan
($17.8 million, 2.3%) is the eighth-largest nondefeased loan in
the pool and the second-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 456-unit multifamily
apartment complex in Springfield, Mo.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  BofA reported a 1.00x DSC
and 91.2% occupancy for the six months ending on June 30, 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
its current criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                          Ratings Lowered

                    GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

                     Rating
                     ------
     Class      To           From        Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --           ----        ----------------------
     J          BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)                      4.39
     K          BB- (sf)     BB (sf)                       3.14
     L          B (sf)       BB- (sf)                      2.31
     M          CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                       1.27
     N          CCC (sf)     B (sf)                        0.64
     O          CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)                       0.23

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

        Class    Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
        -----    ------              ----------------------
        A-2      AAA (sf)                             25.19
        A-3      AAA (sf)                             25.19
        A-1A     AAA (sf)                             25.19
        B        AA+ (sf)                             20.20
        C        AA (sf)                              18.12
        D        A+ (sf)                              14.16
        E        A- (sf)                              12.29
        F        BBB+ (sf)                             9.59
        G        BBB (sf)                              7.92
        H        BBB- (sf)                             5.64
        X-1      AAA (sf)                               N/A
        X-2      AAA (sf)                               N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two 2005-HEL1 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two tranches
issued by GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-HEL1.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of home equity lines of
credit.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the each of the collateral pools were to
increase by 10%, model implied results indicate that the deals'
ratings would remain stable.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-HEL1

    * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 39%

-- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
    Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


I-PREFERRED TERM: AM Best Cuts Rating on 2 CDO's to 'c'
-------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the ratings on five tranches of a
collateralized debt obligation(CDO) totaling $269.08 million and
has affirmed the ratings of two additional tranches totaling
$18.83 million issued by I-Preferred Term Securities IV, Ltd., and
I-Preferred Term Securities IV, Inc. (collectively, I-Preferred
Term Securities IV), a special purpose vehicle domiciled in Grand
Cayman, Cayman Islands.  The outlook for all ratings is stable.

The $287.91 million principal balance of the rated notes are
collateralized by a pool of trust preferred securities, surplus
notes and secondary market securities (collectively, the capital
securities), primarily issued by small to medium-sized U.S.
insurance entities and a few deposit-taking institutions.  The
capital securities are pledged as security to the notes.  Interest
paid by the issuers of the capital securities are the primary
source of funds to pay operating expenses of the issuers and
interest on the notes.  Repayment of the note principal is funded
primarily from the redemption of the capital securities.

In addition to the rating considerations outlined below, the
downgrades were primarily due to the fact that three of the bank
issuers of capital securities are not publicly rated by other
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and are no
longer shadow rated by A.M. Best.  As stated in A.M. Best's
published criteria for rating insurance-related CDOs, such unrated
issuers are assigned a rating of "bb+."

These rating actions primarily consider: (1) the current issuer
credit ratings (ICRs) of the issuers of the capital securities;
(2) in addition to the base default assumptions outlined in
A.M. Best's published criteria for rating insurance-related
CDOs, a stress of up to 250% on the assumed marginal default
rates of insurers (derived from Best's Idealized Default Rates
of Insurers) in order to exceed observed adjusted peak impairment
rates underlying the data used in A.M. Best's impairment studies;
(3) the amount of capital securities considered to be in distress,
such as securities issued by financially impaired companies
that are non-performing, companies that have chosen to defer
interest payments and operating entities with ICRs below "bbb-";
(4) recoveries of 0% after defaults on the capital securities;
and (5) qualitative factors such as the effect of adjusting
ICRs to reflect potential near-term and intermediate-term
movement of ratings as indicated by rating outlooks or modifiers;
subordination levels associated with each rated tranche; the
adjacency of very high investment grade ratings to very low non-
investment grade ratings in the transaction's capital structure;
the effect of interest rate spikes; the general economic trends
for insurers; the magnification of the effect of unanticipated
incremental defaults due to the diminution of the collateral pools
after redemptions; and the possibility that redemptions by highly
rated entities will leave lower rated companies in collateral
pools, thereby lowering the ratings of the tranches supported by
such pools.

The following debt ratings have been downgraded:

I-Preferred Term Securities IV

  -- to "a" from "a+" on $138.03 million floating rate Class A-1
     senior notes, due June 24, 2034

  -- to "bb+" from "a" on $37.00 million floating rate Class A-2
     senior notes, due June 24, 2034

  -- to "bb+" from "a" on $13.90 million fixed/floating rate Class
     A-3 senior notes, due June 24, 2034

  -- to "c" from "ccc" on $54.65 million floating rate Class B-1
     mezzanine notes, due June 24, 2034

  -- to "c" from "ccc" on $25.50 million fixed/floating rate Class
     B-2 mezzanine notes, due June 24, 2034

These debt ratings have been affirmed:

I-Preferred Term Securities IV

  -- "c" on $12.55 million fixed rate Class C mezzanine notes, due
     June 24, 2034

  -- "c" on $6.28 million fixed rate Class D subordinate notes,
     due June 24, 2034

All amounts are from the September 24, 2010 trustee report.


INTEGRAL FUNDING: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-2, A-3, and B notes from Integral Funding Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO).  At the same time, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on the class A-1, C, and D notes.  S&P
removed the ratings on class A-2 and A-3 from CreditWatch with
positive implications.

The upgrades primarily reflect the increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios following the continued
paydown of the class A-1 note.  The current balance of the class
A-1 note is $459 million-about 40% of its original balance-down
from $755 million in October 2009, the time of S&P's last rating
action.  As a result, the class A O/C ratio (per the trustee
report) increased to 126.02% in December 2010 from 117.19% in
October 2009; the class B and C O/C ratios also increased during
the same period to 114.95% and 109.34%, respectively, from 109.91%
and 105.98%.

The transaction also benefited from improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying collateral and a decline in the level of
defaults since the last rating action.  Based on the December 2010
trustee report, the transaction has approximately $35 million par
in defaults down from approximately $73.5 million par back in
October 2009.

Standard & Poor's also notes that the class C and D are current in
their interest and that their prior deferred interest balance has
been paid off in full.

These factors increased the credit support available to class A-2,
A-3, and B at its previous rating level, and S&P raised S&P's
rating on the classes as a result.  The affirmations indicate
adequate credit support for the class A-1, C, and D at their
current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

Integral Funding Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-2               AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3               AA- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
B                 BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Integral Funding Ltd.
Class             Rating
A-1               AAA (sf)
C                 B+ (sf)
D                 CCC- (sf)


JWS CBO: Fitch Junks Rating on $21.9 Million Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed two classes of notes and downgraded one
class of notes issued by JWS CBO 2000-1, LTD./Corp. (JWS CBO) and
assigned Recovery Ratings (RRs) as follows:

* $15,000,000 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf/RR1';
* $16,500,000 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf/RR1';
* $21,973,096 class D notes downgraded to 'Csf/RR4' from 'CCsf'.

The affirmations reflect the significant amortization that has
occurred to the class B notes, not rated by Fitch, since Fitch's
last review and the credit quality of the remaining performing
portfolio, while accounting for the increased concentration risk
in the portfolio.  In Fitch's opinion the class C-1 and C-2 notes
have a real possibility of default and as such remain at 'CCCsf'.
Fitch expects the class D notes to default at maturity, and the
notes have been downgraded to 'Csf' to reflect this risk.  The
recovery prospects for the class D notes will be determined by
realized recoveries on defaulted collateral as well as the future
performance of the performing portfolio.

The class B notes, which are senior in priority to the class C-1
and C-2 notes, have been paid down by $34.6 million since
September 2009 to $0.3 million outstanding.  As of the December
2010 trustee report, the principal balance of collateral was
$77.6 million compared to $118.8 million in September 2009.  The
balance of collateral Fitch currently considers performing is
$43.6 million.

The credit quality of the performing portfolio remains at 'B-
/CCC+' similar to September 2009. Additionally, Fitch considers
49% of the performing portfolio with credit quality of 'CCC+' or
lower.  Over 20% of the currently performing portfolio is
comprised of securities issued by companies that do not have a
rating, Fitch considered the obligations of these entities as
'CCC' credit risk in its analysis consistent with its rating
methodology for Corporate CDOs.

JWS CBO's current performing portfolio is comprised of over 86%
senior unsecured debt with remaining positions primarily in
subordinated debt.  The largest three obligors in the remaining
performing portfolio represent 38% of the collateral par balance.
The top three industry concentrations for the performing portfolio
are Automobiles, Lodging & restaurants, and Building and
materials.

In Fitch's view the current rating on the class C-1 and C-2 notes
remains indicative of the credit risk.  The class D notes are
undercollateralized when compared against performing collateral
balance, principal cash, and expected recoveries on defaulted
securities which in Fitch's opinion will lead to an ultimate loss
at maturity.

The class C-1 and C-2 notes have been assigned a Recovery Rating
of 'RR1' based on the total discounted future cash flows projected
to be available to these notes in a base-case default scenario.
These discounted cash flows of approximately $14.9 million and
$15.2 million, to the class C-1 and C-2 notes respectively,
yielded an ultimate recovery projection in a range between 91% and
100%, which is representative of an 'RR1' on Fitch's Recovery
Rating scale.  Additionally, the class D notes have been assigned
a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' based on the total discounted future
cash flows projected to be available to these notes in a base-case
default scenario.  These discounted cash flows of approximately
$9.8 million yielded an ultimate recovery projection in a range
between 31% and 50%, which is representative of an 'RR4' on
Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.

Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

JWS CBO is a collateralized bond obligation managed by Stonegate
Capital Management, L.L.C., that closed on July 18, 2000.  The
transaction is scheduled to mature in July 2012.


KINGSLAND I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Kingsland I, Ltd.:

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Delayed Drawdown
     Notes due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $98,575,877),
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$190,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $187,294,167),
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on September 25,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed
     Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$17,250,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$8,750,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$13,750,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2019 (current rated
     balance of $4,995,919), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2019 (current rated
     balance of $3,687,584), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the rating action in September 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated December 3, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2355 compared to 2618
in the September 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 7.7% of the underlying portfolio versus
11.1% in September 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $4.1 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$13.1 million in September 2009.  Finally, the weighted average
recovery rate of the portfolio has improved to 47.6% from 45.7% in
September 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in September 2009.  The Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 127.41%, 116.75%, 108.05% and 105.93%, respectively,
versus September 2009 levels of 123.40%, 113.08%, 104.65% and
102.56%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class D
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $371 million, defaulted par of $9.3 million, weighted
average default probability of 25.97% (implying a WARF of 3376), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.63%, and a
diversity score of 48.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Kingsland I, Ltd., issued in July 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2701)

  -- Class A1a: +2
  -- Class A1b: +2
  -- Class A2: +3
  -- Class B1: +2
  -- Class B2: +2
  -- Class C1: +2
  -- Class C2: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Type I: +2
  -- Type II: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4051)

  -- Class A1a: -1
  -- Class A1b: -1
  -- Class A2: -1
  -- Class B1: -2
  -- Class B2: -2
  -- Class C1: -3
  -- Class C2: -3
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Type I: -2
  -- Type II: -2

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (43.63%)

  -- Class A1a: +1
  -- Class A1b: +1
  -- Class A2: +1
  -- Class B1: 0
  -- Class B2: 0
  -- Class C1: +1
  -- Class C2: +1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Type I: 0
  -- Type II: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (39.63%)

  -- Class A1a: 0
  -- Class A1b: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class B1: 0
  -- Class B2: 0
  -- Class C1: -1
  -- Class C2: -1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Type I: -1
  -- Type II: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  Additionally, however, in light of the large
   positive difference between the reported and covenant levels
   for weighted average spread, Moody's believes that the
   manager's ability to deteriorate these collateral quality
   metrics is more limited.  As a result, Moody's base case
   analysis incorporates the impact of assuming the midpoint of
   reported and covenanted values for the weighted average spread.


LEO CONSUMO: DBRS Puts 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) has assigned a BBB (sf) rating to the
EUR326,100,000 Class A Notes and a BB (sf) rating to the
EUR19,100,000 Class B Notes (together the "Senior Notes") issued
by LEO CONSUMO 1 S.R.L.  The assets supporting the Senior Notes
consist of Italian consumer loans, mortgage loans and financial
leases.

The final ratings are based upon review by DBRS of these
analytical considerations:

  -- Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
     available credit enhancement.

  -- Relevant credit enhancement is in the form of
     overcollateralization.  Credit enhancement levels are
     sufficient to support DBRS's projected expected Cumulative
     Net Loss (CNL) assumption under various stress scenarios at a
     BBB (sf) and BB (sf) standard, for the Class A Notes and
     Class B notes, respectively.

  -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
     flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
     in which they have invested.

  -- The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
     originations, underwriting, servicing, and financial
     strength.

  -- The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
     Servicer and Sub-servicer to perform collection activities on
     the collateral.

DBRS derives expected and stressed loss forecasts based upon
historical data.  For consumer loan transactions, the primary
variables stressed include frequency and severity upon default.

In addition to reviewing results encompassing sensitivities on
loss levels, DBRS also reviews three different modeling scenarios
whereby losses are distributed more heavily in the beginning,
middle, or end of the transaction's life than is suggested by the
historical data (front-loaded, belly, back-loaded).


LIME STREET: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Lime Street CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$12,600,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the last rating action in June
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of principal proceeds into substitute assets with
higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated December 9, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2725 compared to 2832
in the May 2009 report.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $3.7 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$21.9 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
121.22%, 113.42%, 108.65% and 104.95%, respectively, versus May
2009 levels of 115.89%, 108.43%, 103.87% and 100.33%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $386 million, defaulted par of
$7.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 28.22%
(implying a WARF of 3673), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 42.72%, and a diversity score of 50.  These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Lime Street CLO, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2938)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4408)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: -1

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.72%)

  -- Class A: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.72%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  Additionally, in light of the large positive
   difference between the reported and covenant levels for the
   weighted average spread, Moody's considered the impact of
   assuming the midpoint of the Moody's calculated weighted
   average spread and the covenant in its analysis.


LUTHERAN SOCIAL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on $17 Million Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'BB+' rating on these bonds:

* $17,000,000 Illinois Finance Authority revenue bonds (Lutheran
    Social Services of Illinois), series 2006.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Rating Rationale:

*  Lutheran Social Services of Illinois Obligated Group (LSSI)
    had a strong year in fiscal 2010 (year end June 30) supported
    by improved investment income and donations and continued
    expense management, which turned a $2.1 million loss in fiscal
    2009 to a $2.4 million gain in fiscal 2010.

*  The strong year supported solid debt service coverage of 4.5
    times (x).

*  Liquidity indicators as of Sept. 30, 2010, including the cash
    and unrestricted investments of a non-obligated foundation,
    were mixed with good cash to debt and cushion ratio offset by
    days cash on hand (DCOH) of only 69 days.

*  Cash and unrestricted investments of just the obligated group
    remained extremely thin at $5.3 million (adjusted for a
    $2.5 million line of credit) which equated to 21 DCOH as of
    Sept. 30, 2010.

*  As the second largest social service organization in Illinois,
    LSSI maintains a leading role statewide as a provider of
    essential services, with most programs operating at capacity.

*  Credit concerns remain LSSI's reliance on government funding
    (over 70%), its ability to receive timely payment from
    Illinois on state contracts, and the volatility in its
    operating performance due to investment income and donations
    used to support operations.

Key Rating Drivers:

*  After receivables climbed as high as 30% above historical
    levels due to delayed state payments, LSSI received full
    payment in late November 2010 on funds owed from the state,
    enabling it to pay off its lines of credit.  Given the fiscal
    stress in Illinois, LSSI's ability to continue to receive
    timely payment from the state and the financial strain that
    delayed payments cause are key rating drivers.

*  LSSI continues to manage expenses with donations and
    investment income remaining stable.

Security:

The bonds are secured only by the unrestricted receivables of the
obligated group, with no mortgage pledge.

Credit Summary:

The affirmation of the 'BB+' rating reflects LSSI's solid fiscal
year in 2010, which supported good debt service coverage, adequate
liquidity for the rating level, and continued role as a large
provider of essential services in the state of Illinois.  Credit
concerns remain LSSI's reliance on government funding and the
financial stress at the state level which has led to payment
delays on contracts.

At Sept. 30, 2010, LSSI and Cornerstone had combined cash and
investments of $17.7 million, which equates to 69 days cash on
hand, 104% cash to debt, and a 12.9 times (x) cushion ratio, which
is consistent year-over year, but remains lower than liquidity in
2005 and 2006.  The Cornerstone Foundation is a non-obligated
affiliate that does not directly pledge its cash and investments
to bondholders, but does exist solely to support LSSI's mission
and is viewed as an additional source of liquidity.  As Illinois
has delayed payments on state contracts, advances from Cornerstone
have helped LSSI sustain operations, which Fitch views positively.
Unrestricted cash and investments at just the obligated group
remain thin at $5.3 million; however, management reports that they
have paid down the line of credit as of Dec. 30, 2010.

After three consecutive years of negative excess margins, LSSI
had a positive 2.5% excess margin in fiscal 2010, turning a
$2.1 million loss in fiscal 2009 to a $2.4 million gain in fiscal
2010.  While this figure was helped by improved donations and
investment income, it also reflects LSSI's management's strong
expense control measures, as expenses were flat year-over-year
at approximately $94.6 million per year and lower than the
$97.4 million in expenses in fiscal 2008.  Management continued
to cut expenses in fiscal 2010, eliminating a senior institutional
advancement position.

Operating pressure continues to come from the fiscal and political
turmoil in the state of Illinois. In fiscal 2010, out of the
$72 million in government funding that LSSI received $62 million
came from the state.  In November 2010, the state paid LSSI all it
owed on contracts to date, and management reported that timely
payment had continued through the end of 2010, which has brought
LSSI's receivables down and helped it pay off the line of credit.
However, there is no indication that timely payments will continue
and it remains a key credit concern.  In June 2010, Fitch
downgraded the rating on the State of Illinois's GO bonds to 'A'
from 'A+'.  In the press release Fitch noted the state's fiscal
problems and the passage of a fiscal 2011 budget that did not
address the annual operating deficit or accumulated liabilities.
The full press release, Fitch Downgrades Illinois' GO Bonds to 'A'
from 'A+', dated June 11, 2010, is available at
'www.fitchratings.com'.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's belief that management will be
able to control expenses and manage through any future payment
delays from the state, coupled with stability in donations and
investment returns.  The Outlook also takes into account the solid
demand for and essentiality of the services LSSI provides.  While
these services may face budget cuts, it is unlikely that they will
be completely eliminated.  These factors combined with
Cornerstone's historical support of LSSI provide stability at the
current rating level.

LSSI, headquartered in Des Plaines, IL, is a large, not-for-profit
residential and social services provider.  Total revenues of the
obligated group in fiscal 2010 were approximately $97 million.  In
addition, LSSI has 16 non-obligated affiliates.  LSSI covenants to
provide audited financial statements within 180 days of each
fiscal year-end and quarterly disclosure of the first three fiscal
quarters within 90 days.


MBIA Insurance: S&P Lowers Ratings on 11 Housing Bonds to B
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the
following 11 housing bonds to 'B' from 'BB+', following S&P's
Dec. 22, 2010, downgrade of the rating on MBIA Insurance Corp.
to 'B' from 'BB+' on Dec. 22, 2010:

   * Alameda Housing Authority, Calif.'s multifamily housing
     revenue refunding bonds (Ginnie Mae collateralized -
     Independence Plaza Apartments) series 1998A

   * Denver City and County, Colo.'s Fannie Mae collateralized
     multifamily housing revenue bonds (Capitol Heights
     Apartments) series 1999

   * Denver City and County's multifamily housing revenue bonds
     (FHA-insured mortgage loan - Boston Lofts Project) series
     1997A and 1997B

   * National City Community Development Commission, Calif.'s
     multifamily housing revenue bonds (Ginnie Mae collateralized
     - Park Villas Apartments) series 1997A and 1997A-T

   * Nevada Housing Division's multi-unit housing revenue bonds
     (Austin Crest Project) series 1997

   * Nevada Housing Division's multi-unit housing revenue bonds
     (Diamond Creek Apartments Project) series 1999A

   * Oswego County Industrial Development Agency, N.Y.'s civic
     facility revenue bonds (Seneca Hill Manor Project) series
     1997

   * San Jose, Calif.'s multifamily housing revenue bonds (FHA-
     insured mortgage loan - Sixth & Martha Family Apartments -
     Phase II) series 2001C

   * San Jose, Calif.'s multifamily housing revenue bonds (Vill
     Pkwy Sr Apts) series 2001D

   * University City Industrial Development Authority, Mo.'s
     (Cantebury Gardens Project) bonds series 1995A

   * Utah Housing Corp.'s multifamily housing mortgage revenue
     bonds (The Ridge At Jordan Landing Apartments Project) series
     1999A and 1999B

All of the issues receive partial support in the form of
guaranteed investment contracts or investment agreements from MBIA
Insurance Corp.  If the issuer act to terminate, replace, or
guarantee the existing agreements, and to provide cash flows that
demonstrate the ability to make bond payment obligations without
relying on the interest earnings from the investment agreements,
Standard & Poor's will take appropriate rating action.


MERIDIAN FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Rating on 3 Series of Term Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on three
series of medium-term notes (MTNs) issued by Meridian Funding Co.
LLC (Meridian).

The rating action follows the Dec. 22, 2010, lowering of the
rating on MBIA Insurance Corp. (MBIA) to 'B' from 'BB+'.  MBIA
guarantees the full and timely payment of principal and interest
of each of the MTNs according to the terms of each series.
Pursuant to S&P's criteria for ratings on bond-insured securities,
S&P will generally suspend or withdraw ratings on issues enhanced
by a surety bond when the rating on the surety provider is below
'B+' and there is no Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR).

S&P withdrew S&P's ratings on all three series of MTNs because
MBIA is currently rated lower than 'B+' and two of the series,
while having SPURs, are cross-collateralized with the third series
that does not have a SPUR.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Lifts Rating on $5 Million Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said these rating action on Morgan
Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 and Morgan Stanley
EUR3,421,000 Floating Rate Notes due December 20, 2012, Series
1667, collateralized debt obligation transactions.

The CSOs, issued in 2007, reference a portfolio of 84 senior
syndicated synthetic corporate loans.

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref. no:
n94cx)

* US$100,000,000 Class A-II Floating Rate Notes due
   December 20, 2012, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
   September 14, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref. no:
n94da)

* US$10,000,000 Class A-I Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
   2012 (Ref No: n94da), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
   September 14, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref. no:
n94du)

* US$5,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
   2012, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 14, 2010
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref. no:
n9r0u)

* US$5,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
   2012, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on September 14, 2010
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley EUR3,421,000 Floating Rate Notes due
December 20, 2012, Series 1667

* Morgan Stanley EUR 3,421,000 Floating Rate Notes due
   December 20, 2012, Series 1667, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
   previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's rating action taken today is the result of the shortened
time to maturity of the CSOs, an improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio, and a substantial level of credit
enhancement remaining for all tranches.  The CSOs have a remaining
life of a little less than 2 years.  The 10-year weighted average
rating factor of the portfolio is 2691, equivalent to B2.  For
Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22, this compares to a
10-year WARF of 2991 from the last rating review in September
2010.  For Morgan Stanley EUR3,421,000 Floating Rate Notes due
December 20, 2012, Series 1667, this compares to a 10-year WARF of
3781 from the last rating review in March 2009.  There have been
three credit events in the portfolio since inception, resulting in
1.03 percent of losses based on the portfolio value at closing.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades $5 Mil. Floating Notes to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said these rating action on Morgan
Stanley ACES SPC Series 2007-35, a collateralized debt obligation
transaction.

* US$5,000,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2012,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded to
   Caa2 (sf)

The CSO, issued in 2007, references a portfolio of corporate
synthetic senior secured loans.

Moody's rating action is the result of the shortened time to
maturity of the CSO, the level of credit enhancement remaining in
the transaction, and the improvement of the credit quality of the
portfolio.  The CSO has a remaining life of 1.7 years.  Since the
last rating action in March 2009, the 10-year weighted average
rating factor of the portfolio, counting only the exposures that
are performing as of today, improved from 2918 to 2625.  Remaining
credit enhancement is approximately 6.5 percent.  There have been
12 credit events since the last rating action.  Moody's took into
account a recent amendment to the transaction documents that gives
the noteholder the option to rebalance the portfolio following the
removal of a reference entity, increasing the notional amount of
each remaining exposure proportionally to maintain a constant
portfolio size.  Moody's rating action incorporates the additional
volatility introduced by this option.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are given in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where
higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-
versa:

* Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
   of the CSO by 6 months, keeping all other things equal.  The
   result of this run is two notches higher than the base case.

* Market Implied Ratings are modeled in place of the
   corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default probability
   of the reference entities in the portfolio.  The gap between an
   MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an indicator
   of the extent of the divergence in credit view between Moody's
   and the market.  The result of this run is not materially
   different from the base case.

* Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting all
   entities rated Caa1 and below.  The result of this run is five
   notches lower than the base case.

* Moody's conducts a sensitivity analysis consisting of notching
   down by one the ratings of reference entities in the Media:
   Broadcasting & Subscription sector.  The result of this run is
   one notch lower than the base case.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.6.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model.  For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.


MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises BB+ Rating on $117MM Certs. to BBB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on TIERS
Corporate Bond-Backed Certs Trust MOT 1998-5's $117.866 million
class Amort and ZTF certificates to 'BBB (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and
removed them from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Sept. 10, 2010.

S&P's ratings on the certificates are dependent on S&P's rating on
the underlying security, Motorola Solutions Inc.'s 5.22%
debentures due Oct. 1, 2097 ('BBB').

The rating actions follow S&P's Jan. 4, 2011, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BBB' from 'BB+' and its
removal from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P may take
subsequent rating actions on the class Amort and ZTF certificates
due to changes in our ratings assigned to the
underlying security.


MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-1 Certs. From BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Corporate
Backed Trust Certificates Motorola Debenture-Backed Series 2002-14
Trust's $25.5 million class A-1 certificates to 'BBB' from 'BB+'
and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed with
positive implications on Sept. 10, 2010.

S&P's rating on the class A-1 certificates is dependent on S&P's
rating on the underlying security, Motorola Solutions Inc.'s 6.5%
debentures due Nov. 15, 2028 ('BBB').

The rating action follows S&P's Jan. 4, 2011, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BBB' from 'BB+' and its
removal from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P may take
subsequent rating actions on the class A-1 certificates due to
changes in S&P's ratings assigned to the underlying security.


MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS: S&P Raises Rating on $44MM Certs. to BBB
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Corporate
Backed Trust Certificates Motorola Debenture-Backed Series 2002-
12's $44.4 million certificates to 'BBB' from 'BB+'.  At the same
time, the rating was removed from CreditWatch, where it was
placed with positive implications on Sept. 10, 2010.

S&P's rating on the certificates is dependent on S&P's rating on
the underlying security, Motorola Solutions Inc.'s 5.22%
debentures due Oct. 1, 2097 ('BBB').

The rating action follows S&P's Jan. 4, 2011, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BBB' from 'BB+' and its
removal from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P may take
subsequent rating actions on the certificates due to changes in
S&P's ratings assigned to the underlying security.


NOMURA CORPORATE: S&P Raises Rating of Clydesdale CLO Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, A-3, B, C, and D notes from Clydesdale CLO 2007 Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, managed by
Nomura Corporate Research and Asset Management.  S&P removed the
ratings of class A-2, A-3 and B notes from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed S&P's
rating on the class A-1 note.

According to the December 2010 monthly trustee report, the
transaction has $3.2 million in defaulted securities, down from
$23.4 million at the time of S&P's last rating action in October
2009.  The transaction was also failing its supplemental diversion
test in October 2009, which diverted any excess interest proceeds
to be reinvested (after paying class D deferred interest) until
the transaction passed the test.  These factors contributed to the
increased overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, which in turn
improved the credit cushion to the rated tranches.

The trustee calculated the class A, B, C, and D O/C ratios to be
119.53%, 112.21%, 108.26%, and 104.58%, respectively, as of
December 2010.  The corresponding O/C ratios were 116.50%,
109.55%, 105.69%, and 102.10% in October 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from the improved credit
quality of the underlying collateral since S&P's last rating
action. The transaction is currently passing all coverage tests,
including the supplemental diversion test.  As a result, excess
interest proceeds after the payment of class D interest is flowing
to the equity tranche.  The transaction is still in its
reinvestment period, which ends in October 2014.

As a result of improved credit support, S&P raised its ratings on
the class A-2, A-3, B, C, and D notes.  S&P affirmed its rating on
the class A-1 note to reflect adequate credit support at its
current rating.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

Clydesdale CLO 2007 Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-2               AA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3               A+ (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos
B                 BBB (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)
D                 B+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

Rating affirmed:

Clydesdale CLO 2007 Ltd.
Class             Rating
A-1               AA+ (sf)


OPTEUM ALT-A: Moody's Junks Rating on Six Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 16
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 2 Opteum Alt-A
deals issued in 2005.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Alt-A RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on
the underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: February 2010" is
adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination.  This baseline rate is higher than the average
rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small
pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the
overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.
Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  If
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2005-4

-- Cl. I-APT, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A1B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A1C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A1D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. II-A1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2005-5

-- Cl. I-APT, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A1C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A1D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. II-A1B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. II-A1C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. II-A1D1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
    2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

-- Cl. II-A1D2, Current rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
    Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.

-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
    Jan. 21, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

-- Cl. II-AN, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
    B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RACE POINT: Moody's Raises Rating of $31.2 Mil. Notes to Caa1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Race Point III CLO:

  * US$42 million Class C Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously
    on July 30, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  * US$31.2 million Class D Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
    previously on November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
    for Possible Upgrade;

  * US$10.8 million Class E Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
    previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
    for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the downgrade of the notes in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated December 16,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2815
compared to 3167 in the July 2009 report, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 9.5% of the underlying
portfolio versus 19.3% in July 2009.  Additionally, defaulted
securities total about $7.14 million of the underlying portfolio
compared to $49.26 million in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since July 2009.  The Class A/B, Class C/D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 129.20%, 111.99% and
109.83%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of 122.60%, 106.50%
and 104.48%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $608.2 million, defaulted par of $10.1 million,
weighted average default probability of 27.57%, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 45.93%, and a diversity score of 75.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Race Point III CLO, issued in April 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
denominated in U.S. Dollars, Euros, and Pounds Sterling.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009 and "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the double binomial approach
within the Binomial Expansion Technique framework, as described in
Sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.3.7 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology
published in August 2009.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  As credit estimates do
not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and outlooks,
a stress of a quarter notch-equivalent assumed downgrade was
applied to each of these estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including the following:

1) Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2) A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (3028)

* Class A: +3
* Class B: +3
* Class C: +3
* Class D: +3
* Class E: +5

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4542)

* Class A: -3
* Class B: -2
* Class C: -1
* Class D: -4
* Class E: 0

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR +2% for USD assets / +5% for EUR/GBP assets
(43.67% / 65.41%)

* Class A: 0
* Class B: 0
* Class C: +1
* Class D: +1
* Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR -2% for USD assets / -5% for EUR/GBP assets
(39.67% / 55.41%)

* Class A: -1
* Class B: -1
* Class C: -1
* Class D: -2
* Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
    defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
    be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
    overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
    recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
    selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
    Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
    the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
    potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
    weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
    be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
    issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and
    participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for
    a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in
    its analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
    reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
    collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
    covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
    lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
    rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted average
    coupon, and diversity score.

4) The deal has significant exposure to non-USD denominated
    assets.  Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a
    direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to
    the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
    tranches.


SACO RESIDENTIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Certificate
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one SACO residential mortgage backed
security resecuritization trust as a result of actions taken on
the underlying classes.  The affected trust represents a
beneficial ownership interest in a separate trust fund, which
includes bonds that have either been affirmed or downgraded.

The Underlying Deals consist of:

Ocwen Residential MBS Corp 1998-R2

-- Class B2-A (CUSIP 675748AV9);
-- Class B3-A (CUSIP 675748AX5).

Ocwen Residential MBS Corp 1999-R1

-- Class B1-A (CUSIP 675748BS5);
-- Class B2-A (CUSIP 675748BU0);
-- Class B3-A (CUSIP 675748BW6);
-- Class B4-A (CUSIP 675748BY2).

Structured Asset Mortgage Investments, Inc. 1998-6

-- Class B-4 (CUSIP 86358HAR0);
-- Class B-5 (CUSIP 86358HAS8);
-- Class B-6 (CUSIP 86358HAT6).

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Series 1995-A

-- Class B-1 (CUSIP 79548A9N2).

Fitch affirmed the Re-REMIC classes based on the amount of credit
support provided by an unrated class E, and based on the
sequential pay structure of the Re-REMIC.  Class C has 99% credit
enhancement provided by classes D and E.  Class D has 57%
enhancement provided by class E.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SACO 1999-4 Re-Remic transaction:

-- Class C affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Negative;
-- Class D affirmed at 'B', Outlook Negative.


SAN GABRIEL: S&P Raises Ratings on All Classes of CLO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all
classes from San Gabriel CLO I Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Churchill Pacific
Asset Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings
on class A-1L, A-1LV, and A-2L from CreditWatch positive.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since our last rating action in
December 2009.

According to the Dec. 1, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
currently holds $19.9 million in 'CCC' rated assets, down from
$24.3 million noted in the Oct. 30, 2009 trustee report.  In
addition, the transaction holds $10.9 million in defaulted
securities, down from $32.5 million.  The transaction is in
its reinvestment period and each of the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have improved slightly
since our last rating action.  The class A O/C ratio is 112.12%
versus 111.71% in October 2009, the class B-1L O/C ratio is
107.66% versus 107.26%, and the class B-2L O/C ratio is 103.14%
versus 102.43%.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as we deem necessary.

                  Rating and Creditwatch Actions

San Gabriel CLO I Ltd.
              Rating
Class       To          From
A-1L        AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LV       AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L        A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L        BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
B-1L        BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)
B-2L        CCC+ (sf)   CCC- (sf)


SAN JOAQUIN: Moody's Changes Ba2 Rating Outlook to Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's affirmed the Ba2 rating and revised the outlook to
stable from negative for the revenue bonds of the San Joaquin
Hills Transportation Corridor Agency.  The rating applies to
$2.1 billion of outstanding Series 1993 and Series 1997 revenue
bonds issued by the agency to finance the construction of a 15-
mile limited access toll road in Orange County.

The Ba2 rating is based on the sound economic profile of the
service area and Moody's expectation of continued traffic and toll
revenue growth; the availability of reserves and additional
liquidity support provided by payments from its sister agency, the
Foothill/Eastern TCA, pursuant to a November 2005 mitigation and
loan agreement.  On June 30, 2009 the agency received its last
$30 million installment of a total of $120 million in mitigation
payments.  The agreement provides an additional $1.04 billion in
loans from F/ETC if needed to meet SJHTCA's rate covenant.  The
Ba2 rating is dependent on the operating support from F/ETCA,
accordingly SJHTCA's rating is closely tied to the credit quality
of F/ETCA.


STRUCTURED ASSETS: Moody's Junks Rating on Three Class Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 3 tranches from Structured Asset
Securities Corp Trust 2006-3H.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Alt-A RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination.  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75. For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-3H

* Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


TIERS WOLCOTT: S&P Lowers CDO Floating Rate Certs Rating to D
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Tiers
Wolcott Synthetic CDO Floating Rate Credit-Linked Trust Series
2007-31 Certificate To 'D' (sf) from 'CCC-' (sf).

The rating action follows a number of recent write-downs of
underlying reference entities, which have caused the notes to
incur partial principal losses.


TRIAXX PRIME: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $1.5 Bil. Notes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four classes of
notes issued by Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2, Ltd.  The classes of
notes affected by the rating action are:

* US$1,500,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
   Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039 (current balance of
   $810,806,356.13), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 13,
   2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

* US$1,499,950,000 Class A-1B1 First Priority Senior Secured
   Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039 (current balance of
   $121,608,658.52), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 13,
   2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

* US$1,499,950,000 Class A-1B2 First Priority Senior Secured
   Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
   previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

* US$100,000 Class A-1BV First Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due October 2039 (current balance of $54,053.78),
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 13, 2010 Downgraded
   to Ca (sf)

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from recent substantial amortization of the Class A-1
Notes.  The senior notes of this deal benefited from the increased
prepayment speed of the underlying RMBS since early 2009.  Despite
deteriorating credit quality which has been observed through a
significant increase in WARF since the closing date, approximately
92% of the Class A-1B1 and 46% of the Class A-1A/A-1BV notes have
been paid off as a result of higher than expected prepayment
speed.

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of Jumbo and Alt-A RMBS which were
originally rated Aaa.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses in addition to
the standard notching assumption applied to assets under review
for possible downgrade.  Moody's considered negative sensitivity
runs including downgrading all non-Ca assets by 2 notches. The
model results for the notes worsened within one notch compared to
the standard assumption but were nevertheless still better than
the current rating.

In order to adjust for the faster prepayment speed of the
underlying RMBS, Moody's also performed several scenario tests,
including the application of different recovery rates and weighted
average lives for each asset.  The model results for all notes in
each case are better than the current public ratings.

The principal methodology used in these rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in August 2009.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool for
each credit in the reference.  Specifically, correlated defaults
are simulated using a normal copula model that applies the asset
correlation framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are
generated by applying within the simulation the distributional
assumptions, including the correlation between recovery values.
Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk.  The
Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted average of losses
to each tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight is the
likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as
the shortfall in the present value of cash flows to the tranche
relative to the present value of the promised cash flows.  The
present values are calculated using the promised tranche coupon
rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate tranches, the
discount rate is based on the promised spread over Libor and the
assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


TROPIC CDO: Moody's Cuts Rating on $37.5 Million Notes to C
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by TROPIC CDO IV LTD.

* US$160,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
   (current balance of $140,968,376), Downgraded to B3 (sf);
   previously on November 2, 2009 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade;

* US $40,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2035
   (current balance of $40,000,000), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
   previously on November 2, 2009 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade;

* US $37,500,000 Class A-3L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   April 2035 (current balance of $38,364,928), Downgraded to C
   (sf); previously on November 2, 2009 Ca (sf) Placed Under
   Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken today are primarily
the result of an increase in the assumed defaulted amount in the
underlying portfolio.  The assumed defaulted amount increased by
$43 million since the last rating action in October 2009.
Cumulative assumed defaults now total $156 million.  All the
assumed defaulted assets are carried at zero recovery in our
analysis.  The remaining assets in the portfolio have also shown a
slight deterioration, as indicated by a WARF increase to 2148,
from 1798 as of the last rating action date.  Currently, 59% of
the portfolio is estimated to be Ba1 or below, as determined both
by using FDIC Q3-2010 financial data in conjunction with Moody's
RiskCalc model to assess non-publicly rated bank trust preferred
securities.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches
affected and an increase of their expected losses since the last
rating action.  As of the latest trustee report dated October 14,
2010, the Senior Overcollateralization Ratio is 98.63% (limit
140.00%), the Class A-3 Overcollateralization Ratio is 81.70%
(limit 112.00%) and the Class B Overcollateralization Ratio is
59.61% (limit 103.00%),versus trustee reported levels from the
report dated October 7, 2009 of 123.79%, 103.80 and 76.95%
respectively, which were used during the last rating action.

TROPIC CDO IV LTD., issued on November 18, 2004, is a collateral
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.  On October 20, 2009, the last rating action date,
Moody's downgraded five classes of notes, which were the result of
the application of revised and updated key modeling assumptions,
as well as the deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction's underlying portfolio.  On November 2, 2009, Moody's
placed the Class A-1L, A-2L and A-3L Notes under review for
possible downgrade due to the acceptance of the offer by a third
party to buy certain securities from the transaction portfolio, as
per the Trustee notice dated as of October 30, 2009.  On November
2, 2009, the Trustee filed an Interpleader Complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
requesting a judicial determination regarding how to proceed
with the Third Party's offer.

Moody's rating action also takes into account recent developments
with regards to the Interpleader Action. Moody's received a notice
from the trustee, dated as of December 23, 2010, stating the
Trustee has received a copy of the letter to the Court from the
Third Party's counsel.  According to the Trustee notice, the Third
Party has withdrawn its offer to buy back the securities from the
transaction portfolio.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  In Moody's
opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain negative.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly composed of trust preferred
securities issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks
that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate
their credit quality, Moody's derives credit scores for these non-
publicly rated assets and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated
transactions to their volatility, as described in Moody's Rating
Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions", October 2009.  The effect of the stress
testing of these credit scores varies between one and three
notches, depending on the total amount and relative size of these
securities in the collateral pool.

Moody's evaluation of this transaction relies on financial data
received for a majority of bank obligors in the pool as of Q3-
2010. This financial data is used by Moody's to assess the credit
quality of bank obligors in the pool, relying on RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV.  The results obtained
from the RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating
scale and adjusted by one notch where necessary in order to
compensate for the absence of credit indicators such as rating
reviews, outlooks and adjustments factoring in cyclical
developments in the economy.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity
of the model results to changes in the WARF was examined.  If WARF
is increased by 50 points from the base case of 2148, the model
results in an expected loss that is one notch worse than the
result of the base case for Class A-1L.  If the WARF is decreased
by 600 points, expected losses are one notch better than the base
case results.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the risk of triggering an Event
of Default, the recent deal performance in the current market
conditions, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodologies used in rating TROPIC CDO IV LTD. were
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Bank Trust Preferred Security
CDOs" published in June 2010, and "Updated Approach to the Usage
of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October
2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used
by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class O Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
J commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2003-C6.  In addition, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on 15 other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's U.S. conduit and fusion criteria.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool. Using servicer-provided financial information, Standard &
Poor's calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.45x
and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 88.8%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.17x and an LTV of 111.5%.  All of the DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude 11 ($93.7 million, 15.2%)
defeased loans and two ($8.8 million, 1.4%) specially serviced
assets.

S&P affirmed S&P's rating on the class IO interest-only (IO)
certificates based on S&P's current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the December 2010 remittance report, three assets
($11.0 million, 1.8%) were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc. (LNR), none of which are top 10 loans.  One of
these assets ($6.5 million, 0.95%) is real estate owned (REO),
one ($3.0 million, 0.5%) is more than 60 days delinquent, and one
($2.1 million, 0.4%) is within its grace period.  S&P estimated
losses of 31.1% and 33.9% for two ($8.8 million, 1.4%) of the
loans.  The remaining loan was transferred to the special servicer
on May 18, 2010, due to a sponsor bankruptcy.  However, the
borrower has been remitting monthly payments.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the December 2010 remittance report, the collateral balance
was $616.5 million, which is 64.7% of the balance at issuance.
The collateral includes 76 loans, down from 102 loans at issuance.
Eleven ($93.7 million, 15.2%) of the loans are defeased.  The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., provided financial
information for 99.7% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, 98.0%
of which was interim-2010 or full-year 2009 data. We calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.59x for the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.45x and 88.8%,
respectively.  These figures exclude two of the three specially
serviced loans, for which we separately estimated losses.
Thirteen loans ($216.7 million, 35.2%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Ten ($65.6 million, 10.6%) loans have a
reported DSC below 1.1x, and nine ($61.0 million, 9.9%) of these
loans have a reported DSC below 1.0x.  To date, the pool has
experienced principal losses totaling $1.7 million in connection
with two loans.

                    Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding balance
of $268.4 million (43.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.38x and
93.5%, respectively.  Four of the top 10 loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist.

The 50 Central Park South loan ($80.5 million, 13.1%) is the
largest loan in the pool and is secured by the leased fee interest
in a condominium unit operated as a Ritz Carlton Hotel in midtown
Manhattan.  The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist
because it was not repaid on its Oct. 11, 2010, anticipated
repayment date.  The loan's interest rate has increased by 2.0%,
and the borrower has been remitting payments at the increased
rate.

The Lloyd Center loan ($61.9 million, 10.0%) is the second-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. regional
mall in Portland, Ore.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to upcoming tenant lease expirations.  As of
Dec. 31, 2010, the reported DSC for the property was 1.83x.  The
property was 94.8% occupied as of Oct. 6, 2010.

The Via Tuscany Apartments loan ($16.9 million, 2.7%) is the
sixth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 280-unit
apartment complex in Melbourne, Fla.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC and an occupancy
decline.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC for the property
was 0.83x, with 77.3% occupancy.  These figures have improved, and
as of the six months ended June 30, 2010, the reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.04x and 84.3%, respectively.

The 3875 & 3955 Faber Place loan ($12.4 million, 2.0%) is the
ninth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 129,341-sq.-ft.
office building in North Charleston, S.C.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC. As of the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2010, the reported DSC for the property was 0.97x.
The property was 93.0% occupied as of Oct. 15, 2010.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The rating actions are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

Rating Raised:

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C6

         Rating
Class To         From     Credit enhancement (%)
J     BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)                   6.68

Ratings affirmed:

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C6

Class  Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-3    AAA  (sf)                         29.47
A-4    AAA  (sf)                         29.47
B      AAA  (sf)                         24.64
C      AAA  (sf)                         22.52
D      AA+  (sf)                         18.46
E      AA   (sf)                         16.14
F      A+   (sf)                         13.24
G      A    (sf)                         11.12
H      A-   (sf)                          8.99
K      BB   (sf)                          5.13
L      BB-  (sf)                          4.36
M      B+   (sf)                          3.59
N      B    (sf)                          2.81
O      B-   (sf)                          2.23
IO     AAA  (sf)                           N/A


* Fitch Holds CCCsf/RR1 Rating on Brascan $13.4MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgraded three and affirmed one class of Brascan
Structured Notes 2005-2 reflecting substantial paydown of the
transaction's senior liabilities at the end of its reinvestment
period.

The collateralized debt obligation (CDO) exited its reinvestment
period on Dec. 15, 2010; at which time, uninvested principal
proceeds of $124 million were used to pay down the senior
liabilities of the transaction.  Class A was paid in full; while
class B received paydown of 71%.  Further, class B is expected to
be paid in full on the next payment date from recent loan
paydowns.  The upgrades to classes B through D reflect the
significantly increased credit enhancement to the remaining
classes.

Fitch's base case loss expectation is 45.7%, which remains
consistent with last review.  Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.  As of the Dec. 15, 2010
trustee report, all over- collateralization and interest coverage
tests were in compliance.

The transaction is highly concentrated with only nine assets
remaining in the portfolio, including a $2.7 million defeased
interest.  Principal proceeds from the recent paydown of an
office portfolio loan are reported by the asset manager to be
$13.2 million.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 64% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 7.6% from, generally, trailing 12-month second quarter
2010.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
a defaulted mezzanine loan secured by interests in a large
multifamily loan located in New York City.  The property is
currently in foreclosure and Fitch modeled a full loss on the
CDO's position in its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a B-note secured by a 157,000 square foot office property
located in Greenwich, Connecticut.  The largest tenant vacated the
property in April 2010, and cash flow at the property has
significantly declined.  Fitch modeled a term default and a full
loss on this overleveraged position in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a B-note secured by a luxury hotel located in Los Angeles,
California.  Property cash flow does not support stressed debt
service.  Fitch modeled a term default and full loss in its base
case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The
default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Based on this analysis, the class B through E notes' credit
characteristics are generally consistent with the rating
categories assigned.

Classes B through D are assigned a Stable Rating Outlook
reflecting the classes' senior positions in the capital stack,
and positive cushion in the cash flow modeling.  These classes
maintain Loss Severity ratings of 'LS5'.  The LS ratings indicate
each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced
by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the
collateral under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be
considered in conjunction with probability of default indicated by
a class' long-term credit rating.

Class E is assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR1' reflecting modeled
recoveries of at least 91% of the class's principal balance.
Recovery Ratings (RR) provide a forward-looking estimate of
recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted structured finance
securities.

In January 2011, Fitch was notified by the asset manager,
Brookfield Real Estate Financial Partners, LLC, that it intended
to terminate a $5 million interest rate swap four years early in
2012 with the payment of a termination fee of approximately
$300,000, and put a new two-year basis swap in place prior to the
next payment date.  A prior basis swap matured in December 2010.
Fitch reviewed both proposed actions and determined that their
projected net effect on the rated notes is not significant enough
to warrant a change in ratings.

Fitch is not a party to the transaction and therefore does not
provide consent or approval, as that remains the sole preserve of
the transaction parties.  Fitch expects to be notified by the
trustee when either the proposed early swap termination or two
year basis swap placement is completed.

Fitch has affirmed ratings and revised RR ratings for th:

-- $13.4 million class E at 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'CCCsf/RR3'.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned outlooks to these classes:

-- $8.7 million class B to 'AAAsf/LS5' from 'BBsf/LS5'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $34.5 million class C to 'Asf/LS5' from 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $34.5 million class D to 'Bsf/LS5' from 'CCCsf/RR2'; Outlook
    Stable.

Class A is paid in full.

Classes A though D are removed from Rating Watch Positive.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 40 Classes From 26 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 40
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 26 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued from
2003 to 2008.  In addition, S&P placed its ratings on 50 classes
from one of the downgraded transaction and 33 other deals on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The collateral supporting the affected transactions consists of
fixed and adjustable-rate prime, subprime, Alternative-A, closed-
end second lien, seasoned, small balance commercial, and
reperforming mortgage loans.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of interest shortfalls on
the affected classes during recent remittance periods.  S&P's
ratings reflect its view of the magnitude of the interest payment
deficiencies that have affected each class to date compared with
the remaining principal balance owed and the likelihood that
certificateholders will be reimbursed for these deficiencies.  The
ratings also considered the balance of current delinquencies of
the affected transactions.

All of the classes had speculative-grade ratings before S&P
lowered them with the exception of class 1-A-1 from Alternative
Loan Trust 2004-33.

The CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's assessment of potential
interest shortfalls on the affected classes in recent remittance
periods being reported by the trustee would negatively affect the
ratings.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings
on securities that experience interest shortfalls and upon
confirmation of the reported data, S&P will adjust the ratings as
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                 Alternative Loan Trust 2004-20T1
                        Series    2004-20T1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-3        12667FPP4     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                 Alternative Loan Trust 2004-26T1
                       Series    2004-26T1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-3        12667FWF8     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2004-33
                         Series    2004-33

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-A-1      12667FA21     CCC (sf)             AA- (sf)

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2004-J12
                         Series    2004-J12

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-3        12667FF42     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                 Alternative Loan Trust 2005-77T1
                       Series    2005-77T1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-M        12668BCV3     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2005-J5
                        Series    2005-J5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-2        12667GHT3     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2007-1T1
                        Series    2007-1T1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-A        23246KBP5     D (sf)               CC (sf)

            American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      II-1A-1    026935AH9     D (sf)               CCC (sf)
      II-2A-1    026935AJ5     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
                         Series    2003-11

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      AF-5       03072SLT0     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
      AF-6       03072SLU7     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

               Banc of America Funding 2007-5 Trust
                         Series    2007-5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      7-B-1      059523CA6     D (sf)               CC (sf)
      7-B-2      059523CB4     D (sf)               CC (sf)

               Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2008-2
                         Series    2008-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-3        07326HAH7     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
      A-4B       07326HAK0     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)

       Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-B
                         Series    2007-B

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-A1       07324FAB6     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

                 Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5
                         Series    2005-5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      II-1A-1    07386HUG4     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

               Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-C
                         Series    2004-C

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      AF-5       152314KJ8     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

              CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-56
                        Series    2003-56

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-A-1      12669FAR4     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

          Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-CB8
                        Series    2005-CB8

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      AF-5       12489WQG2     B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                         Series    2003-17

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      IV-A-1     22541QHV7     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                        Series    2004-AR2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      I-A-1      22541Q6Y3     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                         Series    2005-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      D-B-3      225458GC6     D (sf)               CC (sf)

             CSFB Mortgage Backed Trust Series 2004-1
                          Series    2004-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      III-A-1    22541SAN8     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-5 Trust
                         Series    2005-5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      D-B-2      225458UY2     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

           CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2004-R2
                         Series    2004-R2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-2        12669UCG3     D (sf)               CC (sf)

           Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2
                         Series    1997-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-5        24763LBM1     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
      A-6        24763LBN9     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

            Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1
                         Series    1998-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-5F       24763LDB3     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
      A-6F       24763LDC1     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

       Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust
                         Series    2004-5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-1        251563GD8     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

                  Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W1
                         Series    2002-W1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-2        31392CMN1     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)

       Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust, Series 2005-3
                         Series    2005-3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M10        31659TET8     D (sf)               CC (sf)
      M11        31659TEU5     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                   GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6
                         Series    2006-6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      AF-2       362334MD3     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

                GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
                        Series    2005-RP1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B1         36242DXP3     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
      B2         36242DXQ1     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
      B3         36242DXR9     B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

                GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3
                        Series    2005-RP3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B2         362341LU1     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-13F
                        Series    2004-13F

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-4        36242DME0     D (sf)               CC (sf)

            IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR5
                        Series    2007-AR5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      4-A-1-1    45669EAK2     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

            Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11
                         Series    2006-11

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-A-2      61749WAH0     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      1-A-3      61749WAJ6     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      1-A-5      61749WAL1     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      1-A-6      61749WAM9     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R1
                         Series    2004-R1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-1        62951MAF7     CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

           National City Mortgage Capital Trust 2008-1
                         Series    2008-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      2-B-4      635419AW4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

      New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-ALT2
                        Series    2006-ALT2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      AF-2       643529AB6     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      AF-3       643529AC4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      AF-4       643529AD2     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      AF-5       643529AE0     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      AF-6B      643529AU4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

      Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp. Alternative Loan Trust
                        Series    2005-AP1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      II-M-1     65535VHK7     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

      Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., Alternative Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-WF1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-2        65537BAB6     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      A-3        65537BAC4     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      A-4        65537BAD2     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      A-5        65537BAE0     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
      A-6        65537BAF7     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                PHH Mortgage Trust Series 2007-SL1
                        Series    2007-SL1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-1        69337YAB0     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
      M-2        69337YAC8     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)
      M-3        69337YAD6     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)

                   Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-2
                         Series    2005-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      II-B-1     74160MHX3     CCC (sf)             B (sf)

                    RALI Series 2002-QS17 Trust
                        Series    2002-QS17

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-2        76110GZ95     AA- (sf)/Watch Neg   AA- (sf)

                    RALI Series 2004-QA6 Trust
                        Series    2004-QA6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      NB-III-1   76110HH51     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
      NB-III-2   76110HH69     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)
      NB-III-3   76110HH77     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

                    RALI Series 2004-QS11 Trust
                        Series    2004-QS11

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-3        76110HXH7     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                    RALI Series 2004-QS7 Trust
                        Series    2004-QS7

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-3        76110HUF4     D (sf)               CC (sf)

     RePerforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R4
                         Series    2003-R4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-2        12669FFV0     D (sf)               CC (sf)

         Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2002-A12
                         Series    2002-L

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-2        45660NJB2     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
      B-3        45660NJC0     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

         Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
                        Series    2004-HS2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-1-4      76110VQJ0     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
      A-1-5      76110VQK7     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
      A-1-6      76110VQL5     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)

                    RFMSI Series 2005-S4 Trust
                         Series    2005-S4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-2        76111XUZ4     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                    RFMSI Series 2005-S8 Trust
                         Series    2005-S8

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      M-1        76111XD34     D (sf)               CC (sf)

  Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-18
                        Series    2004-18

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      1-A1       863579FQ6     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
      1-A2       863579FR4     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)
      1-A3       863579FS2     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

  Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-20
                        Series    2004-20

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      5-A        863579HG6     CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)

   Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-1
                         Series    2005-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      6-A        863579LG1     BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)

      Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR7
                        Series    2007-AR7

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      III-A-1    86364KAG9     B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

       Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR2
                        Series    2003-AR2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      A-2        86358HTZ2     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

                 Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                        Series    2003-40A

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      4-A        86359BEP2     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)

                 Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                        Series    2005-RF2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B2         86359DFA0     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
      B4         86359DFC6     D (sf)               CC (sf)

                 Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                        Series    2005-RF7

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B1         86359DWV5     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
      B2         86359DWW3     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

       Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2008-RF1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B1         86362DAD4     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)

            Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-3
                          Series    2002-3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-3        885220BW2     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 64 Classes of Certificates
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 64
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from nine
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered S&P's ratings on 39 of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because S&P expect the interest shortfalls to continue.

Thirty-six of the 39 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for four or more
months.  The remaining three classes have had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for three months.  The recurring interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily due to
one or more of these factors:

   * Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts in
     effect for specially serviced loans;
   * A lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer
     has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;
   * Special servicing fees; and
   * Interest rate reductions or deferrals resulting from loan
     modifications.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls.

ARAs and resulting ASER amounts are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the
stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due, and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which
classes from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'
because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly
subject to change, or even reversal, once the special servicer
obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

S&P detail the 64 downgraded classes from the nine CMBS
transactions.

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Series 2003-2

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s
series 2003-2 (BACM 2003-2).  The lowered ratings reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to four of the seven loans that are currently with the
special servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC (ORIX), as well as
interest not advanced and special servicing fees.  Additional
trust expenses related to the Regal Parc Apartments loan, which
is deemed nonrecoverable, also contributed to the interest
shortfalls. S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class F and G
certificates because S&P believes the recurring interest
shortfalls have reduced liquidity support available to these
classes.  As of the Dec. 13, 2010 trustee remittance report,
ARAs totaling $44.4 million were in effect for five loans.

The total reported ASER amount on four loans was $136,102, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $2.0 million.  Standard
& Poor's considered four ASER amounts (totaling $136,102), all
of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees and interest not advanced ($103,930), in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $415,785 and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected class H and all of the classes subordinate to it.
Classes J, K, L, and M have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between three and nine months, which S&P expect to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.   Consequently, S&P
lowered S&P's ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the BACM 2003-2 transaction consists
of 118 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.4 billion.
As of the Dec. 13, 2010, trustee remittance report, seven
loans ($103.5 million; 7.5%) in the pool were with the special
servicer. The payment status of these loans is as follows: two
($53.5 million, 3.9%) are nonperforming matured balloon loans,
four ($42.7 million, 3.1%) are real estate owned (REO), and
one ($7.3 million, 0.5%) is less than 30 days delinquent.

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR17

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class L, M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR17 (BSCMS 2007-PWR17).  The lowered ratings
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to nine of the 15 loans that are currently
with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management (C-III),
including the third-largest loan in the pool, the RRI Hotel
Portfolio loan ($179.7 million, 5.6%), as well as special
servicing fees.  S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class J
and K certificates because S&P believe these classes are
susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  As of the Dec. 13,
2010, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $100.5 million
were in effect for 10 loans.  The total reported ASER amount,
excluding an ASER recovery of $1.1 million on the RRI Hotel
Portfolio loan, was $149,939, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $4.1 million.

Standard & Poor's considered six ASER amounts (totaling $112,828),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions. The
reported accumulated interest shortfalls have affected class L and
all of the classes subordinate to it.  As of the Dec. 13, 2010,
trustee remittance report, a $1.1 million ASER recovery occurred
related to the RRI Hotel Portfolio loan.  The special servicer
indicated that it does not expect ASER recoveries to occur in the
near term.  Absent the ASER recovery, classes J and K would have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for five and nine
months, respectively.  Classes L, M, N, O, P, and Q have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for 12 months, which
S&P expect to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P lowered our ratings on these classes to 'D
(sf)'.

The collateral pool for BSCMS 2007-PWR17 consists of 261
loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.2 billion.  As
of the Dec. 13, 2010, trustee remittance report, 15 loans
($298.0 million; 9.3%) in the pool were with the special
servicer.  The payment status of these loans is as follows: 11
($268.2 million, 8.4%) are in foreclosure, two ($18.1 million,
0.5%) are 90-plus-days delinquent, one ($6.0 million, 0.2%) is
less than 30 days delinquent, and one ($5.7 million, 0.2%) is REO.

CD 2007-CD4

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F, G, H, J, and K
certificates from CD 2007 -CD4.  The lowered ratings reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to 28 of the 40 loans that are currently with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital)
as well as interest not advanced and special servicing fees.
S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class C, D, and E certificates
because we believe these classes are susceptible to future
interest shortfalls.  As of the Dec. 13, 2010 trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $509.3 million were in effect for 35 loans.
The total reported ASER amount on 28 loans was $2.0 million, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $18.2 million.  Standard
& Poor's considered 26 ASER amounts (totaling $1.7 million), all
of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees and interest not advanced ($75,390), in determining
its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $2.1 million and accumulated interest shortfalls have
affected class F and all of the classes subordinate to it.
Classes F, G, H, J, and K have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between four and 12 months, which S&P expect to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered
its  ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for CD 2007-CD4 consists of 376 loans with an
aggregate trust balance of $6.5 billion.  As of the Dec. 13, 2010,
trustee remittance report, 40 loans ($1.2 billion; 19.4%) in the
pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of these
loans is as follows: 12 ($468.7 million, 7.3%) are in foreclosure,
19 ($395.3 million, 6.1%) are REO, five ($340.4 million, 5.3%) are
90-plus-days delinquent, two ($26.4 million, 0.4%) are less than
30 days delinquent, one ($10.0 million, 0.2%) is 30 days
delinquent, and one ($7.9 million, 0.1%) is current.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2005-
C3

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class H and J certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C3 (CSFB 2005-C3).  The lowered ratings reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to 10 of
the 14 loans that are currently with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC (LNR), as well as special servicing fees.  S&P
lowered S&P's ratings on the class E, F, and G certificates
because S&P believe these classes are susceptible to future
interest shortfalls.  As of the Dec. 17, 2010 trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $64.5 million were in effect for 11 loans.
The total reported ASER amount on 10 loans, excluding a $123,858
ASER recovery, was $164,412, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $1.4 million.  Standard & Poor's considered six ASER
amounts (totaling $83,537), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, in
determining its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest
shortfalls totaled $123,318 and accumulated interest shortfalls
have affected class H and all of the classes subordinate to it.
Classes H and J have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for 11 months, which S&P expects to remain outstanding
for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered S&P's
ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for CSFB 2005-C3 consists of 185 loans with
an aggregate trust balance of $1.5 billion.  As of the Dec. 17,
2010, trustee remittance report, 14 loans ($198.2 million;
13.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is as follows: two ($108.3 million, 7.4%)
are in foreclosure, six ($54.7 million, 3.7%) are REO, one
($17.0 million, 1.2%) is a nonperforming matured balloon loan,
two ($14.9 million, 1.0%) are less than 30 days delinquent, two
($3.0 million, 0.2%) are 90-plus-days delinquent, and one
($0.3 million, 0.1%) is current.

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C4

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O,
P, and Q certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust Series 2007-C4 (CSCM 2007-C4).  The lowered ratings
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to 15 of the 24 loans that are currently with
the special servicer, Torchlight Investors LLC (Torchlight),
as well as special servicing fees.  S&P lowered S&P's ratings
on the class E and F certificates because we believe these
classes are susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  As of
the Dec. 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, ARAs excluding
one liquidated loan, totaled $116.1 million and were in effect
for 15 loans.  The total reported ASER amount, excluding ASER
recoveries resulting from the liquidated loan, was $544,000, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $4.6 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered 14 ASER amounts (totaling $540,923), all of
which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $715,599 and accumulated
interest shortfalls have affected class G and all of the classes
subordinate to it.  Classes H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between four
and 11 months, which S&P expects to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future. Consequently, S&P lowered S&P's ratings on
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for CSCM 2007-C4 consists of 201 loans with an
aggregate trust balance of $2.0 billion.  As of the Dec. 17, 2010,
trustee remittance report, 24 loans ($387.7 million; 19.1%) in the
pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of
these loans is as follows: 17 ($366.9 million, 18.0%) are 90-
plus-days delinquent, one ($7.8 million, 0.4%) is current, two
($6.5 million, 0.3%) are in their grace period, one ($1.8 million,
0.1%) is in foreclosure, one ($1.8 million, 0.1%) is less than 30
days delinquent, one ($1.6 million, 0.1%) is 30 days delinquent,
and one ($1.3 million, 0.1%) is REO.

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2005-
LDP5

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class N, O, P, and Q
certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2005-LDP5 (JPMC 2005-LDP5).  The lowered ratings
reflect accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER
amounts related to one of the 11 loans that are currently with the
special servicer, CWCapital, as well as interest not advanced and
special servicing fees.  Other expenses related to the liquidation
of the Village Square Plaza loan and an interest rate modification
on the Hospitality Ventures Portfolio loan also contributed to the
interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered S&P's rating on the class M
certificate because S&P believes this class is susceptible to
future interest shortfalls.  As of the Dec. 15, 2010 trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $61.6 million were in effect for
five loans.  The total reported ASER amount on one loan was
$9,357, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.7 million.
Standard & Poor's considered one ASER amount (totaling $9,357),
which was based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees, interest not advanced ($84,575), and interest
rate reduction of $73,273 resulting from the modification of the
Hospitality Ventures Portfolio loan, in determining its rating
actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$352,370 and accumulated interest shortfalls have affected class
N and all of the classes subordinate to it.  Classes N, O, P,
and Q have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
nine or 10 months, which we expect to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future. Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on these
classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for JPMC 2005-LDP5 consists of 187 loans
with an aggregate trust balance of $3.8 billion.  As of the
Dec. 15, 2010 trustee remittance report, 11 loans ($267.5 million;
7.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is as follows: two ($102.6 million, 2.7%)
are in their grace periods, two ($91.3 million, 2.4%) are REO,
two ($35.1 million, 0.9%) are less than 30 days delinquent, two
($16.5 million, 0.4%) are in foreclosure, one ($16.0 million,
0.4%) is 30 days delinquent, one ($3.0 million, 0.1%) is current,
and one ($3.0 million, 0.1%) is 90-plus-days delinquent.

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP7

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class J, K, L, and M
certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-LDP7 ( JPMC 2006-LDP7).  The lowered ratings reflect
accumulated interest shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts
related to 10 of the 23 loans that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, as well as interest not advanced and special
servicing fees.  As of the Dec. 15, 2010 trustee remittance
report, ARAs totaling $61.9 million were in effect for 16 loans.
The total reported ASER amount on ten loans was $176,574, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $3.3 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered seven ASER amount (totaling $130,969), all of
which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees in determining its rating actions.  The reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $571,545 and accumulated
interest shortfalls have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class J. Class M has had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for 11 months, which S&P expects to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered
S&P's rating on this class to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for JPMC 2006-LDP7 consists of 256 loans with
an aggregate trust balance of $3.8 billion.  As of the Dec. 15,
2010 trustee remittance report, 23 loans ($391.6 million; 10.3%)
in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of
these loans is as follows: six ($123.3 million, 3.3%) are 90-plus-
days delinquent, three ($114.9 million, 3.0%) are current, seven
($60.4 million, 1.6%) are REO, two ($36.7 million, 1.0%) are in
foreclosure, two ($32.1 million, 0.8%) are in their grace periods,
two ($20.6 million, 0.5%) are 30 days delinquent, and one
($3.6 million, 0.1%) is 60 days delinquent.

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-BPC1

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, and P
certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-BPC1 (MLMT
2004-BPC1).  The lowered ratings reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to one of the nine
loans that are currently with the special servicer, J.E. Robert
Co. Inc. (J.E. Robert), as well as interest paid to servicer on
outstanding advances, interest not advanced, and special servicing
fees.  An interest rate modification on the Mirada Apartment Homes
loan also contributed to the interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered
S&P's ratings on the class G and H certificate because we believe
these classes are susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  As
of the Dec. 13, 2010 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$20.8 million were in effect for two loans.  The total reported
ASER amount on one loan was $84,641, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $418,551. Standard & Poor's estimated one ASER
amount (totaling $56,426), as well as considered current special
servicing fees and interest rate reduction of $25,907 from the
modification of the Mirada Apartment Homes loan in determining
its rating actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls
totaled $151,974 and accumulated interest shortfalls have affected
class J and all of the classes subordinate to it. Classes L, M, N,
and P have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between
four and 12 months, which S&P expects to remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered S&P's rating on
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for MLMT 2004-BPC1 consists of 86 loans with
an aggregate trust balance of $1.0 billion.  As of the Dec. 13,
2010 trustee remittance report, nine loans ($155.1 million; 15.1%)
in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of
these loans is as follows: three ($55.3 million, 5.4%) are 60 days
delinquent, two ($35.4 million, 3.4%) are 30 days delinquent, one
($28.9 million, 2.8%) is in foreclosure, one ($21.4 million,
2.1%) is less than 30 days delinquent, one ($8.8 million, 0.9%) is
current, and one ($5.1 million, 0.5%) is REO.

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8

S&P lowered S&P's ratings on the class M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8 (MSC
2006-HQ8).  The lowered ratings reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls resulting from ASER amounts related to 14 of
the 19 loans that are currently with the special servicer, J.E.
Robert, as well as special servicing fees.  S&P lowered S&P's
ratings on the class K and L certificates because S&P believe
these classes are susceptible to future interest shortfalls.
As of the Dec. 14, 2010, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaled
$83.5 million and were in effect for 17 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $306,338, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $3.1 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 10 ASER amounts
(totaling $276,136), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, in determining its rating
actions.  The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$311,960 and accumulated interest shortfalls have affected class M
and all of the classes subordinate to it. Classes N, O, P, and Q
have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between seven
and 11 months, which we expect to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered S&P's ratings on
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for MSC 2006-HQ8 consists of 264 loans with an
aggregate trust balance of $2.5 billion.  As of the Dec. 14, 2010
trustee remittance report, 19 loans ($161.3 million; 6.5%) in the
pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of these
loans is as follows: 10 ($106.3 million, 4.3%) are in foreclosure,
five ($38.9 million, 1.6%) are 90-plus days delinquent, three
($13.0 million, 0.5%) are REO, and one ($3.1 million, 0.1%)
is a nonperforming matured balloon loan.

                          Rating Actions

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-2
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
F      A- (sf)   A+ (sf)       9.26         0            0
G      BBB- (sf) A- (sf)       7.47         0            0
H      CCC+ (sf) BBB (sf)      5.84    82,030       82,030
J      D (sf)    B+ (sf)       4.37    83,881      172,095
K      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      3.56    46,600      139,801
L      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     2.74    46,600      139,801
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     2.09    37,280      228,153

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR17
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
J      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)       3.98         0            0
K      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)     2.96         0            0
L      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      2.58  (32,572)      468,051
M      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     2.19    49,953      599,441
N      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.81    49,953      599,441
O      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.56    33,304      399,644
P      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.43    16,650      199,797
Q      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.17    33,304      399,644

CD 2007-CD4 Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
C      CCC+ (sf) B (sf)        9.28         0            0
D      CCC (sf)  B (sf)        8.39         0            0
E      CCC- (sf) B (sf)        7.75         0            0
F      D (sf)    B- (sf)       6.98    46,207      389,494
G      D (sf)    B- (sf)       5.95   311,020    1,244,081
H      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     4.80   352,107    2,230,383
J      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      3.77   312,983    2,982,034
K      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     2.62   352,107    4,283,546

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
E      B+ (sf)   BB (sf)       5.64         0            0
F      CCC+ (sf) B+ (sf)       4.23         0            0
G      CCC- (sf) B (sf)        3.10         0            0
H      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      1.84    21,011       93,310
J      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.41    22,966      252,630

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
E      CCC+ (sf) B (sf)        9.46         0            0
F      CCC (sf)  B (sf)        8.56         0            0
G      CCC- (sf) B (sf)        7.53    11,211       28,305
H      D (sf)    B- (sf)       6.51   100,668      235,722
J      D (sf)    B-(sf)        5.23   125,840      511,762
K      D (sf)    B- (sf)       3.82   138,426      818,414
L      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     2.80    89,162      847,250
M      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      2.41    33,438      367,817
N      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      2.16    22,291      245,196
O      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      1.90    22,291      245,196
P      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.64    22,291      245,196
Q      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.26    33,438      367,817

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP5
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
M      CCC+ (sf) B (sf)        2.29         0            0
N      D (sf)    B (sf)        1.87    50,509      369,008
O      D (sf)    B- (sf)       1.74    21,539      193,850
P      D (sf)    B- (sf)       1.60    21,535      193,813
Q      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     1.32    43,074      396,885

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
J      CCC- (sf) B (sf)        2.76    45,304      220,338
K      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)       2.37    70,501      141,003
L      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)       1.98    70,497      140,993
M      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     1.46    94,002      463,489

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-BPC1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
G      BB (sf)   BBB- (sf)     5.80         0            0
H      B- (sf)   BB (sf)       4.28         0            0
J      CCC+ (sf) BB- (sf)      3.67     8,082        8,082
K      CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)       3.22    17,828       17,828
L      D (sf)    B+ (sf)       2.61    23,774       79,774
M      D (sf)    B (sf)        2.16    17,825       71,298
N      D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)     1.85    11,887       47,547
P      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      1.55    11,887       91,022

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Credit        Reported
          Rating        enhancement  interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To        From           (%)   Current  Accumulated
K      CCC+ (sf) B- (sf)       3.76         0            0
L      CCC- (sf) B- (sf)       3.21         0            0
M      CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)     2.80    10,421       10,421
N      D (sf)    CCC (sf)      2.39    44,058       98,672
O      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     2.12    29,372      269,608
P      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.85    29,372      323,090
Q      D (sf)    CCC- (sf)     1.30    58,748      646,226


* S&P Withdraws 35 CAPCOs Medium-Term Note Issues
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on all
35 capital Company medium-term note issues following its updated
criteria for rating state certified capital companies (CAPCOs) tax
credit programs where either a portion of the principal amount
due or a substantial portion of the interest amount due by a CAPCO
can be satisfied by state government-issued tax credits.

As a result of these updated criteria, which take effect
immediately, Standard & Poor's will no longer rate obligations
because either a portion of the principal amount due or a
substantial portion of the interest amount due by a CAPCO can be
satisfied by state government-issued tax credits.  S&P believe the
economic benefit of these tax credits to the investor is
uncertain.

The withdrawn ratings include the short-term ratings that were
assigned in error to two notes issued by Stonehenge Capital Fund
Connecticut I - Issuer I LLC and Stonehenge Capital Fund
Connecticut I-Issuer II LLC.

Ratings Withdrawn

Issue                                  Rating
               CUSIP               To          From

Aegis Alabama Venture Fund LP
US$5.257 mil capco nts med-term
nts ser 2008 due 03/01/2019         NR          BB-

ATVF II LLC
US$4.017 mil senior
structured guaranteed notes
med-term nts ser 2008 due
08/01/2015
               --                   NR          BB-

CFB Venture Fund I Inc.
US$7.515 mil sr struc
med-term nts ser 1998B
due 09/01/2012
               12520*AB2            NR          BB+

Enhanced Alabama Issuer LLC
US$18.713 mil med-term
nts ser 2004 due 03/01/2014
               29333*AA5            NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital Alabama
Fund II LLC
US$22.278 mil capco nts
med-term nts ser 2008
due 03/01/2019
               --                   NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital District Fund LLC
US$25.919 mil med term nts
med-term nts ser 2004 due
03/01/2013
               29334*AA4            NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital New York Fund II LLC
US$13.554 mil med term
med-term nts ser 2004 due
12/15/2015
               29248#AA5            NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital New York Fund III LLC
US$11.487 mil med-term
nts ser 2005 due 01/15/2016
               29334@AA2            NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital Texas Fund II LLC
US$27.377 mil CAPCO nts
med-term nts ser 2008 due
08/01/2015
               --                   NR          AA+

Enhanced Capital Texas Fund LP
US$23.413 mil Texas CAPCO
med-term nts ser 2005 due
08/11/2011
               29333@AA3            NR          AA+

Enhanced Colorado Issuer LLC
US$22.058 mil med-term nts
ser 2002A due 03/01/2013
               29331@AA5            NR          AAA

Enhanced Louisiana Capital III LLC
US$6.8 mil med-term
nts ser 2003 due 03/01/2013
               29333#AA1            NR          AA+

Enhanced New York Issuer LLC
US$11.636 mil 9.43% taxable
med-term nts ser 2000 due
12/15/2011
               29332*AA6            NR          AA+

New York Small Business Venture Fund II LLC
US$6.382 mil med-term nts ser
2004 B1 due 12/14/2015
               64977@AB9             NR          A+

New York Small Business Venture Fund II LLC
US$6.382 mil med-term nts
ser 2004 A1 due 12/14/2015
               64977@AA1             NR          AAA

New York Small Business Venture Fund III LLC
US$2.68 mil sr med-term
nts ser 2005A1 due 11/18/2016
               64978#AA8             NR          AAA

New York Small Business Venture Fund III LLC
US$2.68 mil sr med-term nts
ser 2005B1 due 11/18/2016
               64978#AB6             NR          A+

New York Small Business Venture Fund LLC
US$11.256 mil 8.62% sr
struct nts med-term nts ser
2000 A4 due 12/27/2011
               64977#AG6             NR          AAA

New York Small Business Venture Fund LLC
US$11.256 mil sr nts
med-term nts ser 2000
B4 due 12/27/2011
               64977#AH4             NR          A+

Republic Holdings Texas LP
US$4.975 mil cert cap secd
med-term nts ser 2005 due
08/05/2011
               --                    NR          BB-

Stonehenge Capital Fund Connecticut I - Issuer I LLC
US$20.311 mil CAPCO
med-term nts ser 2008-B due
08/01/2015
               --                  AA-/NR      AA-/A-1+
               --                    NR          AA-

Stonehenge Capital Fund Connecticut I - Issuer II LLC
US$7.324 mil medium term
notes series 2008-B due
08/01/2015
               --                  AA-/NR      AA-/A-1+
               --                    NR          AA-

Stonehenge Capital Fund Hawaii III
US$4.976 mil med-term
nts ser 2006B-1 due
01/31/2011
               --                     NR          A+

Stonehenge Capital Fund Hawaii IV LLC
US$3.021 mil senior structured
nts (CAPCO) med-term nts ser
2007B-1 due 01/31/2012
               --                     NR          A+

Waveland NCP Alabama Ventures II LLC
US$9.137 mil capco nts med-term
nts ser 2008 due 03/01/2019
               --                     NR          BB-

Whitecap Alabama Growth Fund II LP
US$21.906 mil defeasance capco
nts med-term nts ser 2008 due
08/15/2018
               96466WAA2              NR          AAA

Wilshire Alabama Partners LLC
US$1.5 mil med-term
nts ser 2004 due 03/01/2014
               97186MAA1              NR          A+

Wilshire Colorado Partners LLC
US$22.058 mil med-term
nts ser 2002-1 due 03/01/2013
               97186Q9A4              NR          A+

Wilshire DC Partners LLC
US$13.106 mil med term
med-term nts ser 2004 due
03/01/2013
               971865AA8              NR          A+

Wilshire Louisiana Partners III LLC
US$8 mil med-term nts
ser 2002 due 03/01/2012
               9718809A9              NR          A+

Wilshire Louisiana Partners IV LLC
US$6.8 mil med-term nts
ser 2003 due 03/01/2013
               97191#AA9              NR          A+

Wilshire New York Partners III LLC
US$35.16 mil med-term nts
ser 2000 due 03/15/2012
               97190*9B9              NR          A+

Wilshire New York Partners IV LLC
US$5.218 mil med-term nts
ser 2004 due 12/15/2015
               97191*AA3              NR          A+

Wilshire New York Partners V LLC
US$8.692 mil med-term nts
ser 2005 due 12/15/2016
               --                     NR          A+

Wilshire Texas Partners I LLC
US$22.792 mil med-term nts
ser 2005 due 08/01/2011
               97202#AA6              NR          A+

NR--Not rated.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases by individuals and business entities estimating
assets and debts or disclosing assets and liabilities at less than
$1,000,000.  The list includes links to freely downloadable images
of the small-dollar business-related petitions in Acrobat PDF
format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                          *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***