TCR_Public/101024.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 24, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 295

                            Headlines

ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine CDO Deals to 'CC'
ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A Notes to 'Ba2'
ATRIUM II: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 10 Series 2002-PB2 Certs.

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-1 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-PWR12 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-TOP24 Certs.
BTC SPV: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Notes From 'CCC'
CAPITAL AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

CARNEGIE HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2004-1 CDO to 'B1'
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 19 Classes of Notes
COUNTRYWIDE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 168 Tranches

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2004-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-C3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2001-CKN5 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-C4 Notes

EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
EASTMAN HILL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
EVRAZ NORTH: Moody's Withdraws All Outstanding Ratings
FAIRFAX COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 1998A Bonds to 'B+'
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on Two Series 1997-C1 Notes

GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-C1 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CC1 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999-C1 Certs. to 'D'
HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 26 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 2007-CIBC18 Certs.

JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-LDP1 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-CIBC13 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Series 2004-C2 Certs.
KEOKUK AREA: Moody's Junks Ratings on Hospital Revenue Bonds
LANDMARK II: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-C2 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2006-C7 Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class F to 'A' From 'BB'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2008-C1 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Two 2001-NC1 Tranches

MT WILSON: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
N-45 FIRST: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E, Series 2003-3
N-45 FIRST: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class F, Series 2003-1
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
NEWNAN HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'

NORMAN REGIONAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
NORTHAMPTON GENERATING: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 1994 A Bonds
OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Tranches
ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
RACERS SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2001-29-E Certs. to 'C'

RAIT CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes of Notes
RAYTOWN INDUSTRIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
RHODE ISLAND HEALTH: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $9.32MM Bonds
SAINTS MEDICAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on 1993A Debt
SALOMON BROS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 1998-OPT2 Tranche

SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C1 Notes
SCHOONER TRUST: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class G to 'BB'
SONIC CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes to 'BB+'
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Tranches

TIAA CMBS: S&P Raises Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Securities
TRIBUNE LTD: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Two CDO Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2006-C27 Certs.

* Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on North Carolina Medical's Bonds
* S&P Assigns Ratings on 19 Tranches to CreditWatch Positive
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 42 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Rating on City of Augusta's Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Duarte, California's Bonds to 'BB+'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Three CDO Deals
* S&P Junks Rating on Minneapolis, Minnesota's Bonds From 'AAA'
* S&P Puts Ratings on Nine Tranches From Six CDO Transactions

                            *********

ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine CDO Deals to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'CC
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' on nine classes from ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1
Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
the termination of the interest rate swap contract for the
transaction, resulting in a payment to the hedge counterparty.
S&P expects that the interest payments on these classes will be
deferred for an extended period of time due to the termination
payment.

Based on correspondences with the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
it is S&P's understanding that following a payment default, the
hedge counterparty terminated the interest rate swap contract for
the transaction.  The termination of the hedge contract triggered
a termination payment totaling $68.4 million to the counterparty.
Based on the transaction's documents and payment waterfall, it is
S&P's understanding that the termination payments to the hedge
counterparty are made before any interest or principal proceeds
are made available to the deferrable classes.  S&P expects that
the termination payments may not be paid in full for several
years, and full principal and interest payments to deferrable
classes will likely not be paid for many years.

According to the most recent trustee report dated Sept. 30, 2010,
ACAS 2007-1 was collateralized by 117 classes of commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS, $1.1 billion, 99%) from 21
distinct transactions issued from 2005 through 2007 and four
classes ($11.8 million, 1%) from JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1, which is a
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.
The aggregate principal balance of the assets totaled
$1.11 billion.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ACAS 2007-1 according to its current
criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

                        Ratings Lowered

                    ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class    To                   From
             -----    --                   ----
             E-FL     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             E-FX     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             F-FL     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             F-FX     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             G-FL     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             G-FX     CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             H        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             J        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
             K        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)


ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded two classes of Notes issued by Ansonia CDO
2006-1, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor, low percentage of performing
collateral, and realized losses from underlying collateral pool.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2010
     Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2010
     Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Ansonia CDO 2006-1, Ltd., is a static cash CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
(93.1% of the collateral pool balance), real estate investment
trust debt (5.8%), and CRE CDO debt (1.1%).  As of the
September 23, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance
of the transaction, including Preferred Shares and the balances
of the Defaulted Interest and Deferred Interest , has decreased
to $806.1 million from $806.7 million at issuance, with the
paydown directed to the Class A-FL and A-FX Notes.  The paydown
was mainly due to payments of interest in respect of Credit
Impaired Securities being classified as Principal Proceeds per
the Indenture dated as of November 14, 2006.

There are only seven assets with par balance of $32.6 million
(4.8% of the current collateral pool balance) that are considered
Performing as of the September 23, 2010 Trustee report.  The
maining 95.2% of the collateral are classified as Credit Impaired
Securities, Imminently Credit Impaired Securities, or Non-
Performing Securities.  As of September 23, 2010, total collateral
par amount has decreased to 686.4 million from $806.7 million at
issuance.  The reduction of the collateral par amount was mainly
due to realized losses to the transaction from CMBS collateral.

On May 5, 2009, non-payment of full interest on certain classes of
Notes caused an Event of Default.  As of the September 23, 2010
Trustee report, the EOD is continuing and a declaration of
acceleration of Maturity has not been made.  While the risk of
collateral liquidation is still a possibility, the acceleration of
Maturity has not been declared thereby reducing the risk of much
higher loss severities from such liquidation under the current
stressed environment.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,647 (including Impaired Collateral
Interests) compared to 6,814 at last review.  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates is: A1-A3 (0.7% compared to
0.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (5.0% compared to 5.7% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (4.7% compared to 10.9% at last review), B1-B3
(11.1% compared to 16.7% at last review), and Caa1-C (78.5%
compared to 66.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.3
years compared to 6.9 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 3.9% compared to 4.6% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, the same as at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.6, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 3.9% to 7.4% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch upward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expects
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced this rating action on Aphex
Capital, Motive Series 2005-D1 Trust, a collateralized debt
obligation transaction referencing a managed portfolio of 80
synthetic credit corporate and sovereign exposures.

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A Secured Fixed Rate Credit-Linked
     Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2009
     Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         Rating Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
improved credit quality of the reference portfolio and the
shortened time to maturity of the CSO tranche.  Offsetting these
positive factors is low remaining subordination.

The underlying portfolio of synthetic credit securities references
senior unsecured bonds.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio is 279, equivalent to Baa2.  This compares
to a 10-year WARF of 387 from the last rating review.  There have
been no credit events since inception of the transaction.  The CSO
notes have a remaining life of 5 years and remaining credit
enhancement of 3.44%.

In the process of determining the rating action, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Removal of forward-looking measures - The notching adjustment
    on each entity's rating due to credit watch or negative
    outlook was removed.  The result of this run showed no impact
    compared to the base case.

(2) Use of Market Implied Ratings - MIRs were used in place of the
    corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
    probability of each corporate name in the reference portfolio.
    The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental
    rating is an indicator of the extent of the divergence of
    credit view between Moody's and the market.  This run
    generated a result that was three notches worse than the one
    modeled under the base case.

(3) Reduction of time to maturity -- Time to maturity was reduced
    by six months, all other things being equal.  The result of
    this run showed no impact compared to the base case.

(4) Stress on largest industry group -- All entities in the
    Banking, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sectors, the
    largest sector concentration, representing 30% of the
    portfolio notional, were notched down by one.  The result of
    this run was one notch worse than the base case.

Taking into consideration sensitivity analyses and other factors,
the committee vote resulted in a rating one notch lower than the
base case result.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROMv2.6.
This model is available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions
-- Analytical models, upon return of a signed free license
agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's also ran a stress scenario defaulting the lowest rated
entity in the reference portfolio.  The result of this run was one
notch worse than the base case.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
Corporate CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference
pool may have leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the
Corporate CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of
volatility.  All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be
higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomic conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent depending on the
expected severity of the worsening conditions.


ATRIUM II: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Atrium II:

  -- US$185,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016
     (current balance of $152,910,962), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
     previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$12,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$11,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$6,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3 (sf);

  -- US$6,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Upgraded
     to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 16% or $29 million since the last
rating action in June 2009.  As a result of the delevering, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last rating
action in June 2009.  As of the latest trustee report dated
September 7, 2010, the Class A, Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 121.7%, 114.3% and
107.2%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 107.7%, 102.0% and
96.4%, respectively.  All of the overcollateralization ratios are
currently in compliance.  In addition, the Class B and Class C
Notes are no longer deferring interest and all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

Moody's notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last rating
action.  Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the last rating
action due to a decrease in the percentage of securities with
ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative
Outlook." Furthermore, based on the September 2010 trustee report,
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 10.9% of the
underlying portfolio versus 18.4% in May 2009.  The deal also
experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $6 million
from approximately $20 million in May 2009.

Moody's noted that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  Based on the September 2010 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 6.4% of the underlying portfolio versus 3.3% in May
2009.  These investments potentially expose the notes to market
risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $203 million, defaulted par of $12 million, weighted
average default probability of 23.21% (implying a WARF of 3551), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.63%, and a
diversity score of 56.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Atrium II, issued in December 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2841)

  -- Class A-1: +1
  -- Class A-2a: +2
  -- Class A-2b: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C-1: +2
  -- Class C-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4261)

  -- Class A-1: -1
  -- Class A-2a: -2
  -- Class A-2b: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C-1: -3
  -- Class C-2: -3

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (43.63)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2a: 0
  -- Class A-2b: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C-1: +1
  -- Class C-2: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (39.63)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2a: -1
  -- Class A-2b: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C-1: -1
  -- Class C-2: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 10 Series 2002-PB2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of ten classes
and affirmed three classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-
PB2:

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010 Ba1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 2, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and concerns about loans approaching
maturity in an adverse environment.  Seventy-five loans,
representing 77% of the pool, mature within the next 36 months.
Nineteen of these loans, representing 29% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On September 2, 2010, Moody's placed ten classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
15.5% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 29, 2008.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to
$754.4 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 90 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool.  Twenty loans, representing 22% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 23%
of the pool.  The pool includes one loan, representing 5.3% of the
pool, with an investment grade credit estimate.

Nineteen loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.2 million (31% loss severity on
average).  Nine loans, representing 13% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
880 Troy Corporate Center Loan ($28.1 million -- 3.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 186,565 square foot office building
located in Troy, Michigan.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in January 2010 for imminent default due to a the
ability of the sole tenant to terminate the lease effective
January 2010.  The tenant has not yet terminated the lease and the
loan is current.  The remaining eight specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $48 million loss (48% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has estimated a
$43.2 million loss (32% expected loss based on a 63% probability
default) from these troubled loan.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of losses from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 88%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 73% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12.4% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.59X, respectively, compared to
1.25X and 1.21X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 30, essentially the same as Moody's prior
review.

The loan with the credit estimate is the Town Center East Loan
($40.2 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by the fee
interest in six land parcels in Foster City, California.  The
parcels are located in Metro Center, a 100 acre mixed use
development containing office, retail, residential and hotel.  The
parcels are improved with 676,000 square feet of Class A office
space and 98,700 square feet of retail space.  All of the parcels
are subject to long-term ground leases.  Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.08X, respectively,
compared to A2 and 1.10X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Regency Square Loan
($73.2 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center located in Richmond, VA.  The center is anchored by Macy's
and XXI Forever.  The property was 83% leased as of May 2010
compared to 100% at last review.  In-line tenant sales have
declined to $248 PSF as of December 2009 compared to $451 at
securitization.  The loan matures in November, 2011.  Due to the
decline in performance as well as the approaching loan maturity,
Moody's considers that this loan has a high probability of default
and has included this loan with other troubled loans.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 145% and 0.69X, respectively, compared to
105% and 0.96X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 84 William Street Loan
($29.5 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 121
unit apartment building located in Manhattan.  The property is
master leased to the New School through June, 2013.  The loan
matures in November, 2011.  Although performance has been stable,
Moody's stressed the cash flow due to Moody's concerns about 100%
of the units being leased to a single tenant and the approaching
loan maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.23X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Plaza at Citrus Park Loan
($26.7 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 325,000
square foot retail center located in Tampa, Florida.  The property
was 96% leased as of December, 2009 compared to 97% at last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.48X,
respectively, compared to 57% and 1.57X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-1 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-MFX, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 8, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 8, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $3.08 billion
from $3.14 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 158 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 53%
of the pool.

Forty-one loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in the
realized loss of $1.7 million.  Twenty loans, representing 17%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Solana Loan ($220.0 million --
7.1% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$360.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
1.9 million square foot mixed-use property located in Westlake,
Texas.  The loan sponsor is Robert Maquire.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 for imminent
default.  A loan modification had been negotiated in March 2010
but the borrower subsequently indicated cash flow problems.  The
second largest specially serviced loan is the 575 Lexington Avenue
Loan ($162.5 million -- 5.3%), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $325.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by a 637,000 square foot office building located in
Manhattan.  The loan sponsors are the California State Teachers'
Retirement System and Silverstein Properties.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2010 for imminent
default.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $67.9 million appraisal
reduction for 15 of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-PWR12 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR12 on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 26, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)


  -- Cl. C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 10, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to
$1.999 billion from $2.079 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 210 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  There are no loans with credit
estimates and no loans have defeased.

Fifty eight loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $12.4 million loss (66%
loss severity on average).  Currently ten loans, representing 6%
of the pool, are in special servicing.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-TOP24 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-TOP24 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 6, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.50 billion
from $1.53 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 159 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
47% of the pool.

Thirty-six loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Currently 11 loans, representing 13% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the W Hotel San
Diego Loan ($65.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 258 key hotel located in San Diego, California.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in April 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently real estate owned.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Hilton Tapatio
Loan ($54.0 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
585 key hotel located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due to imminent
default and is in the process of foreclosure.  The remaining nine
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $66.1 million
appraisal reduction for six of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through
NR have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $2.9 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


BTC SPV: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Notes From 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on BTC SPV
(Cayman) 2001-1 Ltd.'s class A-6 through A-18 zero-coupon notes to
'AAA (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'.

The ratings on each of the class A-6 through A-18 notes are
dependent on the lowest of S&P's ratings on the reference
obligations: Blue Wing Asset Vehicle Series 2010-2's class A1
('AAA (sf)'), B1 ('AAA (sf)'), and C1 ('AAA (sf)') notes; and
S&P's ratings on the collateral securities: U.S. Treasury bonds
('AAA').

The rating actions follow the notification from the swap
counterparty (Barclays Bank PLC {AA-/Negative/A-1+}) of the
replacement of the former reference obligation and collateral
securities with those listed.  S&P may take subsequent rating
actions on the class A-6 through A-18 notes due to changes in
S&P's ratings assigned to Blue Wing Asset Vehicle Series 2010-2's
classes A1, B1, and C1 or the collateral securities.


CAPITAL AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior and upgraded the subordinate
outstanding classes of the Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust
2007-1, 2007-3, and 2008-CPA transactions.  Fitch also revised the
Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative for class A-2 of the 2008-
CPA transaction.

The upgrades and Outlook Revision are a result of continued
available credit enhancement in excess of stressed remaining
losses.  The collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base
case expectations, with loss pace declining across all three
transactions.  Currently, under the credit enhancement structure,
the securities can withstand stress scenarios consistent with the
higher rating categories and still make full payments of interest
and principal in accordance with the terms of the documents.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-1:

  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-3:

  -- Class A-4 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-CPA:

  -- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.


CARNEGIE HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2004-1 CDO to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced this rating action on Carnegie
Hill, Series 2004-1, a collateralized debt obligation transaction
referencing a managed portfolio of 103 synthetic corporate credit
corporate exposures.

Issuer: Carnegie Hill, Series 2004-1

  -- US$15M Notes due June 20, 2011 Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on Oct 28, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the overall credit improvement of the portfolio and the reduction
of the time to maturity of the transaction.  The overall credit
improvement of assets rated Caa and below was significant over the
last 12 months.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
current portfolio is 1613, equivalent to Ba3.  This compares to a
10-year WARF of 1784 from the last rating review.  Since the last
rating action, there have been no credit events.  The notes have a
remaining life of 0.67 years and credit enhancement of
approximately 9.5%.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Use of Market Implied Ratings -- MIRs were used in place of
the
    corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
    probability of each corporate name in the reference portfolio.
    The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental
    rating is an indicator of the extent of the divergence of
    credit view between Moody's and the market.  This run
    generated a result that was higher by one notch than the one
    modeled under the base case.

(2) Defaulted all Caa Referenced Entities -- To test the deal
    sensitivity to the lowest rated entities of the portfolio, all
    Caa exposures amounting to a little over 8% of the reference
    pool, were ran as defaulted.  This run generated a result that
    was lower by 6 notches than the one modeled under the base
    case.

(3) Removal of forward-looking measures -- The notching adjustment
    on each entity's rating due to watch for downgrade or negative
    outlook was removed, resulting in a positive impact of one
    notch.

Taking into considerations the result of these sensitivity
analyses and other factors such as the impact of short time to
maturity on the model, the rating committee vote resulted in an
upgrade of the tranche's rating to a level three notches lower
than the base case result.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROMv2.6.
This model is available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions
-- Analytical models, upon return of a signed free license
agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
Corporate CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference
pool may have leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the
Corporate CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of
volatility.  All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be
higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomic conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent depending on the
expected severity of the worsening conditions.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CBA
Commercial Assets' series 2007-1.  S&P also affirmed S&P's ratings
on the M-4, M-5, M-6, and M-7 classes.

The downgrade of the M-3 class follows a principal loss as
reflected on the Sept. 27, 2010, remittance report.  The M-3 class
realized a 67.9% loss to its opening principal balance of
$2,233,000.  S&P downgraded the remaining three classes due to
continued poor collateral performance and credit support erosion
to the classes.  S&P affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on classes M-4,
M-5, M-6, and M-7, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)'
because they incurred principal losses at that time.  According to
the September 2010 remittance report, all four classes had lost
100% of their respective original outstanding principal balances.

As of the September 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 176 loans and eight real estate owned assets with an
aggregate trust balance of $96.4 million, down from 237 loans
totaling $127.6 million at issuance.  Fifty-one loans totaling
$28.6 million (29.7%) are currently with the special servicer.
Eight of the assets in the pool are REO (4.9%), 31 are in
foreclosure (16.83%), two are in bankruptcy (0.4%), three are 90-
plus-days delinquent (1.8%), five are 60-days delinquent (3.6%),
and eight are 30-plus-days delinquent (6.5%).  To date, the trust
has experienced losses on 21 loans with a weighted average loss
severity of 76%.  The total losses to the trust are $11.4 million
as per the Sept. 27, 2010, remittance report.

                         Ratings Lowered

                      CBA Commercial Assets
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-1

                     Rating
                     ------
     Class       To          From         Credit enhancement
     -----       --          ----         ------------------
     A           CCC+ (sf)   BB- (sf)                   8.19
     M-1         CCC (sf)    B- (sf)                    4.55
     M-2         CCC- (sf)   CCC+ (sf)                  0.74
     M-3         D (sf)      CCC (sf)                    N/A

                        Ratings Affirmed

                      CBA Commercial Assets
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-1

        Class       Rating             Credit enhancement
        -----       ------             ------------------
        M-4         D (sf)                            N/A
        M-5         D (sf                             N/A
        M-6         D (sf)                            N/A
        M-7         D (sf)                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two classes,
affirmed five classes and downgraded 20 classes of CD 2006-CD2
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-CD2:

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010 A3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 30, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VPM-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 30,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VPM-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VPM-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 30,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VPM-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sept. 30,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of 16 pooled classes are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans.  The downgrade of four
non-pooled classes, which are supported by a junior loan
associated with Villas Parkmerced, a multifamily property located
in San Francisco, California, is due to a decline in performance
of this property.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On September 30, 2010, Moody's placed 20 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
10% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February12, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $2.89 billion
from $3.1 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 194 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
32% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 0.6% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.  At
securitization the pool contained two loans, representing 12% of
the original balance, which had investment grade credit estimates.
However, due to declines in performance and increased leverage,
these loans are now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.

Thirty-nine loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $37 million loss (52% loss severity on
average).  Currently, 16 loans, including five of the pool's top
ten loans, are in special servicing.  The specially serviced loans
represent 26% of the pool.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the Villas Parkmerced Loan ($300.0 million -- 12% of the pool),
which represents the senior interest in a $350 million first
mortgage loan.  The junior interest is held within the trust and
secures non-pooled classes VPM-1, VPM-2, VPM-3 and VPM-4.  The
property is also encumbered by a $200 million B-note which is held
outside the trust.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in May 2010 for imminent default after the Borrower indicated that
it had insufficient funds to cover the property's operating
expenses.  The loan is secured by a 3,221-unit multi-family
complex located in San Francisco, California.  The property was
92% leased as of April 2010 compared to 97% at securitization.
The property has been operating under a 1.0X actual DSCR for
several years and matures in October 2010.  At securitization this
loan had an investment grade credit estimate.  Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.84X, respectively.  Moody's
expects that any losses from this property will first be absorbed
by the B note and does not currently estimate a loss to the senior
loan.

The remaining 15 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types and are either 90+ days delinquent, real estate
owned or in the foreclosure process.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $62.0 million appraisal reduction for six
of the specially serviced loans.  Excluding the Villas Parkmerced
Loan, Moody's has estimated an aggregate $203.9 million loss (49%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for nine
poorly performing loans representing 23% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $18.8 million loss (44% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 90% and 53% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 107% compared to 144% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.0%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.94X, respectively, compared to
1.06X and 0.87X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 51 at Moody's prior review.

The second loan that previously had an investment grade credit
estimate is the Sun Trust Center Loan ($77.0 million -- 3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 646, 281 square foot commercial
complex consisting of a 30-story Class A office tower, a seven-
story office building and an eight-story atrium in Orlando,
Florida.  The loan is on the servicer's watch list for low
occupancy.  As of June 2010, the center was 70% leased,
essentially the same as at last review.  Sun Trust Bank, the
largest tenant, vacated over half the net rentable area it
originally occupied when its lease expired in 2008.  The property
also faces additional possible leasing volitality due to other
leases expiring by year end 2010.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 119% and 0.86X, respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Harrisburg Portfolio Loan ($60.3 million -
- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by four office properties
that encompass 16 buildings.  The properties are in three office
parks located in Harrisburg and Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.  The
portfolio totals 671,800 square feet.  As December 2009, the
portfolio was 90% leased, essentially the same as at
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.8X,
respectively, compared to 145% and 0.73X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Sunset Media Tower Loan
($55.0 million -- 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 22-
story, 314,000 square foot, Class A office building located in
Hollywood, California.  The loan is on the watch list for low
occupancy.  As of June 2010, the property was 70% leased compared
91% at last review.  The House of Blues, which originally leased
19% of the NRA, vacated when its lease expired in April 2010.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.92X compared to 134%
and 0.77X, respectively, at last review.

The third largest loan is the Stadium Gateway Loan ($52.0 million
-- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a six-story Class A
office building located adjacent to the Anaheim Stadium in
Anaheim, California.  The sponsor is Macquarie Office Trust.  The
loan is on the watch list for low occupancy.  As of December 2009,
the property was 88% leased compared to 79% in 2008.  Although
leasing has improved since last review, Moody's is concerned about
the property's exposure to firms in residential construction and
financing.  The largest tenants are Turner Construction and
Countrywide Home Loans, which together lease 32% of the NRA.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.76X compared to 135%
and 0.76X, respectively, at last review.


COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 19 Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 19 classes of COMM 2007-C9
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C9 on
review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. AM, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug. 22, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. AM-FL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug. 22, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ-FL, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)


  -- Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 11, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$2.878 billion from $2.901 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 109 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 52% of the pool.  No loans have defeased.

Thirty six loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $2.89 million loss (30% loss severity on
average).  Currently six loans, representing 5% of the pool, are
in special servicing.  The specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily, office, retail and industrial properties.


COUNTRYWIDE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 168 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 168
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from 8 RMBS
transactions issued by Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The ratings of CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-J5 Class I-A-2 and Class I-A-4, are based on the loss
allocations rules outlined in the Prospectus.  Moody's notes that
there is a discrepancy between the loss allocation rules in the
Prospectus, and those outlined in the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement.  The trustee has stated that the PSA will be amended to
conform to the loss allocation rules set forth in the Prospectus.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-J7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-J1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-21, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-22, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-23, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-24, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-25, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-26, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-27, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-28, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010  Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-29, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-30, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-31, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-32, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-33, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-34, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-35, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-36, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-37, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-38, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-39, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-40, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-41, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-42, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-43, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-44, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-J2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2004-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed ten classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-C1, on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. M, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned B1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. N, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 22, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 17, 2008 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 17, 2008.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to
$1.19 billion from $1.62 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 234 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool.  Eighteen loans,
representing 10% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities, essentially the same as at last
review.

Fifty-three loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.1 million loss (20%
loss severity on average).  Currently eight loans, representing 6%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $27.2 million appraisal reduction for six
of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 14 classes and
affirmed five classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
2005-C1:

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-SP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 19, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On September 22, 2010, Moody's placed 14 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
7.2% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
16.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 17, 2009.  See the
ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last
rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to
$1.24 billion from $1.51 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 149 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 38% of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 8% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 9%
of the pool.

Forty-eight loans, representing 42% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $10.4 million (12% loss severity
overall).  Fourteen loans, representing 6% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $25.3 million appraisal reduction on ten
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $37.2 million loss (49% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated a
$24.2 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from this troubled loan.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 92%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 94% compared to 100% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.14X, respectively, compared to
1.38X and 1.04X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 33 compared to 39 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the GGP Retail Portfolio Loan
($109.2 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by four
regional malls containing 2.2 million square feet, of which
1.8 million square feet is collateral for the loan.  The
properties are located in Wyoming, Idaho, Utah and Washington.
The portfolio's combined occupancy was 94% as of March 2010
compared to 83% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
106% and 1.0X, respectively, compared to 107% and 1.04X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Phelps Dodge Tower Loan
($54.5 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 409,900
square foot class A office building located in Phoenix, Arizona.
The property is subject to a 50-year ground lease with the City of
Phoenix.  The property was 96% leased as of June 2010, essentially
the same as at last review.  Performance improved due to increases
in base rent.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.04X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Mansards Loan ($50.1 million -- 4.0%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1,337 unit multifamily
property located in Griffith, Indiana.  The property was 90%
leased as of June 2010.  The loan matures in January 2012.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.93X, respectively,
essentially the same as at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-C3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3 on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 11, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 12, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to
$1.492 billion from $1.636 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 189 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool.  Seven loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review also represented 5% of the
pool.

Twenty five loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $12.88 million loss (62%
loss severity on average).  Currently 17 loans, representing 16%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Southland Center Mall Loan ($105.9 million --
7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 640,000 square foot
retail mall located in Taylor, Michigan.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in April 2009 due the bankruptcy filing and
reorganization of the sponsor, General Growth Properties Inc. This
property is included in the list of "special consideration
properties" established as part of the bankruptcy plan.  These
properties do not have negotiated loan extensions, but GGP has the
ability to offer the properties to the various trusts via deeds in
lieu.  The remaining 16 loans are secured by multifamily, retail
and office properties.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.6 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure
to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2001-CKN5 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2001-CKN5.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five additional classes
from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the interest
shortfalls that have affected the trust, as well as the potential
for future interest shortfalls.  As of the September 2010
remittance report, the trust experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $160,149 primarily related to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amounts associated with four
($53.7 million, 7.6%) of the six specially serviced loans in the
pool.  These four loans had appraisal reduction amounts in effect
totaling $20.9 million, which generated ASERs of $132,419.
Further driving the interest shortfalls were monthly special
servicing fees ($23,874).  The monthly interest shortfalls
affected class K and all classes subordinate to it and also
reduced the liquidity support available to the remaining pooled
classes.  In arriving at its adjusted ratings, S&P also considered
the volume of loans maturing within the next year, as well as a
loan that is subject to workout fees.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect liquidity support and subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class A-X and A-Y interest-only certificates based on its
current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the September 2010 remittance report, six loans
($100.0 million, 14.2%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Three ($52.8 million,
7.5%) of the specially serviced loans are classified as 90-plus
days delinquent and the remaining three ($47.2 million, 6.7%)
are classified as late, but less than 30 days delinquent.  Four
($53.7 million, 7.6%) of the specially serviced loans have ARAs
in effect totaling $20.9 million.

The Macomb Mall loan ($43.0 million total exposure, 6.1%) is the
second-largest loan in the pool, and the largest loan with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by 509,070 sq. ft. of
retail space in Roseville, Mich.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in September 2009 and is classified as late but
less than 30 days delinquent.  As of December 2009, reported debt
service coverage and occupancy were 1.03x and 67.3%, respectively.
The special servicer has indicated that the borrower has submitted
various proposals for a loan restructure but that none were
satisfactory and alternative resolution paths are being discussed.
If the resolution of the loan involves an asset disposition,
Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss to the trust.
Furthermore, if it continues to be delinquent, the loan has the
potential to generate significant ASER interest shortfalls, as an
October 2009 appraisal valued the mall at an amount well below the
outstanding loan balance.

The One Sugar Creek Place loan ($42.8 million total exposure,
6.1%) is the third-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest
loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 509,428-
sq.-ft. office property in Sugar Land, Texas.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in April 2010 and is
classified as 90-plus days delinquent.  Reported DSC was 1.66x as
of December 2009; however, the special servicer's comments
indicate that the building became 100% vacant in March 2010 when
the single tenant's lease expired.  An ARA of $18.6 million is in
effect.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this loan.

The Copper Creek Apartments loan ($8.1 million total exposure,
1.1%) is the third-largest loan with the special servicer.  The
loan is secured by a 300-unit multifamily property in Houston,
Texas.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in July
2010 and is classified as 90-plus days delinquent.  Reported DSC
was 0.46x as of December 2009.  An ARA of $2.0 million is in
effect.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this loan.

The remaining three specially serviced loans have balances that
individually represent less than 1.0% of the total pool balance.
They have a weighted-average reported DSC of 0.68x.  S&P estimated
losses on all three of these loans, resulting in a weighted-
average loss severity rate of 20.5%.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined two
loans to be credit-impaired.  The Normandy Apartments loan
($995,165, 0.1%) appears on the master servicers' watchlist for
low DSC, which was 0.30x as of December 2009.  The loan is secured
by a 50-unit multifamily property in Normandy, Mo.  The second
loan S&P determined to be credit-impaired is the Knell's Ridge
Plaza loan ($728,786, 0.1%).  The loan appears on the master
servicers' watchlist for low DSC, which was 0.35x as of December
2009.  The loan is secured by a 14,891-sq.-ft. mixed-use property
in Chesapeake, Va.  Given these two loans' low DSCs, S&P considers
them to be at an increased risk of default and loss.

The Bayshore Mall loan ($30.2 million, 4.3%), which is the fourth-
largest loan in the pool and discussed in detail below, was
previously with the special servicer and has been returned to the
master servicer.  Pursuant to the transaction documents, the
special servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all
future principal and interest payments on the loan (including the
balloon maturity payment) if it continues to perform and remains
with the master servicer.

Excluding the transaction's defeased loans, cooperative apartment
loans, specially serviced loans, and two credit-impaired loans for
which S&P estimated losses, 61 loans ($250.5 million, 35.5%) have
anticipated repayment dates or final maturity dates through
September 2011.  Standard & Poor's considered this large volume of
loans with near-term ARDs/maturities in its ratings actions.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
had an aggregate trust balance of $706.6 million, down from
$1.07 billion at issuance.  The pool includes 159 loans, down from
195 loans at issuance.  Thirty-nine loans ($210.0 million, 29.7%)
are defeased.  Forty-eight loans ($111.3 million, 15.8%) are
secured by COOP properties.  The master servicers for the deal are
KeyCorp Real Estate Capital (non-COOP loans) and NCB FSB (COOP
loans).  KeyCorp provided full-year 2008, full-year 2009, or
interim-2010 financial information for all of the nondefeased and
non-COOP loans in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.34x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and loan-to-value ratio were 1.29x and 78.9%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the
transaction's defeased loans, COOP loans, specially serviced
loans, and the two loans that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced and credit-impaired loans.  S&P excluded the COOP loans
because they did not default under S&P's stress scenario due to
extremely low leverage.  The master servicers reported a watchlist
of 29 loans ($100.2 million, 14.2%), including two of the top 10
loan exposures, which S&P discuss in detail below.  Twenty-one
loans ($140.7 million, 19.9%) in the pool have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, and 15 ($74.3 million, 10.5%) loans have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $269.7 million (38.2%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.32x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV ratio for the top 10 exposures were 1.06x and 94.3%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude one COOP
loan and two specially serviced loans.

The Bayshore Mall loan is the fourth-largest loan in the pool and
the largest loan on the master servicer's' watchlist.  The loan
has a balance of $30.2 million (4.3%) and is secured by 429,546
sq. ft. of retail space in Eureka, Calif.  The loan appears on the
master servicers' watchlist due to low DSC.  Reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.88x and 87.3%, as of December 2009 and March
2010, respectively.

The Richardson Industrial Portfolio loan is the 10th-largest loan
in the pool and the second-largest loan on the master servicers'
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $12.3 million (1.7%) and is
secured by a portfolio of five industrial properties comprising
284,378 sq. ft. in Richardson, Texas.  The loan appears on the
master servicers' watchlist due to low DSC.  Reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.08x and 82.5%, as of December 2009 and July 2010,
respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with its analysis.

                        Ratings Lowered

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CKN5

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class   To             From      Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --             ----      ----------------------
     D       AA (sf)        AA+ (sf)                   17.81
     E       A+ (sf)        AA (sf)                    16.30
     F       A- (sf)        AA- (sf)                   14.40
     G       BBB (sf)       A (sf)                     11.74
     H       BB+ (sf)       A- (sf)                    10.03
     J       CCC+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)                   7.95
     K       CCC- (sf)      BB+ (sf)                    5.10
     L       CCC- (sf)      BB (sf)                     4.34
     M       CCC- (sf)      B+ (sf)                     2.44

                        Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CKN5

      Class         Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----         ------           ----------------------
      A-4           AAA (sf)                          29.20
      B             AAA (sf)                          23.89
      C             AAA (sf)                          21.23
      A-X           AAA (sf)                            N/A
      A-Y           AAA (sf)                            N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-C4 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C4.
S&P lowered four of these ratings to 'D (sf)'.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 10 other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The lowered ratings
reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon
the eventual resolution of one of five specially serviced loans.
In addition, current and potential interest shortfalls, primarily
due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and special
servicing fees, prompted us to lower S&P's ratings on classes K,
L, M, and N to 'D (sf)'.  S&P expects these interest shortfalls to
continue for the foreseeable future.  Classes G, H, and J have
experienced shortfalls for six months and are at an increased risk
of experiencing shortfalls in the future.  If these shortfalls
continue, S&P will likely further downgrade these classes to 'D
(sf)'.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the transaction.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage of 1.29x and a loan-to-value ratio of 97.2%
for the pool.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under
its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.02x and an
LTV of 120.5%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 43.3% and 29.7%, respectively.  All of the
adjusted DSC and LTV calculations excluded four specially serviced
loans ($99.2 million, 11.0%) and nine defeased loans ($212.9
million, 23.6%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
specially serviced loans, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.  S&P also excluded 79
cooperative apartment loans ($286.0 million, 41.5%) from all of
the DSC and LTV calculations.  These loans did not default under
its 'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-X, A-SP, and A-Y interest-
only certificates based on S&P's current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the September 2010 remittance report, five loans
($100.9 million, 11.2%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, J.E.  Robert Co. Inc. Two ($46.8 million, 5.2%) are
more than 90 days delinquent, one ($24.0 million, 2.7%) is 30 days
delinquent, one ($15.7 million, 1.7%) is less than 30 days
delinquent, and one ($14.4 million, 1.6%) is current.  Appraisal
reduction amounts of $28.5 million are in effect against three of
the specially serviced loans.

The Village on the Parkway loan ($45.1 million, 5.0%), the second-
largest loan in the pool, is the largest loan with the special
servicer.  It is secured by a 381,166-sq.-ft. anchored retail
center in Addison, Texas.  The loan was transferred to JER on Oct.
21, 2009, due to imminent default, in anticipation of the largest
tenant vacating 33.4% of the gross leasable area after its lease
expired in January 2010, which subsequently occurred.  The
property was foreclosed and is currently being marketed for sale.
Based on the most recent appraisal, an ARA totaling $21.6 million
is in effect for this asset.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset, with
a loss severity in excess of 50.0%.

The Wayzata Office loan ($24.0 million, 2.7%), the fifth-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 65,626-sq.-ft. office building
in Wayzata, Minn.  The loan was transferred to JER on April 20,
2010, due to payment default.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported
DSC was 1.64x, and as of June 1, 2010, the property was 82.2%
occupied.  An ARA totaling $6.5 million is in effect for this
asset.  A modification is currently under negotiation, and a
receivership motion has been halted pending the outcome.

The Oak Grove Apartments loan ($15.7 million, 1.7%), the eighth-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 369-unit multifamily
complex in Miami, Fla.  The loan was transferred to JER on Aug. 4,
2009, due to imminent default.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported
DSC was 0.79x.  Occupancy was 94.3% as of July 27, 2010.  The
borrower has informed JER that it will not be funding operating
deficits at the property any longer, and arrangements are being
made by the borrower to prepare the property for sale.  Standard &
Poor's anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The Grassmere Office Building loan ($14.4 million, 1.6%) is
secured by a 224,930-sq.-ft. office building in Nashville, Tenn.
The loan was transferred to JER on Sept. 9, 2010, due to imminent
default.  The loan matured on Oct. 10, 2010, and the special
servicer is currently evaluating the potential for an extension or
modification.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the property had a reported
DSC of 2.14x.  Occupancy was 100.0% as of June 30, 2010.

The remaining specially serviced loan ($1.7 million, 0.2%) had an
anticipated repayment date of May 2009 and is currently more than
90 days delinquent.  A modification is currently under
negotiation.

Five loans totaling $62.7 million (5.5%) were previously with the
special servicer but have since been returned to the master
servicer.  According to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future
principal and interest payments on the loans (including the
balloon maturity payments) if they continue to perform and remain
with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $902.5 million, which represents 79.3% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 159 loans
in the pool, down from 177 at issuance.  The master servicer for
the transaction, KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc.,
provided financial information for 100.0% of the pool, and 84.1%
of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2009 or interim
2010 data.

Excluding the cooperative apartment loans, S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.32x for the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.29x and 97.2%,
respectively, which exclude four specially serviced assets
($99.2 million, 11.0%) for which S&P has estimated losses
separately.  Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for these four loans.
Seventeen loans ($134.7 million, 14.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including four of the top 10 loans.  Ten
loans ($101.7 million, 11.3%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.1x, and nine of these loans ($65.2 million, 7.2%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  Nine loans ($212.9 million,
23.6%) have been defeased.  To date, the transaction has realized
principal losses of $5.6 million in connection with four loans.

                    Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $295.9 million (51.6%).  Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.20x
for the top 10 loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
loans were 1.16x and 112.0%, respectively.  Four of the top 10
loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Bertakis MHP Portfolio loan ($36.5 million, 4.0%), the third-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a seven-property, 1,723-
unit mobile home park portfolio consisting of six properties in
Michigan and one in Texas.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to its upcoming maturity.  The loan had
previously matured on Aug. 11, 2009, but has been extended using
three successive one-year extension options.  The current
extension option expires on Nov. 11, 2010, with final maturity
anticipated on Nov. 11, 2012.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported
DSC was 1.02x, and as of June 30, 2010, the property was 90.7%
occupied.  This DSC figure represents a significant decline from
the Dec. 31, 2008, reported figure of 2.36x.  The 2008 figure was
based on net cash flow that included revenue from noncollateral
assets.  The precipitous decline in DSC was primarily due to the
exclusion of this revenue in the 2009 figure.

The Village Square Shopping Center and Deerpath Court Shopping
Center loan ($30.2 million, 3.3%), the fourth-largest loan in the
pool, is secured by a two-property, 363,021-sq.-ft. anchored
retail portfolio in Lake Zurich, Ill.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC associated with the
Deerpath Court property.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the portfolio had a
reported DSC of 1.28x, with a 1.45x DSC for the Village Square
property and a 1.02x DSC for the Deerpath Court property.
Occupancy for the portfolio as of June 30, 2010, was 89.7%, with
95.5% occupancy for the Village Square property and 81.7% for the
Deerpath Court property.

The Timberlake Apartments and Madison Pointe Apartments loan
($18.2 million, 2.0%), the sixth-largest loan in the pool, is
secured by a two-property, 511-unit multifamily portfolio in
Sarasota, Fla., and College Stations, Texas.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Dec. 31,
2009, the portfolio had a reported DSC of 0.99x, with a 0.76 DSC
for the Timberlake Apartments property and a 1.34x DSC for the
Madison Pointe property.  Occupancy for the portfolio as of June
20, 2010, was 84.0%, with 82.0% occupancy for the Timberlake
Apartments property and 86.0% for the Madison Pointe property.

The City Park Retail loan ($17.8 million, 2.0%), the eighth-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 74,265-sq.-ft.
unanchored retail center in Lincolnshire, Ill.  The loan appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to an occupancy decline.
As of Dec. 31, 2009, reported DSC for the property was 1.16x.  As
of June 30, 2010, property occupancy was 65.3%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C4

                Rating
                ------
   Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
   -----  --              ----          ----------------------
   B      A   (sf)        AA+ (sf)                       11.52
   C      BBB+ (sf)       A+ (sf)                         8.68
   D      BBB- (sf)       A (sf)                          7.57
   E      BB- (sf)        A- (sf)                         6.16
   F      B (sf)          BBB+ (sf)                       5.21
   G      CCC- (sf)       BBB- (sf)                       3.63
   H      CCC- (sf)       BB+ (sf)                        3.32
   J      CCC- (sf)       BB (sf)                         2.85
   K      D (sf)          BB- (sf)                        2.22
   L      D (sf)          B+ (sf)                         1.74
   M      D (sf)          B (sf)                          1.43
   N      D (sf)          B- (sf)                         0.95

                        Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C4

           Class  Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
           -----  ------        ----------------------
           A-2    AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-3    AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-4    AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-5    AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-6    AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-1-A  AAA (sf)                       24.60
           A-J    AAA (sf)                       15.93
           A-X    AAA (sf)                         N/A
           A-SP   AAA (sf)                         N/A
           A-Y    AAA (sf)                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Eastland CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of
     $94,064,558.99), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 9,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$825,600,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of
     $764,369,990.55), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 9,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$206,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
     on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$78,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
     on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$81,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current
     outstanding balance of $82,890,594.48), Upgraded to Caa2
     (sf); previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated August 31, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2594 compared to 3049
in the June 2009 report and is currently in compliance with a
trigger level of 2740.  Securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make
up approximately 8.53% of the underlying portfolio versus 14.46%
in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
113.58%, 106.02%, 100.40% and 96.81%, respectively, versus June
2009 levels of 109.45%, 102.43%, 97.18% and 93.82%, respectively,
and the Class A overcollateralization test is currently in
compliance.  However, as a result of the continued failure of the
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization tests, excess
spread and principal collections are being diverted to pay down
Class A Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $1,252 million, defaulted par of $197 million,
weighted average default probability of 28.74% (implying a WARF of
3992), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.71%,
and a diversity score of 65.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Eastland CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3194)

  -- Class A-1: +2
  -- Class A-2a: 0
  -- Class A-2b: +3
  -- Class A-3: +3
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +5
  -- Class D: 0


Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4790)

  -- Class A-1: -2
  -- Class A-2a: -2
  -- Class A-2b: -2
  -- Class A-3: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: 0

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (43.71%)

  -- Class A-1: +1
  -- Class A-2a: 0
  -- Class A-2b: +1
  -- Class A-3: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (39.71%)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2a: -1
  -- Class A-2b: 0
  -- Class A-3: 0
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


EASTMAN HILL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class, affirmed two classes, and
maintained Rating Watch Evolving on three classes of notes issued
by Eastman Hill Funding I, Ltd./Inc.:

  -- $87,287,403 class A-1-FL notes remain at 'Bsf'; Rating Watch
     Evolving;

  -- $1,704,832 class A-1-FX notes remain at 'Bsf'; Rating Watch
     Evolving;

  -- $88,992,235 class A-2 notes remain at 'Bsf'; Rating Watch
     Evolving;

  -- $10,000,000 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf';

  -- $37,338,480 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';

  -- $25,000,000 combination notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

The nature of the dispute which led to Fitch's assignment of
Rating Watch Evolving is described in Fitch's press releases dated
March 5, 2009 and April 6, 2010.  While all funds were distributed
under the transaction's regular priority of payments for the
June 30, 2010 payment, for the Sept. 30 payment the court ordered
that a portion be held in escrow.

Fitch's rating for the classes A-1-FL and A-1-FX (together class
A-1), A-2, and A-3 notes address their ability to receive timely
interest and ultimate principal payment at or prior to the notes'
legal maturity.  Although the overall performance of class A-1
since last review has been positive, with the notes having
delevered 27.2% since April 2010, the litigation is still ongoing
and a portion of the principal and interest proceeds continues to
be held in escrow.

The overall credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
slightly since the last review.  The trustee reported Fitch
weighted average rating factor has increased to 20 from 17.  The
percentage of the portfolio with a Fitch-derived rating below
investment grade is 25.5% compared to 18.6% at last review.  A
portion of the interest to the class A-1 and A-2 notes and all of
the interest to class A-3 is being fulfilled through the use of
principal.  The results of Fitch's Structured Finance Portfolio
Credit Model and cash flow model indicate that the portfolio
deterioration for the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes was at least
offset by the delevering mentioned above.

Conversely, the class B-1 notes are deferring interest.  Fitch
considers default inevitable for the class B-1 notes, therefore,
they have been downgraded to 'Csf'.

Fitch does not assign Loss Severity Rating and Rating Outlooks to
classes rated 'CCCsf' or lower.  Fitch currently does not assign
Recovery Ratings to distressed classes of structured finance CDOs.
No Loss Severity Ratings are being assigned at this time to the
class A-1 and A-2 notes in view of the ongoing litigation.

Eastman Hill is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation which
closed on July 2, 2001.  The portfolio is monitored by TCW Asset
Management Company.  The reinvestment period ended in June 2006.
The portfolio is composed of corporate bonds (52.3%) and
residential mortgage-backed securities (47.7%).


EVRAZ NORTH: Moody's Withdraws All Outstanding Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings for Evraz
North America, Evraz Inc., NA and Evraz Inc. NA Canada.

The last rating action on ENA was October 1, 2010, when the
ratings were assigned.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating for its
own business reasons.  The company has decided not to proceed with
the note issue.

Withdrawals:

Issuer: Evraz Inc. NA

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn,
     previously rated B1, LGD3, 32%

Issuer: Evraz Inc, NA Canada

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn,
     previously rated B1, LGD3 32%

Issuer: Evraz North America

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated B2
  -- Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Evraz Inc. NA

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

Issuer: Evraz North America

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

Evraz North America refers to the combined operations of Evraz
Inc. NA and Evraz Inc. NA Canada, described below.  For analytical
and rating purposes, Moody's views EINA and EICA as one
consolidated entity.  The company's business is structured along
its product lines, which are Flat Products, Tubular Products and
Long Products.  Evraz Group S.A., also described below, is the
parent company of EINA and EICA.

EINA, headquartered in Portland, Oregon, is a steelmaking company
with operations in the U.S. and Canada.  Through its flat and
tubular divisions, it operates two steel mills, two pipe mills,
and one scrap processing facility.  Its major products include
discrete steel plate, coiled plate, structural tubing, large
diameter line pipe, and electric resistance welded pipe.  Through
its long products division, it operates steelmaking and finishing
facilities, which include the production of railroad rail.  EINA
is one of two principal producers in the U.S. rail market.

EICA, through its flat and tubular divisions, operates steelmaking
facilities, finishing facilities, and a plate mill that produces
discrete steel plate and coiled plate.  It also operates pipe
finishing facilities where it produces electric resistance welded
line pipe and oil country tubular goods.

Evraz Group S.A. is a leading global vertically integrated steel
company headquartered in Russia with assets in Russia, the
Ukraine, Europe, North America and South Africa.  Through its
mining division, the company also operates iron ore and coal
mining complexes.  The company generated $9.8 billion in revenue
in 2009.  Steel production was 15.3 million tons.


FAIRFAX COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 1998A Bonds to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'B+' from 'AAA' its
rating on Fairfax County Redevelopment & Housing Authority, Va.'s
series 1998A multifamily housing revenue bonds (Castel Lani
project), and removed it from CreditWatch.

"The downgrade is based on S&P's view of the project's reliance on
short-term market-rate investments," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Wendy Dolber.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Cash flows showing timely payment of principal and interest on
  the bonds plus fees until April 1, 2019; after that date there
  are insufficient funds to pay debt service plus fees until
  maturity.

Offsetting factors are:

* Strong asset/Liability parity of 103.4% at its lowest;

* The high credit quality of the assets consisting of a Federal
  Housing Administration-insured mortgage loan under the Risk
  Share Program; and

* Investments held in a Fidelity Treasury money market fund rated
  'AAAm'.

In addition, S&P has been advised that the issuer is considering
waiving its fee for several years, which would have a considerable
positive impact on cash flows.  However, to date, Standard &
Poor's has not received the documentation.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions where funds are invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.  According to its revised criteria, S&P caps ratings on
bonds issued in transactions that assume stressed reinvestment
rates at the 'A' level.  Standard & Poor's analyzes updated cash
flow statements, based on its current stressed reinvestment rate
assumptions for all scenarios as set forth in the related criteria
articles.

If the security prepays, there are sufficient assets to cover the
reinvestment risk based on the 30-day minimum notice period
required for special redemptions.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on Two Series 1997-C1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 1997-C1.

The affirmation of the class G, at 'B+ (sf)', reflects concerns
about the propensity of the class to experience future interest
shortfalls relating to the specially serviced assets or other
loans that may default in the future.  Outstanding accumulated
shortfalls have been reported for the class for the past seven
trustee remittance reports, but are expected to be fully recovered
over the next two trustee remittance reports.  If this does not
occur, S&P will lower the rating.

S&P affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on class H, which S&P had lowered
in January 2006 due to a $1.6 million principal loss at that time.
According to the September 2010 remittance report, class H has
sustained principal losses totaling $6.4 million, or 11% of its
original principal balance.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.48x and a loan-to-value ratio of 60.3%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.93x and an LTV ratio of 65.0%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
23.4% and 37.4%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude one defeased loan ($25.3 million; 17.7%) and
four specially serviced assets ($10.8 million; 7.6%), for which
S&P separately estimated losses and included in its 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss severity figures.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Sept. 15, 2010, remittance report, five assets
($12.6 million; 8.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  Four assets ($10.8 million,
7.6%) are real estate owned, and one ($1.8 million, 1.3%) is in
its grace period.  One of the specially serviced assets
($3.6 million, 2.5%) has an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
$3.1 million in effect.  In addition, nonrecoverable advance
determinations have been made for three loans ($7.2 million,
5.1%).  The four REO assets are former Circuit City locations.
Details of all five specially serviced loans are:

The Circuit City - Countryside asset ($3.7 million total exposure,
2.5%) is a stand-alone, vacant 33,225-sq.-ft. retail building
previously occupied by Circuit City in Countryside, Ill.  The
related loan was transferred to the special servicer on Nov.  21,
2008, due to imminent default and became REO via foreclosure on
Oct. 19, 2009.  An ARA of $3.1 million is in effect for this asset
as of April 23, 2010.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant
loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Circuit City - Clearwater asset ($3.1 million total exposure,
1.8%) is a stand-alone, vacant 43,684-sq.-ft. retail building
previously occupied by Circuit City in Clearwater, Fla.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 13, 2009, due to
imminent default and became REO via a deed-in-lieu on Jan. 21,
2010.  The property was listed for sale, an offer was recently
accepted, and the contracts have been sent to the prospective
buyer.  An ARA was in effect for this asset, but future advances
have now been declared no-recoverable.  Standard & Poor's expects
a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Circuit City - Minnetonka asset ($2.65 million total exposure,
1.8%) is a stand-alone, vacant 32,873-sq.-ft. retail building
previously occupied by Circuit City in Minnetonka, Minn.  The
related loan was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 30,
2008, due to imminent default and became REO via foreclosure on
Oct. 9, 2009.  The property was listed for sale, an offer was
accepted, and the contract is anticipated to close by the end of
October 2010.  An ARA was in effect for this asset, but future
advances have now been declared nonrecoverable.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Circuit City - Lafayette asset ($2.6 million total exposure,
1.4%) is a stand-alone, vacant 34,205-sq.-ft. retail building
previously occupied by Circuit City in Lafayette, La.  The related
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 30, 2008, due
to imminent default and became REO via foreclosure on Oct. 28,
2009.  The property is currently listed for sale.  An ARA was in
effect for this asset, but future advances have now been declared
nonrecoverable.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon
the resolution of this asset.

The Plantation Business Park loan ($1.8 million, 1.3%) is secured
by a 52,419-sq.-ft. office building in Plantation, Fla.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Aug. 4, 2008, due to
litigation.  There were two matters pending, including a) code
enforcement violations and b) control and management of the
property.  The City of Plantation has issued a letter confirming
the code violations have been cured.  The loan had an anticipated
repayment date of April 1, 2007, which was not exercised and
therefore required an increase in the interest rate to 13.405%.
However, due to the current circumstances, the special servicer
entered into a short-term forbearance with the borrower, which
only requires the borrower to pay mortgage payments based on the
original interest rate of 8.405%, with all excess cash flow
applied to the outstanding principal balance.  Current cash flow
at the property is insufficient to pay mortgage payments and
therefore there is currently no excess cash flow.

The servicer's nonrecoverable declaration and subsequent advance
recoveries on the four Circuit City assets prompted shortfalls to
the class G and all classes subordinate to it.  The recoup of
prior advances by the servicer began in March 2010 and ended in
June 2010, causing an accumulated interest shortfall of $1.0
million to class G.  The class has received interest recoveries
the past three trustee remittance reports, which has reduced the
outstanding accumulated interest shortfalls.  S&P anticipates the
class will completely recover in two periods.  The nonrecoverable
advance on Circuit City - Countryside was subsequently reversed,
and ongoing interest not advanced is estimated by the servicer to
be $52,000 for the three remaining Circuit City assets.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $142.8 million (38 loans), compared
with $1.7 billion (355 loans) at issuance.  Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC, the master servicer, provided financial information
for 78.7% of the trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided
financial information was full-year 2008, full-year 2009, or
partial-year 2010 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.52x for the nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.48x and 60.3%,
respectively, and exclude one defeased loan ($25.3 million; 17.7%)
and four specially serviced assets ($10.8 million; 7.6%), for
which S&P separately estimated losses.  Furthermore, financial
information was not provided on the previously referenced four
specially serviced assets.  Five loans ($22.0 million, 15.4%) are
on the master servicer's watchlist.  Two loans ($18.3 million,
12.8%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and three loans
($8.4 million, 5.9%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The
trust has experienced $56.7 million of principal losses on 18
loans to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $71.3 million (49.9%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.49x for the top 10 nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.43x and
55.3%, respectively.  Two of the top 10 loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist, which S&P discusses below.

The Central Valley Plaza Shopping Center loan ($13.4 million;
9.4%) is the largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured
by a 299,238, sq.-ft. anchored retail center located in Modesto,
Calif.  The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to
a low DSC and a major tenant expiring.  The Wal-Mart lease
initially expired Oct. 26, 2010, but Wal-Mart has since signed a
five-year renewal option.  As of year-end 2009, the reported
occupancy and DSC were 92% and 1.06x, respectively, versus 100%
and 1.25x at issuance.

The Portage Center & Waseca Center loan ($4.4 million; 3.1%) is
the ninth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by
two anchored retail centers totaling 175,369 sq. ft. in Portage,
Wis., and Waseca, Minn.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low DSC and decreased occupancy.  The Portage
Center is 100% occupied, while the Waseca Center is 51% occupied
as of April 2010.  The borrower is currently advertising the
space.  As of year-end 2009, the reported combined occupancy and
DSC were 77% and 0.75x, respectively.  Reported DSC at issuance
was 1.28x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Affirmed

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-C1

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             G        B+ (sf)                   37.14
             H        D (sf)                      N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-C1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed 13 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-
C1:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 2, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and concerns about loans approaching
maturity in an adverse environment.  Ninety five loans,
representing 99% of the pool, mature within the next 36 months.
Fourteen of these loans, representing 10% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index
(Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
6.5% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 23, 2006.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to
$894.2 million from $1.18 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 96 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 34% of the pool.  Twenty three loans,
representing 32% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 22% of the pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $16.4 million (29% loss severity
overall).  Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $17.9
million loss (41% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$7.2 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 92% and 79% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 76% compared to 81% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.46X, respectively, compared to
1.53X and 1.36X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 30 compared to 46 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Jamaica Center Loan
($53.8 million - 6.0%), which is secured by a 215,800 square
foot retail center located in Jamaica (Queens), New York.  The
property is 100% leased, the same as last review.  The largest
tenant is a 15-screen multiplex movie theater operated by
National Amusement, Inc. (38% of the net rentable area; lease
expiration May 2022).  Performance has been stable.  The loan
has amortized 5% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 74% and 1.32X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.25X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Price Self Storage Portfolio
($42.1 million -- 4.7%), which is secured by three self storage
properties located in southern California.  The properties total
4,345 units, including 185 RV storage spaces.  As of January 2010
the portfolio was 88% leased compared to 93% at last review.
Overall performance has been stable.  The loan has amortized 4%
since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.35X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.27X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Cumberland Mall Loan ($40.4 million
-- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by 505,000 square feet of a
891,000 square foot regional mall located in Vineland, New Jersey.
The mall is anchored by Boscov's, BJ's, Home Depot (not part of
the loan collateral) and JC Penny and Regal Cinemas.  As of
January 2010 the in-line space was 90% leased, essentially the
same as securitization.  Performance has slightly declined since
last review but it has been offset by 6% amortization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to
74% and 1.35X at last review.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CC1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Corporation, series 2006-CC1 as a result of increased
interest shortfalls on the underlying collateral.  A complete list
of rating actions follows at the end of this release.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2009.  Since that time, approximately 48.7% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and 1.3% is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Currently, 74.6% of the portfolio is rated below
investment grade and 29.1% has a Fitch derived rating in the 'CCC'
rating category or lower, compared to 55.7% and 6.4%,
respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.  The
transaction has paid down by $20.9 million since issuance.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentration in distressed assets, Fitch believes
that the probability of default for all classes of notes can be
evaluated without factoring potential further losses from the non-
defaulted portion of the portfolio.  Therefore, this transaction
was not modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model.

For all classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower)
and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (25.9%).
Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement to each class is
well below the percentage of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls.  According to the Sept. 22, 2010 trustee report, the
class A notes received a partial interest payment and classes B
through G continue to defer their interest payments.

GSMS 2006-CC1 is a CMBS Mezzanine Resecuritization issued in April
2006.  The transaction is collateralized by 87 CMBS assets from 60
transactions.  The portfolio is composed of 89.9% CMBS from the
2003 through 2006 vintages and the remaining 10.1% is from the
1997 through 2002 vintages.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $323,294,116 class A downgrade to 'C' from 'B/LS2', remove
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $18,280,000 class B downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $10,155,000 class C downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $3,554,000 class D downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $3,554,000 class E downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $4,062,000 class F downgrade to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $3,046,000 class G downgrade to 'C' from 'CC'.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999-C1 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. II'S series 1999-C1.  S&P lowered its
rating on class H to 'D (sf)'.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the interest shortfalls
that have affected the trust, as well as the potential for future
interest shortfalls associated with several assets that are with
the special servicer.  S&P lowered its rating on the class H
certificate to 'D (sf)' because of recurring interest shortfalls
that S&P expects will continue for the foreseeable future.

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the trust experienced
monthly interest shortfalls totaling $99,441 related to five of
seven specially serviced assets in the pool.  The monthly interest
shortfalls caused classes G and H to experience interest
shortfalls for one month and six months, respectively.  In
addition, it is S&P's understanding that the master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, intends to make nonrecoverable
advance determinations on two specially serviced assets, Howard
Johnson Riverwalk Plaza Hotel and Dicks Clothing & Sporting Goods
Store, as well as recover prior advances related to two other
specially serviced assets, Field & Stream Woodridge Apartments and
Dana Corporation Office Warehouse, which will further reduce the
interest distributions to the trust in future remittance periods.

The primary cause of the interest shortfalls reported on the
September 2010 remittance report was trust expenses paid by the
servicer related to legal expenses associate with one specially
serviced asset ($42,595), the master servicer's nonrecoverable
declaration for two specially serviced assets ($30,911), and
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions amounts stemming from
ARAs ($21,248).  As of the Sept. 18, 2010, remittance report, the
collateral pool consisted of 32 loans and four real estate owned
assets with an aggregate trust balance of $55 million.  Two loans
($9.7 million, 17.7%), including the largest loan in the trust
($8.4 million, 16.1%), are defeased and not scheduled to mature
before April 1, 2013.  To date, the trust has experienced a loss
of $23.8 million in connection with 42 loans.

As of the September 2010 remittance report, seven assets
($22.2 million, 40.41%) were with the special servicer, ORIX
Capital Markets Inc. The payment status of the specially serviced
assets is: four ($8.4 million, 15.3%) are REO, two ($12.2 million,
22.5%) are 90-plus days delinquent, and one ($1.6 million, 2.85%)
is late but less than 30 days delinquent.  Six of the specially
serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in effect
totaling $5.4 million.

Details regarding the five specially serviced assets that are the
primary drivers of the interest shortfalls are:

Old Times Union Building loan, the largest nondefeased loan in the
pool, has a total exposure of $6.5 million (11.6%) and was
transferred to the special servicer in May 2010 due to imminent
default.  According to the special servicer, the sole tenant of
the property vacated the property in June 30, 2010.   In addition,
the loan matured in June 1, 2010, and is now 90-plus days
delinquent.  The loan is secured by a 100,300-sq.-ft office
building in Albany, N.Y.  The borrower is working to bring a new
tenant into the building and is also researching alternative uses
for the building.  The borrower is negotiating forbearance for the
collateral.  An ARA of $1.6 million is in effect for this asset,
based on a July 2010 appraisal.  S&P expects a significant loss to
the trust upon the resolution of this loan, should the
aforementioned forbearance agreement not be reached.

Howard Johnson Riverwalk Plaza Hotel loan is the largest exposure
($7.1 million, 10.7%) in the pool, which includes approximately
$1.2 million of servicer advances and interest thereon.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 5, 2008, due to
maturity default.  The loan is 90-plus days delinquent and is
secured by a 132-room, full-service lodging property, built in
1933 in San Antonio, Texas.  An ARA of $1.48 million is in effect
for this asset.  The master servicer has made a nonrecoverable
determination for this loan, which will be reflected in the
October 2010 remittance report.  Field & Stream/Woodbridge
Apartments loan is the third-largest exposure ($3.7 million, 4.9%)
in the pool, which includes approximately $975,000 of servicer
advances outstanding.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on May 15, 2008, due to imminent default and is currently
REO.  The asset consists of two multifamily properties, totaling
158 units in Lexington, Ky.  The master servicer declared it
nonrecoverable in June 2010.  Prior to the nonrecoverable
declaration, there was an ARA of $785,020 million in effect, based
on a June 2010 appraisal of $2 million.  The master servicer
intends to recover all or a portion of the prior servicer advances
noted above.  Dicks Clothing & Sporting Goods Store is the fourth-
largest exposure ($3.4 million, 4.7%) in the pool, which includes
approximately $856,251 of outstanding servicer advances and
interest thereon.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Oct. 6, 2008, due to maturity default and is currently
REO.   The asset consists of a vacant 65,000-sq.-ft. retail
property.  An appraisal reduction amount of $502,181 is in effect
based on a Feb. 19, 2009, appraisal of $3.0 million.  The master
servicer has made a nonrecoverable determination for this loan,
which will be reflected in the October 2010 remittance report.
Dana Corporation Office Warehouse, the seventh-largest exposure
($2.4 million, 3.7%), includes approximately $408,000 in servicer
advancing and interest thereon.  The asset consists of a 108,016-
sq.-ft. industrial property, built in 1984 in Vinita, Okla.  The
master servicer declared the asset nonrecoverable in March 2010.
Prior to the nonrecoverable declaration, there was an ARA of
$1.0 million in effect based on an Aug. 20, 2009, appraisal of
$1.6 million.  The master servicer intends to recover all or a
portion of the prior servicer advances noted above.  The lowered
ratings are consistent with Standard & Poor's current criteria and
analysis of the transaction.

                         Ratings Lowered

                 GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

                Rating
                ------
   Class   To             From         Credit enhancement (%)
   -----   --             ----         ----------------------
   F       BB- (sf)       BBB(sf)                      75.32
   G       CCC- (sf)      B+(sf)                       22.68
   H       D (sf)         B-(sf)                       10.54


HOMEBANC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 26 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 26
tranches and upgraded two tranches from four RMBS transactions,
backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Homebanc Mortgage Trust.

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

In addition to adjustments to reflect updated loss expectations,
the ratings of all tranches in Homebanc 2005-1 and the senior
tranches in Homebanc 2005-3, 2005-4 and 2005-5 are being adjusted
to reflect certain omissions in the transaction documents.
Previous rating actions assumed a sequential transaction
structure.  Due to an omission in the closing documents, however,
all tranches in the Homebanc 2005-1 transaction receive principal
pro-rata.  There is also no loss allocation to any tranche in the
transaction.  As a result, once all the mortgages are paid-off or
written down, payment shortfalls due to the final under-
collateralized amount will be shared by all the tranches in the
Homebanc 2005-1 transaction.  Due to the same omissions in the
transaction documents for Homebanc 2005-3, 2005-4 and 2005-5,
there is no distinction in cashflow or loss priority within the
senior tranches of those transactions.  Moody's ratings for the
Class A-1 and Class A-2 tranches for these transactions,
previously viewed as super senior / super senior support tranches,
have been adjusted to reflect this pro-rata structure.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Homebanc Mortgage Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 2007-CIBC18 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 13 classes of JP Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Corp. 2007-CIBC18 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 8, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 8, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 10, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $3.76 billion
from $3.90 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 216 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool.

Fifty-eight loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $44.0 million (54% loss severity on
average).  Twenty-two loans, representing 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $67.3 million appraisal reduction for 16
of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-LDP1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-LDP1 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-J, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-JFL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 21, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 9, 2008 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 9, 2008 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 9, 2008 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 9, 2008 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 9, 2008.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to
$2.12 billion from $2.88 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 202 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 44% of the pool.

Thirty-six loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.5 million (35% loss severity).
Fifteen loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $26.6 million appraisal reduction for eight of the
specially serviced loans

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-CIBC13 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eight classes of J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-CIBC13 on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 7, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on December 7, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated January 20, 2010.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to
$2.528 billion from $2.720 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 219 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 35% of the pool.  There are no loans with credit
estimates and no loans have defeased.

Fifty five loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $50.6 million loss (60%
loss severity on average).  Currently 12 loans, representing 19%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the DRA-CRT Portfolio I Loan ($180.9 million --
7.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 16 property office
portfolio with locations in Florida, Maryland and North Carolina.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in November 2009 due
to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on October 1,
2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is The Shore Club Loan
($109.6 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 322
room boutique hotel located in Miami, Florida.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in September 2009 due to imminent
default.  The loan matures on December 1, 2010.  The remaining ten
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $174.5 million
appraisal reduction for eight of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$11.18 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience future interest shortfalls because of the high
exposure to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Series 2004-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 11 classes,
confirmed two classes and affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 2, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. RP-1, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. RP-2, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. RP-3, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. RP-4, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. RP-5, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The confirmations and affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

On September 22, 2010, Moody's placed 13 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 9, 2008.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to
$900.92 million from $1.06 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 118 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 56% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans,
representing 29% of the pool, which have investment grade credit
estimates.  Eleven loans, representing 7% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 8% of the pool.

Twenty-two loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $4.9 million (30% loss severity
overall).  Four loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Robert Duncan Plaza Loan ($40.7 million -- 4.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 332,000 square foot Class A office building
located in Portland, Oregon.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing due to bankruptcy of the sponsor, Rubicon REIT.
Property performance has been stable and the loan is expected to
be returned to the master servicer once the bankruptcy is resolved
with no loss to the trust.  The property was 95% leased as of
December 2009 compared to 100% at last review.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a
mix of property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$15.7 million loss (22% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.6 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 65% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
100% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 88%, essentially the same
as at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.4X and 1.16X, respectively, compared to
1.43X and 1.15X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 27 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Somerset Collection
Loan ($125.5 million - 13.9%), which is a 50.0% pari passu
interest in a $251.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.4 million square foot
regional mall located in Troy, Michigan.  The mall is the dominant
mall in its trade area and is anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, Saks
Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus.  The center was 97% leased as of
December 2009, essentially the same as at last review.  The loan
is interest only for its entire 10-year term.  Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A1 and 2.17X, respectively,
compared to A1 and 1.44X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Republic Plaza Loan
($99.3 million -- 11%), which represents the pooled portion of a
$125.3 million first mortgage loan.  The non-pooled portion
($26.0 million) is in the trust and supports non-pooled Classes
RP-1, RP-2, RP-3, RP-4 and RP-5.  The loan is secured by a
1.3 million square foot Class A office building located in
downtown Denver, Colorado.  The property was 93% leased as of July
2010 compared to 97% at last review.  The largest tenants include
Ecana Oil & Gas (25% of net rentable area; lease expiration April
2019) and DCP Midstream LP (10% NRA; lease expiration May 2016).
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and
1.81X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.92X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Hometown America Portfolio VII
Loan ($91.2 million -- 10.1%), which is secured by ten
manufactured housing communities located in Florida, Michigan,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Colorado and Illinois.  The portfolio
totals 3,900 pads.  The portfolio was 91% leased as of June 2010
compared to 95% at last review.  The loan has amortized 4% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shoppes at English Village Loan
($24.6 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 103,000 square foot
lifestyle retail center located approximately 30 miles northwest
of downtown Philadelphia in North Wales, Pennsylvania.  The center
was 99% leased as of December 2009 compared to 93% at last review.
The largest tenants are Trader Joe's and Talbot's.  Performance
has declined due to a decline in rental revenue.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.92X, respectively, compared to 92%
and 1.05X at last review.

The third largest loan is the East Village Marketplace Loan
($20.4 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 77,000
square foot retail property located in Chula Vista, California.
The center was 93% leased as of December 2009.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.37X, respectively, compared to 82% and
1.21X at last review.


KEOKUK AREA: Moody's Junks Ratings on Hospital Revenue Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Keokuk Area Hospital's
bond rating to Caa2 from B3.  The downgrade affects approximately
$5.4 million of outstanding Series 1998 revenue bonds issued
through the City of Keokuk, IA.  The downgrade reflects KAH's weak
operating performance through 11 months fiscal year 2010 and
thinner cash.  The rating outlook remains negative reflecting
Moody's expectations for continued operating challenges, liquidity
pressures, and Moody's belief that should KAH file for bankruptcy
a lower rating may be warranted based on the estimated recovery
value of the bonds.

                        Ratings Rationale

Legal Security: The Series 1998 bonds are secured by a gross
revenue pledge of KAH with a negative mortgage lien.  KAH is the
only member of the obligated group.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None.

                           Challenges

* Very weak liquidity position with just 18.5 days cash on hand
  and 21.2% cash-to-debt at fiscal year end 2009 (September 30
  year end), which has deteriorated through 11 months FY 2010
  (10.2 days cash on hand and 11.5% cash-to-debt at August 31,
  2010)

* Very modest operating results through 11 months FY 2010 (-3.7%
  operating margin, 2.0% operating cash flow margin), results in
  weak debt ratios (30.7 times debt-to-cash flow and 0.4 times
  peak debt service coverage)

* Small hospital in a challenging service area, as Medicare,
  Medicaid, and self-pay represented approximately 71% of gross
  revenues in FY 2009; population in Lee County has been declining
  in recent years

* Limited capital spending in recent years has led to a high
  average age of plant of 16.1 years at August 31, 2010

                            Strengths

* Distinctly leading market share in a primary service area (PSA)
  that covers the City of Keokuk and southern Lee County, IA

* All fixed rate debt and defined contribution pension plan

                   Recent Developments/Results

KAH's operating performance has weakened in interim FY 2010.
Through unaudited 11 months FY 2010 (period ended August 31,
2010), KAH recorded an operating loss of $1.0 million (-3.7%
operating margin) and operating cash flow of $534,000 (2.0%
operating cash flow margin), compared with a $474,000 operating
loss (-1.7% margin) and $1.1 million operating cash flow (4.0%
margin) for the same period FY 2009.  In audited FY 2009, KAH
recorded an operating income of $669,000 (2.0% margin) and
operating cash flow of $2.3 million (6.8% margin).  Management
attributes the weaker operating results in FY 2010 to KAH's
continued challenged payer mix and steep volume declines,
particularly in the latter months of FY 2010.  In an effort to
stabilize operating performance and maintain cash, management has
worked to control expenses, which has included reducing staff by
approximately 22-23 full-time equivalents and a wage freeze for FY
2011.

Due to stressed operating performance, KAH's Moody's adjusted debt
ratios are very modest.  Based on 11 months FY 2010 results
annualized, adjusted debt-to-cash flow measures a very high
(unfavorable) 30.7 times and maximum annual debt service coverage
an anemic 0.4 times.

KAH's unrestricted liquidity position has declined markedly in FY
2010, which is a material credit concern.  At August 31, 2010,
KAH's absolute unrestricted cash and investments declined to
$828,000 from to $1.6 million at FYE 2009 (September 30 year end).
As a result, cash on hand declined to a very weak 10.2 days
(annualized) at August 31, 2010 from 18.5 days at FYE 2009.
Likewise, cash-to-debt decreased to a very weak 11.5% from 21.2%
over the period.  According to management, absolute level of total
unrestricted cash and investments at September 30, 2010 was in-
line with August 31, 2010.

Management notes that KAH maintains a distinct market share lead
of its PSA, which covers the City of Keokuk and southern Lee
County, IA.  According to US Census Bureau data, Lee County is
characterized by population decline in recent years (6.8% drop
from April 2000 to July 2009) and a median household income
noticeably below the state and national levels.

                             Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's concerns that operating
results will continue to be challenged in FY 2011, KAH's weak and
deteriorating liquidity position, and Moody's belief that should
KAH file for bankruptcy a lower rating may be warranted based on
the estimated recovery value of the bonds.

               What could change the rating -- Up

An upgrade is unlikely in the near-term; over the longer term,
material liquidity gains without additional debt, sustained
operating improvement, and reversal of recent patient volume
losses

              What could change the rating -- Down

Continued decline in absolute cash and investments leading to even
weaker liquidity ratios; continued volume declines and weak
operating results; bond payment default or bankruptcy

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on Keokuk Area Hospital financial report

  -- First number reflects audited FY 2009 for the year ended
     September 30, 2009

  -- Second number reflects unaudited 11 months FY 2010 (through
     August 31, 2010) annualized

  -- Investment returns classified as non-operating and smoothed
     at 6%

* Inpatient admissions: 3,304; 2,713 (represents inpatient
  admissions for full year FY 2010)

* Total operating revenues: $33.4 Million; $29.7 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenues available for debt service:
  $2.3 million; $632,000

* Total debt outstanding: $7.5 million; $7.2 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $1.6 million; $1.6 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: 1.40 times; 0.59
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: 1.45 times; 0.40 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 3.98 times; 30.75 times

* Days cash on hand: 18.5 days; 10.2 days

* Cash-to-debt: 21.2%; 11.5%

* Operating margin: 2.0%; -3.7%

* Operating cash flow margin: 6.8%; 2.0%

                            Rated Debt

Issued through City of Keokuk, IA (debt outstanding as of
September 30, 2009)

* Series 1998 Fixed Rate Revenue Bonds ($5.8 million outstanding),
  rated Caa2

The last rating action with respect to KAH was on February 5,
2010, when a municipal finance scale rating of B3 was affirmed and
the outlook was negative.  That rating was subsequently
recalibrated to B3 on May 7, 2010.


LANDMARK II: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
class B notes issued by Landmark II CDO Ltd. to 'D (sf)' from 'BBB
(sf)'.  Landmark II CDO Ltd. is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation transaction managed by Aladdin Capital Management LLC.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A, C, and
D notes.  The affirmations reflect S&P's view that these tranches
have adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings
according to its corporate CDO criteria.

The downgrade of the class B notes reflects the nonpayment of
interest to the class B notes.  According to the trustee, the
interest due to the class B noteholders has been deposited in a
separate escrow account pending resolution of an interpleader
action the trustee filed in June 2009.  Under the terms of the
transaction, class B cannot defer any interest payment.  Due to an
error, S&P did not lower its rating on the class B notes to 'D
(sf)' when the noteholders did not receive interest payments.

                         Rating Lowered

                      Landmark II CDO Ltd.

              Class       To              From
              -----       --              ----
              B           D (sf)          BBB (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                      Landmark II CDO Ltd.

                      Class        Rating
                      -----        ------
                      A            AA (sf)
                      C            CC (sf)
                      D            CC (sf)

Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:            Landmark II CDO Ltd.
Co-issuer:         Landmark II CDO Inc.
Current manager:   Aladdin Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:       Mizuho International PLC
Trustee:           Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:  cash flow CLO


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-C2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C2 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-C2 and placed 12 classes on
review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-5, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 25, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 25, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 25, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 4, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of Classes M through Q are due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $30.01 million loss which has resulted in
a 100% principal loss for Classes Q and S and a 67% principal loss
for Class P.  The servicer has recognized appraisal reductions
totaling $40.3 million for nine of the loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's placed Classes A5 through L on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 10, 2009.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction during the past 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $1.565
billion from $1.942 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 93 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
48% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 2% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 7% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $30.01 million loss
(70% loss severity on average).  Currently 14 loans, representing
35% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Woodbury Office Portfolio II Loan
($158.2 million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by 22
office buildings located in Woodbury, New York.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent
default.  The borrower has submitted a modification proposal which
is being reviewed by the special servicer.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Macquarie DDR
Portfolio II Loan ($143.1 million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is
secured by eight retail properties located in Minnesota,
Tennessee, Wisconsin and Florida.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in February 2010 due to imminent default.  The
borrower has submitted a proposal for a loan extension which is
being reviewed by the special servicer.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Park 80 West Loan
($100 million-6.4% of the pool), which is secured by an office
property located in Saddle Brook, New Jersey.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to the
borrowers request to restructure the loan terms.  The remaining 11
loans are secured by a mix of retail, industrial, office, mobile
home park and hotel properties.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
S have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$4.12 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure
to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2006-C7 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
In the press release published earlier, class H from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7 was omitted from the rating
list.  A corrected version is:

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 61
classes of certificates from nine U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transactions due to interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered
its ratings on 44 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because S&P expects
these interest shortfalls to continue.

The 44 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have experienced
interest shortfalls for five or more months.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for
  specially serviced loans;

* Lack of servicer advancing for loans where nonrecoverable
  advance declarations have been made; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing fees
that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

Nine classes experienced shortfalls for three months or more and
are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in the future.
If these shortfalls continue, S&P will likely further downgrade
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses where nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

S&P detail the 61 downgraded classes from the nine CMBS
transactions below.

     Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O,
P, and Q certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Series 2008-C1 due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to the eight loans that are currently with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc., as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$60.7 million were in effect for eight loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $312,335, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1.6 million.  Standard & Poor's considered the eight ASERs,
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees in determining its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls totaled $361,075 and have affected
all of the classes subordinate to and including class E.  Classes
K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q have experienced interest shortfalls for
six (K, L), seven (M), and nine (N, O, P, Q) months, respectively,
and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable
future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the CSCM 2008-C1 transaction consists of
59 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $877.7 million.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, eight loans ($144.6.0
million; 16.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The
payment status of these loans is: one (2.9 million, 0.4%) is in
foreclosure, and seven ($141.7 million, 16.1%) are more than 90
days delinquent.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C6

S&P lowered its ratings on the class N, P, Q, and S certificates
from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C6 due to interest
shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to six of the 12
loans that are currently with the special servicer, LNR,, as well
as special servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $12.9 million were in effect for six loans.
The total reported ASER amount was $65,887, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $536,497 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered four ASERs ($25,814), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees in
determining its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $87,598 and have affected all of the classes subordinate to
and including class N.  Classes Q and S have experienced interest
shortfalls for six and 10 months, respectively, and S&P expects
these shortfalls will recur for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2006-C4 transaction consists of
82 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $944.3 million.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 12 loans ($104.1 million;
11.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent loans is: One ($3.3 million, 0.4%) is
REO, nine ($50.1 million, 5.3%) are in foreclosure, one
($15.0 million, 1.6%) is 30 days delinquent, and one
($35.7 million, 3.8%) is less than 30 days delinquent.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C6

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, P, Q and S
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C6
(LB-UBS 2006-C6) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to 11 of the 13 loans that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the Sept.
17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $37.2 million were in
effect for 11 loans.  The total reported ASER amount was $199,975,
and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.6 million.

Standard & Poor's considered six ASERs, all of which were based on
MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees in
determining its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
totaled $300,425 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class K.  Classes N, P, Q, and S have experienced
interest shortfalls for eight (N, P), nine (Q), and 10 (S) months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls will recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2006-C6 transaction consists of
212 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.1 billion.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 13 loans ($167.5 million;
5.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: three (54.6 million, 1.8%) are REO, four
($31.2 million, 1.0%) are in foreclosure, four ($26.7 million,
0.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one ($18.0 million, 0.6%)
is 30 days delinquent, and one ($37.0 million, 1.2%) is a matured
balloon loan.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C7
(LB-UBS 2006-C7) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to 13 of the 16 loans that are currently with the special
servicer, CW Capital Asset Management LLC, as well as special
servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $74.8 million were in effect for 13 loans.  The total
reported ASER amount was $396,430, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $3.4 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 10
ASERs, all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees in determining its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls totaled $493,619 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class H.
Classes K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S have experienced interest
shortfalls for 10 months, and S&P expects these shortfalls will
recur for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2006-C6 transaction consists of
181 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.0 billion.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 16 loans ($202.7 million;
6.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: seven ($113.4 million, 3.8%) are REO,
eight ($69.9 million, 2.4%) are in foreclosure, and one ($19.4
million, 0.7%) is current.

              Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ9

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust Series 2006-HQ9
(MSCI 2006-HQ9) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to nine of the 22 loans that are currently with the
special servicer, J.E. Robert Co., Inc., as well as interest not
advanced and special servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 14, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $51.7 million were in effect for
14 loans.  The total reported ASER amount was $143,175, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.2 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered eight ASERs, all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as interest not advanced ($329,677), and
current special servicing fees in determining its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls totaled $562,753 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class H.
Classes L, M, N, O, P, and Q have experienced interest shortfalls
for five (L, M), six (N, O, P), and eight (Q) months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls will recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2006-C6 transaction consists of
207 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.5 billion.  As of
the Sept. 14, 2010, remittance report, 22 loans ($255.7 million;
10.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: six ($23.8 million, 1.0%) are in
foreclosure, 11 ($135.7 million, 5.5%) are more than 90 days
delinquent, two ($6.4 million, 0.3%) are less than 30 days
delinquent, one ($75.0 million, 3.0%) is in its grace period, and
two ($14.7 million, 0.6%) are current.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ14

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust Series 2007-IQ14
due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 21 of
the 37 loans that are currently with the special servicer, CIII
Asset Management LCC, as well as special servicing fees and
interest not advanced ($418,034) on two loans.  As of the
Sept. 15, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $212.9 million
were in effect for 23 loans.  The total reported ASER amount was
$710,359, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$5.3 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 21 ASERs, all of which
were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing
fees in determining its rating actions.  The reported interest
shortfalls totaled $1.473 million and have affected all of the
classes subordinate to and including class H.  Classes H, J, K, L,
and M have experienced interest shortfalls for four (H), eight (J,
K), and 10 (L, M) months, respectively, and S&P expects these
shortfalls will recur for the foreseeable future.  Consequently,
S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the MSCI 2007-IQ14 transaction consists of
423 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $4.8 billion.  As of
the Sept. 15, 2010, remittance report, 37 loans ($1.27 billion;
26.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: four ($72.9 million, 1.5%) are REO, 18
($267.9 million, 5.5%) are in foreclosure, eight ($120.3 million,
2.5%) are more than 90 days delinquent, four ($18.6 million, 0.4%)
are 30 days delinquent or less, and three ($785.3 million, 16.2%)
are current.

         Salomon Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J and K certificates from
Salomon Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2000-C3 due to
recurring interest shortfalls resulting from an ASER related to
one of the 14 loans that are currently with the special servicer,
LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 20, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $28.5 million were in effect for
five loans.  The total reported ASER amount was $136,432, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.2 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered one ASER, which was based on an MAI appraisal,
as well as current special servicing fees in determining its
rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls totaled $171,951
and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class H (rated 'CCC+ (sf)').  Classes J and K have experienced
interest shortfalls for 10 months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls will recur for the foreseeable future.  Consequently,
S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the SBCM 2000-C3 transaction consists of
49 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $251.3 million.  As of
the Sept. 20, 2010, remittance report, 14 loans ($78.5 million;
31.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: one ($20.6 million, 8.2%) is REO, one
($20.3 million, 8.1%) is more than 90 days delinquent, one
($2.1 million, 0.8%) is less than 30 days delinquent, two
($16.3 million, 6.5%) are current, and nine ($19.2 million, 7.6%)
are matured balloon loans.

         Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C28

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, N, O, and P
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series
2006-C28 (WBCMT 2006-C28) due to interest shortfalls resulting
from ASERs related to 19 of the 25 loans that are currently with
the special servicer, CWCapital, as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$202.1 million were in effect for 20 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $842,763, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $6.9 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 18 ASERs, all of
which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees in determining its rating actions.  The reported
interest shortfalls totaled $941,573 and have affected all of the
classes subordinate to and including class H.  Classes J, K, L, M,
N, O, and P have experienced interest shortfalls for seven (J, K),
nine (L, M, N, O), and 10 (P) months, respectively, and S&P
expects these shortfalls will recur for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C28 transaction consists of
207 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.5 billion.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 25 loans ($622.8 million;
17.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: seven ($254.0 million, 7.2%) are REO, 12
($127.0 million, 3.6%) are in foreclosure, five ($51.7 million,
1.5%) are more than 90 days delinquent, and one ($190.0 million,
5.4%) is 30 days delinquent.

         Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C32

S&P lowered its ratings on the class N, O, P, and Q certificates
from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C32
(WBCMT 2007-C32) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to eight of the 11 loans that are currently with the
special servicer, CWCapital, as well as special servicing fees and
interest not advanced ($153,687) on one loan.  As of the Sept. 17,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $122.6 million were in
effect for nine loans.  The total reported ASER amount was
$217,713, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$4.3 million.  Standard & Poor's considered seven ASERs, all of
which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as interest not
advanced for one loan and current special servicing fees in
determining its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
totaled $544,720 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class N.  Classes N, O, P, and Q have experienced
interest shortfalls for six, seven, eight, and 10 months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls will recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2007-C32 transaction consists
of 143 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.8 billion.
As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 11 loans
($357.7 million; 9.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The payment status of these loans is: three ($36.9 million, 1.0%)
are REO, five ($125.4 million, 3.3%) are in foreclosure, one
($36.1 million, 0.9%) is more than 90 days delinquent, one
($22.0 million, 0.6%) is 30 days delinquent, and one
($137.4 million, 3.6%) is current.

                         Ratings Lowered

     Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
             Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                               -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  E      B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)        9.01              4,201      101,454
  F      B (sf)     B+ (sf)         8.26             35,608      105,677
  G      B- (sf)    B+ (sf)         7.25             47,477      140,902
  H      CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)          5.60             77,150      228,966
  J      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)         4.84             35,608      105,677
  K      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)       3.71             53,411      260,173
  L      D (sf)     CCC (sf)        3.33             11,240       67,438
  M      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)       2.95             11,240       77,373
  N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)       2.57             11,240       94,910
  O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)       2.44             3,747        33,719
  P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)       2.19             7,493        67,438
  Q      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)       1.94             7,493        67,438

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C6
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
             Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                               -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  N      CCC+ (sf)  BB- (sf)            1.98          6,318    12,512
  P      CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)             1.62         14,655    29,310
  Q      D (sf)     B (sf)              1.44          7,325    23,675
  S      D  (sf)    CCC+ (sf)           1.26          7,325    50,965

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C6
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
             Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  K      CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)              2.09          35,105     35,105
  L      CCC  (sf)  B- (sf)             1.84          32,362     32,362
  M      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)             1.45          48,547     48,547
  N      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)           1.20          32,366    152,587
  P      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)           0.94          32,366    258,893
  Q      D (sf)     CCC (sf)            0.82          16,185    130,729
  S      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.43          48,542    454,604

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  H      CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)            3.45           13,823      13,823
  J      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)          2.56          132,509     158,942
  K      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)          1.67          136,693   1,032,994
  L      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)          1.42           32,046     320,455
  M      D (sf)     CCC (sf)           1.29           16,025     160,249
  N      D (sf)     CCC (sf)           0.91           48,070     480,704
  P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          0.78           16,021     160,206
  Q      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          0.65           16,025     160,249
  S      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          0.53           16,021     160,206

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ9
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  H      B- (sf)     BB- (sf)           4.49          24,946     38,257
  J      CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)            3.19         163,694    807,915
  K      CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)            2.15         130,951    905,083
  L      D (sf)      B (sf)             1.76          43,410    303,872
  M      D (sf)      B- (sf)            1.63          14,467    101,270
  N      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)          1.24          43,410    303,872
  O      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)          0.98          28,939    202,571
  P      D (sf)      CCC (sf)           0.85          14,467    101,270
  Q      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)          0.46          43,410    325,759

            Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ14
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
             Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                               -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  G      CCC+ (sf)   B (sf)              6.84              0            0
  H      D (sf)      B- (sf)             5.32        284,044      848,091
  J      D (sf)      B- (sf)             4.31        241,702    1,523,991
  K      D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)           3.17        271,910    2,177,610
  L      D (sf)      CCC (sf)            2.79         81,178      773,505
  M      D (sf)      CCC- (sf)           2.53         54,116      552,038

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  J      D (sf)     CCC (sf)           7.09          40,017   220,197
  K      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          4.81          33,343   333,433

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C28

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  H      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)             4.46         152,563    373,931
  J      D (sf)     CCC (sf)            3.18         230,387  1,420,059
  K      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.67          79,005    553,032
  L      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.42          39,502    290,676
  M      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.04          59,253    533,281
  N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.91          19,751    177,760
  O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.66          39,502    355,520
  P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.40          39,502    361,958


             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
  Class  To         From     Credit enhancement (%)  Current  Accumulated
  -----  --         ----     ----------------------  -------  -----------
  N      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.73         53,180    283,432
  O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.48         45,134    278,081
  P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.23         45,139    346,597
  Q      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.98         45,139    394,356


MERRILL LYNCH: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class F to 'A' From 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded the ratings of Merrill Lynch Mortgages Loans Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-Canada 1
as follows:

Class E to AA from BBB (low)
Class F to A from BB

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the rating of Class X at AAA.

As of the September 2010 reporting period, four loans remain in the
pool.  Three of the four loans are fully amortizing and two loans are
in special servicing.

The Chelmsford Plaza loan (13.5% of the pool) is a 36,044 retail
centre in Chelmsford, Ontario and transferred to the special servicer
in July 2009 for maturity default.  DBRS has confirmed with the
special servicer that the property is fully occupied and the borrower
is in discussions to pay off the loan.

The Point Inn (11.91% of the pool) is a 150-key hotel in Calgary with
a loan per key of $14,500.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in February 2008 due to litigation at the borrower level.
The loan has been brought current and benefits from the low leverage
point, on a per square foot basis.

Additionally, as of September 2010, the cumulative balance of the two
loans in special servicing is $2,452,906, which is less than the
current balance of the unrated Class G. DBRS does not rate Class G.
The current balance of Class G is $4,734,237.

The remaining two loans are secured by a mixed-use building on the
western edge of the Toronto CBD and a full-service hotel in Quebec
City, Quebec.

Outside of the Chelmsford Plaza loan, the remaining loans in the pool
do not mature until 2018 and 2020.

Credit enhancement to the remaining rated bond classes has increased
substantially since issuance and is reflected in the ratings
upgrades.

DBRS will continue to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis,
with more information being available in our Global CMBS Monthly
Surveillance Report.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2008-C1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 21 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-C1 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. AM-AF, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on June 23, 2008 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AM, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 23, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. AM-A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on June 23, 2008 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ-AF, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ-A, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. S, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$940.4 million from $948.8 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 92 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 52% of the pool.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Currently seven loans, representing 19% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Farallon Portfolio Loan ($150.0 million -- 16.0% of the pool),
which represents a pari passu interest in a $1.5 billion first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 56,991 pads in 273
manufactured housing properties located throughout the United
States.  The loan is current but was transferred to special
servicing in July 2010 due to a modification on the floating rate
portion of the debt.  The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$9.0 million appraisal reduction on six of the specially serviced
loans.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Two 2001-NC1 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of two tranche
issued by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I, Inc., Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC1

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing the transaction consists of subprime
collateral originated New Century Corporation.

The downgrades are a result of $104,824 cumulative unpaid interest
for the Class M-1 and $30,145 cumulative unpaid interest for the
Class M-2 bonds as of the September 27, 2010 remittance period and
there is a high likelihood it will never be recovered and the
balance of loans delinquent 60 days or more, including loans in
foreclosure and real estate owned, compared to the total depletion
of all credit enhancement.  The security Class M-1 remains on
review for possible downgrade as Moody's completes its review of
this transaction.  Additional sensitivities of losses will be a
function of future actual and projected losses that correspond to
benchmarks provided in Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Securities in Default.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


MT WILSON: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$6,900,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based on the
September 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor
is 2536 compared to 2828 in June 2009, and securities rated Caa1
and below make up approximately 6.3% of the underlying portfolio
versus 14.4% in June 2009.  Moody's adjusted WARF has also
declined since the last rating action due to a decrease in the
percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook." The deal also experienced
a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to $8.4 million from
approximately $23 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action as a result of paydowns of
senior notes due to overcollateralization ratio failures and
higher than expected recoveries on defaulted securities.  The
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 124.34%, 113.42%, 106.3%, and 103.65%,
respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 116.57%, 106.48%, 99.86%,
and 97.32%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the
Class D and E Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all
previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Furthermore, the Class E Notes also benefit from a structural
feature in the deal whereby during the amortization period, the
failure of the Interest Diversion Ratio to be equal to or greater
than 103.69% results in the diversion of excess interest to
delever first the Class E notes, followed by Class D Notes, Class
C Notes, Class B Notes, and Class A Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $281.6 million, defaulted par of $10.5 million,
weighted average default probability of 29.7% (implying a WARF of
3760), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.75%,
and a diversity score of 54.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd., issued in May 31, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2800)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4200)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.75%)

  -- Class A: +1
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.75%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average coupon, and diversity score.  With
   respect to the weighted average spread, Moody's analyzed the
   impact assuming a mid-point between the reported and the
   covenanted value to give some credit to the deal's higher
   weighted average spread.


N-45 FIRST: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E, Series 2003-3
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed these ratings of N-45 First CMBS Issuer
Corporation, Series 2003-3:

Class A-2 at AAA
Class B at AA
Class C at A
Class D at BBB (low)
Class E at BB (high)
Class IO at AAA

Since issuance in September 2003, the transaction has experienced a
collateral reduction of approximately 41% and the weighted-average
debt service coverage ratio, as of the September 2010 cut-off, was
2.04x.

The transaction continues to perform well with two loans remaining in
the pool.  The remaining two loans mature in August 2011 and December
2012 and have an average debt yield in excess of 21%, which DBRS
considers to be strong.

While performance has remained strong, the transaction is
concentrated with only two loans remaining in the pool; however, the
refinance outlook for the remaining loans is favourable, given the
healthy debt yields and historical performance.

There are no loans in special servicing, on the servicer's watchlist
or on the DBRS HotList.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis, with
ongoing updated information being available in the Global CMBS
Monthly Surveillance Report.


N-45 FIRST: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class F, Series 2003-1
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded these three classes of N-45 First CMBS Issuer
Corporation, Series 2003-1:

Class C to AAA from AA
Class D to AA (low) from A (low)
Class E to BB (high) from BB

DBRS has also confirmed these other classes in the transaction:

Class A-2 at AAA
Class IO at AAA
Class B at AAA
Class F at B

DBRS does not rate the $13.3M Class G.  The trends for all classes of
the transaction are Stable.

The rating action comes in response to increased credit enhancement
for the bonds, which was caused by loan maturities.  In the DBRS
analysis, a net cash flow stress of 20% was applied to all loans in
the transaction to arrive at the current rating categories.

The positive rating action was tempered by the sub-par performance of
five loans (10.19% of the pool) that are on the servicer's watchlist,
four of which (5.73% of the pool) DBRS has placed on the DBRS
HotList.  Those four loans are on the servicer's watchlist for low
occupancy and a low YE2009 DSCR.  DBRS estimates that the performance
and positions of the properties securing these four HotList loans
increase their respective refinance risk.  Two of the four HotList
loans mature in 2011.  Despite the risk with these loans, they have
an average debt yield of 18.5%, which is considered to be healthy and
any potential losses associated with the loans resulting from a
default would be contained to the first loss piece.

The pool collateral has reduced 60% since issuance and now has a
total balance of $223 million

DBRS will continue to monitor the transaction on a monthly basis for
updated performance on the HotList loans as well as upcoming loan
maturities.  For more information on this transaction, refer to the
DBRS Global CMBS Monthly Surveillance Report.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded five classes of Notes
issued by Newcastle CDO X, Limited.

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to two primary factors: 1) the decreased
credit enhancement of several senior classes of Notes as a result
of certain full and partial Note redemptions to three classes and
2) the increased recovery rate volatility of the Caa through C
rated collateral.  Since last review, there have been
$63.75 million in junior note cancellations including a full
cancellation of the Class B Notes and partial cancelations of the
Class A-3 and Class C Notes.  As a result, the credit enhancement
of Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have decreased.  Class A-1 now
represents 72% of the outstanding Note balance compared to 69% at
last review.  While subsequent reinvestment into higher rated
collateral since last review mitigates some of this effect, the
expected losses on the classes of senior Notes is magnified by the
negative ratings migration of the Caa through C rated collateral.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Newcastle CDO X, Limited is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
(revolving period ends in June 2012) backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (63.1%), residential
mortgage backed securities (16.4%), REIT debt (11.4%), small
business loans (5.1%), and CRE CDO (4.0%).  As of the
September 20, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction has decreased to $1.336 billion from $1.4 billion
at issuance due to full (Class B) and partial (Classes A-3 and C)
note cancellations.  Moody's has expressed its concern with note
cancellations.  Please see the special report "Delaware Court of
Chancery Upholds Junior CDO Note Cancellations; Potentially
Important Credit Implications for Senior Noteholders in Structured
Credit Transactions" published on July 2010.

There are ten assets with par balance of $68.3 million (5.1% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the September 20, 2010 Trustee report.  Eight of these
assets (79.5% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS, and two are RMBS
(20.5%).  Moody's expects little to no recovery on these assets
once losses are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,179 compared to 2,157 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (22.8% compared to 7.1% at last review), A1-
A3 (12.6% compared to 7.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (26.5%
compared to 37.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (14.4% compared to
21.2% at last review), B1-B3 (4.0% compared to 11.4% at last
review), and Caa1-C (19.7% compared to 16.2% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.6
years (which is the WAL limit within the reinvestment period)
compared to 7.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 23.0% (which is the WARR limit within the reinvestment period),
the same as at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.0% compared to 7.8% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.6, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 23.0% to 13.0% or up to 33% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward
and 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expects
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


NEWNAN HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'BB+' from 'AAA' on the Newnan Housing Authority (Eastgate
Apartments Project), Ga.'s series 2005 multifamily housing revenue
bonds and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.
A Fannie Mae credit facility secures the bonds.

The lower rating reflects the need for a replacement of the
carryover amount schedule as shown in the trust indenture with a
revised schedule based on the updated cash flows.

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's placed certain housing-related
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications based on S&P's
revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced housing
transactions.  This issue was included.  The revised criteria
affects government-enhanced housing transactions that have funds
invested in money market funds and other investments with no
guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements based
on a zero-reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  Standard & Poor's believes the
bonds would be able to meet all costs from transaction cash flows
for the term of the bonds, assuming no reinvestment earnings, if
the carryover amount schedule as shown in the trust indenture were
to be replaced with a revised schedule based on the updated cash
flows.  The carry forward balance schedule indicates to the
trustee the minimum amount of funds that need to be maintained in
the revenue account on each interest payment date.  If the trustee
were to release funds out of the transaction resulting in an
insufficient minimum balance, this could lead to a cash flow
shortfall in the future.


NORMAN REGIONAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' these revenue bonds
issued by Norman Regional Hospital Authority:

  -- Approximately $94 million series 2007;
  -- Approximately $67 million series 2005;
  -- Approximately $49.7 million series 2002;
  -- Approximately $19.5 million series 1996B.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade to 'BB+' reflects Norman Regional Hospital
     Authority's heavy debt burden, modest profitability and weak
     liquidity which, in combination, present a financial profile
     that is not consistent with Fitch's 'BBB' category borrowers.

  -- NRH's high debt burden is high as indicated by maximum annual
     debt service equating to 5.8% of fiscal 2010 revenues
     (compared to the 'BBB' median of 3.5%) and debt to
     capitalization of 67.3% at fiscal year end 2010 (compared to
     the 'BBB' median of 50.1%).

  -- NRH's liquidity indicators are weak at fiscal year end 2010
     with cash to debt of 28.6%, cushion ratio of 3.5 times
     and 97.7 days cash on hand; each of which are below the
     respective 'BBB' category medians of 75.9%, 8.5x and 122.2.

  -- Moderate profitability combined with NRH's heavy debt burden
     has resulted in light coverage of MADS of 1.16x and 1.51x in
     fiscal 2009 and 2010, respectively.

  -- NRH holds a leading market share of approximately 60% in its
     primary service area of Cleveland County.

  -- NRH's bad debt expense in fiscal 2010 equated to 17.5% of
     total revenues which is materially higher than Fitch's 'BBB'
     median of 6.5%.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Given NRH's heavy debt burden and light liquidity, a
     weakening of operating profitability from fiscal 2010 levels
     would likely result in a downgrade.

  -- With the opening of the HealthPlex Hospital in October 2009,
     NRH's future capital needs should be relatively light.
     Therefore, operating cash flow is expected to replenish NRH's
     liquidity position.

Security:

The bonds are secured by a pledge of gross revenues of the
obligated group.

Credit Summary:

Norman Regional Hospital Authority is a public trust that was
created by the city to operate Norman Regional Hospital, a 337
licensed bed acute care hospital.  The system is currently
composed of Norman Regional Hospital, 45-bed Moore Medical Center
and HealthPlex Hospital, a newly constructed 136 bed hospital
located four miles from the main hospital that opened in October
2009.

The downgrade to 'BB+' reflects NRH's heavy debt burden and weak
liquidity, which is tempered by solid historical profitability and
a leading market share position in the Norman, OK service area.
NRH's elevated debt burden reflects the authority's investment in
the new HealthPlex Hospital and Moore Medical Center in 2007 and
2008, respectively.  Maximum annual debt service of $19.3 million
equates to high 5.8% of fiscal 2010 revenues and debt to capital
capitalization of 67.3% exceeds the 'BBB' category median of
50.4%.  NRH's strong historical operating profitability had
mitigated Fitch's concerns over the authority's high leverage and
debt burden.  However, NRH's lower operating profitability over
the last two fiscal years led to weak coverage of MADS of 1.16x
and 1.51x in fiscal 2009 and 2010, respectively.

While NRH's level of unrestricted cash and investments had
improved to $68.4 million at June 30, 2010 from $58.6 million at
fiscal year-end 2009, liquidity indicators remain weak relative to
Fitch's 'BBB' category medians.  NRH's cash to debt, cushion and
days cash on hand ratios at June 30, 2010 of 28.6%, 3.5x and 97.7,
respectively, all trail the respective 2010 'BBB' category medians
of 75.9%, 8.5x and 122.2.

Historically, NRH's operating profitability had been strong with
annual operating and operating EBITDA margins in excess of 3.5%
and 10%, respectively, from fiscal 2006 through fiscal 2008.
However, operating EBITDA margins declined to 7.8% and 9.7% in
fiscal 2009 and 2010, respectively.  Management implemented
several expense control measures beginning in fiscal 2009, which
improved operating cash flow in fiscal 2010 and expected to
generate further improvement in fiscal 2011.  However, given the
increased interest and depreciation expense related to the
HealthPlex Hospital, NRH's operating margins are expected to
remain weak.  Management has budgeted a 1.2% operating margin
($4.1 million) in fiscal 2011.  NRH maintains a leading market
share in its primary service area of Norman and portions of
Cleveland County of nearly 60%.

The Outlook revision to Stable from Negative reflects Fitch's
belief that management's Financial Recovery Plan has been
effective in improving NRH's operating cash flow, which is
expected to be sustained through fiscal 2011.  Capital needs are
very modest and should allow for strengthening of liquidity
measures.  However, given NRH's sizable debt load, capital related
and liquidity measures, while improving, are expected to remain
weak relative to 'BBB' medians over the near term.

Disclosure:

NRH discloses quarterly and annual financial information and
utilization statistics to the MSRB's EMMA system.


NORTHAMPTON GENERATING: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on 1994 A Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating on Northampton Generating
Company, L.P.'s $153 million senior tax-exempt series 1994 A
resource recovery revenue bonds due 2009 to 2019 (senior bonds) at
'C'.  The debt was issued by the Pennsylvania Economic Development
Financing Authority in 1994 and the proceeds loaned to
Northampton.

The rating affirmation reflects continuing inability to meet
scheduled debt service payments on the senior bonds with cash flow
from operations.  Northampton was required to draw on its senior
debt service reserve in order to make its debt service payments in
2010, and the reserve has not been fully replenished.  Fitch
expects the reserve shortfall will not be eliminated and that
operating cash flow will continue to be insufficient to meet
scheduled debt service.  Fitch expects that absent a restructuring
or external funding, a payment default is likely in 2011 or 2012.

Northampton's financial performance has been worse than expected
primarily due to fuel costs and operating and maintenance expenses
that have exceeded original projections, and power prices that
have not escalated to anticipated levels.  Debt service peaks in
the fourth quarter of 2010, subsequent to a reduction in
contractual capacity payments effective Oct. 1, 2010, under
Northampton's power purchase agreement, placing additional strain
on the project's liquidity.  The PPA further restricts
Northampton's ability to sell power in excess of its contractual
obligation at profitable rates.  Fitch does not expect that
Northampton will be relieved from its obligations under the PPA,
nor is it likely that sponsors will provide additional cash
liquidity.  Any deterioration in operating performance from
expected levels may accelerate an eventual default.

Future rating actions are likely to be influenced by:

  -- Service disruptions that would reduce PPA revenues;
  -- Increases in waste coal and alternative fuel costs;
  -- Increases in other operating and maintenance expense levels.

Northampton consists of a 112 megawatt (net) coal-fired qualifying
facility in Northampton County, PA, that supplies energy to
Metropolitan Edison Co. (Issuer Default Rating 'BBB-' by Fitch)
under a long-term PPA.  Northampton is structured as a limited
partnership and is owned by indirect subsidiaries of Calypso
Energy Holdings LLC, which is owned by Cogentrix Energy, LLC and
investment companies managed by EIF Management, LLC.


OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 3 tranches,
downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches and confirmed the ratings on
2 tranches from 2 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by Opteum in 2006.

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-APT, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1C1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1C2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-APT, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2006-2

  -- Cl. A1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1C, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of notes from Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust's
series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
rating on the class A-1 notes from series 2006-A.  S&P removed all
of the affected ratings from CreditWatch.  S&P previously placed
the ratings on CreditWatch negative on May 4, 2010.

Standard & Poor's raised its loss expectations for series 2006-A,
2007-A, and 2007-B).  S&P based the increased loss expectations
on S&P's analysis of each transaction's current performance,
including an increase in the monthly net loss rate, repossession
inventory, delinquencies, and declining recovery rates over the
past several months, combined with its forward-looking analysis.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's view that current credit
enhancement for the class A-2 notes from series 2006-A, the class
A-1 and A-2 notes from series 2007-A, and the class A-1 notes from
2007-B, is no longer sufficient to maintain the former ratings
given the increase in its expected net losses.  In S&P's view,
higher-than-expected losses have depleted the available
overcollateralization for each series while increases in the class
A-2 interest rate for series 2006-A and 2007-A have reduced the
level of excess spread available to cover losses and build O/C
back to its target level.

The affirmation of the class A-1 notes from series 2006-A reflects
S&P's view that the class A-1 notes will likely be paid off prior
to the transaction's O/C depletion, keeping the class senior to
class A-2 in the payment priority.  While all three series, based
on the transaction documents, pay principal sequentially,
principal payments for the series 2006-A and 2007-A will switch to
pro rata if, at any point in time, the principal balance of the
class A notes exceeds the total pool balance.  S&P believes that
the class A-1 notes will likely be paid in full prior to the
transaction becoming undercollateralized.  S&P base its view on
the current monthly paydown of the class A-1 notes from series
2006-A given the current monthly depletion of O/C.  Thus, S&P has
given some credit to the subordination of the class A-2 notes when
analyzing the class A-1 notes.  For series 2007-A, however, S&P
believes that the class A-1 notes will most likely not be paid
down prior to the complete depletion of O/C, thus switching the
principal payments to a pro rata distribution.

                            Table 1a
                     Cumulative Net Losses %
             (As of the September 2010 distribution)

                                       Former(ii)  Revised
                       Pool    Current lifetime    lifetime
        Series  Month  Factor  CNL (i) CNL exp.    CNL exp.
        ------  -----  ------  ------- ----------  ---------
        2006-A  49     64.33   5.03    14.0-16.0   15.0-17.0
        2007-A  41     68.65   5.94    12.0-14.0   16.0-18.0
        2007-B  35     75.47   5.69    14.0-16.0   18.0-20.0

                   (i) CNL-cumulative net loss.
                         (ii) May 4, 2010

                            Table 1b
                     Collateral Performance %
             (As of the September 2010 distribution)

                                    60-plus
                            Pool    day     Repo
             Series  Month  Factor  delinq. Inventory
             ------  -----  ------  ------- ---------
             2006-A  49     64.33   1.63    3.51
             2007-A  41     68.65   0.86    1.74
             2007-B  35     75.47   1.32    2.11

As of the September 2010 distribution report, O/C was 8.23%,
2.92%, and 5.34% of the initial pool balances for series 2006-A,
2007-A, and 2007-B, respectively.  The O/C levels have decreased
from the target O/C amount of 11.0%, 8.0%, and 9.5% of the initial
pool balances, respectively.  S&P believes that expected future
losses combined with stresses on excess spread will continue to
lead to additional O/C depletion for each series.

The notes from series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B are each
structured with interest rate swaps with Citibank acting as swap
counterparty.  In each case, the trust is making a fixed-rate
payment in the 5.0%-5.5% range to the swap counterparty with the
swap counterparty paying one-month LIBOR back to the trust.  When
the transaction was initially rated, S&P assumed that the fixed-
rate payment would be made.  However, as one-month LIBOR sits at
historical lows, each series is making sizeable payments to the
swap counterparty, reducing the amount of excess spread available
to cover losses and replenish O/C to its required level.  In
addition, the class A-2 notes for series 2006-A and 2007-A are
currently paying the maximum auction rate of one-month LIBOR plus
350 bps, placing additional stress on the generation of excess
spread.

Series 2007-A and 2007-B have breached loss and delinquency
performance tests which, according to the transaction documents,
require the servicer, GreenTree Servicing LLC, to fully charge-off
a loan when it becomes 360 days delinquent or 180 days after
repossession of the collateral.  For the most part, manufactured
housing transactions have not included charge-off policies, with a
charge-off occurring only when the collateral has been liquidated.
As a result of the change in the charge-off policy for series
2007-A and 2007-B, a sizeable percentage of delinquent loans and
repossessed inventory has been charged-off prior to collateral
liquidation.  The charge-off policy described above has caused
spikes in the cumulative net losses for series 2007-A and 2007-B
because a large percentage of charged-off collateral has not
realized recoveries.  While, S&P believes that the pace of net
losses will eventually slow as recoveries are realized, S&P also
believe that credit enhancement is not sufficient to maintain the
current ratings.

S&P incorporated its cash flow analysis in its review of these
transactions, which included current and historical performance to
estimate future performance.  S&P's various cash flow scenarios
included forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of
losses, and voluntary prepayment speeds that S&P believes are
appropriate given each transaction's current performance.  The
results demonstrated, in S&P's view, that the decrease in O/C and
the increased amount owed to the class A-2 notes for series 2006-A
and 2007-A to pay the maximum auction rate of one-month LIBOR plus
350 bps have caused enhancement to no longer be sufficient to
maintain the current ratings on the downgraded notes.

Series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B are insured by a bond insurance
policy issued from Ambac Assurance Corp. (R/--/--).  Under S&P's
criteria, the issue credit rating on a fully credit-enhanced bond
issue is the higher of two ratings: the rating on the credit
enhancer, or the SPUR (Standard & Poor's underlying rating) on the
class.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of each
transaction to consider whether the credit enhancement remains
sufficient, in its view, to cover S&P's revised cumulative net
loss expectations under its stress scenarios for each of the
lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                                 Rating
                                 ------
             Series   Class   To       From
             ------   -----   --       ----
             2006-A   A-2     B-       BB+/Watch Neg
             2007-A   A-1     CCC-     BB-/Watch Neg
             2007-A   A-2     CCC-     BB-/Watch Neg
             2007-B   A-1     B-       BB-/Watch Neg

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                                 Rating
                                 ------
             Series   Class   To        From
             ------   -----   --        ----
             2006-A   A-1     BB+       BB+/Watch Neg


RACERS SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2001-29-E Certs. to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by RACERS Series 2001-29-E:

  -- Series 2001-29-E Certificates, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on September 27, 2002 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note that is a repackaging of the
Class III Mezzanine Notes of SAAR Holdings CDO, Limited.  The
rating of the certificates is based on the underlying security and
the legal structure of the transaction.

The rating action reflects the credit quality of the repackaged
Class III Notes which are currently rated C (sf) by Moody's.
Moody's notes that the Class III Notes are currently deferring
interest and are not expected to receive any significant
distributions in the future.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


RAIT CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 21
classes from RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd. and RAIT Preferred Funding II
Ltd., which are both commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
rating on one class from RAIT II.

The downgrades and affirmation primarily reflect S&P's assessment
of increased risks and credit stability considerations regarding
certain subordinate note cancellations that occurred prior to
their repayment through the transaction's payment waterfall.  The
rating actions also reflect S&P's analysis of each transaction,
including the respective collateral assets.

According to the September 2010 trustee reports for both
transactions, as well as notices from the trustee, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., these notes were cancelled without payment:

                                                 $US amount
     Transaction name                Tranche     cancelled
     ----------------                -------     ----------
     RAIT I                          D           2,500,000
     RAIT I                          F           21,500,000
     RAIT I                          G           8,000,000
     RAIT I                          H           500,000
     RAIT II                         D           625,000
     RAIT II                         E           2,900,000
     RAIT II                         F           425,000
     RAIT II                         G           1,000,000

To assess the increased risks and credit stability considerations
regarding certain subordinate note cancellations, S&P applied
these stresses which S&P considered appropriate:

S&P generated cash flow analysis using two scenarios.  The first
scenario utilized the current balances of the notes, including any
note cancellations, when modeling the interest or principal
diversion mechanisms.  In the second scenario, S&P only recognized
the balance of the senior notes in the calculation of any interest
or principal diversion mechanisms.  S&P then applied the lower of
the rating levels indicated by the cash flow analysis under the
two scenarios described above as the starting point for S&P's
rating analysis for each class of notes.  Finally, S&P reviewed
the level of cushion relative to its credit stability criteria and
made further adjustments to the ratings that S&P believed were
appropriate.

Additional information regarding each transaction is detailed
below.

                              Rait I

According to the Sept. 20, 2010, trustee report, RAIT I's current
asset pool included these:

* Forty whole loans and senior participation loans
  ($665.4 million, 67.3%); and Ninety subordinate interest loans
  ($322.8 million, 32.7%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for the
nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its adjusted
net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent financial
data primarily provided by the collateral manager, RAIT
Partnership L.P.

The transaction includes 18 defaulted loan assets ($74.7 million,
7.6%) and one credit risk asset ($9.2 million, 1%).  Standard &
Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates for these assets,
which ranged from 0% through 52%.  S&P based the recovery rates
primarily on information from the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers.  Notable defaulted or
credit risk assets include:

* The Oceans Resort senior interest loan ($30.0 million, 3%);

* Colonial Parc/Arrow's Edge senior interest loan ($9.2 million,
  0.9%);

* The Stag Portfolio (12 property) subordinated loan
  ($7.6 million, 0.8%);

* The Mansions at Canyon Springs subordinated loan ($7.0 million,
  0.7%); and

* The Hyatt Hotel Portfolio ($5.5 million, 0.6%).

                             Rait II

According to the Sept 27, 2010, trustee report, RAIT II's current
asset pool included these:

* Sixty whole loans and senior participation loans
  ($655.8 million, 83.8%); and Twenty-five subordinate interest
  loans ($126.5 million, 16.2%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for the
nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its adjusted
net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent financial
data primarily provided by the collateral manager, RAIT
Partnership L.P.

The transaction includes two defaulted loan assets ($25.4 million,
3.3%).  Standard & Poor's estimated that there would be no
recovery upon the eventual resolution of both assets.  S&P based
the recovery primarily on the information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers.  The
defaulted loan assets are the Menlo Oaks Corporate Center
subordinated loan ($20 million, 2.6%) and 1901 Newport Blvd
mezzanine loan ($5.4 million, 0.7%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transactions and their underlying
collateral assets according to its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

                       RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd.
                       Floating-rate notes

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class     To                   From
             -----     --                   ----
             A1A       BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
             A1B       BBB- (sf)            BBB (sf)
             A2        BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
             B         B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)
             C         B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)
             D         B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
             E         B- (sf)              BB (sf)
             F         B- (sf)              BB (sf)
             G         CCC+ (sf)            BB- (sf)
             H         CCC+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
             J         CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)

                  RAIT Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                       Floating-rate notes

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class     To                   From
             -----     --                   ----
             A1R       BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
             A1T       BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
             B         B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)
             C         B (sf)               BB- (sf)
             D         B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
             E         CCC+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
             F         CCC+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
             G         CCC (sf)             B (sf)
             H         CCC- (sf)            B (sf)
             J         CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                  RAIT Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                       Floating-rate notes

                    Class             Rating
                    -----             ------
                    A2                BB+ (sf)


RAYTOWN INDUSTRIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA' its
rating on Raytown Industrial Development Authority (Brittany Place
Apartments Project), Mo.'s Fannie Mae-collateralized multifamily
housing revenue bonds series 1997 A and B, and removed it from
CreditWatch.

"The downgrade is based on S&P's view of the project's reliance on
short-term market rate investments," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Wendy Dolber.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds until maturity; and

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2021.

Credit strengths include:

* The high credit quality of the assets consisting of a Fannie Mae
  pass-through certificate, considered to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Strong debt service coverage of until maturity; and

* Investments held in fully insured account with Security Bank of
  Kansas City.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions where funds are invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on S&P's current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.

If the security prepays, it is S&P's view that there are
sufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the 15-
day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


RHODE ISLAND HEALTH: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $9.32MM Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to negative
from stable on Rhode Island Health and Educational Facilities
Building Corp.'s $9.32 million series 1994 bonds, issued for
Westerly Hospital.  The 'BB-' rating was affirmed.

Standard & Poor's believes Westerly's financial profile is weak
overall, with volatile financial performance in recent years;
however, financial ratios for the hospital alone are adequate for
the current rating.  Standard & Poor's recently learned the
hospital is now part of a larger corporate structure known as
Westerly Hospital Healthcare, which includes the hospital, an
employed physician group, a Women's Health organization, and other
smaller entities.

The rating reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of the hospital's
improved financial operating results through fiscal 2009, although
through the first 10 months of fiscal 2010 ended July 31, results
were significantly short of budgeted expectations but better than
the same period in 2009; declining hospital utilization through
the interim period of fiscal 2010; and minimal direct competition,
although there is outmigration.

"S&P would consider returning the outlook to stable if Westerly
improves its utilization and revenue growth to offset the
financial losses of the system's employed physicians," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jennifer Soule.  "Westerly will
also need to maintain its balance sheet by sustaining or improving
its liquidity and debt measures," said Ms. Soule.

If Westerly is unable to achieve these results, Standard & Poor's
could consider lowering the bond rating to the 'B' category.
However, Standard & Poor's believes a lower rating is currently
precluded by the hospital's liquidity, which continues to be
adequate for the rating.  Management has indicated that recent
physician hires and recruiting should allow for volume and
financial recovery in fiscal 2011.  A positive rating action is
unlikely at this time.

Westerly Hospital is located in the city of Westerly in the state
of Rhode Island where there are several other financially troubled
stand-alone hospitals.


SAINTS MEDICAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on 1993A Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the Ba3 rating assigned to
Saints Medical Center's debt on Watchlist for potential downgrade.
The Watchlist action is due to the announcement that Covenant
Health Systems has decided to end affiliation discussions with
Saints.  As Moody's discussed in Moody's last report, the ability
for Saints to continue making strategic investments is a key
factor of Moody's rating analysis, and without an affiliation with
Covenant, Saints faces significant challenges in terms of access
to capital.  Saints is highly leveraged, as evidenced by 42.4%
cash to debt, 97.4% debt to capitalization, 16.2 times debt to
cash flow as of fiscal yearend 2009, and peak annual debt service
coverage of 0.89 times, and liquidity balances at Moody's last
review were rapidly declining.  Unrestricted cash and investments
fell to $23.1 million (61 days cash on hand) as of FYE 2009, a
15.4% decline from the prior year amount of $27.3 million (74 days
cash on hand).  As of March 31, 2010 (6 months of FY 2010), Saints
had approximately 44 days cash on hand.  Moody's expects to
complete the review in the next 90 days.

Legal Security: Lien on gross receipts of Saints Memorial Medical
Center; 1.10 times rate covenant; debt service reserve fund.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                             Outlook

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of September 30, 2009)

  -- Series 1993A; Fixed Rate ($51.0 million outstanding) rated
     Ba3

The last rating action with respect to the Saints Medical Center
was on June 22, 2010, when the rating was downgraded to Ba3 from
Ba2 and the outlook was revised to negative from stable.


SALOMON BROS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 1998-OPT2 Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued by Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. 1998-OPT2

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. Series
1998-OPT2

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain; previously on June 30, 2009 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing the transaction consists of subprime
collateral originated by Option One Corporation

The Class M-1 bond experienced a $595 interest shortfall in the
November 2009 remittance period.  This amount has not been
reimbursed.  Additionally, there has been no interest payment to
Class M-1 since the June 2010.  Through the September 2010
remittance period cumulative interest shortfall has risen to
$2,857 due in part to the non-recoverable advances.  Furthermore,
there has been no principal distribution since the May 2010
remittance period.

The Class M-1 remains on review direction uncertain as Moody's
completes its review of this transaction.  Additional
sensitivities of losses will be a function of future actual and
projected losses that correspond to benchmarks provided in Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Salomon
Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
The interest shortfalls affecting the transaction are primarily
due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and special
servicing fees.  S&P downgraded class J to 'D (sf)' because S&P
expects the interest shortfalls affecting the class to continue
for the foreseeable future.  The downgrades also reflect credit
support erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of all 12 of the specially serviced assets.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on
classes K, L, M, and N, which S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)'
previously, due to interest shortfalls S&P determined were
recurring at that time.  S&P downgraded classes M and N to 'D
(sf)' on Dec. 21, 2005, class L to 'D (sf)' on April 6, 2009,
and class K to 'D (sf)' on June 14, 2009.  According to the
September 2010 remittance report, these classes subsequently
sustained principal losses.  S&P affirmed its rating on the
class X1 interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.32x and a loan-to-value ratio of 78.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.18x and an LTV ratio of 99.9%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
29.1% and 36.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude all 12 ($51.2 million; 9.6%) specially
serviced assets and 21 defeased loans ($108.2 million; 20.3%).
S&P separately estimated losses for the specially serviced assets,
which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Sept. 20, 2010, remittance report, 12 assets
($51.3 million; 9.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Three of these assets are real
estate owned (REO, $19.5 million, 3.7%), one is a matured balloon
loan ($2.3 million; 0.4%), five are 90-plus-days delinquent
($16.6 million, 3.1%), and three are less than 30 days delinquent
($12.8 million; 2.4%).  Nine of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $12.2 million.

The Westford Technology Park II loan, the fifth-largest
nondefeased asset in the pool ($10.5 million; 2.0%) and the
largest asset in special servicing, is secured by a 104,790-sq.-
ft. office building in Westford, Ma., built in 2000.  The payment
status of the loan is less than 30 days delinquent.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 13, 2010, due to an
imminent payment default following AECOM Inc.'s (88,290 sq. ft.;
84% of net rentable area) notification that it will be vacating
the property upon its Dec. 14, 2010, lease expiration.  The
borrower is currently marketing the space, and the special
servicer reports no current prospects.  The reported DSC was 1.48x
as of year-end 2009, while the reported occupancy was 100% as of
June 30, 2010.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of this asset.

The Corporate Forum asset, the seventh-largest nondefeased asset
in the pool and second-largest asset in special servicing, has a
total exposure of $10.5 million, which includes $1.5 of advancing
and interest thereon.  The property, which is REO, is an 182,855-
sq.-ft. office building in Atlanta, Ga., built in 1981 and
renovated in 1994.  The asset was transferred to the special
servicer on Feb. 19, 2009, for imminent monetary default and an
ARA of $3.2 million is in effect.  The reported DSC was 0.55x as
of year-end 2008, while the reported occupancy was 68.6% as of
September 2010.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the resolution
of this asset.

The Bent Tree Apartments loan, the 11th-largest nondefeased asset
in the pool and the third-largest asset with the special servicer,
has a total exposure of $9.0 million, which includes $738,343 of
advancing and interest thereon.  The property, which is also REO,
is a 274-unit apartment complex in Antioch, Tenn, built in 1986.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 12,
2009, for imminent monetary default and an ARA of $2.0 million is
in effect.  The reported DSC was 0.48x as of year-end 2009, while
the reported occupancy was 87% as of July 2010.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The nine ($23.5 million, 4.4%) remaining specially serviced assets
have balances that individually represent less than 1.0% of the
total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated losses for all of
these assets and for the nine loans the weighted average loss
severity is 34.8%.

Two loans totaling $17.7 million (3.3 %) were previously with the
special servicer and have been returned to the master servicer.
Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the loans (including the final balloon
payments) if they continue to perform and remain with the master
servicer.

Excluding the transaction's defeased loans, as well as the 12
specially serviced assets for which S&P estimated losses, 60
($268.0 million, 50.3%) loans have anticipated repayment dates
(ARDs) or final maturity dates through year-end 2011.  Standard &
Poor's considered this large volume of loans with near-term
ARDs/maturities in its analysis.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Sept. 20, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $533.3 million (120 loans), compared
with $952.7 million (182 loans) at issuance.  Midland Loan
Services Inc., the master servicer, provided financial information
for 98.4% of the nondefeased loans.  All of the servicer-provided
financial information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or
full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.40x for the nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.32x and 78.2%,
respectively, and exclude all 12 ($51.2 million; 9.6%) specially
serviced assets and 21 defeased loans ($108.2 million; 20.3%).
S&P separately estimated losses for these 12 specially serviced
assets.  Twenty-three loans are on the master servicer's watchlist
($105.8 million; 19.9%).  Four loans ($28.9 million, 5.4%) have a
reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 16 loans ($68.3 million,
12.8%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has
experienced $41.1 million of principal losses to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $113.5 million (21.3%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.43x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans
were 1.14x and 105.8%, respectively.  These figures exclude the
fifth- and seventh-largest assets in the pool, the Westford
Technology Park II loan ($10.5 million; 2.0%) and The Corporate
Forum asset ($10.5 million exposure; 1.7%), which are with the
special servicer and discussed above.  Three of the top 10 loans
secured by real estate are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Van Ness Post Centre loan ($17.0 million; 3.2%) is the largest
asset in the pool and is secured by a 109,315-sq.-ft. mixed use
property in downtown San Francisco built in 1911 and renovated in
1989.  The property consists of approximately 44,165 sq. ft. of
space occupied by a health club, 32,974 sq. ft. of retail space,
and 32,176 sq. ft. of office space.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  Circuit City, which
had occupied all of the retail space (32,974 sq. ft.; 30% of NRA),
vacated the property in 2008.  The lease to 24 Hour Fitness
(44,165 sq. ft.; 40% of NRA) expires Dec. 31, 2010, and renewal
discussions with the borrower are ongoing.  For year-end 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 63.1% and 1.04x, respectively.
Based on the current leasing status, S&P estimates a DSC of 0.55x.

The Ironwood Apartments loan ($15.4 million; 2.9%) is the second-
largest asset in the pool and is secured by an 104-unit apartment
complex in Houston, Texas, built in 2000.  This loan also appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For year-end
2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 92.0% and 0.85x,
respectively.

The Greenhouse Marketplace Shopping Center loan ($12.0 million;
2.3%) is the fourth-largest nondefeased asset in the pool and is
secured by an 103,029-sq.-ft. shadow anchored retail center in San
Leandro, Calif., built in 1986.

This loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to
upcoming lease expirations.  The largest expiring lease is for the
sole collateral anchor, Big Lots (30,032; 29% of NRA).  Their
lease expires Jan. 31, 2010, and the tenant will be vacating the
property at that time per the master servicer.  For year-end 2009,
the reported occupancy and DSC were 100.0% and 1.60x,
respectively.  Considering the upcoming vacancy of the Big Lots
space, S&P estimates a DSC of 0.84x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

         Salomon Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class     To     From        Credit enhancement (%)
       -----     --     ----        ----------------------
       C         AA     AA+                          18.20
       D         A      AA                           15.97
       E         BBB    A                            13.29
       F         BB+    BBB+                         10.61
       G         B      BBB                           7.93
       H         CCC-   BB-                           4.36
       J         D      CCC-                          0.79

                        Ratings Affirmed

         Salomon Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class     Rating Credit enhancement (%)
             -----     -----------------------------
             A3        AAA                     33.39
             B         AAA                     25.80
             K         D                         N/A
             L         D                         N/A
             M         D                         N/A
             N         D                         N/A
             X1        AAA                       N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


SCHOONER TRUST: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class G to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded these ratings of five classes of Schooner Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4:

Class C to A (high) from A
Class D to BBB (high) from BBB
Class E to BBB from BBB (low)
Class F to BBB(low) from BB (high)
Class G to BB (high) from BB

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings of 11 classes as
follows:

Class A-1 at AAA
Class A-2 at AAA
Class XP-1 at AAA
Class XC-1 at AAA
Class XP-2 at AAA
Class XC-2 at AAA
Class B at AA
Class H at BB (low)
Class J at B (high)
Class K at B
Class L at B (low)

The ratings upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to the
bonds from a collateral reduction of approximately 29% since
issuance.  Fifteen loans have paid out of the pool since September
2005.  Additionally, as of the September 2010 remittance, the
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio remains stable at 1.66x.

There are currently three loans representing 13.08% of the
transaction on the servicer's watchlist, however, DBRS has not added
any of these loans to the DBRS HotList.  Given the current debt
yields and strong performance, DBRS believes the risk surrounding the
servicer watchlisted loans is mitigated.

DBRS has added one loan, Milliken Crossing Shopping Centre (5.97% of
the pool) to the DBRS HotList because the YE2009 net cash flow (NCF)
has declined 21% since issuance.  The loan continues to cover at a
1.14x DSCR, however, the debt yield, at 8.06%, is not considered
stable.

DBRS has applied a NCF stress of 20% across all the loans in the pool
and any potential losses associated with the loans resulting from a
default would be contained to the first loss piece.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction on a monthly basis in the
Global CMBS Monthly Surveillance report, which can provide more
detailed information on the individual loans in the pool.


SONIC CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on classes
A-1 and A-2 from Sonic Capital LLC's series 2006-1 to 'BB+ (sf)'
from 'BBB- (sf)'.  Sonic Capital LLC is a U.S. corporate
securitization for which the rated notes are paid by future
earnings from the underlying corporate entity, Sonic Capital.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view that the company's continued
declines in operating performance have weakened credit protection
measures.  S&P largely attributes the decline in same-store sales
over the past year to high unemployment due to the economy
weakening consumer spending.  S&P also believes that severe
weather conditions in the second fiscal quarter of 2010 also
affected same-store sales performance at Sonic's restaurants.
Over the same time period, many quick service operators
experienced weak same-sales performance, but S&P believes that
Sonic's performance was generally weaker than its competitors
within the industry.  The weak sales performance, combined with
Sonic's refranchising efforts, have resulted in profit declines
for Sonic Corp., quarter-over-quarter, since May 2008.  The
lowered ratings reflect S&P's expectation that performance trends
may be weak in the next quarter, but may stabilize in the
company's fiscal 2011.  However, given S&P's belief of the
likelihood of sustained high unemployment in the U.S., S&P expects
competition in the restaurant sector to remain intense and do not
anticipate material improvements in operating performance in the
near term.

S&P generally analyzes two features when S&P rates U.S. corporate
securitizations: the quality of the underlying assets, which are
essential to generating the revenues; and features in place to
mitigate risk to continued operations in the event that the
originator of the asset falls into bankruptcy.  In S&P's view, the
operations at the corporate level for Sonic, such as marketing,
product research and development, brand management, quality
control, etc., are analogous to the "servicing" function in some
other types of structured finance transactions.

The methodology S&P applied to this transaction begins with a
business risk assessment for the underlying company that takes
multiple factors into consideration, including but not limited to
industry characteristics, company position, and barriers to market
entry.

From there, S&P may elevate the rating on the securitization up to
three to four notches above the rating implied by the business
risk assessment on the underlying company based on S&P's view of a
number of factors affecting the securitization.  These include,
among other factors, the structural and legal enhancements
available to support the transaction, the role of a control party,
and the availability of a satisfactory backup servicer/manager to
mitigate risk to ongoing operations in the event of the company's
bankruptcy.

In U.S. Corporate Securitizations, this ongoing operational
reliance on the servicer, in this instance Sonic Industries
Services Inc., introduces a different type of performance risk
than that of some other typical securitizations.  S&P believes
that the continued management of the business as an ongoing
concern is key to performance.  Therefore, the rating on the
securitization is dependent on the business and financial strength
of the servicer.  In April 2010, S&P lowered its ratings on both
classes from series 2006-1 due to the weakened state of Ambac
Assurance Corp. ('R'), the control party, and the liquidity
provider for the transaction.  S&P will continue to monitor the
securitization and take rating actions as S&P deems appropriate.

                        Ratings Lowered

                        Sonic Capital LLC
       US$800 million fixed-rate series 2006-1 senior notes

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class     To                   From
             -----     --                   ----
             A-1       BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
             A-2       BB+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9
certificates from five transactions, backed by mortgage loans
guaranteed by FHA or VA, issued by Structured Asset Securities
Corporation.

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF1

  -- A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 29, 2010 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF2

  -- A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF3

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF4

  -- A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1999-RF1

  -- A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings were downgraded because these certificates did not
have sufficient credit enhancement to maintain the current ratings
compared to the revised loss expectations on the deals.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien mortgage loans guaranteed by FHA or VA (typically 80%
FHA and 20% VA.)

Moody's estimated losses on the underlying mortgage pools by
multiplying lifetime pipeline losses expected from the related
pools by a factor of 1.50.  The lifetime pipeline losses were
derived based on lifetime roll rates to default of 85% for 60-day
delinquencies, 95% for 90+ day delinquencies, 100% for loans in
foreclosure, and 100% for loans where the homes are held-for-sale,
each applied with a severity of approximately 8%.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels,
Moody's analyzed each certificate's loss coverage ratio based on
aggregate credit enhancement, which combines cash available on the
reserve account and excess spread compared to updated pool losses.
The certificates that do not have enough loss coverage ratio to
maintain current ratings based on the new loss levels have been
downgraded.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As a part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the
expected loss on each collateral pool by an additional 10% and
found that ratings do not change.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transactions in the past 6 months.


TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 5
tranches, upgraded the rating of 3 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 8 tranches from 7 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

In addition to adjustments to reflect updated loss expectations,
Moody's has also adjusted the ratings on tranches A-1A and A-1B
issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-2ALT to reflect the fact that
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement allocates losses to all the
senior tranches on a reverse sequential basis after credit support
depletion date.  Previous rating actions relied upon conflicting
language in the Prospectus Supplement, which provides that all the
senior tranches will take losses on a pro rata basis after credit
support depletion date.  The Trustee has confirmed that it is
following the PSA rather than the Prospectus, and Moody's has
adjusted its analysis accordingly.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Tranches A-1,A-2, and A-3 issued by Terwin mortgage Trust 2007-
6ALT, are wrapped by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Confirmed at
Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009).  For securities insured by
a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher
of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the
current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the
guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-17HE

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-9HGA

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-2ALT

  -- Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-6ALT

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously
     on Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)


TIAA CMBS: S&P Raises Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from TIAA CMBS I
Trust's series 2001-C1.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on four
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
structure and of the remaining collateral in the pool.  S&P
affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only certificate based
on its current criteria.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of all of the remaining assets in the transaction.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, Standard & Poor's
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.43x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 55.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.24x and an LTV of 68.9%.  The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 3.8% and 4.3%, respectively.  All of
the adjusted DSC and LTV calculations excluded seven defeased
loans ($30.1 million, 14.9%).  S&P also excluded 27 cooperative
apartment loans ($25.5 million, 14.8%) from all of the DSC and LTV
calculations.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Sept. 21, 2010, remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $202 million, which represents 13.8% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 85 loans in
the pool, down from 259 at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, provided financial
information for 86.4% of the pool.  This information excluded the
seven defeased loans ($30.1 million, 14.9%) and 27 cooperative
apartment loans ($25.5 million, 14.8%).  In addition, 17% of the
financial information was full-year 2008 data, while 13.7% of the
financial information was not provided for the pool.  The age or
lack of financial information was a consideration in S&P's rating
analysis.

Excluding the cooperative apartment loans and the defeased loans,
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.56x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.43x
and 55.4%, respectively.  According to the Sept. 21, 2010,
remittance report, no assets are with the special servicer, also
Berkadia.  The transaction has realized principal losses of
$2.5 million in connection with one loan to date.

Two loans ($3.9 million, 1.9%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The larger loan on the watchlist is Lamplighter
Village ($3.4 million, 1.7%).  The loan is secured by a 250-pad
manufactured housing community in Federal Heights, Colo.  The loan
appears on the watchlist due to a decrease in occupancy.  The
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.46x and 72%, respectively, as of
December 2009.  The remaining loan ($456,731, 0.2%) appears on the
watchlist due to a pending loan maturity on Dec. 4, 2010.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $91.4 million (45.2%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.80x for the top 10 loans.  Financial information was not
provided for two ($17.5 million, 8.7%) of the top 10 exposures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.51x and
55.7%, respectively.  Details regarding three of the top 10
exposures are:

The McIntyre Square loan ($17.5 million, 8.7%) is the largest loan
in the pool.  The loan is secured by a 252,795-sq.-ft. retail
property in Pittsburgh, Pa.  The tenants include Kmart, Giant
Eagle, and Office Max.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, reported DSC was
1.61x.  As of the June 30, 2010, rent roll, overall property
occupancy was 94.7%, with lease expirations in 2011 for 18% of the
net rentable area.  The Napa Warehouse loan is the third-largest
loan in the pool.  The loan is secured by a 377,000-sq.-ft.
industrial property in Napa, Calif.  According to the inspection
report the master servicer provided, the property is 100% occupied
by Biagi Brothers under a lease expiring in 2018.  S&P did not
receive financial information for the loan.  The Cliffwood Plaza
Shopping Center loan is the fifth-largest loan in the pool.  The
loan is secured by a 74,941-sq.-ft. retail property in Matawan,
N.J.  According to the Oct. 1, 2010, rent roll, the overall
property occupancy was 100%, and the largest tenant is A&P (75.7%
of the net rentable area under a lease expiring in 2023).
Financial information was not provided for the loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral in the pool according to
S&P's criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with the raised and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Raised

                        TIAA CMBS I Trust
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certs series 2001-C1

                               Rating
                               ------
  Class  To        From                    Credit enhancement (%)
  -----  --        ----                    ----------------------
  F      AAA (sf)  AA (sf)                 62.21
  G      AA+ (sf)  A+ (sf)                 54.95
  H      A+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)               38.64
  J      BBB+ (sf) BBB- (sf)               31.39
  K      BBB (sf)  BB+ (sf)                25.95
  L      BB+ (sf)  BB- (sf)                18.70
  M      B+ (sf)   B (sf)                  15.07
  N      B (sf)    B- (sf)                 11.44

                        Ratings Affirmed

                        TIAA CMBS I Trust
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certs series 2001-C1

             Class  Rating     Credit enhancement (%)
             -----  ------     ----------------------
             C      AAA (sf)                    89.40
             D      AAA (sf)                    78.52
             E      AAA (sf)                    71.27
             X      AAA (sf)                      N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


TRIBUNE LTD: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Two CDO Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on the notes from Tribune Ltd.'s series 50 and 51, both
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transactions.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete repurchase and
cancellation of the notes.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                           Tribune Ltd.
                            Series 50

                               Rating
                               ------
                  Class      To      From
                  -----      --      ----
                  Notes      NR      CCC- (sf)

                           Tribune Ltd.
                            Series 51

                               Rating
                               ------
                  Class      To      From
                  -----      --      ----
                  Notes      NR      CCC- (sf)

                          NR - Not rated


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2006-C27 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 16 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-C27 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug. 14, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 6, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $2.92 billion
from $3.08 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 157 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 41%
of the pool.

Forty-three loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $48.6 million (41% loss severity).
Fourteen loans, representing 7% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $55.4 million appraisal reduction for ten of the
specially serviced loans

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


* Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on North Carolina Medical's Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BB+' rating on these outstanding
revenue bonds issued by the North Carolina Medical Care Commission
on behalf of Halifax Regional Medical Center:

  -- Approximately $16,715,000 hospital revenue bonds series 1998.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Rating Rationale:

The 'BB+' rating reflects Halifax's weak financial profile and
location in a challenging service area.
One of Halifax's main credit strengths is its position as a sole
community hospital with leading 66% market share.

Liquidity metrics have improved due to adequate cash flow, and
modest capital spending with 98 days cash on hand at July 31,
2010; however, planned capital projects will likely constrain
further growth over the near-to-medium term.

Halifax's five-year capital plan includes the renovation and
expansion of its operating rooms, new parking, PACU expansion, and
ambulatory space expansion.  Halifax plans to finance phase I of
the project with $6 million of debt within the next year, which
Fitch believes can be absorbed at the current rating level.
However, the financing of Halifax's additional capital needs over
the next five years could place pressure on the rating.

Profitability remains challenged due to an unfavorable payor mix,
increasing levels of bad debt expense, declining utilization
trends, and the costs associated with Halifax's physician clinic,
with weak operating margins in the range of negative 2.4% to 1.6%
over the last five years.  However, through the 10 months ended
July 31, 2010 (interim period), Halifax posted a consolidated 2.7%
operating margin due to significant improvement in physician
clinic operations and successful expense management practices.

Significant decline in utilization trends reflected in the interim
period mainly due to the recession, with acute discharges down
6.1% and emergency room visits down 4.8% when compared to the same
prior year period.

                        Key Rating Drivers

  -- Sustained profitability improvement as exhibited through the
     interim period will be necessary to support Halifax's future
     capital needs.

  -- Additional debt issuance above the $6 million anticipated
     within the year could place downward pressure on the rating
     if profitability and liquidity metrics are not maintained.

Security:

The bonds are secured by a pledge of gross receipts and a debt
service reserve.  The absence of a mortgage at this rating level
is a credit weakness.

Credit Summary:

The 'BB+' rating on Halifax Regional Medical Center's reflects
weak profitability, adequate balance sheet indicators, and a
moderate debt position.  Additional credit concerns include high
dependence on governmental payors, above-average bad debt expense,
small revenue base, and declining utilization trends.

Halifax's main credit strength is the maintenance of a leading
market share position of about 66% in its primary service area.
In addition, the hospital received sole community hospital status
in fiscal 2009, which means it garners enhanced reimbursement from
Medicare and Medicaid.  Largely flat to declining utilization
coupled with recruitment and other expenses related to Halifax's
physician clinic resulted in a negative 0.9% operating margin in
fiscal 2009.  Reduced use of locum tenens, successful ramp-up of
new physicians and a move to productivity-based staffing has since
had a positive impact, as Halifax generated $2.35 million in
income from operations for the interim period, a 2.7% operating
margin comparing favorably against Fitch's non-investment grade
median of 0.1%.  Personnel costs dropped to 51.3% of revenues as
of July 2010, down from 54.2% in fiscal 2009.

In addition, limited capital spending coupled with positive
operating cash flow has resulted in improved liquidity.  At
July 31, 2010, Halifax had $21.4 million in unrestricted cash and
investments equating to 98.2 days of cash on hand (DCOH), up from
$17.4 million in fiscal 2009 (76.6 DCOH) and comparing favorably
to Fitch's non-investment grade median of 76.6 DCOH.  While
liquidity indicators have improved over the past few fiscal years,
Halifax's future capital plans will likely constrain further
balance sheet growth.  Halifax's five-year capital plan totals
approximately $25 million including roughly $2.4 million in annual
routine capital spending, with $6 million to be funded by debt
within the next year.

Halifax has relied on operating leases to fund some of its capital
needs historically and its operating lease expense will total
$1.3 million for fiscal 2010.  Pro forma maximum annual debt
service, which is inclusive of capital and operating lease
expenses in addition to an estimate of the $6 million of
additional debt, is calculated at $3.89 million.  Historical
coverage of pro forma MADS is adequate, at 2.4 times by EBITDA and
2.3x by operating EBITDA for the interim period and in line with
Fitch's non-investment grade medians of 2.0x coverage by EBITDA
and 1.7x coverage by operating EBITDA.  The balance sheet
indicates some leverage, with cash-to-pro forma debt dropping to
approximately 97.6% (from 112.7% in fiscal 2009) and a pro forma
cushion ratio of 11.8x as of July 31, 2010.  Still, these metrics
compare favorably to Fitch's non-investment grade medians of 63.2%
cash to debt and 6.0x cushion ratio.  Fitch also notes that
Halifax is considering additional debt-financed capital spending
over the medium term, and will consider that debt and take
appropriate rating action as necessary.  Halifax has limited
additional debt capacity at its current rating level.

Ongoing credit concerns include high dependence on government
payors and an above-average bad debt expense reflective of the
challenging service area.  While management's attention to
controlling expenses has yielded positive results, Halifax
continues to be hindered by its unfavorable payor mix that
included approximately 53% Medicare and 19% Medicaid in fiscal
2009.  Additionally, an economically challenged service area has
resulted in higher bad debt expense, as demonstrated by an
increase to 17.7% of revenues in fiscal 2009 from 14.7% in 2008.
Finally, utilization trends have been negative at Halifax, with
acute discharges in fiscal 2009 down 2.4% from fiscal 2008 levels,
and continuing to drop in the interim period ending July 31, 2010.
Management attributes this decline to economic impact and shifts
in the insured population, and has thus far been successful in
preserving profitability by managing expenses against total
revenues.  Further, Halifax anticipates improving its physician
clinic operation to a net loss of approximately $1 million in
fiscal 2010, against a net loss of $3.7 million in fiscal 2009.

The Stable Outlook is supported by Halifax's position as a sole
community hospital, which provides for certain operating stability
via enhanced Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement and expectation
of the sustained improved financial performance exhibited in the
interim period.  However, Halifax's future capital plans could
place downward pressure on the rating.

Halifax is a 204 licensed-bed community medical center (144
operated beds) providing primary and secondary care services.
The medical center is located in Roanoke Rapids, approximately
75 miles northeast of Raleigh.  In fiscal 2009, Halifax had
$104.8 million in total operating revenue.

Disclosure to Fitch has been adequate with quarterly disclosure,
although only audited annual disclosure is required in the bond
documents.  Halifax provides disclosure upon request to other
third parties.  Fitch notes that quarterly disclosure includes a
balance sheet and income statements; however, a statement of cash
flows and management discussion and analysis is not provided.


* S&P Assigns Ratings on 19 Tranches to CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 19
tranches from 13 U.S. collateralized debt obligation transactions
on CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the same time, S&P
placed its ratings on five tranches from three U.S. CDO
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.  These 24
tranches have a total issuance amount of $3.486 billion.

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's most recent monthly review
of U.S. cash flow and hybrid CDO performance.  The rationale for
the actions is based on both quantitative and qualitative
performance parameters.  These parameters include the
transactions' structural features and a broad view of the
underlying collateral within each transaction, including these:

* An increase in paydowns to the tranches from both scheduled and
  unscheduled asset amortization;

* A change in the level of overcollateralization available to
  support each tranche since origination, or since S&P's last
  rating action; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of the securities that
  collateralize the rated notes.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after S&P complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis for each of the affected
transactions and evaluate additional information S&P may receive
during discussions with the relevant collateral managers.  S&P
expects to resolve these CreditWatch placements within 90 days.
S&P will continue to monitor the CDO transactions S&P rates and
take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, as S&P
deems appropriate.

                  Ratings Placed On Creditwatch

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Transaction                 Class To                  From
  -----------                 ----- --                  ----
  Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1    A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
  Callidus Debt Partners CLO  A     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
   Fund II
  CapitalSource Commercial    A-PT  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
   Loan Trust 2006-2
  Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     A1    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
  CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd            A     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
  Denali Capital CLO IV Ltd   D     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
  Gulf Stream Repack Trust    A2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
   2003-1
  Hewett's Island CLO III     A-1   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
  Hewett's Island CLO III     B-1   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
  Madison Park Funding IV Ltd C     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
  Madison Park Funding IV Ltd D     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)
  Madison Park Funding IV Ltd E     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
  Marathon CLO II Ltd         A-1A  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
  Marathon CLO II Ltd         A-1B  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)
  MCG Commercial Loan Trust   D     BB (sf)/Watch Neg   BB (sf)
   2006-1
  Monument Park CDO           A-1   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
  Monument Park CDO           A-2   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
  NEW WORLD FUNDING 2008-1    A-1S  AA (sf)/Watch Neg   AA (sf)
  Securitized Product of
  Restructured Collateral
  Limited SPC for the account
  of the Series 2005-1
  Segregated Portfolio        A1    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg  AAA (sf)
  Securitized Product of
  Restructured Collateral
  Limited SPC for the account
  of the Series 2005-1
  Segregated Portfolio        A2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg  AA+ (sf)
  Securitized Product of
  Restructured Collateral
  Limited SPC for the account
  of the Series 2005-1
  Segregated Portfolio         B     A (sf)/Watch Neg    A (sf)
  Signature 7 L.P.             A     A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)
  TCW High Income Partners    II-A  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)
  TCW High Income Partners    II-B  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)

                   Other Ratings Outstanding

            Transaction                 Class Rating
            -----------                 ----- ------
            Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1    B     BBB+ (sf)
            Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1    C     BBB+ (sf)
            Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1    D     CCC- (sf)
            Callidus Debt Partners CLO  B     BBB+ (sf)
            Fund II
            Callidus Debt Partners CLO  C-1   CCC- (sf)
            Fund II
            Callidus Debt Partners CLO  C-2   CCC- (sf)
            Fund II
            CapitalSource Commercial    A-1A  AA+ (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            CapitalSource Commercial    A-1B  AA+ (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            CapitalSource Commercial    B     AA (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            CapitalSource Commercial    C     BBB+ (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            CapitalSource Commercial    D     CCC- (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            CapitalSource Commercial    E     CCC- (sf)
            Loan Trust 2006-2
            Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     A2    AAA (sf)
            Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     A3    AA- (sf)
            Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     B     BBB+ (sf)
            Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     C     BB+ (sf)
            Carlyle Vantage CLO Ltd     D     CCC- (sf)
            CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd            B     BBB+ (sf)
            CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd            C     B+ (sf)
            CoLTS 2005-2 Ltd            D     CCC+ (sf)
            Denali Capital CLO IV       A     AA (sf)
            Denali Capital CLO IV       B     BBB+ (sf)
            Denali Capital CLO IV       C     BB+ (sf)
            Gulf Stream Repack Trust    A1    AAA (sf)
             2003-1
            Hewett's Island CLO III     A-2   BBB+ (sf)
            Hewett's Island CLO III     B-2   BB+ (sf)
            Hewett's Island CLO III     C     B+ (sf)
            Hewett's Island CLO III     D     CCC- (sf)
            Madison Park Funding IV     A-1a  AAA (sf)
            Madison Park Funding IV     A-1b  AA+ (sf)
            Madison Park Funding IV     A-2   AA+ (sf)
            Madison Park Funding IV     B     A+ (sf)
            Marathon CLO II Ltd         A-2   A- (sf)
            Marathon CLO II Ltd         B     BB+ (sf)
            Marathon CLO II Ltd         C     CCC- (sf)
            Marathon CLO II Ltd         D     CCC- (sf)
            MCG Commercial Loan Trust   A-1   A- (sf)
            2006-1
            MCG Commercial Loan Trust   A-2   A- (sf)
            2006-1
            MCG Commercial Loan Trust   A-3   A- (sf)
            2006-1
            MCG Commercial Loan Trust   B     A- (sf)
            2006-1
            MCG Commercial Loan Trust   C     BBB+ (sf)
            2006-1
            Monument Park CDO Ltd.      B     B+ (sf)
            Signature 7 L.P.            B     BB- (sf)
            Signature 7 L.P.            C     CCC+ (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
tranches from eight U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed 10 of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 25
other tranches from seven transactions.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

The 13 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $2.402 billion.  Six of the eight affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of U.S. RMBS and other SF securities.  One transaction is
a high-grade SF CDO of ABS that was primarily collateralized at
origination by 'AAA (sf)' though 'A (sf)' rated tranches of RMBS
and other SF securities.  The other transaction is a CDO of CDO
transaction that was primarily collateralized at origination by
notes from other CDOs, as well as by tranches from RMBS and other
SF transactions.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                         Rating Actions

                                     Rating
                                     ------
   Transaction           Class   To           From
   -----------           -----   --           ----
   C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.    B-1     BB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.    B-2     BB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.    C       B+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   C-Bass CBO X Ltd.     A       BB+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
   C-Bass CBO X Ltd.     B       CCC (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding,     A-1     CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding,     A-2     CC (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Mount Skylight CDO    A1      CC (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
   Orchard Park Ltd.     A1ser1  CCC- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   Orchard Park Ltd.     A1ser2  CCC- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   Pine Mountain CDO     A-1     CC (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
   Prudential Structured A-2L    B (sf)       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
    Finance CBO I
   TABS 2005-2 Oakville  A-1     CC (sf)      CCC+ (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

     Transaction                           Class     Rating
     -----------                           -----     ------
     C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.                    D-1       CC (sf)
     C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.                    D-2       CC (sf)
     C-Bass CBO IV Ltd.                    E         CC (sf)
     C-Bass CBO X Ltd.                     C         CC (sf)
     Coolidge Funding,                     B         CC (sf)
     Coolidge Funding,                     C         CC (sf)
     Coolidge Funding,                     D         CC (sf)
     Coolidge Funding,                     E         CC (sf)
     Mount Skylight CDO                    A2        CC (sf)
     Mount Skylight CDO                    B         CC (sf)
     Mount Skylight CDO                    C         CC (sf)
     Mount Skylight CDO                    D         CC (sf)
     Pine Mountain CDO                     A-2       CC (sf)
     Pine Mountain CDO                     A-3       CC (sf)
     Pine Mountain CDO                     B         CC (sf)
     Pine Mountain CDO                     C         CC (sf)
     Pine Mountain CDO                     D         CC (sf)
     Prudential Structured Finance CBO I   B-1       CC (sf)
     Prudential Structured Finance CBO I   B-1L      CC (sf)
     Prudential Structured Finance CBO I   B-2       CC (sf)
     Prudential Structured Finance CBO I   B-2L      CC (sf)
     TABS 2005-2 Oakville                  A-2       CC (sf)
     TABS 2005-2 Oakville                  B         CC (sf)
     TABS 2005-2 Oakville                  C         CC (sf)
     TABS 2005-2 Oakville                  D         CC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
tranches from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation of
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The downgraded
tranches have a total issuance amount of $2.199 billion.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on six tranches from three
transactions and removed three of them from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
CMBS securities.  The affirmations reflect current credit support
levels that S&P believes are sufficient to maintain the current
ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                         Rating Actions

                       Crest G-Star 2001-2

                       Rating
                       ------
         Class   To                 From
         -----   --                 ----
         A       A+ (sf)            AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
         C       CC (sf)            B- (sf)/Watch Neg
         Combo   CCC- (sf)          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
         B-1     CCC+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         B-2     CCC+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                          G-Star 2002-1

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class   To                 From
     -----   --                 ----
     A-1MM   AAA (sf)/A-1 (sf)  AAA (sf)/A-1 (sf)/Watch Neg
     A-2     AA+ (sf)           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
     BFL     CCC+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
     BFX     CCC+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
     C       CCC- (sf)          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                        Newcastle CDO VII

                       Rating
                       ------
         Class   To                 From
         -----   --                 ----
         I-B     B- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
         I-A     BB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         II      CCC (sf)           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         III     CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Newcastle CDO X

                       Rating
                       ------
         Class   To                 From
         -----   --                 ----
         S       AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
         A-1     AA- (sf)           AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         D       CCC+ (sf)          B (sf)/Watch Neg
         C       B- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
         A-3     BB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
         A-2     BB+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         F       CCC- (sf)          CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
         E       CCC (sf)           CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                         Newcastle CDO VII

                         Class   Rating
                         -----   ------
                         IV-FL   CC (sf)
                         IV-FX   CC (sf)
                         V       CC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 42 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 42
classes from 13 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent collateral
issued from 2002 through 2006 and one risk transfer transaction
issued in 2005.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on 89
classes from these as well as six additional transactions.

The "scratch-and-dent" collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of reperforming, nonperforming,
outside-the-guidelines, and document-deficient first-lien, fixed-
and adjustable-rate, residential mortgage loans secured by one- to
four-family properties.  The risk transfer transaction has an
underlying pool of loans predominantly made up of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, first-lien, Alt-A, and subprime mortgage loans.

The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's current and
projected losses, which S&P based on the dollar amounts of loans
currently in the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real
estate owned pipelines, as well as its projection of future
defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative losses to date in its
analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using its criteria listed in the
"Related Criteria And Research" section below.  As part of its
analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the underlying
mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For
example, the risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools
influences S&P's default projections, while its outlook for
housing-price declines and the health of the housing market
influence its loss severity assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P
adjusted its loss expectations for each deal based on upward
trends in delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, and the ability to
withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to maintain a
'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its view, a class
could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given its current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in its view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P determine
appropriate.

                         Rating Actions

                    RAAC Series 2006-SP1 Trust
                         Series 2006-SP1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A-2        76112B3D0   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
       A-3        76112B3E8   A- (sf)              AA (sf)
       M-1        76112B3F5   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust
                         Series 2002-RS2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A-I-5      760985JL6   AA (sf)              AAA (sf)
       M-I-1      760985JP7   CCC (sf)             B (sf)

                          RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust
                        Series 2003-RS10

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-2      760985D32   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2003-RS8 Trust
                        Series 2003-RS8

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-1      760985ZH7   B (sf)               A (sf)
       M-I-2      760985ZJ3   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
       M-I-3      760985ZK0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS10 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS10

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-1      76112BDV9   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)
       M-II-4     76112BEF3   D (sf)               CC (sf)
       M-I-2      76112BDW7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS12

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-1      76112BFV7   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
       M-I-2      76112BFW5   CC (sf)              B (sf)
       M-I-3      76112BFX3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       M-II-5     76112BGG9   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)
       M-II-6     76112BGH7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)


                   RAMP Series 2004-RS2 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-2      760985Q61   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       M-I-3      760985Q79   D (sf)               CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS4 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS4

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-1      7609853E9   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
       M-I-2      7609853F6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       M-II-2     7609853J8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                    RAMP Series 2004-RS8 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS8

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-I-1      76112BAG5   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
       M-I-2      76112BAH3   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       M-II-3     76112BAP5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                    RAMP Series 2006-RS1 Trust
                         Series 2006-RS1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A-I-2      76112BT83   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
       A-I-3      76112BT91   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
       A-II       76112BU24   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
       M-1        76112BU32   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2006-RS2 Trust
                         Series 2006-RS2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       A-2        76112B2C3   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
       A-3A       76112B2D1   CCC (sf)             B (sf)
       A-3B       76112B2S8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
       M-1        76112B2E9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                Smart Home Reinsurance 2005-1 Ltd
                          Series 2005-1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M-2        83169RAB9   A (sf)               AA (sf)
       M-3        83169RAC7   BBB (sf)             AA- (sf)
       M-4        83169RAD5   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
       M-5        83169RAE3   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
       M-6        83169RAF0   CCC (sf)             A- (sf)
       M-7        83169RAG8   CCC (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
       M-8        83169RAH6   CCC (sf)             BBB (sf)

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series 2005-GEL4

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       M3         86359DRN9   CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
       M4         86359DRP4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                   RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust
                        Series 2002-RS2

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M-I-2      760985JQ5   CC (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985JT9   CCC (sf)

                    RAMP Series 2002-RS3 Trust
                         Series 2002-RS3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-5      760985LV1   BB (sf)
                 M-I-1      760985MA6   CC (sf)
                 M-I-2      760985MB4   CC (sf)
                 A-II       760985LY5   AAA (sf)
                 A-II-S     760985LZ2   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-1     760985MD0   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985ME8   CC (sf)
                 M-II-3     760985MF5   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2003-RS1 Trust
                         Series 2003-RS1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-5      760985RX1   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      760985RY9   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-IO     760985SC6   AAA (sf)
                 A-II       760985SD4   CC (sf)
                 M-I-1      760985RZ6   CCC (sf)
                 M-I-2      760985SA0   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust
                        Series 2003-RS10

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-6      760985C82   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-7      760985C90   AAA (sf)
                 M-I-1      760985D24   AA (sf)
                 M-II-1     760985D73   A (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985D81   CC (sf)

                 M-II-3     760985D99   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2003-RS7 Trust
                         Series 2003-RS7

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-5      760985XV8   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      760985XW6   AAA (sf)
                 M-I-1      760985XX4   AA (sf)
                 M-I-2      760985XY2   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-1     760985YC9   BB (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985YD7   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2003-RS8 Trust
                         Series 2003-RS8

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-6A     760985ZE4   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6B     760985ZT1   AAA (sf)
                 A-1-7      760985ZF1   AAA (sf)
                 A-1-8      760985ZG9   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-1     760985ZN4   AA (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985ZP9   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-3     760985ZQ7   CC (sf)
                 M-II-4     760985ZR5   CC (sf)
                 M-II-5     760985ZS3   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS10 Trust
                        Series 2004-RS10

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-4      76112BDS6   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-5      76112BDT4   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      76112BDU1   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-2     76112BED8   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-3     76112BEE6   CC (sf)
                 M-II-1     76112BEC0   AA (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust
                        Series 2004-RS12

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-4      76112BFS4   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-5      76112BFT2   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      76112BFU9   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-2     76112BGD6   A (sf)
                 M-II-3     76112BGE4   A- (sf)
                 M-II-4     76112BGF1   BBB+ (sf)


                   RAMP Series 2004-RS2 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS2

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-4      760985Q38   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-5      760985Q46   AAA (sf)
                 M-I-1      760985Q53   A (sf)
                 M-II-1     760985R37   BB (sf)
                 M-II-2     760985R45   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS3 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-4      760985V32   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-5      760985V40   AAA (sf)
                 M-1        760985V65   BB (sf)
                 M-2        760985V73   CCC (sf)
                 M-3        760985V81   CC (sf)
                 M-4        760985V99   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS4 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS4

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-5      7609852X8   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      7609852Y6   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-1     7609853H2   A+ (sf)
                 M-II-3     7609853K5   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS8 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS8

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-I-4      76112BAD2   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-5      76112BAE0   AAA (sf)
                 A-I-6      76112BAF7   AAA (sf)
                 A-II-3     76112BAS9   AAA (sf)
                 M-II-1     76112BAM2   A (sf)
                 M-II-2     76112BAN0   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-4     76112BAQ3   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2004-RS9 Trust
                         Series 2004-RS9

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M-II-1     76112BCM0   AA (sf)
                 M-II-2     76112BCN8   CCC (sf)
                 M-II-3     76112BCP3   CC (sf)
                 M-II-4     76112BCQ1   CC (sf)


                   RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust
                         Series 2005-RS7

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A-2        76112BWU0   A (sf)
                 A-3        76112BWV8   A (sf)
                 M-1        76112BWW6   B (sf)
                 M-2        76112BWX4   CCC (sf)
                 M-3        76112BWY2   CCC (sf)
                 M-4        76112BWZ9   CC (sf)
                 M-5        76112BXA3   CC (sf)
                 M-6        76112BXB1   CC (sf)

                   RAMP Series 2006-RS2 Trust
                         Series 2006-RS2

                Class      CUSIP       Rating
                -----      -----       ------
                M-2        76112B2F6   CC (sf)

                Smart Home Reinsurance 2005-1 Ltd.
                          Series 2005-1

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 M-1        83169RAA1   AA+ (sf)

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series 2005-GEL4

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 A          86359DRK5   AAA (sf)
                 M1         86359DRL3   AAA (sf)
                 M2         86359DRM1   AA+ (sf)
                 M5         86359DRQ2   CC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Rating on City of Augusta's Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'BB' from 'AAA' on the City of Augusta Housing Authority, Ga.'s
series 2004 multifamily housing revenue bonds, issued on behalf of
Ashton Richmond L.P. for the Richmond Summit Apartments project
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.  A
Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security secures the bonds.

The lower rating reflects the need for a replacement of the
carryover amount schedule as shown in the trust indenture with a
revised schedule based on updated cash flows.

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's placed certain housing-related
issues on CreditWatch with negative implications based on the
revised criteria for federal government-enhanced housing
transactions.  This issue was included.  The revised criteria
affects government-enhanced housing transactions that have funds
invested in money market funds and other investments with no
guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero-reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  Standard & Poor's believes the
bonds would be able to meet all costs from transaction cash flows
for the term of the bonds, assuming no reinvestment earnings, if
the carryover amount schedule as shown in the trust indenture were
to be replaced with a revised schedule based on the updated cash
flows.  The carry forward balance schedule indicates to the
trustee the minimum amount of funds that need to be maintained in
the revenue account on each interest payment date.  If the trustee
were to release funds out of the transaction resulting in an
insufficient minimum balance, this could lead to a cash flow
shortfall in the future.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Duarte, California's Bonds to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA' its
rating on Duarte, California's series 1997A multifamily housing
revenue bonds (Heritage Park Apartments), and removed the rating
from CreditWatch.

"The downgrade is based on S&P's view of the project's reliance on
short-term market-rate investments," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Wendy Dolber.

The bonds are secured by a Fannie Mae mortgage pass-through
certificate.  The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity; and

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2019.

Credit strengths in the issue include:

* Investments held in 'AAAm' rated First American Treasury
  Obligations Fund Class D money market fund; and

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae pass-through
  certificate, considered to be 'AAA' eligible.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions where funds are invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on S&P's current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Three CDO Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
tranches from three U.S. collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  The tranches with lowered ratings have a total
issuance amount of $175 million.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
seven other tranches from four transactions and removed two of
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P withdrew its rating on one tranche from CBO Holdings III Ltd.
- Series Spirit CBO 2004-1, following the complete paydown of the
notes.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including
deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due to
increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
experienced downgrades into the 'CCC (sf)' range.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Transaction           Class  To           From
   -----------           -----  --           ----
   Admiral CBO (Cayman)  B-1    D (sf)       CC (sf)
   Admiral CBO (Cayman)  B-2    D (sf)       CC (sf)
   Admiral CBO (Cayman)  C      D (sf)       CC (sf)
   BEA CBO 1998-2        A-3    D (sf)       CC (sf)
   CBO Holdings III      A      NR           AAA (sf)
    Spirit CBO 2004-1
   Credit Linked Asset   A      A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Neg
    Securities I
   JUNIPER CBO 1999-1    A-3A   D (sf)       CC (sf)
   JUNIPER CBO 1999-1    A-3B   D (sf)       CC (sf)
   MWAM CBO 2001-1       A      AA (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Neg

                        Ratings Affirmed

      Transaction                           Class   Rating
      -----------                           -----   ------
      Gallatin Funding I Ltd.               A-1     AA+ (sf)
      Gallatin Funding I Ltd.               A-2     AA- (sf)
      South Street CBO 1999-1 Ltd.          A-2     CC (sf)
      South Street CBO 1999-1 Ltd.          A-2L    CC (sf)
      South Street CBO 1999-1 Ltd.          A-3     CC (sf)


* S&P Junks Rating on Minneapolis, Minnesota's Bonds From 'AAA'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CCC'
from 'AAA' on Minneapolis, Minnesota's multifamily mortgage
revenue refunding bonds (Riverside Plaza Project), series 1998.
The rating remains on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
bonds are secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

The issue was included in a May 12, 2010, rating action in which
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affects government-enhanced housing transactions in which
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

"S&P has analyzed updated financial statements, and in its opinion
assets are not sufficient to pay debt service through bond
maturity assuming 0% earnings on investments, and a payment
default may occur in the next 90 days," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Lawrence Witte.


* S&P Puts Ratings on Nine Tranches From Six CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on nine
tranches from six corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transactions on CreditWatch positive.  At the same
time, S&P placed its ratings on eight tranches from seven
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions and two tranches from
one synthetic CDO transaction backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 10 tranches from five corporate-backed synthetic CDO
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch positive.  The
CreditWatch placements and affirmations followed S&P's monthly
review of U.S. synthetic CDO transactions.

The CreditWatch positive placements reflect seasoning of the
transactions, rating stability of the obligors in the underlying
reference portfolios over the past few months, and synthetic rated
overcollateralization ratios that had risen above 100% at the next
highest rating level.  The CreditWatch negative placements reflect
negative rating migration in the respective portfolios and SROC
ratios that had fallen below 100% as of the September month-end
run.  The affirmations reflect deterioration in the respective
portfolios and SROC ratios that moved below 100% at the tranche's
next-highest rating level.

                         Rating Actions

                       Credit Default Swap
  EUR3.75 bil 30,000,000 Unfunded Portfolio CDS (Osprey) between
             Calyon (Buyer) and BNP Paribas (Seller)

                                    Rating
                                    ------
        Class           To                    From
        -----           --                    ----
        Swap            B-srp (sf)/Watch Neg  B-srp (sf)

                       Credit Default Swap
           US$400 mil Credit Default Swap - CRA500046

                                    Rating
                                    ------
        Class           To                    From
        -----           --                    ----
        Swap            AA+srp (sf)/Watch Pos AA+srp (sf)

                       Credit Default Swap
           US$400 mil Credit Default Swap - CRA800186

                                    Rating
                                    ------
        Class           To                    From
        -----           --                    ----
        Swap            AA+srp (sf)/Watch Pos AA+srp (sf)

                          Maclaurin SPC
US$118 mil Maclaurin SPC, acting on behalf of and for the account
            of the Series 2007-1 Segregated Portfolio

                                     Rating
                                     ------
         Class           To                    From
         -----           --                    ----
         A               CCC (sf)/Watch Neg    CCC (sf)
         B               CCC (sf)/Watch Neg    CCC (sf)

                    Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                         Series 2008-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
         Class           To                    From
         -----           --                    ----
         A1              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)
         A2              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

                 Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2005-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
         Class           To                    From
         -----           --                    ----
         III A           CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
         III B           CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
         III C           CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
         III D           CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

                 Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
         Class           To                    From
         -----           --                    ----
         III             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
           Class           To                    From
           -----           --                    ----
           A3-$LMS         B (sf)/Watch Neg      B (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 2

                                Rating
                                ------
    Class           To                    From
    -----           --                    ----
    A1-$LS          BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos
    A1A-$LS         BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos
    A1B-$LS         BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos
    A1-$FMS         BBB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
    A3-$LMS         BB- (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
    A3A-$LMS        B+ (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
    A7-$LS          CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg   CCC+ (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
           Class           To                    From
           -----           --                    ----
           A3-YLS          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 5

                                Rating
                                ------
    Class           To                    From
    -----           --                    ----
    A1-$LMS         BBB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
    A3-$LMS         BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 7

                                 Rating
                                 ------
     Class           To                    From
     -----           --                    ----
     A1-ELS          BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos
     A3-ELS          B- (sf)/Watch Neg     B- (sf)

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 8

                                 Rating
                                 ------
     Class           To                    From
     -----           --                    ----
     A3-ELS          B+ (sf)               B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 9

                                 Rating
                                 ------
     Class           To                    From
     -----           --                    ----
     A1-GLS          BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Pos

                      PARCS-R Master Trust
                         Series 2007-12

                                      Rating
                                      ------
          Class           To                    From
          -----           --                    ----
          Trust Unit      BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

                       STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
                          Series 2006-5

                                      Rating
                                      ------
          Class           To                    From
          -----           --                    ----
          A2-D2           B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***