TCR_Public/101017.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 17, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 288

                            Headlines

ACADEMIC FINANCE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
ACT 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-3 Notes to 'D'
ALABAMA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
BACCHUS 2006-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-4 Certs.
BIRMINGHAM-SOUTHERN COLLEGE: Moody's Cuts Debt Rating to 'B1'
CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

COBALT CMBS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Series 2007-C2 Certs.
COLUMBIA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2000 Bonds to 'BB+'
COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
COMM 2003-LNB1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 Classes of Certs.

COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Certs.
COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Notes to 'D'
COMM 2006-C8: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-C8 Certs.
COMM 2010: Fitch Rates Various Certificates; Gives Stable Outlook
COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Assigns Ratings on Series 2010-C1 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-CF2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 264 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-TFL2 Certs. to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-2 Certs. to 'D'
DAKOTA COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'

DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Assigns Ratings on Series 2010-RS2 Notes
EDINVEST - AMENDED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
EFSI - AMENDED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Notes
FAIRFAX COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B'
FIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on Series 1996 Bonds

FRASER SULLIVAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
GALLERIA CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GECMC 2003-C1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Certs.
GECMC 2007-C1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
GLACIER FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'

GLACIER FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'D'
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2003-C1 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-RR1 Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-RR2 Notes
GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches

INDYMAC IMJA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 187 Tranches
INDYMAC INDB: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-2 CRE CDO Deals
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-CIBC10 Certs.

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2002-C1 Securities
KATONAH V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
LASELL COLLEGE: Moody's Affirms Long-Term Rating at 'Ba1'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2004-C4 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2001-C3 Notes

LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-LLF Certs.
LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'
M-2 SPC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1999A Bonds to 'Ca'
MIAMI BEACH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Outstanding Bonds

MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
MISSISSIPPI HIGHER: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Bonds
MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-2 Bonds to 'B-'
MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2008-3 Bonds to 'B'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2007-5 Certs.

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-6 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-RR6 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 13 2004-RR2 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2007-XLF9 Certs.
MSC 2007-SRR3: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes

MSC 2007-SRR4: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 Classes of Notes
N-STAR REL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
NEVADA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
NEWPORT WAVES: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
SAN DIEGO NATURAL: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on 1998 Certs.

STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on Various Classes
SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Keeps CCCsf Ratings on Class M-1 & M-2 Notes
SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Keeps Bsf Ratings on Class M1 & M2 Notes
TENZING CFO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
TRAVIS COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'B2'

WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2005-C22 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-C30 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-C31 Certs.

* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 62 Subprime RMBS Deals
* S&P Affirms Ratings on 41 Certs. From Four RMBS Deals
* S&P Cuts Rating on Portland, Oregon's 1998A Bonds to 'BB+'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches From Three CDO CMBS Deals

* S&P Junks Rating on Orange County's 1999A Housing Bonds
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 36 Classes From 25 CMBS Deals
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on Seven Classes From Six CDO Transactions

                            *********

ACADEMIC FINANCE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan notes and
downgraded the subordinate note issued by Academic Finance
Corporation - Amended and Restated 2006 Indenture of Trust (2005).
The Rating Outlook remains Stable for the senior notes and Fitch
has assigned a Negative Outlook for the subordinate note.  Fitch
used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP
Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria', as well as the refined basis
risk criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press release
'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS
Review' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement consisting of subordination
and projected minimum excess spread to cover the applicable risk
factor stresses.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'B' due to the
trust's very high cost structure that will limit the trust's
ability to generate excess spread and reach parity of 100%.  The
rating may be downgraded further unless the trust begins to place
auction-rate securities at favorable rates and generate
significant amount of excess spread.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Academic Finance Corporation - Amended and Restated 2006 Indenture
of Trust (2005):

Series 2005

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

Series 2006

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.


ACT 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-3 Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on class A-3 from ACT 2005-RR Depositor Corp., a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.

The downgrade follows a principal loss sustained by the class
according to the Sept. 22, 2010, trustee report.  Class A-3
incurred a principal loss in the amount of $7.0 million, or 4.2%
of the class' opening principal balance.

According to the Sept. 22, 2010, trustee report, ACT 2005-RR is
collateralized by 105 CMBS classes ($484.6 million, 100%) from 38
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004, and the first-
loss CMBS classes comprise 44.8% of the collateral.

According to the most recent trustee report, ACT 2005-RR sustained
a $9.6 million principal loss, $7.0 million of which was passed
through to class A-3, due to principal losses sustained on seven
underlying CMBS transactions.  To date, ACT 2005-RR has
experienced $552.5 million, or 52.4%, in total principal losses
from its original face value of $1.1 billion.


ALABAMA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA' the
rating on Alabama Housing Finance Authority's multifamily housing
revenue bonds (Village Green Apartments Project) series 2003F and
removed it from CreditWatch.  The bonds are secured by a Fannie
Mae credit facility.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions where
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections
indicate that assuming no reinvestment earnings there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service
starting on the March 1, 2035, interest payment date.  On that
date, the shortfall is projected to be just over $11,500.  The
projected shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and
reaches just over $125,000 by bond maturity March 1, 2036,
assuming no interest earnings from now until that date.  Beginning
March 1, 2024, in the event that the security prepays, there may
be insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
15-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on
Aladdin Synthetic CDO 2006-1 and 2006-2, collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

The CSOs, issued in 2006, referenced a portfolio of synthetic
corporate senior unsecured bonds.  They were downgraded as a
result of the deterioration in credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and realized losses incurred from credit events.

Issuer: Aladdin Synthetic CDO 2006-1

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$7,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

  -- EUR8,000,000 Class D-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aladdin Synthetic CDO 2006-2

  -- US$8,000,000 Class 7D Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

  -- US$10,000,000 Class 10D Floating Rate Notes due 2013 Notes,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the loss in subordination and/or tranche notional coupled with the
low credit quality of the reference portfolio.  The 2006-1 class
D, 2006-1 class E, 2006-2 class 7D and 2006-2 class 10D notes have
incurred 100% loss.  The 2006-1 class B and 2006-1 class C notes
have incurred more than 50% loss.  The 2006-1 class A and 2006-2
class B notes have incurred no tranche loss, but have minimal
subordination remaining.

The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the portfolio is
1456, equivalent to Ba3 (excluding settled credit events).  The
portfolio continues to deteriorate with 22% of the portfolio
currently rated B1 or below, compared to 8.6% from the last
review.  There are 30 entities with a negative outlook compared to
4 that are positive, and 5 entities on watch for downgrade
compared to none on watch for upgrade.  In the near to medium
term, the portfolio is skewed towards the negative.

The portfolio has experienced 9 credit events, equivalent to 7.46%
of the portfolio based on the portfolio value at closing.  (Note
that this is not equivalent to actual subordination loss as it
does not include changes in subordination/portfolio value as a
result of substitutions in and out of the portfolio.) In addition,
the portfolio is exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc., iStar
Financial Inc., and Residential Capital, LLC, all of which are not
credit events, but nonetheless are rated C. The maturity of the
notes range between 2.5 to 5.8 years.

Moody's rating action factors in the modeling result of a number
of sensitivity analyses:

(1) MIRs -- Moody's rating action first took into account the
    result of a sensitivity analysis consisting of modeling MIRs
    in place of the corporate fundamental rating to derive the
    default probability of each corporate name in the reference
    portfolio.  The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate
    fundamental rating is an indicator of the extent of the
    divergence of credit view between Moody's and the market on
    each referenced name in the CSO portfolio.  The results of
    this run had no ratings impact compared to the base case.

(2) Removing the notch down on all reference entities on negative
    outlook -- There was no material impact to the model result
    compared with that of the base case.

(3) Positive notch all reference entities on positive watch --
    There was no material impact to the model result compared with
    that of the base case.

(4) Positive notch all reference entities on positive watch and
    shorten the time to maturity by 12 months -- There was no
    impact to the model results compared to that of the base case.

Scenarios (2) -- (4) were generated to test the sensitivity of the
current ratings in face of differing expectations for the macro-
economy currently held by Moody's Investors Service.  The central
macroeconomic scenario predicted by Moody's is of a sluggish
recovery in the corporate universe.  The current ratings assigned
would be the ratings if the economy recovers faster and stronger
than currently anticipated based on the results of scenarios (2) -
- (4).

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done using the CDOROM model.  For a
description of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the
CDOROM user guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  Although the impact of these decisions is mitigated
by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of these
decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty in
Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of Corporate CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the Corporate CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner tranches.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomics conditions evolves
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO tranches will likely experience a 100% loss.


BACCHUS 2006-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Bacchus (U.S.) 2006-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$252,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $192,205,401),
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 2, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1(sf);

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$28,000,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     July 2, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$12,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to B1(sf); previously on
     July 2, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf);

  -- US$12,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019 (current outstanding balance of
     $10,844,127), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 2,
     2009 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A Notes due to previous
failures in the Overcollateralization Ratio Tests, and the
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in July 2009.

Since July 2009, the Class A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 21% or $52.1 million.  Until April 2010, both excess
spread and principal proceeds were diverted to pay down the Class
A notes as a result of overcollateralization test failures.  As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action in July 2009.  As of the
latest trustee report dated September 8, 2010, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 130.5%, 115.1%, 109.3% and 104.8%, respectively,
versus May 2009 levels of 117.2%, 105.9%, 101.4%and 97.5%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class E
overcollateralization ratio has increased due to the diversion of
excess interest to delever the Class E Notes in the event of a
Class E overcollateralization test failure, including on the April
2010 payment date, when $1.2million of interest proceeds reduced
the outstanding balance of the Class E Notes by 10%.  Moody's also
notes that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring
interest and that all previously deferred interest has been paid
in full.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1/ CCC+ and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated September 8,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2488
compared to 2679 in the May 2009 report, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 6.0% of the underlying
portfolio versus 14.8% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted
securities total about $9.9 million of the underlying portfolio
compared to $28.4 million in May 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $271 million, defaulted par of $9.9 million, weighted
average default probability of 26.2% (implying a WARF of 3520), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.6%, and a
diversity score of 50.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Bacchus (U.S.) 2006-1 Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  As of March 31, 2010, IKB Capital Corporation (the
Collateral Manager) has assigned all of its rights and obligations
under the Collateral Management Agreement to Halcyon Bacchus
(U.S.) Management LLC (the Successor Collateral Manager).

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

This is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2816)

  -- Class X: 0
  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2
  -- Class II Combination Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4224)

  -- Class X: 0
  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -2
  -- Class II Combination Notes: -1

This is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (46.61%)

  -- Class X: 0
  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: 0
  -- Class II Combination Notes: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (42.61%)

  -- Class X: 0
  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: -1
  -- Class II Combination Notes: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ballyrock CLO III, Ltd.:

  -- US$100M Class A-1 Revolving Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 14, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$350M Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Notes, Upgraded to Aa1
     (sf); previously on August 14, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$24M Class B Floating Rate Notes Notes, Upgraded to A2
     (sf); previously on August 14, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- US$33M Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Notes, Upgraded
     to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 14, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1
     (sf)

  -- US$45M Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Notes, Upgraded
     to B2 (sf); previously on August 14, 2009 Downgraded to B3
     (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in August 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated September 20 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2568 compared to 3204
in the July 2009 report and is currently in compliance with the
trigger level of 2684, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 2.59% of the underlying portfolio versus 15.72% in
July 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$5.33 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$15.62 million in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C
and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 122.67%,
114.68% and 105.61%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of
120.57%, 112.72% and 103.80%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $580.49 million, defaulted par of $16.75 million,
weighted average default probability of 24.42% (implying a WARF of
3465), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.15%,
and a diversity score of 56.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Ballyrock CLO III, Ltd., issued in June 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2772)

  -- Class S: 0
  -- Class A-1: +1
  -- Class A-2: +1
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4158)

  -- Class S: 0
  -- Class A-1: -2
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.15%)

  -- Class S: 0
  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.15%)

  -- Class S: 0
  -- Class A-1: -1
  -- Class A-2: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is at what pace delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds
   will occur.  Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment
   levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by the
   manager, which may have significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2006-4 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 20, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
realized and anticipated losses for the pool resulting from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $2.653
billion from $2.727 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 162 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34%
of the pool.  Two loans, representing 2% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review was represented by one loan or 0.2% of
the pool.

Forty-one loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.8 million loss (30%
loss severity on average).  Currently 20 loans, representing 12%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The 20 specially serviced
loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master servicer
has recognized an aggregate $90.8 million appraisal reduction for
14 of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through S
have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $5.4 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


BIRMINGHAM-SOUTHERN COLLEGE: Moody's Cuts Debt Rating to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1 from Ba3 the rating
on Birmingham-Southern College's debt issued through the Private
Education Building Authority of the City of Birmingham.  The
rating remains on Watchlist for potential downgrade.  The rating
applies to the College's Series 1996, 1997 and 2002 Revenue Bonds.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects the extraordinary endowment fund
expenditures for the College in FY 2010 as the ongoing structural
operating deficits combined with capital project expenses led to
steep decreases in total investments.  Despite a 9.3% FY 2010
investment return on endowment funds (not including life income
funds) the funds ended the year at May 30, 2010 with a 14%
absolute decline.  Moody's calculation of expendable financial
resources for FY 2009 was negative $16.5 million.  The FY 2010
results will drive material worsening of flexible reserves.  With
virtually all investments subject to donor restrictions the
College has been focused on attracting new unrestricted gifts
(with approximately $3 million raised to date in FY 2011) and
requesting the Alabama Attorney General to release the
restrictions on prior gifts that are below $25,000 and more than
10 years old (requested action pending on approximately
$0.7 million).

With the prior President and Chief Financial Officer no longer
employed by the institution, the interim management team along
with a group of seven focused board members are meeting frequently
to chart a course the College's future.  They have begun
addressing the structural operating deficits, making material
payroll expense cuts (51 staff layoffs along with 14 positions not
filled on a pool of 400 full-time employees in addition to a
faculty reduction of 24.8 full-time equivalents for the current
year), degree program elimination, stopping defined contribution
retirement plan contributions, and tiered salary reductions.  The
working budget holds endowment spending a $4 million for FY 2011,
sharply down from the prior year.  Around $2.5 million of one-time
expenditures predominately related to the presidential transition
will be absorbed in FY 2011, but will lead to approximately
$10 million run rate reduction in expenditures as compared to
operating expenses of $58 million in FY 2009.

The College saw relatively stable enrollment in fall 2010 (1,511
full-time equivalent students versus 1,488 FTEs in fall 2009)
despite negative publicity around the management issues.  New
freshmen students, however, were down from the prior year (368 as
compared to 424.) The turnaround plan for the College will likely
include net tuition and auxiliary revenue increases as the Board
pursues revenue growth along with expense containment.  The
desirability of the campus was aided this fall as a new residence
facility opened which management reports as being 95% occupied.

The ongoing cash flow deficits led the College to end FY 2010 with
not only a fully drawn operating line from Regions Bank of
$15 million, but also an additional $2.3 million deficit financing
loan from the same bank.  Moody's remain concerned that the
College is heavily dependent on Regions Bank (rated Baa1/P-2) for
operating liquidity, interest rate swaps and other variable rate
loans totaling $34 million.  BSC trustees and management are near
completion of a conversion of the line of credit with Regional to
a 15 year term loan as part of its turnaround plan.

Moody's expect to conclude Moody's next review of the rating
within a 90 day time frame.  Moody's review will include FY 2010
financial statements (expected in November), progress in
negotiating the Regions Bank note, along with the broader
turnaround plan to manage expenses and increase net student
revenue.  Moody's review will also focus on the ability to garner
unrestricted gifts and manage near term cash flow given the
paucity of unrestricted funds.

Key Indicators (Fall 2009 Enrollment And Fiscal Year 2009
financial data):

* Full-time equivalent enrollment: 1,488 students

* Freshman applicants accepted: 59%

* Accepted students enrolled: 28%

* Net tuition per student: $10,227 (down 6.1% from $10,888 in FY
  2008)

* Total pro forma direct debt: $53.7 million

* Total financial resources: $62.9 million

* Expendable financial resources: -$16.5 million

* Unrestricted financial resources: -$33.1 million

* Expendable resources to pro forma direct debt: -0.23 times

* Pro forma direct debt to revenue: 1.9 times

* Total financial resources per student: $43,587

* Annual operating margin: -54.3%

* Average operating margin: -32.8%

                           Rated Debt

* Private Educational Building Authority of the City of Birmingham
  Series 1996, 1997 and 2002: Ba3

The last rating action with respect to Birmingham-Southern College
was on June 21, 2010 when the rating was lowered to Ba3 from Ba1
and placed on review for further downgrade.


CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed one class and downgraded nine classes of
Notes issued by Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd.,
due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Aaa
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd., is a static cash
CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of mezzanine debt (41.0%
of the pool balance), whole loans (33.6%), B-note debt (11.4%),
preferred equity (7.5%) and commercial mortgage backed securities
(6.4%).  As of the September 30, 2010 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including Preferred
Shares, has decreased to $399.8 million from $455 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A- Notes, as a
result of paydowns and interest redirected as a result of the
failing of the Class A/B Par Value Test.

There are six assets with par balance of $122.2 million (43.7% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired Collateral
Interests as of the September 30, 2010 Trustee report.  Moody's
expects significant realized losses to occur from those Impaired
Collateral Interests once they are realized.  To date the deal is
undercollateralized by $106 million due to realized losses and the
restructuring of certain loan collaterals.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM(R) v2.6 as Moody's expect the underlying
non-CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,356 compared to 8,946 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: B1-B3 (6.4% compared to 11.3% at last review), and
Caa1-C (93.6% compared to 88.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.5 years compared
to 7.5 years at last review.  The shorter WAL is partially due to
the deal becoming static in September, 2010.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 17.9% compared to 28.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors due to the
diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the pooled transactions.  Moody's modeled a MAC of
100.0% the same as at last review.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 17.9% to 12.9% or up to 22.9% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward
or 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of two classes,
affirmed eight classes and downgraded 18 classes of CD 2006-CD3
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-CD3:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. Q, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XS, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The confirmations and affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On September 22, 2010, Moody's placed 20 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 22%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar underlying ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $3.48 billion
from $3.57 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 191 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 43%
of the pool.  There is one loan, representing 8% of the pool with
an investment grade credit estimate.  At last review, the High
Point Furniture Mart Loan ($190.0 million -- 6% of the pool), also
had a credit rating.  However, this loan has been transferred to
special servicing due to declines in performance and no longer has
a credit rating.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans.

Fifty-five loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $7.3 million loss (80% loss severity on
average).  The pool has also realized an additional $7.2 million
in loss from five modified loans.  Currently, 25 loans,
representing15% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the High Point Furniture Mart
Loan, which was transferred to special servicing in March 2010 due
to the borrower defaulting on the master lease, which resulted in
a payment default.  The loan is currently in the process of
foreclosure.

The remaining 24 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types and are either 90+ days delinquent, REO or in the
foreclosure process.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $83.2 million appraisal reduction.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $209.2 million loss (43% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 27 poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $127.6 million loss (38% expected loss based on a 75%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 for 81% of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 107% compared to 145% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.0%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.25%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
0.99X and 0.88X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 47 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with a credit estimate is the GGP-sponsored Ala Moana
Portfolio Loan ($293.2 million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is a
pari passu interest in a first mortgage loan secured by a
2.0 million square foot mixed-use portfolio located on the island
of Hawaii.  The largest property is the Ala Moana Mall, which is
considered the world's largest open-air shopping center.  As March
2010, the portfolio was 95% leased, essentially the same as at
last review.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
April 2009 when GGP filed for bankruptcy.  It is anticipated that
GGP will significantly pay down the current balance once the new
company emerges from bankruptcy.  In addition, the loan's maturity
will be extended to 2018 and the loan will be structured with a
25-year amortization schedule.  The current credit estimate and
stressed DCSR are A3 and 0.90X compared to A3 and 0.79X,
respectively, at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 16% of the pool.
The largest loan is the ShopKo Portfolio Loan ($246.4 million --
7.1% of the pool), which is a pari passu interest in a first
mortgage loan secured by a mixed-use portfolio comprised of 112
properties located throughout 12 states.  The properties are 100%
leased to ShopKo on a triple-net basis for 15 years.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to
124% and 0.84X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Intercontinental Boston Hotel Loan
($175.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 424-
room, luxury hotel located in Boston's Financial District.  The
hotel was constructed in 2006 and is affiliated with the
Intercontinental Hotel Group, which signed a 99-year triple net
lease with the payment guarantee for the first 25 years.  The loan
is interest-only throughout its 15-year term.  There is additional
mezzanine debt of $45 million.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
147.3% and 0.75X, respectively, the same as at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Fair Lakes Office Portfolio Loan
($142.4 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is a pari passu
interest in a first mortgage loan secured by a 1.25 million square
foot office park located in Fairfax, Virginia.  The complex
consists of nine buildings ranging in size from 75,000 square feet
to 275,000 square feet.  As of June 2010, the complex was 87%
leased compared to 98% at last review.  Over 60% of the net
rentable area is due to expire prior to loan maturity.  The loan
sponsor is the Shorenstein Company.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 111% and 0.90X compared to 131% and 0.80X, respectively, at
last review.


COBALT CMBS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Series 2007-C2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 13 classes of Cobalt CMBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C2, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-3, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 19, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFX, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-JFX, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-JFL, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)


  -- Cl. D, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $2.35 billion
from $2.42 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 143 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool.

Forty-seven loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the trust since securization,
resulting in an aggregate $25.0 million realized loss (50% loss
severity on average).  Currently 15 loans, representing 17% of the
pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant loan
($250.0 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $3.0 billion first mortgage loan spread among
five CMBS deals.  The A note had $1.4 billion in mezzanine debt
behind it at securitization.  The loan is secured by two adjacent
multifamily apartment complexes with 11,230 units located on the
east side of Manhattan.  The loan is currently in foreclosure.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $21.4 million
appraisal reduction for 8 of the specially serviced loans.  The
servicer has not yet recognized an appraisal reduction for the
PCV/ST loan.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


COLUMBIA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2000 Bonds to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on District
of Columbia Housing Finance Agency's (Aspen Court Project)
multifamily housing revenue bonds series 2000 to 'BB+' from 'AAA',
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Renee J. Berson.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity;

* Debt service coverage is projected to fall below investment-
  grade levels in 2030; and

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2020.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* Investments held in 'AAAm'-rated Wells Fargo Funds Trust -
  Government Money Market Fund; and

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae guaranteed pass-
  through certificates, which S&P considers to be 'AAA' eligible.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information,
based on S&P's current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for
all scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed nine classes of COMM 2003-LNB1, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and interest shortfalls.  The
affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 9%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 9, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to
$687.1 million from $846.30 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 51% of the pool.  The pool includes four loans,
representing 36% of the pool, with investment grade credit
estimates.  Ten loans, representing 14% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities, the same
as at last review.

Fifteen loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $4.8 million loss (41%
loss severity on average).  Currently, six loans, representing 4%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Quality Inn & Holiday Inn Loan ($11.4 million
-- 2% of the pool), which is secured by two limited service
hotels, totaling 451 rooms, located in Hampton, Virginia.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2007 due to
imminent default and is currently in the process of foreclosure.
On September 23, 2010 the master servicer declared the loan non-
recoverable and will no longer be advancing interest payments.
This will be reflected in the October remittance statement.  In
addition the servicer will also begin recouping
approximately$500,000 of funds previously advanced on this loan
beginning with the October remittance statement.  As a result, it
is anticipated that interest shortfalls will increase
significantly beginning in October, affecting Classes G through
NR.

The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $4.3 million
appraisal reduction on three of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $19.9 million loss (81%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $14.5 million loss (22% expected loss based on a 63%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and 2009 operating
results for 97% and 96% of the pool, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 85% compared to 92% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.1%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
1.34X and 1.13X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 25 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the 75 Rockefeller
Plaza Loan ($65.0 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 578,2000 square foot office building that is part of the
Rockefeller Center complex in New York City.  The property is 100%
leased to Time Warner Companies Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa2; stable outlook) under a 21-year triple net lease that
is coterminous with the loan's maturity (August 2014).  The loan
is interest only for its entire term.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.58X, respectively, compared to A3 and
0.97X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Westfield
Shoppingtown Portfolio Loan ($65.0 million -- 9.5% of the pool),
which represents a 34% pari passu interest in a first mortgage
loan.  The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in two
regional malls located in California.  The loan sponsor is
Westfield America, Inc., a publicly traded REIT.  Westfield
Shoppingtown Galleria at Roseville Mall is a 1.0 million SF center
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, J.C. Penney and Sears.  Westfield
Shoppingtown Main Place Mall is a 1.1 million SF center that is
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom and J.C. Penney.  Moody's credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.24X, respectively,
compared to Aa2 and 1.94X at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Chandler Fashion
Center Loan ($47.3 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which represents
a 49% pari passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million SF super-
regional mall located approximately 18 miles southeast of downtown
Phoenix in Chandler, Arizona.  The center is anchored by
Dillard's, Macy's, Nordstrom and Sears.  The center was 99% leased
as of July 2010, the same as at last review.  The loan sponsor is
the Macerich Company, a publicly traded REIT.  Moody's credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.46X, respectively,
compared to Aa1 and 2.43X at last review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the 1669 Collins Avenue
Loan ($23.9 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by the
leased fee interest in the land under the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in
South Beach, Florida.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR
are Aa1 and 0.91X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and .89X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Gateway Center BJ's Loan
($40.4 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 152,500
SF portion of a 640,000 SF community center located in Brooklyn,
New York.  The collateral is 100% leased to BJ's Wholesale Club
(85% of the gross leasable area; lease expiration 2027) and
several restaurant tenants.  The property is shadow anchored by
Home Depot, Target, Bed Bath & Beyond and Marshall's.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 84%
and 1.19X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Palladium at Birmingham Loan
($34.8 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by two
retail properties located in Birmingham, Michigan.  The properties
total 150,000 SF.  Palladium Retail is a 124,500 SF
entertainment/retail center.  Willits Retail consists of three
ground-floor condominium units that total 25,400 SF.  The
properties were 78% leased as of June 2010 compared to 83% at last
review.  Performance has declined since last review due to
decreased occupancy.  This loan is currently on the master
servicer's watchlist for low DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
131% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.85Xat last
review.

The third largest loan is the Redland Center Loan ($25.0 million -
- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 134,000 SF office
condominium located in Rockville, Maryland.  The property is 100%
leased to the General Services Administration (Department of
Health and Human Services) through March 2013.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR 98% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 98% and
0.97X at last review.


COMM 2003-LNB1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from COMM 2003-
LNB1.  S&P lowered its ratings on classes M, N, and O to 'D (sf)'.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six additional classes
from the same transaction.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on six
classes from COMM 2002-WFA.

The COMM 2003-LNB1 downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the
interest shortfalls that have affected the trust, as well as the
potential for future interest shortfalls.  As of the September
2010 remittance report, the trust experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $69,652, primarily related to three of the
seven specially serviced assets in the pool.  The monthly interest
shortfalls caused classes M, N, and O to experience interest
shortfalls.  It is also S&P's understanding that the master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage, intends to make a
nonrecoverable advance determination and recover prior advances
related to the specially serviced Hampton Inn & Holiday Inn loan,
which will further reduce the interest distributions to the trust
in future remittance periods.

The affirmations of the ratings on the COMM 2003-LNB1 principal
and interest certificates reflect subordination and liquidity
support levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.
S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest-only certificate
based on its current criteria.

The affirmations of the ratings on the COMM 2002-WFA certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the Westfield Shoppingtown Portfolio
loan.  The certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from a
$49.8 million portion of this loan.  The whole loan is secured by
two anchored retail properties comprising 1,346,894-sq.-ft. in
Santa Ana, Calif.  and Roseville, Calif.  For the year ended
Dec. 31, 2009, the reported whole-loan debt service coverage (DSC)
was 2.43x, and occupancy was 98.0%.  Further details regarding
this loan are discussed below.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the September 2010 remittance report, seven assets
($30.8 million, 4.5%) in the COMM 2003-LNB1 pool were with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment
status of the specially serviced assets is: one ($884,929, 0.1%)
is real estate owned; two ($7.9 million, 1.2%) are in foreclosure;
two ($13.2 million, 1.9%) are 90-plus days delinquent; and two
($8.8 million, 1.3%) are 60 days delinquent.  Three of the
specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $11.8 million.  Most of the $69,652 in monthly
interest shortfalls reported on the September 2010 remittance
report was due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
amounts stemming from the ARAs ($61,997).

The Hampton Inn & Holiday Inn loan ($14.8 million total exposure,
2.2%), is the largest loan with the special servicer and is
secured by two lodging properties comprising 451 rooms in Hampton
City, Va.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in May
2008 for imminent monetary default and was reported as 90-plus
days delinquent on the September 2010 remittance report.  Current
financial information was not available for the loan.  There is
a $7.5 million ARA in effect, and there is approximately
$3.0 million in advances outstanding on the loan.  The master
servicer has conveyed to us that, beginning with the October 2010
remittance report, they intend to declare a nonrecoverable advance
determination on the loan and recover approximately $500,000 of
$3.0 million outstanding advances over three months.  This will
further reduce the interest distributions to the trust in future
remittance periods.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

The remaining specially serviced assets have balances that,
individually, represent less than 1.0% of the pool balance.  S&P
estimated losses for all of these assets, which resulted in a
weighted average estimated loss severity of 43.2%.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P considered one
additional loan to be credit-impaired.  The Sunshine Village MHP
loan ($3.6 million, 0.5%) is secured by a 170-unit mobile home
park in Lake Worth, Fla.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist for low DSC and low occupancy.  As of March
2010, DSC and occupancy were 0.05x and 41.0%, respectively.  Given
the poor performance, S&P considers this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the COMM 2003-LNB1
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $687.1 million,
down from $846.0 million at issuance.  The pool includes 78 loans
and one REO asset, down from 92 loans at issuance.  The master
servicer provided financial information for 96.5% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool.  The information provided primarily
reflected full-year 2009 performance (94.9% on a balance basis),
with the remainder (1.5%) reflecting full-year 2008 performance.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.87x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were
1.70x and 79.7%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude the transaction's 10 ($95.8 million, 13.9%) defeased
loans, one ($24.0 million, 3.5%) land loan that S&P analyzed
separately, seven ($30.8 million, 4.5%) specially serviced assets,
and one ($3.7 million, 0.5%) loan that S&P determined to be
credit-impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for the
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  The master
servicer reported a watchlist of 15 loans ($92.6 million, 13.5%).
Eighteen loans ($92.6 million, 13.5%) in the pool have a reported
DSC of less than 1.10x, and 12 loans ($40.9 million, 6.0%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                   Summary of Top 10 Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate in the COMM 2003-LNB1
transaction have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$346.9 million (50.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.16x for the top 10
exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10
exposures are 1.89x and 79.7%, respectively.  These figures
exclude the 1669 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach Land loan
($24.0 million, 3.5%, eighth-largest real estate exposure), which
is secured by a leasehold interest in the land beneath the Ritz
Carlton hotel in Miami Beach, Fla., and was analyzed separately.
The reported DSC on the loan was 1.19x as of December 2009.

The second-largest exposure in the pool, the Westfield
Shoppingtown Portfolio loan, has a trust balance of $53.3 million
(7.8%) and a whole-loan balance of $189.3 million.  The whole-loan
balance consists of the $53.3 million securitized in the COMM
2003-LNB1 deal, $49.8 million securitized in the COMM 2002-WFA
trust, as well as $86.2 million securitized in the GECCMC 2002-3
trust.  The master servicer reported a DSC of 2.43x for the whole-
loan balance as of the year ended Dec. 31, 2009.  Occupancy was
98.0% for the same period.  S&P's updated valuation for this asset
is comparable to its value at last review.  S&P calculated an
adjusted LTV ratio of 42.4% for the whole-loan balance, which is
consistent with the current ratings.

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the Palladium at
Birmingham loan ($34.8 million, 5.1%) was the only top 10 exposure
appearing on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan, which is
the fifth-largest real estate exposure in the pool, is secured by
a 149,873-sq.-ft. retail asset in Birmingham, Mich.  As per the
September 2010 watchlist report comments, the loan appears on the
watchlist due to low DSC.  Reported DSC and occupancy were 1.00x
and 77.8%, respectively, as of December 2009.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transactions according to its
current criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with its analysis.

                Ratings Lowered (Comm 2003-Lnb1)

                         COMM 2003-LNB1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                    Rating
                    ------
   Class     To           From          Credit enhancement (%)
   -----     --           ----          ----------------------
   D         A (sf)       A+ (sf)                        12.85
   E         BBB+ (sf)    A (sf)                         11.31
   F         BBB- (sf)    A- (sf)                         9.77
   G         BB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)                       8.54
   H         B+ (sf)      BBB (sf)                        6.70
   J         CCC+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)                        4.23
   K         CCC- (sf)    BB (sf)                         3.62
   L         CCC-(sf)     B+ (sf)                         2.85
   M         D (sf)       B- (sf)                         2.23
   N         D (sf)       CCC+ (sf)                       1.62
   O         D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                       1.15

                Ratings Affirmed (Comm 2003-Lnb1)

                         COMM 2003-LNB1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

     Class     Rating                 Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     ------                 ----------------------
     A-1        AAA (sf)                               21.62
     A-1A       AAA (sf)                               21.62
     A-2        AAA (sf)                               21.62
     B          AA+ (sf)                               17.47
     C          AA (sf)                                15.62
     X-1        AAA (sf)                                 N/A

                Ratings Affirmed (Comm 2002-Wfa)

                         COMM 2002-WFA
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                       Class     Rating
                       -----     ------
                       A-3A      AAA (sf)
                       A-3B      AAA (sf)
                       B-1       AAA (sf)
                       B-2       AAA (sf)
                       B-3       AAA (sf)
                       B-4       AA+ (sf)

                       N/A - Not applicable.


COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of COMM 2004-LNB3,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. C, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 29, 2008 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 1, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 1, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 1, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 1, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 9, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to
$1.11 billion from $1.34 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 87 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool.  Fourteen loans,
representing 22% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities, the same as at last review.

Seventeen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $17.1 million loss (55%
loss severity on average).  Currently five loans, representing 6%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $28.0 million appraisal reduction for
thespecially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of COMM 2005-C6 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and
placed nine classes on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 20, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5B, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 20, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of Classes H through L are due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $54.8 million loss which has resulted in
a 100% principal loss for Class L and a 12% principal loss for
Class K.  The servicer has recognized appraisal reductions
totaling $52.2 million for six of the loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's placed Classes A5B through G on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 30, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction during the past 6 months.

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to
$1.853 billion from $2.272 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 123 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 48% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 2% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 9% of the pool.

Twenty two loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $54.8 million loss (72% loss severity on
average).  Currently nine loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Tropicana Center Loan ($54.3 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which
is secured by a 580,000 square foot anchored retail center located
in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2009 due to payment default.  The remaining
eight loans are secured by a mix of multifamily, retail, hotel and
mixed use properties.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through P
have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $5.9 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class M commercial mortgage pass-through
certificate from COMM 2005-FL10, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.  Concurrently, S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)'
rating on the class A-1 certificate from the same transaction.

The downgrade of class M to 'D (sf)' reflects principal losses, as
well as accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for an
extended period of time on this class.  The total principal losses
to date on class M are $33,450, which includes $377 of losses that
were reported in the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report
because of the MacQuarie/DDR Trust Portfolio loan.

S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1 certificate
following the full repayment of the remaining balance on this
class as noted in the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report.

According to the September 2010 trustee remittance report, the DDR
loan has a whole-loan balance of $105.4 million that is split into
four pari passu pieces.  One of the four pari passu pieces
totaling $4.7 million makes up 0.7% of the pooled trust balance.
The DDR loan in this transaction was transferred to the special
servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors Inc., on May 28, 2009, due
to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on Oct. 1, 2009,
and was modified on Nov. 30, 2009.  It is S&P's understanding
that, as part of the modification, the maturity on the loan was
extended to June 1, 2011.  Pursuant to the transaction documents,
the special servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 1.0% of
all future principal and interest payments.  As a result, the
workout fee is being passed through to the trust as a principal
loss to class M on each monthly trustee remittance report.  S&P
expects principal losses on class M to continue until the loan is
liquidated from the trust.

                         Rating Lowered

                         COMM 2005-FL10
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                Reported
                Rating                    Interest Shortfalls ($)
                ------                    -----------------------
     Class   To          From             Current    Accumulated
     -----   --          ----             -------    -----------
     M       D (sf)       CCC- (sf)         11         11,927

                        Rating Withdrawn

                         COMM 2005-FL10
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                 Rating
                                 ------
              Class         To              From
              -----         --              ----
              A-1           NR              AAA (sf)

                         NR - not rated.


COMM 2006-C8: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-C8 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 19 classes of COMM 2006-C8,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C8 on
review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 22, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec 22, 2006 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 22, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 9, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to
$3.586 billion from $3.776 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 171 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool.  No loans have defeased.

Fifty-three loans, representing 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $14.4 million loss (37%
loss severity on average).  Currently twenty-seven loans,
representing 16% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
twenty-seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$169.5 million appraisal reduction for 20 of the specially
serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through S
have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $9.2 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


COMM 2010: Fitch Rates Various Certificates; Gives Stable Outlook
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on COMM 2010 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Loss Severity
ratings and a Stable Outlook:

  -- $453,206,000 class A-1 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $75,089,000 class A-2 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $179,498,000 class A-3 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $351,830,000* class XP-A 'AAAsf';
  -- $353,896,500* class XS-A 'AAAsf';
  -- $353,896,500* class XW-A 'AAAsf';
  -- $24,628,000 class B 'AAsf/LS3'
  -- $28,911,000 class C 'Asf/LS3'
  -- $44,973,000 class D 'BBB-sf/LS3'
  -- $7,496,000 class E 'BBB-sf/LS4'
  -- $12,849,000 class F 'BBsf/LS4'
  -- $12,850,000 class G 'B-sf/LS4'.
  * Notional amount and interest only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Oct. 6, 2010.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 42 loans secured by 63 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$856 million as of the cutoff date.  The loans were originated
GACC, Ladder Capital, and Natixis.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.6% of the pool and asset
summary reviews on 84.8% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
of 1.40 times, a Fitch stressed loan-to value of 82.8%, and a
Fitch debt yield of 11.5%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 5.0% to issuer cash flows and 11.9% below
full-year 2009 performance.  This compares favorably relative to
the average Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.05x and 110.7% across Fitch
rated conduit transactions in 2007.

The transaction is concentrated by loan and sponsor.  The largest
10 loans account for 60.4% of the pool and the largest 15 account
for 72.8%.  There is no material sponsor concentration across
multiple loans.

The Master Servicer and Special Servicer will be Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., and Midland Loan Services, Inc., rated 'CMS1' and 'CSS1',
respectively, by Fitch.


COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Assigns Ratings on Series 2010-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional to ratings
thirteen class of CMBS securities, issued by COMM 2010-C1 Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-
C1.

  -- US$453.206M Cl. A1 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$75.089M Cl. A2 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$179.498M Cl. A3 Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. XP-A Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. XS-A Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. XW-A Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. XW-B Certificate, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- US$24.628M Cl. B Certificate, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  -- US$28.911M Cl. C Certificate, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  -- US$44.973M Cl. D Certificate, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  -- US$7.496M Cl. E Certificate, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)
  -- US$12.849M Cl. F Certificate, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)
  -- US$12.85M Cl. G Certificate, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 42 fixed rate loans secured
by 63 properties.  The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis.  Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis.  Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses.  Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The transaction is concentrated relative to previously rated
conduit transactions but more diverse than previously rated large
loan transactions.  Moody's approach to rating the deal
incorporated a blend of both Moody's conduit and large loan rating
methodologies.

The credit risk of each underlying loan is determined primarily by
two factors: 1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default,
which is largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's
assessment of the severity of loss in the event of default, which
is largely driven by each loan's LTV ratio.  The Moody's Trust
Stressed DSCR of 1.25X is lower than the 2007 large loan
transaction average of 1.63X, but higher than the 2007 conduit
transaction average of 0.89X.  Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 83.1% is
lower than the 2007 conduit transaction average of 113.9%, but
higher than the 2007 large loan transaction average of 68.5%.
Moody's Total LTV ratio (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 86.8%
is also considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the
rated debt.

The transaction benefits from one loan, identified as Liberty
Mutual Headquarters, being assigned a credit estimate of Aaa.  The
loan is the third largest asset in the transaction, representing
approximately 5.8% of the pool balance.  Loans assigned credit
estimates of Aaa are not expected to contribute any loss to a
transaction.  However, Moody's also considers the creditworthiness
of loans when evaluating the effects of pooling amongst portfolio
assets.  Generally, Aaa quality loans neither benefit nor harm the
diversity profile of a pool.  Excluding Liberty Mutual
Headquarters, the loan level Herfindahl score for the pool is 18.

Property type composition and correlations also affect transaction
performance.  Loans collateralized solely, or in part, by retail
properties represent 60.2% of the pool.  Despite a challenging
retail environment, the loans collateralized by retail properties
experienced low historical net operating income volatility.
However, property type concentrations increase asset correlations
which affect pool default and loss distributions.  Loans
collateralized solely, or in part, by office properties represent
38.0% of the pool.  Historically, office properties have
experienced a high degree of net operating income volatility
compared to other commercial real estate sectors.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Medium, the same
as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.  This
reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination.  The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings.  V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 15%, or 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa classes would be Aa1, Aa3, A1, respectively.  Parameter
Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time; rather they are designed to
provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might
change if key input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed.  The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-CF2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed nine classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-CF2:

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 232001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 20, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 232001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 12, 2005
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 12, 2005
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 26, 2008
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 232001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
8% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 11%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 26, 2008.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 66% to $384.01
million from $1.13 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
41% of the pool.  Six loans, representing 24% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 37% of the pool.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $30.1 million loss (32%
loss severity on average).  Currently, 13 loans, representing 13%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $6.9 million appraisal reduction for five
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $24.8 million loss (50% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $3.2 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and 2009 operating
results for 98% and 80% of the pool, respectively.  Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 72% compared to 80% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.2% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.56X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.44X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 32 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool.
The largest loan is the CNN Building Loan ($41.3 million -- 10.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 292,000 square foot (SF), 11-
story office building located in Washington, D.C.  Built in 1990,
the facility is located in the Capital Hill submarket adjacent to
Union Station.  As of June 2009, the property was 99% leased
compared to 97% at last review.  The building serves as the
regional headquarters of the CNN cable network, which occupies
approximately 24% of the net rentable area (NRA) on a lease
expiring in December 2020.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69%
and 1.49 X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.41X, at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 2001 York Road Loan ($28.1 million
-- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by an 184,000 SF office
building located in Oakbrook, Illinois.  As of September 2010, the
property was 92% leased compared to 100% at last review.  Despite
the decline in occupancy, performance has improved due to
increased rental revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 82% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.06X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Riverfront Plaza Loan ($16.0 million
-- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 245,000 SF retail
center located in Chicago, Illinois.  As of June 2010, the
property was 99% leased, the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR 51% and 2.02X, respectively, compared to 59% and
1.74X, respectively, at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 264 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 264
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches, and confirmed the
rating of 32 tranches from 10 RMBS transactions issued by Credit
Suisse First Boston.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

In addition, the ratings of two of the affected tranches have been
downgraded to reflect both updated loss expectataions and the
correction of certain inaccurate assumptions used in earlier
rating actions.  The rating on the Tranche D-X, an interest-only
tranche issued by CSMC 2006-2, has been adjusted to reflect the
fact that the notional balance of Tranche D-X is linked to the
outstanding principal balances of related loan groups 1,3, and 5.
Previous rating actions were based on the incorrect assumption
that the notional balance of Tranche D-X was linked to the
outstanding principal balance of all groups.  Also, the rating on
the Tranche D-X, an interest-only tranche issued by CSMC 2006-7,
has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the notional balance of
Tranche D-X is linked to the outstanding principal balances of
related loan groups 5,9, and 12.  Previous rating actions were
based on the incorrect assumption that the notional balance of
Tranche D-X was linked to the outstanding principal balance of all
groups.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-P, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-12, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-P, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-15, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-9, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-10, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-11, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-12, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-13, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-14, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-15, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-TFL2 Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class A-2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificate from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2007-TFL2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrade reflects recurring interest shortfalls for the past
six consecutive months (according to the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee
remittance report) resulting primarily from a nonrecoverable
determination by the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital,
on the Biscayne Landing loan and Resorts Atlantic City real estate
owned asset.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls on class A-2 to
continue and not be recoverable in the near term.

S&P previously lowered its ratings on classes A-3 through E to 'D
(sf)' on July 7, 2010, due to recurring interest shortfalls.
According to the September 2010 trustee remittance report, the
classes subordinate to class A-1 (rated 'BB-') have continued to
experience interest shortfalls totaling $550,073 in September with
cumulative interest shortfalls to date of $5.2 million due
primarily to the nonrecoverable determinations, coupled with
special servicing fees and other expenses related to the two
aforementioned assets.

According to the special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors
Inc., the larger of the two specially serviced assets, the Resorts
Atlantic City asset ($175.0 million pooled balance {14.3%};
$360.0 million whole-loan balance), is under contract for sale.
TriMont stated that it anticipates the property sale to close
later this year subject to the potential buyer obtaining a New
Jersey gaming license.  A November 2009 appraisal valued the asset
at $88.2 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

TriMont stated that it is pursuing foreclosure on the Biscayne
Landing loan ($77.2 million pooled balance {6.3%}; $165.7 million
whole-loan balance), while also exploring a note sale.  TriMont
indicated that the timing of liquidation may occur as early as the
end of this year.  An October 2009 appraisal valued the asset at
$15.5 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-2 Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class A-2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificate from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2007-TFL2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrade reflects recurring interest shortfalls for the past
six consecutive months (according to the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee
remittance report) resulting primarily from a nonrecoverable
determination by the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital,
on the Biscayne Landing loan and Resorts Atlantic City real estate
owned asset.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls on class A-2 to
continue and not be recoverable in the near term.

S&P previously lowered its ratings on classes A-3 through E to 'D
(sf)' on July 7, 2010, due to recurring interest shortfalls.
According to the September 2010 trustee remittance report, the
classes subordinate to class A-1 (rated 'BB-') have continued to
experience interest shortfalls totaling $550,073 in September with
cumulative interest shortfalls to date of $5.2 million due
primarily to the nonrecoverable determinations, coupled with
special servicing fees and other expenses related to the two
aforementioned assets.

According to the special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors
Inc., the larger of the two specially serviced assets, the Resorts
Atlantic City asset ($175.0 million pooled balance {14.3%};
$360.0 million whole-loan balance), is under contract for sale.
TriMont stated that it anticipates the property sale to close
later this year subject to the potential buyer obtaining a New
Jersey gaming license.  A November 2009 appraisal valued the asset
at $88.2 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

TriMont stated that it is pursuing foreclosure on the Biscayne
Landing loan ($77.2 million pooled balance {6.3%}; $165.7 million
whole-loan balance), while also exploring a note sale.  TriMont
indicated that the timing of liquidation may occur as early as the
end of this year.  An October 2009 appraisal valued the asset at
$15.5 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

                         Rating Lowered

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-TFL2

                                              Reported
                  Rating                 interest shortfalls ($)
                  ------                 -----------------------
    Class    To           From            Current   Accumulated
    -----    --           ----            -------   -----------
    A-2      D (sf)       CCC- (sf)        43,567       135,701


DAKOTA COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'B+' and
removed from CreditWatch Dakota County Community Development
Agency, Minn.'s  multifamily housing mortgage revenue refunding
bonds series 2000, issued for the Southfork Apartments.  The bonds
are secured by a Fannie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action in
which S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's
revised criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions
in which funds are invested in money market funds and other
investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial statements.  In
S&P's opinion, assets are not sufficient to pay debt service
through bond maturity assuming 0% earnings on investments.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Assigns Ratings on Series 2010-RS2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. REMIC Trust Series 2010-RS2's
$620.867 million class A1 through A7 residential-backed
certificates.

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. REMIC Trust Series 2010-RS2's
certificate issuance is a resecuritization of the underlying U.S.
residential mortgage loans.  The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

* The timely interest and principal payments made under S&P's
  stressed scenarios, which are consistent with the assigned
  rating categories;

* The underlying transactions' subordination levels, loss
  severities, and delinquency pipelines;

* S&P's ratings on the underlying securities and the underlying
  securities expected performance; and

* The transaction's payment and legal structures.

                        Ratings Assigned

  Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. REMIC Trust Series 2010-RS2

                                     Interest           Amount
  Class  Rating       Type           Rate               (mil. $)
  -----  ------       ----           --------           --------
  A1     AAA (sf)     Senior         Variable            246.307
  A2     AAA (sf)     Subordinate    Variable            110.830
  A2A*   AAA (sf)     Subordinate    Variable                N/A
  A3     AA (sf)      Subordinate    Variable             51.730
  A3A*   AA (sf)      Subordinate    Variable                N/A
  A4     A (sf)       Subordinate    Variable             54.180
  A4A*   A (sf)       Subordinate    Variable                N/A
  A5     BBB (sf)     Subordinate    Variable             51.730
  A5A*   BBB (sf)     Subordinate    Variable                N/A
  A6     BB (sf)      Subordinate    Variable             54.180
  A6A*   BB (sf)      Subordinate    Variable                N/A
  A7     B (sf)       Subordinate    Variable             51.730
  A7A*   B (sf)       Subordinate    Variable                N/A

* The class A2A, A3A, A4A, A5A, A6A, and A7A certificates are
  reset certificates and did not have a principal balance as of
  the closing date.

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


EDINVEST - AMENDED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior and the subordinate student loan
notes issued by EdInvest - Amended and Restated 2006 Indenture of
Trust (2003).  The Rating Outlook remains Stable for the senior
notes and a Negative Outlook is assigned to the subordinate notes.
Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria, as well as the refined
basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press
release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP
SLABS Review' to review the ratings.  A full ratings list is shown
below.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement consisting of
subordination and projected minimum excess spread to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses.  The ratings on the subordinate
notes may be downgraded further unless the trust begins to place
auction-rate securities at favorable rates and generate
significant amount of excess spread.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

EdInvest - Amended and Restated 2006 Indenture of Trust (2003):

Series 2003

  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2004

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2005

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2006

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.


EFSI - AMENDED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes and downgrades
the subordinate notes issued by EFSI - Amended and Restated 2006
Indenture of Trust (2003).  The Rating Outlook remains Stable for
the senior notes, and a Negative Outlook is assigned for the
subordinate notes.  Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria, as
well as the refined basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's
Sept. 22, 2010 press release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in
Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to review the ratings.  A
full ratings list is shown below.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement consisting of subordination
and projected minimum excess spread to cover the applicable risk
factor stresses.

The ratings on the subordinate notes are downgraded to 'B' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will limit the trust's
ability to generate excess spread and reach parity of 100%.  The
ratings may be downgraded further unless the trust begins to place
auction rate securities at favorable rates and generate
significant amount of excess spread.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

EFSI - Amended and Restated 2006 Indenture of Trust (2003):

Series 2003

  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2004

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2005

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

Series 2006

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.


FAIRFAX COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'B' from 'AAA' on Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing
Authority (Island Walk Project), Va.'s series 2004 FHA-insured
multifamily housing revenue bonds and removed the rating from
CreditWatch with negative implications, based on S&P's view of the
project's reliance on short-term market-rate investments.

The rating reflects S&P's view of the project's revenues from
mortgage debt service payments and investment earnings that are
insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on the bonds plus
fees until maturity, with debt service coverage projected to fall
below investment-grade levels in 2017.  In addition, projections
show the project's asset liability parity will fall below 100% in
2035

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's placed certain housing ratings
on CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria
for certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.
This issue was included.  Standard & Poor's revised criteria
affects government-enhanced housing transactions that have funds
invested in money market funds and other investments with no
guaranteed rate of return.

The project currently has guaranteed investment contracts with
Natixis Funding for its bond fund and debt service reserve fund.
Both of the guaranteed investment contracts expire Dec. 30, 2016.
Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information, and,
based on the current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for
all scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles,
Standard & Poor's believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond
costs from transaction revenues until maturity.


FIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews 'Ba3' Rating on Series 1996 Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed First Mortgage Revenue
(Bessemer Housing Authority Section 8 Assistance Elderly Project)
Series 1996 on Watch for Possible Downgrade.  The bonds are
currently rated Ba3 with a Negative outlook.  The rating action is
based on the failure of the property's management to provide
Moody's with required financial information in a timely manner.
Moody's will continue to reach out to management within the next
four weeks, but in the event that Moody's requests go unanswered
once again, the ratings will either be downgraded or withdrawn.


FRASER SULLIVAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$33,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$32,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes, Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     August 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$33,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes, Due 2020, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     August 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in August 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated September 10, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2556 compared to 3094
in the July 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 4.01% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.78%
in July 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$7.7million of the underlying portfolio compared to $35.8 million
in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
128.58%, 118.52%, 109.67% and 105.71%, respectively, versus July
2009 levels of 124.72%, 114.96%, 106.38% and 102.44%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $473.3 million, defaulted par of $15.6 million,
weighted average default probability of 27.44% (implying a WARF of
3935), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.20%,
and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Fraser Sullivan CLO II, Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3148)

  -- Class A-1a: 0
  -- Class A-1b: 0
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4722)

  -- Class A-1a: -1
  -- Class A-1b: -1
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: 0

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.20%)

  -- Class A-1a: 0
  -- Class A-1b: 0
  -- Class A-2: 0
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.20%)

  -- Class A-1a: 0
  -- Class A-1b: 0
  -- Class A-2: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


GALLERIA CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Galleria CBO V, Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Term Notes, due 2037
     (current balance of $114,617,435.50), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

  -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Revolving Notes, due
     2037 (current balance of $0), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

Galleria CBO V, Ltd. is a multi-sector collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of structure finance
assets, including Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities,
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities and CDOs originated between
1997 and 2003.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and failure of the coverage tests.  The weighted average rating
factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased from 3801 in
March 2009 to 4447 in September 2010.  Defaulted securities have
also increased from $21 million to $41 million during this period.
Additionally, approximately $3.6 million of RMBS within the
underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the
general macro uncertainties are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.  However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further change.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) were stressed by eleven
notches, and securities currently rated A (sf) or Baa (sf) were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) or B (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while
current Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2006 and
2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, currently Aaa (sf) or Aa
(sf) rated securities were stressed by eight notches, and
securities currently rated A (sf), Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were
stressed by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the
B range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current Caa (sf)
securities were treated as Ca (sf).

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) or
Baa (sf) were stressed by five notches, Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed to Caa3 (sf), and B (sf) or Caa (sf) securities were
treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the first
half of 2006, those currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by four
notches, while Aa (sf), A (sf) and Baa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current B (sf)
and Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa (sf), A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were stressed by four
notches, currently B (sf) rated securities were treated as Caa3
(sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities were treated as Ca
(sf).  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated securities
were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities
were treated as Ca (sf).

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by
four notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf )
or Baa (sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM
securities currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches,
Aa (sf) and A (sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by
six notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine
notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below,
and are also currently on review for possible downgrade have been
stressed to Ca (sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including the correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account of: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present).  The Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows.  The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


GECMC 2003-C1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of GECMC 2003-C1,
GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corporation Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. H, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 19, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. M, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned B1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. N, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. O, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 15, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned B3
     (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities  transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 19, 2008.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to
$772.4 million from $1.189 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 27% of the pool.  Twenty-one loans, representing 24%
of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review was represented
by twenty-eight loans, representing 31% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $4.7 million loss (13%
loss severity on average).  Currently three loans, representing 3%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The three specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $8.5 million appraisal
reduction for two of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Class P has
experienced interest shortfalls totaling $920,000.  Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience future
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


GECMC 2007-C1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of GECMC 2007-C1, GE
Capital Commercial Mortgage Corporation Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on May 9, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on May 9, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-JFL, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6% to
$3.699 billion from $3.953 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 189 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 44% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any
defeased loans.

Forty loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $30.3 million loss (16%
loss severity on average).  Currently 33 loans, representing 25%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The thirty-three specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $86.8 million appraisal
reduction for 17 of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K through T
have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $8.1 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


GLACIER FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class A-2 and B notes issued by Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.,
a cash flow collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class A-1
notes and its 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class C and preference
shares notes.

The transaction triggered an event of default on Aug. 10, 2009,
followed by an acceleration of the maturity on July 14, 2010.
According to S&P's review, the transaction missed an interest
payment on the class A-2 and B nondeferrable tranches following
the acceleration of the maturity that modified the sequence in
which payments are made to the various classes of noteholders.

The rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

                          Rating Actions

                    Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.

                                    Rating
                                    ------
            Class            To               From
            -----            --               ----
            A-2              D (sf)           CC (sf)
            B                D (sf)           CC (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.

                      Class         Rating
                      -----         ------
                      A-1           A+ (sf)
                      C             CC (sf)
                      Pref Shares   CC (sf)


GLACIER FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on the class A-2 and B notes issued by Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.,
a cash flow collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class A-1
notes and its 'CC (sf)' ratings on the class C and preference
shares notes.

The transaction triggered an event of default on Aug. 10, 2009,
followed by an acceleration of the maturity on July 14, 2010.
According to S&P's review, the transaction missed an interest
payment on the class A-2 and B nondeferrable tranches following
the acceleration of the maturity that modified the sequence in
which payments are made to the various classes of noteholders.

The rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

                         Rating Actions

                    Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.

                                    Rating
                                    ------
            Class            To               From
            -----            --               ----
            A-2              D (sf)           CC (sf)
            B                D (sf)           CC (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.

                      Class         Rating
                      -----         ------
                      A-1           A+ (sf)
                      C             CC (sf)
                      Pref Shares   CC (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2003-C1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
and affirmed 11 classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 1, 2007
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 29, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Caa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.7% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
7.9% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the credit estimate of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the credit estimate level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 1, 2007.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the September 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $831.2
million from $1.05 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 93 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 35% of the pool.  Twenty loans, representing 33% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 32%
of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit estimates representing 12% of the pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a $6.9
million realized loss (72% loss severity).  Four loans,
representing 4% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $15.3 million loss (50%
expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$15.1 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 96% and 68% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 85% compared to 95% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
1.39X and 1.21X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 27 compared to 44 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Oakbrook Center
Loan ($51.9 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $207.5 million mortgage loan.  The
loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a mixed-use property
located in Oak Brook, Illinois that consists of an open-air
regional mall, three office buildings and a ground lease
underlying a hotel and theater.  Oakbrook Center totals
approximately 2.4 million square feet.  The mall is anchored by
Lord & Taylor, Macy's, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom and Sears.
Performance has slightly improved since last review.  The loan has
amortized 6% since last review.  Moody's current credit estimate
and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.74X, respectively, compared to A1
and 1.62X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit estimate is the Chandler
Fashion Center Loan ($49.2 million - 5.9%), which represents a
participation interest in a $96.4 million mortgage loan.  The loan
is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million square foot
regional mall located in Chandler, Arizona.  The center is
anchored by Dillard's, Macy's, Nordstrom and Sears.  None of the
anchors are owned by the borrower.  Performance has been stable.
The loan has amortized 6% since last review.  Moody's current
credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.31X, respectively,
compared to Aa2 and 2.12X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 12% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Renaissance at Columbia Loan
($35.4 million -- 4.3%), which is secured by a 625,000 square foot
mixed use property consisting of office (51%) and
warehouse/distribution (49%) space located in Columbia, Maryland.
The loan is on the watchlist due to low occupancy and a decline in
DSCR.  As of March 2010 property was only 60% leased due to a
major tenant, which previously leased 39% of the net rentable area
vacating in December 2009.  The property was 97% leased at last
review.  Moody's analysis is based on a stabilized value for the
property.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 90% and 1.14X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Town Plaza South Gate Loan
($33.2 million -- 4.0%), which is secured by a 300,000 square foot
retail center located in Los Angeles, California.  As of June 2010
property was 87% leased compared to 98% at last review.  The loan
is on the watchlist due to low DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 119% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 107% and 0.96X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the Norwest Woods Loan ($29.7 million -
3.6%), which is secured by a 322-unit apartment complex located in
Norwood, Massachusetts.  As of March 2010 the property was 92%
leased compared to 82% at last review.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 127% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.79X at
last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-RR1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine and affirmed eight classes
issued by Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-RR1 as
a result of increased interest shortfalls on the underlying
collateral.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2009.  Since that time, approximately 32.9% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and 37.8% is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Currently, 98.9% of the portfolio is rated below
investment grade and 43.5% has a Fitch derived rating in the 'CCC'
rating category or lower, compared to 83.5% and 16.3%,
respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentration in distressed assets, Fitch believes
that the probability of default for all classes of notes can be
evaluated without factoring potential further losses from the non-
defaulted portion of the portfolio.  Therefore this transaction
was not modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model (SF PCM).

For all classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower)
and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (45.5%).
Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement to each class is
well below the percentage of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls.  According to the Sept. 22, 2010 trustee report, the
class A-1 notes received a partial interest payment and classes A-
2 through Q continue to defer their interest payments.  Losses on
the underlying collateral have completely eroded the non-rated
class S notes and 22.9% of the class Q balance.  As a result,
Fitch has downgraded the class Q notes to 'Dsf'.

GCCFC 2006-RR1 is a static CMBS resecuritization, which closed
Nov. 8, 2006.  The transaction is collateralized by 74 CMBS assets
from 34 transactions.  The portfolio is composed of 79.4% CMBS
from the 2006 vintage and the remaining assets are from the 2005
(20.2%) and 1998 vintages (0.5%).

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $429,619,000 class A-1 to 'Csf' from 'Bsf';
  -- $122,276,000 class A-2 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $16,524,000 class B to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $9,914,000 class C to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $4,957,000 class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $13,219,000 class E to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $5,783,000 class F to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,872,000 class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $1,273,067 class Q to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $11,567,000 class H at 'Csf';
  -- $4,957,000 class J at 'Csf';
  -- $6,609,000 class K at 'Csf';
  -- $4,957,000 class L at 'Csf';
  -- $3,305,000 class M at 'Csf';
  -- $2,479,000 class N at 'Csf';
  -- $3,304,000 class O at 'Csf';
  -- $827,000 class P at 'Csf'.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-RR2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 and affirmed nine classes issued
by Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-RR2 as a
result of increased interest shortfalls on the underlying
collateral.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2009.  Since that time, approximately 30.9% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and 17.2% is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  The entire portfolio is rated below investment
grade and 40.7% has a Fitch derived rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 92.9% and 17.7%, respectively, when
Fitch took its last rating action.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentration in distressed assets, Fitch believes
that the probability of default for all classes of notes can be
evaluated without factoring potential further losses from the non-
defaulted portion of the portfolio.  Therefore this transaction
was not modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model (SF PCM).

For all classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower)
and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (41.1%).
Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement to the class A-1
notes does not provide sufficient cushion to the percentage of
assets experiencing interest shortfalls.  For classes A-2 and
below, the amount of interest shortfalls on the underlying
collateral well exceeds the credit enhancement to these classes.
According to the Sept. 22, 2010 trustee report, the class A-2
notes received a partial interest payment and classes A-3 through
Q continue to defer their interest payments.

Greenwich 2007-RR2 is a static CMBS resecuritization, which closed
in June 2007.  The transaction is collateralized by 63 CMBS assets
from 30 transactions.  The portfolio is composed of 99.4% CMBS
from the 2006 and 2007 vintages, and the balance from the 2005
vintage (0.6%).

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $245,000,000 class A-1FL to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf';
  -- $72,232,000 class A-1FX to 'CCsf' from 'Bsf';
  -- $79,308,000 class A-2 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $40,315,000 class A-3 to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $16,523,000 class B to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $6,609,000 class C to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $4,626,000 class D to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $11,235,000 class E to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $4,627,000 class F to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $11,235,000 class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $9,253,000 class H at 'Csf';
  -- $3,965,000 class J at 'Csf';
  -- $5,287,000 class K at 'Csf';
  -- $3,966,000 class L at 'Csf';
  -- $2,643,000 class M at 'Csf';
  -- $1,322,000 class N at 'Csf';
  -- $3,305,000 class O at 'Csf';
  -- $1,982,000 class P at 'Csf';
  -- $661,000 class Q at 'Csf'.


GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from 10 RMBS
transactions issued by GSAMP Trust and GSAA Home Equity Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of closed
end second lien loans.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  Class A-1 issued by GSAA
Home Equity Trust 2007-S1 is wrapped by CIFG Assurance North
America, Inc. (Rating Withdrawn).  RMBS securities wrapped by CIFG
Assurance North America, Inc. are rated at their underlying rating
without consideration of CIFG's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the each of the collateral pools were to
increase by 10%, model implied results indicate that most of the
deals' ratings would remain stable, with the exception of Class
II-M-1 from GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-S1 and class M-1 from
GSAMP Trust 2005-S2, for each of which model implied results would
be one notch lower (for example, Ba2 versus Ba1, or Ca versus
Caa3).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-S1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 54%

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-S1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 67%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (Insured
Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-S1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 12%

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-S2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 8%

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 57%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 58%

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S3

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 65%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S4

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 57%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S5

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 73%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S6

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 54%

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


INDYMAC IMJA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 187 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 187
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 29 tranches from 35 RMBS
transactions issued by IndyMac.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac IMJA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A4

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac IMSC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac IMSC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR9

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR15

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR19

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR21

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR23

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR25

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR27

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR29

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR35

  -- Cl. 1A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR37

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR39

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR41

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR13

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR15

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR17

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


INDYMAC INDB: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches, and confirmed the rating of one tranche, from IndyMac
INDB Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1.  The collateral backing this deal
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
subprime residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac INDB Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to
2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.


JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 12 classes issued by
JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Limited/LLC as a result of increased interest
shortfalls on the underlying collateral.

On Sept. 27, 2010, the class A and B notes did not receive their
full interest distribution as a result of insufficient interest
proceeds due to the continued interest shortfalls on the
underlying collateral.  On Oct. 1, 2009, the trustee declared an
event of default due to non-payment of full and timely accrued
interest to the class A and B notes.  The class A and B notes are
non-deferrable classes and are downgraded due to default in the
payment of their accrued interest.  Noteholders had not given
direction to accelerate the notes or liquidate the portfolio at
the time of this review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentration in distressed assets, Fitch believes
that the probability of default for all classes of notes can be
evaluated without factoring potential further losses from the non-
distressed portion of the portfolio.  Therefore this transaction
was not modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model.

For classes C and below, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity
to the default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and
lower) and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls.
Currently, the entire portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 91.4% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower.  Additionally, approximately 62.5% of the
underlying collateral is experiencing interest shortfalls.

JER CRE CDO 2006-2 is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Oct. 17, 2006.  According to the Sept.
27, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio consists of commercial
mortgage backed securities (70.1%), commercial real estate loans
(25.4%) and structured finance CDOs from the 2004 and 2005 vintage
(4.5%).

Fitch has downgraded and affirmed these classes as indicated:

  -- $332,193,905 class A-FL notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'CCsf';

  -- $120,055,000 class B-FL notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

  -- $17,000,000 class C-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $43,028,000 class C-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $20,000,000 class D-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $28,022,000 class D-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $10,000,000 class E-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $20,014,000 class E-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $40,818,000 class F-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $36,017,000 class G-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $13,206,000 class H-FL notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $60,027,000 class J-FX notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $78,036,000 class K notes affirmed at 'Csf';

  -- $72,033,000 class L notes affirmed at 'Csf'.


JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-2 CRE CDO Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on two additional classes from
the same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
interest shortfalls to the transaction.  The nondeferrable class
A-FL and B-FL obligations experienced interest shortfalls
according to the Sept. 20, 2010, remittance report.  This prompted
S&P's downgrades of these classes to 'D (sf)'.  The interest
shortfalls to the nondeferrable classes triggered an event of
default under the indenture based on an Oct. 4, 2010, notice from
the trustee, Bank of America N.A.

The interest shortfalls are primarily the result of the failure of
the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral
for JER 2006-2 to produce sufficient interest proceeds to pay the
full interest amounts due to the classes.  The amount of interest
payments on the collateral has steadily declined in each of the
past six months, according to the trustee reports for JER 2006-2.
The amounts declined to $472,495 in September 2010 from $895,533
in April 2010.  According to the Sept. 20, 2010, remittance
report, only class A-FL received interest in the amount of
$158,737.

If the interest payments decline further, it may cause payment
shortfalls to the hedge counterparty.  A default in the payment
due to the hedge counterparty may then result in the termination
of the swap contract and trigger termination payments to the swap
counterparty.  If S&P determine that the interest due to the
deferrable classes may be deferred for many years as a
result of termination payment, S&P may lower the 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings to 'CC (sf)'.

According to the Sept. 20, 2010, trustee report for JER 2006-2,
the current asset pool included these:

* One hundred CMBS tranches ($750.7 million, 71.4%);
* Eight subordinated loans ($226.3 million, 21.5%);
* Two whole loans ($40.4 million, 3.8%); and
* Three CRE CDO tranches ($34.3 million, 3.3%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed JER 2006-2 according to its current
criteria.  S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

                     JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                               Rating
                               ------
             Class    To                   From
             -----    --                   ----
             A-FL     D (sf)               BB (sf)
             B-FL     D (sf)               B+ (sf)
             C-FL     CCC- (sf)            B (sf)
             C-FX     CCC- (sf)            B (sf)
             D-FL     CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)
             D-FX     CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)
             E-FL     CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)
             E-FX     CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        F-FL     CCC- (sf)
                        G-FL     CCC- (sf)


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-CIBC10 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2004-CIBC10 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-J, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 19, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to
$1.615 billion from $1.962 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 193 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 23% of the pool.  Twenty two loans, representing 19%
of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review also represented
19% of the pool.

Forty-seven loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $247,547 loss (1% loss
severity on average).  Currently 12 loans, representing 12% of the
pool, are in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Continental Plaza Loan
($88.0 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 640,000
square foot office property located in Hackensack, New Jersey.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in June 2009 due to
maturity default and is in the foreclosure process.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the ABB Building
Loan ($50.0 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
470,000 square foot office property located in Houston, Texas.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due
to imminent default.  The remaining ten specially serviced loans
are secured by a mix of property types.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $59.7 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
NR have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $2.5 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2002-C1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-C1.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the current ratings.  In its analysis, S&P also considered
refinance risk associated with nondefeased and nonspecially
serviced loans that are coming due in 2011 and 2012.  The near-
term maturities represent $550.1 million, or 91.8% of the pool.
Finally, S&P considered future workout/corrected loan fees in its
analysis.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the transaction.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage of 1.31x and a loan-to-value ratio of 88.0%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.13x and an LTV of
113.3%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 35.6% and 25.3%, respectively.  All of the adjusted
DSC and LTV calculations excluded two specially serviced loans
($7.0 million, 1.2%) and 13 defeased loans ($114.3 million,
19.1%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest-only certificate
based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the September 2010 remittance report, three loans
($15.3 million, 2.6%) were with the special servicer, LNR Partners
Inc.  Two ($7.0 million, 1.2%) are more than 90 days delinquent,
and one ($8.3 million, 1.4%) is 30 days delinquent.  S&P estimated
minimal losses for the two 90-plus-day delinquent loans ranging
from 10% to 12%.  Appraisal reduction amounts totaling
$1.8 million are in effect against these two specially serviced
loans.

The Baymeadows loan ($8.3 million, 1.4%) is the largest loan with
the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 264-unit
multifamily property in Ridgeland, Miss.  The loan was transferred
to the special servicer on July 29, 2010, due to imminent default.
As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 0.68x, and occupancy at
the property was 75%.

The One Monaco Park ($3.5 million, 0.6%) and Two Monaco Park
($3.5 million, 0.6%) loans are the remaining loans with the
special servicer.  These loans are each secured by office
properties in Denver, Colo., that were constructed in 1978 and
1974, respectively.  The loans are both reported as more than 90
days delinquent, and the reported DSCs as of Dec. 31, 2009, were
0.57x and 0.75x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's expects minimal
losses upon the eventual resolution of these assets.

Three loans ($18.5 million, 2.3%) that were previously with the
special servicer have been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided the loans
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.

                      Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $599.2 million, which represents 73.4% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 104 assets
in the pool, down from 129 at issuance.  The master servicer for
the transaction, Wachovia Real Estate Asset Management (Wachovia),
provided financial information for 98.4% of the pool, and all of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2009, interim-
2009, or interim-2010 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.33x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.31x
and 88.0%, respectively, which exclude two specially serviced
loans ($7.0 million, 1.2%) and 13 defeased loans ($114.3 million,
19.1%).  Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 0.66x for the two specially
serviced assets that were excluded.  Thirty-four loans
($160.2 million, 26.7%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Twenty-five loans ($117.8 million, 19.7%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, and 20 of these loans ($96.0 million, 16.0%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  Thirteen loans ($114.3 million,
19.1%) have been defeased.  To date, the transaction has realized
seven principal losses totaling $8.9 million.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $196.9 million (32.9%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.45x for the top 10 loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the
top 10 loans were 1.33x and 78.6%, respectively.  Three of the top
10 loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  Details
regarding the three loans that appear on the watchlist are:

The Potomac Festival loan ($17.8 million, 3.0%) is the fifth-
largest loan in the pool secured by real estate and the largest
loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a
251,959-sq.-ft. retail property in Woodbridge, Va.  The loan
appears on the watchlist due to low occupancy.  As of Dec. 31,
2009, reported DSC was 1.19x, and as of the June 30, 2010, rent
roll, overall property occupancy was 64%.

The Akron Centre Plaza loan ($16.2 million, 2.7%) is the seventh-
largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 195,623-sq.-ft.
office building in Akron, Ohio.  The loan appears on the watchlist
due to low DSC and occupancy.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, reported DSC
for the loan was 0.46x, and occupancy at the property was 71%.

The Donelson Corporate Center loan ($12.2 million, 2.0%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 233,539-
sq.-ft. office building in Nashville, Tenn.  The loan appears on
the watchlist due to an insurance event caused by flooding.
However, the servicer comments indicate that the repair work has
been completed.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.73x,
and occupancy at the property was 98%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the affirmed ratings.

                        Ratings Affirmed

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

         Class  Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
         -----  ------             ----------------------
         A-2    AAA (sf)                            28.84
         A-3    AAA (sf)                            28.84
         B      AAA (sf)                            23.73
         C      AA+ (sf)                            17.94
         D      AA  (sf)                            16.23
         E      A-  (sf)                            12.14
         F      BBB+(sf)                            10.10
         G      BBB-(sf)                             7.37
         H      BB+ (sf)                             5.33
         J      BB (sf)                              4.31
         K      BB- (sf)                             3.62
         L      B (sf)                               2.26
         M      B- (sf)                              1.58
         X-1    AAA (sf)                              N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KATONAH V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Katonah V, Ltd.:

  -- US$184,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015
     (current outstanding balance of $78,067,150), Upgraded to Aaa
     (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
     to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3
     (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 54% or $91.6 million since the
last rating action in July 2009.  As a result of the delevering,
the overcollateralization ratios of the Class A, Class B, and
Class C Notes increased to 133.2%, 112.3%, and 103.7%,
respectively, based on the latest trustee report dated
September 9, 2010, vs. the May 2009 levels of 116.5%, 105.9%, and
101.1%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying
portfolio has been relatively stable since the last rating action,
as measured by Moody's adjusted WARF, due to a decrease in the
percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $118.6 million, defaulted par of $10.5 million,
weighted average default probability of 24.02% (implying a WARF of
3811), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 40.85%,
and a diversity score of 48.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Katonah V, Ltd., issued in May 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Katonah V was the
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in August 2009.  Other methodologies
and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3049)

  -- Class A-1 Notes: 0
  -- Class A-2 Notes: +2
  -- Class B-1 Notes: +1
  -- Class B-2 Notes: +1
  -- Class C Notes: +1
  -- Class D Notes: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4573)

  -- Class A-1 Notes: -1
  -- Class A-2 Notes: -2
  -- Class B-1 Notes: -2
  -- Class B-2 Notes: -2
  -- Class C Notes: -1
  -- Class D Notes: 0

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR +2% (42.85%)

  -- Class A-1 Notes: 0
  -- Class A-2 Notes: +1
  -- Class B-1 Notes: 0
  -- Class B-2 Notes: 0
  -- Class C Notes: 0
  -- Class D Notes: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (38.85%)

  -- Class A-1 Notes: 0
  -- Class A-2 Notes: 0
  -- Class B-1 Notes: -1
  -- Class B-2 Notes: -1
  -- Class C Notes: -1
  -- Class D Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


LASELL COLLEGE: Moody's Affirms Long-Term Rating at 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Lasell College's Ba1 long-
term rating.  The rating applies to $8.9 million of Series A bonds
issued through the Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities
Authority.  At this time, Moody's have revised the outlook to
positive from stable as a result of the strong operating cash flow
consistently generated by Lasell, enrollment growth that lends the
College greater stability, and reduced risk in the debt structure.
The College has a total of $42.3 million of direct debt, of which
$32.8 million is in a variable rate mode and subject to
refinancing in 2014.

Legal Security: The Series A bonds are a general obligation of the
College, further secured by a lien on Gross Receipts.  Pursuant to
an Intercreditor Agreement, the Series A bonds are on parity with
Lasell's Series 2001 bonds, Series 2006 bonds, and Series 2008
bonds and share security provisions.  The Loan and Trust Agreement
requires the College to meet a debt service coverage ratio of 1.15
times (2.7 times estimated at 6/30/2010) and to certify that debt
service coverage including additional bonds will be at least 1.20
times.  Under the terms of the Series 2006 and 2008 bonds, Lasell
must also limit annual capital spending not financed by that debt
to $2 million.  There are also restrictions on the College's
ability to pledge its property and assets.

Debt-Related Derivatives: During Fiscal Year 2010, Lasell
restructured its swaps portfolio in conjunction with refinancing
its outstanding variable rate debt.  The College is now party to
five floating-to-fixed interest rate swap agreements with a
combined notional amount of $39.0 million that are designed to
hedge the interest rates of its variable rate debt.  Four of the
swaps are currently in effect (totaling $32.8 million notional
amount) while one takes effect in 2011 ($6.2 million notional
amount).  The counterparty for all of the swaps is RBS Citizens,
N.A. (rated A2/P-1 with a negative outlook).  Under all swaps, the
College pays a fixed rate and receives a variable rate based on
one-month LIBOR.  As of June 30, 2010, the market value of the
swap portfolio to the College was negative $5.8 million.  Lasell
is not required to post collateral under the agreements.  There
are no automatic termination events, but the counterparty may
terminate the agreement if the College loses its tax-exempt
status.  Moody's believes the swaps introduce basis risk and
counterparty risk to the College's portfolio, and these risks are
reflected in the current rating level.

Rating Rationale:

                            Strengths

* Sustained improvement in operating performance generates robust
  operating cash flow margins and good debt service coverage.
  Lasell continues to produce solid operating margins under
  Moody's methodology, with an annual average operating margin in
  FY 2007-2009 of 9.0% that represented a strong increase from
  3.7% in FY 2002-2004.  Operating cash flow margin of 18.9% in FY
  2009 generated 3.0 times debt service coverage.  Preliminary
  financial results for FY 2010 show an operating margin of more
  than 7.0% with a continued robust operating cash flow margin
  that produced an estimated 2.9 times debt service coverage

* Continued growth in enrollment (estimated 1,677 full time-
  equivalent students in fall 2010) provides greater ability to
  withstand student market volatility and displays further
  progress in solidifying the College's role in an attractive
  suburban Boston environment.  Lasell's FTE enrollment has more
  than doubled over the last decade from 798 in fall 2000, in line
  with a similar increase in undergraduate applications.
  Undergraduates comprise approximately 95% of total enrollment,
  and this figure is anticipated to decline slightly as additional
  graduate programs are implemented.  Selectivity has improved,
  decreasing from 79.4% for fall 2004 to an estimated 67.6% for
  fall 2010.  The average annual capital spending ratio of 2.9
  times from FY 2005-2009 indicates significant recent investment
  in campus facilities, including three additional residence
  halls, that has boosted the appeal of the campus. In conjunction
  with enrollment growth, the College has demonstrated healthy
  growth of net tuition per student ($13,915 estimated in FY 2010,
  up 44% over FY 2005), a critical credit factor as the College
  relies on student charges for approximately 92% of operating
  revenue as calculated by Moody's.  Despite this growth, the
  College's tuition discount rate is relatively high (41% in FY
  2009), and net tuition per student of $13,750 in FY 2009 is
  lower than the $14,417 median for private universities rated Ba1
  and below as well as the $18,030 FY 2009 median for Baa rated
  small universities.  .

* Recovery in financial resources reduces balance sheet leverage.
  After suffering consecutive investment losses of 3.5% (FY 2008)
  and 17.7% (FY 2009), Lasell reported a return of 9.1% for the
  fiscal year ending June 30, 2010.  Positive investment returns
  combined with continued operating surpluses and higher gifts in
  FY 2010 (estimated $3.8 million compared to $1.4 million in FY
  2009) bolstered financial resources, with estimated total
  financial resources of $24 million in FY 2010 representing a
  record high.  Estimated expendable financial resources of $16.6
  million cover direct debt by 0.4 times and operations by 0.4
  times. These levels are improved over 0.3 times and 0.2 times in
  FY 2009, respectively, and are the highest levels since FY 2006.

Moody's note that Lasell's financial resources are depressed by
the interest rate swap liability, and its liquidity position is
significantly stronger.  Based on Moody's methodology for
analyzing liquidity, the College held $20 million of unrestricted
monthly liquidity at June 30, 2009, which translated into 224
monthly days cash on hand (days cash on hand from investments
liquid within one month).  This figure compares favorably to the
Baa-rated medians of 150 monthly days cash on hand.  Lasell is
considering undertaking an $11 million project to construct a new
dormitory and parking garage.  In Moody's opinion, additional debt
without commensurate growth in financial resources and revenue
available to pay debt service could place pressure on the current
rating and outlook.

                           Challenges

* Student market position represents an ongoing challenge for this
  tuition-dependent institution. Despite enrollment growth, first-
  year matriculation remains at a relatively low level. Nearly 50%
  of Lasell students hail from Massachusetts, with the majority
  from other New England states and the Northeast.  As a result,
  the College faces significant competition from numerous
  institutions in the Boston area.  For fall 2010, approximately
  22% of students who were accepted chose to enroll.  Although the
  matriculation ratio in fall 2010 (21.5%) was slightly lower than
  fall 2007-2009, the College strategically chose to lower the
  entering freshmen class size due to a limit on student housing
  availability and focused on attracting transfer students, who
  tend to be commuter students.

* Additional debt in recent years increases operating leverage.
  Due to a doubling of debt between FY 2005 and 2009 to $42.6
  million, debt to operating revenues was a high 1.1 times for FY
  2009.  In addition, debt service represented a relatively high
  6.8% of operating expenses in that year.  While growth in
  revenues and a slight decline in outstanding debt improved the
  debt to operating revenues closer to 1.0 times, debt service
  represented an estimated 7.6% of expenses in FY 2010. In Moody's
  opinion, high operating leverage restricts the College's
  financial flexibility.

* Debt structure continues to pose risks, with thin liquidity
  compared to variable rate debt.  Of the total $42.3 million of
  outstanding direct debt, $32.8 million, or 78%, is in a variable
  rate mode.  Prior to FY 2010, this debt had been in the form of
  weekly variable rate demand bonds with a put feature supported
  by letters of credit.  During FY 2010, $30 million of the bonds
  were directly purchased by RBS Citizens, N.A. and the remainder
  was converted to a commercial loan with the bank, all for a
  five-year term expiring September 1, 2014.  The College pays the
  bank a variable rate based on LIBOR.  As mentioned above under
  "DEBT-RELATED DERIVATIVES," the College also restructured the
  swap portfolio designed to hedge the variable rates of this
  debt.  While reduced, Moody's believes the debt structure
  maintains risks to the College, including market risk resulting
  from the need to refinance the debt in 2014 and counterparty
  risk due to the concentration of debt and swap exposure with a
  single bank.  Monthly and annual liquidity of $20 million as of
  June 30, 2009 cover just 60% of the variable rate debt.

* Strong relationship with Lasell Village, a continuing care
  retirement community on the College's campus, including shared
  corporate parent and a management agreement under which Lasell
  College operates Lasell Village.  Despite strong occupancy,
  Lasell Village represents a much higher risk enterprise than the
  College, somewhat limiting the credit rating of the College,
  especially given the approximately $19 million of debt of the
  Village, which Moody's treats as an indirect debt of the
  College.  The College has no legal obligation to pay the debt of
  Lasell Village.

                       Recent Developments

The College is concluding the transfer of management of most of
its investment portfolio to SEI from Commonfund during October
2010.  At June 30, 2009, investment assets were allocated across
equities (38%, including 35% domestic and 3% international), 28%
fixed income, 11% cash, 9% hedge funds, and 15% other.  Under a
revised asset allocation to be implemented in part by SEI,
Lasell's investment portfolio will be 50% equities (33% domestic
and 17% international), 35% fixed income, 4% hedge funds, and 11%
other.  Moody's believes the concentration of over 80% of
endowment management with a single firm represents vulnerability
that risks unique to that firm could limit the College's ability
to liquidate assets when needed.

Lasell recently reached an agreement with the Massachusetts
Attorney General in a case alleging that the College between 2003
and 2007 directed students to borrow for student loans through
Citizens Bank (now RBS Citizens, N.A.), which charged higher
interest than alternate lenders.  Under the agreement, Lasell will
pay over $191,000 to more than 1,000 affected students.  According
to the College, this payment will be charged to FY 2010.

                             Outlook

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the College
will continue to produce healthy operating performance that
generates strong operating cash flow and good debt service
coverage, successfully navigate the risks of its debt structure,
issue additional debt that is commensurate with growth in
financial resources, stabilize its market position, and
effectively manage its relationship with a much higher risk
organization (Lasell Village).

                What could change the rating -- Up

Marked improvement in financial resources that provides greater
cushion for debt and operations; reduced risk in debt structure;
significant and sustained strengthening of market position

               What could change the rating -- Down

Inability to manage risks of debt structure; erosion of financial
resources; issuance of additional debt without commensurate growth
in financial resources; deterioration of operating cash flow

Key Indicators (FY 2009 financial data and fall 2009 enrollment
data; estimated 2010 data in parentheses):

* Total Enrollment: 1,579 full-time equivalent students (1,677)

* Selectivity: 63.8% (67.6%)

* Matriculation: 24.2% (21.5%)

* Total Financial Resources: $16.8 million ($23.9 million)

* Total Direct Debt: $42.3 million (current)

* Total Comprehensive Debt: $61.6 million (includes the
  outstanding debt of Lasell Village)

* Expendable Financial Resources to Direct Debt: 0.39 times

* Expendable Financial Resources to Operations: 0.43 times

* Monthly Liquidity: $19.8 million

* Monthly Days Cash (unrestricted funds available within 1 month
  divided by operating expenses excluding depreciation, divided by
  365 days): 224 days

* Three-Year Average Operating Margin: 9.0% (7.1%)

* Operating Cash Flow Margin: 18.9% (20.2%)

                           Rated Debt

* Series A: Ba1

The last rating action was on February 12, 2009, when the Ba1 bond
rating and stable outlook of Lasell College were affirmed.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2004-C4 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2004-C4, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2004-C4 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. B, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 30, 2007 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 30, 2007 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 30, 2007 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. P, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned B1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. S, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 11, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned B3
     (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 30, 2007.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to
$990.0 million from $1.41 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 87 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 26% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 63% of the pool.  Seven loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 14% of the
pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.4 million loss (42%
loss severity on average).  Currently seven loans, representing 8%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The seven specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.9 million appraisal
reduction for four of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K through T
have experienced interest shortfalls totaling $1.8 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
future interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2001-C3 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C3.  S&P lowered its rating on
class N to 'D (sf)'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
eight additional classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P considered the
volume of loans with near-term maturities, as well as loans
subject to workout fees, in its review.  S&P lowered the class N
rating to 'D (sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls, primarily
related to an appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction and
special servicing fees (including loan workout fees).

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.28x and a loan-to-value ratio of 90.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.09x and an LTV ratio of 117.5%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
28.8% and 27.1%, respectively.  S&P's DSC and LTV calculations
exclude the transaction's 29 defeased loans ($428.2 million,
42.4%), one ($2.1 million, 0.2%) of the transaction's two
specially serviced loans, and one loan ($3.4 million, 0.3%) that
S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P estimated losses for
the specially serviced and credit impaired loans separately and
included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect liquidity support and subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its 'D
(sf)' rating on class P, which S&P had lowered in November 2005
due to interest shortfalls S&P determined were recurring at that
time.  According to the September 2010 remittance report, the
class has since lost over half of its original principal balance.
S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only certificate
based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the September 2010 remittance report, two loans
($65.7 million, 6.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The Westlake Center loan ($64.2 million total exposure, 6.3%) is
the third-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 453,635-sq.-ft. office
property in Seattle.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in November 2009 and is classified as late, but less than
30 days delinquent.  The loan has an anticipated repayment date of
Feb. 11, 2011.  As of June 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were
1.66x and 92.0%, respectively.

The Atwater Court loan ($2.1 million total exposure, 0.2%) is
secured by a 38,680-sq.-ft. industrial property in Buford, Ga.,
and is the second loan with the special servicer.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in April 2009 due to past-due
payments and is classified as 90-plus days delinquent.  Reported
DSC was 1.04x as of December 2008.  There is an appraisal
reduction amount of $679,157 in effect.  Standard & Poor's expects
a moderate loss upon the resolution of this loan.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined one
loan to be credit-impaired.  The CVS Plaza loan ($3.4 million,
0.3%) appears on the master servicer's watchlist because of low
DSC and occupancy issues.  he loan is secured by a 24,131-sq.-ft.
strip mall in West Orange, N.J.  DSC as of December 2009 was
0.28x.  Given the low DSC, S&P considers this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss.

Two loans totaling $107.4 million (7.8%) were previously with the
special servicer but have since been returned to the master
servicer.  According to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future
principal and interest payments on the loans (including the
balloon maturity payments) if they continue to perform and remain
with the master servicer.

Excluding the transaction's defeased loans, as well as the one
specially serviced loan and one credit-impaired loan for which S&P
estimated losses, 66 ($495.3 million, 49.0%) loans have ARDs or
final maturity dates through July 2011.  Standard & Poor's
considered this large volume of loans with near-term
ARDs/maturities in the rating actions.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
had an aggregate trust balance of $1.01 billion, down from
$1.38 billion at issuance.  The pool includes 99 loans, down from
135 loans at issuance.  Twenty-nine loans ($428.2 million, 42.4%)
are defeased.  The master servicer provided full-year 2008,
interim-2009, or full-year 2009 financial information for all of
the nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.43x for the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.28x and 90.1%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the
transaction's defeased loans, one ($2.1 million, 0.2%) of the
transaction's two specially serviced loans, and one loan
($3.4 million, 0.3%) that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.
S&P estimated losses for the specially serviced and credit
impaired loan separately.  The master servicer reported a
watchlist of 25 ($150.9 million, 14.9%) loans, including four of
the top 10 loan exposures, which S&P discuss in detail below.
Eighteen loans ($119.0 million, 11.8%) in the pool have a reported
DSC of less than 1.10x, and 12 loans ($90.8 million, 9.0%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $370.6 million (36.7%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.45x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV for the top 10 exposures were 1.20x and 102.5%, respectively.

The Shoppingtown Mall loan is the fourth-largest loan in the pool
and the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan
has a balance of $39.4 million (3.9%) and is secured by a 773,634-
sq.-ft. retail property in DeWitt, N.Y., a suburb of Syracuse.
The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low
DSC.  As of December 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.54x
and 92.84%, respectively.  As of March 2010, DSC had increased to
1.10x, while the occupancy rate was 90.0%.

The Park Central loan is the fifth-largest loan in the pool and
the second-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
loan has a balance of $29.4 million (2.9%) and is secured by a
343,419-sq.-ft. mixed-use retail/office property in Phoenix, Ariz.
The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC
and its upcoming Dec. 11, 2010, ARD.  As of December 2009,
reported DSC and occupancy were 0.88x and 91.9%, respectively.

The Nexus Canyon Park Laboratory loan is the sixth-largest loan in
the pool and the third-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $20.8 million (2.1%) and is
secured by a 152,050-sq.-ft. office in Bothell, Wash.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to its upcoming
Dec. 11, 2010, ARD.  As of December 2009, reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.83x and 100.0%, respectively.

The Comstock Office Tower loan is the 10th-largest loan in the
pool and the fourth-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $11.2 million (1.1%) and is
secured by a 108,340-sq.-ft. office in Frisco, Texas.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of
December 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.04x and 79.1%,
respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with its analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
Class      To                From          Credit enhancement (%)
-----      --                ----          ----------------------
F          BBB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)                       7.67
G          BBB- (sf)         BBB (sf)                        6.48
H          BB (sf)           BB+ (sf)                        4.9
J          B+ (sf)           BB (sf)                         2.89
K          B (sf)            BB- (sf)                        2.21
L          CCC+ (sf)         B (sf)                          1.19
M          CCC- (sf)         B- (sf)                         0.84
N          D (sf)            CCC (sf)                        0.16

                        Ratings Affirmed

            LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C3
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C3

       Class         Rating          Credit enhancement (%)
       -----         ------          ----------------------
       A-1           AAA (sf)                          22.70
       A-2           AAA (sf)                          22.70
       B             AAA (sf)                          17.23
       C             AA (sf)                           12.82
       D             A+ (sf)                           11.23
       E             A- (sf)                            9.45
       P             D (sf)                             0.00
       X             AAA (sf)                            N/A


                       N/A - Not applicable.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-LLF Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF
C5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrades to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' on classes J and VIS
reflect recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
special servicing fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction amounts, and other expenses related to two loans, the
Whitehall/Highgate Hotel Portfolio loan and the Ventana Inn and
Spa loan.  According to the Sept. 15, 2010 trustee remittance
report, classes J and VIS have experienced interest shortfalls for
the past eight consecutive months.  Details on the two
aforementioned specially serviced loans are:

The Whitehall/Highgate Hotel Portfolio loan has a trust and whole-
loan balance of $108.4 million, which consists of a $102.8 million
senior pooled component and a $5.6 million subordinate nonpooled
component that supports the class WHH raked certificate (not rated
by Standard & Poor's).  In addition, the equity interests in the
borrower of the whole loan secure $91.0 million of mezzanine debt.
The loan is secured by nine full-service hotels totaling 2,262
rooms in eight states.  The loan, which is current, was
transferred to the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC on Dec. 2, 2009, due to imminent monetary default.  CWCapital
stated that it is currently in discussions with the borrower to
modify the loan.  CWCapital anticipates that the modification
agreement will close this year.   The Ventana Inn and Spa loan has
a trust and whole-loan balance of $26.0 million consisting of a
$21.6 million senior pooled component and a $4.4 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the class VIS
certificate.  In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of
the whole loan secure $28.8 million of mezzanine debt.  The loan
is secured by a 60-room, full-service luxury hotel in Big Sur,
Calif.  The 60-plus-days delinquent loan was transferred to the
special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors Inc., on Jan. 19,
2010, following a payment default.  TriMont indicated that it has
filed a notice of default on the loan in August and is pursuing
foreclosure.  In addition, TriMont has stated that the property is
currently operating under a receivership and a mezzanine lenders'
Uniform Commercial Code foreclosure hearing has been scheduled for
Oct. 22, 2010.  An appraisal reduction amount of $2.2 million is
in effect against the whole-loan balance based on the March 1,
2010, appraisal value of $25.2 million.

                         Ratings Lowered

     Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
                           2007-LLF C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                             Reported
                   Rating               Interest Shortfalls ($)
                   ------               -----------------------
   Class      To          From          Current    Accumulated
   -----      --          ----          -------    -----------
   J          D (sf)      CCC- (sf)      16,819        119,223
   VIS        D (sf)      CCC- (sf)       6,161         40,645


LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Louisiana
Housing Finance Agency's series 2007 multifamily housing revenue
bonds (Spanish Arms Project) to 'B+' from 'AAA', and removed it
from CreditWatch.  The bonds are secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-
backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action in
which S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's
revised criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions
in which funds are invested in money market funds and other
investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections
indicate that, assuming no reinvestment earnings, there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service
starting on the Sept. 20, 2017 interest payment date.  On that
date, the shortfall is projected to be just over $4,000.  The
projected shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and
reaches just over $100,000 by bond maturity on March 20, 2049,
assuming no interest earnings from now until that date.  Beginning
Sept. 20, 2034, in the event that the security prepays, there may
be insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
15-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


M-2 SPC: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on M-2
SPC Series 2005-A and Series 2005-H, collateralized debt
obligation transactions referencing a managed portfolio of 96
synthetic credit corporate and sovereign exposures.

Issuer: M-2 SPC Series 2005-A

  -- US$10M M2 Series 2005-A Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: M-2 SPC Series 2005-H

  -- US$15M M2 Series 2005-H Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
credit events in the reference portfolio.  Since the last rating
action, there have been credit events on Idearc Inc, General
Growth Properties Inc, RH Donnelley Corp, CIT Group Inc, and Ambac
Assurance Corporation.  In addition, iStar Financial Inc was
downgraded to Ca and Residential Capital LLC is still rated C.
These credit events have reduced the subordination on Series 2005-
A and Series 2005-H to 1.25% and 1.21%, respectively.  ResCap and
iStar comprise 2.64% of the portfolio.  Assuming both names
default as expected, if the weighted average recovery rate of
those exposures is less than 55%, the tranches will suffer losses.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in rating the notes was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Obligations" rating
methodology published in September 2009.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
these issuers can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transactions in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlation characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
Corporate CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference
pool may have leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the
Corporate CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of
volatility.  All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be
higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomic conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
tranches will likely experience 100% losses.


MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1999A Bonds to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the $5,180,000 of
Maricopa County Industrial Development Authority Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (Whispering Palms Apartment Project) Senior
Series 1999A to Ca from Caa1.  The rating action is based on the
lack of financial support from the borrower, weak debt service
coverage levels and the continued tapping of the Debt Service
Reserve Fund.

The outlook has been revised to stable given the new rating level.
A sizable portion of the underfunded Debt Service Reserve Fund may
be used to meet January 1, 2011 interest payments.  The Series A
Bonds continue to be insured by National Public Finance Guarantee
(formerly MBIA and currently rated Baa1, Developing) who is
considered to be the holder of the outstanding 1999A Bonds while
the event of default continues.  The $1,800,000 of remaining
Subordinate Series B Bonds are not rated nor has there been any
interest payment since July 1, 2007.

The Project:

Built in 1985, Whispering Palms Apartments is a 200 unit low-
income Bond qualified housing complex currently serving a
predominantly low to moderate income clientele and is located
within the west-central Phoenix submarket, approximately four
miles west of downtown Phoenix.  The dominant land use in this
relatively mature market area is single and multifamily
residential development with a limited commercial and retail
presence.

Whispering Palms was restructured during the third quarter of 2004
with approximately $750,000 spent for rehabilitation purposes.  A
new 501c3, Rainbow Phoenix LLC, assumed ownership and hired
property manager Morrison, Ekre & Bart Management Services, Inc.
to manage daily operations.

Recent Developments:

On July 1, 2010, the Series A bonds experienced another technical
default when the Trustee tapped the Series A Debt Service Reserve
for $261,975.52 (or 87% of the $300,367.50 payment) bringing the
reserve down to $106,546.65.  This tap is more severe than the
January 1, 2010 interest payment when the Trustee tapped Debt
Service Reserve for $95,607.83 or 62% of the required $155,367.50
payment.  The Series A bonds have an interest payment of $151,525
due on January 1, 2011, and it is anticipated that the reserve
fund will be used to satisfy the payment.

Debt service coverage ratios derived from 2009 audited financial
statements have deteriorated to 0.60x from 0.78x in 2008.  Interim
financial statements show coverage improving to 0.70x but the
property is still behind in funding the debt service account.
Occupancy has been quite volatile as a result of weak economic
conditions but has averaged 93% in 2010, a significant improvement
from the 84% average in 2009, and above the 90.3% level projected
by CB Richard Ellis.  Rents, however, remain below the Phoenix
area average and the property is experiencing stiff competition
from nearby properties, one of which has lowered rents by as much
as 30% to maintain occupancy.

Credit Strengths:

* Proactive Property Management by a 501c3; Rainbow Phoenix LLC

* Improving occupancy levels which are currently above the Phoenix
  average

Credit Challenges:

* Underfunded Debt Service Reserve Fund that continues to be
  tapped for debt service payments

* Weak debt service coverage

                             Outlook

The rating outlook was revised to stable as a result of the
downgrade to Ca.  Moody's anticipates the Debt Service Reserve
Fund being tapped to meet debt service requirements on January 1,
2011.  Property performance over the next nine months is most
critical to replenishing reserves and meeting principal and
interest payments on July 1, 2011.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

Increase in occupancy would translate to an increase in revenues
and net operating income which could permit stabilization and
replenishment of reserves.

Financial support from the borrower to meet debt service payments
and replenish the reserve accounts

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Continued withdrawals from the senior debt service reserve fund as
well as increasing vacancy levels would exert negative pressures
on net operating income.  Continued technical default resulting
from the borrower non-payment of required deposits to the trustee
would trigger a downgrade as well.

The last rating action with respect to the Maricopa County
Industrial Development Authority Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds
(Whispering Palms Apartment Project) Senior Series 1999A was on
July 14, 2010, when the bonds were downgraded to Caa1 from B1.


MIAMI BEACH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Outstanding Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BB+' rating on these outstanding
revenue bonds issued by the Miami Beach Health Facilities
Authority on behalf of Mount Sinai Medical Center of Greater
Miami, Inc.:

  -- Approximately $93,847,000 hospital revenue refunding bonds,
     series 2004;

  -- Approximately $68,812,000 hospital revenue bonds, series
     2001A;

  -- Approximately $94,904,000 hospital revenue bonds, series
     1998.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Positive from Stable.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The revision in Outlook reflects Mount Sinai Medical Center's
     significantly improved operating performance as a result of
     recent strategic initiatives and benefits derived from strong
     expense reduction efforts in 2008 continuing through 2010.

  -- Through the six-month interim period ended June 30, 2010,
     MSMC has experienced modest increases in inpatient admissions
     and emergency department visits, and sharp increases in
     cardiac services and births as compared to the year earlier
     period.

  -- Financial operating performance has improved noticeably since
     fiscal 2008 when MSMC lost $15.7 million (negative 3.2%
     operating margin).  In fiscal 2009, MSMC generated positive
     income from operations and solid operating cash flow, which
     has continued to improve through the six-month interim
     period, ended June 30, 2010.  Through the interim period,
     MSMC posted $4.2 million of operating income, equaling a 1.6%
     operating margin and 9.3% operating EBITDA margin, both of
     which exceed the 'BBB' category medians of 1.1% and 8%,
     respectively.

  -- MSMC's liquidity metrics have also improved since fiscal 2008
     as a result of improved operating results and management's
     conservative investment strategy.  At June 30, 2010 (the six-
     month interim period), MSMC held $149.8 million of
     unrestricted cash and investments, equating to 124.6 days
     cash on hand, 6.5 times cushion ratio, and 59.1% cash to
     debt, which are generally consistent with the lower end of
     investment grade credits.

  -- The debt burden remains high, with maximum annual debt
     service equal to 4.4% of revenues through the six-month
     interim period. However, MADS coverage by operating EBITDA in
     the interim period has improved to 2.1x from 1.8x in fiscal
     2009 and 1.0x in fiscal 2008.

What Would Cause An Upgrade?

  -- Sustaining the current levels of financial performance, which
     should, at a minimum, maintain the current level of liquidity
     and profitability.

  -- The resolution of the disposition of the Miami Heart
     Institute (the Institute) will have a material impact on
     MSMC's financial standing, as it carries approximately
     $108 million in debt and has a yearly expense of
     approximately $12 million in debt service payments and
     operating expenses.

                             Security

Debt payments are secured by a pledge of gross revenues, first
mortgage on all of the Medical Center's property, and debt service
reserve accounts.  In addition, the Mount Sinai Medical Foundation
(the Foundation) has provided an unconditional guaranty on the
bonds.

                          Credit Summary

The Outlook revision to Positive reflects the stronger operating
profile of MSMC, after several years of operating losses, as
evidenced by the hospital's recent return to operating
profitability in 2009 which continues into fiscal 2010.  The
improvement in MSMC's profitability and liquidity trends are
driven by its positive utilization trends, primarily as a result
of the expansion of the hospital's cardiological lines of
business, and effective expense reduction strategies implemented
over the past two fiscal years.  Additional positive rating
factors are MSMC's solid market position as the only hospital in
Miami Beach, FL and the strong community support from the
Foundation.  Besides providing an unconditional guarantee on
MSMC's long-term debt, the Foundation has made an annual
contribution of $10 million to the hospital for working capital
needs over the past three years and has committed to provide $10
million for fiscal year 2010.  However, MSMC's high debt ratios,
the uncertainty of the effect that the potential disposal of the
Miami Heart Institute could have on MSMC's financial profile and
the potential for new capital expenditures in the near term
preclude an upgrade at this time.

MSMC produced an operating margin of 0.3% and an operating EBITDA
margin of 8.1% in 2009, which have improved further in the six-
month interim period to 1.6% and 9.3%, respectively.  MSMC's
profitability margins for the six-month interim period exceed
Fitch's medians for the 'BBB' category of 1.1% and 8%,
respectively.  Coverage of MADS by operating EBITDA was 1.8x in
fiscal 2009 which is an improvement from 1.0x in the prior year
period.  Through the six months ended June 30, MADS coverage by
operating EBITDA was 2.1x as compared to the 'BBB' category median
of 2.3x.

The improved operating performance is the result of several
management initiatives begun in 2008 which, among others, included
the appointments of a new chief of cardiology, chief of cardiac
surgery and chief of neurosurgery, along with other additions to
the medical staff in key service lines, and the engagement of
consultants to assist management in its expense reduction efforts.
These initiatives have resulted in modest increases in admissions,
solid increases in patient acuity driven by strong cardiac
surgical volumes, and significant growth in outpatient statistics,
with minimal increases in MSMC's operating expenses in 2009, which
Fitch views as a positive rating factor.  Total operating expenses
increased almost 7% between 2007 and 2008, but increased less than
2% between 2008 and 2009, primarily due to strong labor management
with specific focus on reduction of premium pay, contract labor,
and overtime.  For the six-month ended June 30, total operating
expenses have declined approximately 1%.

Fitch's primary credit concerns include the uncertainty
surrounding MSMC's efforts to dispose of the Miami Heart
Institute, an elevated debt burden, and a relatively high average
age plant.  The disposition of the Institute and the related debt
and operating expense associated with the property is a major
credit factor.  The ability of MSMC to generate solid coverage
ratios without the benefit of any additional income from the
Institute is a positive rating factor, but the property has been
for sale since late 2007 and given the severely troubled
commercial real estate market in South Florida, a sale without a
substantial discount seems unlikely.

MSMC's debt burden is elevated as indicated by MADS equating to
4.5% of fiscal 2009 revenues (compared to the 'BBB' median of
3.5%) and debt to capitalization ratio of 81% in 2009 (compared to
the 'BBB' median of 49.1%).  Additionally, MSMC's high average age
of plant at fiscal year end 2009 of 12.4 years (compared to the
median of 10.4 years for the 'BBB' category) may portend a need
for capital reinvestment.

MSMC is a teaching hospital consisting of 955 licensed beds (716
staffed).  It is the only hospital in Miami Beach, FL.  MSMC had
total operating revenue of $511 million in 2009.  The Foundation
has provided an unconditional guaranty on MSMC's outstanding debt.
MSMC covenants to provide annual and quarterly disclosure to
bondholders.  Quarterly disclosure is excellent, and it includes
management discussion and analysis, a balance sheet, income
statement, cash flow statement, and utilization statistics.  MSMC
also conducts quarterly conference calls for investors.



MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class M pass-through certificate from Merrill Lynch
Floating Trust's series 2006-1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrade of class M to 'D (sf)' reflects recurring interest
shortfalls resulting primarily from special servicing fees and
other expenses on the Royal Holiday Portfolio loan.  Class M has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for an extended period
of time.

The Royal Holiday Portfolio loan has a trust balance of
$65.0 million and a whole-loan balance of $103.0 million
(according to the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report).  The
loan is secured by six full-service hotels totaling 1,501 rooms in
various cities in Mexico.  The 60-plus-days delinquent loan was
transferred to the special servicer, CT Investment Management Co.
LLC, on Feb. 11, 2010, due to imminent default.  According to CT,
the properties are currently not generating sufficient cash flow
to pay debt service on the whole-loan balance.  CT has stated that
the resolution timing is uncertain because the borrower has filed
for bankruptcy protection in the U.S. and Mexico.  CT indicated
that it has retained legal counsel to pursue legal remedies under
the loan documents and has ordered updated appraisals.

                         Rating Lowered

                   Merrill Lynch Floating Trust
             Pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                                          Reported
                  Rating              interest shortfalls ($)
                  ------              -----------------------
     Class   To            From       Current   Accumulated
     -----   --            ----       -------   -----------
     M       D (sf)        BB- (sf)    32,120       85,876


MISSISSIPPI HIGHER: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan Bonds and downgrades
the subordinate bonds issued by Mississippi Higher Education
Assistance Corporation - 2004 Master Trust.  The Rating Outlook
remains Stable for the senior bonds, and a Stable Outlook is also
assigned to the subordinate bonds.  Fitch used its 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student Loan ABS
Rating Criteria, as well as the refined basis risk criteria
outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press release 'Fitch to Gauge
Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to review the
ratings.

The ratings on the senior bonds are affirmed based on sufficient
level of credit enhancement, including subordination and projected
minimum excess spread, to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses.  The ratings on the subordinate bonds are downgraded to
'B' due to the level of asset deficiency that may not allow the
trust to pay the bonds in full.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Mississippi Higher Education Assistance Corporation - 2004 Master
Trust:

Series 2004

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

Series 2007

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B-1 downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Stable.


MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-2 Bonds to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Mississippi Home Corp.'s (Providence Place of Senatobia LLC
Apartments Project) multifamily housing revenue bonds series 2007-
2 to 'B-' from 'AAA', and removed it from CreditWatch from
negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market-rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Insufficient assets to cover the bond payments until maturity;
  and

* Revenue fund is projected to fall below investment-grade levels
  in 2014.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the Ginnie Mae permanent loan
  certificates, which S&P considers to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Investments held in an 'AAAm'-rated market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 102.47% as of July 20, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.



MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2008-3 Bonds to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Mississippi Home Corp.'s (Providence Place of Senatobia Apartments
Project) multifamily housing revenue bonds series 2008-3 to 'B'
from 'AAA', and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market-rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Insufficient assets to cover the bond payments until maturity;
  and

* Revenue fund is projected to fall below investment-grade levels
  in 2016.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the Ginnie Mae permanent loan
  certificates, which S&P considers to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Investments held in an 'AAAm'-rated market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 102.84% as of July 20, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2007-5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-5, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. AM, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. AM-FL, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ-FL, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $4.31 billion
from $4.42 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 324 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool.

Ninety-four loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $27.8 million loss (62%
loss severity overall).  Currently 24 loans, representing 24% of
the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Loan
($800.0 million -- 18.6% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $3.0 billion first mortgage loan spread among
five CMBS deals.  The A note had $1.4 billion in mezzanine debt
behind it at securitization.  The loan is secured by two adjacent
multifamily apartment complexes with 11,230 units located on the
east side of Manhattan.  The loan is currently in foreclosure.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $23.7 million
appraisal reduction for five of the specially serviced loans.  The
servicer has not yet recognized an appraisal reduction for the
PCV/ST loan.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eight classes of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-6, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. AM, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. AJ-FL, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $2.13 billion
from $2.15 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 146 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool.

Forty loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Currently 11 loans, representing 15% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Peter
Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Loan ($202.3 million -- 9.5% of the
pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $3.0 billion
first mortgage loan spread among five CMBS deals.  The A note had
$1.4 billion in mezzanine debt behind it at securitization.  The
loan is secured by two adjacent multifamily apartment complexes
with 11,230 units located on the east side of Manhattan.  The loan
is currently in foreclosure.  The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $24.1 million appraisal reduction for six of the
specially serviced loans.  The servicer has not yet recognized an
appraisal reduction for the PCV/ST loan.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-RR6 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed five and downgraded twelve classes of
Certificates issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc 2005-RR6 due
to the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor.  The affirmations are due to pay-down to the senior
Certificates.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. 2005-RR6

  -- Cl. A-2FX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

MSC 2005-RR6 is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (100% of the pool balance).
As of the September 24, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
Certificate balance of the transaction has decreased to
$442.4 million from $564.1 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A1, Class A2-FX and Class A2-FL Certificates
and realized losses to the non-rated Certificates.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,325 compared to 874 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (33.0% compared to 32.1% at last review),
A1-A3 (17.5% compared to 19.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (9.4%
compared to 15.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (8.7% compared to 18.1%
at last review), B1-B3 (12.9% compared to 12.0% at last review),
and Caa1-C (18.5% compared to 2.5% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.5
years compared to 3.2 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 40.6% compared to 39.1% at last review.  The modest incresase
in WARR is due to the tranche thickness of the underlying
collateral pool.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 3.6% compared to 16.1% at last review.
The low MAC is due to greater diversity in the default probability
of collateral concentrated within a small number of collateral
names.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated certificates.
However, in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions
in certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or
more of the other key parameters.  Rated certificates are
particularly sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the recovery
rate assumption down from 40.6% to 30.6% or up to 50.6% would
result in average rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 5
notches downward and 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 13 2004-RR2 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-RR2, a U.S. resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction and the
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral.
S&P's analysis considered its ratings actions on the underlying
CMBS collateral since its last review of MSC 2004-RR2, as well as
its revised credit estimates on a portion of the unrated CMBS
collateral.  Rating actions affected $28.1 million (17.7% of total
asset balance), while revised credit estimates affected another
$42.2 million (26.6% of total asset balance) since S&P's last
review.

According to the Sept. 30, 2010, trustee report, MSC 2004-RR2 is
collateralized by 14 CMBS classes ($158.4 million, 100%) from 12
distinct transactions issued between 1997 and 2000.  The rated
CMBS collateral has a weighted average rating of 'BBB (sf)' and a
rating range of 'AAA (sf)' to 'B+ (sf)'.  S&P's weighted average
credit estimate of the unrated CMBS collateral is 'bb'.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the affirmed ratings.

                        Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-RR2
           Commercial mortgage pass-through securities

                       Class     Rating
                       -----     ------
                       A-2       AAA (sf)
                       B         AA+ (sf)
                       C         AA- (sf)
                       D         A+ (sf)
                       E         A- (sf)
                       F         BBB+ (sf)
                       G         BBB (sf)
                       H         BBB- (sf)
                       J         BB+ (sf)
                       K         BB (sf)
                       L         BB- (sf)
                       M         B (sf)
                       X         AAA (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2007-XLF9 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2007-XLF9, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class L certificate due
to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from special
servicing fees and other expenses on the Hyatt Place Portfolio
loan.  According to the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee remittance report,
class L has experienced interest shortfalls for the past seven
consecutive months.  S&P does not expect the accumulated interest
shortfalls to be recoverable in the near term.

The Hyatt Place Portfolio loan has a trust balance of
$22.0 million and a whole-loan balance of $49.0 million.  The loan
is secured by four Hyatt Place flagged hotels totaling 512 rooms
in Austin, Grand Prairie, Houston, and San Antonio, Texas.  The
nonperforming matured balloon loan was transferred to the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, on Feb. 18,
2010, due to imminent default after the borrower indicated that it
was unable to payoff the loan by its April 9, 2010 maturity.
Berkadia stated that the resolution timing for this loan is
uncertain as the borrower has filed for bankruptcy protection.
According to Berkadia, under the direction of the bankruptcy
court, the borrower will make adequate protection payments
starting in September and has until Oct. 31, 2010, to file a plan
of reorganization.  The updated July 2010 appraisals value the
properties higher than the trust balance.

                         Rating Lowered

                  Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF9

                                             Reported
               Rating                   Interest Shortfalls ($)
               ------                   -----------------------
   Class   To          From             Current    Accumulated
   -----   --          ----             -------    -----------
   L       D (sf)      CCC- (sf)          2,842         30,072


MSC 2007-SRR3: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 17 classes issued by MSC 2007-SRR3 as
a result of significant negative credit migration of the 2006
vintage commercial mortgage backed securities collateral within
the reference portfolio.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2009.  Since that time, approximately 34.7% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and 17.6% is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Approximately 79.2% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 46.9% has a rating in
the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 73.3% and 23.5%,
respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentrated nature, Fitch believes that the
probability of default for all classes of notes can be evaluated
without factoring potential further losses from the non-defaulted
portion of the portfolio.  Therefore this transaction was not
modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model.

For all classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower)
and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (53.36%).
Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement to each class is
well below the percentage of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls.

MSC 2007-SRR3 represents a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction that references a static portfolio
consisting of CMBS (91.5%) and CMBS B-Piece resecuritizations
(8.5%).  The transaction is designed to provide credit protection
for realized losses on a reference portfolio through a credit
default swap between the issuer and the swap counterparty, Morgan
Stanley Capital Services Inc., which is rated 'A/F1' with a Stable
Outlook by Fitch.

Proceeds from the securities are invested in a pool of eligible
investments, which are protected through the total return swap
agreement between the issuer and MSCS, the TRS counterparty.  The
payment obligations of the TRS counterparty are guaranteed by
Morgan Stanley, the swap counterparty guarantor.  As of the Sept.
16, 2010 trustee report, the TRS account is currently invested in
a money market fund.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $28,110,000 Class A Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,055,000 Class B Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,055,000 Class C Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,055,000 Class D Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,055,000 Class E Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,055,000 Class F Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $10,541,250 Class G Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf',
  -- $10,541,250 Class H Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCC'sf;
  -- $10,541,250 Class J Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $10,541,250 Class K Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $15,854,040 Class L Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $9,491,810 Class M Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $4,000,990 Class N Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $3,007,770 Class O Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $3,495,010 Class P Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $2,501,790 Class Q Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $1,499,200 Class R Notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.


MSC 2007-SRR4: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 13 classes issued by MSC 2007-SRR4 as
a result of significant negative credit migration of the 2006
vintage commercial mortgage backed securities collateral within
the reference portfolio.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
October 2009.  Since that time, approximately 32.1% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and 17.4% is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Approximately 96.2% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 46.2% has a rating in
the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 77.7% and 16.3%,
respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Given the
portfolio's concentrated nature, Fitch believes that the
probability of default for all classes of notes can be evaluated
without factoring potential further losses from the non-defaulted
portion of the portfolio.  Therefore this transaction was not
modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model.

For all classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower)
and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (53.36%).
Based on this analysis, the credit enhancement to each class is
well below the percentage of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls.

MSC 2007-SRR4 represents a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction that references a static portfolio
consisting of 67 CMBS assets.  The transaction is designed to
provide credit protection for realized losses on a reference
portfolio through a credit default swap between the issuer and the
swap counterparty, Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc., which is
rated 'A/F1' with a Stable Outlook by Fitch.

Proceeds from the securities are invested in a pool of eligible
investments, which are protected through the total return swap
agreement between the issuer and MSCS, the TRS counterparty.  The
payment obligations of the TRS counterparty are guaranteed by
Morgan Stanley, the swap counterparty guarantor.  As of the Sept.
16, 2010 trustee report, the TRS account is currently invested in
a money market fund.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $13,800,000 class B notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $18,400,000 class C notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $24,150,000 class D notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $14,950,000 class E notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $18,400,000 class F notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $11,500,000 class G notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf';
  -- $16,100,000 class H notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $9,200,000 class J notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $9,200,000 class K notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $4,600,000 class L notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $4,600,000 class M notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $4,600,000 class N notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
  -- $4,600,000 class O notes downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'.


N-STAR REL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded fifteen classes of Notes issued by N-Star
REL CDO VII, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor and an increase in Defaulted
Securities.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-R, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

N-Star Real Estate CDO VIII Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (59.4% of the pool
balance), mezzanine loans (24.1%), CRE CDOs (8.8%), B-Notes
(5.4%) and commercial mortgage backed securities (2.2%).  As of
the September 1, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate par Note
balance of the transaction has decreased to $842.9 million from
$900.0 million at issuance, with the difference due to
(1) $26 million current availability on the A-R Notes and
(2) cancellation of some junior Notes.

There are six assets with par balance of $92.8 million (9.7% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the September 1, 2010 Trustee report.  Three of these assets
(42.4% of the defaulted balance) are either A-Notes or whole
loans, two assets are CRE CDOs (42.2%), and one asset is a B-Notes
(15.3%).  Defaulted Securities that are not CMBS are defined as
assets which are 60 or more days delinquent in their debt service
payment.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM(R) v2.6 as Moody's expect the underlying
non-CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,470 compared to 7,879 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (2.6% compared to 3.4% at last review), A1-
A3 (0.0% compared to 0.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.1%
compared to 0.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (1.9% compared to 2.0%
at last review), B1-B3 (0.7% compared to 17.8% at last review),
and Caa1-C (94.8% compared to 75.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 7.5
years compared to 6.8 years at last review.  The greater WAL
incorporates certain extension of collateral that have occurred
since last review and the ability for the collateral manager to
reinvest for a specific time period.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 29.3% compared to 30.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors due to the
diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the pooled transactions.  Moody's modeled a MAC of
99.9% compared to 16.1% at last review.  The high MAC is due to an
increase in high risk collateral concentrated within a small
number of collateral names.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 29.3% to 20% or up to 40% would result in average rating
movement on the rated tranches of 3 to 5 notches downward and 3 to
5 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


NEVADA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'BB+' from 'AAA' on the Nevada Housing Division's multifamily
housing revenue bonds (Whittell Pointe Apartments) series 2002A
and 2003 and removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where it had been placed on May 12, 2010, based on
S&P's view of the mortgages' reliance on short-term market rate
investments.

"The rating reflects S&P's view of the division's inadequate
assets to cover debt service in the event of a prepayment of the
mortgages in 2015 for the series 2002A and in 2019 for the series
2003; and an asset/liability parity that is projected to fall
below 100% in 2017 for the series 2002A and in 2020 for the series
2003," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Lawrence Witte.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed this and other ratings on certain
housing issues on CreditWatch with negative implications due to
revised criteria for certain federal-government-enhanced housing
transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affects government-enhanced
housing transactions in which funds are invested in money market
funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that the issue is
susceptible to short-term market rate investment income but that
it will perform at the 'B' rating level.


NEWPORT WAVES: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on
Newport Waves CDO, a collateralized debt obligation transaction
referencing a managed portfolio of 116 synthetic corporate and
sovereign credit corporate exposures.

Issuer: Newport Waves CDO

  -- US$32.5M Series 2 $32,500,000 Sub-Class A3-$LMS Notes Due
     2017 Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 11,
     2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- US$10M Series 2 $10,000,000 Sub-Class A3A-$LMS Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- US$38M Series 2 $38,000,000 Sub-Class A4-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- US$1M Series 2 $1,000,000 Sub-Class A4A-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- US$2M Series 2 $2,000,000 Sub-Class A6-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$2M Series 2 $2,000,000 Sub-Class A6A-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$5M Series 2 $5,000,000 Sub-Class A7-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$5M Series 2 $5,000,000 Sub-Class A7A-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$1.5M Series 2 $1,500,000 Sub-Class A7-$LS Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$1.7M Series 2 $1,400,000 Sub-Class A7B-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$5M Series 2 $5,000,000 Sub-Class A7C-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$50M Series 5 $50,000,000 Sub-Class A1-$LMS Notes Due 2014
     Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- JpnY1000M Series 6 Yen1,000,000,000 Sub-Class A6-YL Notes Due
     2017 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$2.4M Series 2 $2,400,000 Sub-Class A7D-$F Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$25M Series 2 $25,000,000 Sub-Class B3-$F Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR10M Series 8 EUR10,000,000 Sub-Class A3-ELS Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- US$10M Series 10 $10,000,000 Sun-Class A5-$L Notes Due 2017
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
a loss of 1.7% of credit enhancement due to credit events, and
active trading on the portfolio referencing senior unsecured
bonds.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio is 463, equivalent to Baa3.  This compares to a 10-year
WARF of 611 from the last rating review.  Since the last rating
action, there have been credit events on Bradford & Bringley BS
and Ambac Assurance.  The CSO notes have a remaining life of 3.7
and 6.7 years and credit enhancement levels ranging from 0.5% to
4.5%.

On August 4, 2009, the Trustee sent a notice to the Noteholders,
the manager and the issuer informing these parties that the
manager received consent to continue trading without consideration
to the Moody's Rating Test.  This information was shared with
Moody's Investors Service on October 9, 2010.  Active trading on
the portfolio of reference obligations not constrained by the
Moody's Rating Tests results in larger volatility in the ratings,
and its effect was taken into consideration in the committee's
final rating decision.

In the process of determining the rating action, Moody's also took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Reference entities lacking outstanding Moody's Ratings -- When
    no rating is outstanding, and when the public information
    available to Moody's is not sufficient to assign a credit
    estimate, Moody's will assume an implied rating (typically
    consistent within the Caa range) for reference entity that
    takes into consideration the uncertainty of limited
    information.  By replacing the assumed rating for these
    referenced obligations with a Baa3 rating, the portfolio
    weighted average modeled rating, the sensitivity analysis
    shows these impact from the base run.

+1 notch: Series 2 A4A-$L, Series 2 A7-$L, Series 2 A7-$LS, Series
2 A7A-$L, Series 2 A7B-$L, Series 2 A7C-$L, Series 2 A7C-$L,
Series 2 A7D-$F, Series 2 B3-$F, Series 10 A5-$L, Series 2 A6-$L,
Series 2 A6A-$L, Series 5 A1-$LMS, Series 6 A6-YL, Series 8 A3-ELS

+2 notches: Series 2 A3A-$LMS, Series 2 A4-$L, Series 2 A3-$LMS

(2) Use of Market Implied Ratings -- MIRs were used in place of
    the corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
    probability of each corporate name in the reference portfolio.
    The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental
    rating is an indicator of the extent of the divergence of
    credit view between Moody's and the market.  This run
    generated a result that was lower than the one modeled under
    the base case.

-4 notches: Series 5 A1-$LMS

-3 notches: Series Series 2 A3A-$LMS, Series 2 A3-$LMS, Series 8
A3-ELS

-2 notches: Series Series 2 A4-$L, Series 2 A4A-$L, Series 10 A5-
$L, Series 2 A6-$L, Series 2 A6A-$L, Series 6 A6-YL

-1 notches: Series 2 A7-$L, Series 2 A7-$LS, Series 2 A7A-$L,
Series 2 A7B-$L, Series 2 A7C-$L, Series 2 A7C-$L, Series 2 A7D-$F

(3) Defaulted all Caa Referenced Entities -- To test the deal
    sensitivity to the lowest rated entities of the portfolio, all
    Caa exposures were ran at Ca.

(4) Removal of forward-looking measures -- The notching adjustment
    on each entity's rating due to watch for downgrade or negative
    outlook was removed, resulting in a positive impact of one
    notch for Series 2 Sub-Class A3A-$LMS and no material impact
    for all the other tranches.

5) Removal of 5% Short Reference Entities -- The reference
    portfolio currently holds a 5% short security bucket which
    currently is carried as a negative weight in the overall
    portfolio.  The model was ran by excluding this short bucket
    resulting in a one notch down from the base case for 10 of the
    11 downgraded tranches: Series 2 Sub-Class A3A-$LMS, Series 2
    Sub-Class A4-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class A4A-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class
    A7-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class A7-$LS, Series 2 Sub-Class A7A-$L,
    Series 2 Sub-Class A7B-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class A7C-$L, Series 2
    Sub-Class A7D-$F, Series 10 Sub-Class A5-$L

(6) Stress on largest industry group -- All entities in the
    Banking, Insurance, Finance and Real Estate industries were
    notched down by one, representing 40% of the portfolio
    notional.  These sensitivity run resulted in the below
    negative impact as compared to the base case.

-2 notches: Series 2 Sub-Class A4-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class A4A-$L,
Series 2 A3-$LMS, Series 2 A6-$L, Series 2 A6A-$L, Series 5 A1-
$LMS, Series 6 A6-YL, Series 8 A3-ELS

-1 notches: Series 2 Sub-Class A3A-$LMS, Series 2 Sub-Class A7-$L,
Series 2 Sub-Class A7-$LS, Series 2 Sub-Class A7A-$L, Series 2
Sub-Class A7B-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class A7C-$L, Series 2 Sub-Class
A7D-$F, Series 10 Sub-Class A5-$L

(7) Reduction of time to maturity -- Time to maturity was reduced
    by one year, all other things being equal.  This sensitivity
    analysis did not impact the tranches downgraded above.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROMv2.6.
This model is available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions
-- Analytical models, upon return of a signed free license
agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done using the CDOROM model.  For a
description of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the
CDOROM user guide on Moody's website.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
Corporate CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference
pool may have leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the
Corporate CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of
volatility.  All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be
higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomic conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent depending on the
expected severity of the worsening conditions.



SAN DIEGO NATURAL: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on 1998 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa2, rating on San
Diego Natural History Museum's Series 1998 Certificates of
Participation issued through the County of San Diego.  The outlook
remains negative given considerably weak, although improved,
operating performance, extremely limited liquidity and reliance on
a conditional donor pledge to pay for debt service.  Moody's note
the legal security is relatively weak, with no mortgage or deed of
trust on the land or building occupied by the Museum as the
property is owned by the City of San Diego.

Legal Security: The payments on the certificates of participation
are secured by the general obligation of the Museum, with a
security interest in gross revenues, as defined in the sublease
agreement.  There is a debt service reserve fund.  There is no
mortgage or deed of trust on the land or building occupied by the
Museum.

Debt-Related Derivatives: none

                            Challenges

* Moody's believes the Museum's financial position remains weak.
  The Museum had heavily relied on a $2 million operation line to
  meet cash flow needs.  The line officially expired in October
  2009 and was frozen following a $2 million draw.  However, the
  Museum has continued to negotiate extensions of the line's
  termination date (currently extension to November 1, 2010), as
  termination would require repayment of the outstanding draw of
  $1.1 million.  At this time, the Museum has committed to $50,000
  monthly principal payments to repay the line.  Moody's notes the
  FY2010 audit states there is a provision within the extension
  requiring that 50% of any unrestricted contribution over
  $750,000 must be paid toward principal repayment of the line.
  Thus, should there be any major donations received, the
  repayment of the outstanding balance under the bank line will
  likely have preferential claim over the outstanding bonds.

* Given historically limited cash position and now no access to an
  operating line, the Museum's liquidity remains an ongoing
  concern as the Museum held a limited $794,000 in unrestricted
  monthly liquidity as of June 30, 2010, which translated into
  only 22 days monthly days cash on hand (days cash on hand from
  investment liquid within one month).  Operation cash flow
  projections show very lean operations, with unrestricted cash
  projected to drop to less than $100,000 in November 2010,
  followed by expected good gift revenues in December 2010.
  Throughout the projection, the Museum projects maintenance of
  current visitor levels of approximately 70,000 per month.
  Should the Museum be unable to meet these projections,
  operations could be severely hampered given this thin cash
  position.

* Although improving from prior years, operating margin remained
  very weak at negative 10.9% in FY2010, by Moody's calculation.
  Operation cash flow was positive at 6.7% but did not provide
  full coverage of debt service.  Debt service on the outstanding
  1998 COP is being serviced by a foundation that is a long time
  supporter of the Museum.  The Foundation has provided a
  provisional six-year pledge, starting in 2009, to pay for debt
  service, contingent upon the Museum's financial performance.  To
  date, the Foundation has provided funds for the January and July
  2010 debt service payments, one month in advance of the payment
  dates.  Although Moody's notes the significance of this
  commitment to fund bond payments, the conditionality of the
  pledge is a major risk.  Should the Foundation terminate the
  pledge, Moody's remains concerned that the Museum's financial
  operations and ability to pay debt service would be severely
  hampered.

* At the end of FY2010, the Museum maintained a limited $7 million
  of investments, with the majority of investments permanently
  restricted and, therefore, not available to certificate holders.
  The Museum experienced a 16% positive return in FY2010.  The
  current asset allocation of the endowment is 57% domestic
  equities, 14% international equities and 26% fixed income.

                            Strengths

* Although attendance has been lower than expected, management
  notes the Museum has not lost market share.  The Museum recently
  opened a new 3D theater which has been helping to maintain
  visitor-ship levels at approximately 70,000 visitors a quarter
  from September 2009 to June 2010.

* Although the operating margin, by Moody's calculation, remained
  very weak, management was able to implement several major
  expenditure reductions for the FY2010 budget including the
  elimination of 15 positions, ending the 401(K) match to
  employees and implementing mandatory salary reductions.  For the
  2011 budget, additional expenditure cuts are expected to produce
  a $1.7 million savings, resulting in an $500,000 surplus, on a
  cash-basis.

* The Museum receives annual support of approximately $300,000
  from the City of San Diego through tourism related sales tax
  revenues and $100,000 from the County of San Diego through
  discretionary funds.  Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the City
  or County will provide extraordinary support to the Museum,
  consistent with no such support provided in recent years.
  Unexpected extraordinary support from the City or County could
  significantly impact the rating positively.

                             Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's ongoing concerns about
financial operations of the Museum very limited cash flow to meet
monthly expenditures.  The outlook also incorporates uncertainty
surrounding the Museum's ability to negotiate a favorable
repayment plan for the Museum's outstanding operating line of
credit.

                What could change the rating -- Up

Robust growth in financial resources and liquidity, coupled with
trend of more stabilized and balanced operating performance with
no reliance on operating lines

               What could change the rating -- Down

* Continued shortfalls in operating performance or attendance

* Key Indicators (Fiscal year 2010 audited financial data at
  6/30/2010)

* Total Direct Debt: $15.1 million

* Total Cash and Investments: $9.5 million

* Total Financial Resources: $10.6 million

* Expendable Financial Resources: - $485,000

* Expendable Resources to Debt: -0.03 times

* Expendable Resources to Operations: - 0.03 times

* Operating Margin: -10.9%

* Operating Cash Flow Margin: -6.7%

* Monthly Liquidity: $794,000

* Monthly Days Cash: 64 monthly days

Rated Debt:

* Series 1998 Certificates of Participation: Caa2

The last rating action with respect to San Diego Natural History
Museum was on December 10, 2009 when the rating was downgraded to
Caa2 from B1 rating and the outlook was revised to negative from
stable.  That rating was subsequently recalibrated Caa2 on May 7,
2010.


STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on the notes issued by Strata Trust Series 27 and Strata
2006-33 Ltd., two synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

The withdrawals follow the complete redemption of the notes,
pursuant to the termination notice dated March 29, 2010.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                     Strata Trust Series 27
                         Series 2006-27

                               Rating
                               ------
                    Class    To      From
                    -----    --      ----
                    Notes    NR      CCC- (sf)


                       Strata 2006-33 Ltd.
                         Series 2006-33

                               Rating
                               ------
                    Class    To      From
                    -----    --      ----
                    Notes    NR      CCC- (sf)


SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Keeps CCCsf Ratings on Class M-1 & M-2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these seven classes of floating- and
fixed-rated secured notes issued by SVG Diamond Private Equity II
plc, a securitization of existing limited partnership interests
and future commitments to private equity funds, which is managed
by SVG Advisers Ltd.:

  -- EUR55,000,000 class A-1, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $71,600,000 class A-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- EUR76,500,000 class B-1, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at
     'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40,000,000 class B-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,800,000 class C, due February 1, 2024: affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- EUR43,000,000 class M-1, Feb. 1, 2024, remains at 'CCCsf';

  -- $20,300,000 class M-2, due Feb. 1, 2024, remains at 'CCCsf'.

The affirmations reflect the increased net asset value since
Fitch's last review in May 2009.  Specifically, between September
2009 and July 2010, the market value of SVG II's net assets
increased by 13.8% to EUR398.1 million from EUR349.7 million, as
the overall private equity market rebounded following cost cutting
and balance sheet strengthening of underlying portfolio companies.
During the same time period, distributions to SVG II from
underlying investments increased 108% as exit activity of
portfolio companies increased.  The improvement in NAV is
counterbalanced by SVG II's current liquidity shortfall as well as
the fundamental risks of private equity as an asset class, which
include valuation volatility and uncertain cash flow timing and
deal activity.

With respect to liquidity, SVG II currently maintains cash and
liquidity facility assets of EUR146.62 million relative to an
unfunded commitment balance of EUR195.32 million, or a shortfall
of EUR48.70 million.  This shortfall does not pose immediate
credit concern given the slow rate at which unfunded commitments
are currently being drawn by underlying funds, as well as the
potential for additional cash generation through distributions on
existing investments.  That said, Fitch will continue to monitor
SVG II's cash position going forward to determine if ratings on
any of the above-referenced notes could be affected due to
increased capital call activity and/or weak distribution
performance.  Due to a decline in NAV, SVG II entered into an
Early Amortization Erosion Event in March 2009 whereby the re-
investment period was terminated prior to its scheduled date of
March 2011.

The ratings on the notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive timely payment of interest on the classes A and B
notes, ultimate payment of interest on the classes C and M notes
and ultimate repayment of principal on all classes of notes.  A
third-party liquidity facility has been structured to ensure
timely payment of interest and expenses on the class A and B
notes.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in criteria report
entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated March 26, 2010,
Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG II
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble), when
venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases and
suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, the index
data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.
Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base case loss assumption of approximately 25% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 50% for buyout
funds and approximately 40% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains (or
losses) from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and adjust
its base case loss assumptions accordingly.

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity investments
and the impact these have on SVG II's overall NAV and liquidity
relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings may be
influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are drawn,
the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private equity
investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and Fitch's
assessment of how these factors may influence performance for a
given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

SVG II is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and new commitments to private equity funds.  As of
July 30, 2010, approximately 84% of the portfolio was invested in
buy-out funds while 13% was invested in mezzanine-focused funds
and 3% was invested in venture capital funds.  The transaction was
invested in 75 funds managed by 55 managers, with vintages ranging
from 1976-2008, and over 78% invested in funds of a 2005 or later
vintage.  As of the same date, the portfolio was meeting all of
its diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to individual
managers, funds, vintages and currencies.  The class A notes
currently have 71% credit enhancement in the form of subordination
which would cover the transaction's exposure to the largest 19
fund managers, the largest 19 individual funds or all of the funds
of 2006 and later vintages.  The class M notes currently have 19%
credit enhancement in the form of subordination which would cover
the transaction's exposure to investments in the largest three
fund managers, the largest individual three fund investments, or
the majority of the fund investments of the 2007-2008 vintages.

SVG II is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.  Headquartered in London
with offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SVG Capital plc.  Established in 2001, SVG is a
global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of March 31, 2010, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of EUR3.7 billion.  SVG has
66 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S. SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


SVG DIAMOND: Fitch Keeps Bsf Ratings on Class M1 & M2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these seven classes of floating- and
fixed-rated secured notes issued by SVG Diamond Private Equity
plc, a securitization of existing limited partnership interests
and future commitments to private equity funds, which is managed
by SVG Advisers Ltd.:

  -- EUR40,000,000 class A1, due March 19, 2026, at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $55,000,000 class A2, due March 19, 2026, at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- EUR58,500,000 class B1, March 19, 2026 at 'Asf', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $26,300,000 class B2, due March 19, 2026, at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- EUR15,000,000 class C, due March 19, 2026: at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- EUR40,000,000 class M1, due March 19, 2026, at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $49,000,000 class M2, due March 19, 2026, at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

The affirmations reflect increased net asset value since Fitch's
last review in May 2009, as well as adequate near-term liquidity
relative to unfunded commitments.  Between September 2009 and June
2010, the market value of SVG's net assets increased by 17% to
EUR418.56 million from EUR357.96 million, as the overall private
equity market rebounded following cost cutting and balance sheet
strengthening of underlying portfolio companies.  During the same
time period, distributions to SVG from underlying investments also
increased by 129% as exit activity of underlying portfolio
companies increased.  SVG currently has unfunded commitments of
EUR180.44 million, covered by cash and liquidity facilities
totalling EUR188.77 million.  Based on the status of certain
transaction compliance tests, SVG does not currently have the
ability to fund new commitments prior to the end of the
transaction's re-investment period in September 2011, but may fund
existing commitments.  These improvements in NAV and liquidity,
while positive, are counterbalanced by the fundamental risks of
private equity as an asset class, which include valuation
volatility and uncertain cashflow timing and deal activity.

The ratings assigned to the class A, B and C notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive timely payment of interest
and ultimate repayment of principal.  The ratings assigned to the
class M notes address the likelihood that investors will receive
ultimate payment of interest and principal.  A third-party
liquidity facility has been structured to ensure timely payment of
transaction expenses and interest on the class A, B and C notes.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated March 26,
2010, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the SVG
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
The index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, these
index data included the 2005-2007 time period, when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base-line loss assumption of approximately 22% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 50% for buyout
funds and approximately 40% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains or
losses from portfolio investments on an ongoing basis and adjust
its base case loss assumptions accordingly.

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity fund
investments and the impact these have on SVG's overall NAV and
liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore, ratings
may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded commitments are
drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on existing private
equity investments are realized, overall economic conditions, and
Fitch's assessment of how these factors may influence performance
for a given point in time as well as on a going-forward basis.  A
material adverse deviation from Fitch guidelines for any key
rating driver could cause the rating to be lowered by Fitch.  For
additional information about Fitch ratings guidelines for market
value structures, please review the criteria referenced below,
which can be found on Fitch's website.

SVG is a securitization of existing limited partnership interests
and new commitments to private equity funds.  As of June 30, 2010,
approximately 98% of the portfolio was invested in buy-out funds
while the remaining 2% was invested in venture capital funds.  The
transaction was invested in 63 funds managed by 42 managers, with
fund vintages ranging from 1993-2008, and over 50% invested in
funds of a 2005 or later vintage.  As of the same date, the
portfolio was meeting all of its diversification guidelines in
terms of exposure to individual managers, funds, vintages and
currencies.  The class A notes currently have 80% credit
enhancement in the form of subordination which would cover the
transaction's exposure to investments in the largest 31 fund
managers, the largest individual 20 fund investments, or all funds
of the 2001-2008 vintages.  The class M notes currently have 38%
credit enhancement in the form of subordination which would cover
the transaction's exposure to investments in the largest seven
fund managers, the largest individual 10 fund investments, or the
majority of fund investments of the 2006-2008 vintages.

SVG is managed by SVG Advisers Ltd.  Headquartered in London with
offices in Boston, MA and Singapore, SVG is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SVG Capital plc.  Established in 2001, SVG is a
global alternative asset manager focused exclusively on private
equity investments.  As of March 31, 2010, SVG had private equity
funds under management and commitments of EUR3.7 billion.  SVG has
66 employees including 16 investment professionals with over 100
years of total private equity experience.  SVG is authorized and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in the UK and is a
registered broker-dealer and a member of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. in the U.S. SVG is also registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


TENZING CFO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these six classes of floating- and
fixed-rated notes issued by Tenzing CFO, S.A., a securitization of
existing limited partnership interests and future commitments to
private equity funds, which is managed by Vedanta Capital:

  -- $55,000,000 class A affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;

  -- $16,000,000 class B1 affirmed at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

  -- EUR21,000,000 class B2 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33,000,000 class C affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $8,500,000 class D1 remain at 'CCCsf';

  -- EUR10,000,000 class D2 remain at 'CCCsf'.

The affirmations reflect increased net asset value since Fitch's
last review in May 2009 and adequate near-term liquidity relative
to unfunded commitments.  Since September 2009, Tenzing's NAV has
increased by 9% to $196.6 million from $180.4 million, as the
overall private equity market rebounded following cost cutting and
balance sheet strengthening of underlying portfolio companies.
During the same time period, distributions to Tenzing from
underlying investments also increased moderately.  Tenzing
currently has unfunded commitments of $51.6 million, covered by
cash and liquidity facilities totaling $92.7 million.  These
improvements in NAV and liquidity, while positive, are
counterbalanced by the fundamental risks of private equity as an
asset class, which include valuation volatility and uncertain cash
flow timing and deal activity.

The ratings on the notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive timely payment of interest on the class A, ultimate
payment of interest on classes B, C and D notes, and ultimate
repayment of principal on all classes of notes.  A third-party
liquidity facility has been structured to ensure timely payment of
interest and expenses on all classes of notes, with the exception
of class E, which is not rated by Fitch.

In addition to the analytical approach outlined in the criteria
report entitled 'Rating Market Value Structures' dated March 26,
2010, Fitch undertook additional analysis specific to the Tenzing
transaction and its underlying collateral.  Specifically, Fitch's
loss assumptions were based on historically observed peak-to-
trough losses from venture capital and buyout valuation indices.
These index data included the 2000-2002 time period (tech bubble),
when venture capital had significantly higher valuation increases
and suffered material subsequent losses.  For buyout funds, the
index data included the 2005-2007 time period when leverage and
valuations for buyout transactions increased significantly leading
up to the financial crisis, and were subsequently followed by
material mark-to-market losses during the 2007-2009 time period.

Based on observed historical price declines, as well as the
transaction's portfolio composition and vintage diversification, a
base case loss assumption of approximately 25% was applied to all
classes of notes and subtracted from their current levels of
credit enhancement.  The remaining credit enhancement was then
compared to different rating stresses to determine the
appropriateness of existing ratings.  For example, at a 'BBB'
stress level, Fitch assumed a loss of approximately 50% for buyout
funds and approximately 40% for venture capital funds originated
in 2005 and later.  The loss assumptions were increased
(decreased) from these levels when evaluating higher (lower) rated
securities.  Going forward, Fitch will track actual gains (or
losses) on an ongoing basis and adjust its base case loss
assumptions accordingly.

Going forward, the assigned ratings may be sensitive to material
changes in the values of the underlying private equity
investments, and the impact these have on Tenzing's overall NAV
and liquidity relative to the rated liabilities.  Furthermore,
ratings may be influenced by the rate at which unfunded
commitments are drawn, the rate at which gains (or losses) on
existing private equity investments are realized, overall economic
conditions, and Fitch's assessment of how these factors may
influence performance for a given point in time as well as on a
going-forward basis.  A material adverse deviation from Fitch
guidelines for any key rating driver could cause the rating to be
lowered by Fitch.  For additional information about Fitch ratings
guidelines for market value structures, please review the criteria
referenced below, which can be found on Fitch's website.

Tenzing is a securitization of existing limited partnership
interests and new commitments to private equity funds.  As of June
22, 2010, approximately 59% of the portfolio was invested in buy-
out funds while the remaining 41% was invested in venture capital
funds.  The transaction was invested in 37 funds, with vintages
ranging from 1992-2010, and over 65% invested in funds of a 2005
or later vintage.  As of the same date, the portfolio was meeting
all of its diversification guidelines in terms of exposure to
individual vintages and fund types.  The class A notes currently
have 72% credit enhancement in the form of subordination which
would cover the transaction's total investment exposure (including
commitments) to the largest five individual funds or all of the
funds of the 2005-2010 vintages.  The class D notes currently have
24% credit enhancement in the form of subordination which would
cover the transaction's exposure to largest individual fund or
most of the exposure to the 2007-2010 vintages.

Tenzing is managed by Vedanta Capital (Vedanta).  Headquartered in
New York, NY, Vedanta was established in 2006 as a private equity
specialist firm focused on technology-based investments.  As of
June 30, 2010, Vedanta managed approximately $600 million in total
commitments and employed 14 professionals.


TRAVIS COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the underlying rating of
Travis County (Texas) Housing Finance Corporation Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (Park at Wells Branch Apartments Project)
Series 2002A to B2 from Ba3 and affirmed the Ca rating on
Subordinate Series 2002C.  The rating downgrade is based on
declining debt service coverage ratios of both bond series and the
near depletion of the replacement reserve fund.  The outlook on
both series has been revised to negative from stable as a result
of the negative trends in debt service coverage levels and
occupancy.

The Series 2002B bonds have matured and the Junior Subordinate
Series 2002D bonds are not rated.  The Series 2002A bonds continue
to be insured by National Public Finance Guarantee (formerly MBIA)
and carry National's financial strength rating (Baa1, Developing).
The Subordinate Series 2002C bonds are not insured.

Built in 1987, Park at Wells Branch is a 304-unit apartment
complex composed of 18 apartment buildings, and is located in the
northern section of the Austin metropolitan area in Travis County,
Texas.  Community Housing Corporation of America, Inc., is the
owner of the property and Shelter Corporation is the property
manager.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.  Funds are pledged first to the payment of the
principal and interest due on the Series 2002A bonds, then to the
principal and interest due on the Series 2002C bonds, and last, to
the principal and interest due on the Series 2002D bonds.  The
Indenture provides for a Debt Service Reserve Fund for each series
of bonds.  As of September, 2010, the Trustee reports that only
the Debt Service Reserve Fund for Series 2002A bonds remains fully
funded at the maximum annual debt service on the Series 2002A
bonds.  The 2002C Debt Service Reserve Fund has been depleted.

Interest Rate Derivatives: none

                       Recent Developments

The property has been experiencing financial difficulties since
2003, largely due to the weakness of the Austin multifamily rental
market.  Occupancy rates fell during that time to as low as 80%
and the property offered substantial concessions to tenants.  The
ensuing reduction in rental revenues caused the property's
financial performance to deteriorate.  In 2004, the Series 2002C
Debt Service Reserve Fund was tapped to make the June 2004 debt
service payment on Series 2002C bonds.  The Series 2002C bonds
have defaulted on each interest payment date since June 2005.

Debt service coverage ratios derived from 2009 audited financial
statements and calculated net of National's insurance fee have
deteriorated to 1.03x from 1.12x (2008) for 2002A and to 0.92x
from 0.99x (2008) for 2002C.  The declining levels of debt service
coverage may be attributed to stiff competition from newer
properties causing the need to increase concessions as occupancy
fell from 94% in 2009 to a current low of 88% as of August 2010.
To increase curb appeal, CHC is investing $75,000 in new
appliances and is in the process of completing the installation of
wi-fi.

CB Richard Ellis forecasts a decline in rent of 4.3% in 2010 but a
modest increase of 2.1% in 2011 for the Far North Austin
submarket.  Occupancy in this submarket is forecasted to improve
slightly from 94.4% in 2010 to 95.7% in 2011.

Credit Strengths:

* CHC has been making contributions to the property since 2003.
  Significant amounts were contributed in 2007 to fund working
  capital and debt service requirements and CHC is planning to
  invest $75,000 to upgrade appliances and increase curb appeal.

* Series 2002A Reserves: Fund balances provided to Moody's by the
  Trustee show the Series 2002A Debt Service Reserve Fund remains
  fully funded.

Credit Challenges:

* Series 2002C Reserves: Fund balances provided to Moody's by the
  Trustee show that the Series 2002C Debt Service Reserve Fund has
  been depleted.

* Local Multifamily Rental Market: Though the demand for
  affordable multifamily housing has strengthened in the Austin
  market since 2005, the future performance of the property
  remains linked to the strength of the market.  Strong market
  demand and high occupancy rates are necessary for the property
  to regain financial solvency.

                             Outlook

The outlook on both series has been revised to negative from
stable.  The negative outlook is a result of the negative trends
in debt service coverage levels and occupancy.

                What could change the rating -- Up

* Consistent debt service payments on the Series 2002C bonds
* Replenishing the Series 2002C Debt Service Reserve Fund
* Reduced reliance on CHC contributions

               What could change the rating -- Down

* Drawing on the Series 2002A Debt Service Reserve Fund

* Low occupancy rates resulting in debt service coverage
  deterioration

The last rating action was taken on April 1, 2010, when the
ratings and outlook on Travis County Housing Finance Corporation
Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (Park at Wells Branch Apartments
Project) Series 2002A and Series 2002C were affirmed based on 2008
audited financials.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2005-C22 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed ten classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C22 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jan. 13, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $2.4 billion
from $2.5 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 144 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34%
of the pool.  Two loans, representing less than 1% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review was also represented by two
loans, representing less than 1% of the pool.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization..
Currently 13 loans, representing 17% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $65.3 million appraisal reduction for seven of the
specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, interest shortfalls
totaling $2.6 million have reached Class M.  Moody's anticipates
that the pool will continue to experience future interest
shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially serviced
loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-C30 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 10 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C30, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-5, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-MFL, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $7.85 billion
from $7.90 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 262 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool.

Eighty-one loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the trust since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $23.4 million loss (77%
loss severity on average).  Currently 18 loans, representing 24%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant (PCV/ST)
loan ($1.50 billion -- 19.1% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $3.0 billion first mortgage loan spread among
five CMBS deals.  The A note had $1.4 billion in mezzanine debt
behind it at securitization.  The loan is secured by two adjacent
multifamily apartment complexes with 11,230 units located on the
east side of Manhattan.  The loan is currently in foreclosure.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $73.2 million
appraisal reduction for 13 of the specially serviced loans.  An
appraisal reduction has not yet been recognized for the PCV/ST
loan.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-C31 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C31, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on May 29, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on May 29, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5FL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on May 29, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on May 29, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 3, 2009.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $5.80 billion
from $5.85 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 193 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool.

Fifty-five loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust since securitization,
resulting in a $1.7 million loss (32% loss severity).  Currently
22 loans, representing 26% of the pool, are in special servicing.
Three of the pool's top five loans are in special servicing,
including the Beacon D.C.  & Seattle Pool loan ($414.0 million --
7.1%), the 666 Fifth Avenue loan ($395.0 million -- 6.8%) and the
Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Loan ($247.7 million -- 4.3%
of the pool).  The master servicer has not recognized appraisal
reductions for the largest specially serviced loans but has
recognized an aggregate $211.9 million appraisal reduction for 19
specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 62 Subprime RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 62 U.S. subprime
fixed-rate second lien and 13 U.S. variable-rate home equity line
of credit RMBS transactions.  In addition, a summary of the
mortgage pool and bond analysis can be found by performing a title
search for 'RMBS Loss Metrics.'

Fitch's rating actions are:

  -- 651 affirmed classes;
  -- 58 downgraded classes;
  -- Seven withdrawn classes.

Fitch does not use its ResiLogic model to determine mortgage pool
loss projections for second lien and HELOC pools because updated
loan level mortgage data is generally not available for these
transactions in LoanPerformance.  Fitch instead uses historical
roll-rate behavior to project future defaults and assumes 100%
loss severity on defaulted loans.  Fitch then uses its standard
cash flow assumptions, which are described in the April 28 report
'U.S. RMBS Surveillance Criteria'.

On average, Fitch's projected mortgage pool loss assumptions as a
percentage of the initial pool balance (shown below) have not
changed materially since its prior review.  However, some
transactions experienced faster-than-expected deterioration which
resulted in rating downgrades.  Though some transactions have
performed better-than-expected since the last rating review, Fitch
did not upgrade these transactions due to the overall volatility
of the collateral performance and the remaining risk in the
housing market.  Classes currently rated 'B-' or higher that Fitch
may upgrade in the future (if current pool-specific trends
continue) were assigned a Positive Rating Outlook.

Subprime Fixed-Rate Closed-End Second Lien Transactions (projected
loss as % of original balance):

  -- Vintages prior to 2005: 1%;
  -- 2005 vintage: 26%;
  -- 2006 vintage: 57%;
  -- 2007 vintage: 64%.

Variable-Rate HELOC Transactions (projected loss as % of original
balance):

  -- Vintages prior to 2005: 2%;
  -- 2005 vintage: 13%;
  -- 2006 vintage: 18%.

The weaker performance of the closed-end second lien transactions
relative to the HELOC transactions can be explained by the credit
profile of the borrowers.  The closed-end second mortgage pools
reviewed generally had initial weighted average credit scores
between 640 and 700.  The HELOC mortgage pools generally had
weighted average credit scores above 700.  Additionally, the
initial weighted average combined loan-to-value of the closed-end
second mortgage pools reviewed was generally close to 100%.  The
HELOC mortgage pools reviewed generally had weighted average
combined LTVs of approximately 85%.  Furthermore, closed-end
seconds were generally used to fund borrower down payments.  This
significantly raises the likelihood of default.

Declines in home prices since the date of loan origination have
resulted in negative home equity for most second-lien and HELOC
borrowers.  Prior to the start of national home price declines in
the middle of 2006, closed-end second lien transactions benefited
from rapid voluntary prepayments which helped to protect senior
classes of transactions issued prior to 2006 through principal
distribution and credit enhancement deleveraging.  Of the 103
Fitch-rated senior classes issued prior to 2006, 71 have paid in
full and only nine are expected to default.  In comparison, of the
63 Fitch-rated senior classes issued in 2006 and 2007, only 14 are
PIF, and 44 have defaulted or are expected to default in the
future.  This contrasts with HELOC senior classes where only three
are expected to default.

Fitch withdrew ratings for these two classes based on its policy
for interest-only and prepayment penalty classes, which is
described in detail in Fitch's June 23 press release, 'Fitch
Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-Payment Related Structured
Finance Securities'.

  -- CSFB HEMT 2005-3 class P;
  -- CWABS 2002-S4 class A-IO.

In addition, Fitch affirmed and withdrew the 'Dsf/RR6' ratings for
SACO 2005-10 Group 1 because all of the remaining rated classes in
the transaction have been completely written off.


* S&P Affirms Ratings on 41 Certs. From Four RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 41
classes of certificates from four U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transactions.

The affirmations reflect S&P's assessment of the credit
enhancement available to the underlying certificates, which in
S&P's opinion is sufficient to maintain the current ratings on the
re-REMIC classes.  In addition, certain re-REMIC classes may also
benefit from support classes within the re-REMIC transaction.

When performing its analysis on the re-REMIC classes, S&P applied
its loss projections to the underlying collateral in order to
identify the magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed
through to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally, S&P's
projected losses depend on the related underlying collateral type.
S&P then stressed these loss projections at various rating
categories in order to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could
withstand such stressed losses associated with their current
ratings.

Generally, the underlying collateral consists of 2005-2007 vintage
prime, subprime, and Alternative-A loans, which back the
applicable classes that contribute to the re-REMICs.  The
performance of this collateral has generally declined in recent
years.  As a result, over the past several years, S&P has revised
its RMBS default and loss assumptions, and consequently its
projected losses, to reflect its view of the continuing decline in
mortgage loan performance.  The performance deterioration of most
U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                        Ratings Affirmed

           Greenwich Structured ARM Products CI 2005-5
                          Series 2005-5

                Class      CUSIP       Rating
                -----      -----       ------
                N-2        39700VAB8   BBB- (sf)
                N-3        39700WAA8   BB (sf)

                    Picard Funding 1 Limited
                            Series 1

                Class                  Rating
                -----                  ------
                E                      A (sf)
                H                      BBB (sf)
                I                      BBB- (sf)
                G                      BBB+ (sf)
                K                      BB (sf)
                M                      B (sf)
                L                      BB- (sf)
                B                      AA (sf)
                J                      BB+ (sf)
                A                      AAA (sf)
                F                      A- (sf)
                D                      A+ (sf)
                C                      AA- (sf)

                    Picard Funding 3 Limited
                            Series 3

                Class                  Rating
                -----                  ------
                B                      AA (sf)
                H                      BBB (sf)
                I                      BBB- (sf)
                E                      A (sf)
                F                      A- (sf)
                G                      BBB+ (sf)
                C                      AA- (sf)
                D                      A+ (sf)
                J                      BB+ (sf)
                K                      BB (sf)
                A                      AAA (sf)
                M                      B- (sf)
                L                      BB- (sf)

                    Picard Funding 5 Limited
                            Series 5

                Class                  Rating
                -----                  ------
                E                      A (sf)
                C                      AA- (sf)
                F                      A- (sf)
                H                      BBB (sf)
                K                      BB (sf)
                G                      BBB+ (sf)
                J                      BB+ (sf)
                A                      AAA (sf)
                B                      AA (sf)
                M                      B- (sf)
                I                      BBB- (sf)
                D                      A+ (sf)
                L                      BB- (sf)


* S&P Cuts Rating on Portland, Oregon's 1998A Bonds to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on City of
Portland, Oregon's multifamily housing revenue bonds, series 1998A
(Yards at Union Station Project) to 'BB+' from 'AAA' based on its
view of the project's reliance on short-term market rate
investments.  Standard & Poor's also removed the rating from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where it had been placed
May 12, 2010.

Standard & Poor's had included the rating with certain other
housing issues ratings in the CreditWatch placement due to revised
criteria for certain federal government-enhanced housing
transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-enhanced
housing transactions where funds are invested in money market
funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on S&P's current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  "S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Michael Stock.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches From Eight CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
tranches from eight synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on two
tranches from one U.S. synthetic CDO.  S&P removed all the lowered
and affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades are from synthetic CDOs that experienced downward
rating migration in their underlying reference portfolios and had
synthetic rated overcollateralization ratios below 100% as of
S&P's September review and at its projection of the SROC ratios in
90 days, assuming no credit migration.  The two affirmations
reflect SROCs that were at or above 100% at their current rating
levels.

One of the downgraded tranches is from a corporate-backed
synthetic CDO.  Nine tranches are from six synthetic CDOs backed
by commercial mortgage-backed securities.  One tranche is from one
synthetic CDO backed by residential mortgage-backed securities.

                         Rating Actions

                  Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-3 Ltd.

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     A-1F                    CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Neg
     A-1L                    CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Neg

                            HARBOR SPC
                          Series 2006-2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     A                       CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Neg

                   Landgrove Synthetic CDO SPC
                          Series 2007-2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     7A2 Sr                  CCC- (sf)      B- (sf)/Watch Neg

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                          Series 2007-5

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     2007-5                  CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

                     Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                          Series 2007-8

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     Senior                  BB- (sf)       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
     A2                      CCC (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

                    Rutland Rated Investments
                           Series 14

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     Series 14               CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

                             SPGS SPC
                         MSC 2006-SRR1-A2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     A2                      B (sf)         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
     A2-S                    B (sf)         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

                             SPGS SPC
                         MSC 2006-SRR1-B

                                  Rating
                                  ------
   Class                   To            From
   -----                   --            ----
   B                       CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   B-S                     CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

   SPGS SPC, acting for the account of MSC 2006-SRR2 Segregated
                            Portfolio

                                    Rating
                                    ------
     Class                   To            From
     -----                   --            ----
     A-1                     B (sf)         B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches From Three CDO CMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
tranches from three U.S. collateralized debt obligation of
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.  The downgraded tranches have a
total issuance amount of $742.4 million.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 15 tranches from four transactions and
removed seven of them from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
securities.  The affirmations reflect current credit support
levels that S&P believes are sufficient to maintain the current
ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                Rating
                                ------
  Transaction      Class    To            From
  -----------      -----    --            ----
  G-Star 2002-2    A-1MM-a  AAA/A-1 (sf)  AAA/A-1 (sf) /Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    A-1MM-b  AAA/A-1 (sf)  AAA/A-1 (sf) /Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    A-2      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    A-3      AA (sf)       AAA (sf) /Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    BFL      BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    BFX      BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-2    C        BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf) /Watch Neg
  Lenox St 2007-1  A        CCC- (sf)     B- (sf) /Watch Neg
  Lenox St 2007-1  B        D (sf)        CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
  Lenox St 2007-1  C        CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Lenox St 2007-1  D        CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   A        A+ (sf)       AA (sf) /Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   B        BBB+ (sf)     A (sf) /Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   C        BB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   D-FL     B (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   D-FX     B (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   E-FL     CCC (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   E-FX     CCC (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   E-FXD    CCC (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   F-FL     CC (sf)       CCC- (sf) /Watch Neg
  LNR CDO 2002-1   F-FX     CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
  TIAA Real Estate II-FL    AA (sf)       AA (sf) /Watch Neg
    CDO 2002-1
  TIAA Real Estate II-FX    AA (sf)       AA (sf) /Watch Neg
    CDO 2002-1
  TIAA Real Estate III      BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf) /Watch Neg
    CDO 2002-1
  TIAA Real Estate IV       BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf) /Watch Neg
    CDO 2002-1

                        Ratings Affirmed

           Transaction                   Class   Rating
           -----------                   -----   ------
           Lenox Street 2007-1           E       CC (sf)
           Lenox Street 2007-1           F       CC (sf)
           Lenox Street 2007-1           G       CC (sf)
           Lenox Street 2007-1           H       CC (sf)
           Lenox Street 2007-1           J       CC (sf)
           LNR CDO 2002-1                G       CC (sf)
           LNR CDO 2002-1                H       CC (sf)
           TIAA Real Estate CDO 2002-1   I       AAA (sf)


* S&P Junks Rating on Orange County's 1999A Housing Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'CCC' from 'AAA' on Orange County Housing Finance Authority (Park
Avenue Villas Project), Fla.'s series 1999A multifamily housing
revenue bonds and removed the rating from CreditWatch based on the
project's reliance on short-term market-rate investments.

The rating reflects Standard & Poor's view of the insufficient
assets to cover the bond payments until maturity and a revenue
fund with projections showing below investment-grade levels in
2011.

The rating also reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of the high
credit quality of the Fannie Mae credit facility, which S&P
considers to be eligible for a 'AAA' rating; investments held in a
'AAAm' rated market fund; and an asset-to-liability ratio of
101.891% as of Sept. 1, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's placed certain housing-related
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications based on its
revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced housing
transactions.  This issue was included.  The revised criteria
affects government-enhanced housing transactions that have funds
invested in money market funds and other investments with no
guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flows based on its
current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all scenarios
as set forth in the related criteria articles and believes the
bonds will likely be unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 36 Classes From 25 CMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 36
classes from 25 North American commercial mortgage-backed
securities and commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

S&P withdrew its ratings on 28 classes from 21 CMBS and CRE CDO
transactions following the repayment in full of each classes'
remaining principal balance as noted in each transaction's
respective September 2010 remittance reports.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on four interest-only classes from four transactions
following the full reductions of the classes' notional balances as
noted in each transaction's respective September 2010 remittance
reports.

S&P also withdrew its ratings on four additional IO classes from
three CMBS transactions.  S&P withdrew these IO ratings following
the repayment of all principal and interest paying classes rated
'AA- (sf)' or higher from the respective CMBS transactions,
according to S&P's criteria for rating IO securities.

Ratings Withdrawn Following Full Repayment Or Balance Reduction

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-PB1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      XP                       NR                  AAA (sf)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      B                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-TOP4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
      B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

                   COMM 2000-C1 Mortgage Trust
   commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      C                        NR                  AAA (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-SP                     NR                  AAA (sf)

       First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      X-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C7
          commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      X-CP                     NR                  AAA (sf)

     Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
     multiclass pass-through certificates series 2004 LLFC5

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      G                        NR                  BBB+ (sf)
      H                        NR                  BBB- (sf)
      J                        NR                  BB (sf)
      K                        NR                  B (sf)

               Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000CAN3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      F                        NR                  BB+ (sf)
      G                        NR                  B+ (sf)

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6
          commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

               N-45 First CMBS Issuer Corporation
         commercial mortgage backed bonds series 2000-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      E                        NR                  BBB+ (sf)

          Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
    commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      E                        NR                  AA (sf)

                         STRIPs CDO Ltd.
                      STRIPs CDO LTD 2002-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      M                        NR                  BBB+ (sf)

                         STRIPs CDO Ltd.
                     STRIPs CDO notes 2002-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      K                        NR                  BBB- (sf)

                         STRIPs III LTD
                 STRIPs III CDO Ltd series 2003-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      G                        NR                  A+ (sf)

                          STRIPs III LTD
                 STRIPs III CDO Ltd series 2004-1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      M                        NR                  BBB (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C11

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005WHALE6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      H                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
      J                        NR                  A (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C23

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
      A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C27

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)


   Ratings Withdrawn Following Application Of Criteria For IO
                           Securities

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      X                        NR                  AAA (sf)

          Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
  commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      X                        NR                  AAA (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005WHALE6

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class                    To                  From
      -----                    --                  ----
      X-1B                     NR                  AAA (sf)
      X-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

                          NR - Not rated.


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on Seven Classes From Six CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on seven
classes of notes from six synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete redemption of the notes
pursuant to each transaction's termination agreements.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                                               Rating
                                               ------
   Transaction                    Class       To   From
   -----------                    -----       --   ----
   Borealis No.  1 Ltd.           A NZD Nts   NR   CCC- (sf)
   Borealis No.  1 Ltd.           B AUD Nts   NR   CCC- (sf)
   Borealis No.  3 Ltd.           A           NR   CCC- (sf)
   Kingly Square#2 Ltd.           A           NR   CCC- (sf)
   CDS-Lozari                     Tranche     NR   BBB+srp (sf)
   CDS-ANZ Ref#SDB506642681       Tranche     NR   A+srp (sf)
   Momentum Europe Ltd 2007-9                 NR   CCC- (sf)

                        NR - Not rated.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***