TCR_Public/101010.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 10, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 281

                            Headlines

ALABAMA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
AMMC VII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
ASG RESECURITIZATION: S&P Assigns Ratings on $49.1 Mil. RMBS
ATHENS HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
ATHENS HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'

AUGUSTA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB'
AUSTIN HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Corrects Press Release on Note Ratings
BROOKS COUNTY: S&P Corrects Rating on Series 2004 Certs. to 'NR'
CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

CANARAS SUMMIT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts $19MM Notes Rating to CCsf
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Keeps $14MM Notes' CCC/RR1 Rating
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Keeps Bsf/LS5 Rating on E Notes
CAPMARK VII: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes

CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 22 Classes of Certs.
CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
CLAYTON COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2002A Bonds to 'BB'
COLLEGE LOAN: Fitch Cuts Rating on Subordinate Bonds to 'BBsf'

COMMERCIAL CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
CONSECO FINANCE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-B Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 Series 2005-C4 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Series 2005-C6 Certs.
CREST G-STAR: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes

CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches
CWALT INC: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. 1-A-7 Certificates to B3
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2006-PR1 RMBS
EDUCATION LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
EDUCATIONAL FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans

GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Junior Subordinate Bonds to BB
GOLDMAN SACHS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 1999-C1 Certs.
GREEN TREE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'D'
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-GG10 Certs.
GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Classes

HARRIS COUNTY: S&P Junks Rating on Housing Revenue Bonds
HERTZ CORPORATION: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2003-15 Notes
HOME LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Three Tranches
ILLINOIS STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
KENTUCKY HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'

KMART FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Notes to 'C'
KMART LEASE: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 26 2006-C4 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-C6 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2008-C1 Certs.

LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'
LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B'
LUBBOCK HEALTH: S&P Reinstates 'B' Rating on 2001 Revenue Bonds
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Certificates
MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999A Bonds to 'BB'
MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB'
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Classes
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'D'

NEVADA HOUSING: S&P Corrects Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
NEW MEXICO MORTGAGE: S&P Cuts Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B+'

NEW MEXICO MORTGAGE: S&P Cuts Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'
NORTHWEST GEORGIA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
REPACS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Series 2005 CDO
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Rating on 2008-2 Notes

RFC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
SAVANNAH HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
ST JOSEPH: S&P Junks Rating on Refunding Bonds From 'BBB-'
STUDENT LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
SUTTER CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'D'

TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 19 Tranches
TEXAS DEPARTMENT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006 Bonds to 'B'
TEXAS DEPARTMENT: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
TIMES SQUARE: S&P Raises Rating on Mortgage Certs. to 'BB+'
TLR MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $11 Mil. Notes to 'B1'

UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-FL1 Certs.
WACHOVIA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-C21 Certs.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
WESTWOOD CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to Ba3

* S&P Cuts Rating on North Carolina Medical Care's Bonds to 'BB+'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Six CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 34 Classes From Five CMBS Deals

                            *********

ALABAMA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Alabama
Housing Finance Authority's (Ginnie Mae collateralized mortgage
loan - Sherwood Apartments Project) multifamily housing revenue
bonds series 2007D to 'BB' from 'AAA', and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The bonds are secured by
a Ginnie Mae mortgage backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.

"The cash flow projections indicate, assuming no reinvestment
earnings, that there will be insufficient revenues to pay
regularly scheduled debt service starting on the Jan. 20, 2028,
interest payment date," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Moraa Andima.


AMMC VII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AMMC VII, Limited:

  -- US$17,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf);

  -- US$3,300,000 Combination Securities Notes (current balance
     of $2,444,257), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In Moody's
view, these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of
principal proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated
recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into substitute
assets with higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated August 20, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2571 compared to 2892
in the April 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 7.82% of the underlying portfolio versus
16.54% in April 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $9 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$39 million in April 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
119.22%, 114.04%, 106.12% and 103.43%, respectively, versus April
2009 levels of 110.66%, 105.99%, 98.85% and 95.89%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  In particular, the Class E overcollateralization
ratio has increased due to the diversion of interest and principal
proceeds to delever the Class E notes in the event of a Class E
overcollateralization test failure.  Moody's also notes that the
Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest and
that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $456 million, defaulted par of $9 million, weighted
average default probability of 27.63% (implying a WARF of 3646), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.89%, and a
diversity score of 65.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

AMMC VII, Limited, issued in December 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2917)

  -- Class A: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +3
  -- Class E: +3
  -- Combo: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4375)

  -- Class A: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -2
  -- Combo: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.89%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: 0
  -- Combo: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.89%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: -1
  -- Combo: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


ASG RESECURITIZATION: S&P Assigns Ratings on $49.1 Mil. RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ASG
Resecuritization Trust 2010-4's $49.1 million residential
mortgage-backed certificates.

ASG Resecuritization Trust 2010-4 is a U.S. resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by residential mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

* The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
  scenarios, which are consistent with the assigned rating
  categories;

* The underlying transactions' subordination levels, loss
  severities, and delinquency pipelines;

* S&P's ratings on the underlying securities rating and the
  underlying securities expected performance; and

* The transaction's payment and legal structures.

                         Ratings Assigned

                 ASG Resecuritization Trust 2010-4

                                           Interest       Amount
Class  Rating  Type                       rate           (mil. $)
-----  ------  ----                       --------       --------
2-G14  AA sf)  Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      6.995
2-G17  A (sf)  Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      1.500
2-G20  BBB sf) Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      1.499
2-G23  BB (sf) Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      1.499
2-G26  B (sf)  Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      1.499
2-G29  NR (sf) Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through      1.499
2-G100 NR (sf) Sequential, exchangeable    Pass-through     34.603

                         NR -- Not rated.


ATHENS HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA' the
rating on Athens Housing Authority, Ga.'s multifamily housing
revenue bonds, series 2003 (Athens Gardens Apartments Project),
and removed it from CreditWatch.  The bonds are secured by a
Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions where
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections that
indicate that assuming no reinvestment earnings that there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service
starting on the Aug. 20, 2035, interest payment date.  On that
date, the shortfall is projected to be just over $1,400.  The
projected shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and
reaches just under $18,000 by bond maturity on Aug. 20, 2044,
assuming no interest earnings from now until that date.  In the
event that the security prepays, there are sufficient assets to
cover the reinvestment risk based on the 15-day minimum notice
period required for special redemptions.


ATHENS HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Athens
Housing Authority, Georgia's (Clarke Gardens Apartments Project)
multifamily housing revenue bonds series 2003 to 'BB' from 'AAA',
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
bonds are secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions that have
funds invested in money market funds and other investments with no
guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.

"The cash flow projections indicate that, assuming no reinvestment
earnings, there will be insufficient revenues to pay regularly
scheduled debt service starting on the Aug. 20, 2025 interest
payment date," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Moraa Andima.


AUGUSTA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB' from 'AAA' the
rating on Augusta Housing Authority, Ga.'s multifamily housing
revenue bonds, series 2004, issued on the behalf of the Bon Air
Apartment Project, and removed it from CreditWatch.  The bonds are
secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions where
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections that
indicate that assuming no reinvestment earnings that there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service
starting on the Nov. 20, 2027, interest payment date.  On that
date, the shortfall is projected to be just under $950.  The
projected shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and
will reach just over $52,000 by bond maturity on Nov. 20, 2045,
assuming no interest earnings from now until that date.  Beginning
Nov. 20, 2037, in the event that the security prepays, there may
be insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
15-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


AUSTIN HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA'
the rating on the Austin Housing Finance Corp., Texas' series 2010
multifamily housing revenue bonds (Ginnie Mae collateralized
mortgage loan; Elm Ridge Apartments), and removed it from
CreditWatch.  The bonds are secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-
backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions where
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections that
indicate that assuming no reinvestment earnings that there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service on
the Jan. 20, 2038, interest payment date.  On that date, the
shortfall is projected to be just over $2,700.  The projected
shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and reaches
just over $19,000 by bond maturity on Jan. 20, 2051, assuming no
interest earnings from now until that date.  Beginning Jan. 20,
2049, in the event that the security prepays, there may be
insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
15-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Corrects Press Release on Note Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
The total outstanding balance of the securities impacted by the
rating actions listed in the September 16, 2010 press release was
incorrectly stated as $17.7 billion.  The correct amount is
$8.1 billion.

Revised press release:

Moody's takes action on $8.1 billion of Alt-A RMBS issued by Bear
Stearns in 2006 and 2007

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 145
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches and confirmed the
ratings of eight tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by Bear
Stearns Alt-A Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A residential
mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

In addition, the rating on the Tranche II-X-1, an interest-only
tranche issued by Bear Stearns ALT-A 2006-6, has been adjusted to
reflect the fact that the notional balance of Tranche II-X-1 is
linked to the outstanding principal balances of both Tranches II-
A-1 and II-A-2.  Previous rating actions were based on the
incorrect assumption that the notional balance of Tranche II-X-1
was linked to the outstanding principal balance of Tranche II-A-2
only.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-5A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-5A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-6A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-6A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3X-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3X-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BROOKS COUNTY: S&P Corrects Rating on Series 2004 Certs. to 'NR'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has corrected its rating on
Brooks County, Texas' series 2004 certificates of obligation to
'NR' from 'R'.

The rating has been withdrawn.


CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund
VI, Ltd.:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-1D Delayed Draw Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
     June 5, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$279,000,000 Class A-1T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009
     Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$20,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes since the rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  In particular, as of the latest
trustee report dated September 13, 2010, the weighted average
rating factor was 2611 as compared to 3039 in May 2009.  The
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about
$5.8 million from approximately $24 million in May 2009.  Based on
the same report, securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 7.35% of the underlying portfolio versus 16.27% in
May 2009.

Additionally, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
significantly since the rating action in June 2009 and are
currently all in compliance.  The Class A, Class B, Class C, and
Class D Overcollateralization Tests are reported at 121.0%,
114.6%, 107.9%, and 104.1%, respectively versus May 2009 levels of
111.0%, 105.3%, 99.3%, and 95.8%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $377.6 million, defaulted par of $7.1 million,
weighted average default probability of 30.98% (implying a WARF of
3963), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 41.15%,
and a diversity score of 63.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI, Ltd., issued in September
2007, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3170)

  -- Class A-1D: +3
  -- Class A-1T: +3
  -- Class A-2: +3
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4756)

  -- Class A-1D: -2
  -- Class A-1T: -2
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -4
  -- Class D: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (43.15%)

  -- Class A-1D: +1
  -- Class A-1T: +1
  -- Class A-2: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (39.15%)

  -- Class A-1D: 0
  -- Class A-1T: 0
  -- Class A-2: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


CANARAS SUMMIT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Canaras Summit CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$148,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $144,015,800),
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Delayed Funding
     Senior Secured Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
     $72,735,252), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Subordinate Secured
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 25,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$10,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Junior Subordinate
     Secured Deferrable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on June 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In Moody's
view, these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of
sale proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated
recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into substitute
assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based on the
September 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor
is 2649 compared to 3054 in May 2009, and securities rated Caa1
and below make up approximately 5% of the underlying portfolio
versus 8% in May 2009.  Moody's adjusted WARF has also declined
since the last rating action due to a decrease in the percentage
of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or
with a "Negative Outlook." The deal also experienced a decrease in
defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased to $0 from approximately $22 million in
May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action as a result of paydowns of
senior notes due to overcollateralization ratio failures and
higher than expected recoveries on defaulted securities.  The
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 121.56%, 113.35%, 109.02%, and 104.81%,
respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 114.79%, 107.18%, 103.15%,
and 99.18%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the
Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all
previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $284 million, defaulted par of $0.9 million, weighted
average default probability of 28.4% (implying a WARF of 3570), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.3%, and a
diversity score of 63.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Canaras Summit CLO Ltd., issued in June 27, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2856)

  -- Class A1: +2
  -- Class A2: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4284)

  -- Class A1: -1
  -- Class A2: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (46.3%)

  -- Class A1: +1
  -- Class A2: +1
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (42.3%)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor and diversity score.  With respect to the weighted
   average spread, Moody's analyzed the impact assuming a mid-
   point between the reported and the covenanted value to give
   some credit to the deal's higher weighted average spread.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts $19MM Notes Rating to CCsf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes and downgraded one class
of notes issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1.
Fitch has also assigned a Loss Severity rating or a Recovery
Rating on each class of notes, and has revised several Rating
Outlooks.

The rating actions are:

  -- $96,627,816 class A notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS3'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $11,530,614 class B notes affirmed at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $48,428,579 class C notes affirmed at 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27,673,474 class D notes affirmed at 'B-sf/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19,602,044 class E notes downgraded to 'CCsf/RR3' from
     'CCCsf'.

The affirmations reflect the credit enhancement available to the
notes in the forms of collateral coverage, note subordination, and
the application of excess spread to reduce the principal balances
of the notes in order of priority.

Since Fitch's last review in April 2009, the class A notes have
received approximately $215.7 million of principal payments.  Of
this amount, Fitch calculates that over $55 million of the
principal redemptions came from available interest proceeds
(including recoveries on charged-off loans).  In total, the class
A notes have received about 83.5% of their initial principal
balance since close.

Some credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio has occurred
since Fitch's last review, as the transaction has charged-off an
additional $26.1 million of loans during this time.  However, this
has mostly been offset by $25.5 million of recoveries on charged-
off loans received during the same period.  The Sept. 15, 2010
servicer report indicated a cumulative charged-off loan balance of
$57.2 million - relatively unchanged from the April 15, 2009
servicer report that indicated $56.6 million of charged-off loans.
As of the most recent report, there was also a $6.6 million loan
that was over 30 days delinquent.

The combination of excess spread and principal proceeds being
applied toward class A principal has enabled the class A, B, C,
and D notes to retain sufficient credit enhancement to maintain
their current ratings.  However, Fitch notes that the underlying
portfolio has become increasingly concentrated, as only 20
performing obligors remain.  Fitch has downgraded the class E
notes, and assigned Negative Outlooks on the class A, B, C, and D
notes, to account for the potential risk presented by the
portfolio concentration.

The class A, B, C, and D notes have each been assigned a Loss
Severity rating.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential
loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche
size to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as
explained in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss
Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.

The class E notes were assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) based on
the total discounted future cash flows projected to be available
to these bonds in a base-case default scenario.  These discounted
cash flows of approximately $11.9 million yielded an ultimate
recovery projection in a range between 51% and 70%, which is
representative of an 'RR3' on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.
Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's reports 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' and 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Recovery Ratings'.

CapitalSource 2007-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation
that closed on April 12, 2007 and is managed by CapitalSource
Finance LLC.  CapitalSource 2007-1 is secured by a portfolio of
middle-market corporate loans, 80.8% of which are first-lien and
19.2% of which are second-lien or subordinate.  The majority of
these loans are not publicly rated.  Instead, Fitch provides
model-based shadow ratings for the performing loans.  Information
for the model-based shadow ratings was gathered from financial
statements provided to Fitch by CapitalSource.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Keeps $14MM Notes' CCC/RR1 Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms four classes of notes issued by
CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1.

The affirmations are attributable to improved credit enhancement
available to the notes, offset by the increased concentration risk
of the portfolio.  The portfolio has become more concentrated
since the last review in April 2009, with 18 performing obligors
in the portfolio, down from 33.  The largest obligor comprises
approximately 33.5% of the portfolio, whose default could impact
the performance of the most subordinate classes.  While excess
spread offsets this exposure, the Outlook remains Negative on the
notes to reflect the risk.  In addition, the weighted average
rating of the performing portfolio has remained relatively stable
at 'CCC+'.  Approximately 43.2% of the portfolio is currently
considered 'CCC+' or below by Fitch, an improvement from 52.5% at
the last review.

The Rating Outlook on the class D notes remains Negative to
reflect the notes' exposure to future deterioration in portfolio
credit quality and losses in an increasingly concentrated
portfolio.  These notes show considerable vulnerability to obligor
concentration risk, and may experience losses if recoveries on
defaults fall below expectations.

The notes were also assigned Loss Severity ratings.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to
tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

The class E notes were assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) based on
the total discounted future cash flows projected to be available
to these bonds in a base-case default scenario.  These discounted
cash flows of approximately $13.4 million yielded an ultimate
recovery projection in a range between 91% and 100%, which is
representative of an 'RR1' on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.
Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's reports 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs' and 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

CapitalSource CLT 2006-1 is a static, sequentially paying
transaction that closed on April 11, 2006, with approximately
$89.6 million of performing assets left in its portfolio.  The
performing portfolio is composed of 100% middle-market first-lien
loans, 70.7% of which are asset-based loans.  Fitch provides
model-based shadow ratings on the majority of the performing
loans.  Information for the model-based shadow ratings was
gathered from financial statements provided to Fitch by
CapitalSource.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned RR and LS ratings to CapitalSource
CLT 2006-1 as indicated:

  -- $2,963,356 class B notes affirmed at 'AA/LS5', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $31,592,004 class C notes affirmed at 'BBB/LS3', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $24,371,449 class D notes affirmed at 'B/LS3', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14,442,033 class E notes affirmed at 'CCC/RR1'.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Keeps Bsf/LS5 Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
six classes of notes issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust
2006-2:

  -- $50,766,110 class A-PT notes at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118,031,206 class A-1B notes at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $71,250,000 class B notes at 'AAsf/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $157,500,000 class C notes at 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $101,250,000 class D notes at 'BBB-sf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $56,250,000 class E notes at 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, this class has been paid in full:

  -- $0 class A-1A notes 'PIF'.

The affirmations reflect the credit enhancement available to the
notes in the forms of collateral coverage, note subordination, and
the application of excess spread to reduce the principal balances
of the notes in order of priority.

Since Fitch's last review in April 2009, the class A-PT, A-1A, and
A-1B (collectively, class A) notes have received approximately
$723.9 million of principal payments.  This has led to the payment
in full of the class A-1A notes, which were paid principal prior
to class A-1B.  In total, the class A notes have received about
83.1% of their initial principal balance since close.  The
underlying portfolio has experienced some deterioration since
Fitch's last review, but the application of excess spread to
reduce the liabilities has largely offset the notable increase in
charged-off loans.

The cumulative charged-off loan balance was reported at
approximately $180.9 million as of the Sept. 15, 2010 servicer
report.  This represents a marked increase from the March 15, 2009
report, when the cumulative charged-off loan balance was reported
at approximately $58.8 million.  Over this same period, however,
Fitch calculates over $116.8 million of interest proceeds
(including recoveries on charged-off loans) being used to pay
class A principal.  The combination of excess spread and principal
proceeds being applied toward class A principal has enabled the
notes to retain sufficient credit enhancement to maintain their
current ratings, and the Outlook on the class A and B notes
remains Stable.

Fitch maintains its Negative Outlook on the class C, D, and E
notes due to the potential for further credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  Fitch currently considers 42.5% of the
performing portfolio to be rated 'CCC+' or below.  In addition,
the performing portfolio has a significant concentration in loans
related to the banking & finance sector (25.2%).  Finally, there
is some obligor concentration risk present, as the five largest
obligors account for 30.8% of the performing portfolio.

Each class of notes has been assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The
LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.

CapitalSource 2006-2 is a collateralized debt obligation that
closed on Sept. 28, 2006 and is managed by CapitalSource Finance
LLC.  The transaction had a three-year reinvestment period that
was terminated in early 2009 due to excessive charged-off loans.

CapitalSource 2006-2 is secured by a portfolio of middle-market
corporate loans, 87.5% of which are first-lien and 12.5% of which
are second-lien or subordinate.  The majority of these loans are
not publicly rated.  Instead, Fitch provides model-based shadow
ratings for the performing loans.  Information for the model-based
shadow ratings was gathered from financial statements provided to
Fitch by CapitalSource.


CAPMARK VII: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed two and downgraded nine classes of Notes
issued by Capmark VII -- CRE Ltd. due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, current under-
collateralization and increase in Defaulted Collateral Interests.
The affirmations are due to the pace of amortization of the senior
class of Notes and changes in the expected loss distribution of
the collateral.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's
review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2009 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Capmark VII -- CRE Ltd.  is a static (originally revolving)
CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans
(97.4% of the pool balance) and B-Notes (2.6%).  As of the
September 8, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction has decreased to $754.4 million from
$1,000 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the
Class A-1 Notes, as a result of failing the Class A/B principal
coverage tests, recoveries from Defaulted Collateral Interests and
collateral pay-down.  As of the September 8, 2010 Trustee report,
the total collateral balance of the transaction is $663.7 million.

There are twelve assets with par balance of $147.3 million (22.2%
of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Collateral Interests as of the September 8, 2010 Trustee report.
Moody's expects significant losses from the Defaulted Collateral
Interests to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weihted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the additional
default probability stress applied to corporate debt in CDOROM(R)
v2.6 as Moody's expect the underlying non-CUSIP collateral to
experience lower default rates and higher recovery compared to
corporate debt due to the nature of the secured real estate
collateral.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,060
compared to 9,938 at last review.  The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: Ba1-Ba3 (0.1% compared to 0.0% at
last review), B1-B3 (11.9% compared to 0.0% at last review), and
Caa1-C (88.0% compared to 100% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 1.1
years compared to 7.4 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 52.8% compared to 54.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors due to the
diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in pooled transactions.  Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%
compared to 20.7% at last review.  The high MAC is due to higher
default probability collateral concentrated within a small number
of collateral names.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 52.8% to 42.8% or up to 62.8% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 1 to 4 notches downward
and 0 to 4 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 22 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 22 classes of CD 2006-CD2
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-CD2 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-1A, $307.614M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2006 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, $839.906M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2006 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, $305.934M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 22, 2006 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, $217.979M, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $22.945M, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $34.417M, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $38.242M, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $49.714M, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $42.066M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, $38.242M, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, $34.418M, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, $34.418M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, $15.296M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. L, $11.473M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. M, $11.472M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. N, $7.649M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. O, $7.648M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. P, $7.648M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. VPM-1, $10.300M, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. VPM-2, $18.200M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. VPM-3, $2.700M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. VPM-4, $18.800M, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 12, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $2.89 billion
from $3.1 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 194 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
32% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 0.6% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.
The pool includes one loan with an underlying rating, representing
3% of the pool.

Thirty-nine loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $37 million loss (52% loss severity on
average).  Currently, 16 loans, representing 26% of the pool, are
in special servicing.  The largest loan in the pool is the Villa
Parkmerced Loan ($350.0 million -- 12% of the pool), which is
secured by a 3,221-unit, multi-family complex in San Francisco,
CA.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2010 for
imminent default.  The loan matures in October 2010.  The
remaining 15 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$62.0 million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced
loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $3.7
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes from Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust, a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation transaction.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other classes
from the same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction following the termination of the interest rate swap
contract for the class A-1 certificates, which resulted in a
payment due to the hedge counterparty.

The downgrades of classes B through O reflect S&P's expectations
that the interest payments on these classes will be deferred for
an extended period of time due to a termination payment owed to
the hedge counterparty.  S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on
class P following a principal loss of $8.9 million to the class as
noted in the Sept. 22, 2010, remittance report due to losses from
the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral.

S&P previously lowered the affirmed 'D (sf)' ratings on class A-1
and A-2 due to interest shortfalls to the nondeferrable classes.
These classes continue to experience interest shortfalls according
to the Sept. 22, 2010, remittance report.

The trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., provided notice on Sept. 23,
2010, that the hedge counterparty has chosen to terminate the
interest rate swap contract in the transaction.  On Sept. 29,
2010, the trustee provided notice that the termination of the
hedge triggered termination payments totaling $57.8 million to the
counterparty.  According to S&P's interpretation of the
transaction's documents and payment waterfall, the termination
payments to the hedge counterparty are made before any interest or
principal proceeds are made available to the deferrable classes.
S&P expects that the termination payments may not be paid in full
for several years, and full principal and interest payments to
deferrable classes will likely not be paid for many years.

According to the most recent trustee report, Centerline
2007-1 was collateralized by 108 CMBS certificates and
three resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
certificates ($832.8 million, 100%) from 19 distinct
transactions issued between 2000 and 2007.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Centerline 2007-1 according to its
current criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                                 Rating
                                 ------
               Class    To                   From
               -----    --                   ----
               B        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               C        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               D        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               E        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               F        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               G        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               H        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               J        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               K        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               L        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               M        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               N        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               O        CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)
               P        D (sf)               CCC- (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

            Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                         Class    Rating
                         -----    ------
                         A-1      D (sf)
                         A-2      D (sf)


CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class G, H, and I commercial mortgage-backed securities from Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2000-1.  At the same
time, S&P withdrew its rating on class F and affirmed its 'D (sf)'
ratings on classes J, K, and L.  S&P previously downgraded the
class J, K, and L certificates to 'D (sf)' due to interest
shortfalls.

The downgrades of classes G and H reflect Standard & Poor's
analysis of potential interest shortfalls to the classes.  S&P
considered the susceptibility of the transaction to future
interest shortfalls given the portion of the collateral that is
with the special servicer (six of the remaining seven assets,
representing 64.3% of the collateral pool).  The servicer has
deemed advances on two of these loans ($10.1 million; 29.0%)
nonrecoverable.  S&P lowered its rating on class I to 'D (sf)'
following a principal loss the class sustained, as noted in the
September 2010 remittance report.

S&P withdrew its rating on class F following the repayment in full
of the class' principal balance, as noted in the September 2010
remittance report.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on classes J, K,
and L.  S&P lowered its ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)' on
March 11, 2004, due to interest shortfalls S&P determined were
recurring at that time.  According to the September 2010
remittance report, classes J, K, and L have subsequently sustained
full principal losses.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the September 2010 remittance report, six of seven assets
($22.3 million, 64.3%) that remain in the transaction were with
the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. Two of these assets are
real estate owned (REO, $7.9 million, 22.8%), one is in
foreclosure ($6.6 million, 19.1%), and three are classified as
matured balloon loans ($7.8 million, 22.4%).  Four of the
specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $7.3 million.  S&P describe the three largest
assets in special servicing below.

The Sahara Rainbow Center loan, the second-largest asset in the
pool and the largest asset in special servicing, has a total
exposure of $7.7 million, which includes $1,059,174 of advancing
and interest thereon.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Nov. 24, 2008, due to a monetary default; foreclosure
on the property is proceeding.  The property comprises a 53,298-
sq.-ft. retail property in Las Vegas, Nev.  An ARA of $2,798,565
is in effect.  This loan matured on Jan. 10, 2010, and S&P expects
a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Hickory Grove Townhomes asset, the third-largest asset in the
pool and the second-largest in special servicing, has a total
exposure of $5.4 million, which includes $954,871 of advancing and
interest thereon.  The property, which is REO, is a 220-unit
multifamily complex in Columbus, Ohio, that was built in 1974 and
renovated in 1998.  The related loan was transferred to the
special servicer on May 6, 2009, due to a monetary default.  An
ARA of $1,330,333 is in effect.  S&P expects a significant loss
upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Cady Centre asset, the fourth-largest asset in the pool and
the third-largest in special servicing, has a total exposure of
$3.9 million, which includes $422,687 of advancing and interest
thereon.  The property, which is REO, comprises a 23,290-sq.-ft.
office building in Northville, Mich., that was built in 1999.  The
related loan was transferred to the special servicer on March 11,
2009, due to a monetary default.  An ARA of $2,479,232 is in
effect.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset as well.

The three remaining specially serviced assets ($7.8 million,
22.4%) have loan balances that individually represent no more
than 8.3% of the total pool balance.  All three of these assets
are classified as matured balloon loans.  S&P separately
estimated a loss for the largest of these three loans
($2.9 million; 8.3%), which is in the process of foreclosure.
With regard to the other two loans, the special servicer reports
that one loan ($2.7 million; 7.8%) matured Jan. 1, 2010, and the
borrower is in the process of obtaining refinancing.  The other
loan ($2.2 million; 6.3%) is expected to be refinanced by
Sept., 30, 2010.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the collateral had an
aggregate trust balance of $34.7 million, down from $697.1 million
at issuance.  The collateral includes seven assets, down from 91
at issuance.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage
Servicing, provided full-year 2008 or full-year 2009 financial
information for 91.7% of the assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a
weighted average debt service coverage of 1.11x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and loan-to-value
(LTV) were 1.29x and 72.3%, respectively.  These calculations
exclude four of the transaction's six specially serviced assets
($17.4 million, 50.2%) for which S&P separately estimated losses.
To date, the pool has experienced principal losses totaling
$34.6 million on 14 assets.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The lowered, withdrawn, and affirmed ratings
are consistent with S&P's analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-1

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class    To         From     Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    --         ----     ----------------------
       G        CCC- (sf)  BB (sf)                  30.95
       H        CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                  15.91
       I        D (sf)     B- (sf)                    N/A

                        Rating Withdrawn

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-1

                              Rating
                              ------
                Class     To           From
                -----     --           ----
                F         NR           BBB+ (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-1

           Class      Rating     Credit Enhancement (%)
           -----      ------     ----------------------
           J          D (sf)                        N/A
           K          D (sf)                        N/A
           L          D (sf)                        N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CLAYTON COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2002A Bonds to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Clayton
County Housing Authority, Georgia's (Williamsburg South Apartments
Project) multifamily housing bonds series 2002A to 'BB' from
'AAA', and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed certain housing issues on CreditWatch with negative
implications due to revised methodology for certain Federal
Government-Enhanced housing transactions.

"Standard & Poor's has received updated cash flow projections that
indicate, assuming no interest rate earnings, there will be a
deficiency in assets to support the liabilities starting the
April 1, 2018, interest payment date," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Dare Branch.


COLLEGE LOAN: Fitch Cuts Rating on Subordinate Bonds to 'BBsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan bonds at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bonds to 'BBsf' issued by College Loan
Trust-I Amended and restated 2003 Indenture of Trust (2002).
Stable Outlooks are assigned to the senior and subordinate bonds.
Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria, as well as the refined
basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press
release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP
SLABS Review' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior bonds are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
overcollateralization, subordination, and the projected minimum
excess spread) to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.  The
rating on the subordinate bonds are downgraded to 'BBsf' because
the level of hard credit enhancement is only capable of absorbing
the applicable risk factor stress level after accounting for the
trust's ability to generate excess spread, which is very limited
due to the high cost structure of the trust.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

College Loan Trust I- Amended and restated 2003 Indenture of Trust
(2002):

  -- Series 2002-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-11 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-12 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-13 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-16 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-21 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-22 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-23 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-24 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-25 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-26 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-27 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-28 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-29 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 A-30 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-7 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 A-8 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2004-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2004-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005-1 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-7A affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-7B affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-7 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-8 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-9 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-10 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-11 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-12 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-13 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 A-14 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-1 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 B-3 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2002-2 B-4 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2003-1 B-2 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2004-1 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005-1 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007-2 B-1 downgrade to 'BBsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


COMMERCIAL CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class, assigned Loss Severity
ratings, Recovery Ratings and Rating Outlooks to Commercial
Capital Access One, Series 3 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  A full rating list is shown below.

  -- $40.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.5 million class B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43.4 million class C at 'A+sf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.5 million class D at 'BBB+sf/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.5 million class E at 'BBBsf/LS3'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $10.8 million class F to 'CCCsf/RR1' from 'Bsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative.

The $4.7 million class G remains at 'Dsf/RR6'.

Class A-1 has been paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class H.

The downgrade is the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates for
the transaction following its prospective analysis, which is
similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed securities analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of
1.1%, approximately $1.9 million, of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
Of the original 93 loans in the pool, 62 remain.

As of the September 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
60.6% to $170.8 million from $433.7 million at issuance.  Zero
loans are currently defeased.  Fitch has identified 11 Loans of
Concern (18.9%), including five loans in special servicing (7%).
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.  The Negative Outlook for
classes E and F reflects the potential for higher expected losses
from the specially serviced assets (7% of the pool).

The remaining pool has a high concentration of low income housing
tax credit properties (31.8%).  Additionally, 19 loans in the pool
are covered by a SunAmerica limited guaranty (29.8%).  The
guaranty requires SunAmerica, a subsidiary of AIG, to pay the
special servicer, an amount equal to any realized losses arising
from the covered loans, or to purchase the covered loans directly
from the trust at par value if they become distressed.  Credit for
the SunAmerica guaranties was applied according to Fitch's rating
of AIG, which is currently rated 'BBB', Outlook Stable.  Of the
five specially serviced loans in the pool, none are covered by the
guaranty.

The largest specially serviced asset (1.9%) is secured by a
delinquent 60-bed healthcare property located in Gig Harbor,
Washington, about 40 miles from Seattle.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 when the asset's debt service
coverage ratio fell below 1.25 times thereby triggering covenant
default.  Occupancy was approximately 85% as of June 2010.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.7%) is a secured by
an assisted living facility formerly operated by Sunwest
Management, located in Klamath Falls, Oregon.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 as a result of
Sunwest Management's bankruptcy filing.  The loan remains current.
At this time, Fitch does not expect this asset to incur losses.
As of June 2010, occupancy was approximately 97%.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern, which is not in special
servicing, is secured by a portfolio of three healthcare
properties, which have a combined 381 beds, are located in various
cities in central and eastern North Carolina (5.3%).  The
properties have a combined debt service coverage ratio of 2.32x.
Significant deferred maintenance items have been identified at
each of the properties.  The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern
is a tax credit apartment complex located in Austin, TX (3.1%),
which had an average occupancy of 83% and DSCR of 0.72x for the
three months ended March 2010.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a reduction to 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted
market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25x or higher were considered to pay off at
maturity.  Under this scenario, six loans are not expected to pay
off at maturity with two loans incurring a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.

Information used to conduct this review included data received
from Trepp, Berkadia, as master servicer; Dynex Capital, as asset
manager; and third party information received from the World Wide
Web.


CONSECO FINANCE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these actions on the long-term and Recovery
Ratings for the Conseco Finance Vehicle Trust 2000-B notes listed
below:

  -- Class M-1 notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6';
  -- Class M-2 notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6';
  -- Class B notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch withdraws the ratings of the notes.

Fitch's actions follow the transaction not being paid in full by
its legal final maturity date.  Anticipated recoveries are
determined by Fitch's cash flow model and consider stressed
remaining losses, prepayment rates, recovery rates, and unique
structural characteristics.  The trust is backed by sales
contracts and loan agreements secured by commercial trucks and
trailers originated by Conseco Finance Corp.  The loans are now
serviced by the indenture trustee, namely U.S. Bank, N.A.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 Series 2005-C4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C4 on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-J, $93.008M, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $23.253M, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $13.286M, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $23.252M, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $16.609M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $16.609M, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, $13.287M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, $16.608M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, $4.983M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. K, $8.304M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. L, $6.643M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 12, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $1.1 billion
from $1.33 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 146 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34%
of the pool.  Six loans, representing 8% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $21.4 million loss
(84% loss severity on average).  Currently, seven loans,
representing 6% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the 301 Yamato Loan
($26.9 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
206,500 square foot office building located in Palm Beach,
Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
August 2010 for imminent default and is 30 days delinquent.
The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $16.4 million appraisal reduction for the specially
serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $990,137.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Series 2005-C6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 13 classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C6 on review for
possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, $250.460M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jan. 25, 2006 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, $178.452M, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $43.830M, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $28.177M, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $18.785M, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $25.046M, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $31.307M, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, $31.308M, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, $25.046M, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, $28.176M, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, $12.523M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, $12.523M, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. M, $6.262M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Oct. 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 22, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to
$2.22 billion from $2.50 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 218 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 2% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  The pool includes one loan with an underlying rating,
representing 5% of the pool.

Fifty-six loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $9.44 million loss (45%
loss severity on average).  Currently, 14 loans, representing 6%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is The Village at Meyerland Loan ($21.7 million --
1% of the pool), which is secured by a 714-unit, multi-family
property located in Houston, Texas.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in November 2009 for imminent monetary default
and is currently 90+ days delinquent.  The remaining 13 specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $50.8 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through
Q have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.1 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure
to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


CREST G-STAR: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded one, affirmed two and downgraded two classes
of Notes issued by Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor.
The affirmations and upgrade are due to the rapid pace of
amortization of the senior class of Notes.  The rating action is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A Senior Secured Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-1 Second Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2035,
     Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-2 Second Priority Floating Rate Term Notes, Due 2035,
     Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2035,
     Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 10, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP, is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (52.3% of the pool
balance), real estate investment trust debt (47.5%) and whole loan
(0.2%).  As of the August 31, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction, including the Limited Partnership
Interest has decreased to $318.7 million from $500.4 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A Notes.

There are seven assets with a par balance of $30 million (9.7% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
and thirteen assets with a par balance of $122.7 million (39.6%)
that are considered Credit Risk Securities as of the August 31,
2010 Trustee report.  While there have been no realized losses to
date, Moody's expects significant losses to occur from the
Defaulted Securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,392 compared to 1,024 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (8.2% compared to 7.2% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (11.2% compared to 10.7% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (36.8%
compared to 37.4% at last review), B1-B3 (9.8% compared to 18.8%
at last review), and Caa1-C (17.9% compared to 0.2% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 1.3
years compared to 2.3 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 32.2% compared to 26.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 3.1% compared to 29.2% at last review.
The low MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 32.2% to 14.8% or up to 50.0% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward
and 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 76
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 4 RMBS
transactions issued by Countrywide in 2005.

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-11CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-46CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-7CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-85CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWALT INC: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. 1-A-7 Certificates to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 1 tranche
from CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
54CB.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action is a result of corrections to certain loss and
cash flow allocation rules that were used in modeling the deal as
well as updated loss levels on the pool.  This transaction has
super senior support tranches that support other senior tranches
up to a pre-defined dollar limit.  The previous actions on the
transaction did not fully incorporate the dollar limit rules.  The
rating action reflects the correction to the rating of one of the
tranches in the transaction as well as updated recovery on the
remaining tranches.

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-54CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2006-PR1 RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2006-PR1, a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction with one structure backed mainly by Alternative-A
mortgage loan collateral from Puerto Rico and a second re-
securitized real estate mortgage investment conduit structure
backed by two underlying certificates, and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 26 classes from DMSI 2006-PR1 and two grantor trust
transactions backed by the 3-A-F-1-C and 4-A-F-1-C classes from
DMSI 2006-PR1, and removed 18 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades to the Alt-A structure reflect S&P's opinion that
projected credit support for the affected classes is insufficient
to maintain the previous ratings given S&P's current projected
losses under its stress scenarios.  The downgrade to the re-REMIC
structure reflects S&P's assessment of the significant
deterioration in performance of the mortgage loans backing the
underlying certificate.  As a result of this performance
deterioration, the downgraded classes were unable to maintain
their previous ratings at the applicable rating stresses.

S&P's lifetime projected loss has changed for this particular
transaction:

                                    Orig. bal.       Lifetime
Transaction                        (mil. $)         exp. loss (%)
-----------                        ----------       -------------
DMSI 2006-PR1                         1,771            3.17

To assess the creditworthiness of each class from the Alt-A
structure from DMSI 2006-PR1, S&P reviewed the individual
delinquency and loss trends of the transaction for changes, if
any, in risk characteristics and the ability to withstand
additional credit deterioration.  In order to maintain a 'B'
rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a class
could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.

When S&P performed its analysis on the re-REMIC structure from
DMSI 2006-PR1, S&P applied its loss projections to the underlying
trust in order to identify the magnitude of losses that S&P
believes could be passed through to the re-REMIC class.  S&P then
stressed these loss projections at various rating categories in
order to assess whether the re-REMIC class could withstand such
stressed losses at its current rating level.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover its projected losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the transactions in this
review.  In addition, the Alt-A structure from DMSI 2006-PR1 also
benefits from overcollateralization and excess spread.  Four
classes from DMSI 2006-PR1 are bond-insured by Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. (Assured; financial strength rating of 'AAA').
The ratings on the bond insured classes reflect the higher of the
rating on the bond insurer and Standard & Poor's underlying
ratings on the securities.

The Alt-A structure from DMSI 2006-PR1 is backed by fixed-rate,
Alt-A mortgage loans that are secured by first liens on one- to
four-family residential properties in Puerto Rico.  The re-REMIC
structure is secured by two classes from Alternative Loan Trust
2005-11, a transaction backed by Alt-A fixed-rate mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four family residential
properties in the U.S. All of the underlying mortgage loans
backing the re-REMIC have original principal balances that conform
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines.  The grantor trust
classes are backed by the 3-A-F-1-C and 4-A-F-1-C classes from
DMSI 2006-PR1.

                          Rating Actions

    Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Cayman Series 2006-C3-PR1
                         Series 2006C3-PR1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
  Class      CUSIP       To                   From
  -----      -----       --                   ----
  3-A-F-1                BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

    Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Cayman Series 2006C4-PR1
                        Series 2006C4-PR1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
  Class      CUSIP       To                   From
  -----      -----       --                   ----
  4-A-F-1                BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

      Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust
                          Series 2006-PR1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
  Class      CUSIP       To                   From
  -----      -----       --                   ----
  1-A-1      25157GAA0   B (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  2-A-F      25157GAC6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  2-PO       25157GAE2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  3-A-F-1-C  25157GAF9   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  3-A-F-2    25157GAG7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  3-A-1      25157GAH5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  3-PO       25157GAN2   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  4-A-F-1-C  25157GAP7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  4-A-F-2    25157GAQ5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  4-A-I-1    25157GAR3   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  4-A-I-2    25157GAS1   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  4-PO       25157GAZ5   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-F-1    25157GBA9   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-F-2    25157GBB7   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-F-3    25157GBC5   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-F-4    25157GBD3   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-I-1    25157GBE1   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-I-2    25157GBF8   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-I-3    25157GBG6   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-A-I-4    25157GBH4   BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  5-PO       25157GCS9   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  CW-A1      25157GCT7   BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust
                          Series 2006-PR1

                  Class      CUSIP       Rating
                  -----      -----       ------
                  B-1A       25157GCU4   CCC (sf)
                  B-1B       25157GCV2   CCC (sf)
                  B-2        25157GCY6   CCC (sf)
                  B-3        25157GDA7   CC (sf)
                  B-4        25157GDC3   CC (sf)
                  B-5        25157GDE9   CC (sf)
                  B-6        25157GDG4   CC (sf)
                  B-7        25157GDJ8   CC (sf)
                  B-8        25157GDL3   CC (sf)
                  B-9        25157GDM1   CC (sf)


EDUCATION LOAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan bonds at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bond to 'Bsf' issued by Education Loan
Company Trust I Series 2006-1.  Stable Outlooks are assigned to
the senior and subordinate bonds.  Fitch used its 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student Loan ABS
Rating Criteria, as well as the refined basis risk criteria
outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press release 'Fitch to Gauge
Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to review the
ratings.

The ratings on the senior bonds are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
subordination and the projected minimum excess spread) to cover
the applicable risk factor stresses.  The rating on the
subordinate note is downgraded to 'Bsf' due to the trust's very
high cost structure that will limit the trust's ability to
generate excess spread and reach parity of 100%.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Educational Loan Company Trust I:

  -- Series 2006-1 A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006-1 B-1 downgraded to 'Bsf/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


EDUCATIONAL FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes and downgrades
the subordinate note issued by Educational Funding Services, Inc.
- 2005 Indenture of Trust.  The Rating Outlook remains Stable for
the senior notes.  Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria, as
well as the refined basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept.
22, 2010 press release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate
U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to review the ratings.

The transaction's most significant risk factor is the interest
rate risk tied to the fix rate coupon on the subordinate note.
Given the current low interest rate environment, in addition to
having a high cost structure from the spreads on the auction rate
securities, the transaction is under pressure, producing negative
excess spread.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'CCC',
reflecting the trust's declining parity trend caused by the high
cost structure and the unfavorable rate environment.  Even if the
short-term interest rates increase significantly in the near
future, the possibility of default is real as the trust may not
build the parity back up to 100%, given the high spreads on the
senior auction rate securities.

The senior notes are affirmed based on the level of credit
enhancement that is exhibiting a stable trend.  However, the
ratings may come under pressure for downgrades if the enhancement
level begins exhibiting a downward trend.  This is possible if the
payment rate declines and the effect of de-levering is outweighed
by the impact from the negative excess spread.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Educational Funding Services, Inc. - 2005 Indenture of Trust:

  -- Series 2005 A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2005 A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006 A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006 A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2006 A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007 A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Series 2007 B-1 downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'.


GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Junior Subordinate Bonds to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior and subordinate student loan
bonds at 'AAAsf' and 'AA+sf', respectively, issued by Goal Capital
Funding.  Fitch also downgrades the junior subordinate bond to
'BBsf'.  Stable Outlooks are assigned to the senior, subordinate,
and junior subordinate bonds.  Fitch used its 'Global Structured
Finance Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student Loan ABS Rating
Criteria, as well as the refined basis risk criteria outlined in
Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press release 'Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in
Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate bonds are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
subordination, overcollateralization and the projected minimum
excess spread) to cover the applicable risk factor stresses.  The
rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BBsf' because a
mild level of basis risk stress will limit the trust's ability to
generate excess spread and reach and maintain a parity of 100%.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Goal Capital Funding 2007-1:

  -- Series 2007-1 A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 B-1 affirmed at 'AA+sf/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Series 2007-1 C-1 downgraded to 'BBsf/LS3' from 'A-/LS3';
     Outlook Stable.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 1999-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed three classes of Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates 1999-C1, on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. F, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 9, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on May 22, 2003 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans as well as
interest shortfalls.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 9, 2009.  See the
ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last
rating action and the ratings history.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to
$55.0 million from $890.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 36 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool.  Two loans,
representing 18% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 12% of the pool.

Nine loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $23.2 million loss.
Currently seven loans, representing 40% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $5.3 million appraisal reduction for five of the
specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through
J have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.4 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience future interest shortfalls due to the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  The master servicer has made a
determination of non-recoverability for four specially serviced
loans, representing 24% of the pool.  The most recent
determinations were made on September 13, 2010 for the Howard
Johnson Riverwalk Loan ($5.9 million -- 10.7% of the pool) and the
Dick's Clothing Loan ($2.6 million -- 4.7%).  This will result in
increased interest shortfalls beginning with the October
remittance statement.  In addition, the servicer will also begin
recouping advances on the Field and Stream Apartments Loan
($2.7 million -- 4.9%) and the Dana Corporation Loan ($2.1 million
3.7%) in October.  It is expected that these advances will be
recouped over several months.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses and interest
shortfalls from specially serviced loans and the performance of
the overall pool.


GREEN TREE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating to 'D
(sf)' on the class B-1 note from Green Tree Financial Corp.
Manufactured Housing Trust 1996-10.

Higher-than-expected defaults of the underlying collateral caused
an interest shortfall to the class B-1 note on Aug. 15, 2010.  Due
to an error, S&P's rating action on this class did not occur
contemporaneously with the interest payment shortfall.

                         Rating Corrected

  Green Tree Financial Corp. Manufactured Housing Trust 1996-10
    $800 mil. sr/sub pass-through certificates series 1996-10
                          due 11/15/2028

                               Rating
                               ------
                 Class     To            From
                 -----     --            ----
                 B-1       D (sf)        CCC- (SF)


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-GG10 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 11 classes and
affirmed 13 classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-GG10:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On September 22, 2010, Moody's placed 11 classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
16% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 14%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 30%
of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2009.  See the
ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the last
rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive any third party due
diligence reports on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction during the previous 6 months.

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 0.4% to
$7.53 billion from $7.56 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 200 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any
defeased loans or loans with underlying ratings.

Forty-eight loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $12.6 million loss (52% loss severity on
average).  Currently, 31 loans, representing 19% of the pool, are
in special servicing.  Two of the specially serviced loans,
representing 4% of the pool, are secured by properties for which
Maguire Properties L.P.  (Maguire) is the sponsor.  The 550 South
Hope Street Loan ($165.0 million -- 2% of the pool), which is the
largest specially serviced loan, is secured by a 566,000 square
foot office building located in Los Angeles.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 due to imminent
default and is in the process of foreclosure.  The Maguire Anaheim
Portfolio Loan ($103.5 million -- 1% of the pool), which is the
fourth largest specially serviced loan, is secured by two office
properties located in Orange County, California which total
333,500 square feet.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 for imminent default and is currently 90+
days delinquent.

The remaining 29 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types and are either 90+ days delinquent, real estate
owned or in the foreclosure process.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $550 million appraisal reduction.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $762.5 million loss (54% expected loss
on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans representing 23% of the pool.  Two of these loans
are sponsored by Maguire - Wells Fargo Tower ($550.0 million -- 7%
of the pool) and Two California Plaza ($470.0 million -- 6% of the
pool).  Moody's has estimated a $262.3 million loss (16% expected
loss based on a 50% probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 76% and 70% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 124% compared to 131% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.0%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.23X and 0.80X, respectively, compared to
1.19X and 0.79X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 34 compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Shorenstein Portland Portfolio Loan
($697.2 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by 16
office properties located in Portland, Oregon.  The portfolio
totals 3.8 million square feet.  As of March 2010, the portfolio's
was 80% leased compared to 82% at last review and 94% at
securitization.  Performance had been stable through 2008,
however, operating income declined in 2009 due to a drop in
occupancy and increased expenses.  Net operating income for full
year 2009 was approximately 6% lower than in 2008.  The loan is
interest-only for the entire term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 139% and 0.72X compared to 132% and 0.74X, respectively, at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Wells Fargo Tower Loan
($550.0 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
1.4 million square foot Class A office building located in Los
Angeles, California.  As of June 2010, the property was 95% leased
compared to 93% at last review.  The largest tenant is Wells
Fargo, which occupies 22% of the net rentable area with leases
expiring on a staggered basis through 2013.  The loan sponsor is
Maguire.  Moody's is concerned about the property's near-term
lease rollover exposure, given the softness of the Los Angeles
office market and concerns about Maguire's ability to fund tenant
costs due to its current financial issues.  The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist due to low debt service coverage and sponsor
concerns.  The loan is interest-only for the entire term.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR 152% and 0.61X compared to 161% and 0.57X,
respectively, at last review.

The third largest loan is the Two California Plaza Loan
($470.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
1.3 million square foot class A office building located in
downtown Los Angeles, California.  The loan sponsor is Maguire.
As of March 2010, the property was 83% leased, essentially the
same since last review, compared to 90% at securitization.  The
decline in occupancy was due to Aames Financial Corporation, which
leased 11% of the NRA at securitization, declaring bankruptcy and
vacating the property.  Based on information provided by the
master servicer, the largest tenant, Deloitte & Touche, which
leases 26% of the NRA through March 2015, has exercised its
surrender rights under its lease and will vacate approximately
51,506 square feet (4% of the NRA) effective August 2010.  Moody's
is concerned about the property's near-term lease rollover
exposure, given the softness of the Los Angeles office market and
concerns about Maguire's ability to fund tenant costs due to its
current financial issues.  The loan is on the servicer's watchlist
due to low debt service coverage and sponsor concerns.  The loan
is interest-only for the entire term.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 189% and 0.49X compared to 185% and 0.50X, respectively,
at last review.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed three and downgraded six classes of Notes
issued by Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-3 due to
the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, and increase in Defaulted Securities.  The
affirmations are due to the pace of amortization of the senior
notes and the expected loss distribution of the underlying
collateral.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. S, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-3 is a CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (25.0 %
of the pool balance), B-Notes (27.9%), commercial mortgage backed
securities (14.2%), CRE CDO securities (17.6%), and mezzanine
loans (15.4%).  As of the September 20, 2010 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $335.7
million from $420.5 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of paydown from the collateral
pool as well as failing the Class D and E par value tests.

There are six assets with par balance of $79.2 million (25.2% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired Securities
as of the September 20, 2010 Trustee report.  One of these assets
(23.6% of the impaired balance) is A-Note, one asset is C-Note
(2.0%), two assets are CMBS (43.2%) and two assets are CRE CDO
securities (31.2%).  Impaired Assets that are not CMBS are defined
as assets which are 30 or more days delinquent in their debt
service payment.  While there have been no realized losses to
date, Moody's does expect significant losses to occur once they
are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.
Per the legal documentation the transactions will end its
reinvestment period in September 2011.  However, given portfolio
profile requirements as well as very limited investment options,
this analysis effectively deems this transaction static.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  For non-CUSIP collateral,
Moody's is eliminating the additional default probability stress
applied to corporate debt in CDOROM(R) v2.6 as Moody's expect the
underlying non-CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates
and higher recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature
of the secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is
a measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,165 compared to 6,016 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (7.4% compared to 4.2% at last review), A1-
A3 (2.3% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0%
compared to 3.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (18.2% compared to 19.5%
at last review), B1-B3 (5.3% compared to 14.6% at last review),
and Caa1-C (66.8% compared to 58.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 1.6
years compared to 5.0 years (due to reinvestment period) at last
review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 24.6% compared to 33.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors due to the
diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in pooled transactions.  Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.9%
compared to 13.6% at last review.  The relatively low MAC is due
to higher default probability collateral concentrated within a
small number of collateral names.

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key
parameter may be offset by a change in one or more of the other
key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all other key parameters
static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from 24.6% to
14.6% or up to 34.6% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 2 to 4 notches downward and 1 to 5 notches
upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


HARRIS COUNTY: S&P Junks Rating on Housing Revenue Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Harris
County Housing Finance Corp., Texas' (The Gardens At Tomball)
multifamily housing revenue bonds series 2006 to 'CCC' from 'AAA',
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Renee J. Berson.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity;

* Debt service coverage is projected to fall below investment
  grade levels in 2012; and

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2012.

Credit strengths in the issue include S&P's opinion of:

* Investments held in 'AAAm'-rated Wells Fargo money market fund;
  and

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae pass-through
  certificate (considered to be 'AAA' eligible).

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain Federal Government-enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


HERTZ CORPORATION: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2003-15 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed on review
for possible downgrade, the rating of these certificates issued by
The Hertz Corporation Debenture Backed Series 2003-15:

  -- US$25,000,000 of 7.00% Class A Callable Units due June 1,
     2012; B3, Place Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     Previously on July 17, 2009 downgraded to B3;

  -- US$25,000,000 Notional Amount of Interest-Only 0.581% Class
     B Callable Units Due June 1, 2012; B3, Place Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; Previously on July 17, 2009 downgraded to
     B3.

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 7.625% debentures due June 1, 2012, issued by The Hertz
Corporation, which were placed on review for downgrade by Moody's
on September 13, 2010.


HOME LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Three Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 3 tranches
from 2 RMBS transactions issued by Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first and
second-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to
2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

In addition, for the deals affected by the actions, when
calculating the rate of new delinquencies (as described on page 4
of the methodology publication referenced above), Moody's took
into account loans that were reclassified from delinquent to
current due to modification in order to not understate the rate of
new delinquencies.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  All the classes in this
rating actions are wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation
(Segregated Account - Unrated).  RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac
Assurance Corporation are rated at their underlying rating without
consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


ILLINOIS STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes issued by
Illinois Student Assistance Commission 2002 General Resolution.
Fitch also removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a Stable
Outlook to the senior notes and revises the Rating Watch to
Evolving from Negative on the subordinate notes.  Fitch used its
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'FFELP Student
Loan ABS Rating Criteria, as well as the refined basis risk
criteria outlined in Fitch's Sept. 22, 2010 press release 'Fitch
to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review' to
review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement consisting of subordination
and projected minimum excess spread to cover the applicable risk
factor stresses.  The subordinate notes are revised to Rating
Watch Evolving because Illinois Student Assistance Authority plans
to issue series 2010-1 bonds to refinance the auction rate
securities in the 2002 trust, which is expected to result in an
increase of the parity percentage of 2002 trust, possibly
resulting in upgrades.  However, the ratings are likely to be
downgraded if the new issuance is not executed, given that the
trust is significantly under-collateralized.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Illinois Student Assistance Commission 2002 General Resolution:

Series 2002

  -- Class I-3 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class II Subordinate at 'BB/LS3'; revised to Rating Watch
     Evolving from Rating Watch Negative;

Series 2003

  -- Class IV-1 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class IV-3 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

Series 2004

  -- Class VI-3 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

Series 2005

  -- Class VIII-1 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-2 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-3 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-4 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-5 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-6 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-7 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class VIII-8 Senior affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class IX-1 Subordinate 'BB/LS3; revised to Rating Watch
     Evolving from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- Class IX-2 Subordinate 'BB/LS3; revised to Rating Watch
     Evolving from Rating Watch Negative.


KENTUCKY HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Kentucky
Housing Corp.'s series 2010 conduit multifamily housing revenue
bonds, issued for the Ginnie Mae collateralized mortgage loan
country place apartments project, to 'BB+' from 'AAA' and removed
it from CreditWatch with negative implications where Standard &
Poor's placed it on May 12, 2010.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market-rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Moraa Andima.

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's included this issue in a rating
action that placed the ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  Assuming no reinvestment
earnings, cash flow projections indicate there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service
starting on the April 20, 2038, interest payment date.


KMART FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Notes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of Kmart Funding
Corporation Secured Lease Bonds:

  -- Senior Secured Collateralized Note, Downgraded to C from Ca;
     previously on Sept. 24, 2002 Downgraded to Ca from Caa2

                        Ratings Rationale

This credit tenant lease transaction originally consisted of seven
classes supported by 24 retail buildings leased to Kmart under
fully bondable, triple net leases.  In 2001 Kmart filed voluntary
petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.  Kmart subsequently rejected the leases for 17 of
the properties securing in this transaction.  Leases for three of
the properties were assumed by other retailers and 14 properties
were liquidated from the trust.  Based on the January 1, 2010
distribution statement, Class G is in default and has experienced
a $12.3 million loss (58% overall loss).

There were no models used in the review of this security.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
CTL transactions.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a
press release dated September 24, 2002.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


KMART LEASE: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrew the ratings of three credit
tenant lease transactions supported either by Kmart lease
obligations or lease obligations guaranteed by Kmart:

Issuer: Brandon Development Associates

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb. 7, 2002 Downgraded to Ca
     from Caa2

Issuer: Lake Mary Development Associates

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb. 7, 2002 Downgraded to Ca
     from Caa2

Issuer: KMS III Realty Limited Partnership

  -- Senior Secured Collateralized Note, Withdrawn, previously on
     Sept. 24, 2002 Downgraded to Ca from Caa2

                        Ratings Rationale

The credit ratings were withdrawn because Moody's believes it has
insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the credit ratings.  Please refer to Moody's
Investors Service Withdrawal Policy, which can be found on Moody's
website, www.moodys.com.  Moody's has not been able to obtain deal
information from the respective trustees or receive current
distribution statements.

These CTL transactions were originally supported by retail
properties leased to Kmart under fully bondable, triple net
leases.  In 2001 Kmart filed voluntary petitions for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Kmart rejected the leases for the properties securing the Brandon
Development Associates and Lake Mary Development Associates
transactions.  The KMS III Realty Limited Partnership transaction
is secured by leases on 14 properties.  It is not known whether
Kmart rejected any of these leases.

There were no models used in the review of these securities.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
CTL transactions.  Moody's prior full review of the Brandon and
Lake Mary transactions is summarized in a press release dated
February 7, 2002.  Moody's prior full review for the KMS
transaction was September 24, 2002.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transaction in the past 6 months.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 26 2006-C4 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 26 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C4 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 29, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on June 29, 2006 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 29, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-1, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf)
  -- Cl. HAF-2, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-3, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-4, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-5, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-6, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-7, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-8, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-9, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. HAF-10, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
     (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated January 31, 2008.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $1.93 billion
from $2.08 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 145 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
52% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans.
Seven loans, representing 33% of the pool, have investment grade
credit estimates.

Non-pooled Classes HAF-1, HAF-2, HAF-3, HAF-4, HAF-5, HAF-6, HAF-
7, HAF-8, HAF-9, and HAF-10 are collateralized by the junior non-
pooled components of the 70 Hudson Street Loan, the ALMI of North
Dallas Loan, and the Fountains of Miramar Loan.

Thirty-seven loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in a $1.8 million loss (77% loss severity).  Currently
18 loans, representing 11% of the pool, are in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Rivergate Plaza Loan
($58.5 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by two
office buildings totaling 302,058 square feet and located in
Miami, Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2009 due to payment default and is currently real estate
owned.  The remaining 17 specially serviced loans are secured by a
mix of property types.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $76.7 million appraisal reduction for 15 of the
specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
T have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.6 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-C6 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C6 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 6, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans and
concerns about refinance risk in an adverse environment.  Fifty-
five loans, representing 14% of the pool, mature within the next
12 months.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated February 11, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $2.99 billion
from $3.05 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 199 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
52% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans.
Eight loans, representing 36% of the pool, have investment grade
credit estimates.

Fifty-one loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $13.7 million loss (68%
loss severity on average).  Currently 13 loans, representing 6% of
the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Haverhill Apartments Loan ($45.6 million --
1.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 350-unit multifamily
property located in Manassas Park, Virginia.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently real estate owned.  The remaining 12
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.
The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $37.2 million
appraisal reduction for 11 of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K through T
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.7
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2008-C1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-C1 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on June 12, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. Q, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. S, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb. 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review for possible downgrade due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated Febrary 6, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $0.99 billion
from $1.01 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 62 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 63% of
the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans.  Three
loans, representing 27% of the pool, have investment grade credit
estimates.

Fourteen loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
Currently eight loans, representing 10% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Kettering Tower Loan ($27.6 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 484,265 square foot, 30-story office property located
in downtown Dayton, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2009 due to a violation of the Cash Management
Agreement and the servicer is pursing foreclosure /note sale.  The
remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$53.8 million appraisal reduction for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
T have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.1 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-3, a U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities transaction backed by U.S. Alternative-
A mortgage loan collateral.  S&P also affirmed its rating on one
other class from the same transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings given S&P's current projected losses under its stress
scenarios.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics and the ability to
withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to maintain a
'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a
class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% of remaining losses for an 'AAA' rating.  For
example, in general, S&P would assess whether one class could
withstand approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different
class could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

The affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for this class is sufficient to cover
S&P's projected losses associated with this rating level.

Subordination provides credit support for this transaction.  The
underlying collateral for this deal consists of fixed-rate, Alt-A
mortgage loans that are secured by first liens on one- to four-
family residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-3
                          Series 2007-3

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class      CUSIP       To                   From
       -----      -----       --                   ----
       1-A1       52521JAA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       1-A4       52521JAD1   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       2-A1       52521JAE9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
       B1         52521JAF6   D (sf)               CC (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-3
                          Series 2007-3

                 Class      CUSIP       Rating
                 -----      -----       ------
                 1-A3       52521JAC3   CCC (sf)


LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'BB+'
from 'AAA' on Louisiana Housing Finance Agency's multifamily
housing revenue bonds (Meadowbrook Apartments Project), series
2006, and removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of an asset-to-liability
ratio that falls below 100% assuming 0% earnings on uninvested
funds.

The mortgage is backed by a standby credit facility from Fannie
Mae.  If the security prepays, there are not sufficient funds to
cover the reinvestment risk based on the 15-day minimum notice
period required for special redemptions beginning in 2024.
Furthermore, parity falls below 100% in 2024.


LOUISIANA HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating to
'B' from 'AAA' on Louisiana Housing Finance Agency's series 2007
multifamily housing revenue bonds (Ridgefield Apartments Project)
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Securing the bonds is a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market-rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Moraa Andima.

The issue was included in a rating action on May 12, 2010, when
Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch based on revised criteria for certain federal
government-enhanced housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements based
on a zero-reinvestment assumption for all scenarios and assuming
no reinvestment earnings, cash flow projections indicate there
will be insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt
service starting on the Aug. 20, 2016, interest payment date.


LUBBOCK HEALTH: S&P Reinstates 'B' Rating on 2001 Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services reinstated its 'B' rating on
Lubbock Health Facility Development Corp., (Sears Plains
Retirement Corp Project), Texas' series 2001 mortgage revenue
bonds based on the project's reliance on short-term market-rate
investments.

"The rating reflects S&P's assessment of the project's
insufficient revenues from mortgage debt service payments and
investment earnings to pay full and timely debt service on the
bonds and bond costs beyond 2015," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Renee Berson.  "S&P expects bond debt service coverage to
fall below investment-grade levels beyond 2016, and the asset-to-
liability ratio of 100.03% as of Aug. 31, 2010, to fall below 100%
beginning July 2027."

Credit strengths include high credit quality of the assets
consisting of a Ginne Mae mortgage-backed security and investments
held in Dreyfus Cash Management -- Institutional Shares rated
(AAAm).

On May 12, 2010, Standard & Poor's placed certain housing-related
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised
criteria for certain federal government-enhanced housing
transactions.  The revised criteria affect government-enhanced
housing transactions that have funds invested in money market
funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of return.
According to the revised criteria, Standard & Poor's caps ratings
on bonds issued in transactions that assume stressed reinvestment
rates at the 'A' level.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed information submitted by the
trustee under the stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles and
believes the bonds are unable to meet all costs from transaction
cash flows for the term of the bonds.

If the security prepays, Standard & Poor's believes there are
sufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the 30-
day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 67
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 9 RMBS
transactions issued by Merrill Lynch Alternative Note Asset Trust
and Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Alternative Note Asset Trust, Series 2007-A1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Alternative Note Asset Trust, Series 2007-A2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Alternative Note Asset Trust, Series 2007-A3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-A1

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-A2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-A3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-A4

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-AF2

  -- Cl. AF-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-AF1

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 13 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1, Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-MCP1 on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-M, $173.800M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on July 27, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, $115.142M, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $36.932M, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $15.802M, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $32.587M, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $419.553M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $28.242M, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, $17.380M, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, $21.725M, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, $6.518M, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, $8.690M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. L, $6.517M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. M, $4.345M, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated August 27, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to
$1.38 billion from $1.74 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 111 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 44% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  The pool includes two loans with underlying ratings,
representing 4% of the pool.

Thirty-four loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $27.1 million loss (36%
loss severity on average).  Currently, 13 loans, representing 9%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Mansion at Canyon Springs Loan ($35.6 million
-- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 360-unit, multi-family
property located in San Antonio, Texas.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in August 2008 for payment default and is
currently 90+days delinquent.  The remaining 12 specially serviced
loans are secured by a mix of property types.  The master servicer
has recognized an aggregate $29.3 million appraisal reduction for
the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
Q have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.67 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure
to specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999A Bonds to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Mississippi Business Finance Corp.'s retirement facility revenue
refunding bonds series 1999A (Wesley Manor Retirement Community
Inc. project) to 'BB' from 'AAA' and removed it from CreditWatch
with negative implications, where it was placed on May 12, 2010.
The bonds are secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.
Standard & Poor's revised criteria affect government-enhanced
housing transactions where funds are invested in money market
funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.

"The cash flow projections indicate, assuming no reinvestment
earnings, that there will be insufficient revenues to pay
regularly scheduled debt service starting on the Jan. 20, 2028,
interest payment date," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Moraa Andima.


MISSISSIPPI HOME: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB' from 'AAA' the
rating on Mississippi Home Corp.'s multifamily housing revenue
bonds (Madonna Manor Apartments Project) series 2007-3, and
removed it from CreditWatch.  The bonds are secured by a Ginnie
Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on CreditWatch
with negative implications due to revised criteria for certain
federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's revised
criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions where
funds are invested in money market funds and other investments
with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections that
indicate that assuming no reinvestment earnings that there will be
insufficient revenues to pay regularly scheduled debt service on
the July 20, 2027, interest payment date.  On that date, the
shortfall is projected to be just under $200.  The projected
shortfall generally grows each interest payment date and reaches
just over $45,000 by bond maturity on Jan. 20, 2049, assuming no
interest earnings from now until that date.  Beginning July 20,
2042, in the event that the security prepays, there may be
insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the
15-day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 97 classes of notes in 15
National Collegiate student loan securitizations backed by private
(i.e. not government guaranteed) student loans.  The ratings of
the notes remain under review for further possible downgrade.
First Marblehead Data Services, Inc., and First Marblehead
Education Resources, Inc., subsidiaries of First Marblehead
Corporation, are the administrator and the special servicer of the
transactions, respectively.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were prompted by a significant deterioration in
collateral performance and the resulting erosion of parity levels
(i.e. the ratio of total assets to total liabilities) for all
transactions, as well as an upward restatement of the static pool
default information provided by FMC.  Performance deterioration
and data restatement both contributed to Moody's increase of
expected net losses to a range of 24%-36% of the original pool
balance plus any prefunded amounts from a range of 15%-24% as of
March 2009.

As of the August 2010 distribution date, the more seasoned
transactions (i.e., those closed in 2004 or earlier), had
experienced cumulative gross defaults in excess of 18% of the
original pool balance.  Although the more recent transactions
(i.e., those closed in 2005 or later) have incurred lower
cumulative defaults to date, 17% to 45% of the pool balances in
these transactions have not entered repayment status, as the
borrowers are still in school.  Those borrowers who will enter
repayment status in the next 2-3 years are likely to face weak
employment perspectives, which is likely to result in a continued
trend of high delinquencies and defaults.

High defaults have been eroding the collateral base and caused
steady declines in parity levels in all 15 securitizations.
Between July 2009 and July 2010 the total parity, including the
TERI pledge fund, has decreased from a range of 92%-99% to a range
of 86%-95%.  The decreases in the parity levels are eroding excess
spread needed to absorb losses and build up parity.  The loss of
excess spread, in turn, is expected to result in further declines
in parity level.

Delinquent loan balances remain high in all transactions.
Although 30-day past due loans as a percent of loans in active
repayment have declined from the 2009 peak levels of 8% to 20%,
they remain elevated, ranging from 5% to 14%.  The delinquency
pipeline is expected to contribute to additional defaults in the
future.

FMC provides static pool cumulative default information by
repayment year and loan type on a quarterly basis.  In May 2010,
this information was restated by FMC to reflect higher defaults,
which also contributed to Moody's upward revisions of expected
losses on the underlying collateral.  For example, in the restated
data, the cumulative defaults for December 2009 as a percentage of
the total origination balance of all repayment vintages have
increased by approximately 35% for DTC loans and by approximately
70% for the school channel loans.  The ratings of the notes will
remain under review for further possible downgrade until the
conclusion of a third-party audit of this supplemental performance
information.

Available credit enhancement includes overcollateralization,
reserve funds, the TERI pledge fund, subordination, and excess
spread.  Significant structural features include subordinate note
interest triggers, reserve fund floors, and the change in cash
flow allocations among the senior classes under the occurrence of
certain events .  In particular, senior notes from most trusts
(other than the Master Trust, 2003-1, 2004-1, 2007-3 and 2007-4)
benefit from the subordinate note interest trigger event, which
redirects interest payments on the subordinate notes to principal
payments on the senior notes.  As of the August 25, 2010
distribution date, the Class C interest trigger was in effect for
the 2005-1 and 2005-2 transactions.

Notes issued by the Master Trust, 2007-3 and 2007-4 also benefit
from financial guarantee insurance policies provided by Ambac
Assurance Corporation.  Therefore, the ratings of the notes
reflect the higher of the guarantor's financial strength rating
and the underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the
guaranty) on the security.

To assess rating implications of the higher expected losses, each
individual transaction was run through a variety of stress
scenarios using the Structured Finance Workstation(R), a cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.

Our expected lifetime net losses as a percentage of the original
pool balance plus any loans added subsequently are approximately
23.9%, 28.6%, 26.3%, 31.2%, 25.8%, 31.2%, 28.6%, 29.2%, 35.9%,
30.7%, 36.2%, 33.4%, 34.4%, 33.9% and 33.8% respectively for the
Master Trust, 2003-1, 2004-1, 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3,
2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2007-1, 2007-2, 2007-3 and 2007-4
trusts.  For the trusts that do not benefit from any financial
guarantee insurance policy, the ratings of the most junior Class A
tranches could be upgraded in the future if the lifetime expected
net losses are 10% lower, or downgraded if the lifetime expected
net losses are 10% higher than the levels indicated above.  The
ratings of Class 2005AR-16 of the Master Trust and Class A-3-AR-7
of 2007-3 and 2007-4 will not be affected in the future if the
lifetime expected net losses are 10% lower or 10% higher than the
levels indicated above.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of uncertainty with
regard to expected losses are the weak economic environment and
the high unemployment rate, which adversely impacts the income-
generating ability of the borrowers.  Overall, Moody's central
global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's
expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.  The performance of
DTC loans in particular is highly sensitive to these factors.  In
addition, the historical loss performance data available for these
pools is relatively limited particularly for the most recent
securitizations, as over 90% of the borrowers in the pools were
still in school when the notes were issued.  Primary sources of
uncertainty with regard to the ratings of notes issued by the
Master Trust, 2007-3 and 2007-4 are also linked to the future
rating of Ambac Assurance Corporation.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Complete actions are:

Issuer: The National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I (2001
Indenture)

  -- Ser. NCT-2002-AR9, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on June 11, 2009
     Confirmed at A3 (sf)

  -- Ser. NCT-2002-AR-10, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on June 11, 2009
     Confirmed at A3 (sf)

  -- NCT-2003AR-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- NCT-2003AR-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- NCT-2003AR-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- NCT-2003AR-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- NCT-2005AR-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- NCT-2005AR-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1 (The)

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: The National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl.A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl.A-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl.A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Baa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 B2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. A-2-AR-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-L, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to B2
     (sf)

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. A-2-AR-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-AR-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2010 Caa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-L, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to B2
     (sf)


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class C and D notes from National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
2007-1 to 'D (sf)' from 'B (sf)' and 'B- (sf)', respectively.

S&P lowered the ratings to 'D (sf)' because the affected classes
did not receive interest payments on the Sept. 27, 2010,
distribution date.  The transaction breached the class C note
interest trigger, which prompted the interest shortfalls.  The
class C note interest trigger is tested monthly, and the
transaction can cure the breach if it passes the appropriate
performance tests on subsequent distribution dates.

However, S&P believes that this transaction will continue to
breach its class C note interest trigger for the foreseeable
future due to the continued adverse performance trends of the
underlying pool of private student loans, including the
accelerated pace at which the transaction has been realizing
defaults.  Although this transaction has a reserve account in
place for the benefit of the rated notes, the transaction
documents do not contemplate utilizing the reserve account when
the class C interest reprioritization is in effect.  The
transaction did not breach its class D note interest trigger, but
the waterfall provides for class D note interest payment only
after the interest on class C has been paid.  The breach of the
class C note interest trigger, as well as the resulting
reprioritization of interest to pay down senior bonds, resulted in
an interest shortfall to both the class C and D notes.  The
reserve account may be drawn to cover fees to the servicer,
trustee, paying agent, and administrator, as well as backup
administrator fees and expenses, certain additional TERI guarantee
fees, and class A, B, C, and D note interest when no triggers are
in effect.  However, when a class C note interest trigger is in
effect, the reserve account cannot be drawn upon to cover interest
payments to the class C and D notes.

The series 2007-1 transaction breached its class C note interest
trigger due to the combined failure of the cumulative default rate
and parity tests.  The transaction failed its cumulative default
rate test after it exceeded the scheduled cumulative default
threshold rate, which resets upward each year through February
2017.  As of the Sept. 27, 2010, distribution date, the cumulative
default rate was 13.09%, which exceeds the threshold rate of
13.00%.  The parity test failed because the aggregate outstanding
balance of the class A and B notes exceeded the sum of the
collateral balance plus the amounts on deposit in the reserve
account.  The aforementioned parity test result was 99.47% as of
the Sept. 27, 2010, distribution date, almost 300 basis points
below the 102.33% reported as of the Jan. 25, 2010, distribution
date.  The decline reflects the impact that the accelerated pace
of defaults has had on this transaction.

                              Table 1

         Class C Cumulative Default Rate Threshold Resets

                          Series 2007-1

                 Date                      CDR (%)
                 ----                      -------
                 2/1/2008                     4.00
                 2/1/2009                     8.00
                 2/1/2010                    13.00
                 2/1/2011                    17.00
                 2/1/2012                    20.00
                 2/1/2013                    22.00
                 2/1/2014                    25.00
                 2/1/2015                    28.00
                 2/1/2016                    30.00
                 2/1/2017                    32.00

                  CDR - Cumulative default rate.

                         Ratings Lowered

           National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1
         Student loan asset-backed notes and certificates

                                   Rating
                                   ------
               Class       To               From
               -----       --               ----
               C           D (sf)           B (sf)
               D           D (sf)           B- (sf)


NEVADA HOUSING: S&P Corrects Ratings on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected to 'BB+' from 'AAA'
its ratings on Nevada Housing Division's series 1999A and 1999B
multi-unit housing revenue bonds (Diamond Creek Apartments
Project), and removed the ratings from CreditWatch.

The ratings are based on MBIA Insurance Corp. (BB+/Negative), the
guaranteed investment contract provider for the bonds.  On June 5,
2008, Standard & Poor's lowered its rating on MBIA to 'AA' from
'AAA'.  The rating was subsequently lowered to 'BB+'.  However,
S&P did not contemporaneously lower the ratings on the series
1999A and 1999B bonds.  On May 12, 2010, the ratings on the bonds
were placed on CreditWatch with negative implications due to an
error.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 10 classes and confirmed two of Notes
issued by Newcastle CDO IX 1, Limited due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's review, is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. S, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Newcastle CDO IX1, Limited is a revolving cash CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of mezzanine debt (45.8% of the pool
balance), B-note debt (18.3%), bank loan (17.6%), CRE CDO (9.8%),
commercial mortgage backed securities (6.5%),asset-backed
securities (1.7%) and CMBS raked bond (0.3%).  As of the
August 18, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including Preferred Shares and excluding notional S
Class, has decreased to $794.0 million from $825 million at
issuance, due to full or partial Note Cancellations to Class C,
Class D, Class G, and Class H Notes.

There are three assets with par balance of $32.3 million (4.3% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted Securities
as of the August 18, 2010 Trustee report.  Moody's expects
significant losses from those Defaulted Securities to occur once
they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM(R) v2.6 as Moody's expect the underlying
non-CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,674 (including Defaulted
Securities) compared to 3,434 at last review.  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (1.1% compared to
0% at last review), A1-A3 (1.1% compared to 0% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (2.6% compared to 0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (11.7%
compared to 23.7% at last review), B1-B3 (3.6% compared to 17.3%
at last review), and Caa1-C (79.9% compared to 59.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.2
years compared to 10.0 years at last review.  The lower WAL
cooresponds to the actual remaining WAL compared to the
reinvestment WAL.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 32.8% (excluding Defaulted Securities) compared to 15.0%
covenant at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0% compared to 16.7% at last review.
The high MAC is due to the increase of very-high risk collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 32.8% to 22.7% or up to 43% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches downward
and 0 to 6 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded four classes of Notes issued by Newcastle
CDO VII, Limited, due to the deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor and a decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate, an increase in Defaulted Securities, the
failure of the Class III and Class IV interest coverage tests, and
the failure of all Par Value tests, including the Indenture
Specified Event of Default Par Value Test.  The rating action is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transactions.

  -- Class I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Class I-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Class II, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Class III, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Class IV-FL, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Class IV-FX, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Newcastle CDO VI, Limited, is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (68.9%),
residential mortgage backed securities (16.2%), REIT debt (13.9%),
and small business loans (1.0%).  As of the September 17, 2010
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $516.8 million from $525.0 million at issuance, with
approximately $13.3 million in paydowns direct to the Class I-A
Notes.  The paydowns are a result of the redirection of all
interest and principle to paydown the Class I-A Notes due to the
failure of all Par Value tests.  The deal is currently in default
as the indenture lists as a Event of Default if the Class I Par
Value Ratio is less than 103%.  As of the September 17, 2010
trustee report, this ratio is 38.4%.  Additionally, there are
approximately $5.1 million in unpaid interest proceeds to Classes
III, IV-FX, IV-FL, and V.

There are twenty assets with par balance of $126.4 million (26.0%
of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the September 17, 2010 Trustee report.  Seven of
these assets (54.7% of the defaulted balance) are either CMBS, and
thirteen are RMBS (45.3%).  Moody's expects little to no recovery
on these assets once losses are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,706 compared to 810 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (2.4% compared to 7.5% at last review), A1-
A3 (4.6% compared to 2.6% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (22.3%
compared to 61.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (11.0% compared to 6.4%
at last review), B1-B3 (12.1% compared to 10.0% at last review),
and Caa1-C (47.7% compared to 12.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 5.8
years compared to 6.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 13.3% compared to 28.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.1% compared to 18.6% at last review.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 13.3% to 8.3% or up to 18.3% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward
and 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded six classes of Notes issued by Newcastle
CDO V, Limited due to the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor, and a decrease in weighted average
recovery rate.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

  -- Class I Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Class II Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to B1
     (sf); previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Class III Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa1
     (sf); previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Class IV-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Caa3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Class IV-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf); previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Class V Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Newcastle CDO V, limited is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio commercial mortgage backed securities (56.8%), REIT debt
(17.5%), residential mortgage backed securities (14.6%), CMBS
rake-bonds (8.1%), and small business loans (2.9%).  As of the
September 17, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction has decreased to $421.3 million from $500.0
million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class I
Notes.

There are currently no defaulted or non-performing securities in
the deal as of the September 17, 2010 trustee report.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,975 compared to 709 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (6.3% compared to 3.3% at last review), A1-
A3 (5.1% compared to 6.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (39.8%
compared to 54.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (29.8% compared to
23.4% at last review), B1-B3 (4.8% compared to 9.3% at last
review), and Caa1-C (14.2% compared to 3.9% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.7
years compared to 3.7 years at last review.  The lower WAL
cooresponds to the actual remaining WAL compared to the
reinvestment WAL.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of22.0% compared to 26.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.5% compared to 21.0% at last review.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 22.0% to 17.0% or up to 27.0% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 1 to 2 notches downward
and 0 to 1 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


NEW MEXICO MORTGAGE: S&P Cuts Rating on Housing Bonds to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard and Poor's has lowered New Mexico Mortgage Finance
Authority's (St. Anthony Plaza Apartments) multifamily housing
revenue bonds series 2007A to 'B+' from 'AAA', and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity; and

* Debt service coverage is projected by Standard & Poor's to fall
  below investment-grade levels in 2020.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the FHA insurance (which S&P consider
  to be 'AAA' eligible);

* Investments held in 'AAAm'-rated First American Treasury
  Obligations Fund Class D money market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 100.96% as of Sept. 1, 2010

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain Federal Government-Enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


NEW MEXICO MORTGAGE: S&P Cuts Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on New
Mexico Mortgage Finance Authority's (Chateau Apartments)
multifamily housing revenue bonds to 'B+' from 'AAA', and removed
it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity; and

* Debt service coverage is projected by Standard & Poor's to fall
  below investment-grade levels in 2017.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the FHA insurance, which S&P consider
  to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Investments held in 'AAAm'-rated First American Treasury
  Obligations Fund Class D money market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 100.53% as of Sept. 1, 2010

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain Federal Government-Enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


NORTHWEST GEORGIA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the rating to 'BB+'
from 'AAA' and removed from CreditWatch the rating on Northwest
Georgia Consolidated Housing Authority's series 2004 multifamily
housing revenue bonds issued for the Callier Forest Apartments
Project.  The bonds are secured by a Fannie Mae mortgage backed
security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action in
which S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal government-enhanced housing transactions.  S&P's
revised criteria affect government-enhanced housing transactions
in which funds are invested in money market funds and other
investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.  The cash flow projections that
include an assumption of no reinvestment earnings indicate that
beginning Nov. 1, 2019, in the event that the security prepays,
there may be insufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk,
based on the 15-day minimum notice period required for special
redemptions.


PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd.:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     Aug. 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

  -- US$7,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 28,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

  -- US$12,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2021 (current
     Rated Balance of $7,505,533), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in August 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated September 1, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2512 compared to 3008
in the August 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 8.0% of the underlying portfolio versus
17.4% in August 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $19.43 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$39.77 million in August 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
120.37%, 110.96%, 104.57%, and 101.87%, respectively, versus
August 2009 levels of 112.83%, 104.21%, 98.29%, and 95.78%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class C-1,
Class C-2, and Class D Notes are no longer deferring interest and
that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Additionally, the rating action taken on the Type I Composite
Notes results primarily from the reduction of the Type I Composite
Notes Rated Balance and the higher likelihood of future cash
distributions from the Type I Composite Notes underlying
components, which consists of the Class C-2 Notes and the
Subordinated Notes.  Moody's rating of the Type I Composite Notes
addresses solely the repayment of the Rated Balance, which is
reduced by any distributions received from the underlying Class C-
2 Notes and Subordinated Notes components.  According to the
August 2010 payment date report, the Type I Composite Notes have a
Rated Balance of $7,505,533, which is supported by $7 million of
Class C-2 Notes and $5 million of Subordinated Notes.  All of the
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  In
contrast, at the time of the last rating action, the Type I
Composite Notes had a Rated Balance of $8,153,121, and the Class
C-2 Notes and the Subordinated Notes were not receiving
distributions due to overcollateralization test failures.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $448.35 million, defaulted par of $21.42 million,
weighted average default probability of 24.83% (implying a WARF of
3591), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.27%,
and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF --20% (2873)

  -- Class A-1a Notes: +2
  -- Class A-1b Notes: 0
  -- Class A-1c Notes: +2
  -- Class A-2 Notes: +2
  -- Class B Notes: +2
  -- Class C-1 Notes: +2
  -- Class C-2 Notes: +2
  -- Class D Notes: +2
  -- Type I Composite Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (4309)

  -- Class A-1a Notes: -2
  -- Class A-1b Notes: -2
  -- Class A-1c Notes: -2
  -- Class A-2 Notes: -2
  -- Class B Notes: -2
  -- Class C-1 Notes: -4
  -- Class C-2 Notes: -4
  -- Class D Notes: 0
  -- Type I Composite Notes: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR +2% (45.27%)

  -- Class A-1a Notes: 0
  -- Class A-1b Notes: 0
  -- Class A-1c Notes: 0
  -- Class A-2 Notes: 0
  -- Class B Notes: 0
  -- Class C-1 Notes: 0
  -- Class C-2 Notes: 0
  -- Class D Notes: 0
  -- Type I Composite Notes: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR -2% (41.27%)

  -- Class A-1a Notes: -1
  -- Class A-1b Notes: -1
  -- Class A-1c Notes: -1
  -- Class A-2 Notes: -1
  -- Class B Notes: -1
  -- Class C-1 Notes: -1
  -- Class C-2 Notes: -1
  -- Class D Notes: 0
  -- Type I Composite Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


REPACS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Series 2005 CDO
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+ (sf)' rating
on REPACS Trust Series 2005 - Step Up Debt Units I, a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transaction, and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P affirmed the rating following its review of the transaction's
reference portfolio and the impact of the transaction's step-up
feature, which increases the subordination available for the rated
units throughout the life of the transaction.  S&P's review found
that the units have sufficient subordination to maintain their
current rating.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Rating on 2008-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CCC
(sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' on the notes from Residential Mortgage
Securities Funding 2008-2 Ltd., a residential mortgage-backed
securities re-securitized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transaction, and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrade reflects S&P's assessment of the significant
deterioration in the performance of the mortgage loans backing the
underlying certificate.  As a result of this performance
deterioration, the downgraded class was unable to maintain its
previous rating at the applicable rating stresses.

The RMSF 2008-2 notes are backed by class M-1 from Renaissance
Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2.  The underlying collateral from
this trust consists primarily of subprime fixed- and adjustable-
rate, first- and second-lien one- to four-family residential
mortgage loans.

While RMSF 2008-2 was structured with additional enhancement in
the form of repackaged securities (class X from High Grade
Structured Credit CDO 2005-1 Ltd. {'CC (sf)'} and class C from
Porter Square CDO II Ltd. {'CC (sf)'}, which are both secured by
revolving pools of asset-backed securities and synthetic
securities), S&P does not expect any future cash flow from these
underlying classes.

                          Rating Actions

       Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-2 Ltd.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
     Class      CUSIP         To           From
     -----      -----         --           ----
     Notes      76115DAA1     CCC (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg


RFC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 10 classes of Notes issued by RFC CDO 2006-
1, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted
average rating factor.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 21,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd., is a revolving cash CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of whole loans (52.3% of the pool balance),
mezzanine debt (18.2%), commercial mortgage backed securities
(16.8%), B-note debt (11.3%),and CMBS raked bond (1.4%).  As of
the September 21, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance
of the transaction, including Preferred Shares, has decreased to
$512.2 million from $600 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of failing the Class
C, Class D, Class E, Class F, and Class G Overcollateralization
Tests.

There are twenty-two assets with par balance of $176.0 million
(34.2% of the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired
Collateral Interests as of the September 21, 2010 Trustee report.
Moody's expects significant losses from those Impaired Collateral
Interests to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM(R) v2.6 as Moody's expect the underlying
non-CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,951 (including Impaired
Collateral Interests) compared to 3,072 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(1.0% compared to 1.4% at last review), A1-A3 (1.9% compared to
3.5% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (6.5% compared to 11.1% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (8.2% compared to 16.3% at last review), B1-B3
(7.6% compared to 29.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (74.8%
compared to 38.3% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.4
years compared to 2.7 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 33.4% (excluding certain Impaired Collateral Interests)
compared to 34.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  For
non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors due to the
diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the pooled transactions.  Moody's modeled a MAC of
8.5% compared to 15.4% at last review.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 33.4% to 28.3% or up to 38.4% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward
or 0 to 2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


SAVANNAH HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on Housing Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Savannah Housing Authority, Ga.'s multifamily housing revenue
bonds (Savannah Summit Apartments project) series 2003 to 'BB+'
from 'AAA' and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where it was placed on May 12, 2010.  The bonds are
secured by a Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed security.

On May 12, 2010, the issue was included in a rating action where
Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on certain housing issues on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to revised criteria for
certain federal-government-enhanced housing transactions.
Standard & Poor's revised criteria affect government-enhanced
housing transactions where funds are invested in money market
funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated cash flow statements, based
on a zero reinvestment assumption for all scenarios as set forth
in the related criteria articles.

"The cash flow projections indicate, assuming no reinvestment
earnings, that there will be insufficient revenues to pay
regularly scheduled debt service starting on the June 20, 2036,
interest payment date," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Moraa Andima.


ST JOSEPH: S&P Junks Rating on Refunding Bonds From 'BBB-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on St.
Joseph County, Ind.'s general obligation economic development
refunding bonds, issued for Madison Center Inc., to 'CCC' from
'BBB-'.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's placed the 'CCC'
rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating on the GO bonds is based on the credit quality of
Madison Center Inc., a nonprofit mental health center, and moves
in conjunction with the rating on Madison Center's revenue bonds,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Caroline West.  "The
downgrade therefore reflects the lowering of the credit rating of
Madison Center to 'CCC' from 'BB+', reflecting an unexpected and
sharp drop in state funding, which, in turn, has contributed to
deteriorating operating performance in the unaudited fiscal year
ended June 30, 2010; very weak debt service coverage; a decline in
liquidity; and a restructuring of the organization, in which
mental health services will be transferred to another provider."

The lowered rating specifically reflects S&P's view of:

* Balance sheet erosion, with reductions in liquidity, and
  continued reductions expected in debt service reserve funds and
  a considerable debt load;

* Operating performance well off of the previous year and off of
  budgeted expectations, due in large part to Medicaid reductions;

* Very weak coverage, which resulted in a covenant violation; and

* Considerable management turnover, with an interim CEO, and an
  interim CFO in place for over a year.


STUDENT LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded nine classes of notes in two
Student Loan Repackaging trusts.  The ratings remain on review for
possible further downgrade for most notes.  Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas is the administrator and trustee for both
transactions.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 Baa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repacking Trust, Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were prompted primarily by the downgrade of certain
underlying securities referenced in these two transactions on
September 30, 2010.  The ratings of certificates issued by Student
Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1, are based on the ratings of
the underlying securities and the payment timing swap provided by
Deutsche Bank AG, New York Branch.  The payment timing swap covers
any interest shortfalls on the Certificates due solely to the
accrual period for the Certificates being longer than the interest
accrual period for the underlying securities for the related
underlying distribution date.  The actions on eight notes issued
by this trust were prompted by the rating actions on some of the
underlying securities, which were issued by four National
Collegiate Student Loan trusts.  The related underlying securities
are these:

* Group 3 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
  2003-1, Class A-7 (current rating Caa1 (sf) under review for
  possible downgrade) and Class IO Notes (current rating Caa1 (sf)
  under review for possible downgrade);

* Group 4 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
  2004-1, Class A-4 (current rating Caa3 (sf) under review for
  possible downgrade) Class A-IO-2 Notes (current rating Caa3 (sf)
  under review for possible downgrade);

* Group 5 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
  2005-1, Class A-5-1 (current rating Ba1 (sf) under review for
  possible downgrade) and Class A-5-2 Certificates (current rating
  Ba1 (sf) under review for possible downgrade);

* Group 6 Certificates: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
  2005-3, Class A-5-1 Certificates (current rating Ba1 (sf) under
  review for possible downgrade).

The assets of the Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2
consist primarily of the Class 1-A-IO, Class 2-A-IO, Class 3-A-IO,
Class 4-A-IO, Class 5-A-IO, Class 6-A-IO and Class 7-A-IO
Certificates issued by the Student Loan

ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1.  The rating of the Class IO
in the Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2 was
determined based on the weighted average rating of the underlying
IO bonds.  As a consequence of the downgrade of the ratings on
Class 3-A-IO, Class 4-A-IO, Class 5-A-IO and Class 6-A-IO, Class
IO was also downgraded.

The methodology used in rating the notes issued by the Student
Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1 considered the higher of the
pass-through rating of the underlying groups of securities and the
guarantors' rating for the tranches within the 2007-1 trust that
benefit from any financial guarantee.  The methodology used in
rating the Class A-IO from the Series 2007-2 trust consisted in
translating the current rating of each underlying IO of the 2007-1
repackaging trust to Moody's idealized expected loss rate
corresponding to each IO's respective weighted average remaining
life.  Then the average idealized loss and remaining average life
for Class A-IO, both weighted by outstanding notional amount of
the tranches, were used to determine the rating.

For Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1, the primary
sources of uncertainty with regard to the rating are the ratings
of underlying notes in reference and the ratings of the financial
guarantors.  For Student Loan Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2,
the primary sources of uncertainty with regard to the rating are
the ratings of the referenced underlying IO notes issued by Series
2007-1, the weighted average life and the notional balance of the
IO's.

The ratings of notes issued under both the Series 2007-1 and the
Series 2007-2 could be downgraded or upgraded if the underlying
securities referenced in both trusts are downgraded or upgraded.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


SUTTER CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on the
remaining class of notes from Sutter CBO 1998-1 Ltd./Corp.  The
rating actions are:

  -- $5,282,070 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/RR4'.

Fitch subsequently withdraws the rating of the class B notes since
the notes have matured.

At the stated maturity date on Sept. 15, 2010, the class B notes
received a total interest payment of approximately $15.3 million,
leaving a final unpaid interest amount of approximately
$1.1 million and a remaining unpaid principal balance of
approximately $5.3 million.  The downgrade of the class B notes
reflects the issuer's failure to redeem the entire principal
amount due at the stated maturity date.

Sutter CBO 1998-1 was a collateralized bond obligation that closed
on Sept. 1, 1998, and was managed by Wells Fargo Bank, NA.


TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 19 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 19
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 17 tranches, and upgraded the
ratings of 2 tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by Terwin
Mortgage Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime
residential mortgages.

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-11ABS

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2b, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2c, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2a, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2b, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2c, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-10HE

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-14HE

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-16HE

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-2HE

  -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-4HE

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-6HE

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to
2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranche AF-2 issued by TMTS 2005-14HE, tranche AF-2 issued by TMTS
2005-16HE and tranche A-1 issued by TMTS 2005-2HE are wrapped by
Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook
Negative on Nov 12, 2009).  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described above.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.


TEXAS DEPARTMENT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006 Bonds to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'B' from 'AAA' its
rating on Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs' series
2006 multifamily revenue bonds (Village Park Apartments Project),
and removed the rating from CreditWatch.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market-rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Insufficient assets to cover the carryforward balance release
  test; and

* Revenue fund is projected to fall below investment-grade levels
  in 2015.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae credit enhancement
  facility, which S&P considers to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Investments held in 'AAAm' rated market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 100.92% as of July 1, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions that have funds invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


TEXAS DEPARTMENT: S&P Downgrades Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+' from 'AAA' its
rating on Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs'
multifamily revenue bonds (Aspen Park Apartment Project), and
removed the rating from CreditWatch.

"The downgrade is based on S&P's view of the project's reliance on
short-term market-rate investments," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Ryan Butler.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to cover payments reinvestment risk
  based on the 15-day minimum notice period required for special
  redemptions; and

* Default scenario coverage is projected by Standard & Poor's to
  fall below investment-grade levels in 2025.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of these credit strengths:

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae credit enhancement
  facility, which S&P considers to be 'AAA' eligible;

* Investments held in 'AAAm' rated market fund; and

* An asset-to-liability ratio of 100.49% as of July 11, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this issue, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions that have funds invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


TIMES SQUARE: S&P Raises Rating on Mortgage Certs. to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Times
Square Hotel Trust's mortgage and lease amortizing certificates to
'BB+' from 'BB'.  At the same time, S&P revised its outlook on the
rating to stable from positive.

The action follows the Oct. 1, 2010, raising of the corporate
credit rating on Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc.
(BB+/Stable/--).

The rating on the Times Square Hotel Trust transaction is based on
the payments from Starwood on obligations pursuant to a triple-
net-lease for the W New York - Times Square Hotel, located on
Broadway at 47th St. in Manhattan.


TLR MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $11 Mil. Notes to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded notes issued by TLR
Master Trust 2001.  The downgrade was prompted by significant
decrease in lease revenue since mid-2009.  The notes are backed by
cash flow generated from lease payments on a pool of containers
and railcars, which comprise 86% and 14% of the original equipment
cost as of the closing date, respectively.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: TLR Master Trust 2001

  -- $11 million of Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on March 1, 2010, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade is prompted by a nearly 50% drop in lease revenue
since mid-2009.  As a result of the economic slow-down container
utilization rate steadily dropped as demand for containers
decreased.  For instance, between January 2009 and August 2009
utilization rate fell from 91% to 75%.  The decrease in the
utilization rate resulted in lower revenue and higher storage and
handling expenses, since the trust must pay third party depots to
store the unused containers.  As of August 2010, utilization rate
has rebounded to 96%, however the improvement was mainly
attributable to the sales of idle containers and reduction in
fleet size.

The net cash flow from container and rail car leases was not
sufficient to cover the required quarterly principal payment due
in October 2009.  As a consequence, the notes suffer a growing
principal payment shortfall.  According to the September 2010
servicer report, the outstanding principal balance of the note was
$2.2 million greater than scheduled.  Although this nonpayment of
scheduled principal payments does not constitute an event of
default, the cumulative effect of the principal payment shortfalls
is likely to impede repayment of the notes by the final maturity
date of January 31, 2017.

In addition to the principal payment shortfall, the trust has
experienced difficulties in making interest payments.  On the
January 2010 payment date, the trust withdrew $45,627 from the
interest reserve account in order to make the required interest
payment.  The trust has subsequently replenished the account from
a onetime insurance payment for damaged railcar.  The interest
reserve account currently has $1.030 million on deposit, which is
enough to cover approximately fifteen months of interest.

In an effort to reduce expenses, the trust has been actively
selling idled containers.  The number of container units in
service dropped from approximately 18,000 units in January 2009 to
approximately 9,800 units in August 2010.  The reduction in fleet
size indicates that lease revenues are not likely to return to
their previous levels, which renders the ultimate repayment of the
principal highly uncertain.

Since the repayment of the notes by the final maturity date is
highly unlikely, Moody's relied on the expected recoveries on the
container and railcar fleet for assigning its rating.  Moody's
expects recovery rate in the range of 99% to 100%.  Primary
sources of uncertainty with regard to performance of this
transaction are the demand for containers and the used container
and railcar prices.  Factors that affect these variables include
but not limited to the world trade volume and the recovery of
world economy, availability and price of new containers, and scrap
metal prices.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world largest economies.

If the used container and railcar prices decline by 10% or more,
the notes could be further downgraded in the future.

Moody's rating methodology focused on projecting container and
railcar lease revenues, which are driven by utilization rates,
lease rates, the financial stability of leases and their ability
to make lease payments.  Factors that affect these variables
include but not limited to the mix of long term and short term
lease agreements in the Trust, the demand for containers as driven
by the world trade volume and the recovery of the financial
markets.  The simulated revenues are fed through the payment
waterfall to assess potential performance of the notes under
different expected and stressed scenarios.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instrument in this transaction in the past 6 months


UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-FL1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on nine other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction, which
included the revaluation of the collateral securing the remaining
25 floating-rate loans in the pool, seven of which are currently
with the special servicers.  All of the loans are indexed to one-
month LIBOR.  The two major asset types (77.5% of the pooled trust
balance) that were the primary driver of S&P's downgrades are:

Lodging properties, which constitute 59.8% ($840.1 million) of the
pooled trust balance according to the Sept. 15, 2010, trustee
remittance report.  Based on S&P's analysis, its property
valuations have declined, on average, by 19.9% from the levels S&P
assessed in its last review dated Nov. 12, 2009.  Office
properties, which make up 17.7% ($248.5 million) of the pooled
trust balance and have experienced valuation declines, on average,
by 12.7% below its last review levels.  S&P generally attribute
the declines to lower rental rates and/or higher vacancy rates.

The other asset types are multifamily ($238.5 million, 17.0%),
land ($45.5 million, 3.2%), and health care properties
($32.0 million, 2.3%).

S&P lowered its rating on the class O-SA raked certificate to 'D
(sf)' following interest shortfalls to the class for the past
seven months, resulting primarily from special servicing fees for
the St. Anthony Hotel loan.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls
to continue to affect this raked class in the future.

The class X certificate is an interest-only certificate with a
balance that references the aggregate certificate balances of the
pooled principal and interest certificates in the transaction.
S&P lowered its rating on class X based on its current criteria.

S&P previously lowered four of its ratings to 'D (sf)' due to
ongoing interest shortfalls.  S&P affirmed the four 'D (sf)'
ratings on these classes because they continue to have accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding.

                       Lodging Collateral

Lodging properties secure 13 loans in the pool totaling
$840.1 million (59.8% of the pooled trust balance).  These
properties are predominantly in Manhattan (20.8% of the pooled
trust balance); Maui, Hawaii (11.6%); and Washington, D.C.
(8.6%).  S&P based its hotel analyses, in part, on a review of
the borrowers' operating statements available for year-to-date
2010, the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2009, and the borrower's 2010
budgets, as well as Smith Travel Research reports.  S&P noted
that a reduction in business and leisure travel, in its opinion,
significantly affected the performance of lodging collateral in
2009 compared to 2008.  S&P's analysis considered current
conditions in the local lodging markets.  According to STR, the
New York and Washington, D.C., lodging markets posted 15.0% and
0.6% increases, respectively, in revenue per available room for
the first eight months of 2010 compared with 2009, whereas the
general U.S. hotel industry reported a 4.0% increase in RevPAR
for the same period.

                      Largest Lodging Loan

The Essex House loan, the largest loan in the pool, is secured by
a 515-room full-service hotel and five remaining sponsor-owned
residential condominium units in Manhattan.  The current trust
balance is $186.5 million (13.3% of the pooled trust balance), and
the whole-loan balance is $303.1 million.  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure $14.5 million
of mezzanine debt.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC, reported a 0.15x debt service coverage and 73.6%
occupancy for the 12 months ended June 30, 2010.  S&P's adjusted
valuation, yielding a stressed in-trust loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of 162.1%, has fallen 13.2% since its last review, primarily due
to a decline in RevPAR and an increase in operating expenses.  The
loan matures on Sept. 9, 2011, and has one 12-month extension
option remaining.

             Lodging Loans With The Special Servicers

There are two lodging loans with the special servicers.  Details
are:

The Maui Prince Resort loan, the second-largest loan in the pool,
has a trust and whole-loan balance of $192.5 million consisting
of a $162.5 million senior pooled component (11.6% of the pooled
trust balance) and a $30.0 million subordinate nonpooled component
that supports the "MP" raked certificates.  This loan is secured
by a 310-room full-service hotel, development rights for the
construction of additional hotel rooms, two 18-hole golf courses,
and 1,190 acres of developable land in Maui, Hawaii.  In addition,
the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure
four mezzanine loans with a maximum principal balance of
$227.5 million.

The 90-plus-days delinquent Maui loan was transferred to the
special servicer on June 18, 2009, due to imminent maturity
default.  The loan matured on July 9, 2009.  The current property
cash flow is insufficient to cover operating expenses, and
reported occupancy was 50.9% as of June 2010.  An updated October
2009 appraisal valued the property below the senior trust balance.
The special servicer for this loan, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC, has indicated that the loan has been modified following the
sale of the collateral and the assumption of the loan on Aug. 27,
2010.  As part of the loan modification, it is S&P's understanding
that the maturity of the loan was extended to July 9, 2015, with
two one-year extension options.  In addition, the new sponsor
agreed to repay servicer's advances and appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts, as well as pay down the senior loan
balance.  The master servicer, Berkadia, stated that the new
sponsor has funded $40.1 million, of which $12.5 million will be
used to pay down the principal on the senior pooled component and
the remainder will be applied against servicer's advances, ASER
amounts, and other related expenses.  Berkadia stated that it
expects the October 2010 trustee remittance report to reflect the
proceeds.

CWCapital does not anticipate returning the Maui loan to master
servicing until mid-2011 at the request of the new sponsor and the
controlling class representative.  CWCapital has stated that the
new sponsor will pay the special servicing fee from January 2011
until the loan is returned to master servicing.  Despite the loan
modification, S&P's adjusted valuation, which yielded a stressed
in-trust LTV ratio of 199.5%, is down 23.9% since its last review.
While S&P expects the modification to result in the repayment of
the accumulated interest shortfalls to classes J and K next month,
S&P may lower its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on these classes if this
does not occur.

The other lodging loan in special servicing, the St. Anthony
Hotel (St. Anthony) loan, is secured by a 352-room full-service
hotel in San Antonio, Texas.  This loan has a whole-loan balance
of $38.3 million, which consists of a $22.3 million senior pooled
component (1.6% of the pooled trust balance), a $2.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component raked to the class O-SA
certificate, and a $14.0 million subordinate nontrust junior
participation interest.  In addition, the equity interests in
the borrower of the whole loan secure $10.0 million of mezzanine
debt.

The 90-plus-days delinquent St. Anthony loan was transferred to
the special servicer, Berkadia, on Feb. 10, 2010, due to the
borrower's failure to pay operating expenses.  The reported
occupancy was 46.2% as of December 2009.  According to Berkadia,
it is pursuing foreclosure proceedings.  An updated March 2010
appraisal valued the property at slightly above the trust's pooled
balance.  S&P's adjusted valuation, which yielded a stressed in-
trust LTV ratio of 232.9%, has declined 17.7% since its last
review due to a drop in RevPAR.  S&P lowered its rating on class
O-SA to 'D (sf)' due to interest shortfalls that S&P does not
expect to be recovered in the near term.

    Lodging Loan With Maturities Within The Next Three Months

One lodging loan within the pool matures within the next three
months.  The Hilton Arlington-TX loan is secured by a 308-room
full-service hotel in Arlington, Texas.  This loan has a whole-
loan balance of $24.7 million, which consists of a $15.5 million
senior pooled component (1.1% of the pooled trust balance), a
$1.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that supports the
class O-HA raked certificate, and a $7.7 million subordinate
nontrust junior participation interest.  Berkadia reported an
11.08x DSC and 56.2% occupancy for the 12 months ended June 30,
2010.  S&P's adjusted valuation, yielding a stressed in-trust LTV
ratio of 130.7%, is on par with the levels S&P assessed in its
last review.  Accordingly, S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on
class O-HA.  This loan matures on Nov. 9, 2010, and has one one-
year extension option remaining.

           Lodging Loans With Rated Raked Certificates

In addition to the "MP", O-SA, and O-HA raked certificates,
Standard & Poor's also rates the class O-MD raked certificate.
The Marriott Washington DC loan is secured by a 470-room full-
service hotel in Washington, D.C.  This loan has a whole-loan
balance of $118.8 million, which consists of a $55.3 million
senior pooled component (3.9% of the pooled trust balance), a
$1.9 million subordinate nonpooled component raked to the class
O-MD certificate, and three subordinate nontrust junior
participation interests totaling $61.6 million.  Berkadia
reported a DSC of 14.79x and 71.2% occupancy for the 12 months
ended June 30, 2010.  S&P's adjusted valuation, which yielded a
stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 89.3%, is on par with the levels
S&P assessed in its last review.  Accordingly, S&P affirmed its
'CCC+ (sf)' rating on class O-MD.  The loan matures on May 9,
2011, and has one one-year extension option remaining.

                        Office Collateral

Office properties secure five loans totaling $248.5 million (17.7%
of the pooled trust balance).  The office properties are
concentrated in Reston and Fairfax, Va. (8.7% of the pooled trust
balance), Santa Monica, Calif. (5.3%), Boston (1.9%), and Chicago
(1.8%).  S&P based its analysis of the office properties on its
review of the borrowers' operating statements available for year-
to-date 2010, the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2009, and the
borrowers' 2010 budgets, as well as the borrowers' 2010 rent
rolls.  Most of the office properties have experienced lower
rental rates and/or higher vacancies since S&P's last review.

                       Largest Office Loan

The 2600-2800 Colorado Avenue loan, the largest office loan
and the sixth-largest loan in the pool, has a trust balance of
$75.0 million (5.3% of the pooled trust balance) and a maximum
whole-loan balance of $148.0 million.  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure two mezzanine
loans totaling $40.0 million.  This loan is secured by two five-
story office buildings and one freestanding single-story preschool
building in Santa Monica, Calif., totaling 305,750 sq. ft.
Berkadia, the master servicer, reported a 9.70x DSC for year-end
2009 and 93.5% occupancy as of March 2010.  S&P's adjusted
valuation, which yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 92.5%,
is down 6.2% since its last review, due primarily to lower in-
place rental rates.  The loan matures on July 9, 2011, and has
three one-year extension options remaining.

             Office Loans With The Special Servicers

Two office loans in the pool are with the special servicers.
Details are:

The Reston Office Portfolio loan, the eighth-largest loan in the
pool, is secured by four class A office properties totaling
513,300 sq. ft. in Reston, Va.  The loan has a trust balance of
$67.5 million (4.8% of the pooled trust balance) and a whole-loan
balance of $107.0 million.  In addition, the equity interests in
the borrower of the whole loan secure a $31.5 million mezzanine
loan.  The 30-plus-days delinquent loan was transferred to the
special servicer on June 4, 2010, due to imminent maturity
default.  The loan matured on Aug. 9, 2010, and it is S&P's
understanding that it did not meet the DSC and LTV tests necessary
for the borrower to exercise its remaining two one-year extension
options.  The special servicer for this loan, Green Loan Services
LLC, stated that it is exploring various workout strategies with
the borrower and has ordered updated appraisals.  The master
servicer reported a DSC of 6.61x for year-end 2009 and a combined
occupancy of 46.7% as of June 2010.  S&P's adjusted valuation,
which yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 147.1%, has
declined 21.6% since S&P's last review due to lower-than-expected
occupancy.

The 281-321 Summer Street loan, secured by two office buildings
totaling 257,700 sq. ft. in Boston, has a trust balance of
$26.0 million (1.9% of the pooled trust balance) and a whole-loan
balance of $51.0 million.  In addition, the equity interests in
the borrower of the whole loan secure a $15.2 million mezzanine
loan.  This loan, which is current, was transferred to the special
servicer, CT Investment Management Co. LLC, on April 5, 2010, due
to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on May 9, 2010,
and it is S&P's understanding that it did not meet the DSC test
necessary for the borrower to exercise its two remaining 12-months
extension options.  CT stated that the loan has since been
modified (on Aug. 5, 2010).  The loan modification included
extending the maturity to June 9, 2011, with three one-year
extension options.  In addition, CT indicated that it will waive
the special servicing and workout fees on this loan and expects
the loan to be returned to master servicing as early as next
month.  Berkadia reported a 10.21x DSC for year-end 2009 and 54.6%
occupancy as of July 2010.  S&P's adjusted valuation, which
yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 106.4%, has fallen 19.4%
since its last review due to lower-than-expected occupancy.

                 Other Specially Serviced Loans

In addition to the four loans S&P discussed above, three other
loans secured by land are with the special servicers.  Details
are:

The Atlantic Towers loan is secured by three land parcels totaling
2.1 acres in Washington, D.C.  This loan has a trust and whole-
loan balance of $21.6 million (1.5% of the pooled trust balance).
In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole
loan secure two mezzanine loans totaling $18.4 million.  This 90-
plus-days delinquent loan was transferred to the special servicer,
Berkadia, on May 1, 2009, due to imminent maturity default, and
the borrower failed to pay off the loan upon its May 9, 2009,
maturity date.  According to Berkadia, it is pursuing foreclosure
proceedings.  An updated June 2010 appraisal valued the property
above the trust balance.  S&P's adjusted valuation, yielding a
stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 192.9%, has increased 41.8% since
its last review.  The RexCorp NJ/Long Island Land loan is secured
by four parcels of unimproved land totaling 230 acres in Madison
Borough and Chatham Township, N.J., and East Patchogue, N.Y.  The
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $13.9 million (1.0% of
the pooled trust balance).  The equity interests in the borrower
of the whole loan secure mezzanine debt with a maximum principal
balance of $8.8 million.  The 60-plus-days delinquent loan was
transferred to the special servicer, Berkadia, on Feb. 5, 2010,
due to imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on Feb. 11,
2010.  Berkadia has indicated that it is currently pursuing
foreclosure proceedings.  An updated May 2010 appraisal valued the
property below the trust balance.  S&P's adjusted valuation, which
yielded a stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 358.1%, has declined
63.4% since its last review.

The RexCorp Plainview Land loan, secured by two vacant land
parcels totaling 165 acres in Plainview, N.Y., has a trust and
whole-loan balance of $10.0 million.  The equity interests in the
borrower of the whole loan secure mezzanine debt with a maximum
principal balance of $15.1 million.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer, Berkadia, on Feb. 5, 2010, due to imminent
maturity default.  The borrower was unable to pay off the loan
upon its final Feb. 11, 2010, maturity.  According to Berkadia,
the loan has since been modified.  The modification terms included
a reduction in principal balance, an interest rate increase, and
an extension of the maturity date to May 11, 2011, with a 12-month
extension option.  S&P's adjusted valuation, which yielded a
stressed in-trust LTV ratio of 278.9%, has fallen 75.3% since its
last review.

             Other Loan With Rated Raked Certificates

In addition to the raked certificates S&P discussed above,
Standard & Poor's also rates the class O-BH raked certificate in
the pool.  The Beverly HCPI loan has a trust and whole-loan
balance of $35.0 million that consists of a $32.0 million senior
pooled component (2.3% of the pooled trust balance) and a $3.0
million subordinate nonpooled component that supports the class O-
BH raked certificate.  This loan is secured by six skilled-nursing
facilities totaling 852 beds in Indiana and Wisconsin.  In
addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan
secure a $7.0 million mezzanine loan.  Berkadia reported a DSC of
15.47x and 88.6% occupancy for the 12 months ended March 31, 2010.
S&P's adjusted valuation, yielding a stressed in-trust LTV ratio
of 78.4%, is comparable to the levels S&P assessed in its last
review.  Accordingly, S&P affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on class
O-BH.  This loan matures on April 9, 2011, and has one one-year
extension option remaining.

                         Ratings Lowered

              UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
               ------
   Class    To           From           Credit enhancement (%)
   -----    --           ----           ----------------------
   A-1      AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)                        44.51
   A-2      B+  (sf)     BB+ (sf)                        22.47
   B        B (sf)       BB (sf)                         18.39
   C        B- (sf)      BB- (sf)                        16.18
   D        CCC+ (sf)    B+ (sf)                         14.24
   E        CCC (sf)     B (sf)                          12.31
   F        CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)                         10.37
   G        CCC- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)                        8.43
   H        CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)                         6.36
   O-SA     D (sf)       CCC- (sf)                         N/A
   X        AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)                          N/A

                        Ratings Affirmed

             UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

   Class          Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
   -----          ------                ----------------------
   J              CCC- (sf)                               4.42
   K              CCC- (sf)                               2.49
   L              D (sf)                                   N/A
   O-BH           B-(sf)                                   N/A
   O-HA           CCC- (sf)                                N/A
   O-MD           CCC+ (sf)                                N/A
   M-MP           D (sf)                                   N/A
   N-MP           D (sf)                                   N/A
   O-MP           D (sf)                                   N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


WACHOVIA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-C21 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 13 classes of Wachovia Commercial
Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C21 on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-J, $215.323M, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $65.003M, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $32.502M, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $60.941M, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $36.564M, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $40.627M, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, $32.502M, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, $40.627M, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, $16.250M, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, $16.251M, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Nov. 12, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

The classes were placed on review due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated November 12, 2009.

                   Deal And Performance Summary

As of the September 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to
$2.40 billion from $3.25 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 214 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 40% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 3% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  The pool includes two loan with underlying ratings,
representing 6% of the pool.

Forty-eight loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $18.0 million loss (39%
loss severity on average).  Currently, 12 loans, representing 6%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the 110 North Wacker Drive Loan ($44.3 million --
2% of the pool), which is secured by a 227,000 square foot, office
property located in Chicago, Illinois.  The borrower is General
Growth Properties and the building serves as GGP's corporate
headquarters.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to GGP filing for bankruptcy.  The loan matures
in October 2010 and GGP has requested a loan extension.  The
remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate
$69.1 million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced
loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes O through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.7 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches and upgraded the ratings of 25 tranches in three
transactions issued by Washington Mutual in 2005.  Moody's
Investors Service has also upgraded the ratings of one tranche
issued by GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AF1.  The collateral
backing these transactions consists primarily of first-lien,
fixed-rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of updated loss levels on the
pools as well as corrections to certain loss and cash flow
allocation rules that were used in modeling these deals.  The
GMACM 2005-AF1 transaction has super senior support tranches that
support other senior tranches up to a pre-defined dollar limit.
The Washington Mutual 2005-7 and 2005-8 transactions, in addition
to having the aforementioned dollar support limit feature, also
have a percentage support limit feature where some super senior
support tranches only support other senior tranches up to a pre-
defined percentage of the support tranche's current balance in
each period.  The previous actions on these transactions did not
fully incorporate the dollar limit and percentage limit rules.
Moody's has also corrected additional errors in the Washington
Mutual 2005-7 and 2005-8 transactions that caused incorrect cash
flow allocation to some of the senior tranches.  The rating
actions reflect all the aforementioned corrections as well as
updated recovery on the remaining tranches.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AF1

  -- Cl. A-11, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 21, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2005-6 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-CB, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2005-8 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
WMALT Series 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Confirmed at B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 2-CB-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 8,
     2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C-X, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 8, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)


WESTWOOD CDO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class C Notes to Ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Westwood CDO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$237,825,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2022
     (current outstanding balance of $223,647,892), Upgraded to
     Aa2 (sf); previously on June 23, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$26,425,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$8,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded
     to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1
     (sf);

  -- US$19,250,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated September 13, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2609 compared to 3096
in the May 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 10.5% of the underlying portfolio versus
19.1% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$18.3 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$29.0 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
114.2%, 106.3%, 99.8%, and 95.1%, respectively, versus May 2009
levels of 106.9%, 99.7%, 94.0%, and 89.9%, respectively.  Moody's
also notes that the Class C Notes are no longer deferring interest
and that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Additionally, the rating action taken on the Class A-1 notes
considers the benefit from the continued delevering of the notes
as a result of the diversion of excess interest proceeds due to
the failure of the Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization tests.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $293.5 million, defaulted par of $18.8 million,
weighted average default probability of 26.9% (implying a WARF of
3447), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.64%,
and a diversity score of 50.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Westwood CDO II, Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2758)

  -- Class A-1: +2
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +4
  -- Class E: +1
  -- Combination Notes: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4136)

  -- Class A-1: -2
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: 0
  -- Combination Notes: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.64%)

  -- Class A-1: +1
  -- Class A-2: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: 0
  -- Combination Notes: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.64%)

  -- Class A-1: 0
  -- Class A-2: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: 0
  -- Combination Notes: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


* S&P Cuts Rating on North Carolina Medical Care's Bonds to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on North
Carolina Medical Care Commissions' multifamily housing revenue
bonds (McDowell Nursing Center) series 2002A to 'BB+' from 'AAA',
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

"The rating action is based on S&P's view of the project's
reliance on short-term market rate investments," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Renee J. Berson.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity; and

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2035.

Credit strengths in the issue include S&P's view of:

* The high credit quality of the Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed
  security (considered to be 'AAA' eligible); Investments held in
  'AAAm'-rated Fidelity Institutional Money Market Funds: Treasury
  Portfolio money market fund; and

* Bond bebt service coverage within investment-grade level until
  maturity.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on its current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  S&P
believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Six CDO Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
tranches from six U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed five of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
16 other tranches from seven transactions.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

The 10 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $2.039 billion.  All six of the affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of U.S. RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                         Rating Actions

                                   Rating
                                   ------
Transaction            Class   To        From
-----------            -----   --        ----
E*Trade ABS CDO I      A-2     BB+ (sf)   A (sf) /Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO VI          B       BB+ (sf)   AAA (sf)
C-Bass CBO VI          C       BB- (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO VI          D       CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO VI          E       CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)
Libra CDO              SrSwap  D (sf)     CCC+srs (sf)/WatchNeg
Structured Finance     A       CC (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Advisors ABS III
Sherwood Funding CDO   A-1     CC (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
Varick Structured      A-1     CC (sf)    CCC (sf)
  Asset Fund
Varick Structured      A-2     CC (sf)    CCC (sf)
  Asset Fund

                        Ratings Affirmed

    Transaction                           Class     Rating
    -----------                           -----     ------
    Blue Heron Funding IX                 Cert      AAA (sf)
    Blue Heron Funding VII                Cert      AAA (sf)
    C-Bass CBO VI                         A         AAA (sf)
    E*Trade ABS CDO I                     B         CC (sf)
    E*Trade ABS CDO I                     C-1       CC (sf)
    E*Trade ABS CDO I                     C-2       CC (sf)
    E*Trade ABS CDO I                     Pref Shs  CC (sf)
    E*Trade ABS CDO I                     Comp Sec  CC (sf)
    Libra CDO                             C         CC (sf)
    Libra CDO                             D         CC (sf)
    Libra CDO                             X         CC (sf)
    Sherwood Funding CDO                  C         CC (sf)
    Sherwood Funding CDO                  D         CC (sf)
    Structured Finance Advisors ABS III   B         CC (sf)
    Structured Finance Advisors ABS III   C         CC (sf)
    Structured Finance Advisors ABS III   Pref Shs  CC (sf)

                    Other Ratings Outstanding

          Transaction                   Class   Rating
          -----------                   -----   ------
          Libra CDO                     A       D (sf)
          Libra CDO                     B       D (sf)
          Sherwood Funding CDO          A-2     D (sf)
          Sherwood Funding CDO          B-1     D (sf)
          Sherwood Funding CDO          B-2     D (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 34 Classes From Five CMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 34
classes of certificates from five U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transactions due to interest shortfalls.  S&P lowered
its ratings on 23 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because S&P expects
these downgrades to continue.

The 23 downgraded classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have
experienced interest shortfalls for six or more months.  The
recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are
primarily due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced loans;

* Lack of servicer advancing for loans where nonrecoverable
  advance declarations have been made; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing fees
that are likely, in its view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

Eleven of the 34 classes experienced shortfalls for four months or
less and are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in
the future.  If these shortfalls continue, S&P will likely further
downgrade these classes to 'D (sf)'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses where nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5

S&P lowered its ratings on the class M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5
due to recurring interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related
to eight of the 11 loans that are currently with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the Sept. 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$32.2 million were in effect for eight loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $170,635, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.1 million.  Standard & Poor's considered eight ASERs
($170,635), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees in determining its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls totaled $189,723 and have
affected all of the classes subordinate to and including class M.
Class O has experienced interest shortfalls for nine months, and
classes P and Q have experienced interest shortfalls for 11
months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the BACM 2007-5 transaction consists of 97
loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.83 billion.  As of the
Sept. 10, 2010, remittance report, 11 loans ($176.0 million; 9.6%)
in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of
these loans is: two ($47.1 million, 2.6%) are real estate owned,
five ($35.9 million, 2.0%) are in foreclosure, one ($4.0 million,
0.2%) is more than 90 days delinquent, and three ($89.0 million,
4.8%) are in their grace periods.

              LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4 due to
recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs
related to 10 of the 17 loans that are currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management, as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$76.7 million were in effect for 15 loans.  The total reported
ASER amount was $321,273 and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.8 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 10 ASERs
($265,879), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees and interest not advanced
($115,589) on four loans, in determining its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $422,559 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class J.  Classes K,
L, M, N, P, Q, and S have experienced interest shortfalls for
seven (K), eight (L, M & N), nine (P), and 10 (Q and S) months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2006-C4 transaction consists of
145 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.93 billion.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 17 loans ($191.7 million;
10.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent loans is: Four ($100.8 million, 5.5%) are
REO, seven ($55.5 million, 3.0%) are in foreclosure, and six
($35.3 million, 1.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2 due to
recurring interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 17
of the 22 loans that are currently with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc., as well as special servicing fees.  As of the
Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $107.2 million
were in effect for 17 loans.  The total reported ASER amount
was $541,294, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$5.3 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 12 ASERs ($484,731),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $683,699 and have affected all
of the classes subordinate to and including class H.  Classes L,
M, and N have experienced interest shortfalls for 12 months, and
S&P expects these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2007-C2 transaction consists of
166 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.48 billion.  As of
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report, 22 loans ($647.7 million;
18.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: seven ($101.1 million, 2.9%) are REO,
four (31.9 million, 0.9%) are in foreclosure, eight
($272.0 million, 7.8%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one
($53.3 million, 1.5%) is less than 30 days delinquent, and two
($189.3 million, 5.4%) are current.

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR18 due to recurring interest shortfalls resulting
from ASERs related to 11 of the 16 loans that are currently with
the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, as well as
special servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 13, 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $113.9 million were in effect for 13 loans.
The total reported ASER amount was $258,339, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $2.56 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered seven ASERs ($222,829), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees in
determining its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
totaled $308,837 and have affected all of the classes subordinate
to and including class K.  Classes M, N, and O have experienced
interest shortfalls for six months, while classes P and Q have
experienced interest shortfalls for 11 months, respectively, and
S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the BSCMS 2007-PWR18 transaction consists
of 183 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.45 billion.  As
of the Sept. 13, 2010, remittance report, 16 loans ($371.0
million; 15.11%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The
payment status of these loans is: nine ($134.5 million, 5.48%) are
in foreclosure, 4 loans ($63.5 million, 2.59%) are more than 90
days delinquent, 1 loan ($8.8 million, 0.36%) is more than 60 days
delinquent, and 2 loans ($164.1 million, 6.69%) are late and less
than one month delinquent.

             ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, and S
certificates from ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2007-8 (MLCFC 2007-8) due to recurring interest shortfalls
resulting from ASERs related to 15 of the 23 loans that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR, as well as special
servicing fees.  As of the Sept. 14, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $63.6 million were in effect for 16 loans.  The total
reported ASER amount was $325,759, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $2.69 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 13
ASERs ($277,469), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees in determining its rating
actions.  The reported interest shortfalls totaled $427,261 and
have affected all of the classes subordinate to and including
class J.  Classes M, N, P, and Q have experienced interest
shortfalls for nine months, while class S has experienced interest
shortfalls for 10 months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to
recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the MLCFC 2007-8 transaction consists of
216 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.40 billion.  As of
the Sept. 14, 2010, remittance report, 23 loans ($473.1 million;
19.7%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these loans is: one ($3.6 million; 0.15%) is REO, two
($8 million; 0.33%) are in foreclosure, 15 ($173.0 million; 7.20%)
are more than 90 days delinquent, two ($3.5 million; 0.14%) are
more than 60 days delinquent, two ($35.1 million; 1.46%) are late
and less than one month delinquent, and one ($250 million; 10.41%)
is current but with the special servicer.

                         Ratings Lowered

        Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement (%) Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------ -----------  -----------
M     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)           2.56    11,720       19,050
N     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)           2.31    17,620       49,541
O     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            1.93    26,430      196,370
P     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            1.80     8,810       85,978
Q     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.55    17,620      193,820

            LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement (%) Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------ -----------  -----------
J     CCC-(sf)   CCC+ (sf)           4.64    12,637        17,958
K     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            3.15   138,555       886,886
L     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            2.75    34,983       277,447
M     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           2.20    46,644       373,154
N     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.93    23,317       186,539
P     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.53    34,983       305,509
Q     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.26    23,322       233,221
S     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.98    23.322       233,221

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement (%) Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------ -----------  -----------
H     CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)             3.64    74,302         74,302
J     CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)             2.62   184,011        359,309
K     CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)            1.47   207,013        414,021
L     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.96    75,738        786,331
M     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.71    37,869        454,430
N     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.58    18,935        227,215

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement (%) Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------ -----------  -----------
K     CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)             2.98   24,261          24,261
L     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)           2.60   36,507          36,507
M     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            2.22   36,507         167,575
N     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.84   36,504         219,021
O     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.58   24,338         146,030
P     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.45   12,169          94,589
Q     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.32   12,169         133,861

             ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
            Rating                                interest shortfalls ($)
            ------                                -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement (%) Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------ -----------  -----------
J     CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)            3.75    26,936          28,271
K     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)          3.11    78,178         197,921
L     CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)           2.48    65,564         236,136
M     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          2.10    39,340         249,805
N     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          1.97    13,112         118,008
P     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          1.85    13,112         118,008
Q     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          1.59    26,228         236,055
S     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)          1.47    13,112         120,087

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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