TCR_Public/100926.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 26, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 267

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ABACUS LTD: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 21 Classes of Notes
ABERDEEN LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
AIR 2: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS: S&P Assigns Rating on New Credit Facility

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-1 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-1 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 145 Tranches
BOSTON HARBOR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Note Classes

BUSINESS LOAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 Classes of Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-1 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-1 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-1 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-2 Certs.

CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
CENTRAL FALLS, R.I.: Moody's Reviews B3 Rating on Debt
CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certificates
CHYPS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-C3 Certs.

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Certs. to 'D'
CLEARWATER PAPER: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Series 2003-C3 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Rating on 2007-TFL2 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Series 1997-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Series 1999-C1 Certs.
CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches

DEUTSCHE ALT-B: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2006-AB3 Tranches
FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 230 Tranches
FIRST UNION: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three 1999-C2 Certs.
FRANKLIN AUTO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'
FRANKLIN CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches

G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Certs.
GEM VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
GEM LIGOS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
GOOD SAMARITAN: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on $68.8 Mil. Bonds
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-EOP Certificates

GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Tranches
GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 2006-4 Notes
HOPKINS COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $22.7 Bonds to 'Ba1'
INDYMAC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 53 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-CIBC8 Certs.

JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 72 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-FL2 Certificates
KEY COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-SL1 Certs.
KIRKWOOD CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
LARGO LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches

LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-MF1 Certs.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-MF5 Certs.
LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 68 RMBS Tranches
LEHMAN XS: Moody's Junks Rating on Class 1-A2B Notes From 'Ba2'
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2005-MKB2 Securities

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-IQ3 Certs.
NORTHWESTERN INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Notes
OHIO VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Hospital Bonds to 'Ba2'
PIMA COUNTY: S&P Raises Rating on Two Revenue Bonds From 'BB'
PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2001-C1 Certs.

PROTECTIVE FINANCE: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Certificates
RAAM GLOBAL: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating on $150 Mil. Notes
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C3 Certs.
STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Series 2007-6 Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class P Certs. to 'D'

WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class H Certs. to 'D'

* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on City of Bell, California's Bonds
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Tranches From Three TRUP CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 Notes From Four Hybrid CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Certs. From Two Re-Remic RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches From Four Hybird CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes From Two RMBS Deals
* S&P Junks Ratings on St. Joseph County, Indiana's Bonds

                            *********

ABACUS 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the ratings
of two classes of notes issued by ABACUS 2005-1, Limited.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
     Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

  -- US$55,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf).

ABACUS 2005-1, Limited, is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
referencing a portfolio of primarily commercial mortgage-backed
securities (31%), residential mortgage-backed securities (17.1%) and
CDO securities (32.4%), originated between 2003 and 2005.

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result of a
decrease in the number of performing reference assets in the
underlying portfolio.  This deterioration has decreased the par
coverage of the notes, as evidenced by the Trustee reported Class A-1
Overcollateralization Ratio as decreasing from 110.1% in April 2009 to
100% in August 2010.  Additionally, approximately
$130 million of RMBS within the underlying portfolio are currently on
review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss
projections.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there exist
a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a macro level
and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the general macro
uncertainties are those surrounding future housing prices, pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing,
unemployment rate and interest rates.  However, in light of the
performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is
unlikely that the ratings announced are sensitive to further change.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted above,
the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which are currently
on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of the
lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's press
releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for Alt-A, and
January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated ratings impact
of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress varied based on
vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) were stressed by eleven notches,
and securities currently rated A (sf) or Baa (sf) were stressed by
eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba (sf) or B
(sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current Caa (sf)
securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and
Option-ARM securities, currently Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) rated securities
were stressed by eight notches, and securities currently rated A (sf)
, Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were stressed by five notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the B range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while
current Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) or Baa
(sf) were stressed by five notches, Ba (sf) rated securities were
stressed to Caa3 (sf), and B (sf) or Caa (sf) securities were treated
as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the first half of 2006,
those currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by four notches, while Aa
(sf), A (sf) and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba (sf) range were
stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current B (sf) and Caa (sf) securities
were treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the second
half of 2006, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba
(sf) were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated securities
were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities
were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently Ba (sf)
rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated
securities were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated
securities were treated as Ca (sf).

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-2007
subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches if the
RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th for
Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will have
varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf ) or Baa
(sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches, Aa (sf) and A
(sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by six
notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which originated
prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below, and are also
currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed to Ca
(sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and asset
type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating analysis
while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on review for
downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for securities that
have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS team, and that are
no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features,
the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection
bias in the portfolio.  All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table, and
the original rating of the instrument along with its average life to
infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution for
the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within CDOROMv2.6
to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within this framework,
defaults are generated so that they occur with the frequency indicated
by the adjusted default probability pool (the default probability
associated with the current rating multiplied by the Resecuritization
Stress) for each credit in the reference.  Specifically, correlated
defaults are simulated using a normal (or "Gaussian") copula model
that applies the asset correlation framework.  Recovery rates for
defaulted credits are generated by applying within the simulation the
distributional assumptions, including the correlation between recovery
values.  Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each
of the Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

The capital structure is incorporated into CDOROM by specifying the
attachment point and the thickness of the tranche.  The Expected Loss
(EL) for each tranche is the weighted average of losses to each
tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight is the likelihood
of the scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as the shortfall
in the present value of cash flows to the tranche relative to the
present value of the promised cash flows.  The discount rate used to
present value is the current swap rate plus the promised spread on the
tranche based on its remaining maturity.  Solely for the purpose of
discounting losses, Moody's assumes that losses on the tranche occur
60% of the way through the maturity of the tranche.  The final EL of
the synthetic SF CDO tranche is the discounted average of the tranche
loss across all the scenarios simulated in CDOROM.  Since the EL is
based on a simulation process, the convergence of the simulation will
depend, in part, on the number of iterations chosen for the
simulation.  Moody's applies a 99% confidence interval to the EL
result using a Standard Error equal to the square root of the EL
Variance divided by the number of Monte Carlo simulations.  If this
confidence interval adjustment is significant, a larger number of
iterations may be used to reduce the standard error.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.


ABACUS LTD: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 21 Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the ratings
of 21 classes of notes issued by four synthetic ABS CDOs.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: Abacus 2006-14, Ltd.

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045-1 ,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Series 2 Variable Rate Notes, Due
     2045, Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to
     Ca (sf);

  -- US$36,684,375 Class B Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Issuer: Abacus 2006-15, Ltd.

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$36,000,000 Class A-3 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf);

  -- US$37,500,000 Class B Series 1 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf);

  -- US$6,000,000 Class B Series 2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2037,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf);

  -- US$41,150,000 Class C Series 1 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$2,850,000 Class C Series 2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2037,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$14,650,000 Class D Series 1 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2045,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$2,850,000 Class D Series 2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2037,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 29, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf).

Issuer: Abacus 2006-HGS1, Ltd.

  -- US$99,000,000 Class A-1 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2039,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 24, 2008 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$94,500,000 Class A-2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2039,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf);

  -- US$40,500,000 Class B Variable Rate Notes, Due 2039,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf);

  -- US$20,250,000 Class C Variable Rate Notes, Due 2046,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf);

  -- US$9,000,000 Class D Variable Rate Notes, Due 2046,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf);

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Variable Rate Notes, Due 2046,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf);

  -- US$5,400,000 Class F Variable Rate Notes, Due 2046,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 6, 2008 Downgraded to C
     (sf).

Issuer: Abacus 2007-AC1, Ltd.

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2038,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$142,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Rate Notes, Due 2038,
     Withdrawn; previously on April 4, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

Abacus 2006-14, Ltd., Abacus 2006-15, Ltd., Abacus 2006-HGS1, Ltd.,
and Abacus 2007-AC1, Ltd., are synthetic collateralized debt
obligation issuances referencing a portfolio consisting primarily of
residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed
securities.

The credit ratings have been withdrawn because Moody's Investors
Service believes it has insufficient or otherwise inadequate
information to support the maintenance of the credit ratings.


ABERDEEN LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd.:

  -- US$376,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2018 (current balance of $363,049,707),
     Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3 (sf);

  -- US$29,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
     Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$25,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on July 17, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$19,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on July 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$17,250,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018 (current balance of
     $13,685,638), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 17,
     2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in July 2009.  Based on the
July 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is 2687
compared to 3511 in May 2009, which is in compliance with the covenant
of 2954, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ and below make up
approximately 6.66% of the underlying portfolio versus 20.03% in May
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of principal proceeds into substitute assets with higher
ratings.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class
D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 119.57%,
112.36%, 107.43%, and 103.74% respectively, versus May 2009 levels of
114.18%, 107.43%, 102.73%, and 99.25%, respectively.  Currently all
overcollateralization tests are in compliance with the exception of
the Class E overcollateralization test.  In particular, the Class E
overcollateralization ratio has increased due to the diversion of
excess interest to delever the Class E Notes in the event of a Class E
overcollateralization test failure.  Moody's also notes that the Class
D Notes are no longer deferring interest and all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different
from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds of $464.58 million, defaulted par of $17.97
million, weighted average default probability of 29.05% (implying a
WARF of 3808), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
42.59%, and a diversity score of 50.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool
and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In
each case, historical and market performance trends, and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd., issued in March 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd.
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in August 2009.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this
issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published
in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3046)

  -- Class A: +3
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +3
  -- Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4570)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -3
  -- Class E: 0

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on
all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors
are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.59%)

  -- Class A: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.59%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2014 which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO notes' performance may also
be impacted by 1) the managers' investment strategies and behavior,
and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described below:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming worse
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


AIR 2: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions for Air 2 US enhanced
equipment notes:

  -- Series A enhanced equipment notes affirmed at 'BB'; assigned
     Outlook Positive;

  -- Series B enhanced equipment notes affirmed at 'B-'; assigned
     Outlook Positive;

  -- Series C enhanced equipment notes revised from 'C/DR6' to
     'C/RR4';

  -- Series D enhanced equipment notes revised from 'C/DR6' to
     'D/RR6'.

Air 2 US is a special purpose Cayman Islands company created to issue
the EENs, hold the proceeds as Permitted Investments, and enter into a
risk transfer agreement.  AIR 2 US has entered into the risk transfer
agreement, the Payment Recovery Agreement, with a subsidiary of
Airbus.  The primary provision of the PRA states that if American
Airlines, Inc., or United Air Lines fail to pay scheduled rentals
under existing subleases of aircraft with subsidiaries of Airbus, AIR
2 US will pay these rental deficiencies to a subsidiary of Airbus.
These deficiency payments will come from the Permitted Investments.
As such, the greatest risk of the transaction is the bankruptcy risk
of the lessee airlines.

Fitch utilized its 'Surveillance Criteria for Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificates', in the review of AIR 2 US.  However, unlike traditional
EETCs, the transaction has exposure to two airlines.  To compensate
for this factor, the starting point for the series A and B EEN ratings
is the lower of the two airlines Issuer Default Rating.  In this case,
AMR is rated 'CCC', whereas UAL is rated 'B-' with a Positive Outlook
by Fitch.  As such, the anchor for the series A and B EEN ratings was
'CCC'.  Also unlike traditional EETCs, the trust will not be able to
liquidate the portfolio of aircraft upon a default of either airline.
Instead, any payment recovery would come from the re-leasing of the
aircraft.  As such, Fitch looked to the level of lease rate
deterioration that each class could withstand in determining the
amount of uplift above the IDR to award each series of notes.
According to Fitch's EETC Surveillance Criteria, the series A EENs are
eligible for five notches of uplift, while the series B EENs are
eligible for only one notch of recovery uplift.  These results support
the current ratings of 'BB' and 'B-' for series A and B, respectively,
and lead to the affirmation of the ratings.

The Positive Outlooks on the series A and B EENs reflect the fact that
the lease payments, and thus the risk attributable to AMR, will end
with the October 2011 payment date.  Based on the current ratings of
each airline, it is possible that the elimination of this risk could
lead to an upgrade to the series A and B EENs.

Both the series C and D notes continue to shortfall on interest
payments.  The 'C' rating on the series C notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that the notes will likely be unable to recoup missed
interest payments and pay remaining note principal in full.  The
revision of the series D rating to 'D' indicates that Fitch does not
expect that current missed interest payments will be recouped as the
notes are not expected to receive any distributions.


ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS: S&P Assigns Rating on New Credit Facility
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'BBB-' issue-level rating to Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s new five-year
credit facility, consisting of a $600 million revolving credit
facility and a $400 million term loan.  S&P also assigned a '1'
recovery rating, indicating S&P's expectation that lenders would
receive a very high (90%-100%) recovery in a payment default scenario.
S&P will withdraw the rating on the existing credit facility once the
new facility closes.

ATK's revenues have increased significantly in recent years, mostly as
a result of a series of acquisitions that have improved product and
program diversity, but also due to good organic growth.  Although the
company faces certain challenges over the coming year, including
likely reductions in NASA-related revenues and increased pension
expense, S&P expects the company to maintain credit metrics consistent
with S&P's expectations for the ratings, with fully adjusted debt to
EBITDA of around 3.5x.  ATK is the leading manufacturer of solid
rocket motors for space-launch vehicles and strategic missiles, and is
second in the market for tactical missiles.  The company is also the
largest provider of small-caliber ammunition to the U.S. military and
has strong positions in tank and other types of ammunition.

                           Rating List

                     Alliant Techsystems Inc.

       Corporate Credit Rating                BB/Stable/--

                            New Rating

                     Alliant Techsystems Inc.

            $1 Bil 5-yr credit facility           BBB-
             Recovery Rating                      1


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes and
affirmed nine classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-1:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 28, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2F, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 28, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 28, 2001
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 2, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2007
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 28, 2001
     Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 28, 2001
     Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 14, 2004
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 14, 2004
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2007
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 13, 2006
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Oct. 13, 2006
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans and concerns about refinancing
risk associated with loans facing near-term maturity in an adverse
market.  Sixty-four loans, representing 62% of the pool, have matured
or will mature within the next 12 months.  Nine of the loans,
representing 13% of the pool, have a Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio less than 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for
the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 9.2%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 3.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 11.6% of
the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of base and
stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at:

   http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
pay down analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV
ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations
may be considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled
credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or determined
based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For
fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated September 25, 2008.  See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity
page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

                         Deal Performance

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 47% to
$506.5 million from $948.1 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 28% of the pool.  Seventeen loans, representing 38% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 35% of the pool.

Twenty-six loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $31.9 million (23% loss severity).
Fourteen loans, representing 15% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Historic
Mission Inn Loan ($15.1million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by
a luxury hotel in Riverside, California.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 due to the borrower's request for a
discounted pay off.  The loan matures in January 2011.  The loan is
current.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $20.0 million loss
(36% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seventeen poorly
performing loans representing 18% of the pool and has estimated a
$21.9 million loss (18% expected loss based on a 56% probability of
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with partial year 2009 operating results for 62%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 72% compared to 88% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.9% to
the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.68X and 1.64X, respectively, compared to 1.35X
and 1.40X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 25 compared to 55 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the PCS Holdings Corp Loan
($20.6 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 354,900
square foot office complex located in Scottsdale, Arizona.  The
property is 100% triple net leased to PCS Health Systems Inc through
September 2021.  The loan has amortized 5% since last review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 2.01X, respectively, compared to 70%
and 1.50X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Talley Plaza Loan ($16.0 million --
3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 223,400 square foot office
building located in Phoenix, Arizona.  This loan is currently on the
servicer's watchlist due to occupancy concerns.  The property was 79%
leased as of March 2010 compared to 76% at last review.  The loan has
amortized 5% since last review and 11% since securitization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to
144% and 0.77X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Northwest-Hidden Valley Loan
($14.7 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 119,000
square foot office property located in Bellevue, Washington.  The loan
has amortized 5% since last review and 11% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.06X, respectively,
compared to 125% and 0.91X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2003-1 and removed seven of them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 25 additional classes from the same
transaction and removed six of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

Seven of the lowered ratings were on pooled classes.  The downgrades
of these certificates primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the interest
shortfalls that have affected the trust, as reflected on the revised
September 2010 remittance report.  All of the pooled classes
subordinate to class H were reported to have accumulated interest
shortfalls.  Based on its analysis of the assets with the special
servicer, S&P believes that all of the downgraded pooled classes will
be susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  The downgrade of one
and affirmation of seven other ratings on the "ES" raked certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the Emerald Square Mall whole loan.  The
eight "ES" raked classes derive 100% of their cash flows from a
subordinate nonpooled portion of this loan.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the pooled principal and interest
certificates reflect liquidity support and subordination levels that
are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  The affirmations of
S&P's ratings on the "SB" and "WB" raked certificates are due to the
defeasance of the subordinate nonpooled portions of the Sotheby's
Building and Wellbridge
Portfolio whole loans, from which the "SB" and "WB" raked certificates
derive 100% of their cash flows, respectively.  The loans are
performing as S&P expected.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class XC
interest-only certificate based on its current criteria.

       Prior Creditwatch Placements And Interest Shortfalls

Standard & Poor's previously placed its ratings on 13 of the pooled
certificates (class B and all pooled classes subordinate to it) on
CreditWatch with negative implications, reflecting S&P's preliminary
analysis of interest shortfalls affecting the pooled classes as of the
Sept. 13, 2010, remittance report date.  The interest shortfalls
occurred primarily due to the master servicer's recovery of $1.2
million of outstanding prior advances on two assets.  The master
servicer made nonrecoverable advance declarations on the assets and
decided to stop making future principal and interest advances.
However, the $1.2 million was recovered as reported in a restated
remittance report, dated
Sept. 14, 2010, that the trustee posted to its Web site.  Accumulated
interest shortfalls were reported on all of the pooled classes
subordinate to class H.

As of the restated September 2010 remittance report, the trust
experienced monthly interest shortfalls primarily related to the
specially serviced assets in the pool.  The $122,296 monthly interest
shortfall was primarily related to the Lincoln Center Professional
Office Building ($8.9 million total exposure, 1.0%) and Etowah
Crossing Shopping Center ($3.6 million, 0.4%).  Both assets are real
estate owned and with the special servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC.
Also contributing to the reported interest shortfalls were appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions associated with three of the five
additional assets with the special servicer.  These three assets have
appraisal reduction amounts totaling $7.1 million in effect, which led
to an aggregate ASER of $34,895.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the September 2010 remittance report, four ($13.6 million, 1.6%)
loans and three ($19.1 million, 2.2%) REO assets in the pool were with
the special servicer.  The payment status of the specially serviced
loans is as follows: two ($4.4 million, 0.5%) are 90-plus days
delinquent, one ($5.6 million, 0.7%) is in its grace period, and one
($3.6 million, 0.4%) is current.

The Regal Springs Apartments asset ($10.2 million total exposure,
1.2%) is a 220-unit multifamily property in Dallas, Texas, and is the
largest asset with the special servicer.  The asset was transferred to
the special servicer in October 2008 and is classified as REO.  As of
December 2009, the asset had a reported debt service coverage of 0.39x
and an ARA of $6.0 million in effect.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a
significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Lincoln Center Professional Office Building asset
($8.9 million total exposure, 1.0%) is a 91,803-sq.-ft. office
property in Scottsdale, Ariz., and is the second-largest asset with
the special servicer.  The asset was transferred to the special
servicer in April 2008 and is classified as REO.  The master servicer
has made a nonrecoverable advance determination in connection with the
asset and has stopped advancing interest and principal.  Current
financial and occupancy data is not available.  Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The four remaining specially serviced loans and the Etowah Crossing
Shopping Center REO asset have individual exposures that represent
less than 0.7% of the deal balance.  As mentioned above, the master
servicer has made a nonrecoverable advance determination in connection
with the Etowah Crossing Shopping Center asset and has stopped
advancing interest and principal.  ARAs totaling $1.1 million are in
effect for two of the four loans.  Standard & Poor's estimated losses
for the five assets, and arrived at a weighted-average loss severity
of 35.98%.

Three loans totaling $32.0 million (3.7%) were previously with the
special servicer and have been returned to the master servicer.
Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal and
interest payments on the loans (including the final balloon payments,
if applicable) if they continue to perform and remain with the master
servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $857.7 million, down from $1.13 billion at
issuance.  The pool includes 86 loans and three REO assets, down from
112 loans at issuance.  The master servicer provided full-year 2008,
interim-2009, or full-year 2009 financial information for 97.9% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.82x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio were 1.61x and 76.3%, respectively.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the transaction's 19
($298.0 million, 34.8%) defeased loans, as well as the transaction's
seven ($32.7 million, 3.8%) specially serviced assets.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced assets.  The master
servicer reported a watchlist of 11 ($77.6 million, 9.1%) loans,
including two of the top 10 loan exposures, both of which S&P discuss
in detail below.  Twelve ($44.6 million, 5.2%) assets in the pool have
a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and seven ($29.2 million, 3.4%)
assets have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $334.5 million (39.0%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
2.04x for the top 10 real estate assets.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
ratio for the top 10 exposures are 1.65x and 79.0%, respectively.

The Emerald Square Mall loan is the largest loan in the pool, with a
trust balance of $127.4 million (14.8%).  The $127.4 million whole
loan consists of a $91.4 million (10.7%) senior note and a $36.0
million (4.2%) subordinate note, both of which are included in the
subject trust.  The "ES" raked certificates derive 100% of their cash
flows from the subordinate note.  The property is an anchored retail
mall containing a total of 1,022,137 sq. ft. in North Attleboro,
Mass., of which 563,715 sq. ft. serves as loan collateral.  The
property was built in 1989 and renovated in 1999.  The master servicer
reported a DSC of 1.74x for the whole loan (2.47x for the senior note
only) as of December 2009.  Occupancy was 95.0% for the same period.
S&P's updated valuation for this asset has declined 12.8% compared to
its value at issuance, resulting in an adjusted LTV ratio of 70.7% for
the whole loan.

The International Center IV loan is the fifth-largest loan in the pool
and the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has
a balance of $24.8 million (2.9%) and is secured by a 220,661-sq.-ft.
office property in Dallas, Texas.  Reported DSC and occupancy were
1.35x and 52.2% as of December 2009 and March 2010, respectively.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to the lease
termination of a major tenant, Centex Service Co., whose leased space
represented 52.0% of the property's net rentable area (NRA).
According to the watchlist comments, the space was partitioned into
two blocks, one of which has been leased to a tenant, Senior Care
Centers LLC.  The remaining block is being marketed.

The Ashby Crossing Apartments loan is the seventh-largest asset in the
pool and the second-largest asset on the master servicer's watchlist.
The loan has a balance of $23.1 million (2.7%) and is secured by a
288-unit multifamily property in Harrisonburg, Va.  The asset appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy.  As of June
2010, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.81x and 56.5%, respectively.
According to the master servicer, the property's poor occupancy is a
result of oversupply in the local market.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its current
criteria, and the lowered and affirmed ratings are consistent with its
analysis.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
                       (Pooled Certificates)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

              Rating
              ------
Class     To          From                 Credit enhancement (%)
-----     --          ----                 ----------------------
H          BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg             8.80
J          BB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg             5.95
K          B+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg              4.94
L          B- (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Neg               4.10
M          CCC+ (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg               3.27
N          CCC- (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg                2.59
O          CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg               2.09

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
                      (Pooled Certificates)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

              Rating
              ------
Class     To          From                 Credit enhancement (%)
-----     --          ----                 ----------------------
B        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg               19.53
C        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg               17.85
D        AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg               14.67
E        AA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg                13.16
F        A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg                11.65
G        A (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg                 10.14

               Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

       Class    Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    ------               ----------------------
       A-1      AAA (sf)                              24.06
       A-2      AAA (sf)                              24.06
       XC       AAA (sf)                                N/A

              Rating Lowered (Nonpooled Certificate)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class    To        From         Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --        ----         ----------------------
      ES-H     BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)                    N/A

             Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1

       Class    Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    ------               ----------------------
       ES-A     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       ES-B     AA+ (sf)                                N/A
       ES-C     AA (sf)                                 N/A
       ES-D     AA- (sf)                                N/A
       ES-E     A+ (sf)                                 N/A
       ES-F     A (sf)                                  N/A
       ES-G     A- (sf)                                 N/A
       SB-A     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       SB-B     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       SB-C     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       SB-D     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       SB-E     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       WB-A     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       WB-B     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       WB-C     AAA (sf)                                N/A
       WB-D     AAA (sf)                                N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes and downgraded three classes
from Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.'s Small Balance Commercial Loan Trust
2006-1.  A full rating list is shown below.

At origination the collateral pool consisted of 73 small balance
commercial loans with an outstanding balance of $107 million.  These
loans were mainly concentrated in hospitality properties; 88.6% of
this pool consisted of limited service hotels.  The mortgage loans
were originated by Community South Bank which was formed in the state
of Tennessee.  CSB's Small Business Lending Division was formed in
July 2003 for the purpose of originating and selling small balance
commercial mortgage loans.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. services this
transaction and is rated 'CSS2-' as a special servicer by Fitch.

As of September 2010, the pool consisted of 52 loans with an
outstanding balance of $73 million.  The pool has experienced a
significant increase in delinquencies over the past year.  The
percentage of loans more than 60 days delinquent has increased from
5.79% in April 2009 to 22.05% in September 2010.

Distributions of principal and interest are made on the 25th of each
month and commenced in December 2006.  Per the transaction documents,
principal and interest are distributed sequentially.  The class A bond
is the only bond to have received principal payments and the factor on
this bond is currently 56% of the original balance.

The expected loss utilized for this analysis is 15.3%.  To determine
the expected loss on the loan pool, Fitch assumed a 100% default
frequency on the delinquent loans.  The severity on these loans was
determined by estimating the expected loss using updated appraisal
values.  In cases where updated appraisals were over six to 12 months
old Fitch applied a 20% haircut to the most recent appraisal value to
estimate additional declines in appraised value.  If the appraisal was
over 12 months old, a 40% haircut in the appraisal value was applied.
If no updated appraisal was available, Fitch assumed a 70% loss
severity based on historical averages experienced by similar
collateral.  The stressed scenario loss assumptions were determined
using the Fitch expected loss with the appropriate CMBS multiples for
each rating category.

After determining the underlying pools' projected base-case and
stressed scenario loss assumptions, Fitch performed cash flow analysis
to ascertain the amount of collateral loss each class could sustain.
Due to the significant increase in delinquencies and the high loss
severities experienced on similar properties, Fitch has assigned a
Negative Outlook to all classes rated 'B' and above.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity Ratings where applicable:

  -- Class A (07400SAB5) at 'AAAsf/LS2' Outlook Negative;
  -- Class AIO (07400SAA7) at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M1 (07400SAC3) at 'Aasf/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M2 (07400SAD1) at 'Asf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigns Outlooks and Loss Severity and Recovery Ratings where
applicable:

  -- Class M3 (07400SAE9) to 'Bsf/LS4' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- Class M4 (07400SAF6) to 'CCCsf/RR2' from 'BBB-sf';

  -- Class B (07400SAG4) to 'CCsf/RR4' from 'BBsf''.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 145 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 145 tranches,
upgraded the ratings of three tranches and confirmed the ratings of
eight tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by Bear Stearns Alt-A
Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgages.

                         Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance deterioration in
Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment conditions
that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

In addition, the rating on the Tranche II-X-1, an interest-only
tranche issued by Bear Stearns ALT-A 2006-6, has been adjusted to
reflect the fact that the notional balance of Tranche II-X-1 is linked
to the outstanding principal balances of both Tranches II-A-1 and
II-A-2.  Previous rating actions were based on the incorrect
assumption that the notional balance of Tranche II-X-1 was linked to
the outstanding principal balance of Tranche II-A-2 only.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with
fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average
rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the
vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for the 2005, 2006 and
2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool
become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  Once the baseline
rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of
loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies
in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the
higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan
count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased
by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor
ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less
than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-4X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-5A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-5A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-6A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-6A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3X-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-3X-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-1X-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-2X-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BOSTON HARBOR: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$246,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due May 25, 2016
     (current outstanding balance of $154,697,604), Upgraded to
     Aa1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2
     (sf);

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Revolving
     Notes Due May 25, 2016 (currently undrawn), Upgraded to A2
     (sf); previously on August 18, 2009 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due May 25, 2016,
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009 Confirmed
     at B1 (sf);

  -- US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     May 25, 2016 (current outstanding balance of $15,000,783),
     Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of the
notes since the last rating action in August 2009, due to delevering
of the Class A Notes of approximately 36% or
$85.9 million.  As of the latest trustee report dated August 16, 2010,
the Senior overcollateralization ratio is reported at 120.9%, versus
the July 2009 level of 106.8%.  During the latest payment period, the
Class D Notes ceased deferring interest, and the deferred interest
balance was also substantially reduced.

Moody's notes that the deal has also benefited from improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last rating
action.  Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the last rating
action due to a decrease in the percentage of securities with ratings
on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook." Based
on the August 2010 trustee report, securities rated Caa1/CCC+ and
below make up approximately 11.4% of the underlying portfolio versus
13.3% in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different
from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds of $192 million, defaulted par of $6 million,
weighted average default probability of 21.33% (implying a WARF of
3309), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.45%, and a
diversity score of 49.  These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived
from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1, Ltd., issued in May of 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Boston Harbor CLO 2004-1,
Ltd., was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in August 2009.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this
issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published
in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

This is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2647)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: +3
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +4

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3971)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -1

This is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on
all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors
are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (46.5%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (42.5%)
  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2014 which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO notes' performance may also
be impacted by 1) the managers' investment strategies and behavior and
2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) The ability of the issuer to draw on the Class B Floating Rate
   Deferrable Revolving Notes: The Class B Note holder is required
   to advance payments to the Principal Collection Account in
   order to replenish net principal losses that are not first
   covered by funds deposited in the Principal Loss Reserve
   Account and Interest Proceeds.  Due to administrative issues,
   the CLO was unable to draw on the Class B Notes to fund such
   payments over multiple payment periods, a situation which has
   now been remedied.  As a result, Moody's analyzed and
   considered a scenario that assumes the issuer does not receive
   any future support from the Class B Notes.

                      Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information, and confidential
and proprietary Moody's Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the purposes of
maintaining a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses
in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources
MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate,
independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is not an auditor
and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate
information received in the rating process.


BUSINESS LOAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 Classes of Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible downgrade
18 classes of certificates issued in seven securitizations of small
business loans sponsored by Business Loan Express, currently known as
Ciena Capital, LLC.  The loans are secured primarily by commercial
real estate.

The rating actions are due to a rise in delinquencies, which is
expected to result in an increase in losses in the underlying loan
pools.  Since Moody's previous rating actions in February 2009, the 60
days or more delinquencies, including amounts in foreclosure and REO,
increased to a range of 20-38% from a range of 15-23% of the current
pool balance.  Moody's believe that the deterioration in performance
of the collateral pools reflects the difficult economic environment
for small business owners throughout the country.

During the review period, Moody's will project expected defaults and
recoveries on the underlying pools of loans using a loan-by-loan
analysis of business types, property locations, past payment
histories, borrowers' creditworthiness, and most recent appraisals or
estimates of market values of the properties.  The Aaa volatility
proxies will also be determined.  Driving factors of the Aaa
volatility proxy for each deal are the credit quality of the
collateral pool, the historical variability in losses experienced by
the issuer, the servicer quality as well as the industrial,
geographical and obligor concentrations.  The high obligor
concentration in the BLX 2003-A securitization, which has only 17
remaining loans, adds to performance volatility.

Based on Moody's revised expected losses and Aaa volatility proxies,
Moody's will evaluate whether the available credit enhancement
adequately protects investors against future collateral losses for
given rating assignments.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from the recession.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2001-2

  -- US$72M Class A Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$5.808M Class M Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- US$99M Class A Notes, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$8.8M Class M Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- US$90M Cl. A Notes, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 17, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$8M Cl. M Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 17, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-A

  -- US$131.25M Class A Certificate, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009
     Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$15M Class B Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2004-A

  -- US$175M Cl. A Bond, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$20M Cl. B Bond, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$5M Cl. C Bond, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2006-A

  -- US$264M Cl. A Notes, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$24M Cl. B Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$12M Cl. C Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2007-A

  -- US$378.4M Cl. A Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     A2 (sf)

  -- US$26.4M Cl. B Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$17.6M Cl. C Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 (sf)

  -- US$17.6M Cl. D Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 (sf)


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes and
affirmed four classes of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain
their existing ratings.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline
below the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 28, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 61% to
$40.7 million from $102.0 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 120 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 21% of
the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 89 compared to 95 at
Moody's last review.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $5.9 million (65% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes
M-5 through M-8 and a 15% principal loss on Class M-4.  Currently,
there are 16 loans, representing 14% of the pool, in special
servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $1.3
million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $3.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (65% expected loss on average).  Moody's rating action
reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 12% of the current
balance.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes and
affirmed two classes of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-1:

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  The classes that Moody's affirmed are all rated C based on
realized losses and Moody's current base expected loss.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated February 11, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 59% to
$88.3 million from $214.9 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 249 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 18% of
the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 137 compared to 157 at
Moody's last review.

Sixty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $18.1 million (66% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes
M-5 through M-9 and a 25% principal loss on Class M-4.  Currently,
there are 41 loans, representing 16% of the pool, in special
servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$8.9 million loss for the specially serviced loans (66% expected loss
on average).  Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base
expected loss of 13% of the current balance.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes and
affirmed two classes of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-1:

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  The classes that The classes that Moody's affirmed are all
rated C based on realized losses and Moody's current base expected
loss.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 28, 2010.  See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity
page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to
$97.3 million from $166.8 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 174 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 21% of
the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 88 compared to 101 at
Moody's last review.

Fifteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14.7 million (78% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes
M-4 through M-8 and a 53% principal loss on Class M-3.  Currently,
there are 41 loans, representing 18% of the pool, in special
servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$13.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans (78% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loan representing 8% of the pool and has estimated a $1.8
million (25% expected loss based on a 50% probability default) from
these troubled loan.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from this troubled
loan.  Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss
of 17% of the current balance.


CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed five classes of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-2:

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. M-1, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-2, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-3, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-4, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M-5, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  The classes that Moody's affirmed are all rated C based on
realized losses and Moody's current base expected loss.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 28, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to
$95.6 million from $130.5 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 207 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 25% of
the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 87 compared to 94 at
Moody's last review.

Twenty-two loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $6.6 million (64% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes
M-6 through M-8 and a 87% principal loss on Class M-5.  Currently,
there are 53 loans, representing 33% of the pool, in special
servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.3
million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $20.7 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (65% expected loss on average).  Moody's rating action
reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 22% of the current
balance.


CENTERLINE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five classes
from Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust, a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on 11 other classes from the same
transaction.  S&P removed the ratings on the five downgraded classes
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the interest shortfalls
to the transaction.  The nondeferrable classes A-1 and A-2 experienced
interest shortfalls according to the Aug. 20, 2010, trustee report,
which prompted S&P's downgrades of these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The interest shortfalls primarily resulted from the failure of the
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral for
Centerline 2007-1 to produce sufficient interest proceeds to pay the
full interest amounts due to the classes.  According to the trustee
reports for Centerline 2007-1, the amount of interest payments each
month on the collateral has steadily declined in each of the past six
months to $1.2 million in August 2010 from $4.1 million in March 2010.
According to the most recent trustee report, Centerline 2007-1 was
collateralized by 114 CMBS certificates and three resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit certificates ($844.9 million, 100%)
from 19 distinct transactions issued between 2000 and 2007.

Should the interest shortfalls affecting Centerline 2007-1 cause a
swap default and trigger any termination payments to the swap
counterparty for the transaction, S&P may lower the 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on the 14 subordinate classes to 'CC (sf)' if S&P determine
that the interest due to the classes may be deferred for many years.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Centerline 2007-1 according to its current
criteria.  The analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                           Rating
                           ------
         Class    To                   From
         -----    --                   ----
         A-1      D (sf)               BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         A-2      D (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg
         B        CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
         C        CCC- (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg
         D        CCC- (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust

                        Class    Rating
                        -----    ------
                        E        CCC- (sf)
                        F        CCC- (sf)
                        G        CCC- (sf)
                        H        CCC- (sf)
                        J        CCC- (sf)
                        K        CCC- (sf)
                        L        CCC- (sf)
                        M        CCC- (sf)
                        N        CCC- (sf)
                        O        CCC- (sf)
                        P        CCC- (sf)


CENTRAL FALLS, R.I.: Moody's Reviews B3 Rating on Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Central Falls (Rhode Island) B3 general obligation rating, on review
for possible downgrade, reflects the city's weak financial position,
mounting pension obligations, limited tax base, and low wealth levels.
The rating applies to $23.4 million of general obligation debt
outstanding.

During Moody's review period Moody's will focus on the city's ability
to maintain market access through the placement of its tax
anticipation notes and proposed deficit bonds.  Additionally, Moody's
will focus on the city's longer-term plan to address is structural
imbalance, in particular how the city's expects to address the
imminent funding needs of its pension plan for active public safety
employees.  The fiscal receiver is expected to deliver a plan prior to
the end of November.

              City Transitions to State Receivership;
              Long-Term Structural Challenges Remain

The city's weak credit profile, insufficient cash-flows and continued
reliance on market access to finance operations and debt service, by
way of tax anticipation notes, continues to present heightened risk of
a payment default, including the potential for economic loss, should
the city fail to take the necessary steps to address its structural
deficit or lose market access.

Despite the appointment of a state fiscal receiver in July the city's
financial position remains constrained by near-term cash flow
pressures and a significant structural imbalance.  The city projects
ending fiscal 2010 with a $2 million operating deficit, which
represents approximately 12% of operations.  The deficit was driven by
lower than budgeted state aid receipts ($469,584), following a
mid-year reduction to the city's motor vehicle excise tax
reimbursement, and a $1.2 million revenue shortfall as a budgeted
payment from the Wyatt detention center went unpaid due to fiscal
challenges at the facility.  Further, the city experienced over
$368,000 in greater than budgeted expenditures resulting from overtime
costs and unplanned expenses to compensate the court appointed
receiver.  The city anticipates issuing approximately $2 million of
five-year deficit reduction bonds to eliminate the accumulated deficit
once the fiscal 2010 audit has been finalized.

As part of the fiscal 2011 budget process the city initially
identified a structural budget gap of $6.3 million, which included
salary and overtime adjustments, a $3.4 million pension payment
(representing the actuarially required contribution for the city's
public safety pension plan for active employees), a reduced payment
from the detention center and a $1.9 million state aid cut, as
compared to the 2010 budget.  The city resolved the gap by augmenting
revenues, including increasing motor vehicle excise taxes and moving
ahead with a supplemental 10% property tax increase.  Further, the
city proposed approximately $4.3 million in expenditure adjustments to
balance which included leaving the $3.4 ARC (approximately 19% of
total city operations) for the city's active public safety pension
plan unfunded and seeking over $1 million in salary and benefit
reductions.  The city is currently in the process of negotiating with
its public safety collective bargaining units in an effort to achieve
the targeted salary and benefit savings levels.

The city continues to rely on tax anticipation note for liquidity.
The city expects to issue approximately $1.5 million of TANs for
fiscal 2011 by the end of September.  Given the city's weak financial
position its ability to place the notes to meet its near term
obligations will be an important consideration in concluding Moody's
rating review.  Notably, the city's ability to repay the notes is
contingent on its ability to issue deficit bonds prior to the end of
the fiscal year.

The funded status of the city's pension plan for its active public
safety employees continues to deteriorate due to absence of any fiscal
support.  Fiscal 2011 continues the city's practice of leaving the ARC
unfunded and drawing on the remaining plan assets to fund pension
payments.  Without additional funding existing plan assets are
expected to be exhausted three months into fiscal 2012.  The receiver
is expected to make recommendations on pension reform as part of a
long-term strategy to address the city's structural deficit by
mid-November.

                          Key Statistics

* 2008 Population (Census Projection): 18,683 (-1.3% since 2000)

* 2010 Full value: $803 million

* Full value per capita: $43,025

* Overall debt burden: 3.0%

* Payout of principal (10 years): 77.6%

* Fiscal 2009 General Fund balance: $231,000 million (1.3% of
  General Fund revenues)

* Median Family Income as % of Rhode Island, as % of US: 50.9%,
  53.6%

* Per Capital Income as % of Rhode Island, as % of US: 49.9%,
  50.1%

* Debt outstanding: $23.4 million


CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two classes
of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 1997-1.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of interest shortfalls
affecting the transaction, as well as the potential for future
interest shortfalls.   S&P lowered its rating on the class G
certificate to 'D (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' due to cumulative interest
shortfalls.  The cumulative interest shortfalls have been outstanding
for seven months.  The downgrade of class F reflects the
susceptibility of the class to future interest shortfalls relating to
the Buena Vista Springs asset, the largest asset with the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  Berkadia declared a
nonrecoverable determination for this asset in May 2009.

The special servicer has indicated that it intends to recover prior
advances related to The Buena Vista Springs asset.  Berkadia expects
the trust to receive liquidation proceeds upon the liquidation of
another specially serviced asset, the Ames Plaza Lowville loan.  The
special servicer indicated that it anticipates the liquidation
proceeds to partially offset the prior advances related to the The
Buena Vista Springs asset.  S&P details these two assets below.  It is
its understanding from Berkadia that all proceeds from the eventual
liquidation of the Ames Plaza Lowville asset, as well as all scheduled
principal and interest payments due to the trust for September 2010,
will be applied to the outstanding advanced amount and delinquent
taxes related to the Buena Vista Springs loan.  As a result, Standard
& Poor's does not expect any interest or principal payments to be paid
to the trust on the September 2010 payment period.  As of the August
2010 remittance report, the scheduled interest was $143,909 and the
scheduled principal was $122,191.  Furthermore, it is S&P's view that
the classes may continue to experience interest shortfalls due to the
lack of advancing of trust expenses related to The Buena Vista Spring
loan.

                    Specially Serviced Assets

As of the August 2010 remittance report, two ($3.8 million, 16.0%)
assets were with the special servicer.  Both of these loans are in
foreclosure and details regarding these two loans are as follows:

The Buena Vista Springs loan ($3.1 million total exposure, 10.5%) is
the second-largest real estate exposure remaining and the largest
asset with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by two
multifamily properties in Las Vegas.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in March 2008 due to monetary default, and Berkadia
made a nonrecoverable determination for this asset in May 2009.  The
loan currently has approximately $580,000 in outstanding advances, as
well as approximately $400,000 in deferred taxes.  In addition,
Berkadia estimates that there will be ongoing trust expenses required
to cover minimum operating costs.  According to the May 24, 2010,
property inspection report Berkadia provided, the property is
classified as in "poor" condition and most units are classified as
"uninhabitable", with plywood covering many doors and windows.  The
special servicer has appointed a receiver.  Standard & Poor's expects
a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Ames Plaza Lowville loan ($1.3 million total exposure, 5.6%) is
the third-largest real estate exposure remaining and is secured by a
90,603-sq.-ft. retail property built in 1972 in Lowville, N.Y.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in December 2008 due to
monetary default.  There is an appraisal reduction amount of $1.4
million in effect against this asset.  Standard & Poor's expect a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2010 remittance report, the collateral consisted of
five loans with an aggregate trust balance of $23.9 million, down from
107 loans and $533.8 million at issuance.  One loan,
the Cummins Station loan, is defeased and represents 41.4%
($9.9 million) of the collateral.  Two ($3.8 million, 16.0%) loans are
with the special servicer.  S&P discuss details of the remaining two
loans below.  The master servicer, also Berkadia, provided full-year
2008 or full-year 2009 financial information for 100% of the remaining
assets.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.32x for the
remaining assets based on the reported figures.  This calculation
excludes the transaction's two specially serviced assets.  To date,
the transaction has experienced principal losses totaling $13.7
million on seven assets.

The Southtown Plaza loan ($9.9 million, 41.6%) is the largest
nondefeased loan remaining.  The loan is secured by a 497,639-sq.-ft.
retail property built in 1955 in Henrietta, N.Y.  The reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.32x and 76.1%, respectively, as of year-end 2009.
The loan is scheduled to mature in May 2012.

The Le Chateau Apartments loan ($229,669, 1.0%) is secured by a
124-unit multifamily property built in 1972 in Houston, Texas.  The
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.14x and 85.5%, respectively, as of
year-end 2008.  The loan is scheduled to mature in May 2012.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-1

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     F          B- (sf) BBB- (sf)                       54.38
     G          D (sf)  BB (sf)                         32.01


CHYPS CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of notes issued by CHYPS CBO
1999-1 Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $41,000,000 class A-3A notes at 'Dsf/RR6';
  -- $14,851,485 class A-3B notes at 'Dsf/RR6'.

The class A-3A and class A-3B notes defaulted under the contractual
terms of the indenture in August 2009 due to a missed interest payment
and have not received any payments since that time.  The remaining
portfolio of three defaulted bonds and three equity holdings is
expected to generate little to no recovery value.  With over $1.5
million of class A-2 notes remaining, the class A-3A and class A-3B
notes are not expected to receive any future distributions.

CHYPS CBO 1999-1 is a collateralized debt obligation that closed Jan.
7, 1999, and is managed by Delaware Investment Advisers.  The proceeds
of the issuance were invested in a portfolio consisting primarily of
high yield corporate bonds.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-C3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3 and placed ten classes on
review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. A-MFL, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-M, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. A-J, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 15, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 15, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of Classes J through O are due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $4.1 million loss on one loan resulting in a
19% principal loss for Class P.  The servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $54.7 million for seven of the loans currently in
special servicing.

Moody's placed Classes A-MFL through H on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from
anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly performing
watchlisted loans and interest shortfalls.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 30, 2007.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $1.25 billion
from $1.44 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 117 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34% of the
pool.  Four loans, representing 2% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $4.12 million (87% loss severity).  Nine loans,
representing 15% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the 100 & 150 College Road West
Loan ($53.0 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by two,
three-story Class A suburban office buildings located in Princeton,
New Jersey totaling 225,651 square feet.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent maturity default.
The loan matured in March 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 270 Technology Park
Loan ($49.6 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by 11 office
and flex properties located in Frederick, Maryland.  The buildings
total 450,000 square feet.  The loan transferred into special
servicing in December 2008 due to imminent monetary default and is
currently in foreclosure.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $54.7
million appraisal reduction for seven of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.2 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially serviced
and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall pool.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of classes 1A1 and
1A2 issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-7 at Baa1 (sf) and Ca
(sf) respectively.

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-7, Resecuritization Trust
Certificates, Series 2009-7

  -- Cl. 1A1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 4, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 4, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are as a result of bonds having sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current ratings compared to the revised
loss expectation on the pool of mortgages backing the underlying
certificate.

The resecuritization is backed by Class A-1 issued by HSI Asset
Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-NC1.  The underlying certificate
is backed primarily by first-lien, subprime residential mortgage
loans.

The Class 1A1 issued in the resecuritization transaction is a senior
class, supported by a subordinated bond Class 1A2, which receives
principal payments after Class 1A1 but absorbs losses before Class
1A1.  Additionally, Class 1A2 is an "accrual certificate," i.e. it
accrues the interest that would have been otherwise paid to it.  This
accrued interest on Class 1A2 is further used to pay down principal on
the Class 1A1 certificate.  As a result, the credit enhancement
available to 1A1 has increased from 30%, expressed as a percentage of
outstanding resecuritization group balance, as of October 2009 to 45%
as of July 2010.

Moody's ratings on certificates in a resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying certificate and the updated rating on the
      underlying certificate.  Moody's current loss expectation on
      the pool backing HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust
      2007-NC1 is 53.5% expressed as a percentage of outstanding
      deal balance.  The current rating on the A-1 bond is Caa1.

(ii) The credit enhancement available to the underlying
      certificate, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying pool of
mortgage loans (backing the underlying certificate) and then arrived
at an updated rating on the underlying certificate.  The rating on the
underlying certificate is based on expected recoveries on the bonds
under ninety-six different combinations of six loss levels, four loss
timing curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

In order to determine the ratings of the resecuritized bonds, the loss
on the underlying certificate was ascribed to the resecuritized
classes, 1A1 and 1A2, according to the structure of the resecuritized
transaction.  The losses on the resecuritized certificates are
allocated "bottom up" with Class 1A2 taking loss ahead of Class 1A1.
Principal payments to the certificates are allocated sequentially,
with Class 1A1 being paid ahead of Class 1A2.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

As a part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss of the pool of loans backing the underlying certificate
by an additional 10% and found that the rating on the Class 1A1 does
not change.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third party
due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial instruments
in this transaction and the due diligence report had a neutral impact
on the rating.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the class
II-A-2 and II-A-3 certificates from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2007-9, a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
residential mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from
'B+ (sf)' and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P also corrected its rating on class III-A-3 from the
same transaction to 'CC (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.  Additionally, S&P
lowered its ratings on six other classes from this transaction and
removed them from CreditWatch negative.

On April 19, 2010, S&P lowered its rating on class III-A-3 to 'D (sf)'
based on incorrect information in the trustee-provided remittance
reports.  S&P's current 'CC (sf)' rating on class III-A-3 reflects its
assessment of information in corrected remittance reports, as well as
its analysis of the credit support available for this class to cover
the projected loss amounts as of the August 2010 remittance report.

S&P's current 'D (sf)' ratings on classes II-A-2 and II-A-3 reflect
its assessment of information in corrected remittance reports,
including principal write-downs on these classes during prior
remittance periods that were not initially reported by the trustee.

The downgrades of classes II-A-1, III-A-1, III-A-4, III-A-6, III-A-8,
and III-A-9 reflect S&P's assessment of the significant deterioration
in performance of the mortgage loans backing these classes' underlying
certificates.  As a result of this performance deterioration, the
amount of credit enhancement available to the underlying certificates
and to the downgraded classes is insufficient to cover S&P's current
projected losses at the previous rating levels.

When S&P performed its analysis of the re-REMIC classes, S&P applied
its loss projections to the underlying trusts in order to identify the
magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed through to the
applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally, S&P's projected losses depend
on the type of collateral supporting the underlying trusts.  S&P then
stressed these loss projections at various rating categories in order
to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand such stressed
losses at their current rating levels.

The underlying collateral for this transaction is primarily
Alternative-A mortgage loans originated in 2007.  The performance of
this collateral and vintage has generally declined in recent years.
As a result, over the past several years S&P has revised its RMBS
default and loss assumptions, and consequently its projected losses,
to reflect its view of the continuing decline in mortgage loan
performance.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                        Ratings Corrected

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-9
                           Series 2007-9

                                       Rating
                                         ------
  Class    CUSIP          Current      April 19       Pre-April 19
  -----    -----          -------      --------       ------------
  III-A-3    17313NAU9      CC (sf)      D (sf)         B (sf)

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-9
                           Series 2007-9

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class      CUSIP          Current      Pre-Sept. 17
     -----      -----          -------      ------------
     II-A-2     17313NAP0      D (sf)       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
     II-A-3     17313NAQ8      D (sf)       B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                          Rating Actions

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-9
                           Series 2007-9

                                   Rating
                                   ------
  Class      CUSIP         To                   From
  -----      -----         --                   ----
  II-A-1     17313NAN5     CC (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  III-A-1    17313NAS4     CC (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  III-A-4    17313NAV7     CC (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  III-A-6    17313NAX3     CC (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  III-A-8    17313NAZ8     CCC (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
  III-A-9    17313NBA2     CC (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg


CLEARWATER PAPER: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings, including the
'BB' corporate credit rating, on Clearwater Paper Corp. on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  Concurrently, Standard & Poor's placed
all of its ratings, including the 'B+' corporate credit rating, on
Cellu Tissue Holdings Inc. on CreditWatch with positive implications.

"The CreditWatch listings follow Clearwater's announcement of an
agreement to acquire Cellu Tissue for approximately $502 million in
total consideration, which includes approximately $255 million of debt
[which Clearwater intends to tender for or defease]," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Tobias Crabtree.  Under the terms of the
agreement, Clearwater will pay $12.00 per share in cash for Cellu
Tissue's outstanding common stock, representing a premium, based on
the closing price on Sept. 15, 2010, of approximately 52.6% over the
30-day average closing trading price and 48.2% over the 90 day average
closing trading price.  Clearwater intends to fund the acquisition
using a combination of existing cash on hand and $350 million of debt
financing.

The merger is subject to certain customary conditions, including the
receipt of regulatory approvals and Cellu Tissue stockholder approval,
and is expected to be completed by the end of 2010.  The agreement has
been unanimously approved by the boards of directors of both
companies.

The proposed acquisition provides Clearwater an expanded tissue
manufacturing footprint in the U.S.  However, on a pro forma basis,
adjusted leverage is about 2.8x (or about 2.2x on a reported basis),
based upon the trailing 12-month combined adjusted EBITDA level of
approximately $260 million.  This denotes, in S&P's view, a
significant increase in Clearwater's existing leverage of
approximately 1.9x at June 30, 2010, in advance of its likely increase
in capital expenditures related to the expansion of its tissue
manufacturing capacity.  However, the increased leverage is somewhat
mitigated by S&P's view of the proposed combined company's generally
good ability to generate cash flow.

Clearwater is a manufacturer of pulp and paperboard, consumer tissue
products, and lumber products.  Cellu Tissue manufactures a variety of
tissue hard rolls, converted tissue products, and machine glazed
paper.

In resolving the CreditWatch placements, Standard & Poor's will
monitor the progress that the companies make toward closing the
transaction, which Clearwater indicated it expects to close in the
fourth quarter of 2010.  In addition, S&P will meet with management
and assess:

* The combined company's prospective operating performance and
  merger benefits, including targeted synergies, with
  consideration to the proposed capital structure;

* Its ability to fund its substantial growth capital expenditures
  initiatives from internally generated cash flow;

* Clearwater's financial policy, given the more aggressive use of
  its existing cash balances and debt issuance to finance the
  acquisition; and

* The combined company's business risk profile reflecting
  Clearwater's expanded tissue manufacturing footprint.


CONTINENTAL AIRLINES: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on these classes of
Continental Airlines Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificate transactions
as detailed below:

Aircraft Indebtedness Repackaging rust 1998-1

  -- Class A affirmed at 'B+', Outlook to Positive from Stable.

Aircraft Indebtedness Repackaging Trust 1998-2

  -- Class A affirmed at 'B+', Outlook to Positive from Stable.

Continental Airlines, FEATS Series 2000

  -- Class A affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook to Positive from Stable;
  -- Class B upgraded to 'BB' from 'B+', Outlook remains Stable.

EETCs are hybrid corporate-structured debt obligations in which
payment on the notes is effectively supported by the underlying
corporate entity, while structured elements of the transaction provide
protection to investors in the event of issuer default.  As such,
Fitch's ratings on EETC transactions are strongly tied to the Issuer
Default Rating of the issuing entity and incorporate credit to the
reduced probability of default provided by the collateral and
structural enhancements in place.  The analysis also incorporates a
review of the recovery prospects on the issued securities in the event
that they default, similar to Fitch's approach for assigning recovery
credit to secured corporate debt.

On Sept. 10, 2010, Fitch affirmed Continental's IDR at 'B-' and
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.  As the ratings of
EETCs are strongly tied to the rating of the issuing entity as
detailed above, the Outlooks were also revised to Positive from Stable
for the Class A notes in AIR Trust 1998-1, AIR Trust 1998-2, and
Continental FEATS 2000.

The upgrade to the class B notes in Continental FEATS 2000 reflects
the improved PD and recovery prospects as recent amortization of the
notes has decreased the class's amount of exposure relative to
collateral values.  Despite the Outlook revision on Continental, the
Outlook remains Stable for the Class B notes in Continental FEATS 2000
as the class has an expected maturity in November 2010.  As such, an
upgrade in the next 12 to 18 months is unlikely.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Series 2003-C3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of one class, affirmed
15 classes and downgraded eight classes of Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2003-C3:

  -- Cl. A-3, $1.770M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     July 24, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, $55.00M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     July 24, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-5, $862.414M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     July 24, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 24, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 24, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, $47.432M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     April 20, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, $19.405M, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 30,
     2007 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, $38.808M, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on July 30,
     2007 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, $19.405M, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on July 30,
     2007 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, $19.404M, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, $12.936M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     Aug. 26, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, $19.404M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     Aug. 26, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, $19.405M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Aug. 26, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, $12.936M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, $6.468M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, $10.780M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. N, $2.156M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. O, $4.312M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 622-A, $2.378M, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 622-B, $5.640M, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 622-C, $5.639M, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. 622-D, $5.640M, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. 622-E, $16.739M, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. 622-F, $1.502M, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2007 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans and concerns about refinance risk associated with
loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Two hundred and
one loans, representing 82% of the pool, mature within the next 36
months.  Twenty-nine of these loans, representing 16% of the pool,
have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.00X.
The confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for
the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

On August 26, 2010, Moody's placed nine classes on review for possible
downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 3.9%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 1.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 6.8% of the
current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
pay down analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV
ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations
may be considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled
credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or determined
based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For
fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 30, 2007.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to $1.19 billion
from $1.76 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 225 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37% of the
pool.  There are two loans with underlying ratings, representing 21%
of the pool.  Approximately 14% of the pool consists of loans secured
by residential cooperative properties.  These loans have Aaa
underlying ratings.  Twenty-five loans, representing 17% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 18% of the pool.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch list.  The watch list includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watch list to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $14.5 million loss (62% loss severity on
average).  Currently five loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is The Mills
Apartments Loan ($21.1 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 708-unit apartment complex located in Houston, Texas.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent
payment default.  The property was 70% leased as of December 2009.
The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multi-family
and office properties.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$19.1 million loss (45% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loan representing 5.3% of the pool and has estimated a
$19.2 million (42% expected loss based on a 71% probability default)
from these troubled loan.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and 2009 operating results
for 98% and 96% of the pool, respectively.  Excluding defeased loans,
co-op loans, specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 82% compared to 87% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.4% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding defeased loans, co-op loans, specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 1.23X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 20 compared to 28 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the 622 Third Avenue
Loan ($190.5 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.0
million square foot Class A office building located in midtown
Manhattan.  The property also secures a junior loan component ($37.5
million), which is held within the trust and serves as security for
non-pooled Classes 622-A, 622-B, 622-C, 622-D, 622-E and 622-F.  The
property is also encumbered by a mezzanine loan of approximately $39.5
million.  As of April 2010, the property was 90% leased compared to
97% at the end of 2009.  The largest tenants are the Interpublic Group
(45% of the net rentable area; lease expiration in September 2021);
CIBC (13% of the NRA; lease expiration in September 2013) and TMP
Worldwide Inc. (5% of the NRA; lease expiration in September 2015).
The decline in vacancy was partially due to TMP downsizing to 5% of
the NRA from 10% at securitization when its lease expired in 2010.
For 2009, the property's net operating income was 15% higher than at
last review.  However, Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow
due to the recent decline in vacancy and a mark-to-market rental
adjustment.  The loan has amortized approximately 4% since last
review.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.65X,
respectively, compared to A2 and 1.64X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is The Crossings
Loan ($51.5 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 391,000
square foot factory outlet retail center located in the Pocono
Mountains in Tannersville, Pennsylvania.  As of June 2010, the
property was 99% leased, essentially the same as at last review.  The
largest tenants are Liz Clairbourne (4% of the NRA; lease expiration
in September 2015); Gap Outlet (3% of the NRA; lease expiration in
November 2012) and Nike (3% of the NRA; lease expiration in October
2011).  For 2009, the NOI was 37% higher than at last review due to
increases in revenues.  The loan has also benefited from 8%
amortization since last review.  The loan matures in March 2013 and
amortizes on a 300-month schedule.  Moody's underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 2.24X, respectively, compared to A1 and
1.85X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 9% of the pool
balance.  The largest conduit loan is the Great Lakes Crossing Loan
($52.9 million -- 5% of the pool), which represents a 40%
participation interest in a $133 million first mortgage loan.  The
loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.1 million square
foot value-oriented shopping center located approximately 30 miles
north of Detroit in Auburn Hills, Michigan.  The center is anchored by
Burlington Coat Factory (7% of the NRA; lease expiration in January
2014), the Sports Authority (5% of the NRA; lease expiration in
January 2019) and Bed Bath & Beyond (4% of the NRA; lease expiration
in January 2013).  The center is also encumbered by a $3.1 million
B-note which is held outside the trust.  As of June 2010, the center
was 76% leased compared to 82% in October 2009.  Occupancy, tenant
sales and property performance have all exhibited downward trends
since last review.  This loan had an underlying rating at last review,
but due to declines in performance it is now analyzed as part of the
conduit.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 69% and 1.48X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Orchards Corporate Center Loan
($26.8 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by 216,416
square foot office building complex located in Farmington Hills,
Michigan.  The Detroit area office market has suffered from a decline
in rent levels and increased vacancy over the past several years.
According to market data from CB Richard Ellis, current market rents
and vacancy rates are $19.95 per square foot and 25%, respectively,
compared to the property's in-place rents of $23.78 per square foot
and a physical vacancy of 37%.  As of March 2010, the property was 63%
leased compared to 90% at last review.  The property also has
significant lease rollover risk as leases representing 50% of the NRA
expire within the next 36 months.  For 2009, the NOI was 53% lower
than at last review.  The loan is on the master servicer's watch-list.
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for this loan due to
the declining performance and market conditions.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 175% and 0.62X, respectively, compared to 99% and
1.07X at last review, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Gateway Station Loan ($19.2 million --
1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 280,000 retail center located
10 miles south of Fort Worth, Texas.  As of March 2010, the property
was 90% leased, essentially the same as at last review.  The largest
tenants are Kohl's (31% of the NRA; lease expiration in January 2023),
Ross Stores (11% of the NRA; lease expiration in January 2013) and
Staples (9% of the NRA; lease expiration in May 2017).  Despite the
stable occupancy, performance has declined due to lower rental
revenues and higher expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105%
and 0.98X compared to 87.4% and 1.15X at last review.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Rating on 2007-TFL2 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of three classes,
affirmed 9 classes and downgraded three classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-TFL2.

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E,      Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 3, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 3, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 3, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from the anticipated liquidation of two loans in the pool,
the Resorts Atlantic City loan ($175 million, 15% of the pooled
balance) and the Biscayne Landing loan ($77 million pooled and $54.5
million non-pooled, 7%).  The confirmations and affirmations were due
to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable
ranges.  Moody's had placed four classes of this transaction Under
Review, Direction Uncertain on April 1, 2010 due to the lack of
clarity on the expected disposition of The Resorts Atlantic City Loan
and the Biscayne Landing Loan.  This action concludes that review.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large Loan
Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single borrower
transactions.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity, other
concentrations and correlations.  The model also incorporates a
supplementary tool to allow for the testing of the credit support at
various rating levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the
credit support for a rating assuming that all loans in the pool
default with an average loss severity that is commensurate with the
rating level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated April 1, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

As of the September 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 20% to
$1.22 billion from $1.52 billion at securitization due to the payoff
of one loan (CapitalSource Portfolio) and principal payments
associated with three loans (Planet Hollywood Loan, Whitehall Seattle
Portfolio Loan and Biscayne Landing Loan).  The Certificates are
collateralized by seven floating-rate loans ranging in size from 4% to
39% of the pooled trust mortgage balance.  The largest three loans
account for 79% of the pooled balance.  The pool composition includes
casino properties (54% of the pooled balance), office (31%), hotel
(9%) and land (7%).

Classes A-2 through L have experienced significant interest
shortfalls.  Moody's expects interests shortfalls to continue until
the Biscayne Landing Loan and the Resorts Atlantic City Loan have been
liquidated.  The servicer stopped advancing interest on these loans in
February 2010, based upon updated appraisal reports.  Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and
extraordinary trust expenses.

The pool has not experienced losses since securitization.  There are
currently two loans in special servicing, the Resorts Atlantic City
Loan and the Biscayne Landing loan.  The Resorts Atlantic City Loan
($175.0 million - 15% of the pooled trust balance), is secured by a
hotel-casino with 310 feet of boardwalk frontage at the northern end
of the Atlantic City New Jersey Boardwalk.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing on December 1, 2008 and has not paid debt service
since December 2008.  The 2009 appraisal values the property at $88.2
million which is significantly below the trust debt balance.  The
recovery to the trust is expected to be minimal due to low anticipated
liquidation proceeds and significant servicer advances.  The new
potential buyer must apply for a casino license for the property
before title can be transferred.  The licensing process is expected to
take approximately 120 days.  Moody's current underlying rating for
the pooled balance is C, the same as last review.  However, Moody's
expected loss has increased since last review.

The Biscayne Landing Loan ($77.2 million - 7% of the pooled trust
balance and six rake classes) is secured by a 188-acre site located in
North Miami, Florida and was intended to fund pre-development of the
parcel to accommodate a mixed-use project.  In March of 2008, the loan
was moved to special servicing.  A 2010 appraisal was received that
valued the property at $15.5 million which is 3% of the original
appraised value at securitization and significantly below the trust
debt balance.  In March 2010, outstanding reserves were used to repay
servicer advances, fees and interest shortfall recovery associated
with the loan and the remaining $29 million was used to pay down the
pooled principal balance.  The loan collateral is being marketed for
sale and terms are being negotiated with a potential buyer.
Additional to the pooled balance, there are junior trust loans secured
by the asset including rake classes BSL-A, BSL-B, BSL-C, BSL-D, BSL-E
and BSL-F.  Moody's current underlying rating for the pooled balance
is C, the same as last review.

Moody's weighed average pooled loan to value ratio is over 100%
similar to last review in April 2010 and 63.4% at securitization.
Moody's pooled stressed debt service coverage is 0.58X similar to last
review, compared to 1.31X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  Large loan
transactions have a Herf of less than 20.  The pool has a Herf of 4,
the same as last review.

The remaining five loans include the Planet Hollywood loan
($457.7 million, 39% of the pooled balance); the Whitehall
Seattle Portfolio loan ($292.5 million, 25%); the 100 West Putnam loan
($67 million, 6%), the Ritz-Carlton Half Moon Bay loan
($51.5 million, 4%) and the Westin DFW loan ($50 million, 4%).


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 57 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 6 RMBS transactions
issued by Credit Suisse First Boston.  The collateral backing these
deals primarily consists of first-lien, mostly adjustable-rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

                         Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance deterioration in
Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment conditions
that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with
fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average
rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the
vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for the 2005, 2006 and
2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool
become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  Once the baseline
rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of
loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies
in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the
higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan
count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased
by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor
ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less
than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-A-1E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Series 1997-C1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of one class and
affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Series 1997-C1:

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 1999
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 25, 2007
     Upgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. I, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 15, 2005
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Feb. 15, 2005
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to increased credit enhancement resulting from loan
pay downs and amortization and overall stable performance.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for
the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their currentg
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 2.0%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 1.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 5.5% of the
current balance.

Based on the significant increase in credit enhancement since
securitization and the pool's high exposure to defeased loans, it is
likely that the current levels of credit enhancement for the
investment grade classes would be sufficient to maintain their
existing ratings even if overall pool performance declines.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure,
property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools of
credit tenant loans within CMBS transaction.  Moody's public CDO
rating model CDOROMv2.6 is used to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the credit enhancement levels for ratings.
Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating is primarily based on the
senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant leasing the real estate collateral.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default on
the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which means
it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust
through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full
all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a
first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization
trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property,
is vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default.  Moody's also considers the overall structure
and legal integrity of the transaction.  Moody's reconciles and
weights the results from the two models in formatting a rating
recommendation.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated October 25, 2007.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $129.4 million
from $1.36 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 24% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans representing
61% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 39% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  Six
loans, representing 34% of the pool, are CTL loans.  The conduit
component consists of three loans, representing 27% of the pool
balance.

Two loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have
material issues that could impact performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.7 million (21% loss severity).
Currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 100% and 76% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding defeased and CTL loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 49%
compared to 50% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 32% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 11.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.05X and 2.60X, respectively,
compared to 1.47X and 2.53X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 4 compared to 5 at Moody's prior review.

The largest conduit loan is the Hyatt Aruba Loan ($31.4 million --
24.3%), which is secured by a 360-room luxury oceanfront resort
property located in Aruba.  The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a decline in DSCR caused by decrease in revenues.
The loan benefits from a 20-year amortization schedule and has
amortized by approximately 42% since securitization and 20% since last
review.  The hotel's occupancy for trailing 12 months ending June 2010
was 76% compared to trailing 12 months ending December 2006 at 85%.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.37X, respectively,
compared to 45% and 2.52X at last review.

The second conduit loan is the Glastonbury Country Club Loan
($1.8 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-hole
golf course located in an upscale neighborhood near Hartford,
Connecticut.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
low DSCR caused by decrease in revenues.  As of December 2009 NCF DSCR
was 0.69x compared to 1.24x at securitization.  The loan fully
amortizes over the loan term and has amortized by approximately 44%
since securitization and 22% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 48% and
2.10X at last review.

The third conduit loan is the Genus Inc. Building Loan
($1.6 million -- 1.3%), which is secured by a 74,400 square foot R&D
facility located in Newburyport, Massachusetts.  The property is 100%
leased to Varian Inc. through June 2013.  The loan fully amortizes
over the loan term and has amortized by approximately 75% since
securitization and 49% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 26% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 49% and 2.34X at
last review.

The CTL component includes 6 loans secured by properties leased under
bondable leases.  The CTL exposures are Bank of America Corporation
($17.4 million -- 13.5%; Moody's senior unsecured rating A2 - negative
outlook), RadioShack Corporation
($11.6 million -- 9.0%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Ba1 -- stable
outlook), Bon-Ton Stores Inc. ($9.2 million -- 7.1%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa1 -- stable outlook), and Kohl's Corporation ($5.6
million -- 4.3%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1 -- stable
outlook).


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Series 1999-C1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded one and affirmed three classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1:

  -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on May 4, 2006
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to increased credit enhancement due to loan payoffs
and amortization.  The pool has paid down by 87% since Moody's last
full review.  The affirmations are due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges and
a significant increas in credit enhancement.  Based on Moody's current
base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
39.2% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 1.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 44.1% of
the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.  The pool has
significant refinancing risk as seven loans, representing 65% of the
pool, have either passed their anticipated repayment dates or mature
within the next six months.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights the
results from the two models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan
level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
leverage, loan structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated October 3, 2007.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to
$108.22 million from $1.17 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 40% of the pool, with the top three loans
representing 76% of the pool.  The pool includes a credit tenant lease
(CTL) component which comprises 28% of the pool.  The pool does not
contain any defeased loans or loans with underlying ratings.
Defeasance at last review full represented 33% of the pool.

Four loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have
material issues that could impact performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $48.07 million (27% loss severity).  Two
loans, representing 41% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Tallahassee
Mall Loan ($42.9 million -- 39.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
leasehold interest in a 973,973 square foot mall located in
Tallahassee, Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in September 2008 due to imminent default and is currently in the
process of foreclosure.  The second specially serviced loan is secured
by a multifamily property located in Memphis, Tennessee.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate
$41.0 million loss (91% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.  The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $38.9
million appraisal reduction for both specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes G through
O have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$8.2 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, extraordinary trust expenses and
non-advancing by the master servicer based on a determination of
non-recoverability.  The master servicer has made a determination of
non-recoverability for the largest loan in special servicing and is no
longing advancing for this loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 97% and 43% of the non-defeased performing pool,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 85% compared to 82% at Moody's prior
review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of
8.7% to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.11X and 1.45X, respectively, compared to 1.30X
and 1.45X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 4 compared to 36 at Moody's prior full review.  The decline in
Herf has been partially offset by increased credit support due to loan
payoffs and amortization.  The pool has paid down 87% since Moody's
last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Easton Commons Plaza Shopping Center
Loan ($8.6 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 168,922
square foot retail property located in Houston, Texas.  The loan has
amortized 5% since last review.  The loan has passed its September
2009 ARD and is current.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and
1.23X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.28X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 34 Maple Avenue Loan ($8.4 million --
7.7% of the pool), which is secured by a two-story 129,293 square foot
office property located in Parsippany, New Jersey.  The loan has
amortized 9% since last review.  The loan has passed its March 2009
ARD and is current.  Property performance has declined due to
decreased rental income.  Moody's valuation is based on a stressed net
cash flow due to concerns with the property's near-term lease rollover
exposure and a soft local office market.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 96% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.33X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Park Glen West Business Ctr Loan ($4.8
million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 127,336 square
foot industrial property located in St.  Louis Park, Minnesota.
Property performance has declined since last review due to increased
vacancy.  The loan has amortized 6% since last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 77% and
1.45X at last review.

The CTL component ($30.3 million -- 28.0%) consists of two
cross-collateralized loans secured by a bondable lease to Accor SA.
The collateral consists of 11 Motel 6 hotels totaling 1,224 rooms and
located in five states.  Property performance has declined since last
review as the hotel has been impacted by the downturn in the tourism
industry.  On July 2, 2010, Moody's withdrew Accor SA's Prime-3
commercial paper rating due to business reasons.  The last rating
action on Accor SA occurred in September 2009, when Moody's changed
the outlook on Accor's Prime-3 rating to negative from stable.  For
the purpose of rating this component of the subject transaction,
Moody's developed an internal view of the credit quality of the
company.


CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches and
confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from three RMBS transactions issued
by CWABS.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-10

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                         Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to 2007.
Moody's expected pool losses on these three transactions has not
changed since previously published in April 2010.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios.
The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations comprising of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment curves.
The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to small
increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into
consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

If expected losses on the collateral pools were to increase
approximately 7.5% model implied results indicate that the ratings
affected by the actions would remain stable, with the exception of
Class 2-A-4 from CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-10, for
which model indicated results would be C.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


DEUTSCHE ALT-B: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2006-AB3 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9 tranches
from Deutsche Alt-B Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AB3.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-AB3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-5A, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                         Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain under
duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The rating action also reflects a correction to the rating of one of
these tranches, Class A-5A.  Previous rating actions applied loss
allocation rules as set forth in the Prospectus dated
June 29, 2006, which states that when the subordinate certificates are
depleted, Cl. A-5A, wrapped by Assured, does not have any super senior
support and will be allocated its pro rata share of realized losses.
However, per the Pooling and Servicing agreement (PSA) dated June 1,
2006, realized losses otherwise allocable to the -- Cl. A-5A will be
allocated to -- Cl. A-6.  The Trustee has confirmed that they will be
following the PSA.  As such Moody's rating has been adjusted to
reflect the loss allocation rules described in the PSA.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools
left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with
fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average
rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the
vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for the 2005, 2006 and
2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for the
volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a small pool
become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the overall pool
delinquency level due to the concentration risk.  Once the baseline
rate is set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of
loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies
in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the
higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan
count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased
by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor
ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less
than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain securities, as noted above, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the
same methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


FIRST HORIZON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 230 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 230 tranches,
upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches and confirmed the ratings of 3
tranches from 35 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by
First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust.

In addition, the rating on Tranche I-A1 issued by First Horizon
Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA4 has also been adjusted
to reflect the fact that this deal has a "loss allocation limitation"
which does not allow losses to be allocated to tranches from pools
that are overcollateralized after the mezzanine tranches are fully
written down.  The previous rating action did not take into account
this limitation and assumed that losses would be allocated to tranches
from all pools after the mezzanine tranches have been fully written
down.

                         Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-AA1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA11

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
AA9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA10

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-18, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-21, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-22, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-
FA9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-AA10

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-AA12

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-FA11

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
AA1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
AA2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
AA3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
AA4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
AA7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA6

  -- Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
FA8

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
AA2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
FA2

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
FA3

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
FA4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FIRST UNION: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three 1999-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes,
downgraded one class and affirmed three classes of First Union
National Bank-Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2:

  -- IO, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 24, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008 Upgraded
     to Baa1 (sf)

  -- J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2006
     Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- K, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2004
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- L, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2004
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 26, 2006
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.  The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement
due to loan payoffs and amortization.  The pool has paid down by 90%
since Moody's last full review.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain the current ratings.  In addition, the pool benefits from a
high level of defeasance.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 8.6%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 1.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 22.2% of
the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  It
is highly unlikely that investment grade classes would be downgraded
even if there is a significant decline in overall pool performance due
to the high level of credit enhancement available for those classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
Excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights the
results from the two models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan
level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
leverage, loan structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model to evaluate pools of
credit tenant loans within CMBS transactions.  Moody's public CDO
rating model CDOROMv2.6 is used to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the
rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on the
senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the real
estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating
is the key factor in determining the probability of default on the
underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which means it
is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust
through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full
all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a
first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization
trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property
is vacant or "dark", is then examined to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default.  Moody's also considers the overall structure
and legal integrity of the transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated October 16, 2007.  See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity
page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to
$87.02 million from $1.18 billion at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 40 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 50% of the pool.  The pool includes a credit tenant lease
component, representing 26% of the pool.  Twelve loans, representing
29% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last full review represented 50%
of the pool.

Six loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have
material issues that could impact performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.14 million (27% loss severity).  Three
loans, representing 12% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Belmont
Crossing Loan ($4.9 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by
a 192-unit multifamily property located in Smyrna, Georgia.  The loan
transferred into special servicing in February 2009 due to imminent
default as the borrower indicated that it was unable to pay the loan
in full at the March 2009 maturity.  The loan is in the process of
foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Somerpoint
(Woodvalley) Loan ($3.5 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 143-unit multifamily property located in Marietta, Georgia.  The
loan transferred into special servicing in February 2009 due to
imminent default as the borrower indicated it was unable to pay the
loan in full at the March 2009 maturity.  The loan is in the process
of foreclosure.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail property.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $4.1 million loss (39% expected
loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $3.0 million appraisal reduction
for two of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$234,448 loss (25% expected loss based on a 50% probability default)
from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 96% and 60% of the non-defeased pool,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 84% compared to 81% at Moody's prior
full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 15.9% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 0.99X and 1.56X, respectively, compared to 1.54X
and 1.45X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 6 compared to 45 at Moody's prior full review.  The decline in
Herf has been partially offset by increased credit support due to loan
payoffs and amortization.  The pool has paid down 90% since Moody's
last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is a hotel portfolio loan ($9.5 million --
10.9% of the pool), which consists of four cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by four limited stay hotels with a total
of 652 rooms.  Three hotels are located in Virginia and one in
Shreveport, Louisiana.  Property performance has declined since last
review as the hotels have been impacted by the downturn in the tourism
industry.  All four hotels are currently on the watchlist due to an
increased level of default risk and low DSCR.  The loan is fully
amortizing and has paid down 15% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 117% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 71% and
1.90X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Academy Plaza Loan ($9.2 million --
10.6% of the pool), a 156,022 square foot grocery-anchored retail
center located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Property performance is
in-line with last review and the property is currently 82% leased, the
same as at last review.  The loan has amortized 6% since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.44X, respectively,
compared to 73% and 1.33X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Whitehall Estates Loan ($5.8 million --
6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 252-unit multifamily property
located in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The loan is fully amortizing
and has paid down 19% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 60% and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.21X at
last review.

The CTL component includes 16 loans secured by properties leased under
bondable leases.  The largest exposures include Rite Aid Corp. (37% of
the CTL component, Moody's Long Term Corporate Family Rating Caa2 --
stable outlook), CVS (30%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 --
stable outlook) and Walgreen Co. (28%; Moody's senior unsecured rating
A2 -- stable outlook).


FRANKLIN AUTO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class D
notes from Franklin Auto Trust 2008-A to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'.
Concurrently, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch, where S&P
placed it with negative implications on June 3, 2010.

The rating action reflects the transaction's collateral performance to
date, S&P's views regarding future collateral performance, and the
available credit enhancement.  Delinquencies and cumulative gross and
net losses have been trending in line with S&P's revised expectations
from June 2010.  However, cumulative net losses are trending
significantly higher than S&P's initial expectation of 6.00%-6.20% of
the original collateral balance at the time of issuance.

                              Table 1

                    Collateral Performance (%)

                                               Current
                Pool    Current  60-plus day   lifetime
  Series   Mo.  factor  CNL      delinquent    CNL expectations*
  ------   ---  ------  -------  -----------   -----------------
  2008-A   28   39.16   7.08     1.86          10.75-11.25


* Current cumulative net loss expectations are based on
  current performance data.

The issuer initially structured the transaction as a sequential
principal payment structure with credit enhancement consisting of
subordination for the higher-rated tranches, a letter of credit (LOC)
commitment, and a spread account.  The transaction documents state
that the spread account can build by trapping monthly excess spread,
and, combined with the LOC commitment, reach a specified combined
credit enhancement target.  The spread account is subject to a 0.50%
floor, and the LOC is subject to a 1.00% floor, which create a
combined floor of 1.50% of the initial collateral balance.  As of the
August 2010 performance month, the issuer had already replaced the LOC
with a cash-funded account by drawing on the LOC amount available (as
permitted by the transaction documents).  The issuer replaced the LOC
after S&P lowered its short-term ratings on the LOC provider.

In addition, the transaction documents state that the structure can
benefit from a cumulative net loss trigger that prevents any step-down
of the spread account and LOC in the event that losses exceed
prescribed levels in any given month.  However, if cumulative net
losses fall below the trigger for one month, the transaction documents
allow the spread account and LOC to step down to their respective
targets or floors.  Series 2008-A had previously been in breach of its
cumulative net loss trigger, which prevented any step-down of its
credit enhancement, resulting in an enhancement level that was higher
than its target.  However, the additional enhancement has since been
released.

                              Table 2

        Spread Account And LOC/Cash Funded Account Levels

                                             Current
      Initial                Combined        Combined spread
      spread    Initial      enhancement     and LOC/cash
      account   LOC          target          funded account
      deposit   commitment   (% of current)  (% of current)
      -------   ----------   --------------  ---------------
      2.25      5.75         10.25           10.25

On June 3, 2010, S&P placed its rating on the class D notes from
series 2008-A on CreditWatch negative because S&P believed there was a
high likelihood that the transaction would cure its cumulative net
loss trigger within the next couple of months and release credit
enhancement down to its target level.  When S&P placed its rating on
the transaction on CreditWatch negative, cumulative net losses were
6.54%, which exceeded the trigger level of 6.50%.  Currently,
cumulative net losses are 7.08% and below the corresponding trigger
level of 7.60% (the cumulative net loss trigger steps up monthly,
ultimately to 8.80% by February 2011).  As a result, hard credit
enhancement has stepped down to 10.25% of the current pool balance,
from 14.77% as of the May distribution date.  Given its higher
cumulative net loss expectations and the current credit enhancement
levels, S&P lowered its rating on the class D notes.

                              Table 3

                       Hard Credit Support

                                                   Current
                                   Month 24        month 28
                   Total           total hard      total hard
                   hard credit     credit          credit
        Pool       support         support*        support*
  Class factor(%)  at issuance(i)  (% of current)  (% of current)
  ----- ---------  --------------  --------------  --------------
  D     39.16      8.00            14.77           10.25

* Consists of the spread account and the cash-funded account that
  replaced the LOC, and excludes excess spread that can provide
  additional enhancement.

S&P incorporated its cash flow analysis in its review of this
transaction, which included current and historical performance to
estimate future performance.  S&P's various cash flow scenarios
included forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses,
and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that S&P believes are
appropriate given the transaction's current performance.  The results
demonstrated, in S&P's view, that this class now has adequate credit
enhancement at its lowered rating level.

S&P will continue to monitor the transaction's performance to assess
whether the credit enhancement remains sufficient, in its view, to
support the ratings on each class under various stress scenarios.

      Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    Franklin Auto Trust 2008-A

                          Rating
                          ------
          Class    To              From
          -----    --              ----
          D        BB (sf)         BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


FRANKLIN CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded seven subordinate tranches from
five auto loan securitizations sponsored by Franklin Capital
Corporation.

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Underlying rating: Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
     July 21, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2008-A

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 Aa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 21, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

                         Ratings Rationale

The actions are the result of lower lifetime cumulative net loss
expectations on the underlying collateral as well as build-up in
credit enhancement relative to remaining losses.  Even though
transactions from 2005 onward are performing weaker than original
expectations, credit support for the affected tranches has increased
due to sequential payment structures.

Moody's current lifetime CNL expectation for the affected transactions
ranges between 2.4% and 11.0% of the original pool balance, as
compared to a range of 2.4% to 11.5% of the original pool balance when
the securities were placed on review on July 21.  Specifically, for
the 2004-2 transaction, the current loss expectation (as a % of
original pool balance) is 2.4% (or approximately 3.2% of the remaining
pool balance).  The lifetime CNL expectation for the 2005-1
transaction (as a % of original pool balance), which is performing
marginally weaker than original expectation, is 4.25% (or
approximately 2.0% of the remaining pool balance).  The current
expectations for the later transactions, although slightly lower than
previous estimates, are still 2-3 times higher than original
expectations.  Moody's current expectations for the 2006-1, 2007-1 and
2008-A transactions are 7.25%, 9.0% and 11.0% (as a % of original pool
balance) respectively, or approximately 6.0%, 7.1% and 10.0%
respectively of the remaining pool balance.  The higher degree of
deterioration in these transactions reflects the impact of the
economic downturn during the term of these transactions, heightened by
a higher concentration of loans originated in weaker economies of
Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and California.

For 2004-2 transaction, total hard credit enhancement (excluding
available excess spread) for Class A tranche upgraded is approximately
76% of the outstanding collateral pool balances.  Excess spread for
the transaction is approximately 3% per annum.  For 2005-1
transaction, total hard credit enhancement for Class C tranche
upgraded is approximately 21% of the outstanding collateral pool
balances.  Excess spread for the transaction is approximately 3% per
annum.  For 2006-1 transaction, total hard credit enhancement for the
upgraded Class B and C tranches is approximately 42% and 7%
respectively of the outstanding collateral pool balances.  Excess
spread for the transaction is approximately 4% per annum.  For 2007-1
transaction, total hard credit enhancement for the upgraded Class B
tranche is approximately 25% of the outstanding collateral pool
balances.  Excess spread for the transaction is approximately 4% per
annum.  For 2008-A transaction, total hard credit enhancement for the
upgraded Class B and C tranches is approximately 51% and
31%respectively of the outstanding collateral pool balances.  Excess
spread for the transaction is approximately 3% per annum.

The volatility proxy Aaa levels for 2006-1, 2007-1 and 2008-A
transactions are approximately 24%, 28% and 35% respectively, of the
outstanding collateral pool balances.  Ratings on the Class C for
2006-1 could be upgraded if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or
downgraded if the lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.  For 2007-1, Class
B could be upgraded if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or
downgraded if the lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.  For 2008-A, class
C could be upgraded if the lifetime CNLs are lower by 10%, or
downgraded if the lifetime CNLs are higher by 10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions.  The decision to take (or
not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range of
factors including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics.
Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment continues to rise,
and weakness in the used vehicle market.  Moody's currently views the
used vehicle market as stronger now than it was a year ago, when the
uncertainty relating to the economy as well as the future of the U.S
auto manufacturers was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's
central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011;
Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world
largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.


G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10 classes
of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
from G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC, a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'CCC- (sf)' rating on class K from the transaction.

The downgrades and affirmation primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction following interest shortfalls to the transaction.  S&P's
analysis also considered potential interest shortfalls on classes that
have not experienced interest shortfalls.

According to the Aug. 24, 2010, trustee report, cumulative interest
shortfalls to the transaction totaled $3.8 million and affected class
D, as well as its subordinate classes.  The interest shortfalls to
G-FORCE 2005-RR resulted from interest shortfalls on the underlying
CMBS collateral.  The underlying interest shortfalls were primarily
due to special servicing fees and appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions.  According to the Aug. 24, 2010 trustee report, G-FORCE
2005-RR is collateralized by 39 CMBS classes ($415.6 million, 100%)
from 14 distinct transactions issued between 1998 and 2000.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

                       G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                    Rating
                                    ------
             Class            To               From
             -----            --               ----
             A-1              BB (sf)          A (sf)
             A-2              BB (sf)          A (sf)
             B                B+ (sf)          BBB (sf)
             C                CCC+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)
             D                CCC (sf)         BB+ (sf)
             E                CCC- (sf)        BB (sf)
             F                CCC- (sf)        BB- (sf)
             G                CCC- (sf)        B (sf)
             H                CCC- (sf)        CCC+ (sf)
             J                CCC- (sf)        CCC (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                       G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                    Class            Rating
                    -----            ------
                    K                CCC- (sf)


GEM VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by GEM VIII, Limited:

  -- US$10,000,000 Q-1 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2005 Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- US$10,000,000 Q-2 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2005 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$6,000,000 Q-3 Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     June 29, 2005 Assigned Ba3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Combo Notes
result primarily from the reduction of the Stated Principal balances
due to consistent distributions to the Income Notes and the
performance of the Class B, Class D-1, and Class D-2 notes.  The
Stated Principal balances for the Class Q-1 and the Class Q-3 Combo
Notes are reduced by any distributions to the Combo Notes.  The Stated
Principal balance for the Class Q-2 Combo Notes are reduced by any
distributions in excess of the 2% stated rate.  The Combo Notes are
now overcollateralized by their respective rated note components.
According to the June 2010 payment date report, the Class Q-1 Combo
Notes have a Stated Principal balance of
$5.76 million which is supported by $6.5 million of Class B Notes and
$3.5 million of Income Notes.  The Class Q-2 Combo Notes have a Stated
Principal balance of $3.35 million which is supported by $5 million of
Class D-2 Notes and $5 million of Income Notes.  The Class Q-3 Combo
Notes have a Stated Principal balance of
$1.73 million which is supported by $2 million of Class D-1 Notes and
$4 million of Income Notes.  Moody's ratings of the Combo Notes
addresses solely the repayment of the Stated Principal.

Moody's also notes that the credit profile of the underlying portfolio
has been relatively stable over the last year.  Based on the July 2010
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is 1698 compared to
1676 in July 2009, and securities rated Caa1 and below make up
approximately 3.89% of the underlying portfolio versus 3.21% in July
2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to
$9 million from $12.25 million in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different
from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds of $454 million, defaulted par of $9 million,
weighted average default probability of 15.37% (implying a WARF of
2123), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 20.71%, and a
diversity score of 20.  These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived
from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

GEM VIII, Limited, issued in June 2005, is an emerging market
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
sovereign and corporate bonds.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction by simulating a default distribution
in CDOROM v2.6 that was then applied as an input in the cash flow
model.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

This is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
whereby a positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted DP - 20% (1795)

  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D1: +3
  -- Class D2: +2
  -- Class Q1: +2
  -- Class Q2: +2
  -- Class Q3: +2

Moody's Adjusted DP + 20% (2455)

  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: -1
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D1: -1
  -- Class D2: -2
  -- Class Q1: -2
  -- Class Q2: -1
  -- Class Q3: 0

This is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on
all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors
are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (22.71%)

  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: 0
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D1: +1
  -- Class D2: 0
  -- Class Q1: 0
  -- Class Q2: +1
  -- Class Q3: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (18.71%)

  -- Class A1A: 0
  -- Class A1B: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D1: 0
  -- Class D2: -1
  -- Class Q1: 0
  -- Class Q2: 0
  -- Class Q3: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2014 which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO notes' performance may also
be impacted by 1) the managers' investment strategies and behavior, 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different
transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential
additional expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a
result of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap
termination in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.


GEM LIGOS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by GEM LIGOS III, Limited:

  -- US$84,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
     previously on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-3 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
     previously on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- US$29,000,000 Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$24,000,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
     on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
     on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- US$2,000,000 Class Q Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
     on April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action.  Additionally, the rating
action taken on the Class Q Combo Notes results primarily from the
reduction of the rated Class Q Combo Notes Stated Principal balance
relative to the available amount of collateral.  Moody's ratings of
the Class Q Combo Notes addresses solely the repayment of the Stated
Principal.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an improvement
in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated B1 and below.  In particular, as of the latest trustee
report dated August 20, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 940 compared to 980 in the March 2009 report, and securities
rated B1 or lower make up approximately 11.60% of the underlying
portfolio versus 13.86% in March 2009.  Furthermore, a notable decline
is observed in the Moody's adjusted WARF due to a decrease in the
percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" since the last rating action.

Reduction of the Class Q Combo Notes Stated Principal balance results
from the consistent receipt of distributions to the Class Q Combo
Notes attributable to its underlying Class D Notes and Income Notes
components.  The Stated Principal balance of the Class Q Combo Notes
is reduced by any distributions received.  As a consequence of such
distributions, the Class Q Combo Notes are now overcollateralized by
its underlying components.  According to the March 2010 payment date
report, the Class Q Combo Notes have
a Stated Principal balance of $845,133 which is supported by
$1 million of Class D Notes and $1 million of Income Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different
from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds of $586.6 million, defaulted par of $19.5 million,
weighted average default probability of 7.83% (implying a WARF of
1197), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 25.22%.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to
be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and
market performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

GEM LIGOS III, Limited, issued in March 2006, is an emerging market
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
sovereign and corporate bonds.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction by simulating a default distribution
in CDOROM v2.6 that was then applied as an input in the cash flow
model.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms
of the number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted DP -20% (1002)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: +1
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class Q: +2

Moody's Adjusted DP +20% (1384)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: -1
  -- Class A3: -1
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class Q: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on
all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors
are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR +2% (27.22%)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class Q: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR -2% (23.22%)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class A3: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class Q: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2014 which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO notes' performance may also
be impacted by 1) the managers' investment strategies and behavior and
2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described below

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


GOOD SAMARITAN: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on $68.8 Mil. Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Good Samaritan Hospital's (CA)
B2 bond rating assigned to $68.8 million of Series 1991 fixed rate
bonds outstanding issued through the California Health Facilities
Financing Authority.  The outlook has been revised to positive from
stable.  The outlook revision reflects two consecutive years of
operating improvements and growth in unrestricted liquidity, and the
expectation that the current level of financial performance is
sustained in order to maintain adequate liquidity and debt coverage
measures.

Legal Security: Bonds are secured by a first lien on certain pledged
assets, which include the medical center and underlying real estate, a
conference center, and two parking structures.  There are limits on
additional indebtedness.  There is no debt service reserve fund; the
hospital makes monthly interest and sinking fund payments into a bond
fund.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                             Strengths

* High-end clinical provider (Medicare case mix index of 1.76)
  located in downtown Los Angeles, CA

* FY 2010 will be the second consecutive year of reduced operating
  losses following sizable losses in FY 2008 and FY 2009;
  operating improvement is due to favorable payor mix shifts with
  the growth in more profitable Medicare and managed care volumes
  and reduction in Medi-Cal utilization, annual cost savings
  achieved from non-labor expense initiatives implemented, and
  negotiating more favorable managed care contracts; $5.0 million
  operating loss (-1.9% margin) and $8.3 million operating cash
  flow (3.2% margin) posted through eleven months of FY 2010

* Conservative debt structure with all fixed rate debt and no
  interest rate derivatives

* Presence of $44 million of unrestricted cash from a land sale
  that could provide a short-term source of liquidity for
  operations and debt service, but is expected to be spent on a
  large capital project by the end of FY 2012

* Anticipated to receive a sizable one-time net Medi-Cal payment
  for 21 months (April 2009-December 2010) from State Hospital
  Provider Fee Legislation passed in 2009 to draw down new federal
  matching funds for the Medi-Cal program; the legislation is
  currently awaiting CMS approval

                            Challenges

* Unrestricted cash (excluding $44 million of land sale proceeds)
  has grown notably in fiscal year 2010 to $67.5 million (89 days
  cash on hand) as of July 31, 2010, from $53.1 million (69 days)
  at fiscal year end (FYE) August 31, 2009 due to improved
  operating performance and investment gains; however, cash is
  projected to decline to approximately $40 million by the end of
  FY 2012 as the hospital uses cash to complete the major capital
  project

* Even with the continued operating improvements in FY 2010,
  operating cash flow margin remains a low 3.2% resulting in
  improved but still modest leverage measures including peak debt
  service coverage of 1.82 times (based on annualized eleven
  months FY 2010); additionally, the hospital will need to absorb
  and offset $6.5 million of revenue cuts in FY 2011

* Hospital serves a large Medi-Cal patient population (represents
  21.4% of gross revenues), an ongoing concern given the State's
  budget pressures and uncertainty of future funding sources and
  levels for hospitals

* Small and very competitive primary service area consisting of 14
  general acute care hospitals in a 4.5 mile radius; larger
  service area includes over 20 hospitals

* Challenging labor environment, although wage increases are
  moderating; in FY 2010 the hospital entered into three-year
  contracts with both California Nurses Association (CNA) and
  Service Employees International Union (SEIU)

* Very high average age of plant (27 years) due to deferred
  capital needs; the hospital is currently in compliance with
  structural requirements but nonstructural requirements still
  need to be met under state seismic standards

                    Recent Developments/Results

Good Samaritan Hospital is located in downtown Los Angeles,
California.  Fiscal year 2010 will be the second consecutive year the
hospital has reduced operating losses.  Through eleven months of FY
2010, operating losses were cut to approximately
$5.0 million (1.9% margin) and operating cash flow increased to $8.2
million (3.2% margin).  Operating losses declined to
$10.2 million (-3.6% margin) in FY 2009 from $15.6 million (-6.0%
margin) in FY 2008 and operating cash flow grew to $5.1 million (1.8%
margin) in FY 2009, compared with relatively flat growth of $0.9
million (0.4% margin) in FY 2008.  Management attributes the recent
improvements in performance to several factors including (1) favorable
payor mix shifts with growth in more profitable Medicare and managed
care volumes and reduction in Medi-Cal utilization; (2) annual cost
savings realized from non-labor expense initiatives implemented
through its engagement with Wellspring; and (3) more favorable
reimbursement contracts recently negotiated with managed care payors.
In FY 2010, the hospital also successfully entered into three year
contracts with both California Nurses Association and the Service
Employees International Union.

In FY 2010, inpatient admissions declined by 7.7% and outpatient
surgeries grew by a modest 1%.  Management notes that most of the
admissions decline was in less profitable cases including self pay
obstetrics and non-contracted Medi-Cal managed care transfers coming
through the ED.  Despite the weak volume trends, revenues grew by 4.4%
from the favorable payor mix shifts and increased managed care rates.
Good Samaritan is budgeting a slightly lower $4.4 million operating
loss for FY 2011, which Moody's believe will be challenging to achieve
given expected Medicare and Medi-Cal revenue reductions totaling an
estimated $6.5 million.  No rates increases are expected for both
Medicare and Medi-Cal.  In addition, the State distressed hospital
funding Good Samaritan has qualified for since 2006 ended in FY 2010,
with the hospital receiving a decrease in funding from the prior year.
Annual cost savings of about $7.0 million from improved supply and
service contracts are expected to offset the revenue shortfall in FY
2011.

The hospital is also anticipating incremental admissions growth from a
recent move of an internal medicine physician practice onto the
hospital campus and growth in surgical cases following the recruitment
of a neurospine surgeon a year ago.  Management also has identified
additional performance improvement plans that are not incorporated in
the FY 2011 budget including a favorable net revenue impact from a
clinical documentation improvement project that will begin later this
month.  Additionally, Good Samaritan is expected to be a net
beneficiary of a sizable one-time Medi-Cal payment from the State
hospital fee legislation that was passed in 2009 that would allow the
State to levy fees on hospitals, match the fee with federal matching
funds and redistribute to hospitals based on Medi-cal exposure.  The
legislation is currently awaiting approval from CMS.

From Moody's last rating review in December 2009, Good Samaritan's
unrestricted cash position has grown notably due to improved
operations and investment gains.  Unrestricted cash grew to
$67.5 million (89 days cash on hand) as of July 31, 2010 from $53.1
million (69 days cash on hand) at FYE August 31, 2009 and $16 million
(22 days) as of FYE 2008.  Cash-to-debt improved to 98% from 73% in FY
2009 and from a much weaker 21% in FY 2008.  The growth in cash over
the last two years is reportedly due to improved operating performance
and investment gains following a change in the hospital's asset
allocations from primarily government treasuries to mostly corporate
bonds beginning in November 2008.  Good Samaritan's total unrestricted
cash and investments (including land sale proceeds) is invested 85% in
cash (13.7%) and fixed income securities (71.7%) and the remaining is
invested in equities (13.5%) and real estate (1.2%).  However,
unrestricted cash is expected to decline to a projected
$40 million by the end of FY 2012 as the hospital uses cash to fund a
large capital project (discussed below).

Good Samaritan currently has an additional source of liquidity in the
form of $44 million (excluded from Moody's calculation of unrestricted
cash and investments) in cash acquired from a land sale.  The funds
are unrestricted and can be used to support operations and debt
service in the short term; however, this money has been set aside by
the board to fund the construction of a large 190,000 square foot
medical office building and outpatient pavilion, which will assist
with recruiting physicians and expand clinical space.  The total cost
of this project is approximately $78 million.  The project will be
funded with the $44 million in land proceeds, a $12 million gift that
has already been received, and the remaining will be funded through
unrestricted cash.  The project funds are invested approximately 40%
in equities, which Moody's believe creates some risk given market
volatility and the intent to use these funds in the near future.  The
hospital will spend about $12.3 million of these funds on the project
in FY 2011.  Also, capital spending in FY 2010 excluding the large
capital project is budgeted to be approximately $17.2 million up from
nearly $9.0 million spent in FY 2010 which includes spending for
routine capital, electronic medical record, a new linear accelerator
for the radiation oncology program, and increased Cardiac Cath and EP
lab capacity.

Due to increased operating cash flow generation in FY 2010, debt
measures improved but remain modest to service an all fixed rate and
relatively low debt load (measured by total debt-to-operating revenues
of 24%).  Based on annualized eleven months FY 2010 results, Moody's
adjusted maximum annual debt service coverage measured 1.82 times and
adjusted debt-to-cash flow improved to 6.30 times from 1.41 times and
10.18 times respectively in FY 2009.

                              Outlook

The outlook revision to positive from stable reflects two consecutive
years of operating improvements and growth in unrestricted liquidity,
and the expectation that the current level of operating performance is
sustained in order to maintain adequate liquidity and debt coverage
measures.

                What could change the rating -- Up

Growth and stability of volume and revenues; improved operating
performance and ability to sustain improved levels for multiple years;
receipt of hospital tax proceeds to minimize the use of cash for the
project; improved debt coverage measures

               What could change the rating -- Down

Continued operating losses; decline in unrestricted liquidity;
weakening of debt coverage and liquidity measures

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Good Samaritan Hospital, CA

  -- First number reflects audit fiscal year ended August 31, 2009

  -- Second number reflects unaudited eleven months ending
     July 31, 2010 (annualized)

  -- Total expenses associated with Research Institutes
     reclassified as operating expenses from non-operating
     expenses, $1.18 million in FY 2009 and $1.25 million through
     eleven months FY 2010

  -- Investment returns smoothed at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 17,938; 16,596 (11 months FY 2010
  annualized)

* Total operating revenues: $280 million; $282.5 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $12.3 million; $15.9 million

* Total debt outstanding: $72.4 million; $68.8 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $8.7 million; $8.7 million

* MADS coverage based on reported investment income: 2.6 times;
  2.6 times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS coverage: 1.41 times; 1.82 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 10.18 times; 6.30 times

* Days cash on hand: 69 days; 89 days

* Cash-to-debt: 73%; 98%

* Operating margin: (3.6)%; (1.9)%

* Operating cash flow margin: 1.8%; 3.2%

Rated Debt (Debt Outstanding As Of August 31, 2010)

  -- Series 1991 fixed rate revenue bonds ($68.8 million
     outstanding) rated B2

The last rating action with respect to Good Samaritan Hospital was on
December 23, 2009, when a municipal finance scale rating of B2 was
affirmed and the outlook was revised to stable from negative.  That
rating was subsequently recalibrated to B2 on May 7, 2010


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-EOP Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14 classes
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II's series 2007-EOP and removed two of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the deal structure,
including a review of the office properties securing the sole loan
that serves as collateral for the transaction.  S&P's analysis also
considered the information that S&P has received regarding the
transfer of the loan to the special servicer, Bank of America N.A.
The loan was transferred to BofA on May 21, 2010, due to concerns
surrounding the borrower's ability to refinance the loan by its Feb.
1, 2012, final maturity date.  The transfer to special servicing
prompted us to place S&P's ratings on classes K and L on CreditWatch
negative on May 28, 2010, due to the potential for these classes to
experience interest shortfalls from special servicing fees, workout
fees, and other related expenses.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class X interest-only
certificate reflects its current criteria.

BofA has stated that it is currently in discussions with the borrower
to work out the loan, including a possible loan
modification/extension.  The workout could be completed as early as
this year.  BofA has also informed us that the loan is current, and
that no interest shortfalls have occurred to date, because the
borrower has agreed to pay the negotiated special servicing fees and
workout fees, both of which are below the contractual amounts detailed
in the transaction documents.  While S&P does not anticipate any
interest shortfalls at this time, should the trust incur future
interest shortfalls related to expenses from the special servicing
transfer, S&P will evaluate the effect on the trust and adjust its
ratings, as S&P deem appropriate.

S&P based its analysis of the collateral, in part, on a review of the
borrower's operating statements for the trailing 12 months ended March
31, 2010, as well as the borrower's rent rolls as of July 31, 2010.
The master servicer, also BofA, reported debt service coverage of
9.61x for the portfolio for year-end 2009 and overall occupancy of
85.5% as of July 2010.  S&P's adjusted valuations of the office
properties were comparable to the levels that S&P determined in its
last review, dated Feb. 2, 2010.  Based on various stressed scenarios,
S&P's portfolio valuations, which ranged between $4.88 billion and
$5.24 billion, yielded stressed in-trust loan-to-value ratios of 94.1%
and 101.1%.  BofA indicated that updated appraisals dated July 2010
valued the collateral significantly above the trust balance.

As of the Sept. 7, 2010, trustee remittance report, the mortgage loan
has a trust and whole-loan balance of $4.93 billion, which is
currently secured by 98 office properties totaling 34.1 million sq.
ft. in 10 U.S. states.  Since issuance, 37 office properties were
fully released from the collateral pool, resulting in a
$1.93 billion paydown of the senior loan balance.  The top five
geographic concentrations are as follows: Boston (36.0% of net
rentable area), Northern California (33.8% of NRA), Southern
California (16.1% of NRA), Manhattan (4.2% of NRA), and New Orleans
(3.5% of NRA).  The floating-rate IO loan matures on
Feb. 1, 2011, and has one one-year extension option remaining that
brings the final maturity to Feb. 1, 2012.  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrowers of the whole loan secure five mezzanine
loans that are held outside the trust and total
$2.04 billion, down from $3.94 billion at issuance.  Details of the
current collateral for the loan are:

* First mortgage liens on 78 office properties totaling
  23.0 million sq. ft.;

* Cash flow pledges of the borrower's joint-venture interests in
  13 office properties totaling 7.5 million sq. ft.;

* Equity pledges of the borrower's joint-venture interests in
  three properties totaling 1.6 million sq. ft.; and

* Other collateral, including covenants to apply proceeds and
  collateral note assignments with respect to four properties
  totaling 2.0 million sq. ft.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-EOP

                             Rating
                             ------
       Class          To                 From
       -----          --                 ----
       K              BB (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Neg
       L              B- (sf)            B- (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-EOP

                   Class             Rating
                   -----             ------
                   A-1               AAA (sf)
                   A-2               AAA (sf)
                   A-3               AAA (sf)
                   B                 AAA (sf)
                   C                 AA+ (sf)
                   D                 AA (sf)
                   E                 A+ (sf)
                   F                 BBB+ (sf)
                   G                 BBB (sf)
                   H                 BBB- (sf)
                   J                 BB+ (sf)
                   X                 AAA (sf)


GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from three RMBS transactions
issued by GSAMP.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-NC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2007-H1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A2S, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 13,
     2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                         Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios.
The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations comprising of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment curves.
The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to small
increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into
consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 2006-4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one and downgraded eleven classes of Notes issued
by Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-4 due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor, and
increase in Defaulted Securities.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 9, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-4 is a CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (14.1% of
the pool balance), B-Notes (24.0%), commercial mortgage backed
securities (20.3%), CRE CDO securities (15.5%), ABS securities (9.1%)
and mezzanine loans (17.0%).  As of the August 18, 2010 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$358.1 million from $506.0 million at issuance, with the paydown
primarily directed to the Class A-1 Notes, as a result of paydown from
the collateral pool as well as failing the Class A/B, C/D/E and F/G/H
par value tests.  Classes A-2 through K also received some paydown
pro-rata prior to the par value test failure.

There are twelve assets with par balance of $146.2 million (44.4% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired Securities as
of the August 18, 2010 Trustee report.  One of these assets (25.0% of
the impaired balance) is A-Note, one asset is C-Note (1.1%), one asset
is D-Note (10.8%), one asset is E-Note (10.8%), four assets are CMBS
(18.0%) and four assets are CRE CDO securities (34.3%).  Impaired
Assets that are not CMBS are defined as assets which are 30 or more
days delinquent in their debt service payment.  While there have been
no realized losses to date, Moody's does expect significant losses to
occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset correlation.
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.  Per the legal documentation
the transactions will end its reinvestment period in Feburary 2012.
However, given portfolio profile requirements as well as very limited
investment options, this analysis effectively deems this transaction
static.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF of 6,281 compared to 6,112 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (0.2%
compared to 0.0% at last review), A1-A3 (0.2% compared to 0.0% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.0% compared to 3.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(1.6% compared to 17.2% at last review), B1-B3 (29.1% compared to 6.6%
at last review), and Caa1-C (68.8% compared to 73.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 1.9
years compared to 5.0 years (due to reinvestment period) at last
review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for the
collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 12.3%
compared to 11.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset correlation
to the default distribution among the instruments within the
collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's modeled a
MAC of 18.9% compared to 12.0% at last review.  The relatively low MAC
is due to higher default probability collateral concentrated within a
small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the deal.

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However, in
many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key parameter may
be offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameters.
Rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in recovery rate
assumptions.  Holding all other key parameters static, changing the
recovery rate assumption down from 12.3% to 7.3% or up to 17.3% would
result in average rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1
notch downward and 0 to 1 notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions.  The decision to take (or
not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range of
factors including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics.
Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in a majority of property sectors.  The availability
of debt capital is improving with terms returning towards market
norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will be necessary
precursors to commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's
central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011;
Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's
largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.


HOPKINS COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $22.7 Bonds to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 the rating
assigned to Hopkins County Hospital District's
$22.7 million of Series 2008 fixed rate hospital revenue bonds
outstanding.  The outlook has been revised to negative from stable.
The downgrade in the rating and the revision in the outlook to
negative are attributable to a sizable decline in operating
performance in fiscal year (FY) 2009 and continued operating losses in
year-to-date FY 2010 performance with declines in admissions and other
volume measures, along with stagnant liquidity that has resulted in
declining days cash on hand as the expense base has grown.
Furthermore, tax revenues are projected to be negatively impacted by
anticipated declines in assessed property values, with maintenance or
growth in tax revenues requiring an increase in the tax rate.  Moody's
note, however, that an increase in the tax rate will minimize the
ability for further increases in the rate as HCHD would be nearing its
maximum allowable tax rate.  The small size of the organization
(revenue base and medical staff) keeps the hospital vulnerable to
minor operating changes that would not materially impact a larger
organization.

HCHD owns and operates Hopkins County Memorial Hospital, a 54-staffed
bed acute care hospital located in Sulphur Springs, TX.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by Pledged Revenues, as defined
in the bond documents, of HCHD and a debt service reserve fund.  Tax
revenues are not pledged to the bonds.  Bond covenants include a
liquidity pledge of not less than 60 days cash on hand and a rate
covenant of not less than 115%; consultant required if covenants
missed; event of default if rate covenant less than 115% for two
consecutive years or if liquidity less than 60 days one year after
consultant's report issued.

Interest Rate Derivatives: none

                            Challenges

* Small active medical staff of just over 30 physicians drives
  small admission, revenue and asset bases that create
  vulnerability to physician or service interruptions

* Significant volume declines with admissions declining 3% in 2009
  and 10% through the interim period of 2010 compared to the same
  period of the prior year

* Operating deficits in FY 2009 and interim nine months FY 2010 (-
  1.8% and -4.3%, respectively) that have substantially reduced
  operating cash flow margin (7.2% and 3.0%, respectively) and
  weakened Moody's-adjusted maximum annual debt service
  coverage to 1.7 times in FY 2009; Moody's note minimal booking
  of supplemental payments (disproportionate share and upper
  payment limit) year-to-date due to delayed receipt for the year

* Absolute unrestricted liquidity modest at $20 million
  contributes to low 58% cash-to-debt ratio at FYE 2009

                             Strengths

* The only hospital in Hopkins County, with the nearest competitor
  of size located 32 miles to the west in Greenville; HCHD is
  coterminous Hopkins County, with A1 General Obligated Limited
  Tax rated county debt

* Completion of major capital projects on time and slightly below
  budget, and removes need for critical capital spending in the
  near term, enabling HCHD the ability to preserve liquidity

* Cash on hand remains good at 144 days at fiscal yearend (FYE)
  2009 despite a two year decline, and is invested largely in
  highly liquid cash, government securities and money market funds

* Ability to increase tax rate to $0.25 per $100 of assessed
  value, a 53% increase over the current tax rate of $0.1637 per
  $100 of assessed value, though subject to rollback provisions

* Debt is all in a fixed rate mode, and principal payments are
  delayed on the Series 2008 bonds until 2015 which assists in
  growing liquidity in the near-term

                    Recent Developments/Results

HCHD experienced a material decline in operating performance in FY
2009 after record performance in FY 2008.  Operating income (including
tax revenues, interest expense, capitalized interest, and adjustment
in FY 2008 for non-cash unusual accrual) declined to a deficit of $1.0
million (-1.8% margin) in FY 2009 after the hospital recorded a record
profit of $5.6 million (12.4% margin) in FY 2008.

FY 2008's exceptional performance resulted from revenue growth of
12.1% far exceeding expense growth of 2.6%.  Revenues grew in FY 2008
despite decreases in certain volume measures, including an 11.5%
decline in inpatient admissions, 8.6% decline in patient days, and
4.2% decline in emergency room visits.  Additionally, total surgical
volume was relatively flat (0.8% decline) yet newborn admissions grew
5.8%.  Assisting revenue growth was (1) a $500,000 increase in
supplemental payments (disproportionate share and upper payment
limit); (2) a slight $170,000 increase in tax revenues; and (3) an
increase in Medicare case mix index to 1.15 from 0.99, resulting in
higher acuity and higher reimbursement.  Expenses were held relatively
flat with only a 2.7% increase in salaries and benefits and only minor
increases and decreases in other expense categories.  As a result of
this strong performance, operating cash flow increased to $8.8 million
for a very strong margin of 18.4%.

FY 2009's operating performance declined markedly, with expenses
growing faster than revenues.  Total revenue growth was strong at
11.9% despite growth in charity care ($440,000), a decline in
supplemental payments ($660,000), and a decline in admissions.  In FY
2009 admissions declined 3% continuing a multi-year decline to 3,693
in FY 2009 from 4,560 in FY 2006.  Despite the decline in admissions,
increases in inpatient surgeries, acuity (Medicare case mix index
increased to 1.25 in FY 2009 from 1.15 in FY 2008), and outpatient
volumes drove the increase in revenues.

Operating expenses, however, grew at a rate of 29%.  Expenses
increased largely due to (1) a $3.5 million increase in
purchased/contracted services, which, per management, included about
$650,000 of non-recurring legal and consulting fees and an amount for
increased use in agency nurses; (2) $1.5 million of additional
interest expense, which largely represents the increase in capitalized
interest that Moody's reclassifies to operating expenses; (3) a $1.1
million increase in bad debt expense; and (4) a $1.0 million increase
in supplies expense.  Moody's notes that slight dollar changes can
have a large percentage impact on a small hospital of this size.
Operating cash flow also declined, to $3.9 million, but the operating
cash flow margin remained acceptable at 7.2%.

For the first nine months of FY 2010, HCHD is reporting an operating
loss of $1.6 million (-4.3% margin) and an operating cash flow margin
of only 3.0% on unaudited results.  Management reports that only about
$400,000 of supplemental payments have been booked to-date in the
interim period, and expects to book an additional $1.7 million in the
fourth quarter should final notice of pending payment be received.
Management, however, will not book the revenue until notice from the
state is received.  Admissions declined nearly 10% in the interim
period year-over-year, with inpatient surgeries declining slightly.
These trends were partly mitigated by increases in outpatient
surgeries and outpatient visits.  Based on annualized interim results,
Moodys-adjusted peak debt service coverage is very weak below 1 times
coverage.  HCHD must report peak debt service below 1.15 times for two
consecutive years below breach of the rate covenant.

To address the downturn in operating performance, management has taken
steps to (1) renegotiate certain contracts, (2) control salary and
benefit expenses with personnel reductions and changes in benefits,
and (3) control other expenses.  HCHD is continuing to work on
physician recruitment, and is evaluating additional growth in the
medical staff which could include additional physician employment.
Moody's notes that while revenues could grow from such strategies, so
would the expense base which, independent of other changes, would
negatively affect certain ratios including margins and days cash on
hand.

As a District Hospital, HCHD has established a ability to levy taxes
to support operations.  Approximately 5% of operating revenues are
derived from ad valorem taxes.  The ad valorem tax rate has been
stable at $0.1637 per $100 of assessed value across the past eight
years but has generated an increasing amount of tax revenues as
property values have increased.  The District has the option to
increase the tax rate up to a maximum of $0.25 per $100 of assessed
value without further vote, but the rate increase is subject to
rollback should the community obtain sufficient signatures to place
the rollback on a ballot, and subsequently be passed by vote.  Based
upon current operating performance and projected decreases in assessed
values, management has stated its intention to evaluate the option to
increase the existing tax rate to cover expenses.  Moody's notes that
there is not much room between the existing tax rate and the maximum
tax rate as the current tax rate is already 42% of the maximum
available.

Unrestricted cash and investments declined in FY 2008 by
$7 million to $19.1 million with a planned contribution to the
project.  As a result, cash on hand declined to 191 days from 249 days
the year before.  Liquidity increased slightly in FY 2009 to $20.3
million, but cash on hand declined a high 25% to 144 days with a
sizable increase in operating expenses.  As of June 30, 2010,
unrestricted cash and investments increased $1 million and days cash
remained stable.  Management is projecting to spend only $500,000 for
capital in the fourth quarter of the year, preserving liquidity.  The
capital budget for FY 2011 is $2.0 million.

HCHD issued bonds for the first time in 2008, and issued additional
private placement debt in 2009 to support the
$36.5 million in capital projects, including constructing an adjacent
patient tower to expand the number of private patient rooms and
renovate the existing patient rooms, greatly expand the emergency
department, renovate the laboratory and admissions areas of the
hospital, and upgrade the central plant.  The projects are now
complete and were within budget.  Outstanding debt now stands at $34.7
million, generating a high debt-to-revenue ratio of 65% and low
cash-to-debt ratio of 58%.  The bonds are all fixed rate, with
principal payments on the Series 2008 bonds beginning in 2015 and
principal payments on the Series 2009 bonds beginning in 2011.
Management has no plans at this time for additional debt.

                              Outlook

The revision in the outlook to negative from stable is attributable to
the sizable decline in operating performance in fiscal year (FY) 2009
and continued operating losses in year-to-date FY 2010 performance
with declines in inpatient volumes and other measures, along with
stagnant liquidity that has resulted in a decline in days cash on hand
as expenses grew.  Additional concerns center around declining
property values which negatively impact tax revenues and, while the
tax rate could be raised, Moody's note that an increase will minimize
the ability for further increase in the rate as the District would be
nearing its maximum allowable tax rate.

                What could change the rating -- Up

Growth in inpatient volumes and revenue base to mitigate the risks
associated with its small size; substantial reduction in long-term
debt while maintaining and growing liquidity balance; return to
historical levels of operating cash flow generation

               What could change the rating -- Down

Loss of tax revenues to support operations; marked decline in
unrestricted liquidity; continuation of unfavorable operating
performance that negatively impacts cash flow and debt service
coverage; additional debt beyond current capital structure

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Hopkins County Hospital
     District d.b.a. Hopkins County Memorial Hospital

  -- First number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2009

  -- Third number reflects annualized nine month performance as of
     June 30, 2010 (note that only partial recognition of
     supplemental payments is included ($400,000 through nine
     months, then annualized) of management's anticipated
     $2.1 million earned for the year)

  -- Total operating revenues increased by tax revenues; bad debt
     expense added back to total operating revenues and total
     operating expenses; interest expense included in total
     operating expenses

  -- One-time $2.8 million accrual in FY 2008 removed from
     expenses

  -- Investment returns normalized at 5%

  -- Interest expense "grossed up" to include capitalized interest
     of $260,000 in FY 2008 and $1.8 million in FY 2009

* Inpatient admissions: 3,807; 3,693; 2,542 (nine months only)

* Total operating revenues: $45.0 million; $53.5 million;
  $48.7 million (includes only $700,000 of supplemental payments)

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $9.9 million; $4.9 million; $1.7 million

* Total debt outstanding: $25.6 million; $34.7 million;
  $34.7 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $2.9 million; $3.8 million;
  $3.8 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: 3.47 times; 1.21
  times; 0.24 times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: 3.41 times; 1.29 times; 0.46 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 2.69 times; 11.60 times; 21.24 times

* Days cash on hand: 191 days; 144 days; 147 days

* Cash-to-debt: 75%; 58%; 56%

* Operating margin: 12.4%; -1.8%; -6.2%

* Operating cash flow margin: 19.6%; 7.2%; 1.2%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of June, 2010):

  -- Series 2008 fixed rate revenue bonds ($22.7 million
     outstanding), rated Baa3

  -- Series 2009 fixed rate revenue bonds ($9.6 million
     outstanding), privately placed and not rated

The last rating action with respect to HCHD was on April 21, 2008,
when a municipal finance scale rating of Baa3 was initial given with a
stable outlook.  That rating was subsequently recalibrated to Baa3 on
May 7, 2010.


INDYMAC HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 53 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 53 tranches,
confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches, and upgraded the ratings of 3
tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by IndyMac.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

Five pools from two deals affected by these actions have pool policies
(IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2006-B
and IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2006-C).  Based on high rescission rates on claims made for defaults
on subprime collateral, Moody's assumed an average ultimate acceptance
rate of 20%.  Of the deals with pool policies, this resulted in pool
policies providing benefit only for IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan
Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2006-C's three pools.  Without the benefit
of the pool policies, losses to this deal would have been about 2
percentage points higher.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios.
The scenarios include ninety-six different combinations comprising of
six loss levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment curves.
The volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to small
increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into
consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series INABS 2007-B

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2005-A

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2005-B

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2005-C

  -- Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2005-D

  -- Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2006-A

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2006-B

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS 2006-C

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series
INABS 2006-D

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series
INABS 2006-E

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series
INABS 2007-A

  -- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-CIBC8 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-CIBC8, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CIBC8 and placed eight
classes on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Cl. D, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 12, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 12, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned A3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 12, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
     (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 12, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
     (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on April 12, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
     (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 8, 2006 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba3 (sf); Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 8, 2006 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B2 (sf); Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 8, 2006 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 10, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 10, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 10, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of Classes M through P are due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $14.0 million loss on two loans resulting in
a 100% loss for classes P through M and a 24% loss hitting Class L.
The servicer has recognized appraisal reductions totaling $9.8 million
for two loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's placed Classes D through L on review for possible downgrade
due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
pay down analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV
ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity,
is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations
may be considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled
credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or determined
based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For
fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 10, 2008.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

As of the August 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $913 million
from $1.25 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 45% of the
pool.  Nine loans, representing 7% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Four loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have
material issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14 million (42% loss severity).  Six
loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Hebron Heights
Loan ($8.9 million -- 1% of the pool), which is secured by a 59,429
square foot unanchored retail center located in Carrollton, Texas.
The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2008 and is now
real estate owned (REO).

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Mission Foothills
Professional Building Loan ($7.7 million -- 1% of the pool), which is
secured by a 52,000 square foot office building located in Mission
Viejo, California.  The loan transferred into special servicing in
July 2010 due to monetary default.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multi-family and retail properties.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $9.8 million appraisal reduction for two of
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially serviced
and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall pool.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 72 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 72 tranches,
upgraded the ratings of 4 tranches and confirmed the ratings of 17
tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by
J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust.

                         Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S1

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S2

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S3

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-B, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2006-S4

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Confirme d at B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A1, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-A1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A2

  -- Cl. 1-1-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-1-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-2-A6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-S1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2006-FL2 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-FL2 on review for possible downgrade Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-2, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec. 7, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

The 11 classes have been placed under review for downgrade due to the
deterioration in performance of assets in the trust, the significant
concentration of loans secured by hotel properties, and the
refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  There are currently two loans in special
servicing which are Menlo Oaks Corporate Center (9% of the pooled
balance) and Hilton San Diego Mission Valley Hotel (3%).  Four loans,
representing 49% of the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated March 19, 2009.  The previous review was part of Moody's first
quarter 2009 ratings sweep and incorporated assumptions for
capitalization rates and stressed cash flows that were outlined in
"Rating Methodology Update: US CMBS Conduit and Fusion Review Prompted
by Declining Property Values and Rising Delinquencies" dated February
5, 2009.

Moody's review will focus on the deteriorating performance of the
overall assets in the pool including specially serviced and
watchlisted loans.


KEY COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-SL1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes and
affirmed nine classes of Key Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2007-SL1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-SL1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain
their current ratings.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and
the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline
below the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transactions.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated March 18, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to
$212.2 million from $237.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 145 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 23% of the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 88
compared to 91 at Moody's last review.

Forty-seven loans, representing 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.3 million (71% loss severity on
average).  Currently, there are two loans, representing less than 1%
of the pool, in special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $366,884 appraisal reduction for the specially serviced
loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$1.0 million loss for the specially serviced loans (70% expected loss
on average).  Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base
expected loss of 5% of the current balance.


KIRKWOOD CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the ratings
of four classes of notes issued by Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Limited.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$82,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due December 30,
     2044 (current balance of $40,381,062), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

  -- US$30,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 30, 2044, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$13,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 30, 2044, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 30, 2044, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of 63% credit default swaps (the
majority of which are referencing corporate entities), 21% asset
backed securities and 16% CLO securities, which originated between
2001 and 2004.

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased from
$5 million in March 2009 to $15 million in June 2010.  Also, the
underlying portfolio includes five Ca or C rated assets with a total
principal balance of $54 million.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there exist
a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a macro level
and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the general macro
uncertainties are those surrounding future housing prices, pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing,
unemployment rate and interest rates.  However, in light of the
performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is
unlikely that the ratings announced are sensitive to further change.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted above,
the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which are currently
on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th for
Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will have
varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf ) or Baa
(sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches, Aa (sf) and A
(sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by six
notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which originated
prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below, and are also
currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed to Ca
(sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and asset
type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating analysis
while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on review for
downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for securities that
have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS team, and that are
no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features,
the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection
bias in the portfolio.  All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table, and
the original rating of the instrument along with its average life to
infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution for
the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within CDOROMv2.6
to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within this framework,
defaults are generated so that they occur with the frequency indicated
by the adjusted default probability pool (the default probability
associated with the current rating multiplied by the Resecuritization
Stress) for each credit in the reference.  Specifically, correlated
defaults are simulated using a normal (or "Gaussian") copula model
that applies the asset correlation framework.  Recovery rates for
defaulted credits are generated by applying within the simulation the
distributional assumptions, including the correlation between recovery
values.  Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each
of the Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

The capital structure is incorporated into CDOROM by specifying the
attachment point and the thickness of the tranche.  The Expected Loss
(EL) for each tranche is the weighted average of losses to each
tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight is the likelihood
of the scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as the shortfall
in the present value of cash flows to the tranche relative to the
present value of the promised cash flows.  The discount rate used to
present value is the current swap rate plus the promised spread on the
tranche based on its remaining maturity.  Solely for the purpose of
discounting losses, Moody's assumes that losses on the tranche occur
60% of the way through the maturity of the tranche.  The final EL of
the synthetic SF CDO tranche is the discounted average of the tranche
loss across all the scenarios simulated in CDOROM.  Since the EL is
based on a simulation process, the convergence of the simulation will
depend, in part, on the number of iterations chosen for the
simulation.  Moody's applies a 99% confidence interval to the EL
result using a Standard Error equal to the square root of the EL
Variance divided by the number of Monte Carlo simulations.  If this
confidence interval adjustment is significant, a larger number of
iterations may be used to reduce the standard error.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.


LARGO LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six tranches
from Largo (Wayfarer CDO 2007-1) Ltd., a U.S. hybrid corporate
collateralized bond obligation transaction, and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The downgraded tranches have
a total issuance amount of $223.7 million.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in credit quality and S&P's negative rating
  actions on the underlying securities.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the transaction and take
rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, where appropriate.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 Largo (Wayfarer CDO 2007-1) Ltd.

                          Rating
                          ------
              Class   To          From
              -----   --          ----
              A-2     AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
              A-3     AA- (sf)    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
              B       A- (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg
              C       BBB- (sf)   A (sf)/Watch Neg
              D       B+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
              E       CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-MF1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes and
affirmed four classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.,
Series 2005-MF1:

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  The classes that Moody's affirmed are all rated C based on
realized losses and Moody's current base expected loss.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 28, 2010.  See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity
page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to
$245.3 million from $387.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 247 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 1.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 12% of the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 173
compared to 178 at Moody's last review.

Eighty-seven loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15.2 million (46% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes H
through N and a 48% principal loss on Class G.  Currently, there are
34 loans, representing 17% of the pool, in special servicing.  The
master servicer has recognized an aggregate $30.9 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $25.3 million loss for the specially serviced loans (60%
expected loss on average).  Moody's rating action reflects a
cumulative base expected loss of 15% of the current balance.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.  Based
on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.0 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-MF5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed three classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.,
Series 2007-MF5.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$361.7982M, Cl. A Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. X Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$9.155M, Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$13.428M, Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$8.545M, Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans.  The classes that Moody's affirmed are all rated C based on
realized losses and Moody's current base expected loss.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent approximately 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated January 28, 2010.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $391.0 million
from $488.3 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 323 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 1.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 11% of the
pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl score of 212 compared to 224 at
Moody's last review.

Ninety-four loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $30.8 million (74% loss severity on
average).  These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes E
through N and a 22% principal loss on Class D.  Currently, there are
41 loans, representing 16% of the pool, in special servicing.  The
master servicer has recognized an aggregate $30.9 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $45.6 million loss for the specially serviced loans (74%
expected loss on average).  Moody's rating action reflects a
cumulative base expected loss of 18% of the current balance.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.  Based
on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.66 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.


LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 68 RMBS Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 68 tranches
and confirmed the ratings of 18 tranches from 14 RMBS transactions,
backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Lehman XS Trust.

In addition, the ratings on Tranches 1-A1 and 1-A2 issued by Lehman XS
Trust Series 2006-1 have also been adjusted to reflect the fact that
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) allocates losses to these
two classes on a pro-rata basis.  Previous rating actions reflected
additional credit enhancement to Tranche 1-A1 from Tranche 1-A2, based
on conflicting language in the Prospectus Supplement which denotes
Tranche 1-A2 as a support class to Tranche 1-A1.  The Trustee has
confirmed that it is following the PSA, which allows for only pro-rata
allocation between the classes, and Moody's has adjusted its analysis
accordingly.

                         Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on Alt-A
RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of scenarios in
the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed
by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of payment
distribution among the different tranches, average life of the
tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning
ratings.

Class I-A1-2 issued by Lehman XS Trust 2007-10H, Classes A2-2 and A4
issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-14H, and Class A1 issued by
Lehman XS Trust 2007-17H are wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation
(Segregated Account -- Unrated).  Classes WF-3-1, WF-4-1, and WF-6-1
issued by Lehman XS Trust 2006-17 are wrapped by MBIA Insurance
Corporation (Downgraded to B3, Outlook Negative).  For securities
insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the
higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the
current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty)
on the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities that
do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS
securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's notes an
increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which could cause a
further 20% decline in home prices (versus its baseline assumption of
roughly 5% further decline).  Overall, Moody's assumes a further 5%
decline in home prices with stabilization in early 2011, accompanied
by continued stress in national employment levels through that
timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2006-17

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-3-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-3-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-4-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-6-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-3-1, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. WF-4-1, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. WF-6-1, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2006-19

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2007-10H

  -- Cl. I-A1-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 16,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A4-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-AIO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-AIO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2007-17H

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-13

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-15

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-20

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-3

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-9

  -- Cl. A1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-11

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-14H

  -- Cl. A1-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2-1-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2-1-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. AIO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-8H

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2007-9

  -- Cl. I-A1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-AIO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. WF-AIO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


LEHMAN XS: Moody's Junks Rating on Class 1-A2B Notes From 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-10N.

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-10N

  -- Cl. 1-A2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jan. 27, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                         Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily consists of
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, SunTrust Mortgage,
Inc., and various others originated negative amortization (80%) and
fixed-rate (20%) mortgage loans.

The downgrade is a result of $154.9 thousand write-down of the Class
1-A2B and the balance of loans delinquent 60 days or more, including
loans in foreclosure and real estate owned, compared to the total
depletion of all credit enhancement.  The security remains on review
for possible downgrade as Moody's completes its review of this
transaction.  Additional sensitivities of losses will be a function of
future actual and projected losses that correspond to benchmarks
provided in Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities
in Default.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2005-MKB2 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11 classes
of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust's series 2005-MKB2.  S&P lowered two of these ratings to 'D
(sf)'.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 other classes
from the same transaction.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the interest
shortfalls that have affected the trust.  As of the September 2010
trustee remittance report, the trust had experienced current interest
shortfalls of $124,830 and cumulative interest shortfalls in the
aggregate amount of $848,569, adversely affecting class K and all
classes subordinate to it.  Current interest shortfalls, primarily due
to appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and special servicing
fees, prompted us to lower S&P's ratings on classes N and P to 'D
(sf)'.  S&P expects these interest shortfalls to continue for the
foreseeable future.

The downgrades of the remaining classes reflect a reduction of
available interest to the trust and the potential for these classes to
experience interest shortfalls in the future.  Furthermore, the
downgrades of the mezzanine and subordinate classes also reflect
credit support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the
eventual resolution of several specially serviced loans.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.48x
and a loan-to-value ratio of 89.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.08x and an LTV ratio of 115.4%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 45.8% and 26.7%, respectively.
The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude six fully
defeased loans ($187.0 million; 21.2%) and six specially serviced
assets ($123.0 million; 11.9%), for which S&P separately estimated
losses and included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XC and XP
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the Sept. 13, 2010, remittance report, six loans
($123.0 million; 14.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Torchlight Loan Services LLC (Torchlight).  One loan ($6.9 million,
0.8%) is in foreclosure, one ($44.5 million, 5.0%) is a nonperforming
matured balloon, two ($26.7 million, 3.0%) are three-plus months
delinquent, and one ($37.2 million, 4.2%) is less than one month
delinquent.  One loan ($7.8 million; 0.9%) is listed in foreclosure;
however, according to Torchlight, the loan's status is three-plus
months delinquent.  Four of the specially serviced loans have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $14.9 million.  Three
of the six specially serviced loans are top 10 loans, and details of
all six specially serviced loans are:

The Lodgian Portfolio 3 loan is the fifth-largest nondefeased loan in
the pool ($44.5 million, 5.0%) and the largest loan with the special
servicer.  The loan was secured by nine hotel properties encompassing
1,421 rooms at issuance, three (372 rooms) of which have been released
($17.1 million).  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
May 11, 2009, due to imminent default as the borrower was unable to
secure refinancing at maturity.  Crescent Hotels & Resorts was
appointed as receiver for the remaining six hotels in February 2010.
The special servicer is currently reviewing the operations of each
hotel and evaluating potential resolution strategies.  As of the
year-to-date period ended July 2010, the reported occupancy and DSC
for this property were 53% and 1.15x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's
expects a minor loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Centennial Ridge Apartments loan is the sixth-largest nondefeased
loan in the pool ($37.4 million, 4.2%) and the largest loan with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 664-unit multifamily
development in Roswell, Ga.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Sept. 9, 2009, due to monetary default as the borrower
indicated it is unwilling to support operating deficiencies at the
property.  The loan is less than one month delinquent.  Laramar
Specialty Services LLC was appointed as receiver at the property as of
Sept. 3, 2010.  As of year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC
for this property were 94% and 1.17x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Bank One Plaza ? Lexington, KY loan ($20.1 million, 2.2%) is the
eighth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and the third-largest loan
with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 15-story,
234,653-sq.-ft. office building in downtown Lexington, Ky.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 21, 2009, due to
imminent maturity default.  The loan is three-plus months delinquent.
NAI Isaac was appointed as receiver, and the special servicer retained
a broker for the sale of the property.  Marketing will launch in late
September.  As of August 2010, the reported occupancy and DSC for this
property were 48.5% and 0.79x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Crossroads Town Center loan ($8.1 million, 0.9%) is secured by a
36,795-sq.-ft. retail center in Howell, Mich.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 2, 2009, due to monetary
default.  The court appointed Friedman Real Estate Group as receiver
on June 28, 2010.  As of August 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC
for this property were 76% and 1.09x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Willow Creek Shopping Center loan ($7.9 million, 0.9%) is secured
by a 163,478-sq.-ft. retail center in Prescott, Ariz.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 16, 2010, due to imminent
default.  The last full debt service payment was made in December
2009.  The special servicer is commencing foreclosure proceedings and
is evaluating property managers/receivers.  As of year-end 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC for this property were 45% and 1.31x,
respectively.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this asset.

The Folsom Pavilions loan ($7.3 million, 0.8%) is secured by a
46,314-sq.-ft. retail center in Folsom, Calif.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 10, 2010, due to imminent
default and is currently in foreclosure.  The last full debt service
payment was made in December 2009.  The special servicer is working
with the receiver to lease-up the property and has also retained Voit
Co. to market the property.  As of year-end 2009, the reported
occupancy and DSC for this property were 63% and 1.34x, respectively.
Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of this
asset.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the September 2010 remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $881.1 million (73 loans), compared with
$1.14 billion (86 loans) at issuance.  KeyBank Real Estate Capital
Markets Inc., the master servicer, provided financial information for
100% of the trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial
information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, full-year 2009, or
partial-year 2010 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.46x for the nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.48x and 89.93%,
respectively, and exclude six specially serviced assets ($123.0
million; 11.9%), for which S&P separately estimated losses.  If S&P
include those six loans in its calculations, its adjusted DSC is
1.47x.  Twelve loans
($75.5 million, 8.6%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Three
loans ($11.8 million, 1.3%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x,
and six loans ($41.3 million, 4.7%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.0x.  The trust has experienced $7.3 million of principal losses on
two loans to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $369.7 million (41.9%).  Using servicer-reported
information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.46x for the
top 10 nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
figures for the top 10 loans were 1.44x and 90.3%, respectively.
Three of top 10 loans are with the special servicer and are discussed
above.  One of the top 10 loans is on the master servicer's watchlist,
which S&P discuss below.

The North Main Plaza Shopping Center loan ($17.0 million; 1.9%) is the
ninth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by a
217,028?sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Corona, Calif.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC resulting
from a previously vacant Mervyn's (72,000 sq. ft.), which is now
leased to Burlington Coat Factory as of March 2010.  As of June 2010,
the reported occupancy and DSC were 92% and 1.05x, respectively, up
from 62% and 0.95x as of year-end 2009.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its U.S.
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                          Ratings Lowered

                   Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-MKB2

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --         ----         ----------------------
     D         A- (sf)    A (sf)                        10.79
     E         BBB (sf)   A- (sf)                        9.34
     F         BB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                      7.24
     G         BB- (sf)   BBB (sf)                       5.95
     H         B- (sf)    BBB- (sf)                      4.33
     J         CCC (sf)   BB+ (sf)                       3.53
     K         CCC- (sf)  BB (sf)                        2.88
     L         CCC- (sf)  BB- (sf)                       2.40
     M         CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)                        1.91
     N         D (sf)     B (sf)                         1.59
     P         D (sf)     B- (sf)                        0.95

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-MKB2

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-2      AAA (sf)                  24.99
             A-3      AAA (sf)                  24.99
             A-SB     AAA (sf)                  24.99
             A-4      AAA (sf)                  24.99
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                  24.99
             A-J      AAA (sf)                  18.05
             B        AA (sf)                   14.34
             C        AA- (sf)                  13.21
             XC       AAA (sf)                    N/A
             XP       AAA (sf)                    N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-IQ3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes and
affirmed nine classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust
2002-IQ3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-IQ3:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 9, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 9, 2003
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-Y, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2008
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2008
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans and concerns about refinance risk associated with
loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Ninety-six
loans, representing 69% of the pool, mature within the next 36 months.
Seventeen loans, representing 10% of the pool, mature within the next
24 months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
below 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining
within acceptable ranges.  In addition, the pool has benefited from
increased defeasance as well as increased credit subordination due to
loan payoffs and amortization.  Based on Moody's current base expected
loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 5.3%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 2.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 8.5% of the
current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated August 28, 2008.  See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity
page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments related to the monitoring of this transaction in the past
6 months.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to
$628.1 million from $909.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 181 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 35% of the pool.  The pool includes one loan with an
investment grade underlying rating, representing 3% of the pool.  Ten
loans, representing 15% of the pool, have defeased and are now
collateralized by U.S. Government securities compared to 6% at Moody's
last review.

Thirty-four loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a realized
loss of $16.9 million (45% loss severity).  Two loans, representing 5%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Northwestern Corporate Center Loan
($29.7 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 250,322
square foot office building located in Southfield, Michigan.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in August 2008.

The second specially serviced loan is secured by a multifamily
property located in the Atlanta suburbs.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $15.04 million loss (51% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loan representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a $10.9
million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability default)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and 2009 operating results
for 96% and 90%, respectively, of the pool.  Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 73%, the
same as at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10.8% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.67X, respectively, compared to 1.49X
and 1.82X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 28 compared to 25 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the 2731 San Tomas Expressway
Loan ($16.2 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
125,000 SF Class A office located in Santa Clara, California.  The
property is 100% leased to Nvidia Corporation through January 2012.
Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.88X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.63X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 77 P Street Office Loan
($59.1 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 342,411 SF
office building located in the Capitol Hill submarket of Washington,
D.C.  The building was 100% leased as of July 2010, the same as at
last review.  All the tenants are departments of the Washington, D.C.
municipal government with leases expiring in June 2011 (31% of the net
rentable area), November 2011 (47% of the NRA) and April 2012 (23% of
the NRA).  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 77% and 1.30X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Richards Building Loan
($29.6 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
mortgage on a 126,000 SF biotechnology office building located in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  The property was 100% leased as of February
2010, the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
76% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.20X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 125 Delawanna Avenue Loan
($18.0 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 361,120 SF
industrial warehouse facility located in Clifton, New Jersey.  The
property was 100% leased as of July 2010, the same as at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.39X, respectively,
compared to 73% and 1.37X at last review.


NORTHWESTERN INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of notes issued by Northwestern
Investment Management Company CBO I Fund Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $15,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'Csf/RR6';
  -- $11,000,000 class B-2 notes at 'Csf/RR6'.

As of the Aug. 26, 2010 trustee report there were three performing
bonds remaining in the portfolio with a combined par balance of
$8 million, in addition to $1 million of principal cash in the
collection account.  There are also several defaulted bonds and equity
positions that are expected to have minimal recovery value.  The class
A overcollateralization test has been failing since 2002.  As a
result, the classes B-1 and B-2 notes have not received any
distributions since this time.  With over
$17.7 million of class A notes remaining outstanding, the class B
notes will likely not receive any future distributions.

Northwestern CBO I is a collateralized debt obligation that closed
Dec. 15, 1999, and is managed by Mason Street Advisors (formerly known
as Northwestern Investment Management Company).  The proceeds of the
issuance were invested in a static portfolio consisting primarily of
high yield corporate bonds.


OHIO VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Hospital Bonds to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Ohio Valley General
Hospital's (Pennsylvania) bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3, affecting
$33.8 million of debt.  The outlook remains negative at the lower
rating level.

The downgrade reflects Ohio Valley's significant volume declines
resulting in a large operating loss in FY 2010, and challenges with
physician loyalty as indicated by the loss of several key admitting
physicians earlier this year.  The negative outlook reflects the risks
of continued admissions and operating losses that are likely to
continue while the hospital implements a turnaround plan.  The outlook
also reflects Moody's belief that unrestricted cash could decline
given weak cash flow from operations, cash needs for capital and debt
service, and dependence on investment returns that are heavily
weighted in equities.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a gross revenue pledge and
mortgage; additional bonds tests and rate covenants are adequate; debt
service reserve fund

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                            Challenges

* Significant decline in admissions, which were down 14% in fiscal
  year (FY) 2010 are as a result of the loss of referrals from
  several key admitting physicians; volume declines are down also
  due to the economy and some shift in cases to observation status

* Accelerating operating losses with an operating loss of
  $7.9 million (-12.6%) and negative operating cashflow in fiscal
  year 2010, driven by volume declines that resulted in a 5%
  reduction in revenue (excluding a non-recurring settlement
  received in 2009); additionally, the early retirement of the
  former Chief Executive Officer creates some management
  instability

* Small size hospital with $63 million operating revenue and less
  than 4,000 admissions and a high dependency on a few key
  physicians; the hospital is located in the broader competitive
  market of Pittsburgh

* High debt load relative to the hospital's size, which combined
  with operating losses results in a weak 0.5 times peak debt
  service coverage and a high 59% debt-to-revenue in FY 2010

* Continued investment return risk with high investment allocation
  to equities of 70%, contributing to a high degree of variability
  of returns; investment risk takes on greater weight in Moody's
  analysis given OVGH's growing operating losses and total
  dependency on investment returns for cash flow and to support
  debt service and capital

                            Strengths

* Strong liquidity position with 234 days of cash on hand at
  fiscal year end (FYE) June 30, 2010, providing an adequate
  cushion of 114% cash-to-debt

* Conservative debt structure with all fixed rate debt structure
  and no swaps

                    Recent Developments/Results

One of the key drivers of the rating downgrade and negative outlook is
OVGH's significant operating losses and volume declines which
accelerated in FY 2010.  A multi-year trend of operating declines
worsened with operating losses increasing to a
$7.9 million loss (-12.6% margin) in FY 2010 from a $3.6 million loss
(-5.5% margin) in FY 2009.  Operating cash flow declined to a deficit
of $1.1 million (-1.7% operating cash flow margin) from $3.0 million
(4.5% operating cash flow margin) in FY 2009.  Excluding a large
non-recurring positive settlement in FY 2009, revenue was down 5% in
FY 2010.  The revenue decline and increased operating loss was largely
due to volume declines; the revenue decline was also partly due to the
closure of the obstetrics unit.  Admissions declined significantly by
14% to 3,996 in FY 2010 from 4,670 in FY 2009.  Outpatient surgeries
also declined 7% in FY 2010.  Volume declines are due to several key
physicians redirecting referrals to other area hospitals, the economy
and a shift to observation stays.  The considerable admissions loss
attributed to a few key physicians emphasizes OVGH's high reliance on
its top admitting physicians and underscores its historic difficulties
maintaining physician loyalty.  Given OVGH's reliance on its small
medical staff, management is in the process of focusing its attention
on physician alignment by improving physician productivity, attracting
new physicians practicing in the community to the hospital and
improving its relationship with existing medical staff.

Located near Pittsburgh, PA in Kennedy Township, OVGH is located close
to tertiary/quaternary providers in Pittsburgh and local providers
that compete with OVGH for admissions and which affects physician
loyalty with some key physicians maintaining admitting privileges at
other hospitals such as UPMC-Mercy Hospital.  Following the closure of
its obstetric unit at calendar year end 2009, OVGH has underway plans
to open a memory care unit and an orthopedic unit, and is in the midst
of growing its vascular and gerontology-psychology strategies.
Despite the implementation of the new strategies and services, Moody's
believe that the immediate concerns regarding physician loyalty and
volumes will continue to challenge the hospital and make the
turnaround period longer.  Additionally, the abrupt departure of
OVGH's former CEO in June 2010 has introduced a level of uncertainty
around senior management.  In the interim, OVGH's Chief Operating
Officer of twenty five years has taken on the role of the Acting CEO
(while still maintaining his status as the COO) pending final
appointment by the Board of Directors and has immediately implemented
a recovery plan to turn around operations over the next three years by
reducing expenses, enhancing revenue and restoring relationships with
medical staff.

Despite increased operating losses, OVGH has maintained a strong
investment position, although Moody's believe that position could be
eroded quickly in the absence of significant operating improvement and
depending on investment returns.  Unrestricted cash and investments
was maintained at $42.0 million (234 days cash on hand) and 114%
cash-to-debt at June 30, 2010, from
$41.1 million (230 days) and 102% cash-to-debt at June 30, 2009, as a
result of improved investment returns.  Moody's believe that OVGH's
70% investment allocation to equities presents a level of risk for
investments particularly as the hospital's operating losses grow and
the hospital is now entirely reliant on investment returns to support
debt service and capital spending.  OVGH's operational and investment
risk is mitigated by a conservative debt structure with 100% fixed
rate debt and no derivatives exposure.  Capital spending was low in FY
2010 at $4.6 million with $6.0 million estimated for FY 2011 as the
hospital plans to complete construction of a memory care unit and an
orthopedic unit in OVGH's former obstetrics space in FY 2011.  While
this level of capital is not particularly high, given negative
operating cashflow and debt service needs, cash is likely to decline
without favorable investment returns.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the risks of continued admissions and
operating losses that are likely to continue while the hospital
implements a turnaround plan.  The outlook also reflects Moody's
belief that unrestricted cash could decline given weak cash flow from
operations, cash needs for capital and debt service, and dependence on
investment returns that are heavily weighted in equities.

                What could change the rating -- Up

With a negative outlook, a rating upgrade is not likely at this time;
over the longer-term, an upgrade would be considered as a result of
significant and sustained operating improvement and at least volume
stability

               What could change the rating -- Down

Continued decline in operating performance as a result of continued
volume losses; additional loss of key physicians; decline in cash
levels; an increase in either direct debt or indirect debt

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Ohio Valley General
     Hospital
  -- First number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2009
  -- Second number reflects unaudited year ended June 30, 2010
  -- Investment returns smoothed at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 4,670; 3,996

* Total operating revenues: $66.2 million; $62.6 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service: $5.6
  million; $1.6 million

* Total debt outstanding: $40.1 million; $36.9 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $3.5 million; $3.1 million

* MADS coverage with reported investment income: -2.2 times; 1.6
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS coverage with normalized investment
  income: 1.6 times; 0.5 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 11.2 times; negative

* Days cash on hand: 230 days; 234 days

* Cash-to-debt: 102%; 114%

* Operating margin: -5.5%; -12.6%

* Operating cash flow margin: 4.5%; -1.7%

                            Rated Debt

  -- Series 1998 fixed rate bonds ($5.9 million outstanding);
     rated Ba2

  -- Series 2003 fixed rate bonds ($3.9 million outstanding);
     rated Ba2

  -- Series 2005 fixed rate bonds ($23.9 million outstanding);
     rated Ba2

The last rating action with respect to Ohio Valley General Hospital,
PA was on July 13, 2010, when the Baa3 rating was placed on Watchlist
for possible downgrade.




PIMA COUNTY: S&P Raises Rating on Two Revenue Bonds From 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term rating to
'BBB-' from 'BB' on the Pima County Industrial Development Authority,
Arizona's series 2003A and 2006 education revenue bonds, which are
secured by payments received from Paragon Management Inc., Ariz.,
doing business as Paradise Education Center, a charter school.

"The rating action reflects S&P's view of the school's operational
revisions, which S&P believes have strengthened the school's financial
performance enough to position the school to generate net revenues
exceeding future maximum annual debt service in fiscal 2010," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Chris Morgan.

The school, awarded a charter in June 1998, educates what management
projects is an average daily membership of 1,483 for fiscal 2011 on an
89,000-square-foot K-8 campus and a temporary 5,900-square-foot high
school facility, both located in the City of Surprise.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that improved expenditure
controls and changes to its operations have allowed the school to
generate operating surpluses sufficient to meet recent carrying
charges.


PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2001-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes and
affirmed 11 classes of PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-C1:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 2005
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C-2X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2006
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 30, 2001
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans and refinance risk associated with loans
approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Sixty-three loans,
representing 68% of the pool mature within the next 12 months.
Eighteen of these loans, representing 21% of the pool, have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage less than 1.00X.  The affirmations are
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable
ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain
their existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of 3.4%
of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 1.4%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 6.7% of the
current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade
(which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to estimate
Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a
paydown analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact
on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are
either interpolated between these two data points or determined based
on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
underlying ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement
into an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating level, is
incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings in the same
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 17, 2008.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the September 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to
$614.2 million from $881.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 84 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 37% of the pool.  Fifteen loans, representing 28% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 25% of the pool.
One loan, representing 14% of the pool, has an investment grade
underlying rating.

Twenty eight loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15.7 million (70% loss severity).  Five
loans, representing 3.5% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The five specially serviced loans are secured by one hotel
and four multifamily properties.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$6.1 million loss (37% expected loss on average) for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated an
$8.7 million loss (14% expected loss based on a 43% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 94% of
the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
weighted average LTV is 84%, the same at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.1% to
the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 1.27X
and 1.31X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 34 compared to 52 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Danbury Mall Loan
($83.9 million -- 13.7% of the pool), which represents a participation
interest in a first mortgage loan secured by the borrower's interest
in a 1.3 million square foot (collateral is 503,696 square feet)
regional mall located in Danbury, Connecticut.  The mall is anchored
by Macy's, Sears, J.C.  Penney and Lord & Taylor.  The in-line mall
space was approximately 95% leased as of December 2009.  Comparable
in-line tenant sales were $521 per square foot for calendar year 2009,
compared to $561 per square foot for 2008.  The project is owned by an
affiliate of Macerich L.P.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.74X, respectively, compared to Aaa and
2.63X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 10% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the River Center Loan ($25.8 million --
4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 469,000 square foot
office/industrial property located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  The
property was 89% leased as of July 2010 compared to 82% at last
review.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 92% and
1.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Deer Grove Shopping Center Loan ($18.5
million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 214,000 square
foot retail center located approximately 30 miles northwest of Chicago
in Palatine, Illinois.  In 2008, Linens N Things, which represented
21% of the net rentable area at securitization, vacated the property,
resulting in a decline in occupancy and revenues.  The loan has been
on the watchlist since September 2009 due to low DSCR.  As of July
2010 the property was 73% leased compared to 97% at last review.  The
center's three largest tenants are Dominick's Grocery (31% of the NRA;
lease expiration June 2016), Michaels (10% of the NRA, lease
expiration February 2013) and Staples (10% of the NRA; lease
expiration July 2015).  The loan matures in January 2011.  Moody's
believes that there is a high likelihood of default at loan maturity
due to the property's poor performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 112% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.17X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Overland Crossing Shopping Center Loan
($17.1 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 172,000
square foot retail center located in Overland Park, Kansas.  As of
June 2010, the property was 100% leased, the same as at last review.
Despite the stable occupancy, performance has declined due to lower
revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.28X at last review.


PROTECTIVE FINANCE: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three classes
of commercial mortgage FASIT certificates from Protective Finance
Corp. II, a U.S. commercial mortgage financial asset securitization
investment trust transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the remaining collateral in the
pool and the deal structure.  The raised ratings primarily reflect
increased credit enhancement levels due to loan amortization and
payoffs.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered that the remaining
loans in the pool are seasoned, and 96.5% of them are fully
amortizing, with maturities ranging from 2010 through 2021.  The
rating on the class C certificate is constrained by the current rating
on an affiliate of the issuer, Protective Life Insurance Co.
(AA-/Stable/--).

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 25, 2010, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $87.4 million and included 116 loans.  The master
servicer, Protective Life Insurance Co., provided financial
information for 100% of the loans in the pool, 59.3% of which was
full-year 2009 data and 39.2% of which was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average debt service coverage of 1.36x for the
pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  The master servicer did
not report any loans on its watchlist.  Twelve loans
($14.8 million, 16.9%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, four of which
($5.3 million, 6.0%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  With the
exception of the largest loan in the pool (see details below), none of
the loans in the pool are delinquent, according to the master
servicer.  To date, the transaction has experienced two principal
losses totaling $752,907.

The trust contains a variable funding period that allowed for
additional deposits of loans from the closing date until Sept. 30,
2002.  The transaction was created in 1997, upsized in 1998, and
upsized again in 1999.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$20.9 million (23.9%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.23x for the top 10 loans.  The
three largest top 10 loans have reported DSCs below 1.10x, which S&P
discuss in detail below.

The Pearman Dairy Plaza loan ($3.5 million, 4.0%), the largest loan in
the pool, is secured by a 68,150-sq.-ft. retail shopping center in
Anderson, S.C.  The reported DSC and occupancy for year-end 2009 were
0.97x and 74.7%, respectively.  The master servicer reported that it
received the June and July 2010 debt service payments on the loan
after the August 2010 trustee remittance report, which reported the
payment status of the loan as 90-plus-days delinquent.

The Theodore Dawes Plaza loan ($3.0 million, 3.5%), the second-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 124,000-sq.-ft. grocery-anchored
retail strip center in Mobile, Ala.  The reported DSC and occupancy
were 1.07x for year-end 2009 and 72.1% as of April 2010, respectively.

The Bi-Lo Shopping Center loan ($2.1 million, 2.4%), the third-largest
loan in the pool, is secured by a 52,000-sq.-ft. grocery-anchored
retail strip center in Moncks Corner, S.C.  The reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.00x and 94.2% for year-end 2009, respectively.

                          Ratings Raised

                   Protective Finance Corp. II
         Commercial mortgage FASIT certificates series I

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To            From         Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --            ----         ----------------------
    C         AA- (sf)      A+ (sf)                       92.07
    D         BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)                      49.83
    E         BB- (sf)      B (sf)                        24.48


RAAM GLOBAL: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating on $150 Mil. Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa2 (LGD 4, 61%) rating to RAAM
Global Energy Company's proposed $150 million five-year senior secured
notes and affirmed its existing Caa1 Corporate Family Rating and Caa1
Probability of Default Rating ratings.  The outlook is stable.

Assignments:

Issuer: RAAM Global Energy Company

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned Caa2 LGD 4, 61%

                         Ratings Rationale

The proceeds from the new notes offering will be used to repay
borrowings under its existing revolving credit facility and to
partially fund development and drilling activities.  The
$150 million senior secured notes replace the $200 million senior
unsecured notes that Moody's had previously rated.  RAAM has decided
not to move forward with the senior unsecured notes.

Under Moody's Loss Given Default Methodology, the new senior secured
notes are rated one-notch below the CFR due to their having a second
lien on the company's assets.  The new notes are subordinate to the
company's $62.5 million senior secured revolving credit facility,
which has a first lien on RAAM's assets.

The Caa1 Corporate Family Rating reflects RAAM's small scale, high
concentration risk, and high capital intensity property portfolio
combined with significantly higher leverage following the new senior
secured notes offering.  The rating also considers the company's
aggressive capital spending plan that is focused on complex geology,
part of which his being funded with unsecured, term debt.

Although RAAM has been able to grow its reserves and annual production
over the past several years, the company's scale remains comparatively
small to the rated E&P peer group.  Along with this smaller scale is a
high degree of concentration risk, with a focus in areas that Moody's
views as having fairly complex geology which requires significant
capital investments.  This type of property profile leads to higher
production volatility and any variance in performance from any of the
company's larger wells would have a significant impact on total
results.

In addition, the company's planned capital spending program contains a
large exploration focus, targeting large and in some cases, very
costly prospects.  Moody's views the risk profile of this type of
program as being disproportionate with the higher pro forma debt,
particularly given the small scale of the base production.  The
company plans on using a portion of the notes offering to fund an
aggressive drilling program, which Moody's considers to have
significant concentration and execution risk.  Although management has
indicated that it will take measured approach to this program, the
risk to bondholders is still high given the relatively small base
production that would go to support the debt.

Leverage on the proven developed reserves (based on 2009 year-end
reserves and debt) was $11.14/Boe.  However, the company is increasing
debt by nearly 40%, pushing pro forma debt/PD reserves to
approximately $15.55/Boe.  This level of leverage is on the high end
for the peer group, and is even higher when factoring in that 40% of
the PD reserves are not producing and would require additional capital
to get them to the producing phase.

RAAM's pro forma leverage on production of approximately $15,397/Boe
(based on Q2'10 production) is up 44% from year-end 2009 levels, but
still compares favorably to the Caa peer group.  However, this metric
benefits from the flush production of the Gulf of Mexico wells which
possess high capital intensity as evidenced by the company's PD
reserve life of only 2.7 years, and a PDP reserve life of only 1.5
years.  This production profile requires significant capital and
contains execution risk to generate positive sequential quarterly
production trends.

The Caa1 also considers the company's track record in establishing
production in some very complicated areas of the Gulf of Mexico as
well as its liquidity position, which provides some support for its
aggressive drilling program.  The company has been successful in
growing reserves and production over the past three years.

RAAM's liquidity position is currently adequate to cover most of its
cash needs over the next twelve months.  Pro forma for the notes
offering, the company will have approximately $95 million of cash on
hand, along with an amended senior secured revolving credit facility
with an expected borrowing base of $62.5 million that will be undrawn
at close.

RAAM Global Energy Company is headquartered in Lexington, Kentucky.


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes,
upgraded two classes, confirmed one class and affirmed six classes of
Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 19, 2000
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 19, 2000
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 13, 2006
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 9, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010 A3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. G, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2010
     Downgraded to C (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans and concerns about refinance risk associated with
loans facing near-term maturity in an adverse environment.
Thirty-three loans, representing 55% of the pool, have either matured
or are scheduled to mature within the next six months.  Eleven of
these loans, representing 23% of the pool have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage less than 1.00X.

The upgrades are due to the increased credit support due to loan
payoffs and principal amortization.  The deal has amortized by
approximately 60% since Moody's prior review in July 2009.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key rating parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for
the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's placed four classes of this transaction on review for possible
downgrade on August 12, 2010.  This action concludes the review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
12.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 4.5%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 15.8% of
the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.  If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.  In addition,
further downgrades may be warranted if interest shortfalls increase
above their current levels.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range
of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time to time,
Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.  Performance
that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had anticipated during the current review.  Even so,
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action.  There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an
improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased
subordination levels due to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline
in subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the commercial
real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently views the
commercial real estate market as stressed with further performance
declines expected in the industrial, office, and retail sectors.
Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit off a very weak base.
Multifamily has also begun to rebound reflecting an improved supply /
demand relationship.  The availability of debt capital is improving
with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing
price stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
"hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS Conduit
Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions.
Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property
type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level
are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level
diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a
greater impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these two
data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of
these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the loan
which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.  Actual
fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan level
diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and correlations
within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the underlying rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar
underlying ratings in the same transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the excel
based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights the
results from the two models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan
level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
leverage, loan structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers
both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's monitors
transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of quantitative tools
-- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM (Commercial Mortgage
Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis through a comprehensive
review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release
dated July 19, 2009.  Please see the ratings tab on the issuer /
entity page on moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings
history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or more
third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the August 18, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 71% to
$269.70 million from $914.66 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.  Nine loans, representing 37% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 47% of the pool.

Nineteen loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.3 million (20% loss severity on
average).  Fourteen loans, representing 29% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Jorie Plaza Loan ($20.7 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured
by two office buildings located in Oak Brook, Illinois.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in September 2008 due to imminent
default and is currently real estate owned (REO).  The second largest
specially serviced loan is the Westland Meadows Loan ($20.3 million --
7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a manufactured housing property
located in Westland, Michigan.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 due to imminent default and is currently more
than 90 days delinquent.

The remaining twelve loans are secured by a mix of office, industrial,
multifamily and retail properties.  The master servicer has recognized
an aggregate $27.3 million appraisal reduction for four of the
specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $30.5
million loss (49% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing watchlisted loans representing 4% of the pool and has
estimated a $2.8 million loss (24% expected loss based on a 77%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through NR
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.4 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 operating results for 93% of
the non-defeased performing loans.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 82% compared to 87% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15.2% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate
of 9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 1.21X
and 1.36X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The pool has a
Herf of 12 compared to 43 at Moody's prior review.  The decline in
Herf has been largely offset by increased credit support due to loans
payoffs and amortization.

The top three performing non-defeased loans represent 14% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Friedman Portfolio Loan ($16.5
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by three mixed use
(office and retail) properties located in Chicago, Illinois.  The
properties total 169,000 square feet and were approximately 87% leased
as of year-end 2009 compared to 92% at last review.  Overall, the
portfolio's performance has been relatively stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 81% and
1.39X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Seatac Village Shopping Center Loan
($14.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 164,326
square foot anchored retail property located in Federal Way,
Washington.  Major tenants include T.J. Maxx, DSW, and Trader Joe's.
The center was 72% leased as of June 2010 compared to 74% at year-end
2009.  Linens N Things, which leased 20% of the net rentable area at
securitization, vacated in 2008.  Several other tenants that had
co-tenancy subsequently vacated as well.  The loan had an anticipated
payment date of September 1, 2009.  The loan has amortized 3% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 113% and 0.91X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Burlington Self Storage Loan
($7.2 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by a self storage
facility located in Burlington, Massachusetts.  The property was 86%
leased as of October 2009 compared to 81% at year-end 2009.  The loan
matured at the end of August 2010 and per the servicer has been paid
off in full.


STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws 'CCC+' Rating on Series 2007-6 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on
the notes issued by Strata Trust Series 2007-6, a synthetic
corporate-backed collateralized debt obligation transaction.

S&P's rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption and
cancellation of the notes.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                    Strata Trust Series 2007-6

                                Rating
                                ------
                   Class      To      From
                   -----      --      ----
                   Notes      NR      CCC+ (sf)

                          NR - Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class P Certs. to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' on the class P commercial mortgage pass-through
certificate from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2006-C27, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

The downgrade follows principal losses to the class, which were
reported in the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report.  The class P
certificate incurred losses totaling 30.7% of its $7.7 million opening
certificate balance.  The class Q certificate, which Standard & Poor's
does not rate, lost 100% of its $19.1 million opening balance.

According to the September 2010 remittance report, the principal
losses resulted from the liquidation of two assets that were with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  Details of the two liquidated
assets are:

The Montrose Metro Centre I asset, a 115,086-sq.-ft. office building
in Rockville, Md., had a total exposure of $30.5 million.  The loan
was transferred to LNR on Sept. 30, 2009, due to imminent default.
The trust incurred a $12.3 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on Aug. 16, 2010.  Based on the September 2010 remittance
report, the loss severity for this loan was 42.5% of its current
principal balance before liquidation.

The Forest Hill MHP asset, a 433-pad mobile home park in Fort Worth,
Texas, had a total exposure of $12.3 million.  The loan was
transferred to LNR on Nov. 17, 2008, because it was 60-plus days
delinquent.  The trust incurred a $9.1 million realized loss when the
asset was liquidated on Sept. 8, 2010.  Based on the September 2010
remittance report, the loss severity for this loan was 86.8% of its
current principal balance before liquidation.

The remittance report notes that the collateral pool for the
transaction consisted of 157 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.9 billion, down from 162 loans totaling $3.1 billion at issuance.
There are currently six loans totaling $147.6 million with the special
servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses on 10 loans
totaling $48.6 million.  Based on the September 2010 remittance
report, the weighted average loss severity for these loans was
approximately 40.7% of their current principal balance before
liquidation.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class H Certs. to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class H
commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C20, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade follows a principal loss sustained by the class, which
the Sept. 17, 2010, remittance report detailed.  The class H
certificate has experienced reported losses totaling 2.8% of its
beginning certificate balance ($41.2 million).  Classes J, K, L, M, N,
and O, which Standard & Poor's previously lowered to 'D (sf)' due to
recurring interest shortfalls, have lost 100% of their individual
opening balances, which totaled $77.9 million.  In addition, class P,
which Standard & Poor's does not rate, lost 100% of its $48.3 million
opening balance.

According to the remittance report, the principal losses of $127.3
million resulted from the liquidation of one asset that was with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The Macon and
Burlington Mall pool asset comprises two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted regional malls.  The Burlington Mall is a
419,194-sq.-ft. mall in Burlington, N.C., built in 1969 and renovated
in 2004.  The Macon Mall is a 762,398-sq.-ft. mall in Macon, Ga.,
built in 1975 and renovated in 1997.  The asset, which was transferred
to CWCapital on Feb. 27, 2008, due to imminent payment default, had a
total exposure of $131.8 million at the time of liquidation.  The
trust incurred a $127.3 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on Sept. 10, 2010.  Based on the September 2010 remittance
report data, the loss severity for this loan was 97.4%.

In addition, one other asset in the trust has recently been
liquidated.  The Pasadena Crossroads asset ($10.9 million), a
314,942-sq.-ft. retail property in Pasadena, Md., was liquidated on
Aug. 12, 2010.  The loan was paid off in full, and the trust did not
incur a loss as a result of this liquidation.

The remittance report notes that the collateral pool consisted of 170
assets with an aggregate trust balance of $2.71 billion, down from 209
assets totaling $3.66 billion at issuance.  Eleven assets, totaling
$67.6 million (2.5%), are with the special servicer.  To date, the
trust has experienced losses on two loans totaling $129.4 million.
Based on the September 2010 remittance report data, the weighted
average loss severity for these loans was approximately 90.7%.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on City of Bell, California's Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these actions on the City of Bell, California's
general obligation and pension obligation bonds:

  -- Approximately $50 million in outstanding city GOs downgraded
     to 'B' from 'BB' and withdrawn;

  -- Approximately $7.5 million in outstanding Bell Public
     Financing Authority taxable POBs, series 2005 downgraded to
     'B-' from 'BB-' and withdrawn.

These ratings were placed on Rating Watch Negative Aug. 16.  With the
actions, the Rating Watch Negative on both ratings is no longer
applicable.  Fitch will no longer provide coverage of these ratings.

The downgrades are based on publicly available information that
indicates an increase in near-term credit risk.  The withdrawals are
due to city management's lack of response to Fitch's attempts to gain
the information needed to continue to accurately assess the city's
credit quality.

Credit risks include a prospect of default on a sizable
$35 million unrated privately placed debt obligation due Nov. 1, 2010,
absent an extension by the bondholder or a refinancing.  Fitch
believes the city will have difficulty refinancing this obligation
given recent revelations of weak city management and likely financial
strain.  Weak management is evidenced by extraordinarily high salaries
given to some former city officials, which are the subject of a
recently- filed lawsuit by California's Attorney General, an illegal
property tax rate increase and related rebate, and the debt exposure
referenced above.  The lawsuit and an ongoing criminal investigation
could pressure what Fitch believes are already weakened city finances.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Tranches From Three TRUP CDO Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16 tranches
from three U.S. trust preferred securities collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgraded tranches have a total issuance amount of $671.3
million.

The downgrades reflect three primary factors:

* The application of S&P's corporate CDO criteria;

* The application of S&P's revised recovery assumptions for TruPS
  issued by U.S. Banks; and

* In most cases, significant deterioration in the credit quality
  of the underlying asset portfolios due to increased exposure to
  obligors that have either defaulted or deferred payments on
  TruPS, along with an increase in the number of TruPS that
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

In July 2010, S&P stated that S&P has observed severe negative credit
migration and significant increases in defaults and deferrals in the
pools of underlying assets.  In January 2009, S&P indicated its view
that the economic and regulatory conditions pointed to a potential
increase in the number of U.S. banks that defer on their TruPS payment
obligations.  Since January 2009, S&P has observed significant
increases in the number of deferrals of U.S. Bank TruPS held by the
CDOs S&P rates.  While the rate of increase in the number of deferrals
may have recently slowed, in S&P's view, the economic and regulatory
conditions at the root of these deferrals continue to unfold.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Transaction             Class   To           From
  -----------             -----   --           ----
  Dekania CDO I           A-1     BBB- (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  Dekania CDO I           A-2     BB (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Dekania CDO I           B       B+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg
  Dekania CDO I           C-1     CCC- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Dekania CDO I           C-2     CCC- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Dekania CDO I           D       CCC- (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               A       BBB (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               B       BBB- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               C-1     CCC+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               C-2     CCC+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               C-3     CCC+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               D       CCC+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               I Comp  A- (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  ICONS Ltd               IIComp  BBB (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  U.S. Capital Funding I  A-1     CCC+ (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  U.S. Capital Funding I  A-2     CCC- (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg



* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22 tranches
from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation of commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions.  The downgraded tranches have
a total issuance amount of
$732.376 million.  At the same time, S&P removed the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on 15 tranches from three transactions and removed 11 of them
from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
securities.  The affirmations reflect current credit support levels
that S&P believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                      Rating
                                      ------
  Transaction                Class To         From
  -----------                ----- --         ----
  Anthracite CDO III         A     AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         BFL   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         BFX   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         CFL   BBB (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         CFX   BBB (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         DFL   BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         DFX   BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         EFL   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         EFX   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         F     B- (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         G     CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)/Watch Neg
  Anthracite CDO III         H     CCC (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
  CWCapital COBALT III       A     CCC+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       B     CCC- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       C     CCC- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       D     CCC- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       E     CC (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       F     CC (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  CWCapital COBALT III       G     CC (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg
    Synthetic CDO
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  A-1   A (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  A-2a  AA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  A-2b  A (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  B-1   BBB (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  B-2   BBB (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  C-1   BBB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  C-2   BBB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  D-1   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  D-2   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  E-1   B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  E-2   B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fairfield St Solar 2004-1  F     CCC+ (sf)  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.         A-2   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.         A-3   CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

            Transaction                 Class   Rating
            -----------                 -----   ------
            G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.          A-1     A+ (sf)
            G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.          B-1     CC (sf)
            G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.          B-2     CC (sf)
            G-Star 2003-3 Ltd.          Pref    CC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 Notes From Four Hybrid CDO Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 23 classes
of notes from four cash flow and one hybrid collateralized debt
obligation of asset-backed securities transactions.  S&P also withdrew
its rating on the class S notes following the complete paydown on the
final payment date.

The downgrades reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria for
ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of default
and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd., Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd., Lancer
Funding Ltd., and Millstone IV CDO Ltd. are cash flow CDO
transactions; and Topanga CDO II Ltd. is a hybrid CDO transaction.
All five CDOs are collateralized in large part by tranches from
residential mortgage backed securities that have experienced
significant credit deterioration, as well as by tranches from other
CDOs backed by RMBS.

S&P lowered its ratings on the hybrid CDO transaction because the
transaction did not have proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payments on the credit
default swap contracts.  For the four cash flow transactions, S&P has
received notices from the trustees stating that after the liquidation
of the portfolio assets, the available proceeds were insufficient to
pay the noteholders in full.  The rating withdrawal on the class S
notes follows the complete paydown on the final payment date.

                          Rating Actions

                                             Rating
                                             ------
      Transaction                   Class   To       From
      -----------                   -----   --       ----
      AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd     A-1     D (sf)   CC (sf)
      AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd     B(def)  D (sf)   CC (sf)
      AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd     C (def) D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Diversey Harbor ABS CDO       A-1M    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Diversey Harbor ABS CDO       A-1Q    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Diversey Harbor ABS CDO       B       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Diversey Harbor ABS CDO       C       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           A1J     D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           A1S1    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           A1S2    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           A2      D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           A3      D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Lancer Funding Ltd.           B       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          A-1A    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          A-1B    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          A-1C    D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          C-1     D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          C-2     D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Millstone IV CDO Ltd          D       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Topanga CDO II Ltd            B       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Topanga CDO II Ltd            C       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Topanga CDO II Ltd            D       D (sf)   CC (sf)
      Topanga CDO II Ltd            S       D (sf)   CC (sf)

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

           Transaction                   Class   Rating
           -----------                   -----   ------
           AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd     A-2     D (sf)
           AVANTI Funding 2006-1 Ltd     A-3     D (sf)
           Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd   A-2     D (sf)
           Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd   A-3     D (sf)
           Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd   A-4     D (sf)
           Millstone IV CDO Ltd          A-2     D (sf)
           Millstone IV CDO Ltd          A-3     D (sf)
           Millstone IV CDO Ltd          B       D (sf)
           Topanga CDO II Ltd            A-1     D (sf)
           Topanga CDO II Ltd            A-2     D (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Certs. From Two Re-Remic RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 30 classes
of certificates from two resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued in
2006 and 2009.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 92
classes of certificates from the affected transactions, as well as two
additional re-REMIC transactions.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the significant
deterioration in performance of the mortgage loans backing the
underlying certificates.  As a result of this performance
deterioration, the downgraded classes were unable to maintain their
previous ratings at the applicable rating stresses.  The affirmations
reflect S&P's assessment of the credit enhancement available to the
re-REMIC classes, which, in its opinion, is sufficient to maintain the
current ratings on these classes.

When S&P performed its analysis on the re-REMIC classes, S&P applied
its loss projections to the underlying trusts in order to identify the
magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed through to the
applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally, S&P's projected losses depend
on the type of collateral supporting the underlying trusts.  S&P then
stressed these loss projections at various rating categories in order
to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could withstand such stressed
losses at their current rating levels.

The underlying collateral is mainly prime, home equity line of credit,
and Alternative-A mortgage loans from pre-2005 through 2007 vintages.
In S&P's view, the performance of these collateral types from these
vintages has declined in recent years.  As a result, over the past
several years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss assumptions,
and consequently its projected losses, to reflect its view of the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance.  The performance
deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the market's
expectations.

                          Rating Actions

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR13 Trust
                         Series 2009-RR13

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      XIV-A3     05532JCG7     A (sf)               AA (sf)
      XIII-A5    05532JFW9     BBB (sf)             A (sf)

      CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
                         Series 2006-RES

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      04-D-1a    23242YAA3     B (sf)               AA (sf)
      04-D-1b    23242YAB1     B (sf)               AA (sf)
      04-E-1a    23242YAC9     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      04-E-1b    23242YAD7     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      04-F-1a    23242YAE5     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      04-F-1b    23242YAF2     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      04-K-1a    23242YAG0     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-K-1b    23242YAH8     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-L-1a    23242YAJ4     BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-L-1b    23242YAK1     BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-M-1a    23242YAL9     BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-M-1b    23242YAM7     BBB (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-N-1a    23242YAN5     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-N-1b    23242YAP0     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-P-1a    23242YAQ8     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-P-1b    23242YAR6     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-T-1a    23242YAW5     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-T-1b    23242YAX3     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      04-U-1a    23242YAY1     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      04-U-1b    23242YAZ8     CCC (sf)             BB (sf)
      05-A-1a    23242YBA2     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      05-A-1b    23242YBB0     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      05-B-1a    23242YBC8     CC (sf)              BB (sf)
      05-B-1b    23242YBD6     CC (sf)              BB (sf)
      05-E-1a    23242YBJ3     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      05-E-1b    23242YBK0     BB+ (sf)             AA (sf)
      05-F-1a    23242YBL8     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)
      05-F-1b    23242YBM6     CCC (sf)             AA (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR13 Trust
                         Series 2009-RR13

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 XIII-A3    05532JCC6     AA (sf)
                 III-A3     05532JAL8     AA (sf)
                 III-A5     05532JEH3     A (sf)
                 II-A1      05532JAE4     AAA (sf)
                 I-A3       05532JAC8     AA (sf)
                 IX-A1      05532JBJ2     AAA (sf)
                 II-A3      05532JAG9     AA (sf)
                 VI-A3      05532JAY0     AA (sf)
                 IX-A3      05532JBL7     AA (sf)
                 I-A7       05532JDV3     BBB (sf)
                 VIII-A1    05532JBE3     AAA (sf)
                 IV-A3      05532JAQ7     AA (sf)
                 XIV-A1     05532JCE2     AAA (sf)
                 I-A5       05532JDT8     A (sf)
                 XXI-A1     05532KAV3     AAA (sf)
                 II-A5      05532JEA8     A (sf)
                 X-A3       05532JBQ6     A (sf)
                 VI-A1      05532JAW4     AAA (sf)
                 X-A1       05532JBN3     AAA (sf)
                 III-A1     05532JAJ3     AAA (sf)
                 V-A1       05532KEP2     AAA (sf)
                 VII-A3     05532JBC7     A (sf)
                 VI-A5      05532JER1     A (sf)
                 IX-A5      05532JFG4     A (sf)
                 XI-A1      05532KET4     AAA (sf)
                 VI-A7      05532JET7     BBB (sf)
                 XIII-A1    05532JCA0     AAA (sf)
                 XII-A1     05532KCS8     AAA (sf)
                 VIII-A5    05532JFF6     A (sf)
                 XII-A3     05532JFU3     AAA (sf)
                 VII-A1     05532JBA1     AAA (sf)
                 I-A1       05532JAA2     AAA (sf)
                 IV-A5      05532JEM2     A (sf)
                 II-A7      05532JEC4     BBB (sf)
                 VIII-A3    05532JBG8     AA (sf)
                 IV-A1      05532JAN4     AAA (sf)

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR14 Trust
                         Series 2009-RR14

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 XI-A7      05532LCC1     AA (sf)
                 X-A11      05532LBU2     BBB (sf)
                 XII-A3     05532LCK3     AA (sf)
                 VIII-A3    05532LAU3     AA (sf)
                 VIII-A7    05532LAY5     AA (sf)
                 X-A9       05532LBS7     AA (sf)
                 XII-A1     05532LCH0     AAA (sf)
                 VIII-A5    05532LAW9     A (sf)
                 VIII-A8    05532LAZ2     A (sf)
                 IV-A1      05532LAJ8     AAA (sf)
                 XII-A5     05532LCM9     A (sf)
                 IX-A1      05532LBD0     AAA (sf)
                 XIII-A1    05532LCU1     AAA (sf)
                 VI-A1      05532LAN9     AAA (sf)
                 XIII-A5    05532LCY3     A (sf)
                 XIII-A3    05532LCW7     AA (sf)
                 VIII-A1    05532LAS8     AAA (sf)
                 X-A12      05532LBV0     BBB (sf)
                 XI-A1      05532LBW8     AAA (sf)
                 X-A10      05532LBT5     A (sf)
                 XIII-A8    05532LDB2     A (sf)
                 XII-A8     05532LCQ0     A (sf)
                 X-A3       05532LBL2     AA (sf)
                 XI-A5      05532LCA5     A (sf)
                 X-A5       05532LBN8     A (sf)
                 X-A1       05532LBJ7     AAA (sf)
                 XIII-A7    05532LDA4     AA (sf)
                 XII-A7     05532LCP2     AA (sf)
                 XI-A8      05532LCD9     A (sf)
                 X-A7       05532LBQ1     BBB (sf)
                 XI-A3      05532LBY4     AA (sf)

     CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
                         Series 2006-RES

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 04-Q-1a    23242YAS4     BBB (sf)
                 04-Q-1b    23242YAT2     BBB (sf)
                 04-R-1a    23242YAU9     BBB (sf)
                 04-R-1b    23242YAV7     BBB (sf)
                 05-C-1a    23242YBE4     AAA (sf)
                 05-C-1b    23242YBF1     AAA (sf)
                 05-D-1a    23242YBG9     AAA (sf)
                 05-D-1b    23242YBH7     AAA (sf)
                 05-G-1a    23242YBN4     BBB (sf)
                 05-G-1b    23242YBP9     BBB (sf)
                 05-H-1a    23242YBQ7     BBB+ (sf)
                 05-H-1b    23242YBR5     BBB+ (sf)

                     Picard Funding 4 Limited
                             Series 4

                      Class        Rating
                      -----        ------
                      J            BB+ (sf)
                      C            AA- (sf)
                      L            BB- (sf)
                      D            A+ (sf)
                      F            A- (sf)
                      A            AAA (sf)
                      B            AA (sf)
                      M            B- (sf)
                      H            BBB (sf)
                      I            BBB- (sf)
                      G            BBB+ (sf)
                      K            BB (sf)
                      E            A (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches From Four Hybird CDOs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
tranches from four U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P affirmed its ratings on 20 other tranches
from six transactions and removed four of them from CreditWatch
negative.  Additionally, S&P withdrew its rating on one tranche from
MKP CBO III Ltd. following the unwinding of the class B/C combo note.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

The seven downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $545.5 million.  Two of the four affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The other two transactions
are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were primarily collateralized at
origination by 'AAA (sf)' though 'A (sf)' rated tranches of RMBS and
other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                    Rating
                                    ------
Transaction           Class     To         From
-----------           -----     --         ----
Cheyne HG ABS CDO I   A-1LT     CC (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg
Cheyne HG ABS CDO I   A-2       CC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
MKP CBO III           A-2       A (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
MKP CBO III           B/C Combo NR         CCC- (sf) / WatchNeg
Orchid SF CDO         A-1MM     BB+/B (sf) A+/A-1 (sf)/WatchNeg
Orchid SF CDO         A-2       CCC- (sf)  CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Straits Global ABS    A-1       BB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   CDO I
South Coast Fndng V   A-1       A (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Neg
South Coast Fndng V   A-2       BB (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
South Coast Fndng V   A-3       BB (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Whitehawk CDO Fndng   A-1LT     BB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Whitehawk CDO Fndng   A-2       CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Transaction                   Class      Rating
         -----------                   -----      ------
         Cheyne HG ABS CDO I           B          CC (sf)
         Cheyne HG ABS CDO I           C          CC (sf)
         MKP CBO III                   C          CC (sf)
         Orchid SF CDO                 B          CC (sf)
         Orchid SF CDO                 C-1        CC (sf)
         Orchid SF CDO                 C-2        CC (sf)
         South Coast Funding V         B          CC (sf)
         South Coast Funding V         C-1        CC (sf)
         South Coast Funding V         C-2        CC (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      A Combo    CC (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      B Combo    CC (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      C-1        CC (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      C-2        CC (sf)
         Whitehawk CDO Funding         B          CC (sf)
         Whitehawk CDO Funding         C          CC (sf)
         Whitehawk CDO Funding         D          CC (sf)

                    Other Ratings Outstanding

         Transaction                   Class      Rating
         -----------                   -----      ------
         MKP CBO III                   B          D (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      A-2        D (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      B-1        D (sf)
         Straits Global ABS CDO I      B-2        D (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes From Two RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six classes
from two U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities transactions
backed by U.S. prime jumbo and Alternative-A residential mortgage loan
collateral issued in 2003 and 2004.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 10 classes from the same transactions.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support for
the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous ratings,
given its current projected losses due to increased delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the ability
to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to maintain a
'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its view, a class
could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its analysis.

For Alt-A transactions, in order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding its
base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110%
of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand approximately
120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.
Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.

For prime jumbo transactions, in order to maintain an 'AAA' rating,
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand approximately 235% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors applied to specific transactions.  To maintain a
rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating category,
up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 130% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether
a different class could withstand approximately 154% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to cover losses
associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected transactions.
The underlying pools of loans backing these transactions consist of
fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo and Alt-A mortgage loans
that are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                         Rating Actions

        First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR4
                         Series 2004-AR4

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      I-A-1      32051D4Z2     AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      II-A-1     32051D5A6     AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)
      B-1        32051D5F5     B- (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
      B-2        32051D5G3     CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
      B-3        32051D5H1     CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

         Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2003-A10
                          Series 2003-J

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Class      CUSIP         To                   From
      -----      -----         --                   ----
      B-1        45660NUM5     B+ (sf)              BBB (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

        First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR4
                         Series 2004-AR4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 III-A-1    32051D5D0     AAA (sf)
                 IV-A-1     32051D5E8     AAA (sf)

         Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2003-A10
                          Series 2003-J

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        45660NUD5     AAA (sf)
                 A-2        45660NUE3     AAA (sf)
                 A-3        45660NUF0     AAA (sf)
                 A-4        45660NUG8     AAA (sf)
                 A-5        45660NUH6     AAA (sf)
                 PO         45660NUJ2     AAA (sf)
                 A-X        45660NUK9     AAA (sf)
                 B-2        45660NUN3     CCC (sf)


* S&P Junks Ratings on St. Joseph County, Indiana's Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services lowered its long-term rating to
'CCC' from 'BB+' on St. Joseph County Hospital Authority, Indiana's
series 2005 and series 1999 revenue bonds, issued for Madison Center
Inc. At the same time, Standard & Poor's placed the 'CCC' rating on
CreditWatch, with negative implications.  The lowered rating reflects
an unexpected and sharp drop in state funding, which, in turn, has
contributed to:

* Deteriorating operating performance in the unaudited fiscal year
  ended June 30, 2010;

* Very weak debt service coverage; and

* A restructuring of the organization, in which mental health
  services will be transferred to another provider at the end of
  this month.

Management reports that Madison Center is current on its debt service
payments (though debt service reserve funds have been used for
payments).  The CreditWatch, with negative implications, placement
reflects uncertainty around potential restructuring of the remaining
inpatient services at Madison Center.

"S&P expects to have additional conversations with management later
this year regarding discussions about potential partners.  S&P is
concerned with the possibility of a bankruptcy filing," stated credit
analyst Geraldine Poon.

Last year, Standard & Poor's lowered the rating to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'
based on balance sheet erosion, weak coverage, soft utilization
trends, and considerable management turnover.  At that time, however,
unaudited fiscal 2009 financials demonstrated improved financial
performance.  While the audited results in fiscal 2009 showed solid
operating results that were consistent with the internal financial
statements, fiscal 2010 performance has deteriorated significantly.
While the census has been soft, management reports that the severe
drop in Medicaid reimbursement has been a major factor in the erosion
of operating performance, Management continued, noting a historical
decline in reimbursements that now amounts to roughly half of the $27
million to $30 million reimbursements used to be.

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.  Don't
be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of
depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets.  A
company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities
that may never materialize.  The prices at which equity securities
trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet
solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard C.
Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez, Philline
Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***