TCR_Public/100919.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 19, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 260

                            Headlines

ABACUS LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Tranches
ARCC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
ARES VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Puts Ratings on 13 Certs. On Negative Watch
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Certificates

BERNARD NATIONAL: S&P Withdraws Ratings on 14 CDO Transactions
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf/LS3' Rating on Class D Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-4 Certs. to 'D'
CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Junks $130 Million Floating Rate Notes
DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Tranches

FIRST UNION: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C3 Securities
FMC REAL: Deterioration of Credit Quality Cues Moody's Junk Rating
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 9 Classes of Mortgage Certs.
HOUSTON SPORTS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B'
LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF2: Moody's Junks $288 Mil. Class A Cert.

LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF3: Moody's Junks $295MM Class A Cert.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF4: Moody's Holds Junks Ratings on Certs.
LATITUDE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
LENOX HILL: Moody's Raises Ratings on Series 2001 Bonds From 'Ba1'
LUNAR FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Junks Seven Class Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various CDO Deals
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Notes to 'CC'
MOTOROLA INC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Trust Certificates
MOTOROLA INC: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on Corporate Backed Trust Certs.

MT SPOKANE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Subordinate Notes
NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf/LS4' Rating on Class E Notes
NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Cuts $13.7MM of E Notes to 'BBsf/LS5'
NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Cuts $24MM of Class E Notes to 'CCsf/RR5'
NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Two Notes

NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Classes
NORTH STREET: S&P Downgrades Class G Notes Ratings to 'CC'
OCWEN RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 1998-R1 Certs.
PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Three Certificate Classes
RFC CDO: Deterioration in Credit Quality Cues Moody's Junk Rating

ROGER WILLIAMS: S&P Lowers $13MM Reveunue Bonds Ratings to BB-
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Certificates
SECURTIZED ASSET: Moody's Puts Junk Class M-1 Cert. On Review
ST. JOSEPH HEALTH: S&P Downgrades Rating on $18.7MM Bonds to 'B'
T2 INCOME: Improved Credit Quality Cues Moody's Rating Upgrade

TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Ratings on Bond-Backed Certs.
TRAPEZA CDO: Moody's Corrects Ratings Assigned on Class A-2 Notes
TRAPEZA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Fives Classes of Notes
TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

* Moody's Downgrades Rating on City of Salem's Bonds to 'Ba2'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight of US CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches of CDO Transactions
* S&P Puts Ratings on 51 Tranches on CreditWatch Positive

                            *********

ABACUS LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
tranches from ABACUS Ltd.'s series 2004-1, 2004-2, 2005-1, 2005-2,
and 2005-3 all synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
nine outstanding classes from these transactions.

The downgrades follow a number of write-downs in the transactions'
underlying reference portfolios, which have caused the notes to
incur principal losses.

                        ABACUS 2004-1, Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class                   To                 From
       -----                   --                 ----
       Class A                 CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)

                        ABACUS 2004-2, Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class                   To                 From
       -----                   --                 ----
       Class A                 CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       Class B                 CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)

                        ABACUS 2005-1, Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class                   To                 From
       -----                   --                 ----
       A-1                     CC (sf)            CCC (sf)
       A-2                     D (sf)             CCC- (sf)
       B                       D (sf)             CCC- (sf)
       C                       D (sf)             CCC- (sf)
       D                       D (sf)             CCC- (sf)

                        ABACUS 2005-2, Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class                   To                 From
       -----                   --                 ----
       A-1                     CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       A-2                     CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       A-3                     CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)

                        ABACUS 2005-3, Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
       Class                   To                 From
       -----                   --                 ----
       A-1                     CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       A-2                     CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       B                       CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       B Series 2              CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       C                       CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       C Series2               CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
       D                       CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)
       D Series2               CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)
       D Series3               CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)
       E                       D (sf)             CCC- (sf)


ARCC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ARCC Commercial Loan Trust 2006:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$33,000,000 Class A-2B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$44,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 18,
     2009 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$32,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 18, 2009
     Confirmed at B1 (sf);

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1A Notes, Class A-1A
VFN Notes and Class A-2A Notes, which have been paid down by
approximately 32% or $64.8 million since the last rating action in
August 2009.  In addition to principal pay downs, excess spread is
being diverted to pay down Class A-1A Notes, Class A-1A VFN Notes
and Class A-2A Notes as a structural result of the deal incurring
positive realized losses from sales and unrealized losses from
charged-off loans (such losses being the "Additional Principal
Amount").

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $329 million, defaulted par of $28 million, weighted
average default probability of 37.14% (implying a WARF of 6188), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 34.01%, and a
diversity score of 22.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

ARCC Commercial Loan Trust 2006, issued in July 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, second-lien loans and subordinated loans
issued by middle market issuers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-
12 months ago.  For each CE where the related exposure constitutes
more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch
equivalent assumed downgrade (but only on the CEs representing in
aggregate the largest 30% of the pool) in lieu of the
aforementioned stresses.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in all
cases the lowest assumed rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (4950)

  -- Class A-1A: 0
  -- Class A-1A VFN: 0
  -- Class A-1B: +1
  -- Class A-2A: 0
  -- Class A-2B: 0
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (7426)

  -- Class A-1A: 0
  -- Class A-1A VFN: 0
  -- Class A-1B: -3
  -- Class A-2A: 0
  -- Class A-2B: -3
  -- Class B: -3
  -- Class C: -4
  -- Class D: -4

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, whereby a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (36.01%))

  -- Class A-1A: 0
  -- Class A-1A VFN: 0
  -- Class A-1B: +1
  -- Class A-2A: 0
  -- Class A-2B: 0
  -- Class B: +1
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (32.01%)

  -- Class A-1A: 0
  -- Class A-1A VFN: 0
  -- Class A-1B: 0
  -- Class A-2A: 0
  -- Class A-2B: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of charged-off assets: Market value fluctuations in
   charged-off assets reported by the manager and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   Additional Principal Amount level.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling charged-off assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed charged-off recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a
   approximately 92% of securities whose default probabilities are
   assessed through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's
   is not provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.  Moody's also conducted stress
   tests to assess the collateral pool's concentration risk in
   obligors bearing a credit estimate that constitute more than 3%
   of the collateral pool.


ARES VIII: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ares VIII CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$233,900,000 Class A-1-A Senior Secured Notes Due 2016
     (current outstanding balance of $205,688,076), Upgraded to
     Aa3 (sf); previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$22,600,000 Class A-1-B Senior Secured Notes Due 2016
      (current outstanding balance of $19,874,094), Upgraded to
     Aa3 (sf); previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$17,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Notes Due 2016,
     Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2 (sf);

  -- US$23,650,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$9,350,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$19,200,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$13,800,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2016, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$6,750,000 Class D-1 Subordinated Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $3,347,032), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$3,000,000 Class D-2 Subordinated Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $1,487,570), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 11,
     2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$1,250,000 Class D-3 Subordinated Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $619,821), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 11, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$8,000,000 Class 1 Composite Securities Due 2016 (current
     Rated Balance of $3,334,205), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf);

  -- US$4,000,000 Class 3 Composite Securities Due 2016 (current
     Rated Balance of $0), Withdrawn; previously on June 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$2,750,000 Class 5 Composite Securities Due 2016 (current
     Rated Balance of $0), Withdrawn; previously on June 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$13,000,000 Class 7 Composite Securities Due 2016 (current
     Rated Balance of $6,901,362), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on June 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated August 19, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2527 compared to 3063
in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 8.81% of the underlying portfolio versus
19.24% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $6.9 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$11 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
123.28%, 113.99%, 106.01% and 104.7%, respectively, versus June
2009 levels of 117.54%, 108.83%, 101.22% and 99.89%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class C and Class D Notes
are no longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

As the reinvestment period for the deal ended in May 2010, the
senior notes are expected to benefit from delevering going
forward.

The Class 3 and Class 5 Composite Securities were exchanged for
their underlying components at the noteholders' request.  As a
result, the ratings of the notes have been withdrawn.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $500 million, defaulted par of $6.9 million, weighted
average default probability of 22.54% (implying a WARF of 3289), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.28%, and a
diversity score of 57.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Ares VIII Ltd., issued in 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2631)

  -- A1A: +2
  -- A1B: +2
  -- A2: 0
  -- A3: +2
  -- B1: +3
  -- B2: +3
  -- C1: +2
  -- C2: +2
  -- D1: +5
  -- D2: +5
  -- D3: +5
  -- Class 1: +3
  -- Class 6: 0
  -- Class 7: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3947)

  -- A1A: -2
  -- A1B: -2
  -- A2: -1
  -- A3: -2
  -- B1: -2
  -- B2: -2
  -- C1: -1
  -- C2: -1
  -- D1: -1
  -- D2: -1
  -- D3: -1
  -- Class 1: -1
  -- Class 6: 0
  -- Class 7: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, whereby a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.28%)

  -- A1A: +1
  -- A1B: +1
  -- A2: 0
  -- A3: 0
  -- B1: 0
  -- B2: +1
  -- C1: 0
  -- C2: 0
  -- D1: +1
  -- D2: +1
  -- D3: +1
  -- Class 1: +1
  -- Class 6: 0
  -- Class 7: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.28%)

  -- A1A: 0
  -- A1B: 0
  -- A2: 0
  -- A3: -1
  -- B1: -1
  -- B2: -1
  -- C1: -1
  -- C2: -1
  -- D1: 0
  -- D2: 0
  -- D3: 0
  -- Class 1: 0
  -- Class 6: 0
  -- Class 7: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   occur and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to high
   prepayment levels in the [bond/loan] market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Puts Ratings on 13 Certs. On Negative Watch
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2003-1 on CreditWatch
with negative implications, including two 'AAA (sf)' ratings.

The CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's preliminary analysis of
interest shortfalls affecting the trust.  As part of S&P's monthly
surveillance process, Standard & Poor's examined the Sept. 13,
2010, remittance report and observed that interest shortfalls of
$778,149 were affecting the trust, which caused the class B (rated
'AAA (sf)') and the classes subordinate to it to experience
interest shortfalls.

The interest shortfalls reported in the September 2010 remittance
period primarily relate to the Lincoln Center Professional Office
Building asset ($8.9 million total exposure, 1.0%) and the Etowah
Crossing Shopping Center asset ($3.6 million total exposure,
0.4%), two of seven loans and real estate owned assets with the
special servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC.  The master servicer,
Bank of America N.A., has made nonrecoverable advance
determinations and has stopped advancing interest and principal on
the assets.  Furthermore, the current remittance report shows that
the master servicer recovered $1.2 million of outstanding prior
advances on the assets.

Based on S&P's recent discussions with the master servicer, it is
its understanding that the recovery of previous advances
associated with the Lincoln Center Professional Office Building
and Etowah Crossing Shopping Center may be reversed in whole or in
part, which may result in a restatement of the Sept. 13, 2010,
remittance report.

S&P will update and/or resolve its CreditWatch placements upon the
completion of additional analysis, which will include a review of
the restated September 2010 remittance report, as well as an
examination of individual property cash flows and specially
serviced assets.  Should the classes continue to experience
interest shortfalls, S&P will likely initiate downgrades.

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass through certificates series 2003-1

                    Rating
                    ------
    Class  To                   From     Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --                   ----     ----------------------
    B      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)                 19.46
    C      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)                 17.78
    D      AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)                 14.59
    E      AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)                  13.08
    F      A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)                  11.57
    G      A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)                   10.06
    H      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB+ (sf)                 8.72
    J      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  BBB- (sf)                 5.87
    K      BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BB+ (sf)                  4.87
    L      BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)                   4.03
    M      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)                   3.19
    N      B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)                    2.52
    O      B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)                   2.02


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8
certificates from two transactions, backed by reperforming
residential mortgage loans, issued by Bear Stearns Mortgage
Securities Inc.

Issuer: Bear Stearns Mortgage Securities Inc. 1996-06

  -- B-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2003
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- B-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2003
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2003
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Sec Inc. 1997-02

  -- 1-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 1997
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- 1-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 7, 2004
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- 2-B-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2004
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- 2-B-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 7, 2004
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- 2-B-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 1997
     Assigned B2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the deterioration in the
performance of underlying mortgage pools backing the transactions.

The collateral backing these transactions consists of fully
amortizing loans originated under one of the insurance programs of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Following
default, these loans were repurchased by HUD and subsequently sold
in a series of public auctions.

Moody's estimated losses on the underlying mortgage pools by
multiplying lifetime pipeline losses expected from the related
pools by a factor of 1.75.  The lifetime pipeline losses were
derived based on lifetime roll rates to default of 85% for 60-day
delinquencies, 95% for 90+ day delinquencies, 100% for loans in
foreclosure, and 100% for loans where the homes are held-for-sale,
each applied with a severity assumption of 90%.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
rated certificates, Moody's analyzed each certificate's loss
coverage ratio based on aggregate credit enhancement, which
combines subordination (including over-collateralization) and
excess spread compared to updated pool losses.  The certificates
that do not have enough loss coverage ratio to maintain current
ratings based on the new loss levels have been downgraded.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the each of the collateral pools were to
increase by 10%, model implied results indicate that most of the
certificates' ratings would remain stable, with the exception of
classes B-2 and B-3 from Bear Stearns Mortgage Securities Inc.
1996-06, and class 2-B-3 from Bear Stearns Structured Sec Inc.
1997-02, for each of which model implied results would be one
notch lower (A2 versus A1, Ca versus Caa3, and B2 versus B1
respectively).  The model implied result will be two notches lower
( B2 versus Ba3 ) for the class 1-B-2 from Bear Stearns Structured
Sec Inc. 1997-02.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transactions in the past 6 months.


BERNARD NATIONAL: S&P Withdraws Ratings on 14 CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the 14
classes from 13 collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.
The class A-3b notes from Bernard National Loan Investors Ltd. and
the class A-3 notes from Bingham CDO L.P. were wrapped by
financial guarantees provided by MBIA Insurance Corp.

S&P withdrew its ratings on class A-1MT-i from Whitehawk CDO
Funding Ltd., class A-1MM-h from Cheyne High Grade ABS CDO I Ltd.,
and class A-1MM-e from Davis Square Funding II Ltd. because these
notes converted to other series and are no longer outstanding.
S&P withdrew its ratings on the other classes following the
complete redemption of the notes on their respective payment
dates.

Ratings withdrawn:

                                     Rating
Transaction               Class    To     From
Bernard National Loan
Investors Ltd.           A-3b     NR     AA- (sf)
Bingham CDO L.P.          A-3      NR     BBB (sf)
CapitalSource Commer
Loan Trust 2006-1        A        NR     A+ (sf)
CoLTS 2005-1 Ltd.         D        NR     B+ (sf)
Franklin CLO I Ltd.       C        NR     A+ (sf)
Gresham Street CDO
Fdg 2003-1 Ltd           B        NR     AAA (sf)
Longhorn CDO
(Cayman) Ltd.            A-2      NR     AAA (sf)
Longhorn CDO
(Cayman) Ltd.            A-3      NR     AAA (sf)
Merritt Fdg Trust
Ser 2005-2               A-2      NR     AA+ (sf)
Navigator CDO 2003 Ltd.   A-1      NR     AAA (sf)
Race Point CLO Ltd.       A-1      NR     AAA (sf)
Whitehawk CDO
Funding Ltd.             A-1MT-i  NR     AA (sf)
Cheyne HG ABS
CDO I Ltd.            A-1MM-h  NR/NR  B(sf)/Watch Neg/A-1+(sf)
Davis Sq Fdg II Ltd.   A-1MM-e  NR/NR  CCC+(sf)/A-1+(sf)


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf/LS3' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign these ratings to Cabela's Credit
Card Master Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2010-II:

  -- $212,500,000 class A fixed/floating-rate 'AAAsf/LS1';
  -- $20,000,000 class B fixed-rate 'A+sf/LS2';
  -- $10,625,000 class C fixed-rate 'BBB+sf/LS2';
  -- $6,875,000 class D fixed-rate 'BB+sf/LS3'.

Fitch's expected ratings are based on the underlying receivables
pool, available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's
underwriting and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's
legal and cash flow structures, which employ early redemption
triggers.

The transaction structure is similar to series 2010-I, with credit
enhancement totaling 15% for class A, credit enhancement of 7% for
the class B, credit enhancement of 2.75% plus an amount from a
spread account for the class C, and credit enhancement of an
amount from a spread account for the class D notes only.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-4 Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-4 commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from CBA
Commercial Assets' series 2006-2 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade of the class M-4 certificate reflects a $53,939
principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of the
security due to the liquidation of two assets.  The remaining
principal balance of the certificate was $2,229,060 as of the Aug.
25, 2010, remittance report.

As of the Aug. 25, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 200 loans and nine real estate owned assets with an
aggregate trust balance of $95.3 million, down from 294 loans
totaling $130.5 million at issuance.  There are currently 53 loans
totaling $31.5 million (33.1%) with the special servicer.  Nine of
the assets in the pool are REO (9.25%), 22 are in foreclosure
(13.2%), two are in bankruptcy (0.3%), seven are 90-plus-days
delinquent (1.9%), three is 60-plus-days delinquent (1.5%), and
nine are 30-plus-days delinquent (4.7%).  To date, the trust has
experienced losses on 30 loans.  The total losses to the trust are
$6.6 million.

                          Rating Lowered

                      CBA Commercial Assets
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

                    Rating
                    ------
    Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
    -----       --          ----             ------------------
    M-4         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)                      N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Junks $130 Million Floating Rate Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of two classes
of notes issued by Crystal River CDO 2005-1 Limited.  The notes
affected by the rating action are as follows:

* U.S.$109,750,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2046 (current
   balance of $12,120,166), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
   October 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

* U.S.$20,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
   Downgraded to C (sf); previously on October 19, 2009 Downgraded
   to Ca (sf).

Crystal River CDO 2005-1 Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2003 and 2006.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of an increase in the proportion of defaulted assets within the
underlying portfolio.  This deterioration has significantly
decreased the par coverage of the notes.  The Class A/B/C/D Par
Value Test, as reported by the trustee, has decreased from 44% in
October 2009 to 9.86% in August 2010.

Additionally, Moody's noted that the transaction is negatively
impacted by a large pay-fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap
where payments to the hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of
the excess spread in the deal.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the
general macro uncertainties are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.  However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced today are sensitive to further change.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool for
each credit in the reference.  Specifically, correlated defaults
are simulated using a normal copula model that applies the asset
correlation framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are
generated by applying within the simulation the distributional
assumptions, including the correlation between recovery values.
Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account of: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments for
interest and principal proceeds received from portfolio assets,
reinvestment assumptions, the timing of defaults, interest-rate
scenarios and foreign exchange risk.  The Expected Loss for each
tranche is the weighted average of losses to each tranche across
all the scenarios, where the weight is the likelihood of the
scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as the shortfall in
the present value of cash flows to the tranche relative to the
present value of the promised cash flows.  The present values are
calculated using the promised tranche coupon rate as the discount
rate. For floating rate tranches, the discount rate is based on
the promised spread over Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

The principal methodology used in rating Crystal River CDO
2005-1 Limited was "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" rating
methodology published in August 2009.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 7 tranches,
downgraded the ratings of 99 tranches and confirmed the ratings on
15 tranches from 18 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans,
issued by Deutsche Bank.

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The principal methodology used in rating these securities was
"Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: February 2010" rating
methodology published in February 2010.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Certain securities, as noted below, are insured by financial
guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: DBALT 2007-RAMP1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2006-AR4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2006-AR5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-1

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3C, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4A, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-BAR1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AF1

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AR3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AR6

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2007-AR1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2007-AR3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Current Rating at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2006-AB1

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-D, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2006-AB4

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B-2, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
     Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-3A-2, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on
     Nov. 12, 2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-4A, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
      (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-7, Current Rating at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-AB1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AI-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AI-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-B Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-AB2

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-5A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FIRST UNION: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2001-C3 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from First Union
National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2001-C3.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades reflect
concerns with the volume of loans that are coming due through next
year (60.6%), as well as the percentage of the pool reporting debt
service coverage under 1.10x (12.2%).  While many have decent
coverage, it may be challenging to refinance many of these loans,
given capital market conditions.  This could prompt special
servicing transfers, as well as potential delinquencies.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted DSC of 1.32x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 75.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA (sf)' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.11x and an LTV ratio of 97.1%.  The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA (sf)' scenario were 26.8% and 20.4%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude the two ($4.8 million; 0.9%) specially serviced assets and
26 defeased loans ($200.5 million; 37.1%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the two specially serviced assets, which S&P
included in its 'AAA (sf)' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect subordination levels that
are consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class IO-I and IO-II interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance report, two assets
($4.8 million; 0.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc.  One ($3.8 million, 0.7%) asset is real estate
owned, and one ($1.0 million, 0.2%) asset is more than 90 days
delinquent.  Details are as follows:

The Midway Office Park asset is a 55,674-sq.-ft. office property
built in 1977 in Addison, Texas.  The asset was transferred to the
special servicer on Aug. 27, 2008, due to monetary default and is
currently REO.  The special servicer reported that the property is
currently 64.9% occupied, and it is preparing to market the
property for sale.  An appraisal reduction amount of $2.6 million
is in effect on this asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Villa Paradisa Apartments loan ($1.0 million, 0.2%) is secured
by a 32-unit multifamily property built in 1982 in Las Vegas.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on June 22, 2010, due
to imminent default and is currently more than 90 days delinquent.
For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 94.0% and
1.03x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss
upon the resolution of this asset.

Excluding defeased loans, 64 loans ($327.8 million, 96.4%) mature
in 2010 and 2011.  This includes four loans ($12.5 million; 2.3%)
that were specially serviced and subsequently returned to the
master servicer.  The special servicer is entitled to 1% of all
future principal and interest payments on the loan provided it
continues to perform through maturity and remains with the master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2010 remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $540.6 million (100 loans), compared
with $818.8 million (125 loans) at issuance.  The master servicer
provided financial information for 99.3% of the trust balance.
All of the servicer-provided financial information was partial-
year 2009 or full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.35x for the nondefeased loans in the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.32x
and 75.4%, respectively, and exclude the two specially serviced
assets and 26 defeased loans ($200.5 million; 37.1%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced assets.
Twenty-three loans ($91.6 million, 16.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Twelve loans ($14.1 million, 2.6%) have a
reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 11 loans ($51.7 million,
9.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has
experienced $19.9 million of principal losses on 13 loans to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $166.6 million (30.8%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.35x for the top 10 loans in the pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.23x and 81.3%,
respectively.  Three of the top 10 loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist, which S&P discuss below.

The IAC Seattle Speiker loan ($13.3 million; 2.5%) is the fifth-
largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the watchlist.
The loan is secured by a 194,689?sq.-ft. industrial property
constructed in 2000 in SeaTac, Wash.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to lease expirations of several
major tenants within the next six months.  The master servicer has
indicated that Transgroup Express Inc. (7.3% of net rentable area
{NRA}) has recently vacated and that the borrower believes that
Eagle Transport (15.0% of NRA, expiring Oct. 14, 2010, and DHL
Global (17.9% of NRA, expiring Sept. 30, 2010) will also vacate at
their lease expirations.  There are four prospective tenants for
the property.  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC
were 96.0% and 1.42x, respectively.  Standard & Poor's expects the
DSC may decline to approximately 1.0x based upon the information
provided by the master servicer, as well as the market information
S&P considered in its analysis.

The Alliance Business Center loan ($11.5 million; 2.1%) is the
eighth-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
watchlist.  The loan is secured by four mixed-use buildings with
both office and retail in separate buildings totaling 122,964 sq.
ft. built in 1996 in Fort Worth, Texas.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of March 2010, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 72.3% and 0.97x, respectively.

The Madison Center loan ($9.3 million; 1.7%) is the ninth-largest
loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the watchlist.  The
loan is secured by a 220,088-sq.-ft. retail shopping center built
in 1962 in Madison Heights, Mich.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of March 2010, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 81.0% and 0.81x, respectively.
According to the master servicer, the property has three
prospective tenants, one of which is for 25,000 sq. ft.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria and the resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

       First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C3

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --         ----         ----------------------
     H         A (sf)     A+ (sf)                       10.33
     J         BBB- (sf)  A- (sf)                        6.92
     K         BB- (sf)   BBB (sf)                       4.27
     L         B-  (sf)   BB+ (sf)                       3.13
     M         CCC+ (sf)  BB (sf)                        2.38
     N         CCC (sf)   B+ (sf)                        1.24
     O         CCC- (sf)  B  (sf)                        0.48

                         Ratings Affirmed

       First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C3

             Class    Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------    ----------------------
             A-3      AAA (sf)   32.10
             B        AAA (sf)   25.85
             C        AAA (sf)   23.58
             D        AAA (sf)   19.23
             E        AAA (sf)   17.14
             F        AA+ (sf)   14.87
             G        AA (sf)    12.60
             IO-I     AAA (sf)     N/A
             IO-II    AAA (sf)     N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


FMC REAL: Deterioration of Credit Quality Cues Moody's Junk Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one class and downgraded eight classes of
Notes issued by FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd., due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor,
and increase in Impaired Securities.  The rating action, which
concludes our review, is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

* US$94.913M Cl. A-1 Notes, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
   April 15, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

* US$43.941M Cl. A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$43.941M Cl. B Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$49.434M Cl. C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* US$34.055M Cl. D Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$13.182M Cl. E Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$21.97M Cl. F Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$35.153M Cl. G Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* US$12.084M Cl. H Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
   May 12, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd., is a CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans, B-Notes, and mezzanine
loans.  As of the August 23, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $402.5 million
from $439.4 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the
Class A-1 Notes, as a result of the end of the Reinvestment
Period.

There are nine assets with par balance of $116.8 million that are
considered Impaired Securities as of the August 23, 2010 Trustee
report. Four of these assets are either A-Notes or whole loans,
four assets are B-Notes and one asset is a mezzanine loan.
Moody's does not expect significant losses from these Impaired
Securities to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM v2.6 as we expect the underlying non-
CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,164 compared to 7,132 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is as follows: Aaa-Aa3, Baa1-Baa3, Ba1-Ba3, B1-B3, and
Caa1-C.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.2
years compared to 3.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 20.6% compared to 28.8% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
reducing the maximum over concentration stress applied to
correlation factors by half due to the diversity of tenants,
property types, and geographic locations inherent in the
collateral pools.  Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.9% compared to
23.9% at last review.  The low MAC is due to higher default
probability collateral concentrated within a small number of
collateral names.

The principal methodologies used in rating FMC Real Estate CDO
2005-1, Ltd. were "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs
Backed by Commercial Real Estate Securities" published in June
2004, and "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in August
2009.  Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdgeR v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 20.6% to 10.6% or up to 30.6% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 1 to 5 notches downward
and 1 to 6 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take a rating action is dependent on an assessment of
a range of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.  Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the
current stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness
in the commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's
currently views the commercial real estate market as stressed with
further performance declines expected in a majority of property
sectors.  The availability of debt capital is improving with terms
returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price
stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-
shaped" for 2010 and 2011; we expect overall a sluggish recovery
in most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend
growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent
unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 9 Classes of Mortgage Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2003-C2.  S&P also
placed these ratings and the ratings on four additional classes
from the same transaction on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades and CreditWatch placements follow S&P's preliminary
analysis of the transaction after the August remittance report
noted that interest shortfalls had affected seven classes from the
trust.  The interest shortfalls relate primarily to three of the
six assets ($72.1 million, 8.73%) that are with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  The rating
actions also reflect S&P's assessment of the transaction's
susceptibility to increased future interest shortfalls if the
master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (Berkadia),
recovers outstanding advances related to one of the six specially
serviced assets.

As of the August 2010 remittance report, interest shortfalls
totaling $339,079 have affected the class J through N certificates
for one month, and the class O certificates for two months.  The
interest shortfalls are primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs) that are currently in effect for
two of the six specially serviced assets, which have a balance of
$55.4 million (6.7% of the trust balance).  The reported ASERs for
these two assets totaled $156,340.  In addition, the master
servicer made a nonrecoverable advance declaration in connection
with one asset, which is real estate owned (REO).  The master
servicer is also recovering prior advances for this same asset,
which contributed $157,132 of the interest shortfalls that
were reported in the August remittance report: $74,985 of the
shortfall for this asset was due to current interest that was not
advanced and $82,147 was due to the recovery of advances made in
prior periods.  S&P expects the recovery of prior advances to
increase, as Berkadia has stated that it will recover $789,637 in
outstanding advances related to the REO asset over the next three
months.  As a result, S&P expects classes F, G, and H to be
susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  Standard & Poor's will
resolve and/or update the CreditWatch placements after we have
further dialogue with the servicers and perform a full analysis of
the transaction.

As of the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 75 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$827.5 million.  22 loans ($293.5 million, 35.5%) have been
defeased.  Of the six assets with the special servicer, one
($16.7 million, 2.0%) is REO, one ($2.9 million, 0.4%) is in
foreclosure, one ($11.4 million, 1.4%) is more than 90 days
delinquent, and three ($91.3 million, 11.0%) are within their
respective grace periods.  Four of the specially serviced assets
have ARAs in effect totaling $48.6 million.  To date, the trust
has experienced a loss of $4.2 million in connection with
one loan.

Ratings lowered and placed on creditwatch negative:

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C2

                Rating
Class   To                   From        Credit enhancement (%)
F       BBB+/Watch Neg (sf)  A+ (sf)                      12.17
G       BBB/Watch Neg (sf)   A (sf)                       10.80
H       BB+/Watch Neg (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                     8.85
J       B+/Watch Neg (sf)    BB+ (sf)                      6.32
K       B/Watch Neg (sf)     BB (sf)                       5.34
L       B-/Watch Neg (sf)    BB- (sf)                      4.37
M       CCC+/Watch Neg (sf)  B+ (sf)                       3.20
N       CCC/Watch Neg (sf)   B- (sf)                       2.61
O       CCC-/Watch Neg (sf)  CCC (sf)                      2.03

Ratings placed on creditwatch negative:

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C2

                Rating
Class   To                   From        Credit enhancement (%)
B       AAA/Watch Neg (sf)   AAA (sf)                     22.31
C       AAA/Watch Neg (sf)   AAA (sf)                     20.36
D       AA+/Watch Neg (sf)   AA+ (sf)                     16.65
E       AA/Watch Neg (sf)    AA (sf)                      14.70


HOUSTON SPORTS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
on the Harris County-Houston Sports Authority, Texas' junior-lien
series 1998-B, 1998-C, 2001-B, 2001-C, 2001-D, 2001-E, and 2001-H
bonds, and the third-lien series 2004A-3 bonds to 'B' from 'BBB-'.

"The downgrade is the result of higher debt service payments in
the short term due to acceleration of the series 2001C, 2001D, and
2001E bonds, and the likelihood for a decline in reserve levels
due a potential sizable collateral posting requirement related to
interest rate swap agreements," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst James Breeding.  Also triggering the downgrade is the
recent, and potentially continuing, decline in excess hotel
occupancy tax and vehicle tax revenues that would be available to
support the junior-lien bonds.

At the same time, however, Standard & Poor's has affirmed its
'BBB' underlying rating on the Authority's senior-lien bonds
outstanding.  The 'BBB' underlying rating applies to the series
1998-A, 2001-A, 2001-G, and 2001-I bonds.

The 'BBB' rating on the senior-lien bonds reflects S&P's view of:

   -- the limited nature, volatility, and recent negative trends
      of the pledged tax revenue streams, though the revenue base
      remains large and diverse;

   -- good coverage of senior-lien debt service despite the recent
      declines in pledged tax revenues; and

   -- a lengthy maturity schedule extending through 2041, with a
      continuing rise in the annual debt service requirement.

The 'B' rating on the junior- and third-lien bonds reflects S&P's
assessment of:

   -- the reliance on other available special or supplemental
      revenues, specifically tied to events at the constructed
      venues, to support debt service payments for certain series
      of junior-lien bonds;

   -- the need for pledged hotel occupancy and vehicle rental tax
      revenues to increase to cover payments on the junior-lien
      bonds that do not have a pledge of other revenue streams;
      and

   -- the anticipated sharp reduction of available reserves to
      cover any shortages in revenues available for debt service.

The stable outlook on the senior-lien bonds reflects Standard &
Poor's expectation, that while pledged revenues have been
declining, they are still at a level sufficient to cover annual
debt service requirements.  Monthly set-aside requirements that
are above the minimum necessary to cover debt service help to
ensure adequate coverage.  In the long term, the rating could
be pressured if hotel occupancy tax and/or vehicle rental taxes
continue to experience declines.  Given the escalating nature of
the debt service schedule, an upgrade is unlikely even if revenues
were to grow considerably.

The negative outlook on the junior-lien bonds reflects S&P's
expectation for coverage of junior-lien bond debt service to
remain thin, with the reliance on revenues from non-tax sources,
including the potential need for additional supplemental revenues
to cover accelerated debt service payments.  Falling coverage,
coupled with a significantly reduced reserve fund, could create
additional pressure on the rating.  If the Authority exhaust the
majority of the Additional Required Reserve and excess revenues
fall below a 1.0x coverage level, specifically for the series
1998B and 2001B bonds, it may be forced to draw upon the surety
policies.  Also, if financial pressure related to the accelerated
payments of the series 2001C, D, and E bonds increase and a draw
on debt service reserve funds is required, then Standard &
Poor's would likely lower the rating.  The rating on the series
2001H bonds and the third-lien series 2004A-3 bonds would also be
affected, even though there are no debt service payments due on
these bonds until 2020 and 2031, respectively.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF2: Moody's Junks $288 Mil. Class A Cert.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed two classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities
Inc., Series 2006-MF2 as follows:

* US$288.863M Cl. A Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Dec. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

* US$8.745M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
   Dec. 10, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

* US$0.839M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
   Dec. 10, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

* Cl. X Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10,
   2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their existing ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; we expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of
the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating LaSalle Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF2 is "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 40% to
$298.4 million from $495.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 339 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 11% of the pool. The pool has a Herfindahl (Herf)
score of 227 compared to 251 at Moody's last review.

Ninety loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $47.5 million. These losses have
resulted in the elimination of Classes D through N and a 93%
principal loss on Class C. Currently, there are 70 loans,
representing 22% of the pool, in special servicing.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $33.4 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans. Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $43.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
16% of the current balance.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.2 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF3: Moody's Junks $295MM Class A Cert.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF3 as
follows:

* US$295.524M Cl. A Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Dec. 10, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

* US$6.711M Cl. B Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Dec. 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

* Cl. X Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 10,
   2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating LaSalle Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF3 is "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated
between these two data points or determined based on a multiple or
ratio of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the
credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying
ratings is melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into
an overall model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based
on the underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range
of credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated December 10, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to
$302.2 million from $493.4 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 303 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 11% of the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl (Herf)
score of 206 compared to 235 at Moody's last review.

One hundred nine loans, representing 36% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Sixty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $53.7 million.  These losses have
resulted in the elimination of Classes C through N and a 16%
principal loss on Class B.  Currently, there are 59 loans,
representing 19% of the pool, in special servicing.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $11.1 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $49.9 million loss for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
18% of the current balance.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, the pool has
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $908,031.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF4: Moody's Holds Junks Ratings on Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed these three classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF4:

* US$312.926M Cl. A Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

* US$7.891M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
   Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

* US$11.836M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
   Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

* US$7.272M Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
   Jan. 28, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

* Cl. X Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 28,
   2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their existing ratings.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  Small balance transactions, which represent
approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe,
have generally experienced higher defaults and losses than
traditional conduit and fusion transaction

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating LaSalle Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF4 is "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Small Loan Transactions" rating methodology published
in December 2004.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be
found on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated January 28, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the August 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to
$339.9 million from $450.9 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 287 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.5% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 11% of the pool.  The pool has a Herfindahl
(Herf) score of 203 compared to 217 at Moody's last review.

Eighty loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $47.5 million.  These losses have
resulted in the elimination of Classes E through N and a 19%
principal loss on Class D. Currently, there are 53 loans,
representing 21% of the pool, in special servicing.  The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $29.5 million appraisal
reduction for the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $56.8 million loss for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
21% of the current balance.

The pool has also experienced significant interest shortfalls.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, the pool has
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.7 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.


LATITUDE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Latitude CLO I Ltd.:

  -- US$45,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B-1 Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$2,000,000 Class B-2 Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- US$13,300,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
     previously on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously
     on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In addition
to these factors, the rating actions on the Class B-1 and the
Class B-2 notes also reflect a correction made to the modeling of
the note payment waterfall.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated July 20, 2010, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2800 compared to 2866 in the
June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up
approximately 9.17% of the underlying portfolio versus 17.09% in
June 2009.  Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the last
rating action due to a decrease in the percentage of securities
with ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a
"Negative Outlook." Additionally, defaulted securities total about
$14.37 million of the underlying portfolio compared to $31.96
million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
127.42%, 112.81%, 106.32% and 102.12%, respectively, versus June
2009 levels of 114.86%, 102.97%, 97.60% and 94.10%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class C and Class D Notes
are no longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

In the previous rating action dated June 18, 2009, the note
payment waterfall was modeled such that the Class B-2 notes were
subordinated in right of payment of principal to the Class B-1
notes.  In fact, the Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes should receive
interest and principal on a pari passu basis.  The note payment
waterfall has been remodeled accordingly, and the rating actions
reflect the correction.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $235.52 million, defaulted par of $24.96 million,
weighted average default probability of 25.91% (implying a WARF of
3828), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.72%,
and a diversity score of 63.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Latitude CLO I Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition, to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3062)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: +3
  -- Class B1: +2
  -- Class B2: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4594)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: -2
  -- Class B1: -1
  -- Class B2: -1
  -- Class C: -4
  -- Class D: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, whereby a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.72%)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: +1
  -- Class B1: 0
  -- Class B2: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.72%)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: 0
  -- Class B1: 0
  -- Class B2: 0
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


LENOX HILL: Moody's Raises Ratings on Series 2001 Bonds From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating assigned to
Lenox Hill Hospital's Series 2001 bonds to Baa3 from Ba1.  The
rating has been removed from watchlist, and the outlook is
positive at the higher rating level.  The rating action impacts
$127 million of Series 2001 bonds and reflects LHH becoming a
member of North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System (rated
Baa1) effective May 19, 2010, and Moody's expectations for ongoing
operational improvement at LHH.

Legal Security: Gross revenue pledge of Lenox Hill Hospital.  1.25
rolling twelve-month debt service covenant test and 50 day cash on
hand requirement.  Moody's analysis has historically incorporated
the consolidated financial performance of Lenox Hill Hospital and
Manhattan Eye Ear and Throat Hospital who is not obligated on the
debt but merged with LHH in 2007.

Debt-Related Interest Rate Derivatives: none

                             Strengths

* Recent merger with North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System
  (rated Baa1 with stable outlook) allows for many opportunities
  for operational improvement.  LHH has struggled as a standalone
  hospital in the competitive New York landscape, unable to
  achieve certain economies of scale and to negotiate competitive
  reimbursement rates and terms with private payers.  Moody's
  expects that the new management team will focus on operational
  efficiencies and expense containment, improved managed care
  contract rates and terms, and capturing of market share,
  including Manhattan and parts of Queens, with a goal of
  breakeven operations at LHH by FY 2012.

* Although the legal security and obligated group for the Series
  2001 bonds has not changed, the upgrade to Baa3 heavily
  incorporates an assumption that North Shore will provide the
  necessary financial and managerial resources to improve and grow
  LHH's clinical services, increase profitability, and make
  adequate capital investments.  Moody's believes that this is a
  very strategic acquisition for North Shore, and as such, expect
  a strong ongoing commitment from the North Shore team to improve
  LHH's financial performance, expand clinical activities, and
  maintain a strong reputation.

* Large tertiary care provider ($665 million of operating revenue
  and 28,344 inpatient admissions in FY 2009) located on the Upper
  East Side of Manhattan with specialties including cardiac care,
  obstetrics, and orthopedics.  LHH has a high Medicare case mix
  index (1.8 in FY 2009) and a favorable payer mix (47% commercial
  payers, 8% Medicaid, and 41% Medicare, as calculated from
  discharges).  LHH serves as a teaching affiliate of New York
  University Langone Medical Center.

* Management reports strong physician support for the merger, with
  expected ongoing recruitment and expansion of medical staff.

* Diverse patient mix and geographical draw at LHH that
  complements North Shore's patients' origins.  LHH currently
  draws less than half of its patients from Manhattan (44%), and
  draws patients from other New York boroughs and out of state,
  including Queens and Brooklyn (each 15%).  Moody's believe that
  LHH's strong market presence in the western region of Queens
  will nicely mesh with North Shore's stronger presence in the
  eastern parts of Queens.

                            Challenges

* Multi-year operating deficits and weak operating cash flow (2.6%
  operating deficit and 4.1% cash flow margin in FY 2009).  Debt
  service coverage has been thin (1.7 times in FY 2009).  Pressure
  on patient volumes and weak managed care contracts have
  contributed to weak operating performance.  In FY 2009, LHH
  recorded 28,344 inpatient admissions, down from 31,494 in FY
  2005.  Based on unaudited financial data for the first six
  months of FY 2010, Moody's believe LHH's operating performance
  has improved modestly including growth of inpatient admissions
  volumes and outpatient surgeries year to date compared to the
  first 6 months of FY 2009.  Moody's expects that there is
  significant room for operational improvement at LHH, with
  management targeting breakeven operations within 2-3 years.

* Historically thin balance sheet liquidity and past significant
  exposure to hedge funds and other alternative investments with
  more limited liquidity, including within the pension plan.  In
  FY 2009, LHH had $170.7 million of unrestricted cash and
  investments (including $20 million drawn on a working capital
  line of credit, which was has since been repaid), which provided
  96 days cash on hand and covered $185 million of debt 0.92
  times.  North Shore is in the process of placing redemptions and
  liquidating a large proportion of alternative investments, with
  an expected significant shift into fixed income and equities
  which could be liquidated more quickly.

* LHH has a relatively large unfunded pension obligation
  ($131 million in FY 2009), although the Hospital froze the
  defined benefit plan in 2007 and converted it to a defined
  contribution plan for all employees except nurses, which should
  help limit future growth of the obligation.

* Need for continued capital investment at LHH.  Capital spending
  has been low (0.7 times in FY 2009) and age of plant has
  steadily grown over the past four years (up to 14.2 years in FY
  2009) indicating ongoing capital needs.  Debt to revenue remains
  moderate at 27.8% in FY 2009.

                   Recent Developments/Results

Effective May 19, 2010, LHH became a member of North Shore-Long
Island Jewish Health System.  North Shore has become the sole
corporate member of LHH.  All LHH board members are now part of
the North Shore board, with an LHH executive committee kept
locally.  The Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
and Chief Operating Officer of North Shore will now serve those
roles for LHH.

                             Outlook

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectations for sustained
improvement in LHH's operating performance and balance sheet
liquidity.

                What could change the rating -- Up

Improved cash flow and debt service coverage coupled with growth
of unrestricted cash and investments and improved balance sheet
liquidity

                What could change the rating -- Down

Inability to turn around operating performance; balance sheet
deterioration; significant increase in debt absent compensating
growth of unrestricted cash and investments and revenue to pay
debt service

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for LHH and Subsidiaries

  -- First number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2009

  -- Investment returns smoothed at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Admissions: 29,014 admissions; 28,344 admissions

* Total operating revenue: $651.3 million; $665.2 million

* Net revenue available for debt service: $62.0 million; $42.8
  million

* Total debt outstanding: $178.0 million; $184.96 million

* Operating margin: (1.7%); (2.6%)

* Operating cash flow margin: 5.5%; 4.1%

* Cash-to-debt: 79.3%; 92.3%

* Debt-to-cash flow: 3.38 times; 5.45 times

* Days cash on hand: 82.5 days; 96.4 times

                           Rated Debt

* Series 2001: Baa3

Last Rating Action:

The last rating action with respect to Lenox Hill Hospital was on
June 10, 2010, when the Ba1 rating was placed on watchlist for
upgrade.


LUNAR FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes from Lunar Funding I Ltd.'s series 10, 11, and 12, three
synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  Prior to the withdrawal, the ratings on
series 10 and 11 were on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete redemption and
cancellation of the notes.

                         Ratings Withdrawn

                       Lunar Funding I Ltd.
                            Series 10

                            Rating
                            ------
               Class      To      From
               -----      --      ----
               10         NR      B- (sf)/Watch Pos

                       Lunar Funding I Ltd.
                            Series 11

                            Rating
                            ------
               Class      To      From
               -----      --      ----
               11         NR      CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

                       Lunar Funding I Ltd.
                            Series 12

                                Rating
                                ------
                   Class      To      From
                   -----      --      ----
                   12         NR      CCC- (sf)

                          NR - Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Junks Seven Class Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 13 classes,
confirmed two and affirmed four classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2004-KEY2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-KEY2 as follows:

* US$78.305M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* US$92.126M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* Cl. XP Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
   Oct. 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* Cl. XC Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
   Oct. 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* US$181.953M Cl. A-1A Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf);
   previously on July 29, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

* US$345.746M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf);
   previously on July 29, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

* US$26.474M Cl. B Certificate, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);
   previously on July 29, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

* US$8.361M Cl. C Certificate, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$22.295M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);
   previously on July 29, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

* US$12.54M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$15.328M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$11.147M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$15.328M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$6.967M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$5.573M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$4.181M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$2.786M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$2.787M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

* US$1.180M Cl. P Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on July 29, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The confirmations and affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their existing
ratings.

On July 29, 2010, Moody's placed 15 classes on review for possible
downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 3.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.0% of the current balance.  Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2004-KEY2 is "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion
Transactions" rating methodology published in April 2005.  Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herf, a measure of loan level
diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and
has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations
and correlations may be considered in our analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a
periodic basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full
review is summarized in a press release dated September 18, 2008.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on
moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

As of the August 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to
$833.4 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 36% of the pool.  Sixteen loans, representing 12% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 13%
of the pool.  The pool contains one loan, representing 10% of the
pool, which has an investment grade underlying rating.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.38 million.  Ten loans,
representing 7% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The ten specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property
types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $13.2 million loss for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loan representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$7.4 million loss from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, classes G through Q have
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.3 million.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially
serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 94% and 91%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 88% compared to 91% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.8%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.16X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 1.15X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 42 compared to 51 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Crossroads Center Loan,
which is secured by the borrower's interest in a 905,300 square
foot regional mall located in St. Cloud, Minnesota.  The mall is
anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's and Sears.  In-line occupancy was
98% as of March 2010 compared to 92% at last review.  The loan has
amortized 4% since last review.  The loan sponsor is General
Growth Properties.  The property was included in GGP's bankruptcy
filing but has been returned to the master servicer.  The loan
maturity was extended from August 1, 2010 to January 30, 2014.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.34X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.32X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 13% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the U-Haul Portfolio Loan, which
is secured by two similarly sized loans which are cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted.  The loans are secured by 34
U-Haul operated self-storage and retail properties located across
18 states and totaling 1.5 million square feet.  The combined
occupancy was 74% as of March 2010.  Performance has declined
since last review due to the occupancy decline.  The loan has
amortized 4% since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
70% and 1.43X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.52X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 1900 Ocean Apartments Loan, which
is secured by a 266 unit multifamily property located in Long
Beach, California.  The property was 97% leased as of March 2010
compared to 93% at last review.  The loan has amortized 3% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.89X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the 15 & 200 Meadowlands Parkway Loan,
which is secured by two office properties located in Secaucus, New
Jersey.  The properties were 89% leased as of March 2010.  The
loan has amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.07X at
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various CDO Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on Morgan
Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22, a collateralized debt
obligation transaction referencing a managed portfolio of 85
synthetic credit corporate exposures.

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref.  no:
n94da)

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-I Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
     2012, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on February 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref.  no:
n94cx)

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-II Floating Rate Notes due
     December 20, 2012, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     February 9, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref.  no:
n94du)

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
     2012, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on February 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC Series 2007-22 (Ref.  no:
n9r0u)

  -- US$5,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes due December 20,
     2012, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on February 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the shortened time to maturity of the CSO tranches and a
substantial level of credit enhancement remaining.  Offsetting
these positive factors is the low credit quality of the reference
portfolio.

The underlying portfolio of synthetic credit corporate securities
references senior secured loans with a recovery rate fixed at 70%
in case of credit event.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio is 2991, equivalent to B3.  This compares
to a 10-year WARF of 2947 from the last rating review.  Since the
last rating action, there have been credit events on General
Growth Properties, Inc. and Visteon Corporation.  The CSO notes
have a remaining life of 2.3 years and respective remaining credit
enhancement levels of 13.4% (Class A-I and Class A-II), 8.5%
(Class D), and 6.7% (Class E).

In the process of determining the rating action, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Removal of forward-looking measures -- The notching adjustment
    on each entity's rating due to credit watch or negative
    outlook was removed.  This run generated a result that was one
    notch better (Class A-I, Class A-II, Class D), or not
    materially different (Class E) than the one modeled under the
    base case.

(2) Use of Market Implied Ratings -- MIRs were used in place of
    the corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default
    probability of each corporate name in the reference portfolio.
    The gap between an MIR and a Moody's corporate fundamental
    rating is an indicator of the extent of the divergence of
    credit view between Moody's and the market.  This run
    generated a result that was one notch better (Class A-I, Class
    A-II), not materially different (Class D), or one notch worse
    (Class E) than the one modeled under the base case.

(3) Reduction of time to maturity -- Time to maturity was reduced
    by six months, all other things being equal.  This run
    generated a result that was one (Class A-I, Class A-II, Class
    E), or two (Class D) notches better than the one modeled under
    the base case.

(4) Stress on largest industry group -- All entities in the
    Hotels, Gaming, and Leisure were notched down by one, the
    largest sector concentration representing 14% of the portfolio
    notional.  The result of this run showed no impact (Class A-I,
    Class A-II, Class D) or one notch worse (Class E) compared to
    the base case.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROMv2.6.
This model is available on moodys.com under Products and Solutions
-- Analytical models, upon return of a signed free license
agreement.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done using the CDOROM model.  For a
description of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the
CDOROM user guide on Moody's website.

Moody's also ran a stress scenario defaulting all reference
entities modeled at Caa1 and below representing 16.8% of the
portfolio.  The run generated an expected loss consistent with a
rating two notches below the base case modelling for Class A-I,
Class A-II, Class E, and four notches for Class D.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of
the complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations
over time in default rates for instruments with a given rating,
(b) variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of
Corporate CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference
pool may have leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the
Corporate CSO liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of
volatility.  All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be
higher for more junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomic conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent depending on the
expected severity of the worsening conditions.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class IIIA, IIIB, IIIC, IIID notes issued by Morgan Stanley
Managed ACES SPC's series 2006-6 and the class IIIA and IIIB notes
issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC's series 2006-9 to
'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'. Both transactions are synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

The downgrades follow a number of credit events within the
transactions' portfolios of underlying corporate reference
entities.  S&P received final valuations on the credit events in
the underlying portfolios, which indicated that losses in the
portfolios caused these notes to incur principal losses.


MOTOROLA INC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Trust Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+' rating on
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates Motorola Debentures-Backed
Series 2002-14 Trust's $25.5 million class A-1 certificates on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P's rating on the class A-1 certificates is dependent on its
rating on the underlying security, Motorola Inc.'s 6.5% debentures
due Nov. 15, 2028 ('BB+/Watch Pos').

The CreditWatch placement follows S&P's Sept. 2, 2010, placement
of its 'BB+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the class A-1 certificates due to changes in its ratings assigned
to the underlying security.


MOTOROLA INC: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on Corporate Backed Trust Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+' rating on
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates Motorola Debentures-Backed
Series 2002-12's $44.4 million certificates on CreditWatch with
positive implications.

S&P's rating on the certificates is dependent on its rating on the
underlying security, Motorola Inc.'s 5.22% notes due Oct. 1, 2097
('BB+/Watch Pos').

The rating action follows S&P's Sept. 2, 2010, placement of its
'BB+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the certificates due to changes in its ratings assigned to the
underlying security.


MT SPOKANE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Subordinate Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed the ratings of the subordinate notes and
certificates in the Mt. Spokane 2007-A LLC synthetic
securitization of U.S. farm mortgage loans originated and serviced
by Northwest Farm Credit Services.  The securitization is a Credit
Default Swap issued to cover any losses on the underlying
reference pool of loans made to farmers primarily in the Pacific
northwest region.  The reference pool consists of real estate-
secured first lien agricultural business loans.  Under the terms
of the Credit Default Swap agreement, Mt. Spokane 2007-A LLC is
required to make payments to Northwest FCS for any defaulted loans
occurring in the reference pool (net of recoveries) using the
proceeds from the note issuance.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Mt. Spokane 2007-A LLC

  -- Cl. D, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on March 3, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on March 3, 2010 Ba2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Certificates, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on March 3,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Class D, E, and Certificates were placed under review for possible
downgrade in March 2010 because of an increase in late stage
delinquencies, bankruptcies, and foreclosures (collectively,
nonperforming loans) in the underlying reference pool, which
exposed the notes and certificates to potential losses.  Over the
last six months, the rate of delinquency growth has subsided, and
performance of the reference pool has stabilized.

Moody's expects Mt. Spokane 2007-A to incur lifetime cumulative
net losses of approximately 0.42% of the original reference pool
balance or 12.9% of the current note and certificate balance.
Moody's projected lifetime cumulative net losses on the reference
pool by assuming that 100% of the loans 60+ days past due, loans
in foreclosure and loans to bankrupt obligors eventually will
default.  Moody's also assumed that over the remaining term of the
transaction the current delinquency, bankruptcy, and foreclosure
amounts will be replicated two more times.  Based on these
assumptions, Moody's evaluated the remaining net losses against
the available credit enhancement provided by overcollateralization
and subordination.

If nonperforming loans increase from 0.97% to 1.05% of the current
reference pool balance, or the recoveries on defaulted loans are
less than 80%, the junior classes of notes would be under
downgrade pressure.

The primary source of uncertainty in the performance of this
transaction is the current macroeconomic environment and its
impact on farm revenues and real estate values in the states of
Oregon, Idaho, Washington and Montana, which are the largest
concentrations in this transaction.


NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf/LS4' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of notes issued by NewStar
Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1.  Fitch has also assigned Loss
Severity (LS) ratings to each class of notes. The rating actions
are:

  -- $318,612,902 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $18,628,312 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $24,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $58,500,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27,000,000 class D notes affirmed at 'BBB+sf/SL5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29,100,000 class E notes affirmed at 'BBsf/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative.

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance of the
underlying loan portfolio since Fitch's last rating review in
February 2009, in addition to the diversion of excess spread to
protect the notes against charged-off loans.  The notes of NewStar
2007-1 benefit from credit enhancement in the forms of collateral
coverage, note subordination, and the application of excess spread
via the additional principal amount (APA).  Upon the occurrence of
a loan charge off, the APA feature directs part or all of the
excess interest otherwise available to the subordinate notes to
pay down the senior-most notes in an amount equal to the aggregate
balance of charged off assets in the portfolio.

Although the underlying portfolio has experienced several charge-
offs since Fitch's last review, the structure has fully
compensated for any potential losses via the diversion of excess
spread.  The total commitment amount of charged-off loans was
reported at approximately $21 million as of the Aug. 13, 2010
servicer report, compared to $0 as of the Feb. 13, 2009 report.
As a result, between the May 2009 and February 2010 payment dates
approximately $21.7 million of excess spread was diverted to
redeem the senior notes, essentially eliminating the principal at
risk of the charged-off loans.  Fitch currently considers 16.9% of
the performing portfolio to be rated 'CCC+' or below, down from
18% at the last review.  Finally, the latest servicer report
indicates a portfolio weighted average spread of 4.9%, an
improvement from 4.1% as of the February 2009 report.  Fitch
believes that the current ratings remain indicative of the credit
enhancement and structural protection available to each class of
notes.

The Outlook for the class A-1, A-2, and B notes remains Stable due
to their relatively senior positions and the stable collateral
performance to date.  The Outlook for the class C, D, and E notes
remains Negative.  The roughly three years remaining in the
transaction's reinvestment period presents a longer risk horizon
for these notes.  In addition, the class C, D, and E notes will be
most vulnerable to the sizeable portion of underlying assets rated
'CCC+' or below.

Each class of notes has been assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The
LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.

NewStar 2007-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on June 5, 2007, and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.
(NewStar).  The transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to
end in May 2013.  NewStar 2007-1 is secured by a portfolio
comprised of 94.8% corporate loans, primarily to middle-market
issuers, and 5.2% commercial real estate loans.  Approximately
98.1% of the loans are first-lien, with the remaining 1.9%
representing second-lien positions.  The majority of these loans
are not publicly rated. Instead, Fitch provides model-based shadow
ratings for the performing loans.  Information for the model-based
shadow ratings was gathered from financial statements provided to
Fitch by NewStar.


NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Cuts $13.7MM of E Notes to 'BBsf/LS5'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes and downgraded one class
of notes issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1.  Fitch
has also revised several Rating Outlooks and assigned Loss
Severity ratings to each class of notes. The rating actions are:

  -- $308,964,375 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $5,160,890 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS2'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $22,500,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $35,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'Asf/LS4'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $25,000,000 class D notes affirmed at 'BBBsf/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13,750,000 class E notes downgraded to 'BBsf/LS5' from 'BBB-
     sf'; Outlook Negative.

The affirmations reflect the credit enhancement available to the
class A-1 and class A-2 notes (collectively, the class A notes)
and the class B, C, and D notes in the forms of collateral
coverage, note subordination, and the application of excess spread
via the additional principal amount (APA).  Upon the occurrence of
a loan charge off, the APA feature directs part or all of the
excess interest otherwise available to the subordinate notes to
pay down the senior-most notes in an amount equal to the aggregate
balance of charged off assets in the portfolio.

At the last payment date on June 30, 2010, approximately
$11.1 million of excess interest proceeds was paid toward class A
principal in payment of the APA. As the transaction remains in its
reinvestment period, this distribution represented the only
principal redemption of the class A notes to date, aside from some
minimal distributions from the class A-2 funding account.  The
availability of excess spread to redeem the senior notes has
helped mitigate the effects of the credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio on the class A, B, C, and D notes.  However,
Fitch has assigned Negative Outlooks to these notes to reflect the
deteriorating credit quality of the underlying portfolio.

The downgrade of the class E notes was driven by the negative
credit migration of the portfolio since Fitch's last rating review
in February 2009.  As of the June 13, 2010 servicer report, the
total commitment amount of charged-off loans was reported at
$22.8 million, compared to $0 as of the Dec. 13, 2008 report.  The
remaining APA, after accounting for recoveries received to date on
charged-off loans and the application of excess spread towards
class A principal, now stands at approximately $10 million.  Fitch
currently considers 33.2% of the performing portfolio to be rated
'CCC+' or below, up from 11.8% at the last review.  The Outlook
remains Negative for the class E notes.

Each class of notes has been assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The
LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.

NewStar 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on June 8, 2006, and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.
(NewStar).  The transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to
end in June 2011.  NewStar 2006-1 is secured by a portfolio
comprised of 95.1% corporate loans, primarily to middle-market
issuers, and 4.9% commercial real estate loans.  Approximately
97.8% of the loans are first-lien, with the remaining 2.2%
representing second-lien positions.  The majority of these loans
are not publicly rated.  Instead, Fitch provides model-based
shadow ratings for the performing loans.  Information for the
model-based shadow ratings was gathered from financial statements
provided to Fitch by NewStar.


NEWSTAR TRUST: Fitch Cuts $24MM of Class E Notes to 'CCsf/RR5'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three and downgraded three classes of
notes issued by NewStar Trust 2005-1.  Fitch has also revised
several Rating Outlooks and assigned a Loss Severity (LS) rating
or a Recovery Rating (RR) to each class of notes. The rating
actions are:

  -- $97,505,573 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $49,774,735 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $18,682,557 class B notes affirmed at 'AAsf/LS5'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $39,233,370 class C notes downgraded to 'BBsf/LS4' from
     'Asf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $24,287,324 class D notes downgraded to 'CCCsf/RR2' from
     'BBB-sf';

  -- $24,287,324 class E notes downgraded to 'CCsf/RR5' from
     'Bsf'.

The affirmations reflect the credit enhancement available to the
class A-1 and class A-2 notes (collectively, the class A notes)
and the class B notes in the forms of collateral coverage, note
subordination, and the application of excess spread via the
additional principal amount (APA).  Upon the occurrence of a loan
charge off, the APA feature directs part or all of the excess
interest otherwise available to the subordinate notes to pay down
the senior-most notes in an amount equal to the aggregate balance
of charged off assets in the portfolio.

At the last payment date on July 26, 2010, approximately
$36.3 million was paid toward class A principal, of which
$2.4 million represented excess interest proceeds.  To date, Fitch
calculates that approximately $9.3 million of excess interest
proceeds have been used to pay class A principal.  In total, the
class A notes have been paid down 37.7% of their initial principal
balance, with the majority of the paydowns occurring since Fitch's
last rating review in February 2009.  The principal redemption of
the class A notes has resulted in increased credit enhancement
levels for both the class A and class B notes, helping to mitigate
the credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.

The downgrades of the class C, class D, and class E notes were
driven by the continuing negative credit migration that has
occurred since Fitch's last rating review in February 2009.  As of
the July 13, 2010 servicer report, the total commitment amount of
charged-off loans was reported at $42.1 million, compared to $0 as
of the Jan. 13, 2009 report.  The remaining APA, after accounting
for recoveries received to date on charged-off loans and the
application of excess spread towards class A principal, now stands
at $32.1 million.  Fitch currently considers 49.7% of the
performing portfolio to be rated 'CCC+' or below, up from 32.1% at
the last review.

Fitch recognizes the risks associated with the significant
concentration of commercial real estate loans in the underlying
portfolio.  Exposure to this troubled sector represents
approximately 31.3% of the performing portfolio.  Additionally,
Fitch recognizes the increasing obligor concentration in the
underlying portfolio, as 45 performing obligors and five charged-
off obligors remain.  Due to these risk factors, Fitch has
assigned Negative Outlooks to all of the notes.

The class A, B, and C notes have been assigned Loss Severity
ratings.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity
Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.

The class D and E notes were each assigned a Recovery Rating based
on the total discounted future cash flows projected to be
available to these bonds in a base-case default scenario.
Discounted cash flows for the class D notes of approximately
$17.9 million yielded an ultimate recovery projection in a range
between 71% and 90%.  Discounted cash flows for the class E notes
of approximately $4.5 million yielded an ultimate recovery
projection in a range between 11% and 30%.  These recovery
estimates are representative of an 'RR2' and an 'RR5',
respectively, on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.  Recovery Ratings
are designed to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries
on currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities
rated 'CCC' or below.  For further detail on Recovery Ratings, see
Fitch's reports 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' and
'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

NewStar 2005-1 is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
Aug. 10, 2005, and is managed by NewStar Financial, Inc.  The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in October 2008.  NewStar
2005-1 is secured by a portfolio comprised of 68.7% corporate
loans, primarily to middle-market issuers, and 31.3% commercial
real estate loans.  Approximately 96.1% of the loans are first-
lien, with the remaining 3.9% representing second-lien positions.
The majority of these loans are not publicly rated.  Instead,
Fitch provides model-based shadow ratings for the performing
loans. Information for the model-based shadow ratings was gathered
from financial statements provided to Fitch by NewStar.


NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Two Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings withdraws the ratings on notes from NextStudent
Master Trust I auction-rate student loan-backed notes series 2006-
1 and series 2007-1.  The underlying collateral has been
liquidated at the request of the investors following an event of
default.

Fitch withdraws the following ratings which were placed on Rating
Watch Negative on March 30, 2010:

  -- Series 2006A-1 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-2 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-3 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-4 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-5 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-6 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-7 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-8 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-1 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-2 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-3 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-4 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-5 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-6 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-7 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-8 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-9 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-10 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-11 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-12 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-13 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-14 notes 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-15 notes 'BBB'.
  -- Series 2006B-1 notes 'B';
  -- Series 2007B-1 notes 'B'.


NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23 classes
of senior notes from NextStudent Master Trust I.  The original
underlying collateral consisted of loans originated under the
Federal Family Education Loan Program, i.e. government guaranteed
student loans.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades of the senior notes were prompted by the
acceleration and liquidation of the student loan collateral
following several events of default under the trust indenture.
Proceeds from the sale of the underlying collateral at an auction,
which took place on July 21, 2010, were applied to repay
approximately 93.6% of the senior notes outstanding at the time.
After the September 10 2010 payment date, approximately $98.8
million of the senior notes and $80.6 million of the subordinates
notes remained outstanding.  Neither classes of notes are accruing
any interest.  The securitization trust has small claims against
NextStudent Inc., the original master servicer and administrator
of the trust, and another transaction party.  Although these
amounts would be used to reduce a portion of the senior notes, a
full repayment of the notes is not possible.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Ratings

  -- 2006A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2006A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2007A-15, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 9, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


NORTH STREET: S&P Downgrades Class G Notes Ratings to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
G notes issued by North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2005-7
Ltd., a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, to 'CC (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes from the
same transaction.

The downgrade follows a number of write-downs in the underlying
reference portfolio, which has caused the class G notes to incur
partial principal losses.


OCWEN RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 1998-R1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3
certificates, backed by reperforming residential mortgage loans,
issued by Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1998-R1.

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1998-R1

  -- B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 26, 1998
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 27, 2004
     Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 27, 2004
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the deterioration in the
performance of the underlying mortgage pool backing the
transaction.

The collateral backing this transaction consists of fully
amortizing loans originated under one of the insurance programs of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Following default, these loans were repurchased by HUD and
subsequently sold in a series of public auctions.

Moody's estimated loss on the underlying mortgage pool by
multiplying lifetime pipeline loss expected from the related pool
by a factor of 1.75.  The lifetime pipeline loss was derived based
on lifetime roll rates to default of 85% for 60-day delinquencies,
95% for 90+ day delinquencies, 100% for loans in foreclosure, and
100% for loans where the homes are held-for-sale, each applied
with a severity assumption of 90%.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss level on
rated certificates, Moody's analyzed each certificate's loss
coverage ratio based on subordination compared to the updated pool
loss.  The certificates that do not have enough loss coverage
ratio to maintain current ratings based on the new loss level have
been downgraded.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

As a part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the
expected loss on the collateral pool by an additional 10% and
found that ratings on the certificates do not change.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Junks Three Certificate Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed eight classes of PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C2 as
follows:

* Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 23,
   2000 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* US$18.230M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
   on April 4, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

* US$48.423M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
   on Oct. 10, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

* US$13.452M Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
   on July 9, 2007 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

* US$13.451M Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
   on Sept. 25, 2008 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

* US$18.831M Cl. F Certificate, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on Sept. 25, 2008 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

* US$16.141M Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously
   on Sept. 25, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

* US$18.832M Cl. H Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously
   on Oct. 3, 2007 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

* US$29.592M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
   on Oct. 3, 2007 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

* US$8.071M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously
   on Oct. 23, 2000 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

* US$8.071M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously
   on Oct. 23, 2000 Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

* US$10.761M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Oct. 23, 2000 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* US$5.380M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
   on Oct. 23, 2000 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and poorly performing loans, interest shortfalls and
refinance risk associated with loans maturing in an adverse
economic environment.  Twenty-three loans, or 75% of the non-
defeased pool, have or will mature within the next 36 months.
Eight of these loans, representing 37% of the pool, have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their existing
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
15.4% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.3%. Moody's stressed scenario loss is
18.6% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base and stress scenario losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in rating PNC Mortgage Acceptance
Corp., Series 2000-C2 were "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Conduit
Transactions" published in September 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July
2000.  Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herf score, a measure of loan level
diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and
has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations
and correlations may be considered in our analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying
ratings in the same transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses
the Excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and
weights the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 3, 2007.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the August 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 79% to
$223.82 million from $1.08 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 35 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 65% of the pool.  One loan, representing 5% of the
pool, has defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. Defeasance at last review represented 28% of the pool.

Ten loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7.16 million.  Sixteen loans,
representing 56% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the AppleTree Business Park
Loan, which is secured by a 435,000 square foot office complex
located in Cheektowaga, New York, a suburb of Buffalo.  The loan
was transferred into special servicing in June 2010 due to
imminent default.  The loan has passed its September 1, 2010
anticipated repayment date (ARD) and is current.  The property was
90% leased as of March 2010, compared to 84% at last full review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 4351 N Atlantic
Road Loan, which is secured by a 236,770 square foot single tenant
office building located in Auburn Hills, Michigan.  Continental
Teves leases 192,200 square feet of the space through July 2020.
The loan transferred into special servicing in June 2010 due to
the borrower's inability to repay the loan at maturity in July
2010.  The borrower has been working to refinance the loan and is
marketing the property for sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Northside
Marketplace Loan, which is secured by a 189,299 square foot retail
property located in Nashville, Tennessee.  The loan transferred
into special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent payment
default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.  The loan passed an
anticipated repayment date of September 1, 2010 and the borrower
is seeking a loan modification.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, hotel, retail and multifamily properties. The master
servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.2 million appraisal
reduction for four of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $30.4 million loss (32% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.1 million loss from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes M through O
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $1.0
million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial-year 2010
operating results for 94% and 21%, respectively, of the non-
defeased pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 83% compared to 79% at Moody's
prior full review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14.4% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.17X and 1.45X, respectively, compared to
1.29X and 1.42X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 35 at Moody's prior full review.
The decline in Herf has been partially offset by increased credit
support due to loan payoffs and amortization. The pool has paid
down 57% since Moody's last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Sweetheart Cup Distribution
Center Loan, which is secured by a 1.03 million square foot
industrial building located in Hampstead, Maryland.  The property
is fully occupied by a single tenant, Solo Cup Company, through
July 2020.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review and is on
the watchlist due to an anticipated repayment date of October 1,
2010.  Although property performance has been stable since
securitization, Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow due
to a challenged refinance environment and our concerns about
single tenant exposure.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and
1.34X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.30X at last review.

The second largest loan is The Waterford at Portage Loan, which is
secured by two multifamily properties located in Akron, Ohio.
This loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
low DSCR.  Property performance has declined primarily due to
increased operating expenses and a decline in occupancy.  The
properties are currently 87% occupied compared to 90% at last full
review.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review and matures
in July 2015.  Moody's believes that there is a high probability
that this loan may default prior to loan maturity.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 151% and 0.68X, respectively, compared to
117% and 0.88X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Waterford at Spencer Oaks Apartments
Loan, which is secured by a multifamily property located in
Denton, Texas.  This loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low DSCR.  Property performance remains in line
with Moody's last full review and as of May 2010, the property was
92% leased, compared to 86% at last full review.  The loan has
amortized 4% since last review and matures in June 2015.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 1.01X, respectively, compared
to 107% and 0.94X at last review.


RFC CDO: Deterioration in Credit Quality Cues Moody's Junk Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 14 classes of Notes issued by RFC CDO 2007-
1, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted
average rating factor, and increase in Defaulted Interest.  The
rating action, which concludes our review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

* Cl. A-1 Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 13,
   2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-1R Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 13,
   2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 13,
   2009 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2R Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 13,
   2009 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. B Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. C Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. D Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. E Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. F Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. G Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. H Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. J Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. K Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. L Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RFC CDO 2007-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
of whole loans, B-Notes, commercial mortgage backed securities,
mezzanine loans and collateralized debt obligation.  As of the
July 30, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $919.8 million from $1 billion at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A-1 and A-1R
Notes, as a result of failing the Class A/B, Class C/D/E, and
Class F/G/H Par Value Tests.

There are twenty-three assets with par balance of $262.6 million
that are considered Defaulted Interest as of the July 30, 2010
Trustee report.  Moody's expects significant losses from those
Defaulted Interest to occur once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated collateral.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
eliminating the additional default probability stress applied to
corporate debt in CDOROM v2.6 as we expect the underlying non-
CUSIP collateral to experience lower default rates and higher
recovery compared to corporate debt due to the nature of the
secured real estate collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,097 compared to 4,434 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is as follows: Baa1-Baa3, Ba1-Ba3, B1-B3, and Caa1-C.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 2.5
years compared to 8.0 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 29.8% compared to 34.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool.  For non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is
reducing the maximum over concentration stress applied to
correlation factors by half due to the diversity of tenants,
property types, and geographic locations inherent in the
collateral pools.  Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0% compared to
15.2% at last review.  The high MAC is due to the increase of
very-high risk collateral concentrated within a small number of
collateral names.

The principal methodologies used in rating RFC CDO 2007-1, Ltd.,
were "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Revolving Facilities in CDOs
Backed by Commercial Real Estate Interests" published in July
2004, and "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in August
2009.  Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.  When determining default timing in Moody's analysis of cash
flow of this transaction, Moody's assumed a delay in the default
timing to better reflect its expectation of how the underlying
real estate collateral will perform in this commercial real estate
downturn.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 29.8% to 20.6% or up to 40.9% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 4 notches downward
and 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take a rating action is dependent on an assessment of
a range of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.  Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the
current stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness
in the commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's
currently views the commercial real estate market as stressed with
further performance declines expected in a majority of property
sectors.  The availability of debt capital is improving with terms
returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price
stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-
shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to
trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent
unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ROGER WILLIAMS: S&P Lowers $13MM Reveunue Bonds Ratings to BB-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'BB-'
from 'BB' on Rhode Island Health & Educational Building Corp.'s
remaining $13.0 million series 1998 revenue bonds, issued for
Roger Williams Hospital (renamed Roger Williams Medical Center
effective Jan. 4, 2010).

The outlook is negative based on Standard & Poor's assessment of
the organization's decreasing revenue and volumes through the
fiscal 2010 interim period (nine months ended June 30, 2010),
uncertain economic factors, as well as the organization's thin and
declining liquidity.

Roger Williams' financial operating performance improved gradually
from fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2009 (excluding one-time expenses);
however, management indicates fiscal 2010 year-end results, while
expected to be break-even, will vary negatively from fiscal 2009.
While management is focused on reducing costs through
efficiencies, the organization's declining revenues and volumes
are, in Standard & Poor's view, a negative credit consideration.
Standard & Poor's believes these factors are magnified by
uncertain economic issues, including imminent Medicaid cuts, which
are currently unknown, and general recessionary pressures that
have likely contributed to the declining volume.  In addition,
Standard & Poor's believes Roger Williams' liquidity continues to
be thin for the rating, with a balance of approximately
$13.0 million in unrestricted cash, or just 27 days' coverage of
annual operating expenses available to support the organization.

In Standard & Poor's opinion, offsetting credit factors include
Roger Williams' light level of debt, with a moderate cash-to-debt
ratio of 56% through the interim period of fiscal 2010, although
down from 71% at the close of fiscal 2009, and a low debt burden
ratio of 1.9%.

"If Roger Williams' financial operations further decline, or if
liquidity were to decrease, we would consider a lower rating,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jennifer Soule.  "To return
to a stable outlook, we believe Roger Williams will need to meet
or favorably exceed its budgeted expectations through fiscal 2010
and into fiscal 2011, with no further decline in liquidity," said
Ms. Soule.

Standard & Poor's would consider a higher rating over the coming
years, if Roger Williams achieves a trend of operational and
balance sheet improvement on target with management's budgeted
expectations, which may take several years for the organization to
achieve.  Standard & Poor's would view any additional debt
negatively; however, management indicates they do not have any
additional debt plans at this time.

Roger Williams and St. Joseph Health Services (B-/Negative) became
part of a holding company named CharterCARE Health Partners on
Jan. 4, 2010.  Roger Williams Medical Center, which does not
provide obstetric or pediatric services, operates a 220-licensed-
bed acute-care hospital in Providence, R.I.  The medical center is
affiliated with a nursing home and a real estate holding
corporation.


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 6
certificates, backed by reperforming residential mortgage loans,
issued by Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Series
1997-HUD1.

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Series
1997-HUD1

  -- A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 30, 1997
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- A-WAC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 30, 1997
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 30, 1997
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2004
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2004
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 18, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the deterioration in the
performance of the underlying mortgage pool backing the
transaction.

The collateral backing this transaction consists of fully
amortizing loans originated under one of the insurance programs of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Following default, these loans were repurchased by HUD and
subsequently sold in a series of public auctions.

Moody's estimated loss on the underlying mortgage pool by
multiplying lifetime pipeline loss expected from the related pool
by a factor of 1.75.  The lifetime pipeline loss was derived based
on lifetime roll rates to default of 85% for 60-day delinquencies,
95% for 90+ day delinquencies, 100% for loans in foreclosure, and
100% for loans where the homes are held-for-sale, each applied
with a severity assumption of 90%.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss level on
rated certificates, Moody's analyzed each certificate's loss
coverage ratio based on subordination compared to updated pool
loss.  The certificates that do not have enough loss coverage
ratio to maintain current ratings based on the new loss level have
been downgraded.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If the expected loss on the collateral pool were to increase by
10%, the ratings of classes A-4, A-WAC, and IO will change from B1
to B2, the rating of class B-1 will change from Caa3 to Ca, and
the ratings of classes B-2 and B-3 will remain unchanged.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


SECURTIZED ASSET: Moody's Puts Junk Class M-1 Cert. On Review
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
tranche, confirmed the rating of one tranche, and upgraded the
rating of one tranche from Securitized Asset Backed Receivables
LLC Trust 2006-FR1.  The collateral backing this deal primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime
residential mortgages.

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR1

* Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
   (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The actions reflect the continued performance deterioration in
Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and unemployment
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued from 2005 to
2007.  Classes A-1 and A-2C were upgraded and confirmed,
respectively, primary due to strong credit enhancement relative to
expected pool losses.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation, the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The principal methodology used in rating these securities was
"Subprime RMBS Loss Projection Update: February 2010", rating
methodology published in February 2010.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issuer can also be found on Moody's website.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the collateral pool were to increase by
about 7.5%, model implied results indicate that most of the deal's
ratings would remain stable, with the exception of Classes M-1,
for which the model indicated result would be Ca.


ST. JOSEPH HEALTH: S&P Downgrades Rating on $18.7MM Bonds to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'B-' from
'BB-' on Rhode Island Health and Educational Building Corp.'s
$18.7 million series 1999 bonds issued for St. Joseph Health
Services.

The lower rating reflects Standard & Poor's belief that St.
Joseph's volatile operating performance and declining financial
profile is more indicative of a 'B-' credit rating. Through the
first nine months of fiscal 2010 (interim period ended June 30,
2010), St. Joseph realized an operating loss that significantly
varied from management's budgeted expectations, which it
attributed to declining utilization in both its inpatient and
outpatient lines of service.

The 'B-' rating further reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of
St. Joseph's limited balance sheet with continued declines in the
organization's already minimal liquidity and the competitive Rhode
Island service area, which is dominated by 'A' rated Lifespan.

"In our opinion, the outlook remains negative due to various
financial uncertainties, including the success or failure of the
organization's recovery plans, future revenue and volume-growth
potential, and pending information on the magnitude of imminent
Medicaid cuts," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jennifer
Soule.  "In addition, it is our understanding St. Joseph will
violate its debt service coverage bond covenant based on fiscal
2010 financial results," said Ms. Soule.

Standard & Poor's considers the organization's liquidity weak for
the current rating.  Over the next one to two years, it is our
expectation St. Joseph will achieve management's identified cost
savings and work toward profitable operations and positive cash
flows.  If this holds true, Standard & Poor's could consider
returning the outlook to stable.  It is also our expectation
that volumes and revenues will stabilize over that period as well.
However, if St. Joseph's financial profile were to deteriorate
further, Standard & Poor's would consider a lower rating.

St. Joseph Health Services operates 249-staffed beds on one campus
at Our Lady of Fatima Hospital in North Providence and 94 beds at
St. Joseph Hospital for Specialty Care in Providence.


T2 INCOME: Improved Credit Quality Cues Moody's Rating Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd.:

* U.S. $22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable
   Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 30,
   2009 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

* U.S. $9,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
   Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 30,
   2009 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

* U.S. $12,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
   Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 30,
   2009 Upgraded to B3 (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in July 2009.  Based on the
August 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
2995 compared to 3691 in July 2009, and securities rated Caa1 and
below make up approximately 13.39% of the underlying portfolio
versus 20.37% in July 2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease
in defaults. In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities has decreased to about $5 million from approximately
$8 million in July 2009.  In Moody's view, these positive
developments coincide with reinvestment of principal proceeds into
substitute assets with higher ratings.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
increased since the last rating action.  The Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
143.12%, 129.30%, 124.39% and 118.39%, respectively, versus July
2009 levels of 142.08%, 128.36%, 123.49% and 117.53%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $289.87 million, defaulted par of $7.58 million,
weighted average default probability of 30.15%, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 43.50%, and a diversity score of 25.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends, and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in rating T2 Income Fund CLO I,
Ltd., was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2009.  Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issuer can also be found on Moody's
website.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including the following:

1. Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2. A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities on all rated notes, assuming that all other factors
are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3238)

* Class A: 0
* Class B: +2
* Class C: +2
* Class D: +2
* Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4856)

* Class A: -1
* Class B: -2
* Class C: -2
* Class D: -2
* Class E: -1

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes, assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.50%)

* Class A: 0
* Class B: 0
* Class C: 0
* Class D: 0
* Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.50%)

* Class A: 0
* Class B: 0
* Class C: -1
* Class D: -1
* Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by:

1. uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and

2. the large concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing
    between 2012 and 2014 which may create challenges for issuers
    to refinance.

CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by:

1. the managers' investment strategies and behavior and

2. divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
    different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.



TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Ratings on Bond-Backed Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+ (sf)' ratings
on TIERS Corporate Bond-Backed Certificates Trust MOT 1998-5's
$117.866 million class Amort and ZTF certificates on CreditWatch
with positive implications.

S&P's ratings on the class Amort and ZTF certificates are
dependent on its rating on the underlying security, Motorola
Inc.'s 5.22% notes due Oct. 1, 2097 ('BB+/Watch Pos').

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's Sept. 2, 2010, placement
of its 'BB+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S& may take subsequent rating actions on
the class Amort and ZTF certificates due to changes in its ratings
assigned to the underlying security.


TRAPEZA CDO: Moody's Corrects Ratings Assigned on Class A-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's adjusts the rating of US$53,000,000 Class A-2 Second
Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2041 to Caa2 (sf).
Revised release:

Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded notes
issued by Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd.:

  -- US$281,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance of
     $264,558,690), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$53,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance of
     $53,000,000), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance of
     $25,431,713), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd., issued in November 8, 2006, is a collateral
debt obligation backed by a managed portfolio of bank, insurance,
and REIT trust preferred securities.  On March 27, 2009, Moody's
downgraded 5 classes of notes as a result of the application of
revised and updated key modeling assumptions, as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.

Moody's indicated that the rating actions on the notes are
primarily the result from the increase in the assumed defaulted
amount, as evidenced by $37.37 million additional defaults of the
trust preferred securities held in the portfolio since the last
rating action and an increase in the WARF from 2310 (March 27,
2009) to 2896 (September 9, 2010).  The par loss due to the
increase in the assumed defaulted amount has resulted in loss of
overcollateralization for the tranches affected and an increase of
their expected losses since the last rating action.  In addition,
the overcollateralization tests continue to breach their triggers
which has resulted in a diversion of excess spreads to pay down
senior notes.  As of the latest trustee report dated July 31,
2010, the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 109.65%, 101.95%,
93.22%, 85.63%, 81.87%, 77.70%, respectively, versus March 27,
2009 levels of 129.41%, 120.72%, 110.90%, 102.34%, 98.19%, 94.00%,
respectively.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  According
to FDIC data, 118 U.S. banks have failed to date this year, while
140 banks failed in 2009, as compared to 25 in all of 2008.  In
Moody's opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain
negative while insurance and REIT are stabilizing with the
exception to commercial P&C insurance and healthcare and lodging
REITs which remain negative.

Moody's also gave consideration to the Event of Default analysis
for Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd.  Although Trapeza CDO XI, Ltd. has not
declared an Event of Default to date, Moody's notes the current
Class A Overcollateralization level is 109.65%.  The transaction
would declare an Event of Default if this level falls below 100%.
Since this transaction is close to triggering an Event of Default,
additional modeling scenarios were considered in this case
assuming that acceleration has been declared.

Cumulative assumed defaults now total $169.62 million, 34.10% of
the portfolio, $37.37 million of which have occurred since the
previous rating action.  All the assumed defaulted assets are
carried at zero recovery in Moody's analysis.  The remaining
assets in the portfolio have also suffered credit deterioration,
with now 41.58% of the portfolio estimated to be Baa2 or below, as
determined using FDIC Q1-2010 financial data in conjunction with
Moody's RiskCalc model to assess non-publicly rated bank trust
preferred securities.  Similarly, 14.72% of the remaining assets
in the portfolio are estimated to be Baa3 or below by Moody's
Insurance team using insurance companies reported financial data.
Finally, 18.22% of the remaining performing assets in the
portfolio are REIT TRUPs with an estimated rating of Ba2 or below
by Moody's REIT team using REIT companies reported financial data.

Given the current market conditions, Moody's have assumed in
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis that there are no
amortizations and thus, the WAL of the portfolio is around 26.
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis are described in Moody's
Rating Methodology publication titled "Moody's Approach To Rating
U.S. Bank Trust Preferred Security CDOs", June 2010, under
Appendix A (page 8).

The portfolios of these CDOs are mainly composed of trust
preferred securities issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community bank, insurance companies and REITs that are generally
not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's derives credit scores for these non-publicly rated assets
and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to their
volatility, as described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in rated Transactions",
October 2009.  The effect of the stress testing of these credit
scores may vary between 1 and 3 notches, depending on the total
amount and relative size of these securities in the collateral
pool.

Moody's evaluation of this transaction relies on financial data
received for a majority of obligors in the pool as of Q1-2010.
This financial data is used by Moody's to assess the credit
quality of obligors in the pool, relying on RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV.  The results obtained
from the RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating
scale and adjusted by one notch where necessary in order to
compensate for the absence of credit indicators such as rating
reviews, outlooks and adjustments factoring in cyclical
developments in the economy.  Moody's also incorporated
information provided by the manager in the latest investor report
to account for more recent information on the performance of the
underlying obligors.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  Among those key
factors, consideration was made of further increase and decrease
in the assumed defaulted assets in the model results.  The effect
of increasing the assumed defaulted amount by $33 million equated
to an expected loss that is two notches below the one modeled
under the base case with the current assumed defaulted amount at
$170 million.  Conversely, decreasing the assumed defaulted amount
by $33 million resulted to an expected loss that is three notches
above the one modeled under the base case.  In addition, the
sensitivity of the model results to increases and decreases to the
WARF (representing a slight improvement and a slight deterioration
of the credit quality of the collateral pool) was examined
resulting in an expected loss that is one notch below the one
modeled under the base case for Class A-1 when the WARF is
increased by 304 points from the base case of 2896.  Not so
similarly, the WARF needed to drop by 196 points from the base
case in order to yield an expected loss that is one notch above
the one modeled under the base case.

Additional sources of uncertainty to the evaluation assumptions
result from continued negative outlook of the underlying
collateral portfolio sectors, especially in the banking industry
where Moody's anticipate more banks closure by FDIC in 2010
compared to previous years.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include, among other
elements, an assessment of the collateral manager track record and
practices.  In particular, Moody's looked at the quality of
information provided by the manager, its interpretation of the
documentation and level of diligence in the implementation of the
transaction criteria.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's
rating approach, using CDOROMTM v.2.6 to develop the loss
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained.  This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge.  CDOROMTM v.2.6 is available on
moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon
return of a signed free license agreement.


TRAPEZA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Fives Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded notes
issued by Trapeza CDO X, Ltd. The notes affected by the rating
action are:

  -- US$268,000,000 Class A-1 (current balance of
     $249,663,961.59), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$69,000,000 Class A-2 (current balance of $69,000,000),
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf);

  -- US$31,000,000 Class B (current balance of $31,218,375.37),
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf);

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C-1 (current balance of $22,186,534.54),
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf);

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C-2 (current balance of $40,014,170.66),
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd. is a collateral debt obligation backed by a
portfolio of Bank, Insurance and REIT trust preferred securities
and it was issued in June, 15, 2006.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action on the notes is
the result of a significant increase in the defaults and deferrals
on the trust preferred securities held in the portfolio and the
deterioration of the overall credit quality of the remaining
portfolio.  Such negative performance has been observed through
numerous factors, including a decline in the average credit rating
of the portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted
average rating factor) and an increase in the assumed amount of
defaults.  Since the last rating action on March 27, 2009, the
Weighted Average Rating Factor has increased by 122 from 2133
(March 27, 2009) to 2255 (September 3, 2010).  Additionally, there
were approximately $53.62 million of additional assumed defaults
in this transaction.

The par loss due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount
has resulted in loss of overcollateralization for the rated
tranches.  In addition, the overcollateralization tests continue
to breach their triggers, resulting in a diversion of excess
spreads to pay down senior notes.  As of the latest trustee report
dated July 31, 2010, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios were reported at 115.432%, 105.132%,
89.263% and 79.322%, respectively, versus previous levels of
134.85%, 123.16%, 106.06% and 95.27%, respectively at the time of
last rating actions.

The credit deterioration in these portfolios is a reflection of
the continued distress in some part of the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by regional and community banks continued to
increase.  According to FDIC data, 118 U.S. banks have failed so
far this year, while 140 banks failed in 2009, as compared to 25
in all of 2008.  In Moody's opinion, the banking sector outlook
continues to remain negative while insurance and REIT are
stabilizing with the exception to commercial P&C insurance and
healthcare and lodging REITs which remain negative.

Moody's notes that the cumulative assumed defaults in this
transaction now total $184.17 million or 37.66% of the portfolio,
$53.62 million of which have occurred since the previous rating
action.  All the assumed defaulted assets are carried at zero
recovery in Moody's analysis.  The remaining performing assets in
the portfolio have also suffered credit deterioration.  76% of the
portfolio are bank TruPS with an estimated rating of Ba1 (sf) or
below, as determined using FDIC Q1-2010 financial data in
conjunction with Moody's RiskCalc model.  0.70% of the remaining
portfolio are insurance TruPS with an estimated rating of Ba2 (sf)
or below by Moody's Insurance team using insurance companies
reported financial data.  Finally, 23.3% of the remaining
performing assets in the portfolio are REIT TruPS with an
estimated rating of B3 (sf) or below by Moody's REIT team using
REIT companies reported financial data.

Given the current market conditions, Moody's have assumed in
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis that there are no
amortizations and the WAL of the portfolio is around 26 years.
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis are described in Moody's
Rating Methodology publication titled "Moody's Approach To Rating
U.S. Bank Trust Preferred Security CDOs", June 2010, under
Appendix A (page 8).

The portfolios of these CDOs are mainly composed of trust
preferred securities issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community bank, insurance companies and REITs that are generally
not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's derives credit scores for these non-publicly rated assets
and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to their
volatility, as described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in rated Transactions",
October 2009.  The effect of the stress testing of these credit
scores may vary between 1 and 3 notches, depending on the total
amount and relative size of these securities in the collateral
pool.

Moody's evaluation of this transaction relies on financial data
received for a majority of bank obligors in the pool as of
Q1_2010.  This financial data is used by Moody's to assess the
credit quality of obligors in the pool, using RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV.  The results obtained
from the RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating
scale and adjusted by one notch where necessary in order to
compensate for the absence of credit indicators such as rating
reviews, outlooks and adjustments factoring in cyclical
developments in the economy.  Moody's also incorporated
information provided by the manager in the latest investor report
to account for more recent information on the performance of the
underlying obligors.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses on some of the
key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity analysis
includes further increase and decrease to the WARF (representing a
slight improvement and a slight deterioration of the credit
quality of the collateral pool) and the results indicate a one-
notch downward movement on Class A1 when WARF was increased by 445
and a one-notch upward movement when the WARF was decreased by
255.  In addition, a decrease of 1% in the WAC or 0.5% in the WAS
of the collateral pool resulted in one notch downward movement on
the Class A1 notes.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include, among other
elements, an assessment of the collateral manager track record and
practices.  In particular, Moody's looked at the quality of
information provided by the manager, its interpretation of the
documentation and level of diligence in the implementation of the
transaction criteria.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's asset correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.6,
according to Moody's rating approach, to develop the loss
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained.  This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge.  CDOROM v.2.6 is available on moodys.com
under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon return of
a signed free license agreement.


TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded notes
issued by Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd.:

  -- US$194,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of
     $185,089,698), Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of
     $26,000,000), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd., issued in August 11, 2005, is a collateral
debt obligation backed by a managed portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.  On March 27, 2009, Moody's
downgraded 5 classes of notes as a result of the application of
revised and updated key modelling assumptions, as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.

Moody's indicated that the rating actions on the notes are
primarily the result from the increase in the assumed defaulted
amount since the last rating action, as evidenced by
$30.10 million additional defaults of the trust preferred
securities held in the portfolio, and an increase in the WARF from
1526 (March 27, 2009) to 1690 (September 9, 2010).  The par loss
due to the increase in the assumed defaulted amount has resulted
in loss of overcollateralization for the tranches affected and an
increase of their expected losses since the last rating action.
In addition, the overcollateralization tests continue to breach
their triggers which has resulted in a diversion of excess spreads
to pay down senior notes.  As of the latest trustee report dated
August 10, 2010, the Class A and Class B overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 123.91% and 95.34%, respectively, versus
March 27, 2009 levels of 133.86% and 103.60%, respectively.

The credit deterioration exhibited by these portfolios is a
reflection of the continued pressure in the banking sector as the
number of bank failures and interest deferrals of trust preferred
securities issued by banks has continued to increase.  According
to FDIC data, 118 U.S. banks have failed to date this year, while
140 banks failed in 2009, as compared to 25 in all of 2008.  In
Moody's opinion, the banking sector outlook continues to remain
negative while insurance and REIT are stabilizing with the
exception to commercial P&C insurance and healthcare and lodging
REITs, which remain negative.

Cumulative assumed defaults now total $56.82 million, 16% of the
portfolio, $30.1 million of which have occurred since the previous
rating action.  All the assumed defaulted assets are carried at
zero recovery in Moody's analysis.  The remaining assets in the
portfolio have also suffered credit deterioration, with now 52.09%
of the portfolio estimated to be Baa2 or below, as determined
using FDIC Q1-2010 financial data in conjunction with Moody's
RiskCalc model to assess non-publicly rated bank trust preferred
securities.  Similarly, 36.30% of the remaining non-publicly rated
assets in the portfolio are estimated to be Baa3 or below by
Moody's Insurance team using insurance companies reported
financial data.

Given the current market conditions, Moody's have assumed in
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis that there are no
amortizations and thus, the WAL of the portfolio is around 25.
Moody's cash-flow modeling analysis are described in Moody's
Rating Methodology publication titled "Moody's Approach To Rating
U.S. Bank Trust Preferred Security CDOs", June 2010, under
Appendix A (page 8).

The portfolios of these CDOs are mainly composed of trust
preferred securities issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community bank, insurance companies and REITs that are generally
not publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's derives credit scores for these non-publicly rated assets
and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to their
volatility, as described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in rated Transactions",
October 2009.  The effect of the stress testing of these credit
scores may vary between 1 and 3 notches, depending on the total
amount and relative size of these securities in the collateral
pool.

Moody's evaluation of this transaction relies on financial data
received for a majority of obligors in the pool as of Q1-2010.
This financial data is used by Moody's to assess the credit
quality of obligors in the pool, relying on RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV.  The results obtained
from the RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating
scale and adjusted by one notch where necessary in order to
compensate for the absence of credit indicators such as rating
reviews, outlooks and adjustments factoring in cyclical
developments in the economy.  Moody's also incorporated
information provided by the manager in the latest investor report
to account for more recent information on the performance of the
underlying obligors.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to some of the key factors driving the ratings.  The sensitivity
of the model results to increases and decreases to the WARF
(representing a slight improvement and a slight deterioration of
the credit quality of the collateral pool) was examined resulting
in an expected loss that is one notch below the one modeled under
the base case for Class A-1 when the WARF is increased by 160
points from the base case of 1690.  Not so similarly, the WARF
needed to drop by 290 points from the base case in order to yield
an expected loss that is one notch above the one modeled under the
base case.  Additionally, the effects of higher and lower spread
and coupon rates of the collateral pool resulted in these:
Increasing the spread to an average spread of 2.3% and coupon rate
to an average coupon rate of 7.2% yielded an expected loss that is
one notch below the one modeled under the base case.  Conversely,
decreasing the spread and coupon by the same magnitude from the
base case to 1.5% and 5.5%, respectively, resulted in an expected
loss that is one notch above the one modeled under the base case
for Class A-1.

Additional sources of uncertainty to the evaluation assumptions
result from continued negative outlook of the underlying
collateral portfolio sectors, especially in the banking industry
where Moody's anticipate more banks closure by FDIC in 2010
compared to previous years.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include, among other
elements, an assessment of the collateral manager track record and
practices.  In particular, Moody's looked at the quality of
information provided by the manager, its interpretation of the
documentation and level of diligence in the implementation of the
transaction criteria.  Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in these rating methodologies, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

The transaction's portfolio was modeled, according to Moody's
rating approach, using CDOROMTM v.2.6 to develop the loss
distribution from which the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter
was obtained.  This parameter was then used as an input in a cash
flow model using CDOEdge.  CDOROMTM v.2.6 is available on
moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon
return of a signed free license agreement.


* Moody's Downgrades Rating on City of Salem's Bonds to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 the
rating and assigned a negative outlook to $772,000 of City of
Salem (NJ) General Obligation Bonds and $19.5 million of Revenue
Bonds (Finlaw State Office Building Project), Series 2007, issued
through the Salem County Improvement Authority.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade reflects continued pressures put on the city by the
responsibility for the Finlaw State Office Building Project, on
which the city has guaranteed debt service payments.  The
project's debt service reserve fund has been needed to pay two
additional debt service payments after Moody's downgraded the
city's general obligation rating to Ba1 from Baa3 in August 2009
following two draws on the reserve in 2009.  Given that the city
is obligated to pay debt service on the bonds once the debt
service fund is exhausted, the additional draws on the reserve
fund and lack of plans to replenish utilized amounts further
increase the likelihood that the city's guarantee will be called
upon.  Moody's believes, given the city's already narrow financial
position, strained liquidity position and limited tax base, that
if this as yet contingent liability were to become a full or
partial liability, the city's finances would be stressed to meet
this additional burden.  Additionally, the city's currently
average debt burden would grow to very high levels.

  Finlaw Project Underperforms Projections; Use Of Debt Service
      Reserve Increases Likelihood of Use Of City Guarantee

In 2007 the city guaranteed bonds, issued by the Salem County
Improvement Authority, to finance a downtown office building.  The
bonds, while ultimately secured by the city's general obligation
tax pledge, were expected to be supported by revenues generated by
leasing the office space.  Construction delays of the facility
resulted in delayed lease payments and as such, the last four debt
service payments have been paid, in part, with funds in the Debt
Service Reserve Fund.  The Debt Service Reserve Fund was
originally sized at $1.8 million and following the four draws
($488,000 in February 2009, $127,000 in August 2009, $55,000 in
February 2010, and $159,000 in August 2010), the fund has been
reduced to $1.02 million.

The anchor tenant of the office building (leasing 84% of office
space) is the State of New Jersey (GO rated Aa2/stable outlook).
Additional leases are with the Salem County Improvement Authority
and a State Senator.  Moody's views the lease revenue stream
supporting the bonds as somewhat speculative, given tenants'
ability to terminate the leases under certain circumstances, which
are unrelated to credit events.  An important risk in the
structure, as Moody's identified when Moody's first assigned a
rating to the bonds, is the fact that the state lease is for 20
years and the bonds amortize over 30 years, leaving funding
uncertainties in the out years.  Additionally, the revenue
associated with signed leases, $1.1 million, is insufficient to
cover both debt service ($1.06 million annually over the next four
years) and maintenance on the building, estimated at $145,000.

The risks to the revenue stream associated with the 20-year term
of the state lease ,which accounts for the majority of revenue
($914,000 or 82% of the total revenue identified), a possible
termination of the leases and recent draws on reserves increase
the likelihood that the city would have to make debt service
payments.  Given the size of the debt, as compared to the city's
resources, as reflected in the limited taxbase, narrow financial
position and already strained liquidity, the need of city to step
up to provide debt service would have a material impact on the
city's financial position (outlined below).

  City Guarantee Is Called On After The Debt Service Reserve Is
                            Liquidated

The city guarantee calls for the Debt Service Reserve, initially
funded at 125% of average annual debt service, or $1.8 million, to
be used first for any deficiency.  Then once the Debt Service
Reserve Fund has been exhausted, the city is obligated to pay debt
service for the life of the bonds as there is no replenishment
mechanism for the Debt Service Reserve.  Under the terms of the
Guaranty Agreement between the city, the SCIA and Fulton Financial
Advisors, N.A. (the trustee for the transaction) if the SCIA has
not deposited with the trustee sufficient funds to pay debt
service 20 days into the month preceding the month in which debt
service is due (February and August 15), the trustee will
immediately inform the city of the deficiency.  The city is then
obligated to remit to the trustee an amount equal to the
deficiency one business day before debt service is due.  The city
is obligated to take any action required for timely payment of
debt service, including adoption of an emergency appropriation.

  City's Financial Position Is Narrow; Cash Flow Borrowing For
                            Operations

The city has a narrow financial position and limited liquidity.
At the end of fiscal 2008, on an unaudited basis, the Current Fund
balance equaled $823,000 or 11% of revenues, a level reserves have
approximated over the last five years.  Management reports that
fiscal 2009 estimated results remained flat over the previous
year.  Included on the 2008 balance sheet are $150,000 of deferred
charges, booked to amortize the cost of a revaluation Net of this
non-cash asset, Current Fund balance is just $673,000 or 9% of
revenues.  Slim reserves have resulted in the need for cash flow
borrowing for operations.  The unaudited 2008 balance sheet shows
$600,000 in Tax Anticipation Notes (issued June 19, 2008; paid in
March 2, 2009) for operations as well as a $150,000 Revaluation
Note Payable to liquidate the non-cash deferred charges.
Additionally, the city defers $1 million of school taxes, which
Moody's views as an off-balance sheet liability.  The Current Fund
balance net of these New Jersey accounting treatment only assets
is a negative $359,000.

Payment Of Debt Service On SCIA Finlaw Bonds Would Have Material
Impact On Financial Position; Limited Liquidity Threatens City's
                Ability to Make Timely Debt Service

Highlighting the sizable liability the city has taken on by
guaranteeing the SCIA Finlaw bonds, 2010 debt service
($1.06 million) is more than the city's $823,000 Current Fund
balance.  Additionally, if the city were to have to absorb the
full debt service on the debt, the levy would need to be raised
28.9%.  Moody's believes this level of increase would be
unmanageable given the city's limited $268 million taxbase, which
is has wealth levels well below the state and nation.  Median
family income of $29,699 and per capita income of $13,559 as
reported in the 2000 Census are 45.4% and 50.2% of state medians,
respectively.

The city and authority currently plan to fully deplete the debt
service reserve fund, as outlined in the guaranty agreement,
before providing funds to the authority for revenue deficiencies.
Given that there is no replenishment mechanism on the debt service
reserve, once the reserve has been exhausted, the city will
continually be on notice to make debt service payments if revenues
associated with the leases are insufficient to pay debt service.
If draws on the debt service reserve fund continue at the current
rate of $220,000 annually, a likely scenario given the cash flow
associated with the leases as compared to debt service and
maintenance, the debt service reserve fund will be depleted by
February 2015.  Assuming no additional revenues from the project
at all, the debt service reserve fund would be fully depleted by
February of 2011.  In both cases, the city would then need to
absorb the full debt service payment.

Further, Moody's believes the city's slim liquidity position could
hinder the city from fulfilling its general obligation pledge on a
timely basis.  The city's guarantee requires just 22 days notice
to cure a deficiency a time frame in which sufficient cash may not
be immediately available.  The city would have to borrow
externally to fund the debt service payment, which would expose
the city to market and third party risk.

        Very High Debt Burden Reflects City's Guarantee Of
                         SCIA Finlaw Debt

Moody's believes the city has taken on a liability which is
disproportionate to the city's size and ability to pay, which is
reflected in the very high debt burden of 13.6% of equalized
value.  Included in the debt burden is the entire $19.5 million
associated with the Finlaw project and a $2.5 million Bond
Anticipation Note that the city borrowed in order to complete the
project.  Debt service was 6.7% of 2008 Current Fund expenditures.
If the city were required to make-up a deficiency of $220,000 on
the current project, debt service would grow to 9.8% and at
$1 million would be 20.6% of the budget.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's belief that revenues
associated with the 2007 Finlaw State Building Project debt will
continue to be insufficient to meet debt service requirements,
requiring additional draws and increasing the likelihood that the
city's guaranty will be called upon.  Given Salem's weak financial
position, the city will likely be challenged to make good on its
guaranty in a timely basis.  Although discussions began last year
with the state to renegotiate lease terms in order to increase
revenues to cover building maintenance costs and prevent
additional draws, it remains uncertain whether these efforts will
prove successful, given state budget pressure and reduced support
for local governments.

What Could Change the Rating UP (removal of negative outlook):

* Rebuilding the debt service reserve to its original size of
  $1.8 million

* Ceasing debt service reserve draws

* A signed lease agreement that provides for sufficient revenues
  to cover debt service

What Could Change the Rating Down

* A further decline in debt service reserves
* A decline in lease revenues

Key Statistics:

* 2008 Population: 5,661 (-3.3% since 2000)

* 2009 Equalized Valuation: $267 million

* 2009 Equalized Value Per Capita: $47,266

* 1999 Per Capita Income (as % of NJ and US): $13,559 (50.2% and
  62.8%)

* 1999 Median Family Income (as % of NY and US): $29,699 (45.4%
  and 59.3%)

* Overall Debt Burden (including SCIA debt): 13.6%

* Payout of Principal (10 years; including SCIA debt): 14.6%

* 2007 Current Fund Balance: $541,000 (8.54% of Current Fund
  revenue)

* 2008 Current Fund Balance: $823,000 (11% of Current Fund
  revenue)

* 2008 Current Fund Balance, net of deferred charges and school
  tax deferrals: -$359,000 (-4.8% of Current Fund revenue)

* Long-term G.O. Debt Outstanding: $772,000

* G.O. and Guaranteed Debt Outstanding: $19.5 million


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
tranches from seven U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
39 other tranches from 10 transactions and removed 11 of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

The 13 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $1.746 billion.  Four of the seven affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDOs of asset-
backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large part by
mezzanine tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  Two of the
seven affected transactions are high-grade structured finance (SF)
CDOs of asset-backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized
in large part by high-grade tranches of RMBS and other SF
securities.  The remaining transaction is a hybrid CDO of CDOs
that was collateralized at origination primarily by notes from
other CDOs, as well as by tranches from RMBS and other SF
transactions.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

Rating actions:
                                      Rating
Transaction                 Class To        From
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd            A-1   B- (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd            C     CC (sf)   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd            D     CC (sf)   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd            E-1   CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd            E-2   CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
Aspen Funding I, Ltd.       A-1L  A (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Neg
Aspen Funding I, Ltd.       A-2L  BB (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Aspen Funding I, Ltd.       A-3L  CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
Aspen Funding I, Ltd.       B-1   CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
Dalton CDO Ltd              A-1a1 CCC (sf)  BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Dalton CDO Ltd              A-1a2 CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd     A1    BB+ (sf)  A- (sf)/Watch Neg
E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd     A2    CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
Hereford Street ABS CDO I   A-1   CC (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
Independence I CDO Ltd.     A     BB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Kent Funding II Ltd         X     D (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
Capella Funding, Ltd.       1     BB (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I  A-1A  A- (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I  A-1B  A- (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I  A-1C  A- (sf)   A- (sf)/Watch Neg
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd.       A-2   D (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd.       A-1   AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding VI Ltd  A-2   CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding VI Ltd  A-1   BB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings affirmed:

Transaction                      Class                Rating
Aspen Funding I, Ltd.            Pfd Shares           CC (sf)
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I, Ltd. B                    CC (sf)
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I, Ltd. C                    CC (sf)
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I, Ltd. Pfd Shares           CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   A-1b1                CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   A-1b2                CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   A-2                  CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   B                    CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   C                    CC (sf)
Dalton CDO Ltd                   D                    CC (sf)
E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd          B                    CC (sf)
E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd          C                    CC (sf)
E*Trade ABS CDO III Ltd          Pref Shrs            CC (sf)
Hereford Street ABS CDO I Ltd    A-2                  CC (sf)
Hereford Street ABS CDO I Ltd    B                    CC (sf)
Hereford Street ABS CDO I Ltd    C                    CC (sf)
Hereford Street ABS CDO I Ltd    D                    CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              A-1A                 CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              A-1B                 CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              A-2                  CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              B                    CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              C                    CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              D                    CC (sf)
Kent Funding II Ltd              E                    CC (sf)
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd.            C                    CC (sf)
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd.            Pre Shares           CC (sf)
South Coast Funding VI Ltd       B                    CC (sf)
South Coast Funding VI Ltd       C                    CC (sf)

Other outstanding ratings:

Transaction                      Class                Rating
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd                 A-2                  D (sf)
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd                 B                    D (sf)
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd.            B                    D (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight of US CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
tranches from six U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
23 other tranches from six transactions and removed three of them
from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

The eight downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a
total issuance amount of $1.107 billion.  The affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDOs of asset-
backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large part by
mezzanine tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

Rating actions:
                                   Rating
Transaction             Class  To         From
Coronado CDO Ltd.       B-1    CC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Coronado CDO Ltd.       B-2    CC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Coronado CDO Ltd.       TypeII CCC (sf)   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Glacier Funding CDO I   A-1    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Glacier Funding CDO I   A-2    CC (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg
Ischus CDO I Ltd        A-1    B- (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
MKP CBO II Ltd          A-1    BBB+ (sf)  A (sf)/Watch Neg
Stack 2004-1 Ltd        A      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Stack 2004-1 Ltd        B      B- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Stack 2004-1 Ltd        C      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Tourmaline CDO I        I      CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings affirmed:

Transaction                    Class      Rating
Coronado CDO Ltd.              A-1        BB+ (sf)
Coronado CDO Ltd.              A-2        BB+ (sf)
Coronado CDO Ltd.              C-1        CC (sf)
Coronado CDO Ltd.              C-2        CC (sf)
Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.     B          CC (sf)
Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.     C          CC (sf)
Glacier Funding CDO I Ltd.     Pref Shrs  CC (sf)
Ischus CDO I Ltd               A-2        CC (sf)
Ischus CDO I Ltd               B          CC (sf)
Ischus CDO I Ltd               C-1        CC (sf)
Ischus CDO I Ltd               C-2        CC (sf)
Ischus CDO I Ltd               Combo Secs CC (sf)
MKP CBO II Ltd                 A-2        CC (sf)
MKP CBO II Ltd                 B          CC (sf)
MKP CBO II Ltd                 C-1        CC (sf)
MKP CBO II Ltd                 C-2        CC (sf)
Stack 2004-1 Ltd               D          CC (sf)
Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.          II         CC (sf)
Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.          III        CC (sf)
Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.          IV         CC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches of CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
tranches from five U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
25 other tranches from 10 transactions and removed 12 of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

The six downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $706.9 million.  Four of the five affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDOs of asset-
backed securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large part by
mezzanine tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The remaining
transaction is a hybrid CDO of CDOs that was collateralized at
origination primarily by notes from other CDOs, well as by
tranches from RMBS and other SF transactions.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

RATING ACTIONS:

                                     Rating
Transaction               Class   To        From
Bristol CDO I Ltd.        A-1     AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
Bristol CDO I Ltd.        A-2     AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO V Ltd.         B       AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO V Ltd.         C       A+ (sf)   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO V Ltd.         D-1     BB (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
C-Bass CBO V Ltd.         D-2     BB (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Commodore CDO I Ltd.      A       BB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
MKP CBO IV Ltd.           A-1     CCC (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Phoenix CDO II Ltd.       A       AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
Porter Square CDO I Ltd.  A-3     AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
Porter Square CDO I Ltd.  B       B- (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures I Ltd.    A-1     AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures I Ltd.    A-2     BB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
SFA CABS II CDO Ltd.      A       A (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.  B       B (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.  C       CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Vermeer Funding Ltd.      A-1     A+ (sf)   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Vermeer Funding Ltd.      A-2     B (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED:

Transaction               Class   Rating
Bristol CDO I Ltd.        B       CC (sf)
Bristol CDO I Ltd.        C       CC (sf)
Commodore CDO I Ltd.      B       CCC- (sf)
Commodore CDO I Ltd.      C       CC (sf)
MKP CBO IV Ltd.           C       CC (sf)
Porter Square CDO I Ltd.  C       CC (sf)
Saturn Ventures I Ltd.    A-3     CC (sf)
Saturn Ventures I Ltd.    B       CC (sf)
Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.  D       CC (sf)
Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.  E       CC (sf)
Tricadia CDO 2006-5 Ltd.  F       CC (sf)
Vermeer Funding Ltd.      B       CC (sf)
Vermeer Funding Ltd.      C       CC (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING:

Transaction               Class   Rating
MKP CBO IV Ltd.           A-2     D (sf)
MKP CBO IV Ltd.           B       D (sf)


* S&P Puts Ratings on 51 Tranches on CreditWatch Positive
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 51
tranches from 29 U.S. collateralized loan obligation
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.  At
the same time, S&P placed its ratings on three tranches from
three U.S. collateralized debt obligation transactions that
are retranchings of other CDO tranches on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  The combined 54 tranches have a total
issuance amount of $8.453 billion.

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's most recent monthly review
of U.S. cash flow and hybrid CDO performance.  The rationale for
the rating actions are based on both quantitative and qualitative
performance parameters, including transaction structural features
and a broad view of the underlying collateral within each
transaction, including these:

* A change in Standard & Poor's rated overcollateralization
  metric.  This ratio, which S&P review monthly based on current
  collateral ratings, provides an estimate of the stability of the
  current rating on a given cash flow CDO tranche;

* An increase in paydowns to the senior tranches from both
  scheduled and unscheduled asset amortizations; and

* A change in the level of overcollateralization available to
  support each tranche since origination, or since S&P's last
  rating action.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after S&P complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis for each of the affected
transactions, and after S&P evaluate additional information S&P
may receive during discussions with the relevant collateral
managers.  S&P expects to resolve these CreditWatch placements
within 90 days.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the
CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as S&P deem appropriate.

                   Ratings Placed On Creditwatch

                                          Rating
                                          ------
Transaction               Class To                    From
-----------               ----- --                    ----
505 CLO I Ltd             A     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
505 CLO II Ltd            B     AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
505 CLO II Ltd            C     A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
505 CLO III Ltd           B     AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
505 CLO III Ltd           C     A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
505 CLO III Ltd           D     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
505 CLO III Ltd           E     BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)
Artus Loan Fund 2007-I    A-1L  AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
Artus Loan Fund 2007-I    A-2L  A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
Avenue CLO IV Ltd         A     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
CapitalSource Commercial
   Loan 2007-1             A     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
Castle Hill III CLO       A-1a  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Castle Hill III CLO       A-1b  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Castle Hill III CLO       B     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
Classic Finance BV        A     A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
Clydesdale CLO 2003       A     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
Endurance CLO I Ltd       A     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Field Point IV Ltd        A-1   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
Franklin CLO IV           B     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Franklin CLO IV           C     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
Galaxy CLO 2003-1         A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Galaxy CLO 2003-1         B     A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-1                  A-2   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-1                  B     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-1                  C     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-2                  A-2   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-2                  B     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-2                  C     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-3                  A-2   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
GE Commercial Loan Trust
   2006-3                  B     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)
Grand Horn CLO Ltd        A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Grand Horn CLO Ltd        B     AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2002-I                   A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2002-I                   B     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2003-1                   A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2003-1                   B     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2004-1                   A     A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO
  2004-1                   C     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
Katonah IV Ltd            A     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
LCM I L.P.                 D-1   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)
LCM I L.P.                 D-2   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)
Merritt Funding Trust
  2005-2                   B     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
Race Point II CLO         A-1   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
RACERS 2007-2-E Certs  2006-2-E B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)
Rosemont CLO Ltd.         B-1   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
Rosemont CLO Ltd.         B-2   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
Sagamore CLO Ltd          A-1   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Sagamore CLO Ltd          A-2   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Sagamore CLO Ltd          A-3   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Senior ABS Repack Trust   A-2   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg    AAA (sf)
SFR Ltd                   A     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
Stedman Loan Fund II      A-1   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Stedman Loan Fund II      A-2   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
TCW Select Loan Fund      B     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
TCW Select Loan Fund      C     A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
Veer Cash Flow CLO    SrRtNts   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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