TCR_Public/100829.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 29, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 239

                            Headlines

ABCDS 2006-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
ALBRIGHT COLLEGE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Revenue Bonds
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches
ARCAP 2006-RR7: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes

BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Securities
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-TOP6 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-BBA7 Certs.
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE: S&P Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'
CITY OF NEWBURGH: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Debt

CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on CLASS I-C Swap, Series 25
CLARKE UNIVERSITY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on 1998 Bonds
CONN FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Certificates
EDUCATION LOANS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans

FRESNO PACIFIC: Moody's Puts 'Ba2' Rating on Watchlist
GS MORTGAGE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E
GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-LN2 Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2005-LDP3 Notes

JPMORGAN AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2000-C3 Certificates
LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LOWER BUCKS: Moody's Downgrades Hospital Bond Rating to 'Ca'
ML CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1998 - AIG-2 Notes

ML CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Puts 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
PROJECT FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Rating on Class I Notes
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Junks Rating on Series 2002-RZ3 Tranche
RIDGEWAY COURT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'

SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Sr. Student Loan Notes
SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Sr. Student Loan Notes
SLM STUDENT LOAN TRUST: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Student Loan Notes
UNITED AIR: S&P Raises Rating on 2000-1 Certificates to 'BB'

* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Development Bonds
* Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Irvington's $113.2 Mil. Debt
* S&P Downgrades Rating on Camarillo, California's Bonds to 'BB'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From 11 CDO Deals

                            *********

ABCDS 2006-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
five classes of notes from ABCDS 2006-1 Ltd., a hybrid
collateralized debt obligation transaction, following the
liquidation of the collateral in the portfolio.  At the same time,
S&P withdrew its 'AAA' ratings on three classes of notes.

These rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of
default and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' because the transaction did not
have proceeds to pay back par payments to the noteholders after
making the termination payments on the credit default swap
contracts.

S&P withdrew its ratings on three principal protected notes as the
underlying treasury strips backing these notes were delivered to
their respective holders in exchange for their respective notes.

The deal had triggered an EOD, after which the controlling
noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of the notes and
liquidate the collateral assets.

                          Rating Actions

                         ABCDS 2006-1 Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
          Class                To                   From
          -----                --                   ----
          SupSrSwap            Dsrb                 CCsrb
          C                    D                    CC
          D                    D                    CC
          E                    D                    CC
          Series B-1           D                    CC
          Series P-1           NR                   AAA
          Series P-2           NR                   AAA
          Series P-3           NR                   AAA

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

                         ABCDS 2006-1 Ltd.

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A-2        D
                        A-3        D
                        B          D

                         NR - Not rated.


ALBRIGHT COLLEGE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 long-term rating on
Albright College's (PA) Series 2004 Revenue Bonds issued through
the Berks County Municipal Authority.  The rating outlook remains
stable.

Legal Security: Bonds are secured by a pledge of gross revenues
and a debt service reserve fund.

Interest Rate Derivatives: In 2009, the College entered into a 10-
year fixed interest rate swap contract with a current outstanding
notional amount of $25.5 million with Wachovia Bank, N.A. (rated
Aa2/P-1).  Under the terms of the agreement the College pays a
fixed rate of 2.8275% in exchange for 74% of LIBOR.  The College
is not required to post collateral and there are no rating
triggers.  As of May 28, 2010, the mark-to-market value of the
swap was a liability of $1.1 million to the College.  Moody's has
incorporated the risks associated with the swaps in the Ba1 long-
term rating.

                            Strengths

* Stable market position and continued healthy student demand as a
  private, co-educational liberal arts institution serving 2,311
  full-time equivalent students in Reading, PA.  Despite regional
  competition from both public and private institutions and
  projected area high school graduation declines, the College
  continues to experience demand as evidenced by an increase in
  fall 2010 applications to 6,619, a 57% increase over 2006.  The
  College is on track to meet the budgeted 507 first-time freshman
  and ESL students in fall 2010, but will enroll a smaller class
  than the 541 enrolled in fall 2009.  The College does not have
  enrollment growth plans and will continue to focus its attention
  on increasing retention, which has improved to approximately 74%
  for freshman to sophomore in the current year.  Given the
  College's recent marketing and admissions efforts, Moody's
  expects some likelihood for continued momentum in attracting and
  retaining students.  Maintaining stability in application demand
  and matriculation are critical credit factors for the
  institution given its reliance on tuition revenue.

* Healthy operating performance with three-year average operating
  margin of 5.1% from fiscal years 2007-2009, as calculated
  by Moody's, covering debt service by 2.6 times over the same
  period.  The College generated $7.7 million of cash flow to
  cover $2.4 million in annual debt service, resulting in
  operating cash flow margins of 14% in both 2009 and 2008, up
  from 9% and 7% in 2005 and 2004, respectively.  Projected FY
  2010 operating performance remains consistent with prior years
  and going forward, Moody's expects healthy operating performance
  to continue based upon Albright's steady growth in net tuition
  revenue and conservative financial management.

* Strengthened fundraising focus and improved three-year gift flow
  to $4.4 million, although slightly below the FY 2009 Moody's Ba-
  rated median of $5.0 million.  Over time it is expected that the
  increased fundraising focus will may help to slightly bolster
  financial resources.

                            Challenges

* Debt structure adds risk, with $25.5 million of variable rate
  debt supported by a single letter of credit agreement from
  Wachovia Bank, NA (rated Aa2/P-1).  The variable rate debt
  structure, (56% of the portfolio) leaves the College vulnerable
  to both counterparty and renewal risk.  While the debt structure
  adds risk, the College maintains adequate monthly liquidity of
  $11.1 million which translates into 89 days monthly days cash on
  hand.

* Continued competition drives the need to invest in capital and
  closely monitor tuition and net tuition rates.  The College's
  dependency on student charges (tuition, student fees and
  auxiliaries) as the primary source (86% in FY 2009) of operating
  revenue stresses the continued importance of successful
  recruitment and retention of students as future demand and
  market position could be pressured given the competitive higher
  education environment in the region.  The high level of
  competition is reflected in the yield rate of 19%, slightly
  below the median of 22% for all Moody's Ba-rated institutions.
  Maintenance of enrollment will be critical to financial
  stability and may prove challenging given continued shifts in
  student demand due to the weak economic environment and regional
  demographics.

* Thin balance sheet with unrestricted financial resources of
  negative $9.8 million in FY 2009 covering debt by -0.2 times.
  Based upon Moody's calculation of available monthly liquidity,
  the College maintained $11.1 million in liquid cash and
  investments that translates into 89 days of monthly days cash on
  hand.  Moody's expects the cash position of the College to
  remain constrained and feels the College has limited capacity to
  incur additional debt at the current rating level because of
  limited liquidity and already elevated leverage levels.

* Need to continue to invest in capital, including possible
  financing plans over the medium-term for student housing could
  pressure rating and/or outlook.  The amount of debt, structure
  and timing of borrowing for student housing has not yet been
  determined.  Depending on the ultimate structure of the
  financing, which could include third-party, non-recourse debt,
  the current rating and/or outlook could be pressured.  When
  plans become more defined, Moody's will review the amount of
  additional debt and its associated structure to assess the
  potential impact on the current rating and outlook.

                       Recent Developments

The Series 2008 variable rate bonds are supported by a letter of
credit from Wachovia Bank, National Association (rated Aa2/P-1)
with a stated expiration date of November 19, 2011.  In Moody's
opinion, this debt structure adds risk to the underlying credit
profile.  The reimbursement agreement and LOC contain various
financial covenants and events of default which, if breached,
could result in acceleration of the bonds and immediate repayment
to the Bank by the College if not remedied after 30 days of
notice.  These events include, but are not limited to the failure
to maintain at least 1.15 times coverage of the Debt Service
Coverage Ratio and least 0.40 times coverage of the Liquidity
Ratio.  As of May 31, 2009, the College's coverage levels met the
requirements (Debt Service Coverage Ratio - 1.7 times, Liquidity
Ratio - 0.86 times) and the projected coverage levels for FY 2010
exceed the ratio covenants (Debt Service Coverage Ratio - 2.4
times, Liquidity Ratio - 0.87 times).  If a covenant is violated
and not remedied, deterioration of the rating could occur at a
faster pace.  Moody's believes that the variable rate debt
structure and terms of the letter of credit add additional risks
especially given unrestricted cash levels that would be
insufficient to fully repay a failed remarketing.

                              Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the College
will continue to maintain a stable market position leading to
growing tuition revenue and positive operating margins.

                What could change the rating -- Up

Substantial growth of the financial resource base; continued
positive operating performance and cash flow generation;
fundraising success

               What could change the rating -- Down

Deterioration of student market position reflected in weaker
selectivity and matriculation; weakening of operating performance
and cash flow generation; increases in debt not accompanied with
growth in financial resources and liquidity

Key Indicators (Fiscal year 2009 financial data, fall 2009
enrollment):

* Total Enrollment: 2,311 full-time equivalent students
* Total Direct Debt: $45.4 million, $18.4 million rated by Moody's
* Expendable Resources to Debt: 0.02 times
* Expendable Resources to Operations: 0.02 times
* Three-Year Average Operating Margin: 4.9%
* Average Debt Service Coverage: 2.5 times
* Monthly Liquidity: $11.1 million
* Monthly Days Cash on Hand: 89 days

Rated Debt:

* Series 2004: Ba1

Series 2008: Aa2/VMIG1 based on letter of credit from Wachovia
Bank, N.A. (Aa2/P-1).  The VMIG1 rating expires with the scheduled
expiration date of the LOC (November 19, 2011) or upon earlier
termination

The last rating action with respect to Albright College was on
October 9, 2009, when the Ba1 rating and stable outlook were
affirmed.  That rating was subsequently recalibrated to Ba1 on
May 7, 2010.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2.

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 27,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-A-3-NC, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 19,
     2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. II-A-3-C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
     March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2.  In
addition to the downgrade, Moody's has corrected the ratings of 2
tranches: Class I-A-2 and I-A-3.  Previously, Moody's calculated
loss allocation to these tranches based on the Prospectus
Supplement dated as of June, 22, 2005, which states that when the
subordinate certificates are depleted, realized losses in respect
of the mortgage loans in Loan Group I will be allocated to the
Class I-A-3 and I-A-2 in that order.  However, per the Pooling and
Servicing agreement of the same date, the realized losses in Loan
Group I will be allocated first to I-A-2 then I-A-3.  The Trustee
has confirmed that they will be following the PSA.  As such
Moody's ratings have been adjusted to reflect the loss allocation
rules described in the PSA.  As a result, Class I-A-2 has a lower
rating than I-A-3 reflecting the lower levels of enhancements.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A and Option Arms residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of Alt-A and Option Arm pools in
conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain under
duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
Alt-A and Option Arm pools issued in 2005.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A and Option Arm RMBS, each individual pool was run through a
variety of scenarios in the Structured Finance WorkstationR (SFW),
the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.
This individual pool level analysis incorporates performance
variances across the different pools and the structural features
of the transaction including priorities of payment distribution
among the different tranches, average life of the tranches,
current balances of the tranches and future cash flows under
expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six
different combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss
timing curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in
losses experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses
on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approaches "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" and "Option ARM RMBS Loss Projection Update: April
2010" are adjusted slightly when estimating losses on pools left
with a small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with
fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average
rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the
vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for the 2005, 2006
and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than
the average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account
for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.
Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 10.10%.  If
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.


ARCAP 2006-RR7: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from ARCap 2006-RR7 Resecuritization Inc., a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on six classes
from the same transaction.  Concurrently, S&P removed all of the
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following the downgrade of underlying
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation securities
that collateralize ARCap 2006-RR7.  The downgraded securities are
from two transactions and total $194.0 million (30.1% of the total
asset balance).

S&P lowered its ratings on classes M, N, and O to 'D' from 'CCC-'
due to interest shortfalls that S&P expects will continue for the
foreseeable future.  According to the July 27, 2010, trustee
report, cumulative interest shortfalls to the transaction totaled
$16.4 million and affected each of the tranches subordinate to
class C.  The interest shortfalls affecting ARCap 2006-RR7 are due
to interest shortfalls on the underlying CRE CDO and CMBS
collateral.  The collateral interest shortfalls primarily reflect
the master servicer's recovery of prior advances, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees.  If the
interest shortfalls to ARCap 2006-RR7 continue, S&P will evaluate
them and may take further rating actions as S&P determine
appropriate.

According to the July 27, 2010, trustee report, ARCap 2006-RR7 was
collateralized by five classes ($233.6 million, 36.3%) from ARCap
2003-1 Resecuritization Trust and five classes ($165.9 million,
25.8%) from ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, both of which are
CRE CDO transactions.  ARCap 2006-RR7 has exposure to these
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust (classes G, H, J, and K;
  $101.0 million, 15.7%); and

* ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust (classes G, H, J, and K;
  $93.0 million, 14.4%).

* ARCap 2006-RR7's assets also include 29 CMBS classes
  ($244.8 million, 38.0%) from 21 distinct transactions issued
  between 1999 and 2004.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2006-RR7 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               ARCap 2006-RR7 Resecuritization Inc.

                              Rating
                              ------
                Class    To           From
                -----    --           ----
                A-D      BBB-         AAA/Watch Neg
                A        BBB-         AAA/Watch Neg
                B        CCC          BBB+/Watch Neg
                C        CCC-         BB/Watch Neg
                D        CCC-         BB-/Watch Neg
                E        CCC-         B-/Watch Neg
                M        D            CCC-/Watch Neg
                N        D            CCC-/Watch Neg
                O        D            CCC-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                ARCap 2006-RR7 Resecuritization Inc.

                              Rating
                              ------
                Class    To           From
                -----    --           ----
                F        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
                G        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
                H        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
                J        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
                K        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
                L        CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg


ARMSTRONG LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd.:

  -- US$133,320,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
     2016 (current outstanding balance of $130,428,375), Upgraded
     to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
     (sf);

  -- US$30,300,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
     2016 (current outstanding balance of $29,642,813), Upgraded
     to A1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2009 Downgraded to A3
     (sf);

  -- US$36,360,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $35,571,375), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 16,
     2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$18,180,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $17,785,688), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 16,
     2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf);

  -- US$18,180,000 Class F Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of
     $18,883,047), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 16,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 51% or $142.2 MM since the last
rating action in June 2009.  In addition to principal pay downs,
excess spread is being diverted to pay down Class A notes as a
result of the failure of the overcollateralization ratios.  As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action in June 2009.  As of the
latest trustee report dated July 21, 2010, the Class C, Class D,
Class E and Class F overcollateralization ratios are reported at
133.37%, 120.11%, 114.43%, and 109.25%, respectively, versus May
2009 levels of 1118.24%, 109.39%, 105.45%, and 101.78%,
respectively.

The deal also experienced a decrease in assets rated Caa1 and
below.  In particular, assets rated Caa1 and below make up 12.28%
of the underlying portfolio versus 25.90% in May 2009.  Moody's
adjusted WARF has declined since the last rating action due to a
decrease of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook".

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par of
$392 million, defaulted par of $45 million, weighted average
default probability of 26.89% (implying a WARF of 4012), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.68%, and a
diversity score of 49.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Armstrong Loan Funding, Ltd., issued in March 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

The table below summarizes the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

* Tranche Name: Class A

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): 0
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): 0

* Tranche Name: Class B

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): 0
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): -1

* Tranche Name: Class C

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): +2
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): -2

* Tranche Name: Class D

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): +2
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): -2

* Tranche Name: Class E

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): +2
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): -1

* Tranche Name: Class F

  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3210): +3
  -- Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4814): -2

The table below summarizes the impact of different recovery rate
levels on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, whereby a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

* Tranche Name: Class A

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%):0
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%):0

* Tranche Name: Class B

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%): 0
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%): 0

* Tranche Name: Class C

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%): 0
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%): -1

* Tranche Name: Class D

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%): 0
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%): -1

* Tranche Name: Class E

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%): +1
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%): 0

* Tranche Name: Class F

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.68%): +1
Moody's Adjusted WARR -- 2% (40.68%): -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
pooled classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2002-2.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other pooled
classes from the same transaction.  In addition, S&P raised five
ratings on the class CM raked certificates.

The downgrades and affirmations of the ratings on the pooled
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
ratings on the mezzanine and subordinate classes reflect credit
support erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of several specially serviced loans.  The lowered
ratings on the subordinate classes also reflect S&P's opinion that
these classes are susceptible to interest shortfalls in the
foreseeable future.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the transaction.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted
debt service coverage of 1.37x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
85.1% in the pool.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows
under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.18x and an LTV of 107.6%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 20.0% and 34.9%,
respectively.  All of the adjusted DSC and LTV calculations
excluded seven specially serviced assets ($41.3 million, 3.0%) and
53 defeased loans ($654.3 million, 47.9%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced assets, which S&P
included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The upgrades of the nonpooled class CM certificates reflect S&P's
analysis of the Crabtree Valley Mall loan, which is the sole
source of cash flow for these certificates.  S&P discuss this loan
in the "Summary of Top 10 Loans" below.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class XC interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

Seven assets ($41.3 million, 3.0%) are with the special servicer,
C-III Asset Management LLC.  Five ($23.7 million, 1.7%) are more
than 90 days delinquent, and two ($17.6 million, 1.3%) are within
their respective grace periods.  S&P estimated losses ranging from
5.0% to 89.0% for these assets.  Appraisal reduction amounts are
in effect against four of the specially serviced assets totaling
$6.5 million.

The Braintree Executive Plaza loan ($14.5 million, 1.1%) is the
largest loan with the special servicer and is secured by a
125,641-sq.-ft. office building in Braintree, Mass.  The loan
transferred to C-III on May 4, 2010, due to imminent default.  The
borrower has stated that anticipated lease terminations will
negatively impact its ability to meet its debt service
obligations.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.28x with
86.0% occupancy.

The six remaining specially serviced loans ($26.9 million, 1.9%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.8% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for these loans, with a
weighted average loss severity of 47.0%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2010 remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $1.36 billion, which represents 79.2% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 131 assets
in the pool, down from 152 at issuance.  The master servicer for
the transaction, Bank of America N.A., provided financial
information for 96.6% of the pool, and all of the servicer-
provided information was full-year 2009 or interim 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.37x
and 85.1%, respectively, which exclude seven specially serviced
assets ($41.3 million, 3.0%) for which S&P has estimated losses
separately.  Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.03x for six of these seven
loans.  The master servicer did not report financial information
for the remaining loan.  Fifteen loans ($129.6 million, 9.5%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Thirteen loans
($114.7 million, 8.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and
nine of these loans ($86.9 million, 6.4%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.  Fifty-three loans ($654.3 million, 47.9%) have
been defeased.  To date, the transaction has realized six
principal losses totaling $27.7 million.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding pooled balance of $341.5 million (26.4%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.54x for the top 10 loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the
top 10 loans were 1.42x and 95.7%, respectively.  Four of the top
10 loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  Details
regarding the Crabtree Valley Mall loan and the four loans that
appear on the watchlist are as follow:

The Crabtree Valley Mall loan is the largest loan in the pool with
a whole-loan balance of $154.5 million, which consists of a
$135.2 million senior pooled balance, and a $19.3 million
subordinate, nonpooled balance.  The raised ratings on the class
CM raked certificates reflect S&P's analysis of the junior
nonpooled portion of this loan, from which the raked certificates
derive 100% of their cash flows.  The loan is secured by a
998,486-sq.-ft. regional mall in Raleigh, N.C.  As of Dec. 31,
2009, the reported DSC for the property was 1.92x.  As of April 1,
2010, the property was 97.8% occupied.  The upgrades of the class
CM certificates reflect this performance, as well as deleveraging
that has occurred on the loan.  Based on S&P's current valuation
using an adjusted net cash flow, S&P's adjusted LTV ratio on the
whole loan is 56.1%.

The Santa Fe Pointe and Reflections of Tampa loan ($25.2 million,
1.8%) is the third-largest loan in the pool, and is secured by a
756-unit, two-property student-housing portfolio in Gainesville,
Fla. and Tampa.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, reported DSC was
0.73x.  As of March 31, 2010, overall property occupancy was
83.3%, with the Tampa property outperforming the Gainesville
property.

The 20555 Victor Parkway loan ($24.7 million, 1.8%) and the 20255
Victor Parkway loan ($23.1 million, 1.7%) are the fourth- and
fifth-largest loans in the pool, respectively.  The loans are
secured by two adjacent office buildings in Livonia, Mich., with
gross leasable areas of 197,280 sq. ft. and 175,235 sq. ft.,
respectively.  The loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist
due to the expiration of a major tenant's lease.  A single tenant
occupies 98.1% of the net rentable area of 20555 Victor Parkway,
and 30.0% of 20255 Victor Parkway.  They have notified the
borrower of their intention not to renew their lease after its
expiration on Dec. 31, 2010, and they anticipate vacating their
space this month.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC for the
loans was 1.58x and 0.84x, respectively.  As of June 30, 2010,
occupancy for the properties was 100.0% and 58.2%, respectively.

The Gravois Bluffs II loan ($21.1 million, 1.4%) is the seventh-
largest loan in the pool, and is secured by a 263,926-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in Fenton, Mo.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Dec. 31, 2009,
the reported DSC was 0.87x.  As of May 4, 2010, the property was
84.2% occupied.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the raised, lowered and affirmed ratings.

              Ratings Lowered (Pooled Certificates)

              Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --              ----          ----------------------
    H      BBB+            A+                              8.84
    J      BBB-            A                               7.24
    K      BB-             BBB+                            4.51
    L      B-              BBB                             3.55
    M      CCC+            BB                              2.59
    N      CCC-            B+                              1.34
    O      CCC-            B                               0.83

              Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

              Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2

           Class  Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
           -----  ------        ----------------------
           A-2    AAA                            21.81
           A-3    AAA                            21.81
           B      AAA                            17.01
           C      AAA                            15.73
           D      AAA                            14.76
           E      AAA                            13.48
           F      AA+                            11.88
           G      AA                             10.28
           XC     AAA                              N/A

              Ratings Raised (Nonpooled Certificates)

              Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                      Class     To     From
                      -----     --     ----
                      CM-A      AAA     AA+
                      CM-B      AA+     AA
                      CM-C      AA      AA-
                      CM-D      AA-     A+
                      CM-E      A+      A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-TOP6 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP6, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

The downgrade of class M to 'D' follows a principal loss sustained
by the class, which was detailed in the August 2010 remittance
report.  The class M certificate experienced reported losses
totaling 67.5% of its $2.8 million opening certificate balance.
To date, class N, which is not rated by Standard & Poor's, has
lost 100% of its $11.2 million original certificate balance.  The
downgrades of classes K and L reflect credit support erosion due
to the write-down of classes M and N.

The principal loss and corresponding credit support erosion
resulted from the liquidation of an asset that was with the
special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The Nortel
Networks asset is a 281,758-sq.-ft. office property in Richardson,
Texas.  The asset had a total exposure of $28.6 million.  The
asset was transferred to the special servicer in September 2009and
became real estate owned in March 2010.  The trust incurred a
$12.0 million realized loss when the asset was liquidated during
the August reporting period.  Based on the August 2010 remittance
report data, the loss severity for this asset was 44.2% (based on
the asset's balance at the time of disposition).

As of the August 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 124 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$792.6 million, down from 150 assets totaling $1.12 billion at
issuance.  Two assets, totaling $4.8 million (0.6%), are with the
special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
totaling $13.1 million on two assets.  Based on the August 2010
remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for these
assets was approximately 41.8%.

                          Ratings Lowered

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP6

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class     To       From      Credit enhancement (%)
       -----     --       ----      ----------------------
       K         CCC      B+                          0.82
       L         CCC-     B                           0.11
       M         D        B-                          0.00


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-BBA7 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2006-BBA7, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other classes from
this transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the
transaction, which included the revaluation of the hotel
collateral securing the two remaining floating-rate loans.  Both
loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR and have final maturities on
Oct. 12, 2010.  Both of the loans are currently with the special
servicer, Bank of America N.A.  The downgrade of class K to 'D'
from 'CCC-' reflects ongoing interest shortfalls to the class for
the past 13 months.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls to
continue.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1B and X-3
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

S&P's analysis of the two loans is based, in part, on a review of
the available borrowers' operating statements for year-to-date
2010 and the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2009, as well as available
Smith Travel Research reports.

The Columbia Sussex Portfolio loan is the larger of the two
remaining loans in the pool.  This loan has a trust and whole-loan
balance of $536.7 million (93.1% of the remaining trust balance as
of the Aug. 16, 2010, trustee remittance report).  In addition,
the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure
mezzanine debt totaling $503.0 million, which is held outside the
trust.  This loan is secured by 14 full-service hotels (six Westin
flags, three Hilton flags, two Sheraton flags, two Marriott flags,
and one Wyndham flag) totaling 5,821 rooms in 10 states, the
District of Columbia, and Ontario, Canada.

The CSP loan was transferred to the special servicer, Bank of
America, on June 22, 2010, due to imminent default after the
borrower had expressed its inability to pay off the loan at its
final maturity date.  Bank of America stated that it is currently
in discussions with the borrower to workout this loan and has
ordered third-party appraisals.  Due to the transfer, special
servicing fees totaling $89,794, as reflected in the July 15,
2010, trustee remittance report, resulted in interest shortfalls
that affected all the classes subordinate to the class B
certificate.  Bank of America indicated that the borrower has
since agreed to pay the ongoing special servicing fees on this
loan.  The borrower has begun to pay the special servicing fees
subsequent to the July 2010 trustee remittance report.  S&P
expects the July 2010 interest shortfalls resulting from special
servicing fees on this loan to eventually be recovered.

The CSP loan terms provided for interest-only payments through
Oct. 12, 2007, and after which time to begin amortizing based on a
25-year schedule.  S&P's adjusted valuation is comparable to the
levels that S&P assessed in its last review dated Aug. 6, 2009.
Based on a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.6%, its
analysis yielded a stressed loan-to-value ratio of 91.1% on the
trust balance.  The master servicer, also Bank of America,
reported a combined debt service coverage of 2.58x for year-end
2009 and 60.7% occupancy for the portfolio as of May 2010.

The remaining loan in the pool, the Citigroup Property Investors
Hilton Portfolio loan, has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$39.5 million (6.9% of the trust balance).  In addition, the
equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure
mezzanine debt totaling $28.0 million, which is held outside the
trust.  The loan is secured by two full-service, two limited-
service, and one extended-stay hotels (four Hilton Garden Inn
flags and one Homewood Suites flag) totaling 944 rooms in Florida,
California, Georgia, Illinois, and Colorado.

The CPI loan was transferred to the special servicer on July 24,
2009, due to imminent default.  The borrower informed the master
servicer that it was unwilling to fund the July 2009 payment
shortfall.  The special servicer stated that it is currently
working with the borrower to modify the loan, which it expects to
close within 30-45 days.  Bank of America noted to us that it
anticipates the borrower to reimburse the special servicing fees
on this loan in connection with the loan modification.  The
December 2009 appraisals valued the collateral at above the trust
balance.

The CPI loan terms provided for interest-only payments for the
first 24 months and thereafter to begin amortizing based on a 25-
year schedule.  S&P's adjusted valuation has declined 9.7% since
its last review due primarily to lower revenue per available room.
S&P's analysis yielded a stressed LTV ratio of 126.2% on the trust
balance.  The master servicer reported a combined DSC of 1.80x for
year-end 2009 and 72.2% occupancy for the portfolio as of June
2010.

                          Ratings Lowered

          Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BBA7

                   Rating
                   ------
Class          To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
-----          --        ----              ----------------------
J              CCC-      CCC                                 1.66
K              D         CCC-                                 N/A

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BBA7

     Class        Rating                Credit enhancement (%)
     -----        ------                ----------------------
     A-1          AA                                     54.79
     A-2          BBB                                    32.55
     B            BB+                                    27.19
     C            BB                                     23.23
     D            B+                                     19.59
     E            B                                      15.94
     F            B                                      12.45
     G            B-                                      6.06
     H            CCC+                                    3.19
     X-1B         AA                                       N/A
     X-3          AA                                       N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE: S&P Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
California Statewide Communities Development Authority's (Quail
Ridge Apartments project) multifamily housing revenue refunding
bonds series 2002E-1 and 2002E-3 to 'BB+' and 'BB-' from 'BBB' and
'BB+', respectively.  The outlooks remain negative.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of a 17% decline in net operating
income in 2009, resulting in debt service coverage of 1.28x
maximum annual debt service on the senior bonds and 1.15x on
junior bonds, based on 2009 audited statements; a decrease in net
occupancy to 84% in 2009 from 91% in 2008; and high loan-to-value
ratio of 94% based on 2009 operating income and the project's
rated debt.

The above weaknesses are partially offset by S&P's view of a debt
service reserve fund funded at 12 months' MADS.

"The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the project's three-
year trend of declining debt service and decreasing occupancy,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Mikiyon Alexander.

Quail Ridge is a 360-unit garden style multifamily apartment
complex constructed in 1980.  The property is located at 962 West
Second St. in Rialto, on a quiet secondary street in a residential
community that is primarily single-family in nature, but contains
a few multifamily residential projects.  The project consists of
114 one-bedroom apartments, 150 two-bedroom apartments, and 96
three-bedroom apartments.


CITY OF NEWBURGH: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 rating on the
outstanding general obligation debt of the City of Newburgh (New
York) and removed the credit from Watchlist for potential
downgrade.  The Ba1 rating affects $33.66 million of outstanding
long-term debt.

The removal from Watchlist reflects stabilization in the past four
months, primarily related to the State of New York's establishing
oversight of city finances and creation of a Special Debt Service
Reserve Fund which will operate as a lock box for payment of debt
service.  Moody's believes that the State's actions increase the
likelihood that the city will be able to access the capital
markets in order to fund operations with cashflow notes.
Additionally, since the Watchlist was assigned, the city has
completed and released fiscal 2008 and 2009 audits, provided
Moody's with fiscal 2010 cashflows, and filled all department head
positions.

The Ba1 rating reflects the city's severely strained financial
position, extremely limited internal liquidity, and continued
heavy reliance on cash flow borrowing and extraordinary measures
to fund operations, as well as its stagnant tax base and weak
socioeconomic characteristics.

               State Oversight & Deficit Financing

The Newburgh Fiscal Recovery Act allows Newburgh to issue deficit
bonds of up to $15 million for the purpose of liquidating actual
deficits in it General Fund, Special Revenue Fund and Capital
Projects Fund.  The Act authorizes the State Comptroller's office
to create a Special Debt Service Reserve Fund for the purpose of
paying debt service on deficit notes or bonds.  The city's
property tax revenues are to be sent directly upon receipt to the
State Comptroller, who will deposit those monies in the SDSRF up
to a minimum required amount of debt service for the fiscal year;
however, the Comptroller is allowed to keep additional monies in
the fund "as the State Comptroller determines necessary" to ensure
sufficient moneys are available to cover debt service.  Further,
the State Comptroller may deposit directly into the SDSRF any
portion of state aid due to the city as the Comptroller determines
necessary.  The city received $12.05 million in property tax
revenues in fiscal 2009 and $4.8 million in state aid; it is
anticipating $12.35 million in property taxes and $4.4 million in
state aid in fiscal 2010, which would cover fiscal 2010 debt
service of $3.077 million by 5.45 times.  The Newburgh Fiscal
Recovery Act also gives the State Comptroller active oversight of
the city's financial operations, including receipt of quarterly
revenue and expenditure reports, review of future year budgets
before their adoption by the city council, and review of three-
year financial plans that are required to include initiatives to
reduce operating expenses.  The State Comptrollers authority as
outlined here are in effect through the life of any deficit bonds
or notes, an anticipated 15 years.

City officials report that upcoming planned deficit financing
notes will enable the city to end fiscal 2010 (Dec. 31 year-end)
with zero fund balances in all of its major funds, which would
mark an improvement from earlier expectations of a fiscal 2010
projected deficit of -$10 million and from fiscal 2009 audited
results.  The city ended fiscal 2009 with a $1.62 million total
General Fund balance (4.2% of General Fund revenues) and
-$1.38 million Unreserved General Fund balance deficit, as well as
a -$7.5 million Capital Projects Fund balance deficit.  The
Capital Fund deficit should be eliminated when the BANs
outstanding are permanently financed.  The city also increased
sanitation rates 30% in fiscal 2010 and created a self-sufficient
enterprise fund for the sanitation system, saving $500,000 from
the General Fund.  Officials are targeting specific revenue
enhancements and expenditure reductions in the fiscal 2011 budget,
although details will not be determined until submitted to the
city council in September.  The budget will be adopted by the city
council in November.

Key Statistics:

* 2008 Census population estimate: 28,101

* 2010 Full valuation: $1.3 billion

* 2010 Full value per capita: $47,556

* 2000 Per Capita Income: $13,360 (57.1% of state and 61.9% of US)

* 2000 Median Family Income: 32,519 (62.9% of state and 65.0% of
  US)

* FY 2009 General Fund balance: $1.62 million (4.2% of General
  Fund revenues)

* FY 2009 Unreserved General Fund balance: -$1.385 million (-3.6%
  of General Fund revenues)

* Direct debt burden: 3.6%

* Overall debt burden: 4.5%

* Payout of principal (10 years): 48.2%

* Long-term General Obligation Debt Outstanding: $33.66 million

Moody's last rating action on the City of Newburgh's outstanding
general obligation debt was April 15, 2010, when it was downgraded
to Ba1 from Baa3 and put on Watchlist for possible downgrade.


CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on CLASS I-C Swap, Series 25
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the following ratings on the Classes issued by
Claris IV Limited Series 25.  Claris IV Limited Series 25 is
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-backed
securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the Class I-A Swap, Class
I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap address the probability of breaching
their respective attachment points as defined in the transaction
documents at or prior to their maturity dates.

The actions reflect (a) the deterioration in credit quality of the
underlying collateral pool since the transaction was last assigned
a DBRS rating on June 30, 2009, (b) amendments to the transaction
as of August 17, 2010, and (c) additional subordination to the
Claris IV Limited Series 25 Class I-A Swap, Class I-B Swap, and
Class I-C Swap as of August 17, 2010.

   -- $233,165,596 Class I-A Swap, Series 25 at AA (low) (sf)
   -- $50,000,000 Class I-B Swap, Series 25 at BBB (low) (sf)
   -- $40,000,000 Class I-C Swap, Series 25 at BB (low) (sf)


CLARKE UNIVERSITY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on 1998 Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 long-term rating on
Clarke University's (IA) Series 1998 bonds issued through Dubuque
County, Iowa, with $5.4 million outstanding.  The University was
formerly known as Clarke College.  The Ba1 rating is based on an
established market position with challenges for undergraduate
enrollment from a highly competitive student market and a
demographically challenged state; an adequate financial resource
cushion; a reduction in outstanding debt; and expected longer-term
capital needs for an aging campus and to compete with peer
institutions.  The rating outlook is stable, which reflects
Moody's expectation of stable financial resources, generally
stable enrollment, modest growth in net tuition revenues, and no
new debt.

Legal Security: The Series 1998 bonds are a general obligation of
the University.  There is a debt service reserve fund funded at
maximum annual debt service.

Debt-Related Derivatives: None

                             Strengths

* Established student market position that should be maintained as
  a small Catholic, liberal arts higher education institution
  located in Dubuque, Iowa.  The University reported enrollment of
  1,057 full-time equivalent students for Fall 2009, up modestly
  from 1,032 in the prior year.  Clarke offers academic programs
  unique in the region, including a Bachelors of Fine Arts,
  Doctorate of Physical Therapy, and a number of adult completion
  degrees (its TimeSaver programs).  For the upcoming Fall 2010,
  Clarke is projecting generally stable enrollment, with an
  increase in traditional undergraduate enrollment offsetting a
  projected decline in enrolled credit hours for its TimeSaver
  programs due to heightened competition from the University of
  Dubuque and from local community colleges.  Net tuition revenues
  have shown good growth, with net tuition per student increasing
  2.6% to $12,954 in FY 2009 from the previous year.  Clarke has
  launched a Bachelors of Applied Science in Information
  Technology degree that may provide employment opportunities at
  the newly-opened IBM site in Dubuque, which is ultimately
  expected to employ 1,300 people by next year.

* Expected balanced operating performance based on sound budgeting
  practices and cost management efforts.  For FY 2009, Clarke
  produced a three year average operating margin of 13.5%, as
  calculated by Moody's assuming a 5% endowment spend rate.
  However, the operating margin for FY 2009 was breakeven at -
  0.5%.  The dramatic difference in the average operating margin
  and the margin for FY 2009 alone reflects the accounting
  recognition of a $10.4 million unrestricted bequest in FY 2009
  (with half of the gift actually received in FY 2008 and the
  other half in FY 2009).  The University expects to report
  balanced operating performance in FY 2010 due to net tuition
  revenue growth as well as the receipt of $5.4 million
  unrestricted bequest.  Operating cash flow has been sound, with
  an annual operating cash flow margin of 8.5% for FY 2009 and
  comparable results expected for FY 2010.  As a result, debt
  service coverage is satisfactory with annual debt service
  coverage of 2.0 times in FY 2009.

* Decrease in outstanding debt to $7.5 million from a high of
  $13.1 million in FY 2004.  This reduction reflects Clarke's
  efforts to improve cash flow generation and operating
  performance, eliminating the University's previous practice of
  drawing on a line of credit to repay Revenue Anticipation Notes
  issued to fund operating cash needs throughout the year.  The
  University no longer issues RANs to fund operating cash needs,
  drawing on the line of credit to fund its working capital needs
  for the summer months with the repayments from receipt of Fall
  semester tuition revenues.  The normal summer draws under the
  line of credit are generally $3.5 million, which substantially
  increases its outstanding debt for a few months.  The University
  has no immediate debt plans.

* Adequate financial resource cushion, with expendable financial
  resources of $11.7 million cushioning total debt by 1.6 times.
  Expendable financial resources as calculated by Moody's declined
  32% from $17.0 million in FY 2008, due largely to investment
  losses.  Expendable financial resources cushion operations by
  0.6 times.  Endowment investments produced a favorable 12.4%
  return for the twelve months ending 6/30/2010 and are
  diversified, with 34% in equities, 39% in fixed income, 9% in
  real estate funds, 10% in commodities, 6% in other alternatives,
  and 2% in cash.  Further, Clarke shows good liquidity, with
  $16.4 million of calculated monthly liquidity and 311 monthly
  days cash as of May 31, 2009.  For FY 2010, Moody's expect
  resources to remain generally stable, driven by investment gains
  and at least stable operating performance.

                            Challenges

* Highly competitive student market and demographically challenged
  state, resulting in expected long-term enrollment challenges for
  its core undergraduate and TimeSaver programs and pressures on
  net tuition revenue growth.  With less than 1,100 FTEs, Clarke
  is relatively small and has a high reliance on student charges
  to fund operations, representing 84% of FY 2009 operating
  revenues.  Although growing, net tuition per student for FY 2009
  is $12,954 and is lower than the FY 2009 median net tuition per
  student of $14,417 for private colleges and universities rated
  Ba1 and lower.

* Longer-term capital needs expected, with Clarke currently
  planning for a Science Building to add lab space at a current
  projected cost of up to $11 million.  The University is
  currently in the quiet phase of a fundraising campaign
  specifically for the building, with $1.7 million in pledges to
  date.  Debt plans beyond the next few years are uncertain,
  although the University may look longer-term to invest in
  student housing and recreation facilities in conjunction with
  its campus master plan.  Additionally, Moody's notes that the
  University's age of plant has steadily increased in recent years
  and stood at a calculated 19.3 years, representing relatively
  old facilities compared to the FY 2009 median of 12.3 years.

                              Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation of stable
financial resources, generally stable enrollment and modest growth
in net tuition revenues, with no new debt.

                 What Could Change the Rating -- Up

Consistently balanced operating performance, with growth in liquid
financial resources providing a greater cushion for debt and
operations; increased enrollment and growth in net tuition
revenues

                What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Borrowing without commensurate growth of financial resources or
incremental revenues to cover debt service; decline in enrollment
and minimal to no growth in tuition revenues; persistent operating
deficits

Key Indicators (FY 2009 financial results; Fall 2009 enrollment
data):

* Total Enrollment: 1,057 full-time equivalent students

* Expendable Financial Resources: $11.7 million

* Total Financial Resources: $21.7 million

* Monthly Liquidity: $16.4 million

* Monthly Days Cash on Hand (unrestricted funds available within 1
  month divided by operating expenses excluding depreciation,
  divided by 365 days): 311 days

* Total Direct Debt: $7.5 million

* Expendable Financial Resources to Debt: 1.6 times

* Expendable Financial Resources to Operations: 0.6 times

* Average Three Year Operating Margin: 13.5% (includes revenue
  recognition of $10.4 million gift in FY 2008)

The last rating action was on May 9, 2008, when the rating of
Clarke University was affirmed and the outlook revised to stable
from positive.  That rating was subsequently recalibrated to Ba1
on May 7, 2010.


CONN FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on three
classes of Series 2006-A asset-backed notes issued by Conn Funding
II, L.P.  The notes are backed by a revolving pool of private
label, consumer installment contracts and revolving loans
originated by Conn's, Inc.

Issuer: Conn Funding II, L.P.

  -- $90,000,000 5.507% Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes, Class A,
     Series 2006-A, downgraded to Ba1 (sf) from Baa2 (sf);
     previously on February 8, 2010, placed under review for
     possible downgrade

  -- $43,333,000 5.854% Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes, Class B,
     Series 2006-A, downgraded to B3 (sf) from B2 (sf); previously
     on February 8, 2010, placed under review for possible
     downgrade

  -- $16,667,000 6.814% Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes, Class C,
     Series 2006-A, downgraded to Caa2 (sf) from Caa1 (sf);
     previously on February 8, 2010, placed under review for
     possible downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The principal reason for the downgrade actions are the ongoing
risks to the ABS related to the Company's long-term funding and
liquidity position.  Furthermore, the performance of the managed
loan portfolio has deteriorated over the past several quarters,
which marginally increases the probability that the Trust will
breach a performance trigger that could lead to the unwinding of a
significant portion of Conn's total financing.

In addition to the rated Series 2006-A notes, the Company derives
a large percentage of its liquidity and funding from a variable
funding securitization facility backed by consumer loan
receivables, and an asset-based revolving credit facility.  Prior
to the Series 2006-A scheduled maturity, both the variable funding
securitization facility and asset-based revolving credit facility
mature in August 2011.  At this time, Moody's does not believe a
negative liquidity event is imminent.  However, Conn's heavy
reliance on capital markets funding increases the risk of adverse
events related to liquidity pressures.  The Company continues to
explore options for renewal or replacement of all of its
outstanding facilities.

Each of Conn's three primary funding sources carries cross-default
provisions whereby a default of any one of the three would trigger
a default of all of the facilities.  During the first quarter of
2010, the Company revised several of the covenants contained in
its borrowing agreements, thereby alleviating the immediate
potential for a covenant violation.  However, continued
deterioration in either the performance of the collateral
supporting the Company's securitizations, or the operating and
financial performance of Conn's, could once again threaten a
breach of triggers or covenants, causing a series of cross-
defaults.

Without these credit facilities, Conn's ability to offer credit to
its customers would be greatly constrained.  This could have
significant implications on Conn's operations given the company's
heavy reliance on credit-driven sales to mostly subprime obligors.
In turn, in a scenario where Conn's is in financial distress,
collateral performance of the related ABS program would likely
suffer.  In such a scenario, servicing quality may deteriorate.
This is of particular concern for this trust, given the high
percentage of cash and in-store payments combined with the lack of
consistent distribution of monthly borrowers' statements which are
key in maintaining customer contact.

Structural mitigants to servicer risk include a contracted backup
servicer, Wells Fargo.  As back-up servicer, Wells Fargo is
contracted to assume the servicer's duties upon a servicer
default, such as the insolvency of the servicer.  If a servicer
default were to occur, Moody's believes that a timely transfer of
responsibilities to a competent successor servicer would mitigate
losses.

The Series 2006-A notes are scheduled to begin monthly repayments
of principal to noteholders in September 2010.  These scheduled
payments amount to 5% of the outstanding note principal balance
each month, and are scheduled to conclude after 20 months in April
2012.

Compared to two years ago, trust data for the June reporting
period indicate charge-offs have increased from about 3.5% to 5.4%
and yield has fallen from about 20.0% to 17.4%, although
performance has shown signs of stabilization since the beginning
of the year.  These combined effects have pushed the three-month
average net portfolio yield below 6%, compared to its level above
10% just two years ago.  Should the net portfolio yield drop below
2% on a three-month average basis, the Trust would enter an
accelerated amortization period where by all principal would be
returned to noteholders on a sequential basis.

Credit enhancement for the Class A, B, and C rated notes totals
about 50%, 24%, and 14%, respectively.

Moody's has reduced the expected range for Trust yield to 16% -
19%, from 18%-21%.  The expected ranges for charge-off rate and
principal payment rate remain unchanged at 5% - 7% and 4% - 6%
respectively.

These performance expectations indicate Moody's forward-looking
view of the likely range of performance over the medium term.
From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these
expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than anticipated when the related securities were rated.
Even so, a deviation from the expected range will not necessarily
result in a rating action nor does performance within expectations
preclude such actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a
rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range of factors
including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
macroeconomic and financial environment, in which unemployment
continues to rise and access to the capital markets remains
difficult, particularly for smaller issuers.  Overall, Moody's
central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011;
Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world
largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated
fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the rating, public information, and
confidential and proprietary Moody's Investor Service information
and confidential and proprietary of Moody's Analytics'
information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer satisfactory for the purposes of
maintaining a credit rating.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust Series 2007-C3, Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's
series 2006-C23, and Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CP5, three U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions.

The downgrades reflect interest shortfalls.  S&P expects the
shortfalls on seven of these classes to continue and, as a result,
S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

All of the classes S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have experienced
interest shortfalls for five months or more.  S&P's determination
of the recurring interest shortfalls for the respective
certificates is primarily due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Interest not advanced by the respective master servicers on
  assets they have declared nonrecoverable; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered loans where
the respective master servicers have made nonrecoverable advance
declarations, and special servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's
view, to cause recurring interest shortfalls.

Eight of the 15 classes also experienced shortfalls in the current
reporting period and are at an increased risk of experiencing
shortfalls in the future.  If these interest shortfalls continue,
S&P will likely downgrade these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of a
loan's stated principal balance when that loan is 60 days past due
and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P exclusively considered ASERs based on
ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  S&P used
this approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
are highly subject to change, or even a reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P detail the 15 downgraded classes from the three CMBS
transactions below.

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class D, E, F, G, H, J, and K
certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series
2007-C3 due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting
from ASERs related to assets currently with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. As of the August 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $149.5 million were in effect for 19 assets.  The
reported current ASER amount was $488,450, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $5,179,902.  Standard & Poor's
considered eight ASERs ($388,597), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, interest not advanced by the master servicer on one
asset it has declared nonrecoverable, and current special
servicing fees to determine its rating actions for this
transaction.  The reported current interest shortfalls total
$1,153,991 and have affected all outstanding classes up to and
including class D.  Classes H, J, and K have all experienced at
least five consecutive months of interest shortfalls, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the CS 2007-C3 transaction consists of 227
exposures with an aggregate trust balance of $2.62 billion.  As of
the August 2010, remittance report, 29 assets ($654.9 million;
25.0% of the trust balance) in the pool were with the special
servicer.  The payment status of the specially serviced assets is:
five are real estate owned (REO) ($72.6 million; 2.8%), three are
in foreclosure ($42.6 million; 1.6%), eight are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($244.5 million; 9.3%), three are 30 days delinquent
($19.8 million; 0.8%), eight are late but less than 30 days
delinquent ($104.5 million; 4.0%), and two are current in their
payments ($170.8 million; 6.5%).

     Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's Series 2006-C23

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2006-C23 due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting
from ASERs related to assets currently with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  As of the August 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $146.0 million were in effect for 14 assets.
The reported current ASER amount was $497,139, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $3,941,505.  Standard & Poor's
considered 11 ASERs ($475,572), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, interest not advanced by the master servicer on one
asset it has declared nonrecoverable, and current special
servicing fees to determine its rating actions for this
transaction.  The reported current interest shortfalls total
$635,635 and have affected all outstanding classes up to and
including class K.  Classes O, P, and Q have all experienced at
least seven consecutive months of interest shortfalls, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C23 transaction consists
of 303 exposures with an aggregate trust balance of $4.10 billion.
As of the August 2010, remittance report, 15 assets
($406.1 million; 9.9% of the trust balance) in the pool were with
the special servicer.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: six are REO ($88.9 million; 2.2%), four are in
foreclosure ($52.1 million; 1.3%), and five are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($265.2 million; 6.5%).

     Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
                          Series 2002-CP5

S&P lowered its rating on the class O certificate from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CP5
due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to loans currently with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  As of the August 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $6.0 million were in effect for
four loans.  The reported current ASER amount was $36,450, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $214,413.  Standard & Poor's
considered four ASERs ($36,450), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, and current special servicing fees to determine its
rating actions for this transaction.  The reported current
interest shortfalls total $60,260 and have affected all
outstanding classes up to and including class N.  Class O has
experienced 12 consecutive months of interest shortfalls, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the CSFB 2002-CP5 transaction consists of
111 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $882.2 million.  As
of the August 2010, remittance report, five loans ($64.0 million;
7.3% of the trust balance) in the pool were with the special
servicer.  The payment status of the specially serviced exposures
is: one is in foreclosure ($6.7 million; 0.8%), two are 90-plus-
days delinquent ($4.2 million; 0.5%), one is 60 days delinquent
($8.6 million; 1.0%), and one is in its grace period
($44.4 million; 5.0%).

                          Ratings Lowered

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
                                                       interest
          Rating                                       shortfalls ($)
          ------                                       --------------
Class  To         From      Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accum
-----  --         ----      ----------------------   -------    -----
D      CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)    8.40                      60,856     60,856
E      CCC (sf)   B (sf)    7.63                      99,185     99,185
F      CCC- (sf)  B (sf)    6.74                     115,715    115,715
G      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)   5.58                     148,777    148,777
H      D (sf)     B- (sf)   4.30                     165,308    425,524
J      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf) 3.15                     148,777    951,260
K      D (sf)     CCC (sf)  2.00                     148,777  1,215,982

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C23

                                                       Reported
                                                       interest
          Rating                                       shortfalls ($)
          ------                                       --------------
Class  To         From      Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accum
-----  --         ----      ----------------------   -------    -----
K      CCC (sf)   B- (sf)   3.59                     15,263     15,263
L      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)   3.33                     44,627     44,627
M      CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)   2.82                     89,249      89,249
N      CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf) 2.43                     66,938      90,269
O      D (sf)     CCC (sf)  2.17                     44,627     197,676
P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf) 1.78                     66,938     546,305
Q      D (sf)     CCC- (sf) 1.40                     66,938     689,949

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

                                                       Reported
                                                       interest
          Rating                                       shortfalls ($)
          ------                                       --------------
Class  To         From      Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accum
-----  --         ----      ----------------------   -------    -----
O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf) 0.52                     20,576     69,145


EDUCATION LOANS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bond to 'Bsf' issued by Education Loans
Inc. Student Loan Trust series 2005-1.  Stable Outlooks are
assigned.  Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Rating
Criteria and FFELP student loan ABS rating criteria, as well as
the refined basis risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29 press
release were used to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior note is affirmed based on the sufficient
level of credit enhancement (consisting of subordination and the
projected minimum excess spread) to cover the applicable basis
factor stress.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'Bsf' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread and reach parity of
100%.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Education Loan Inc. Student Loan Trust, series 2005-1:

  -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf/LS3' from 'Asf/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.


FRESNO PACIFIC: Moody's Puts 'Ba2' Rating on Watchlist
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the Ba2 rating of Fresno
Pacific University on Watchlist for possible downgrade.  The
rating action impacts $6.0 million of outstanding Series 2000A
bonds issued through the California Educational Facilities
Authority.  Following a full review of FPU's credit rating,
Moody's expect to conclude Moody's Watchlist period within the
next 90 days.

The rating action reflects concern regarding the University's
level of liquidity, availability of financial resources, as well
as a challenging debt structure.  Moody's remain concerned as the
University continues to struggle with limited unrestricted
resources (negative $1.8 million in FY2009), with substantial
portions of the University's expendable resources representing
less liquid collections of art.  The University's debt structure
in light of the thin liquidity, causes a concern as it maintains a
$7.9 million three-year loan with a foundation through the
Mennonite church, the University's affiliated religious
background, and an additional $6.3 million of bank debt and loans
to individuals.  This remains a weakness as these loans are
typically for shorter terms than long-term bonds.

Moody's review of the University's credit will focus on a review
of fiscal 2010 financial performance and operating projections, up
to date levels of unrestricted cash and investments and enrollment
trends.  Also to be reviewed is the investments, liquidity and
financial position of the Fresno Pacific University Foundation, a
guarantor of the Series 2000 bonds.

Legal Security: The rated Series 2000 bonds are secured by a
pledge of gross revenues and a mortgage on certain Real Property
of the University.  The bonds are further secured by an
irrevocable guarantee of the Fresno Pacific University Foundation,
which until FY 2009 was consolidated within the University's
audit, limited to the unrestricted assets of the Foundation.  Up
to $4 million of the Foundation's obligations are indemnified by
the AIMS Educational Foundation, a separate not-for-profit
organization affiliated with FPU.

Key Indicators (Fall 2009 enrollment data and FY 2009 audited
financial data):

* Total Enrollment: 2,272 full-time equivalents

* Total Direct Debt: $20.9 million

* Total Resources (as of 4/30/2009 including FPU Foundation
  assets): $16.9 million

* Expendable Resources to Debt: 0.44 times

* Expendable Resources to Operations: 0.25 times

* Three-Year Average Operating Margin: -1.5%

* Three-Year Average Debt Service Coverage: 1.42 times

Rated Debt:

* CEFA Series 2000A: Ba2

The last rating action with respect to Fresno Pacific University
was on January 27, 2009, when the rating was downgraded to Ba2
from Baa3 and the negative outlook was maintained.  The rating was
subsequently recalibrated to Ba2 with a negative outlook on May 7,
2010.

Moody's Investors Service adopts all necessary measures so that
the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of
sufficient quality and from reliable sources; however, Moody's
Investors Service does not and cannot in every instance
independently verify, audit or validate information received in
the rating process.


GS MORTGAGE: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E
------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to the following classes of GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2010-C1.  The trends are Stable.

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class B at AAA (sf)
   -- Class C at AA (sf)
   -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
   -- Class E at BB (sf)
   -- Class F at B (sf)
   -- Class G at NR
   -- Class X at AAA (sf)

The collateral consists of 23 fixed-rate loans secured by 48
commercial properties.  The portfolio has a balance of
$788,489,108.  The pool benefits from low leverage financing with
a DBRS weighted average term DSCR and debt yield of 1.64x and
12.7%, respectively based on the trust amount and a 1.54x and
11.7% based on the whole loan.  The pool also benefits from
significant amortization as 19.2% of the pool amortizes down by
maturity.

DBRS shadow-rates eleven loans, representing 58.4% of the pool,
investment grade.  The investment-grade shadow-rated loans
indicate the long-term stability of the underlying assets.


GULF STREAM: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1,
Ltd.:

  -- US$320,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2016 (current
     outstanding balance of US$188,561,641), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on July 30, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf);

  -- US$34,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2016, Upgraded
     to Ba1(sf); previously on July 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3
     (sf);

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2016, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately 32.6% or $91.1 million since the
last rating action.  The overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action in July 2009.  As of the
latest trustee report dated August 3, 2010, the Senior
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 129.2%, versus July
2009 levels of 113.9%.

Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the portfolio has
been relatively stable since the last rating action.  Based on the
August 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
2821 compared to 2836 in July 2009.  The deal also experienced a
decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to about $9 million from
approximately $30 million in July 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par of
$241 million, defaulted par of $ 16 million, weighted average
default probability of 26.5% (implying a WARF of 3820), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 42.9%, and a diversity score
of 64.  These default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily
on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each
case, historical and market performance trends, and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1, Ltd., issued in August 2004, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

The table below summarizes the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

* Tranche Name Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3056) Moody's
  Adjusted WARF + 20% (4584)

  -- Class A +1 -2
  -- Class C +3 -1
  -- Class D +3 -2

The table below summarizes the impact of different recovery rate
levels on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected losses) ,
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

* Tranche Name Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% Moody's Adjusted WARR --
  2%

  -- Class A 0 -1
  -- Class C +1 0
  -- Class D 0 -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the bond/loan market and/or
   collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
   impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

5) Any other parameter sensitivity or scenario run results if
   available.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-LN2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-LN2.

The downgrade of the class P certificates to 'D' from 'CCC-'
follows a principal loss sustained by the class, which was
reported in the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance report.  The class P
certificates experienced reported losses amounting to 5.2%
($406,760) of its $7.8 million opening certificate balance.  The
unrated class N certificates lost 100% of its $5.7 million opening
balance.

The downgrades to the class J, K, L, M, and N certificates reflect
S&P's analysis of the interest shortfalls affecting the
transaction.  S&P lowered its ratings on the class M and N
certificates due to interest shortfalls that have affected the
classes for the past two months and are likely continue.  The
downgrades to the class J, K, and L certificates reflect a
reduction of available interest to the trust and the potential for
these classes to experience shortfalls in the future relating to
the 11 assets ($104.3 million, 10.3% of the pool) that are
currently with the special servicer.

According to the August 2010 remittance report, the losses relate
to three assets that were with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC.  Details are:

The Cambridge Woods loan is secured by a 132-unit multifamily
property in Toledo, Ohio, which had a balance of $3.5 million and
a total exposure of $3.7 million prior to resolution.  The loan
was transferred to CWCapital in January 2010 due to payment
default.  The trust incurred a $2.4 million realized loss
resulting from a note sale on July 30, 2010.  Based on the August
2010 remittance report, the loss severity for this loan was 67.9%
of its balance before the sale.

The Briar Cliff Woods loan is secured by a 108-unit multifamily
property in Toledo, Ohio, which had a balance of $2.2 million and
a total exposure of $2.4 million prior to resolution.  The asset
was transferred to CWCapital in January 2010 due to payment
default.  The trust incurred a $1.3 million realized loss
resulting from a note sale on July 30, 2010.  Based on the August
2010 remittance report, the loss severity for this loan was 57.1%
of its balance before the sale.

The Raymond Road Shopping Center was a real estate owned asset
with a total exposure of $3.1 million prior to liquidation.  The
center is a 62,345-sq.-ft. retail property in Jackson, Mich.  The
related loan was transferred to CWCapital in May 2009 due to
payment default, and the asset subsequently became REO.  Based on
the August 2010 remittance report, the trust incurred a
$2.4 million realized loss when the asset was liquidated on
Aug. 2, 2010, at a loss severity of 88.31%.

According to the August 2010 remittance report, the collateral
pool for the transaction consisted of 156 loans with an aggregate
trust balance of $1.02 billion, down from 175 loans totaling
$1.25 billion at issuance.  There are 11 loans with the special
servicer totaling $104.3 million (10.3%).  To date, the trust has
experienced losses on eight assets totaling $17.7 million.  Based
on the August 2010 remittance report, the weighted average loss
severity for these assets was approximately 65.7%.

                          Ratings Lowered

       JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-LN2

                    Rating
                    ------
        Class     To        From    Credit enhancement (%)
        -----     --        ----    ----------------------
        J         B-        B+                        2.72
        K         CCC+      B                         2.10
        L         CCC       B                         1.65
        M         CCC-      B-                        1.19
        N         CCC-      CCC+                      0.73
        P         D         CCC-                      0.00


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2005-LDP3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-LDP3.

The downgrade of the class M certificates to 'D' from 'CCC-'
follows a principal loss sustained by the class, which was
reported in the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance report.  The class M
certificates experienced reported losses amounting to 77.1% of its
$2.5 million opening certificate balance.  The class N and O
certificates lost 100% percent of their opening balances, or
$7.6 million and $5.1 million, respectively.  S&P downgraded these
classes to 'D' on Jan. 25, 2010, due to principal losses.

The downgrades to the class H, J, K, and L certificates reflect
S&P's analysis of the interest shortfalls affecting the
transaction.  S&P lowered its ratings on the class K and L
certificates to 'D' from 'CCC' and 'CCC-', respectively, due to
interest shortfalls that have affected these classes for the past
four months, which S&P expects will continue for the foreseeable
future.  S&P lowered its rating on the class J certificates to
'CCC-' from 'CCC' due to interest shortfalls to the class for the
past month.  S&P lowered its rating on the class H certificates
due to the class' increased susceptibility to future interest
shortfalls.  These downgrades also reflect a reduction of
available interest to the trust, as well as the potential for
these classes to experience shortfalls in the future relating to
the eight assets ($65.6 million, 4.0% of the pool) that are
currently with the special servicer.

According to the August 2010 remittance report, the principal
losses on the class M certificates resulted from the liquidation
of two loan exposures that were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Details of the two exposures that
were liquidated are:

The 1850 Sam Rittenberg Boulevard loan was secured by a 9,300-sq.-
ft. unanchored retail property in Charleston, S.C., and had a
total exposure of $1.8 million prior to liquidation.  The loan was
transferred to CWCapital in January 2010 due to payment default.
The trust incurred a $1.2 million realized loss when the loan was
liquidated via a note sale for a loss severity of 71.1%.

The Cottage Grove Marketplace loan was secured by a 12,083-sq.-ft.
unanchored retail property in Cottage Grove, Minn., and had a
total exposure of $1.6 million prior to liquidation.  The loan was
transferred to CWCapital in November 2009 due to imminent payment
default.  The trust incurred a $1.2 million realized loss when the
loan was liquidated via a note sale for a loss severity of 78.9%.

According to the August 2010 remittance report, the collateral
pool for the transaction consisted of 209 loans with an aggregate
trust balance of $1.65 billion, down from 232 loans totaling
$2.02 billion at issuance.  There are eight loans with the special
servicer totaling $65.6 million (4.0%).  To date, the trust has
experienced losses on eight assets totaling $39.9 million.  Based
on the August 2010 remittance report, the weighted average loss
severity for these assets was approximately 47.7%.

                          Ratings Lowered

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class    To         From     Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    --         ----     ----------------------
       H        CCC+       B-                         1.72
       J        CCC-       CCC                        1.11
       K        D          CCC                        0.50
       L        D          CCC-                       0.04
       M        D          CCC-                       0.00


JPMORGAN AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all classes of JPMorgan Auto Receivables
Trust 2008-A asset-backed notes and revises the Rating Outlook as
detailed below:

  -- Class A-3 asset-backed notes at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 asset-backed notes at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B asset-backed notes at 'AAsf', Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C asset-backed notes at 'Asf', Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D asset-backed notes at 'BBBsf', Outlook Positive;
  -- Class E asset-backed notes at 'BBsf', Outlook Positive.

The collateral is performing slightly worse than Fitch's initial
expectations.  However, the credit enhancement structure currently
provides stressed loss coverage consistent with each of the
current rating categories while still making full payments of
interest and principal in accordance with the term of the
documents.  The Positive Rating Outlook on the subordinate notes
reflects the expectation that the structure's coverage of expected
losses will continue to increase and could lead to positive rating
actions within the next year.

As before, the ratings of the securities reflect the high quality
of the underlying retail installment sales contracts, available
credit enhancement, the sound legal and cash flow structure, and
strength of System & Services Technologies, Inc. as the
receivables servicer and JPMorgan as master servicer.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2000-C3 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2000-C3 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $28.7 million class B at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48.9 million class C at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.5 million class D at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class E at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class F at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.7 million class G at 'AAAsf/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative, downgrades,
and assigns a Rating Outlook and LS and Recovery Ratings to these
classes:

  -- $20.8 million class H to 'BBBsf/LS3' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16.3 million class J to 'CCCsf/RR3' from 'BBB+sf';

  -- $9.7 million class K to 'CCsf/RR5' from 'BBBsf'.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
classes L, M, N and P.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class X.

The downgrades are the result of an increase in Fitch expected
losses following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses
and expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.
Fitch expects potential losses of 17.9% of the remaining pool
balance from loans in special servicing and loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The majority of Fitch expected losses are from loans currently in
special servicing with the fifth and 19th largest loans
representing approximately 13.75% of Fitch's expected losses.
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes
over the next one or two years.

As of the June 2010 distribution, the pool has paid down 83% to
$210 million from $1.3 billion at issuance.  Of the original 173
loans, 27 remain in the transaction.  Fitch has identified 15
Loans of Concern (72.4%), including 14 loans in special servicing
(69.5%), as well as other loans with deteriorating performance.
The largest specially serviced loan (26.10%) is collateralized by
a retail property in New Hartford, NY.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in December 2009 due to a maturity default.  The
special servicer is currently working with the borrower on a loan
modification.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, all of the remaining performing
loans are expected to pay off at maturity.


LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned final ratings to the following notes issued by
LEAF Receivables Funding 4, LLC:

   -- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
   -- Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
   -- Class C Notes rated A (sf)
   -- Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
   -- Class E Notes rated BB (sf)


LOWER BUCKS: Moody's Downgrades Hospital Bond Rating to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the bond rating of Lower
Bucks Hospital to Ca from Caa3, removing the rating from
Watchlist.  The downgrade to Ca reflects Moody's assessment that
the recovery value of the bonds will be notably less than 100%
given the current information available.  This action affects the
Series 1992 Bonds (approximately $25 million outstanding) issued
through Langhorne Manor Borough Higher Educational and Health
Authority, Pennsylvania.  The rating outlook is negative at the
lower rating level.

Legal Security: Gross Revenue pledge of LBH with a negative
mortgage lien (see challenges for discussion on liens).  1.10
times maximum annual debt services rate covenant required in the
1992 Series Bond Loan and Security Agreement.  Debt Service
Reserve Fund was partially drawn upon in January 2010

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                            Challenges

* Voluntarily filed to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
  Bankruptcy Code on January 13, 2010 and since then management
  has been working on a plan of reorganization.  The Ca rating
  level reflects Moody's assessment that the recovery value of the
  bonds will be notably less than 100% given the current
  information available.  The DSRF was drawn upon to make the
  January 2010 payment to bondholders, however, in spite of a
  remaining balance in the DSRF, all principal and interest
  payments since that date have been "stayed" by Bankruptcy Court

* Weak unrestricted cash of $9.4 million (32 days cash on hand and
  38% cash-to-debt) as of May 31, 2010, though substantially
  better than when LBH first filed.  Also, as of May 31, 2010, LBH
  has an additional $2.2 million in the debt service reserve fund.

* Revenue has declined for two consecutive years and operating
  margins remain very weak largely reflecting volume declines and
  economic challenges; the immediate market area has experienced
  population declines and exhibits below-average wealth levels

* Deferred capital spending in order to preserve cash levels

* LBH applied for "distressed status" designation by the Pension
  Benefit Guaranty Corporation; waiver status is pending

* State fiscal pressures, which may continue to reduce or
  eliminate any future state appropriations for indigent care to
  LBH ($1.0 million received in FY 2010 and $1.25 million received
  in FY 2009, funding levels which are down materially from
  $4.3 million in FY 2008)

* The validity that Bondholder Liens are secured is being disputed
  in bankruptcy court

                            Strengths

* While still weak, unrestricted cash levels have recently grown,
  from a FYE 2009 low of just $2.8 million, largely as a result of
  revenue cycle initiatives and minimal capital spending

* Management reports that with the help of consultants, operations
  have produced positive cashflow on a monthly basis for the
  majority of the second half of FY 2010, all trade groups and
  vendors are being paid in a timely fashion, and a turn-around
  plan is being formulated with the goal of emerging from
  bankruptcy

* Debt is all fixed rate and there are no derivatives

                             Outlook

The rating outlook is negative.  A lower rating will be considered
if the recovery on the bonds is lower than Moody's current
estimates.

                What would change the rating -- Up

Given the bankruptcy, a rating upgrade is highly unlikely in the
near-term

               What could change the rating -- Down

Lower estimated recovery value of the bonds.

                             Rated Debt

* Series 1992, fixed rate

The last rating action with respect to Lower Bucks was on
January 27, 2010, when the Caa3 municipal finance scale rating was
placed on Watchlist for downgrade.  That rating was subsequently
recalibrated to a global scale rating on May 7, 2010.


ML CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1998 - AIG-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ML CBO Series 1998 - AIG-2:

  -- US$34,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     due August 23, 2010 (current outstanding balance of
     $39,863,824), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 2, 2002
     Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  -- US$100,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     August 23, 2010 (current outstanding balance of
     $143,003,049), Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 2,
     2002 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect a significant likelihood that the issuer will default on
its obligation to repay the current outstanding balance of the
notes at their maturity, and that such a default will result in
losses to holders of the notes consistent with a C rating.
Moody's conclusion is based on the fact that the trustee reported
no remaining collateral in the pool.

ML CBO Series 1998 - AIG-2, issued in August 1998, is a
collateralized bond obligation previously backed by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

While no explicit cash flow analysis was undertaken, the absence
of collateralization implies a 100% expected loss on the notes at
stated maturity on August 23, 2010.


ML CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ML CLO XIX Sterling (Cayman)
Ltd.:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     Due 2010 (current outstanding balance of $15,481,220),
     Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 26, 2002 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf);

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
     2010 (current outstanding balance of $17,592,296), Downgraded
     to C (sf); previously on April 26, 2002 Downgraded to Ca
     (sf).

                         Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect a significant likelihood that the issuer will default on
its obligation to repay the current outstanding balance of the
notes at their maturity, and that such a default will result in
losses to holders of the notes consistent with a C rating.
Moody's conclusion is based on the fact that the trustee reported
no remaining collateral in the pool.

ML CLO XIX Sterling (Cayman) Ltd., issued in November 1998, is a
collateralized loan obligation previously backed by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

According to the latest trustee report, dated as of July 23, 2010,
the portfolio has no collateral and only $1,108,351 of principal
proceeds.  While no explicit cash flow analysis was undertaken,
the under-collateralization implies a 97% expected loss on the
notes at stated maturity on August 24, 2010.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Puts 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B- (sf)' rating on
Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-8's $3 million class A-8
secured fixed-rate notes on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

S&P's rating on the class A-8 notes is dependent on the lowest of
S&P's ratings on (i) the reference obligation, Dynegy Holdings
Inc.?s 6.875% notes due April 1, 2011 ('B-/Watch Neg'); (ii) the
swap payments guarantor, Morgan Stanley ('A'); and (iii) the
underlying security, BA Master Credit Card Trust II?s series 2001-
B's class A floating-rate asset-backed certificates due Aug. 15,
2013 ('AAA (sf)').

The rating action follows S&P's Aug. 17, 2010 placement of its
'B-' rating on the reference obligation on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the class A-8 notes due to changes in S&P's ratings assigned to
the reference obligation, the swap guarantor, or the underlying
security.


PROJECT FUNDING: S&P Withdraws Rating on Class I Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
class I notes issued by Project Funding Corp. I, a collateralized
debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class III and IV notes from the same transaction.
S&P's rating on the class II notes remains on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

S&P's rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption of the
notes on their respective payment date.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

S&P's rating on the class II notes remains on CreditWatch
negative, where it was placed on Sept. 17, 2009, following S&P's
CDO criteria update.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
where appropriate.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                      Project Funding Corp I

         Class               To          From
         -----               --          ----
         I                   NR          B (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                      Project Funding Corp I

                    Class              Rating
                    -----              ------
                    III                CC (sf)
                    IV                 CC (sf)

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                      Project Funding Corp I

              Class              Rating
              -----              ------
              II                 CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

                          NR - Not rated.



RAMP SERIES: Moody's Junks Rating on Series 2002-RZ3 Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued by RAMP Series 2002-RZ3 Trust.

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RZ3 Trust

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 Ba3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The underlying collateral consists of seasoned fixed-rate mortgage
originated under RFC's first-lien high-loan-to-value mortgage Home
Solution program.

The downgrade is a result of a $4,181 write down of the Class M-3
and the balance of loans delinquent 60 days or more, including
loans in foreclosure and real estate owned, compared to the credit
enhancement provided by subordination and excess spread.  The
Class M-3 remains on review for downgrade as Moody's completes its
review of this transaction.  Additional sensitivities of losses
will be a function of future actual and projected losses that
correspond to benchmarks provided in Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Securities in Default.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


RIDGEWAY COURT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
five classes of notes from Ridgeway Court Funding I Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized debt obligation transaction, following the
liquidation of the collateral in the portfolio.

The downgrades reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria for
ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of
default and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

The current downgrades follow notice from the trustee that the
liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

The deal had triggered an EOD, after which the controlling
noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of the notes and
liquidate the collateral assets.

                          Rating Actions

                   Ridgeway Court Funding I Ltd.

                                    Rating
                                    ------
                  Class           To        From
                  -----           --        ----
                  A-1M            D         CC
                  A-1Q            D         CC
                  B               D         CC
                  C               D         CC
                  Q               D         CC

                    Other Outstanding Ratings

                  Ridgeway Court Funding I Ltd.

                         Class    Rating
                         -----    ------
                         A2        D
                         A3        D
                         A4        D


SIERRA TIMESHARE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on these notes issued by
various Sierra Timeshare Receivables transactions:

Sierra Timeshare 2005-1 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2007-1 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A-1 upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2 upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B upgraded to 'A-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2008-1 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook revised to Positive from
     Stable;

  -- Class C affirmed at 'A'; Outlook revised to Positive from
     Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2009-1 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2009-2 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2009-3 Receivables Funding, LLC

  -- Class A notes rated 'A'; Outlook revised to Positive from
     Stable.

Defaults across the portfolio of Fitch rated Sierra Timeshare
transactions have subsided in the past several months,
illustrating both seasonal and year-over year improvement.  The
affirmations to the 2005-1, 2008-1, 2009-1, 2009-2, and 2009-3
transactions reflect the ability of each transaction's credit
enhancement to provide loss coverage consistent with the current
rating levels.  Fitch has revised the Rating Outlook on the
subordinate notes in the 2008-1 transaction and the class A notes
in the 2009-3 transaction to Positive from Stable, indicating that
upgrades are possible in the future as credit enhancement levels
build.

The upgrades of the class A and B notes in the 2007-1 transaction
reflect the fact that coverage multiples of Fitch's expected loss
levels for each class of notes are now sufficient to support
ratings of 'A' and 'A-', respectively.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Sr. Student Loan Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bond to 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student
Loan Trust 2004-10.  Stable Outlooks are assigned to all bonds and
the Rating Watch Negative on the subordinated bond is removed.
Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria and FFELP
student loan ABS rating criteria, as well as the refined basis
risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29 press release ('Fitch to
Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying Updated Criteria') were
used to review the ratings.  A full ratings list is shown below.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
subordination and the projected minimum excess spread) to cover
the applicable basis factor stress.  The rating on the subordinate
note is downgraded to 'BBsf' due to the trust's very high cost
structure that will put pressure on the trust's ability to
generate excess spread (which is the only form of credit
enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a mild level
of basis risk stress.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10:

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-6A affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-6B affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-7A affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-7B affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-8 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf/LS3' from 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Sr. Student Loan Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bond to 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student
Loan Trust 2003-7.  Stable Outlooks are assigned to all bonds and
the Rating Watch Negative on the subordinated bond is removed.
Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria and FFELP
student loan ABS rating criteria, as well as the refined basis
risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29 press release ('Fitch to
Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying Updated Criteria') were
used to review the ratings.  A full ratings list is shown below.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
subordination and the projected minimum excess spread) to cover
the applicable basis factor stress.  The rating on the subordinate
note is downgraded to 'BBsf' due to the trust's very high cost
structure that will put pressure on the trust's ability to
generate excess spread (which is the only form of credit
enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a mild level
of basis risk stress.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-7:

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf/LS3' from 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN TRUST: Fitch Keeps Ratings on Student Loan Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
downgrades the subordinate bond to 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student
Loan Trust 2005-7.  Stable Outlooks are assigned to all bonds and
the Rating Watch Negative on the subordinated bond is removed.
Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria and FFELP
student loan ABS rating criteria, as well as the refined basis
risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29 press release ('Fitch to
Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying Updated Criteria') to
review the ratings.  A full ratings list is shown below.

The ratings on the senior notes are affirmed based on the
sufficient level of credit enhancement (consisting of
subordination and the projected minimum excess spread) to cover
the applicable basis factor stress.  The rating on the subordinate
note is downgraded to 'BBsf' due to the trust's very high cost
structure that will put pressure on the trust's ability to
generate excess spread (which is the only form of credit
enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a mild level
of basis risk stress.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2005-7:

  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf/LS3' from 'AAAsf/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.


UNITED AIR: S&P Raises Rating on 2000-1 Certificates to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on United Air
Lines Inc.'s 2000-1 pass-through certificates, Class B, to 'BB'
from 'B'.  The rating remains on CreditWatch with developing
implications.

"The upgrade reflects improved collateral coverage for the 2000-1B
certificates following repayment of the more-senior 2000-1A1 and
2000-1A2 certificates.  These certificates, a form of enhanced
equipment trust certificate, were restructured in United's (and
UAL's) Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization (2002-2006)," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Philip Baggaley.

All cash flows from the aircraft notes that secure the
certificates have been paid first to the Class A certificates, and
only after those were repaid would the Class B certificates
receive principal or interest.  S&P estimate the loan-to-value of
the Class B certificates, using current market values of the
United aircraft that indirectly secure the certificates, to be in
the 45%-50% range.  Including estimated accrued interest, the LTV
rises to around 55%.  Unlike other EETC's, these restructured
certificates do not have a dedicated liquidity facility that could
pay interest for up to 18 months if United were to enter
bankruptcy again.  When S&P assigned ratings to the restructured
certificates in 2006, following UAL's and United's emergence from
bankruptcy, S&P's analysis combined elements of its criteria for
EETC's and application of recovery analytics, reflecting the
hybrid nature of these securities.

S&P placed its 'B-' corporate credit rating on UAL and United on
CreditWatch with positive implications on May 3, 2010, after UAL
announced an agreement to merge with Continental Airlines.
However, S&P placed its ratings on United's EETC's on CreditWatch
with developing implications, because S&P considers the importance
of the aircraft collateral that secures each EETC to an airline,
and a merger could change its view of that.  Since the CreditWatch
placement, UAL reported strong second-quarter 2010 earnings ($273
million net income, compared with $28 million in second-quarter
2009).  Its financial outlook has improved more sharply than that
of other large U.S. airlines, all of whom are benefiting from
better pricing and passenger traffic.

S&P could most likely raise its corporate credit ratings on UAL
and United to 'B' if the merger is completed and S&P feel that the
combined credit profile, including Continental, is materially
superior to the current one.  On the other hand, S&P could affirm
the existing 'B-' corporate credit ratings if S&P feels that the
merger risks balance or outweigh opportunities.  If the merger is
not completed, S&P would review UAL's credit quality in view of
its improving financial profile, and could revise the pre-merger
announcement 'B-' rating and/or negative rating outlook.

"S&P could also raise, lower, or affirm its ratings on United's
EETC's depending on its determination of United's corporate credit
rating and how S&P believes that the merger would affect the
combined airline's likelihood of affirming its debt obligations on
aircraft securing the various certificates in any future
bankruptcy," Mr. Baggaley added.


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Development Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative
these ratings:

  -- $94 million Tarrant Co Health Facilities Development
     Corporation series 2007 revenue bonds (Valley Baptist Medical
     Center- Brownsville)* to 'BB' from 'BBB';

  -- $37.6 million Rio Grande Valley Health Facilities Development
     Corporation revenue bonds series 1992A&B (Valley Baptist
     Medical Center Project)** to 'BB' from 'BBB'.

* The bonds are supported by an irrevocable letter of credit
  issued by JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., which Fitch was not asked
  to rate.

** The bonds are insured by MBIA, Inc., whose Insurer Financial
   Strength is not rated by Fitch.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade reflects the release of audited financial
     statements for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 (year-ending
     Aug. 31) in March 2010 which show a significant deterioration
     in balance sheet liquidity since fiscal 2007 and negative
     operating profitability in each of the last two fiscal years.

  -- The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's concerns over the lack
     of liquidity growth in spite of improved profitability in the
     interim period.

  -- While Valley Baptist Health System maintains a leading market
     share position of nearly 60% in Cameron County, the service
     area demographics reflect wealth levels that are well below
     state and national averages which is evidenced in a weak
     payor mix.

  -- Although weakened from the time of the original rating in
     2007, interim profitability is improved over fiscal 2008 and
     2009 results.

  -- VBHS was in default of certain covenants under its bank
     reimbursement agreement related to the series 2007 variable
     rate demand bonds as well as its line of credit agreement.
     VBHS has received waivers to the defaults and was in
     compliance with all covenants at the end of the third fiscal
     quarter ended May 31, 2010.  There was no default under the
     master trust indenture.

What Could Trigger A Downgrade?

  -- Further deterioration in the already slim liquidity position.

  -- Default or covenant violation under the reimbursement or
     credit agreements.

Security:

Gross revenue pledge, mortgage lien on property and debt service
reserve fund.

Credit Summary:

VBHS did not release audited financial statements for 2008 and
2009 until March 2010 due to negotiations between VBHS and the
bank group regarding receipt of various waivers under the
reimbursement and credit agreements.  Since fiscal 2007, VBHS'
position of unrestricted cash and investments has declined from
$130.1 million to $73.2 million as of May 31, 2010.  As a result,
VBHS' liquidity ratios are no longer consistent with Fitch 'BBB'
category medians.  At May 31, 2010, VBHS' 59 days cash on hand,
4.2 times cushion ratio and 41.9% cash to debt ratio are all
weaker than the respective Fitch 'BBB' category medians of 114
DCOH, 8.1x and 62.6%.  Additionally, Fitch expresses concern with
the rise in accounts receivables to a high 68 days at fiscal year-
end 2009 from 54 days at FYE 2008.  According to management, the
increase reflects mistreatment of certain billings related to the
implementation of a new software system.  The billing issue is
being resolved and management projects days in accounts receivable
to be closer to 60 days by FYE 2010.

Excluding proceeds from the sale of certain operations, VBHS
posted a loss from operations of $33 million in fiscal 2008 (-6.2%
operating margin) and $29.6 million in fiscal 2009 (-5.7%
operating margin).  Operating EBITDA margins of -0.9% and 2.1% in
fiscal 2008 and 2009 are well below Fitch's 'BBB' category median
of 8%.  While damage and the resulting interruption in service due
to Hurricane Dolly negatively impacted operating results in 2009,
Fitch also believes the weak operating performance reflects VBHS'
poor payor mix and losses from non-acute care business ventures
approved by the Board prior to 2008 and 2009.  In fiscal 2009,
Medicare, Medicaid and self-pay payors composed 29.7%, 29.9% and
14.4% of gross revenues, respectively.  As a result, VBHS receives
substantial payments under Disproportionate Share and Upper
Payment Limit programs.  In fiscal 2008 and 2009, UPL and DSH
payments totaled $22.6 million and $29.4 million, respectively.
While Fitch expects payments under both program to continue in FY
2010 and 2011, the variability in timing and amounts under each
program can materially impact VBHS' profitability.

In September 2009, VBHS engaged FTI Healthcare to perform an
operational assessment.  Through the nine-month interim period,
operating profitability has improved significantly with a
$1.2 million loss from operations (-0.3% operating margin) and
$28.2 million in operating EBITDA (7.1% operating EBITDA margin).

With acute facilities in Harlingen and Brownsville, TX, VBHS
operates a total of 828 acute beds.  In fiscal 2009, VBHS reported
$534.4 million of total revenues and support.  VBHS is not
required to provide annual or quarterly disclosure to the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's EMMA system.  Although the
release of the 2008 and 2009 audits were delayed, management has
been responsive to requests for information from Fitch and has
included balance sheet, income statement and utilization
statistics.


* Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Irvington's $113.2 Mil. Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 rating on the Township Of Irvington's
(New Jersey) G.O. debt and assigned a negative outlook on
$113.2 million of general obligation debt.

                        Ratings Rationale

The Ba1 rating reflects the township's extremely narrow financial
position as reflected in reserves, which are less than 2% of
revenues and negative net of deferred charges, resulting from
years of structurally imbalanced operations.  The rating also
encompasses the moderately-sized tax base near New York City (G.O.
rated Aa2/stable) with low wealth levels and an elevated debt
burden.  The negative outlook reflects risks to the township's
financial position, including a $5 million budget gap for fiscal
2011 (which ends June 30), the need for cashflow borrowing,
potential challenges to placing future cash flow notes given the
significant financial deterioration and the tightened credit
environment for cash flow borrowing, and challenges to increase
the tax levy in the face of a more stringent state-mandated limit
of 2% on levy increases.  The removal of the Watchlist for
Possible Downgrade reflects the use of a tax levy waiver exemption
to resolve a $6 million budget gap in fiscal 2010.

            Very Narrow Financial Operations Persist;
               Cashflow Remains A Key Credit Issue

The township has relied heavily on one-time revenues and deferred
charges to balance the budget.  In fiscal 2008, the township
raised taxes, instituted a tax lien sale (which provided the
township with a one-time increase in revenues), and made budgetary
cuts to relieve financial pressure.  Despite these changes, the
township's financial position remained narrow, with a Current Fund
balance of $773,000, or minimal 0.9% of Current Fund revenues.
Net of deferred charges, the Current Fund balance would be
-$1.4 million, or -1.72% of Current Fund revenues.  Fiscal 2009
results indicate Current Fund balance of $696,000 (0.9% of
revenues); net of deferred charges, the Current Fund balance is a
significantly negative -$8.3 million, or -10.1% of revenues.  The
deferred charge of $9 million was incurred in fiscal 2009 due to
an operating deficit ($4.1 million), largely the result of
budgeting $3 million for the sale of a hospital which did not
materialize, revaluation expenditures ($700,000), an unbudgeted
increase in the self-insurance plan ($1.5 million), and unfunded
grants ($1.1 million).  These operating results exacerbated the
already extremely narrow liquidity position and the township ended
the year with net cash equal to -4.2% of operations.

The township did not adopt its fiscal 2010 budget (year-end June
30) until the spring of 2010 due to a $6 million budget gap and
the state of New Jersey's requirement for local governments to
adopted balanced budgets.  The township made progress toward
closing the earlier identified $12 million budgetary gap, with
solutions including $2 million of extraordinary aid from the
state, furloughs ($775,000), increased sewer rates ($200,000) and
other budget savings.  The township utilized a number of actions
not completely within its control to close the remaining gap,
including the $3 million sale of the hospital (budgeted and
unrealized in 2009), for which the township has a $1 million
deposit.  When these alternatives did not develop, the township
received a levy cap waiver exemption of $11.2 million, leading to
a total levy increase in fiscal 2010 of $15.8 million.  The levy
waiver, in addition to curing the township's budget gap,
alleviated the need for further cash flow borrowing or state aid
in fiscal 2010 -- a strong possibility at the time of Moody's last
review.  The township was able to include the property tax
increase adjustment on its final fiscal 2010 tax bills, which
included a nearly $1,100 per household increase in property taxes.
Subsequent to this tax levy increase, officials conducted a
successful tax sale, yielding approximately $3 million in one-time
revenues.  Officials expect Current Fund balance to end at a still
narrow $799,000, still less than 1% of Current Fund revenues.
Moody's believes that the state's own strained financial situation
makes additional state aid uncertain, while limits on future tax
levy increases will constrain the township's financial flexibility
going forward.

The township has yet to adopt a fiscal 2011 (ending June 30, 2011)
budget, given a $5 million budget gap and uncertainty surrounding
Transitional Aid from the state.  The township has made progress
toward closing the identified $5 million budgetary gap, with
solutions including transitional aid from the state, furloughs
($800,000), sanitation savings ($336,000), closer management of
over-time and other budget savings.  Favorably, the township is
not budgeting the sale of the aforementioned hospital, and has
decreased its budgeted state aid.

In December, the township reported to Moody's the need to issue at
least $10 to $14 million in TANs for 2010 operations;
subsequently, the township secured $7.5 million in cashflow
borrowing from their depository bank.  Due to the tax levy waiver,
the township did not require additional cash needs before note
maturity in October 2010.  Officials indicate the need to secure
$3.75 million in cashflow borrowing in fiscal 2011.  Given the
significantly eroded financial position and the tightened credit
markets, Moody's believes the township may be challenged to place
their cashflow notes.  Moody's negative outlook reflects the
significantly negative impact that failure to place future cash
flow notes could have on the township's credit profile.

          Low Wealth Levels And Above Average Debt Burden

The township's local economy has been impacted by the current
recession, with unemployment rising to a high of 11.1% (May,
2010), above the state's unemployment level (9.6%).  Wealth levels
are substantially below New Jersey medians (per capita income is
62.5% of the state) and 17.37% of residents are below the poverty
line.  Equalized value per capita is among the lowest for a New
Jersey municipality at $89,359.  Township officials anticipate
that new development will help offset declines in assessed
valuation, which dropped 1.7% from $3.23 billion in fiscal 2008 to
$3.18 billion in fiscal 2010, driven by tax appeals following the
2007 tax base revaluation.  The township expects to issue
approximately $800,000 in short term notes to fund the settlement.
The debt burden is well above state medians, at 3.9% of full
value.  A majority of the township's debt ($56.2 million) is
supported by the Municipal Qualified Bonds Act.  Future rating
action will factor the township's ability to gain market access to
place its cash flow borrowing, manage its cash needs, and
eliminate operating deficits given restrictions on levy increases.

                             Outlook

Assignment of the negative outlook reflects the township's narrow
Current Fund balance and Moody's expectation that the township
will be challenged to implement strategies to improve reserve
levels in an environment of expenditure pressure and revenue caps.

What Could Move The Rating Up (Remove Negative Outlook):

* Restoration of structurally balanced operations
* Improved Current Fund balance position net of deferred charges
* Elimination of future cashflow borrowing

What Could Move The Rating Down:

* Inability to regain structurally balanced operations
* The need for increased cashflow borrowing
* Increases in deferred charges

Key Statistics:

* 2000 Population: 60,695 (-0.5% since 2000)

* 2010 Equalized Valuation: $3.1 billion

* 2010 Equalized Value Per Capita: $89,359

* 1999 Per Capita Income (as % of NJ and US): $16,874 (62.5% and
  78.2%)

* 1999 Median Family Income (as % of NJ and US): $41,098 (62.9%
  and 82.1%)

* Direct Debt Burden: 3.9%

* Payout of Principal (10 years): 40.9%

* 2009 Current Fund Balance (ended June 30): $696,000 (0.85% of
  Current Fund revenue)

* Long-term G.O. Debt Outstanding: $113.2 million

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information, and
confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors Service's
information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer satisfactory for the purposes of
maintaining a credit rating.

Moody's Investors Service adopts all necessary measures so that
the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of
sufficient quality and from reliable sources; however, Moody's
Investors Service does not and cannot in every instance
independently verify, audit or validate information received in
the rating process.


* S&P Downgrades Rating on Camarillo, California's Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Camarillo, California's multifamily housing revenue bonds (Park
Glenn Apartments Project) series 1998 to 'BB' from 'AAA' and
removed the rating from CreditWatch based on S&P's view of the
project's reliance on short-term, market-rate investments.

The rating reflects S&P's view of these:

* Revenues from mortgage debt service payments and investment
  earnings are insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on
  the bonds plus fees until maturity.

* Debt service coverage is projected to fall below investment
  grade levels in 2022.

* Asset/liability parity is projected to fall below 100% in 2022.

Partially offsetting the above is S&P's view of these credit
strengths in the issue:

* Investments held in the 'AAAm' rated First American Treasury
  Obligations Fund Class D money market fund, and

* The high credit quality of the Fannie Mae pass-through
  certificate, considered to be AAA-eligible.

On May 12, 2010, S&P placed its ratings on certain housing issues,
including this rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications
due to revised criteria for certain federal government-enhanced
housing transactions.  S&P's revised criteria affect government-
enhanced housing transactions where funds are invested in money
market funds and other investments with no guaranteed rate of
return.

Standard & Poor's has analyzed updated financial information based
on S&P's current stressed reinvestment rate assumptions for all
scenarios as set forth in the related criteria articles.  Based on
this updated financial information, and assuming the stressed
reinvestment rate assumptions, S&P believes transaction revenues
until maturity are insufficient to make bond payments as due.

If the bonds are prepaid, it is S&P's opinion that there are
sufficient assets to cover the reinvestment risk based on the 30-
day minimum notice period required for special redemptions.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that payment on the
bonds is susceptible to short-term market rate investment income
but is expected to perform at the 'BB' level.   In the event that
investment revenues increase, the rating may be raised in the
future.   If investment revenues decrease, the rating could be
lowered.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
tranches from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation of
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.  The downgraded tranches have a
total issuance amount of $1.046 billion.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on 54 tranches from eight transactions and removed 51 of
them from CreditWatch negative.  Additionally, S&P withdrew its
rating on one tranche from Crest 2002-IG Ltd. following the
complete paydown of the notes.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
securities.  The affirmations reflect current credit support
levels that S&P believes are sufficient to maintain the current
ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
   Transaction                  Class    To        From
   -----------                  -----    --        ----
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        A        AAA       AAA/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        B        AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        B-FL     AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        C        AA        AA/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        C-FL     AA        AA/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        D        A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        D-FL     A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        E        BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        E-FL     BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO I Ltd.        F        B-        B-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       B        AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       B-FL     AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       C        A         A/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       C-FL     A         A/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       D        BBB       BBB/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       E        BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       F        BB+       BB+/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       G        BB        BB/Watch Neg
   Crest 2002-IG, Ltd.          B        AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2002-IG, Ltd.          C        A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2002-IG, Ltd.          D        B+        BB+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2002-IG, Ltd.          Pfd Shs  NR        BB/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             A-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             B-1      AA        AA/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             B-2      AA        AA/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             C-1      A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             C-2      A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             D-1      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             D-2      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
   Crest 2003-1 Ltd             PfShr    CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           A        AA+       AA+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           B-1      AA-       AA-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           B-2      AA-       AA-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           C-1      A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           C-2      A-        A-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           D        BBB+      BBB+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           E-1      BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           E-2      BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           F        BB+       BB+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           G-1      BB-       BB-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           G-2      BB-       BB-/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           H-1      B+        B+/Watch Neg
   Crest 2004-1, Ltd.           H-2      B+        B+/Watch Neg
   Crest Clarendon St 2002-1    B-1      A         A/Watch Neg
   Crest Clarendon St 2002-1    B-2      A         A/Watch Neg
   Crest Clarendon St 2002-1    C        BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   Crest Clarendon St 2002-1    D        B+        B+/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      I        A+        AA-/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      II-FL    BBB       BBB/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      III-FL   BB-       BB+/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      IV-FL    B-        B+/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      IV-FX    B-        B+/Watch Neg
   Newcastle CDO V Limited      V        CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   A-1      AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   A-2      AA        AA/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   A-3      A+        A+/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   B        A-        A-/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   C        BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   D-FL     BB-       BB-/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   D-FX     BB-       BB-/Watch Neg
   N-Star Real Estate CDO VII   E        B-        B-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Transaction                  Class              Rating
      -----------                  -----              ------
      Anthracite CDO II Ltd.       A                  AAA
      Crest 2002-IG, Ltd.          A                  AAA
      Crest Clarendon St 2002-1    A                  AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From 11 CDO Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22
tranches from 11 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 21 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on 43 other tranches from 11 transactions and
removed three of them from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

The 22 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $6.939 billion.  Four of the 11 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  Five of the 11 are
high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were primarily collateralized at
origination by 'AAA' though 'A' rated tranches of RMBS and other
SF securities.  Two transactions are CDO of CDO transactions that
were primarily collateralized at origination by notes from other
CDOs, as well as by tranches from RMBS and other SF transactions.
The other transaction is a retranching of other CDO tranches.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Transaction                Class  To        From
  -----------                -----  --        ----
  Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     A1LTa  CCC- (sf) BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     A1LTb  CCC- (sf) BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     A-2    CC (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg
  Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     B      CC (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     C      CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
  CDO Rpck Trst Sec - 2006-A 1Unts  B (sf)    BBB (sf)
  Davis Square Funding III   A1LTa  CC (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Davis Square Funding III   A1LTb1 CC (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Davis Square Funding VII   S      BBB (sf)  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      A-1    CCC- (sf) BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Independence III CDO Ltd.  A-1    B (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Independence III CDO Ltd.  A-2    B (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Independence III CDO Ltd.  B      CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  A-1    CC (sf)   B- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Jupiter High-Grade CDO III A-1NV  CC (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Jupiter High-Grade CDO III A-1VA  CC (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Jupiter High-Grade CDO III A-1VB  CC (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  A-1J   CC (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  A-1S   CC (sf)   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Niagara CDO Ltd.           A      A (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Neg
  Solstice ABS CBO Ltd.      A      CCC- (sf) B (sf)/Watch Neg
  TABS 2004-1 Ltd.           A-1    CC (sf)   B (sf)/Watch Neg
  Witherspoon CDO Funding    A-1 CP CC (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Witherspoon CDO Funding    A1LTa  CC (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Witherspoon CDO Funding    A-2    CC (sf)   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Transaction                Class           Rating
         -----------                -----           ------
         Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     D               CC (sf)
         Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.     E               CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding III   A-2             CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding III   B               CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   A-1a            CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   A-1b            CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   A-2             CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   A-3             CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   B               CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   C               CC (sf)
         Davis Square Funding VII   D               CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      A-2a            CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      A-2b            CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      A-3a            CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      A-3b            CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      B               CC (sf)
         Fort Point CDO I Ltd.      C               CC (sf)
         Independence III CDO Ltd.  C-1             CC (sf)
         Independence III CDO Ltd.  C-2             CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  A-2             CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  B               CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  C-1A            CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  C-1B            CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO II  C-1C            CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO III A-2             CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO III A-2B            CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO III B               CC (sf)
         Jupiter High-Grade CDO III C               CC (sf)
         Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  A-2             CC (sf)
         Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  A-3             CC (sf)
         Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  B               CC (sf)
         Nautilus RMBS CDO II Ltd.  C               CC (sf)
         TABS 2004-1 Ltd.           A-2             CC (sf)
         TABS 2004-1 Ltd.           B               CC (sf)
         TABS 2004-1 Ltd.           C               CC (sf)
         TABS 2004-1 Ltd.           D               CC (sf)
         Witherspoon CDO Funding    B               CC (sf)
         Witherspoon CDO Funding    C               CC (sf)
         Witherspoon CDO Funding    CmbSec          CC (sf)
         Witherspoon CDO Funding    D               CC (sf)



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
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                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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                  *** End of Transmission ***