TCR_Public/100725.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 25, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 204

                            Headlines

ALPINE III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class SM-J Certs.
BOMBARDIER CAPITAL: S&P Corrects Rating on Class M-1 Notes to 'D'
BOMBARDIER CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A to 'B+'

CFSB ABS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2002-HE16 Notes
CGCMT 2006-FL2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-FL2 Certs.
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes
CLYDESDALE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certs.

COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CREDIT AND REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-8 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-CK3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-CF2 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-TFL1 Notes
EDUCATION FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
FRANKLIN AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Tranches
GE-WMC ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C1 Certs.

GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
GRAMERCY CAPITAL: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Action on Bonds
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 2004-FL2 Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL4 Certs.
GSC ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

HELIOS FINANCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2007-S1 Notes
HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Certs.
INGRESS CDO: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Classes
JER CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-C6 Certificates

JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 2003-PM1 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2004-C1 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2000-C9 Certificates
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2002-C3 Certificates

JWS CBO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Class E Notes to 'Ca'
LACKAWANNA COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on GO Debt to 'BB'
LACKAWANNA COUNTY: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on GO Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2005-C1 Certs.

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N Certs. to 'D'
LEHMAN ABS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-2 Certs. to 'CC'
LIBERTY SQUARE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
M-2 SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Series of Notes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 135 Tranches
MOB MANAGEMENT: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Rating on Series 2001 A
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-LIFE1 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 2002-IQ2 Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 251 Tranches

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Certs. to 'D'
MORTGAGE CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-MC2 Certs.
ORANGE COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1998C Bonds to 'BB-'
PARADIGM FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Rating on ABCP Program
PEOPLE'S CHOICE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches

PERITUS I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
POPULAR ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 99 Tranches
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1995-MCF2 Certs.
RESTRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2004-2-A Notes to 'BB+'
RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six Tranches

SALOMON BROTHERS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1999-C1 Certificates
SALS B-2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
SALT CREEK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-6$L 2005-1 Notes
SAXON ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 46 Tranches
SONOMA VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes

SONOMA VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Certs.
TW HOTEL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2005-LUX Certificates
VALEO INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2005-C17 Certs.

WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
WILBRAHAM CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
WOODBURY UNIVERSITY: Moody's Affirms Rating on $18.9 Mil. Bonds

* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 194 Bonds From 120 RMBS Deals to 'D'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Six SF CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches From 27 TruPs CDO Deals
* S&P Puts Ratings on Five Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
* S&P Takes Rating Actions on Two Market Value CDO Transactions

                            *********

ALPINE III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Alpine III.  Alpine III is a
synthetic CDO that references municipal issuers.  The reference
pool consists of ISDA master agreement documenting swap, option
and other derivative transactions.  The transaction was closed in
August 2004.

  -- US$60M Class A Floating Rate Notes due August 16, 2014 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Aug 17, 2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- US$17.025M Class B Floating Rate Notes due August 16, 2014
     MTN Program, Downgraded to A1; previously on Aug 17, 2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- US$9M Class C Floating Rate Notes due August 16, 2014 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Aug 17, 2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- US$8.025M Class D Floating Rate Notes due August 16, 2014 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to B1; previously on Aug 17, 2004
     Assigned Ba1

  -- US$3M Class E Floating Rate Notes due August 16, 2014 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to B3; previously on Aug 17, 2004
     Assigned Ba1

Moody's notes that the ratings of these notes will be withdrawn
subsequently due to the lack of information.

Moody's explains that it has downgraded the ratings due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference pool.  Rating
concentration tests for the pool are currently failing.  The
covenants specify that bond obligations rated below Aaa, Aa1, Aa2,
Aa3 and A1 may not be more than 65%, 50%, 35%, 20% and 10%
respectively.  Currently, these ratios, calculated as a percentage
of the aggregate maximum exposure amount of $750M, are
approximately 87%, 64%, 47%, 20% and 17% respectively.  More than
one third of the portfolio rely on financial guarantees from
various guarantors.  Approximately 14% of the entire portfolio is
guaranteed by a financial guarantor whose Insurance Financial
Strength rating is currently Caa2 on review for upgrade and a
portion of these do not currently have any outstanding rated
obligations.  Approximately 6% of the entire portfolio does not
have any ratings outstanding to derive the default probability.
By way of comparison, the subordination available for various
rated tranches ranges from 1.07% to 6.01%.

Moody's notes that a credit event in the transaction occurs when
there is a failure to pay on the relevant master agreements, and a
failure to pay by the financial guarantor where such guarantee
exists.  Bond obligations of the reference entity are used to
determine the valuation after the occurrence of a credit event.  A
portion of the portfolio has reference entities whose ratings have
been withdrawn.  For these reference entities, Moody's made
various assumptions on their rating that range from Ba1 to Caa3,
to arrive at default probability.

Moody's assigned a default probability for each name according to
the idealized corporate default rates.  A default distribution is
generated by CDOROM to evaluate the expected losses for the
tranches.  CDOROM is based on a Monte Carlo simulation framework,
within which, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the default probability for each credit in
the pool.  Correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies an asset correlation
framework.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Loss Severity Ratings, Recovery
Ratings, and Rating Outlooks to Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2001-1:

  -- $14.2 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.3 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB';

  -- $23.5 million class K to 'CC/RR5' from 'BB';

  -- $2.1 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $5.5 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $6.8 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch also affirms, assigns Outlooks, and LS Ratings to these
classes:

  -- $319.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.3 million class A-2F at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.5 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.5 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19 million class G at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.8 million class O at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X.

Class A-1 has been paid in full.  Class P was not rated by Fitch
at issuance.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 6.3% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $33.4 million from the loans in special
servicing and the loans that are not expected to refinance at
maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the
Fitch total expected losses (92%) is associated with the specially
serviced assets.  The Ratings Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
balance has decreased 44% to $532.1 million from $948.1 million at
issuance.  Forty-one loans (37.1%) have defeased.

Fitch has designated 28 loans (30.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.
These include the 15 specially serviced assets (15.5%) and four of
the top 10 loans in the transaction (7.8%).  The largest specially
serviced asset (2.9%) is secured by a 239 room hotel located in
Riverside, CA.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
June 2010 due to the borrower's request for a discounted payoff of
the loan.  The special servicer is evaluating the borrower's
request.

The second largest specially serviced asset (2.7%) is secured by a
673,396 square foot industrial property located in Grand Blanc,
MI.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2009 due
to delinquency resulting from declining occupancy due to tenant
vacancies.  The special servicer has retained counsel for a
possible foreclosure.

The third largest specially serviced asset (2.3%) is secured by
159,000 sf office complex located in Irving, TX.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2010 due to the
borrower's request for a 24-month maturity extension due to
financial hardship.  The special servicer is currently evaluating
the borrower's request.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 5% reduction to 2009 fiscal year end net operating
income, 10% reduction to 2008, and 15% for all loans which did not
report YE 2008 and applying an adjusted market cap rate between
7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
three loans (2.5% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class SM-J Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
SM-J commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D' from
'CCC-'.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class.
The July 12, 2010, remittance report reflected cumulative
principal losses in the amount of $11,753 for the SM-J class.

The principal losses are due to a modification to the Southdale
Mall loan, the largest exposure in the transaction.  As of the
July 12, 2010, remittance report, the asset had a whole-loan
balance of $158.2 million (9.0%), consisting of a $121.7 million
(6.9%) pooled senior component and a $36.5 million (2.1%)
nonpooled subordinate note, both included in the subject trust.
The SM-A through SM-J nonpooled rake certificates derive 100% of
their cash flows from this subordinate note.

The loan was transferred to the special servicer, J.E.  Robert Co.
Inc., in February 2010 due to the borrower's inability to secure
refinancing proceeds for the loan's April 1, 2010, maturity date.
According to the July 2010 reporting documents, the loan was
modified in April 2010 and returned to the master servicer, Bank
of America N.A., in July 2010.  The special servicer's comments
indicate that the loan's maturity date was extended to April 1,
2013, its amortization schedule was modified to a 30-year schedule
(the loan was interest-only prior to the modification), and the
borrower paid down $28.0 million of the original principal balance
of the senior component (which was $150.0 million).

As a result of the principal paydown, the amount of cash flow
available to service payments on the nonpooled rake certificates
has been reduced, resulting in shortfalls on the most subordinate
raked class, SM-J.  Cumulative interest shortfalls on this class
were $10,851 as of July 2010.  Pursuant to the transaction's
pooling and servicing agreement, principal intended to pay down
the class SM-J certificate is being diverted to pay down the
ongoing interest shortfalls that are affecting this class,
resulting in the observed principal losses.  S&P expects the
principal losses to occur each month going forward.

The loan is secured by 740,326 sq. ft. of a 1,181,355-sq.-ft.
regional mall built in 1956 in Edina, Minn.  The master servicer
reported a debt service coverage of 1.58x for the whole-loan
balance (2.07x for the senior component only) as of December 2009.
Collateral occupancy was 58.0% as of March 2010.


BOMBARDIER CAPITAL: S&P Corrects Rating on Class M-1 Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
class M-1 notes from Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization
Corp.'s series 1999-A by lowering it to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp. did not make the
full interest payment on the class M-1 notes on its May 17, 2010,
payment date.  Due to an error, S&P's rating action on this class
did not occur contemporaneously with the interest payment
shortfall.

                         Rating Corrected

         Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.
                           Series 1999-A

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                    Class       To        From
                    -----       --        ----
                    M-1         D         CCC-


BOMBARDIER CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A notes from Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.'s
series 1998-C to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  S&P also affirmed its 'CCC-'
rating on the class M-1 notes from the same series and its 'B'
ratings on the four class A notes from series 1999-A.

The downgrade of the class A notes from series 1998-C reflects
S&P's view of the higher-than-expected cumulative net losses in
the underlying collateral pool and the resulting reduction in hard
credit enhancement supporting the notes to a level that is
commensurate with the lower rating.  The affirmations of the
ratings on the four class A notes from series 1999-A reflect S&P's
view that credit enhancement for the notes is adequate for the
current ratings, despite S&P's view of the higher-than-expected
cumulative net losses in the underlying collateral pool.  The
affirmation of the rating on the class M-1 notes from series 1998-
C reflects S&P's continuing belief that M-1 noteholders will not
receive ultimate repayment of their original principal investment.

The collateral pool for both Bombardier Capital Mortgage
Securitization Corp. transactions consists of installment sales
contracts and mortgage loans secured by real estate and affixed
manufactured homes.  In the fourth quarter of 2001, Bombardier
announced that it was exiting the manufactured housing loan
origination business.  In March 2006, Bombardier Capital Inc.
resigned as servicer for these transactions and Green Tree
Servicing LLC was assigned as the successor servicer.

As of the June 15, 2010, payment date, the pool factor, or
percentage of the initial pool balance that remains outstanding,
was 24.70% for series 1998-C and 25.09% for series 1999-A.  S&P
calculates that to date, series 1998-C has experienced cumulative
net losses amounting to 37.19% of the original pool balance, and
series 1999-A has experienced cumulative net losses amounting to
37.68% of the original pool balance.

Over the past several years, 90-plus-day delinquencies and
repossessed inventory for both series have been steadily
decreasing to their current levels of approximately 1.00%;
however, the rate of losses has not decreased over the same time
period.  After reviewing the performance information S&P has
received for the transactions to date, S&P raised its cumulative
net loss expectations for both series to 45.0%-48.0%.  Both
revised loss expectations significantly exceed S&P's original
expected base?case loss assumption at issuance.  S&P's analysis
assumes a loss severity of 80%-90%.

At closing, credit support for both transactions was provided
through a combination of subordination, overcollateralization, and
excess spread.  As of the June 15, 2010, payment date,
overcollateralization had been depleted in both transactions and
monthly excess spread for both transactions has been insufficient
to cover monthly net losses.  This has resulted in a significant
number of the subordinated classes in both transactions being
written down.  Currently, classes M-1 and M-2 in the 1998-C
transaction, which combined total 35.27% of the current pool
balance, are providing the only hard credit enhancement to the
class A notes.  The class M-2 notes, which total 3.89% of the
current pool balance, provide credit support to the class M-1
notes.  The class M-1 notes in series 1999-A (29.38% of the
current pool balance) provide the only hard credit enhancement to
the class A notes.

                             Table 1

                        Credit Support (%)
               As of the June 15, 2010, payment date

                     Total hard          Current total
                     credit support      hard credit
Series      Class    at issuance(%)(i)   support (i)(% of current)
------      -----    -----------------   -------------------------
1998-C      A        24.50                   35.27
1998-C      M-1      16.75                   3.89
1998-C      M-2      11.25                   0
1998-C      B-1      7.00                    0
1999-A      A        24.25                   29.38
1999-A      M-1      16.75                   0
1999-A      M-2      11.75                   0
1999-A      B-1      7.00                    0
1999-A      B-2      2.50                    0

(i) Consists of overcollateralization, and subordination; excludes
    excess spread, which can provide additional enhancement.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of
these transactions to assess whether the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in S&P's view, to support the rating on the
notes under various stress scenarios.

                          Rating Lowered

         Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
                 Series   Class   To        From
                 ------   -----   --        ----
                 1998-C   A       B+        BB-

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp.

                     Series   Class   Rating
                     ------   -----   ------
                     1998-C   M-1     CCC-
                     1999-A   A-2     B
                     1999-A   A-3     B
                     1999-A   A-4     B
                     1999-A   A-5     B


CFSB ABS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2002-HE16 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued by CFSB ABS Trust Series 2002-HE16.  The underlying
collateral consists of seasoned fixed-rate mortgage and
adjustable-rate mortgage loans acquired from various subprime
mortgage loan originator by DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.

The downgrade is a result of a $24,989 write down on the Class B-1
and the balance of loans delinquent 60 days or more, including
loans in foreclosure and real estate owned, compared to the credit
enhancement provided by subordination and excess spread.  The
Class B-1 remains on review for downgrade as Moody's completes its
review of this transaction.

Moody's generally rates securities Caa1 or lower if it has a very
high likelihood of taking a loss in the expected case.

Complete rating action is:

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE-16

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 8, 2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CGCMT 2006-FL2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-FL2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and assigned a Negative
Rating Outlook to one class from CGCMT 2006-FL2 Floating Rate
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-FL2, reflecting Fitch's
base case loss expectation of 21.7% for the pooled classes.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.  The Negative Outlook reflects additional sensitivity
analysis related to further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 56.8% of the pool and all
of the junior non-pooled participations are expected to default in
the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B' stress.  In this
scenario, the average cash flow decline is 13.1% from fourth
quarter 2009 cash flows.  In its review, Fitch analyzed servicer-
reported operating statements and rent rolls, updated property
valuations, and recent lease and sales comparisons.  Given that
the loan positions within the pooled portion of the CMBS are the
lower leveraged A-notes (average base case LTV of 136.5%), Fitch
estimates the average recoveries on the pooled loans will be
approximately 61.9% in the base case while the average recoveries
on the more highly-leveraged non-pooled participations will be
approximately 5.6%.  The defaults are determined considering the
total leverage of each asset, including additional B-notes and
mezzanine debt; however, a default may not result in a loss to the
pooled portion given its lower leverage position.  The base case
term and refinance DSCR for the pooled A-notes is 2.0 times and
1.11x, respectively.

The transaction is collateralized by seven loans, four of which
are secured by hotels (64.4%) and three secured by office
properties (35.6%).  One of the hotel properties (3.5%) has an
office component.  All of the final extension options on the loans
are within the next two years and are: 31.6% in 2010 and 68.4% in
2011.

Fitch identified one Loan of Concern within the pool, Snake River
Lodge and Spa (8%), which is specially serviced.  In addition,
Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations for three loans in
the base case stress scenario.  The three contributors to losses
(by unpaid principal balance) in the base case stress scenario are
Radisson Ambassador Plaza Hotel and Casino (69.1% Loss Severity),
and Snake River Lodge (9.5%).

The largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the Radisson
Ambassador Plaza Hotel and Casino loan, is secured by a 233-room,
full service hotel located one block from the beach in the Condado
section of San Juan, Puerto Rico.  Amenities include a 14,800 sf
casino in the lobby, six meeting room facilities, a restaurant, a
sports bar and a business center.  The rooftop contains a pool, a
poolside bar and grill and a fitness center.  The hotel consists
of two towers, one containing 146 standard guest rooms and a
second tower containing 87 suites.  Despite the capital
improvements since issuance, performance has deteriorated with
RevPAR reported at $90.21 as of year-end 2009, compared to $119.16
as of YE 2007.  According to the YE 2009 STR report, RevPAR
penetration was 98.4 indicating the hotel was trailing the market
competition by a small margin.  In addition, revenue from casino
operations has significantly declined since issuance for an
overall decline in hotel revenues of 20% since 2007.

The third largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the
Snake River Lodge loan, is secured by an 88-room, full-service
luxury hotel located at the base of the Jackson Hole mountain
range, in Teton Village.  Amenities include a 17,000 sf, five
story destination spa, which includes 10 treatment rooms, a
restaurant and bar, an indoor/outdoor pool, luxuriously furnished
guestrooms, and 4,205 square feet of meeting space.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in February 2010 due to a
maturity default as a result of the borrower failing to meet the
extension provisions of the loan or to refinance.  The loan was
originally structured with three extension options of which two
have been exercised and one remains.  The loan documents call for
a new or replacement interest rate cap as well as a 1.20x DSCR
hurdle for the third extension option.  The special servicer is in
negotiations with the borrower for a possible forbearance or
extension of the loan; however, an extension workout would require
the borrower pay down a portion of the loan in lieu of satisfying
extension provisions.  The loan remains current.

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative, downgraded, and
assigned Recovery Ratings to these pooled classes:

  -- $22.4 million class K to 'CCC/RR5' from 'BBB';
  -- $23.9 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-'.

Also, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative, upgraded, and
assigned Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to these pooled
classes:

  -- $24.1 million class E to 'AAA/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $26.9 million class F to 'AAA/LS4' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.9 million class G to 'AA/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative,
affirmed, and assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these pooled
classes:

  -- $20.9 million class H at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.4 million class J at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch removed from Rating Watch Negative,
downgraded, and assigned RRs to these non-pooled participation
classes:

  -- $2 million class RAM-1 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $2.4 million class RAM-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-'.

Finally, Fitch removed from Rating Watch Negative, affirmed and
assigned Outlooks to these non-pooled participation classes:

  -- $257,664 class CAC-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $176,519 class CAC-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $205,253 class CAC-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $742,109 class CAN-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.1 million class CAN-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.2 million class CAN-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.6 million class CNP-1 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.1 million class CNP-2 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.2 million class CNP-3 at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1 million class DSG-1 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes DHC-1, DHC-2, DHC-3, DSG-2, PHH-1,
PHH-2, and SRL.

Fitch withdraws the rating on interest-only classes X-2 and X-3.

Classes A-1, A-2, X-1, B, C, D, HFL, HGI-1, HGI-2, HMP-1, HMP-2,
HMP-3, WBD-1, WBD-2 and WPP have been paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) tests to project future default levels for the
underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows
and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was
used to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools
are concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the senior
position of the CMBS note or property specific performance
warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned LS ratings, which indicate each tranche's potential
loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche
size to the expected loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.
LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS ratings to classes
rated 'CCC' or lower.

Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash flows and
fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings stresses.
The credit enhancements were then compared to the expected losses
generated in each rating category to determine potential credit
migration over the next two years.  If the Outlook scenario would
imply a lower rating, then the class was assigned a Negative
Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled
certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay interest
shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the classes.
The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the current
outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is used to
assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class H reflects modeled recoveries of
34.4% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($3.24 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($9,774);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($3.25 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($3.6 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded five classes, downgraded one
class and affirmed 16 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
FL2.  The upgrade reflects the payoff of the City National Plaza
Loan which had accounted for approximately 66% of the pool balance
prior to the payoff.  The downgrade is due to the increase in
credit quality dispersion in the pool and the refinancing risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  All loans in the pool mature within the next 12
months.  Loans secured by hotel properties now represent 64% of
pool balance.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

The pooled classes are secured by seven loans totaling
$164.3 million.  The loans range in size from a little over 2% to
30% of the current pool balance.  As of the July 16, 2010
distribution date, the transaction's aggregate certificate balance
has decreased by approximately 86% to $179.8 million from
$1.3 billion at securitization.

Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the pooled trust
mortgage balance is 89.6% compared to 87.3% at last review on
March 18, 2010, and 61% at securitization.  Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio for the pooled trust mortgage balance is
0.98X, compared to 1.08X at last review and 1.66X at
securitization.

The pool has not experienced losses since securitization.  There
is currently one loan in special servicing, the Snake River Lodge
& Spa Loan ($13.1 million -- 8% of the pooled balance) which is
secured by a 93 room full-service hotel located in Jackson Hole,
Wyoming.  There is also $1.1 million of non-pooled (rake) trust
debt, and a $12.8 million non-trust junior secured loan component.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on February 11,
2010, because the low DSCR did not enable the borrower to exercise
the one remaining extension option.  The special servicer is in
the process of negotiating a resolution with the borrower.  Due to
the decreased net cash flow of the property, Moody's current
underlying rating is B3, unchanged from the last review.

The largest pooled exposure is the Radisson Ambassador Plaza Hotel
and Casino Loan ($50 million - 30% of the pooled balance) which is
secured by a 233 room full-service hotel with a 15,000 square feet
casino located in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  There is also
$4.4 million of rake trust debt, and $35.6 million in mezzanine
debt.  Casino revenue, which continues to represent more than 50%
of the total revenue from the property, has declined since
securitization.  Year end 2005 casino revenue of $19.6 million
declined to $14.6 million as of year-end 2009.  In addition,
Revenue per available room has decreased 26% from a high of $122
in 2006 to $90 in 2009.  Due to the decline in property
performance, Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 123% and Moody's
stressed DSCR is 0.27X.  Moody's current underlying rating for the
pooled balance is B3, the same as at last review.

The second largest pooled exposure is the CarrAmerica -- Pool 3
(National Portfolio) Loan ($28.8 million -- 17.5% of the pooled
balance) which is the 7.5% portion of a pari passu split loan
structure.  There is also $3.8 million of rake trust debt, a
$179 million non-trust junior secured loan component and
$166 million in mezzanine debt.  The portfolio contains
approximately 8.7 million square feet, of which 6.0 million square
feet represents the loan sponsor's wholly-owned interests and its
percentage ownership interests in joint venture properties.  Of
the 6.0 million square feet, approximately 4.9 million square feet
(22 properties) is secured by first mortgage liens and 1.1 million
square feet (8 properties) is secured by a pledge of refinance and
sale proceeds.  The pledged properties represent approximately
8.4% of the total allocated trust balance.  At securitization, the
portfolio contained 19.4 million square feet, of which
13.9 million square feet was borrower owned collateral for the
loan, including 11.6 million square feet in mortgage collateral
and 2.3 million square feet in pledged collateral.  The
outstanding trust balance has decreased by 72.3% since
securitization from the payment of loan collateral release
premiums.  The portfolio has geographic concentration in the San
Jose, California metro area, with 61.4% of the mortgage collateral
by NRA (16 properties) located in San Jose, Santa Clara, Palo Alto
and Sunnyvale.  The suburban San Jose office market has a Fourth
Quarter 2009 Moody's Red-Yellow-Green(R) score of Red (6).  As of
September 2009, the loan collateral secured by first mortgage
liens had a weighted average occupancy rate of 78%, compared to
85% for the current portfolio at Moody's last full review and 87%
at securitization.  The market fundamentals within the Silicon
Valley market have deteriorated significantly.  The San Jose Class
A office market posted a 31% vacancy rate as of 4th quarter 2009,
along with an 11% decline in market rents during 2009 with an
additional 11% decline projected for 2010 (Source: CB Richard
Ellis).  The San Jose R&D market vacancy rate was 18% with a
market rent decline of 15% in 2009 and a further 4% decline
projected through 2011.  It is anticipated that the portfolio's
revenue will decrease as current leases expire and new leases are
signed at lower rents.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 95%,
based on mortgage collateral only and Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.12X.  Moody's underlying rating for the pooled balance is Baa3,
unchanged from last review.

The third largest pooled exposure is the Doubletree Suites
Galleria Loan ($26 million -- 15.8% of pooled balance) which is
secured by a 355-room full service hotel located in the Galleria
submarket in Houston, Texas.  There is also $2.4 million of rake
trust debt, and $25.3 million of non-trust junior secured debt.
Revenue per available room has decreased 13% from a high of $113
in 2008 to $98 for the trailing twelve month period ending
September 2009.  Due to the decline in property performance,
Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 79.8% and Moody's stressed DSCR
is 0.79X.  Moody's current underlying rating for the pooled
balance is Baa3, the same as at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class E, $24,052,896, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Class F, $26,855,000, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to A2

  -- Class G, $23,871,000, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Class H, $20,887,000, Upgraded to A1; previously on March 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Class J, $22,379,000, Upgraded to A3; previously on March 18,
     2010 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class K, $22,380,000, Affirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Class L, $23,871,082, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to B3

  -- Class X-2, Notional, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     November 14, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class X-3, Notional, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     November 14, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class RAM-1, $2,000,000, Affirmed at Caa1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Class RAM-2, $2,400,000, Affirmed at Caa2; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Class DSG-1, $1,000,000, Affirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 3, 2009 Downgraded at Ba1

  -- Class DSG-2, $1,400,000, Affirmed at Ba2; previously on
     March 3, 2009 Downgraded at Ba2

  -- Class DHC-1, $975,993, Affirmed at B3; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to B3

  -- Class DHC-2, $1,073,592, Affirmed at Caa1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Class SRL, $1,100,000, Affirmed at Caa2; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Class CAC-1, $257,664, Affirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class CAC-2, $176,519, Affirmed at Ba2; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Class CAC-3, $205,253, Affirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Class CAN-1, $710,989, Affirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class CAN-2, $1,054,145, Affirmed at Ba2; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Class CAN-3, $2,067,150, Affirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 18, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3


CLYDESDALE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.:

  -- US$234,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015 (current outstanding balance of $131,490,350), Upgraded
     to Aa1; previously on June 17, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on June 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015, Upgraded to Caa1; previously on June 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from delevering of the Class A notes since the last
rating action and increase in the overcollateralization levels of
the notes.

Since the last rating action on July 17, 2009, the Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately $85 million, or
roughly 39% of their outstanding balance reported in May 2009.
Moody's expects delevering to continue as a result of the end
of the deal's reinvestment period in September 2008.  As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action.  Based on the latest
trustee report dated June 7, 2010, the Class A, Class B, and Class
C overcollateralization ratios increased to 126.6%, 113.0%, and
105.3%, respectively, compared to May 2009 levels of 119.8%,
110.3%, and 104.7, respectively.  Moody's notes that the June
overcollateralization levels do not reflect the principal payment
of $27 million which was made to the Class A notes on the June 14,
2010 payment date.  Moody's analyzed the transaction as if this
payment had already occurred.  Additionally, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to about $14 million from
approximately $22MM in May 2009.  Due to the impact of revised and
updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd., issued in September of 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these
classes of Commercial Mortgage Acceptance Corp., series 1998-C2,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $65.1 million class J to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BB';
  -- $21.7 million class K to 'C/RR5' from 'B+'.

Fitch affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $25.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.7 million class G at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.4 million class H at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

The $10 million class L remains at 'D' and the RR has been revised
to 'RR6' from 'RR5'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X.

Fitch does not rate the $122.9 million class F.  Classes A-1, A-2,
A-3, B, C, and D have been paid in full.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 9.4%, approximately $28.4 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down 88%
to $302.8 million from $2.9 billion at issuance.  Ten loans (14%)
are defeased.  Fitch has identified 21 Loans of Concern (32%),
including seven loans in special servicing (17.4%).

The largest specially serviced asset (4.7%) is a 239,540 sf
grocery-anchored retail center located in Anderson, IN.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in August 2008 due to a discovery
that the loan was cross collateralized and cross defaulted with
another loan in the pool, currently the second largest specially
serviced asset (4.3%), a 245,010 sf grocery anchored retail
property located in Lafayette, IN, which was transferred to
special servicing in May 2008.  The special servicer filed a
repurchase claim against the loan seller, Merrill Lynch, because
it has been unable to obtain a signed copy of the Cross Guaranty
and Contribution Agreement, which the borrower claims was never
signed at closing.  The repurchase claim was declined in December
2008 by the court.  Subsequently in March 2010 the Indiana Court
of Appeals ruled the loans are not crossed due to a lack of a
signed and fully executed agreement.  The borrower continues to
pursue workouts on the loan.

The third largest specially serviced asset (3.9%) is an office
property located in Phoenix, AZ.  The property is 100% vacant when
its sole tenant, the IRS, vacated in mid-2009 at its lease
expiration.  The loan is greater than 90 days delinquent.  The
borrower continues to pursue workouts on the loan.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine
value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, eight loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Commodore CDO IV Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$220,000,000 Class A-1(a)-U Floating Rate Variable Funding
     Notes due 2045 (current balance of $52,473,921), Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$36,000,000 Class A-1(b) Floating Rate Notes due 2045,
     Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca.

Commodore CDO IV Ltd., issued on August 19, 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio that
consists primarily of residential mortgage-backed securities and
commercial mortgage-backed securities.  RMBS comprise
approximately 56% of the underlying portfolio, of which the
majority are 2004 and 2005 vintage.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, failure of the coverage tests, and number of assets
that are currently on review for possible downgrade.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor, as reported by the
trustee, has increased from 1668 in February 2009 to 2126 in July
2010.  During the same time, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities increased from $67.5 million to $107.5 million, and the
Class A/B overcollateralization ratio decreased from 76.30% to
34.24%.  Also, in April 2010, the ratings of approximately
$29 million of pre-2005 RMBS in the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated loss projections applicable to certain RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Commodore CDO III,
Ltd. The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$245,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $68,696,639),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on October 19, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3;

  -- US$83,300,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $11,455,235),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on October 19, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa1;

  -- US$16,700,000 Class A-1C First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $16,584,235),
     Downgraded to C; previously on October 19, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca.

Commodore CDO III, Ltd., issued on March 1, 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio that
consists primarily of residential mortgage-backed securities and
commercial mortgage-backed securities.  RMBS comprise
approximately 77% of the underlying portfolio, of which the
majority are from pre-2005 vintage.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), failure of the coverage tests, and number of
assets that are currently on review for possible downgrade.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor, as reported by the
trustee, has increased from 1831 in September 2009 to 2065 in June
2010.  During the same time, the Class A/B overcollateralization
ratio decreased from 41.02% to 35.75%, and the coverage test is
failing.  Also, in April 2010, the ratings of approximately
$76.8 million of pre-2005 RMBS in the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated loss projections applicable to certain RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12 for
Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


CREDIT AND REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-8 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Credit and Repackaged Securities
Limited Series 2006-8, a corporate synthetic obligation
transaction referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

  -- US$200,000,000 Single Tranche Notes due September 20, 1013
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  Since the last rating action, the
portfolio has suffered further losses from the credit events on
Ambac Assurance Corporation., Capmark Financial Group Inc., Cemex,
S.A.B. de C.V., Syncora Guarantee Inc, and Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company.  These credit events couple with the credit
events on Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Federal National
Mortgage Association, Kaupthing Bank hf, Lehman Brothers Holdings,
Inc., and Washington Mutual, Inc have lead to a total losses of
approximately 69% of the rated tranche.  The portfolio has the
highest industry concentrations in Banking (16%), Insurance (15%),
and Finance (10%).


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-CK3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and assigned Rating
Outlooks to several classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2001-CK3.  Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings
and Recovery Ratings to numerous classes.

The downgrades are primarily due to an increase in realized losses
since the last review as well as Fitch's expected losses on loans
currently in special servicing.  Fitch expects losses to fully
deplete classes K and L, while classes M through O have already
been reduced to zero.  As of the June 2010 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced 38.2% to
$696.8 million from $1.13 billion at issuance, which consists of
34.5% of paydown and 3.7% of realized losses.  Thirty-five loans
(35.8%) have defeased, including four (12.1%) of the top 10 loans.
As of the June 2010 remittance, interest shortfalls are reaching
class J.  Expected loss as a percentage of the current deal
balance is 2.6%.  Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any rating changes over the next one to two years.

Fitch has designated 20 loans (10%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes nine specially serviced loans (5.7%).  The largest
specially serviced loan (1.5%) is secured by a 142,000 sf office
building located in White Plains, NY.  The $10.1 million 222
Bloomingdale Road loan transferred to the special servicer in July
2009 and is over 90 days delinquent as of the June 2010
remittance.  The special servicer and the borrower are currently
in negotiations for a DPO.  Current occupancy is 78%, and the
first-quarter 2010 DSCR was 0.50x.  Fitch expects the trust to
experience a loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.1%) is secured by a
267-unit multifamily property located in Austell, GA,
approximately 17 miles west of downtown Atlanta.  The $7.1 million
Whisperwood Apartments loan transferred in March 2010 for imminent
default and is over 90 days delinquent as of the June remittance.
The special servicer is moving forward with foreclosure and Fitch
expects the trust to experience a loss on this loan.  The
property's DSCR for 2009 was 0.17x and the most recent reported
occupancy was 47%.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
(NOI) and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.50% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, 21 loans (11.3% of the overall pool) were assumed
not to be able to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses for
four loans (0.8%) in instances where Fitch's derived value was
less than the outstanding balance.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and
RRs as indicated:

  -- $8 million class G-1 to 'A/LS4' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11.7 million class G-2 to 'A/LS4' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14.1 million class H to 'BB/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.8 million class J to 'CC/RR2' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $9 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- $476.3 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $42.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $56.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.3 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.1 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25.4 million class F at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch has affirmed and revised a Recovery Rating to this class:

  -- $3.6 million class L to 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR2'.

Lastly, Fitch has affirmed class M, which has been reduced to zero
by realized losses, at 'D/RR6'.

The A-1, A-2 and A-3 classes have been paid in full.  Classes M, N
and O have been reduced to zero as a result of realized losses to
the trust.  Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class
A-X.  Fitch did not rate classes N and O at issuance.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-CF2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
series 2001-CF2:

  -- $21.9 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB';
  -- $8.2 million class K to 'CC/RR1' from 'BB-';
  -- $9.3 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B+'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings and Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $283 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.4 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.9 million class F at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14 million class G at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $16.4 million class H at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The $1.7 million class M remains at 'D', and the Recovery Rating
has been revised to 'RR6' from 'RR3'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class A-X.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 4.3%, approximately $21.3 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down 53%
to $494.9 million from $1.1 billion at issuance.  Thirty-one loans
(32.3%) are defeased.  Fitch has identified 32 Loans of Concern
(20.7%), including 12 loans in special servicing (8.8%).

The largest specially serviced asset (1.3%) is a 115-room, non-
flagged, full-service hotel property located in Groten, CT.  The
asset transferred to special servicing in February 2009 for
imminent default as a result of the borrower requesting for loan
modification and relief from the lender due to property
performance decline.  The borrower continues to pursue workouts on
the loan.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.2%) is an 86,072
square foot retail property located in Forest City, NC.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in July 2009 after the borrower
sent a hardship letter to the master servicer informing that the
anchor tenant, Goody's, which occupied 29% of the gross leasable
area, filed Chapter 11 and subsequently vacated in February 2009.
The loan is current, and the borrower has continued to cover the
negative cash flow.  The borrower recently released the vacated
space to an outlet retailer increasing occupancy to 96.5% from
67.5%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by, generally, applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
net operating income, 5% reduction to 2009 fiscal-year-end net
operating income, or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance
issues, such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying
an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 10% to determine
value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 12 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with nine loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-TFL1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed eight
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
series 2006-TFL1.

CSFB 2006-TFL1 has only two loans remaining.  The downgrades of
classes H though L reflect base case losses of 3.6%, as well as
concern over the ability of the Tharaldson Hotel Portfolio loan to
refinance at maturity.  This Fitch loan of concern, which
comprises 87.7% of the pool, is highly leveraged with a base case
stressed loan-to-value of 94% on the A-note and 157% on the total
debt stack.  In addition, its final extended maturity date is in
April 2011.  The downgrades are a result of inadequate credit
enhancement to withstand Fitch's loss expectations, which
incorporate prospective views of cash flow declines and commercial
real estate market value declines.

The Tharaldson Hotel Portfolio loan is secured by fee and/or
leasehold interests in 105 limited service hotels (8,238 rooms).
The portfolio, which is located across 26 states, consists of
hotels with 14 different flags.  Currently, in addition to the
$478.5 million A-note, there are $177.5 million in B-notes and
$145.1 million in mezzanine debt held outside the trust.
Portfolio performance declined substantially enough in 2009 to
trigger a financial covenant.  As of November 2009, all excess
cash flow after debt service is being swept into a lender-
controlled reserve account as additional collateral for the loan.
Under Fitch's updated analysis, the Tharaldson loan is modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.

The other loan in the transaction is secured by Charleston Place
Hotel, a 442-room full-service luxury hotel located in the
Historic District of Charleston, South Carolina.  The collateral
also includes approximately 50,000 square feet of retail space and
a former theater that is used for meeting space and administrative
offices.  The loan is currently in its third and final extension
period and matures in March 2011.  Currently, in addition to the
$67 million A-note, there is both B-note and mezzanine debt held
outside the trust.  Both subordinate loans are serviced only by
excess cash flow and may accrue.  Additionally, the theater
portion of the property secures a $3 million senior lien in favor
of the City of Charleston.  Debt service on this senior lien is
being escrowed in full by the borrower.

In its base case scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
for the two assets is 6.6% from year end 2009 servicer-reported
financial data.

Fitch has downgraded and removed these classes from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Recovery Rating as indicated:

  -- $25 million class H to 'BBB' from 'A-', Outlook Stable;
  -- $27 million class J to 'BB' from 'BBB', Outlook Stable.
  -- $36 million class K to 'B' from 'BBB-', Outlook Negative;
  -- $32.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB-'.

Fitch has affirmed and removed these classes from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned or revised Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $52 million class A-1 at 'AAA', Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $195 million class A-2 at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;

  -- $39 million class B at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;

  -- $34 million class C at 'AA+', Outlook Stable;

  -- $27 million class D at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29 million class E at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24 million class F at 'A+', Outlook Stable;

  -- $25 million class G at 'A', Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only
classes A-X-1 and A-X-2.

Class A-X-3 has paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a class's respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a class's respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a class's respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class L reflects modeled recoveries of
37% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($11.7 million)

  -- Present value of expected interest recoveries ($0.2 million)

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($11.9 million)

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($13.1 million)

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.

As there are only two loans remaining, one of which is over 87% of
the remaining collateral, the transaction is similar to a U.S.
CMBS single-borrower transaction.  In addition to the CREL CDO
methodology, Fitch reviewed the transaction in conjunction with
its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage
Transactions,' including reviewing insurance requirements and
borrower structure.  As there is no current criteria for assigning
Loss Severity ratings to single-borrower deals, none were assigned
to this transaction's classes.



EDUCATION FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes and the class B notes from Education
Funding 2006-1 LLC, a student loan asset-backed securities
transaction.  Concurrently, S&P removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P had placed them
on March 16, 2010.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of the deterioration in
collateral performance for this transaction, including higher-
than-expected levels of delinquencies, defaults, and net losses,
as well as reductions in excess spread.  S&P's default projections
and rating actions on this transaction also reflect its negative
outlook on the private student loan sector for 2010 and its view
that private student loan performance will likely remain under
pressure over the next year.

                         Pool Performance

The EFP 2006-1 transaction had 12 quarters of performance through
the quarterly performance period ended March 2010 (on the April
2010 quarterly distribution date), with a collateral pool factor
(the principal balance remaining in the pool as a percent of the
original pool balance plus the prefunding account) of 85.7%.  At
the same time, the amount of loans in repayment was 58.2% of the
current collateral balance (excluding accrued interest).

Ninety-plus-day delinquencies have fluctuated between
approximately 2.8% and 8.9% as a percent of loans in repayment
since the deal's inception and totaled 5.4% as of March 2010.
Total delinquencies have vacillated between 6% and 18% of loans in
repayment.  As of March 2010, total delinquencies were 12.2%.
Additionally, as of March 2010, forbearance stood at 16.5% of
loans in repayment, forbearance, and deferment, a 59% increase
from the quarterly period ended March 2009.

Defaults continue to rise at a rapid pace.  As of March 2010,
cumulative defaults (as a percentage of the initial collateral
balance and capitalized interest) had increased by 69% since March
2009, to 14.5% from 8.6%.

The higher levels of delinquencies and defaults have eroded
available credit support, as evidenced by the declining
overcollateralization amounts and corresponding parities.  Total
parity (the total pool balance plus the balance of the capitalized
interest account and the collection account {the "total trust
asset value"}, divided by the aggregate balance of the outstanding
notes) has declined by 4.5 percentage points from the same time
last year, and stood at 91.5% as of March 2010.  This is almost
8pps below the starting total parity of 99.54% (according to the
transaction's first servicer report, distributed in December
2006).  Mezzanine parity (the total trust asset value divided by
the aggregate balance of the outstanding class A and B notes) and
senior parity (the total trust asset value divided by the
aggregate balance of the outstanding class A notes) have also
declined by approximately 4.5pps each, and stood at 94.92% and
107.65%, respectively.  These numbers are also down significantly
from their original levels of 102.81% and 114.65%, respectively.

           Default Expectations And Net Loss Projections

Based on S&P's view of the current and projected performance of
this pool of private student loans, S&P has raised its lifetime
cumulative default expectations for this transaction to 33.0%-
35.0% of the original pool balance plus capitalized interest, from
its previous expectation of 20%-21%.  S&P assumed future stressed
recovery rates of approximately 15%-20% of the dollar amount of
cumulative defaults, which results in its expectation for
remaining cumulative net losses of 18.2%-21.4% (as a percent of
the current collateral balance plus capitalized interest as of
March 2010).

                             Structure

This transaction has a lockout period during which principal is
paid sequentially to the class A, B, and C notes.  After the
lockout period ends on the "step-down date," which is the later of
(a) the date on which no class A-1 notes remain outstanding or (b)
the earlier of (i) the first quarterly payment date on which no
senior notes remain outstanding, or (ii) the quarterly payment
date in July 2012), payments of principal will be made pro rata to
the class A, B, and C notes if the subordinate-note principal
trigger is not in effect.  The subordinate-note principal trigger
occurs after the step-down date if the total asset percentage
(total trust asset value divided by principal amount of total
notes outstanding) falls below 101%.  If this happens, the
principal payment priority switches back to sequential for as long
as the trigger remains in effect.  In addition, the transaction
pays principal sequentially within the subclasses of the class A
notes.

The transaction also has two interest reprioritization triggers,
which affect the payment of interest on the class B and C notes.
The transaction will breach the subordinate-note interest trigger
if both the senior asset percentage (total trust asset value
divided by principal amount of senior notes outstanding) falls
below 100% and cumulative defaults exceed the rate outlined in
table 1 below.  If this trigger occurs, interest that would have
been paid to the class B notes is diverted to pay principal on the
class A notes.  The transaction will breach the junior
subordinate-note interest trigger if both the subordinate asset
percentage (total trust asset value divided by principal amount of
senior notes and class B notes outstanding) falls below 100% and
cumulative defaults exceed the rate outlined in table 1 below.
This trigger is currently in effect on the transaction, resulting
in the diversion of interest that would have been paid to the
class C notes to pay principal on the class A notes.  Therefore,
the class C notes are not currently receiving interest payments.

                              Table 1

                     Cumulative Default Rates

    Date                         Class B (%)         Class C (%)
    ----                         -----------         -----------
    April 2008                    3                   3
    April 2009                   10                   8
    April 2010                   17                  14
    April 2011                   25                  23
    April 2012                   27                  25
    April 2013                   30                  28
    April 2014 and thereafter    32                  31

Furthermore, an administrative fee trigger is currently in effect
on the transaction.  The transaction breached this trigger when
the total asset percentage (total trust asset value divided by
principal amount of all outstanding notes) fell below 100%.  This
breach resulted in the subordination of administrative fees below
the payment of principal and interest on all of the notes, and
consequently, the administrative fees are not currently being
paid.  This has a negative impact on the administrator's ability
to fund incremental delinquency management and collections
strategies, including those with outside collection agencies,
beyond what the base servicing agreement provides.

             Breakeven Cash Flow Modeling Assumptions

S&P ran midstream breakeven cash flows for this transaction under
various rating stress assumptions.  These cash flow runs provided
breakeven percentages that represent the maximum amount of
remaining cumulative net losses a transaction (or class of notes)
can absorb (as a percent of the pool balance as of the cash flow
cutoff date) before failing to pay full and timely interest and
ultimate principal.  These are some of the major assumptions S&P
modeled:

* Moderately front-loaded default curves of differing speeds that
  covered periods of five and six years;

* Recovery rates of 15% for the class A notes and 20% for the
  class  notes; and

* Prepayment speeds starting at approximately 2 CPR (constant
  prepayment rate, an annualized prepayment speed stated as a
  percent of the current loan balance) and ramping up over three
  years to a maximum rate of 5 CPR.  After three years, S&P held
  the maximum rate constant.

       Breakeven Cash Flow Modeling Results/Rating Actions

S&P's cash flow runs indicated that the class A notes are able to
absorb remaining cumulative net losses of approximately 26.8%,
before a payment default would occur.  After considering the
aforementioned breakevens and remaining expected net losses of
19.3%-21.4%, S&P lowered its ratings on the class A notes to 'BBB-
' from 'AA-' to reflect its view of the current loss coverage
levels.

The breakevens for the class B notes ranged between 17.6% and
18.0%.  After comparing these breakevens to the remaining expected
net losses of 18.2%-20.2%, S&P lowered the class B ratings to 'B'
from 'BBB-'.

The rating on the class C notes remains 'D', where S&P placed it
on Feb. 10, 2009, due to a breach of the junior subordinate-note
interest trigger and the consequent missed interest payment to
this class.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
student loan receivables backing this transaction relative to
S&P's revised cumulative default expectations and available credit
enhancement.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Education Funding 2006-1 LLC

                             Rating
                             ------
                 Class    To        From
                 -----    --        ----
                 A-1      BBB-      AA-/Watch Neg
                 A-2      BBB-      AA-/Watch Neg
                 A-3      BBB-      AA-/Watch Neg
                 B        B         BBB-/Watch Neg

                     Other Outstanding Rating

                   Education Funding 2006-1 LLC

                        Class     Rating
                        -----     ------
                        C         D


FRANKLIN AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
upgrade eight tranches from five Franklin auto loan
securitizations sponsored by Franklin Capital Corporation.  The
review actions are the result of the build-up in credit
enhancement relative to remaining losses and the lowered projected
Cumulative Net Loss levels for Franklin transactions issued
between 2005 and 2007.  As performance stabilized over the past 12
months, the range of expected lifetime CNL was lowered compared to
Moody's previously published range on February 27, 2009.

Moody's current lifetime CNL projections for the affected
transactions range between 2.40% and 11.50% of the original pool
balance, compared to between 2.50% to 12.00% from previous
reviews.  For the 2004-2 and 2005-1 transactions, the current loss
projections (as a percentage of the original pool balance) range
from 2.40% to 4.40%.  For the 2006-1, 2007-1 and 2008-A
transactions, the current loss projections range from 7.00% to
11.50%.  Even though the CNL projections for the 2006-1, 2007-1
and 2008-A transactions have increased compared to estimates at
deal closing, the build-up in credit enhancement in these
transactions has been rapid.

Total hard credit enhancement (excluding excess spread) for the
MBIA wrapped Class A-4 tranche from Franklin 2004-2 is
approximately 48%.  Other total hard credit enhancements (consist
of subordination, cash reserve account, and Letter of Credit) for
affected Class B and Class C of the senior-subordinate structured
Franklin transactions (2005-1,2006-1, 2007-1, and 2008-A) range
approximately from 21% to 49% and 6% to 31% respectively of the
outstanding collateral pool balances.  Franklin Auto Trust 2008-A
further benefits from a higher total reserve target level at
10.25% compared to targets at 5.25% or 5.00% from earlier Franklin
transactions.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment continues to
rise, and weakness in the used vehicle market.  Moody's currently
views the used vehicle market as stronger now than it was a year
ago, when the uncertainty relating to the economy as well as the
future of the U.S auto manufacturers was significantly greater.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-4, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on December 30, 2008, Upgraded to Aa3 from A1

  -- Guarantor: MBIA (B3; previously on February 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying rating: Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on December 30, 2008, Upgraded to Aa3
     from A1

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on February 27, 2009,Upgraded to A3 from Baa3

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on October 11, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. C, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on February 27, 2009 Downgraded to B2 from Baa2

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. B, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on February 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3 from Aa3

Issuer: Franklin Auto Trust 2008-A

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on February 27, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1

  -- Cl. C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on February 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3 from Aa3


GE-WMC ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from 3 RMBS
transactions issued by GE-WMC.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Issuer: GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on January 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1a, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1b, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2000-C1:

  -- $8.8 million class K to 'CC/RR2' from 'B+'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity and RR
ratings as indicated:

  -- $10.5 million class H at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.6 million class J at 'BB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

The $7.7 million class L remains 'D/RR5'.

Classes A through G have been paid in full while classes M through
O have been reduced to zero due to realized losses.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class X.

The affirmation is the result of sufficient credit enhancement to
offset Fitch's revised loss estimates for the transaction
following Fitch's prospective analysis which is similar to its
recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch expects losses of
19.7% of the remaining pool balance, approximately $6.6 million,
from the loans in special servicing and a loan that is not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The majority of Fitch expected losses (97.1%) come from loans in
special servicing.  Expected loss as a percentage of the original
deal balance is 3.35%.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 96.2% to $33.6 million from $880 million at
issuance.  Four of the remaining loans have defeased (16%).

As of June 2010, there are seven specially serviced loans (70.2%).
The largest specially serviced loan (15.5%), is secured by a 224-
unit apartment complex located in Riverdale, GA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2009 for imminent
maturity default.  The special servicer has foreclosed and the
property is real estate owned.

The second largest specially serviced loan (11.1%) is a 73,149 sf
office property in Fort Lauderdale, FL.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2009 for imminent default.  The special
servicer has approved a modification to extend the maturity date
to October 2011.  The most recent servicer reported occupancy at
year end 2009 was 59.6%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, one loan is not expected to pay
off at maturity and incurs a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2001-C2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D' from
'CCC-'.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class,
which were detailed in the July 15, 2010, remittance report.  ,
The class M certificate experienced losses amounting to 6.3% of
its $11.3 million original certificate balance since the previous
report.  To date, classes N through Q have lost 100% of their
aggregate $22.6 million original certificate balance.  Classes N
through P are rated 'D', and Standard & Poor's doesn't rate the
class Q certificate.

The principal losses detailed in the July 2010 remittance report
resulted from the liquidation of an asset that was with the
special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The 400
Horsham Road asset is a 150,581-sq.-ft. office in Horsham, Pa.
The asset had a total exposure of $16.4 million.  The asset was
transferred to the special servicer on May 6, 2008, and became
real estate owned on Sept. 24, 2008.  The trust incurred a
$13.3 million realized loss when the asset was liquidated on
July 1, 2010.  Based on the July 2010 remittance report data, the
loss severity for this asset was 89.1% (based on the asset's
balance at the time of disposition).

As of the July 15, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 80 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$553.2 million, down from 96 assets totaling $754.9 million at
issuance.  Eight assets, totaling $105.2 million (19.0%), are with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
on seven assets totaling $23.5 million.  Based on the July 2010
remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for these
assets was approximately 41.9% (based on the assets' balances at
the time of disposition).


GRAMERCY CAPITAL: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Action on Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that a Supplemental
Indenture dated as of June 14, 2010, between Gramercy Capital
Corp., an underlying asset in Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.
(as the "Issuer"), and The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company,
N.A. (as the "Trustee") will not at this time result in a
withdrawal, reduction or other adverse action with respect to
Moody's current ratings of any class of notes issued by the
Issuer.  Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the
Supplemental Indenture could have non-credit-related effects.

Moody's has been informed that the Supplemental Indenture received
the consent of the majority of the controlling class and hedge
counterparty, and the Supplement may be summarized:

The Issuer held $24.38 million of GKK Capital LP Trust Preferred
Securities.  The collateral manager, TP Management, an affiliate
of Fortress Investment Group LLC, exchanged the GKK TRUPs for the
replacement securities in the total principal amount of
$24.38 million and three-month Treasury bills in the total amount
of $2.32 million.

CUSIP Deal Name Class of Notes Current public Moody's rating

  -- 385000AC8 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Class B Aa3
  -- 385000AF1 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Class E Ba1
  -- 385000AG9 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Class F Ba2
  -- 385000AH7 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Class G Ba3
  -- 385000AJ3 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Class H B2
  -- 38500VAC0 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class A-2 Baa2
  -- 38500VAE6 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class C Caa2
  -- 38500VAF3 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class D Caa3
  -- 38500VAG1 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class E Caa3
  -- 35800VAH9 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class F Caa3
  -- 38500VAJ5 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Class G Caa3
  -- 38500XAC6 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class A-3 A2
  -- 38500XAD4 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class B-FL Ba1
  -- 38500XAE2 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class C-FL NR
  -- 38500XAF9 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class D NR
  -- 38500XAG7 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class E NR
  -- 38500XAH5 Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Class G-FL NR


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 2004-FL2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 10 classes of
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2004-FL2.

The downgrade of class L is a result of actual principal losses.
To date, the class has incurred $373,648 of losses.  The
affirmations of the remaining classes are a result of adequate
credit enhancement to withstand Fitch's loss expectations, which
incorporate prospective views of cash flow declines and commercial
real estate market value declines.  The assignment of a Negative
Outlook to classes J, K, and N-SO reflects an additional
sensitivity analysis related to further credit migration of the
underlying loans.

There are two loans remaining in the transaction, Southfield Town
Center (84.8%) and Aviation Mall (15.2%).  Under Fitch's updated
analysis, one of the loans is modeled to default in the base case
stress scenario, defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the
modeled cash flow decline is 17.1% from fourth-quarter 2009
servicer-reported cash flow and no losses are expected in the base
case scenario.

Both remaining loans were transferred to special servicing in May
2009 after being unable to refinance prior to the loan's maturity.
The Southfield Town Center loan had an original term of two years,
plus three one-year extensions, which were all exercised.  The
Aviation Mall loan had an original term of four years, plus two
one-year extensions, which were all exercised.  A modification of
both loans was exercised in August 2009 and subsequently, the
loans were returned to the master servicer.

The Southfield Town Center loan is secured by a 2.2 million square
foot office complex located in Southfield, Michigan.  The loan
matures in July 2011 with an additional one-year extension option.
Currently, in addition to the $151.2 million pooled note and a
$7.7 million non-pooled note, there is a $67.4 million B-note and
a $25 million mezzanine loan held outside the trust.  The
modification of the Southfield Town Center loan included these
terms: a two-year maturity extension with a one-year extension
option available; a conversion of the loan from interest-only to
amortizing; an increase in the interest rate cap of the loan to 4%
for the first year through July 2010 and 3.5% for the second year
through July 2011; and an increase in the funding of a rollover
reserve account, to be capped at $7.5 million, for future leasing
costs.

Aviation Mall, while back at the master servicer, remains a Loan
of Concern.  The loan is secured by a 514,612 square foot retail
mall located in Queensbury, New York.  The final extension option
on the loan occurs in July 2011.  Currently, in addition to the
$27 million A note, there is an $8.8 million B note held outside
the trust.  Year-end 2009 property performance and occupancy are
comparable to year-end 2008.  However, current occupancy as of
first-quarter 2010 has declined to 96% compared to 100% at year-
end 2009 with weaker sales anticipated.  The modification of the
Aviation Mall loan included these terms: a two-year maturity
extension; an increase in the interest rate cap of the loan to 3%
for the first year through July 2010 and 7% for the second year
through July 2011; and trapping of all excess cash flow for the
duration of the extension.

Fitch has downgraded and removed this class from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Recovery Rating as indicated:

  -- $15.3 million class L to 'D/RR1' from 'B-'.

Fitch has affirmed and removed these classes from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned or maintained Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $26.4 million class C at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $22.7 million class D at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.4 million class E at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.8 million class F at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.5 million class G at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.5 million class H at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.1 million class J at 'A-'; Outlook Negative from Rating
     Watch Negative;

  -- $10.3 million class K at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative from Rating
     Watch Negative;

  -- $7.7 million class N-SO at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative from
     Rating Watch Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed this rating and maintained the
Outlook as indicated:

  -- $11.3 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, X-1, H-ROSW, L-ROSW, N-ROSW, N-LH, N-MV, K-NO,
M-NO, N-NO, and N-WV have all paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a class's respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a class's respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a class's respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR1' to class L reflects modeled recoveries of
90% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($13.5 million)

  -- Present value of expected interest recoveries ($0.3 million)

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($13.8 million)

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($15.1 million)

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.

As there are only two loans remaining, one of which is over 80% of
the remaining collateral, the transaction is similar to a U.S.
CMBS single-borrower transaction.  In addition to the CREL CDO
methodology, Fitch reviewed the transaction in conjunction with
its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage
Transactions,' including reviewing insurance requirements and
borrower structure.  As there is no current criteria for assigning
Loss Severity ratings to single-borrower deals, none were assigned
to this transaction's classes.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL4 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
pooled classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2006-FL4.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on three raked classes from
this transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, which
included the revaluation of the collateral securing 11 floating-
rate loans indexed to one-month LIBOR and three real estate owned
assets.  The pool consists of lodging, office, retail, and
multifamily properties.  Lodging properties, which constitute
46.6% ($215.3 million) of the pooled trust balance (as of the
July 8, 2010, trustee remittance report), have experienced
declines in valuation to levels between 10.1% and 38.9% below the
levels S&P assessed in its last review, on May 22, 2009.

S&P's downgrades of the pooled certificates also reflect its
opinion that these classes are susceptible to future interest
shortfalls.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the "WSC" raked certificates based
upon its revaluation of the Westchester Shopping Center loan.  The
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from this loan.

The class X-2 certificate is an interest-only certificate with a
balance that references the aggregate certificate balances of the
pooled principal and interest certificates in the transaction.
S&P lowered its rating on class X-2 based on its current criteria.

                         Lodging Collateral

Lodging exposure totals $215.3 million (46.6% of the pooled trust
balance), including four loans and two REO assets.  The hotel
properties are located in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla. (16.6%),
Waikiki, Hawaii (13.8%), Boston, Mass. (5.9%), Scottsdale, Ariz.
(5.1%), Portland, Ore. (3.4%), and Metairie, La. (1.8%).

S&P based its analysis of the hotels on its review of the
borrowers' operating statements for year-end 2009, their 2010
budgets, and available Smith Travel Research (STR) reports.  S&P
noted that a reduction in business and leisure travel
significantly affected the performance of the lodging collateral
in 2009 compared with 2008.  STR reported that revenue per
available room for the general U.S. hotel industry declined 16.7%
in 2009 compared with 2008 and fell 9.3% for the trailing 12
months ended May 2010 compared with the same period in 2009.

                       Largest Lodging Loan

The PGA National Resort and Spa loan, the largest lodging loan
and the largest exposure in the pool, has a trust balance of
$76.9 million (16.6%) and a whole-loan balance of $132.6 million.
In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole
loan secure mezzanine debt totaling $30.4 million held outside the
trust.  The whole loan is secured by a 339-room full-service
resort hotel with amenities that include, among other items, five
18-hole golf courses in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla.  The borrower's
year-end 2009 operating statements for the property reported a
13.2% decline in net operating income from 2008, and S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 38.9% since its last review, due
primarily to a decrease in its expected RevPAR for the property.
Using a weighted average capitalization rate of 11.5%, its
analysis yielded a stressed loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 129.4% on
the trust balance.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
(Wells Fargo), reported a debt service coverage of 3.60x and 54.8%
occupancy for year-end 2009.  The loan matures on Sept. 1, 2010.
Wells Fargo stated that the borrower has not yet indicated whether
it plans to exercise its remaining one 12-month extension option.

  Lodging Exposures With Maturities Within The Next Three Months

Nine of the remaining 11 loans in the pool currently have final
maturities in 2010 or 2011.  One other loan was recently extended
to a final maturity of February 2013, while one matured in August
2009.  In addition to the PGA National Resort and Spa loan, the
ResortQuest Waikiki Beach loan matures within the next three
months.

The ResortQuest Waikiki Beach loan, the third-largest exposure in
the pool, has a trust balance of $63.5 million (13.8%) and a
whole-loan balance of $70.0 million.  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure mezzanine debt
totaling $34.9 million held outside the trust.  The whole loan is
secured by a 644-room, full-service hotel in Waikiki, Hawaii.  The
borrower's year-end 2009 operating statements for the property
reported a 42.9% decrease in net cash flow from 2008.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 10.1% since its last review,
primarily due to a decrease in its expected RevPAR.  Using a
capitalization rate of 10.8%, S&P's analysis yielded a stressed
LTV ratio of 105.9% on the trust balance.  Wells Fargo reported a
DSC of 3.44x and 75.1% occupancy for year-end 2009.  The loan
matures on Oct. 1, 2010.  Wells Fargo stated that the borrower has
not yet indicated whether it plans to exercise its one remaining
12-month extension option.

           Lodging Exposures With The Special Servicers

There are two REO hotel assets with the special servicers.
Details are:

The Mondrian ? Scottsdale asset, a 194-room, full-service
boutique hotel in Scottsdale, Ariz., has a senior pooled
balance of $23.4 million (5.1% of the pooled trust balance) and a
$2.6 million subordinate nonpooled component that provides the
sole source of cash flow for the "MON" raked certificates.  The
property became REO on March 16, 2010.  An appraisal reduction
amount of $9.0 million is in effect against the total exposure of
$28.6 million, which is based on a July 8, 2009, appraisal value
of $21.7 million.  According to Wells Fargo, one of the two
special servicers for this transaction, the property is currently
operating as the Hotel Theodore and is not generating sufficient
cash flow to pay debt service.  The reported occupancy was 40.8%
as of year-end 2009, and Wells Fargo plans to market the property
for sale.  S&P downgraded the "MON" raked certificates to 'D' on
April 27, 2010, due to recurring interest shortfalls resulting
from special servicing fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction amounts, and other related expenses.  The Galleria
Sheraton - Metairie is a 182-room hotel in Metairie, La., with a
senior pooled balance of $8.5 million (1.8% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $1.9 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the "GSM" raked certificates.  The property became REO on
Feb. 4, 2010, and an ARA of $3.4 million is in effect against the
total exposure of $11.1 million, which is based on an Aug. 27,
2009, appraisal value of $9.1 million.  The special servicer for
this asset, Situs Asset Management, has indicated that it is
currently evaluating various purchase offers for the property.
The master servicer reported a 0.25x DSC for year-end 2008 and
64.8% occupancy as of year-end 2009.  S&P downgraded the "GSM"
raked certificates to 'D' on April 27, 2010, due to recurring
interest shortfalls resulting from special servicing fees, ASER
amounts, and other related expenses.

                         Office Collateral

Office properties secure five loans totaling $178.7 million (38.7%
of the pooled trust balance).  The office properties are located
in New York City (20.2%), Houston, Texas (11.3%), and Southern
California (7.2%).

S&P based its analysis of the office properties on its review of
the borrowers' operating statements for year-end 2009, their 2010
budgets, and their 2009 or 2010 rent rolls.  S&P's average
adjusted valuations for the five loans were stable since its last
review.

                        Largest Office Loan

The Metropolitan Tower loan, the largest office loan and the
second-largest exposure in the pool, has a whole-loan balance of
$145.5 million that comprises a $72.8 million senior pooled
component (15.8% of the pooled trust balance), a $8.7 million
subordinate nonpooled component that supports the "MET" raked
certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's), and two nontrust
junior participation interests totaling $64.0 million.  The whole
loan is secured by a condominium interest totaling 259,800 sq. ft.
in the first 18 stories of a 66-story class A office building in
midtown Manhattan.  The reported occupancy of the portion that
serves as collateral for the whole loan was 97.3% as of December
2009.  S&P's adjusted valuation has increased 5.7% from its last
review, primarily due to lower-than-expected operating expenses.
Using a capitalization rate of 8.5%, S&P's analysis yielded a
stressed LTV ratio of 73.2% on the trust balance.  Wells Fargo
reported a DSC of 11.34x for year-end 2009.  The loan matures on
Nov. 1, 2010, and Wells Fargo stated that the borrower has not yet
indicated whether it plans to exercise its one remaining 12-month
extension option.

             Office Loans With The Special Servicers

There are two office loans that are with the special servicers.
Details are:

The 260 East 161st Street loan, which is a matured balloon loan,
has a whole-loan balance of $30.0 million that consists of a
$20.2 million senior pooled component (4.4% of the pooled trust
balance), a $0.8 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the N-E161 raked certificate (not rated by Standard &
Poor's), and a $9.0 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  The whole loan is secured by a 10-story, 223,600-sq.-
ft. class B office building in Bronx, N.Y.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, Wells Fargo, on the April 1,
2010, maturity date after the borrower was not able to meet the
DSC test to exercise its one remaining 12-month extension option.
Wells Fargo stated that it is currently finalizing a loan
modification with the borrower, which would include extending the
loan's maturity to April 1, 2013, amending the participation
agreement, and paying down $1.1 million of the senior trust
balance.  The June 1, 2010, appraisal valued the property at
$45.0 million.  S&P's adjusted valuation has increased 12.7% from
its last review due to lower-than-expected operating expenses.
Using a 9.0% capitalization rate, its analysis yielded a stressed
LTV ratio of 90.8% on the trust balance.  Wells Fargo reported a
7.09x DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2010, and 84.9%
occupancy as of April 2010.

The 2600 West Olive Avenue loan, which is in its grace period,
has a whole-loan balance of $36.6 million consisting of a
$15.7 million senior pooled component (3.4% of the pooled trust
balance), a $6.4 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the "2600" raked certificates (not rated by Standard &
Poor's), and a $14.5 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  The whole loan, secured by a 148,300-sq.-ft. class A
office building in Burbank, Calif., was transferred to the special
servicer on March 25, 2009, due to imminent default after the
borrower submitted a proposal to modify the loan.  The special
servicer for the loan, Situs, indicated that the loan was modified
on April 26, 2010.  The modification terms include new capital
from the borrower to bring the loan current as well as to fund
capital and debt service reserves.  The modification also extended
the loan's maturity to Feb. 28, 2012, with one 12-month extension
option.  A Dec. 31, 2009, appraisal valued the property at
$30.0 million on a stabilized basis.  S&P's adjusted valuation has
declined 6.4% from its last review due to a longer-than-expected
stabilization period.  S&P's analysis, which factored in a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9% and current market
data, yielded a stressed LTV ratio of 121.5% on the trust balance.
Wells Fargo reported a 0.34x DSC for year-end 2008 and 50.8%
occupancy as of March 2010.

              Other Loans With The Special Servicers

In addition to the four assets discussed above, one additional
loan and one REO asset are with the special servicers.  Details
are:

The Northwest Plaza Shopping Center asset, which became REO on
Sept. 1, 2009, has a whole-loan exposure of $29.3 million that
includes a $24.7 million senior pooled component (5.3% of the
pooled trust balance) and a $4.6 million subordinate nonpooled
component that supports the "NW" raked certificates (not rated by
Standard & Poor's).  The property includes a 1.7 million-sq.-ft.
super-regional mall and an attached 12-story, 152,600-sq.-ft.
class B office building in St. Ann, Mo., that were 29.0% and 48.7%
occupied, respectively, as of April 2010.  The special servicer,
Wells Fargo, indicated that the property is under contract for
sale for $13.0 million to the City of St. Ann in lieu of a
condemnation suit.  Wells Fargo expects the transaction to close
by the first quarter of 2011.  An ARA of $24.6 million is in
effect on the total exposure of $31.9 million, which is based on a
Jan. 26, 2010, appraisal value of $13.0 million.  The Greenwich
Residential loan, which is a matured balloon loan, has a trust
balance of $25.8 million (5.6% of the pooled trust balance) and a
$40.8 million whole-loan balance.  Situs, the special servicer,
indicated that the cash flow at the property is being trapped in a
lockbox and is only sufficient to make debt service payments on
the senior trust balance.  This loan is secured by a 31-unit
multifamily condominium conversion complex in Greenwich, Conn.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on July 22, 2009,
due to imminent maturity default.  The loan had an Aug. 1, 2009,
maturity with three remaining six-month extension options.  At the
time of the first extension option, Situs indicated that the
borrower did not fund a required $20.0 million principal paydown,
which resulted in an event of default under the loan agreement.
The borrower reported positive NOI for the five months ended
May 31, 2010, and for year-end 2009.  According to Situs, the
borrower has rented out 29 of the 31 units and plans to market and
sell the condo units early next year.  Situs is currently
negotiating a loan modification with the borrower while pursuing
foreclosure.  An ARA of $1.8 million is in effect on the whole
loan based on the Aug. 11, 2009, appraisal value of $26.8 million.
S&P's analysis, using an 8.25% capitalization rate, yielded a
stressed LTV ratio of 154.1% on the trust balance.

                   Loans With Raked Certificates

In addition to the "MON" and "GSM" raked certificates, Standard &
Poor's also rates the "WSC" raked certificates, which derive 100%
of their cash flow from the Westchester Shopping Center loan.

The Westchester Shopping Center loan has a whole-loan balance of
$33.2 million that consists of a $17.6 million senior pooled
component (3.8% of the pooled trust balance), a $3.1 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the "WSC"
certificates, and a nontrust junior participation interest with an
outstanding balance of $12.5 million.  The loan is secured by a
157,350-sq.-ft. neighborhood shopping center in Los Angeles,
Calif.  S&P's adjusted valuation is comparable to the levels that
S&P assessed in its last review.  Using a 9.0% capitalization
rate, S&P's analysis yielded a stressed LTV ratio of 71.5% on the
trust balance.  Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 1.77x for year-end
2009 and 100% occupancy as of March 2010.  The loan matures on
Feb. 1, 2011, and has no extension options remaining.

                          Ratings Lowered

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL4

                   Rating
                   ------
Class          To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
-----          --        ----              ----------------------
A-1            AA        AAA                                89.65
A-2            BBB-      AA+                                39.79
B              BB-       AA-                                32.13
C              B-        BB+                                25.49
X-2            AA        AAA                                  N/A

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL4

                       Class        Rating
                       -----        ------
                       N-WSC        BBB-
                       O-WSC        BB+
                       P-WSC        BB

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GSC ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on five
classes of notes issued by GSC ABS CDO 2005-1, Ltd./Corp.

This rating action is a result of the liquidation of the
collateral.  GSC 2005-1 entered an event of default on Nov. 5,
2008, after the sum of non-defaulted collateral and cash assets
declined below the amount of the remaining senior swap, class A1S
and A1J notes.  The required majority of the controlling class
voted to accelerate on Feb. 9, 2010, and subsequently voted to
liquidate the portfolio on Feb. 10, 2010.  The trustee held a
public auction on June 29, 2010 and sold the collateral.  The
proceeds from the sale were sufficient to make a payment of
interest to class A1S notes.  There were no available funds to
make any other payments of interest or principal on any other
classes of notes.  All rated notes experienced a full loss.

GSC 2005-1 was a hybrid structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Jan. 12, 2006, and was managed by GSC
Group.  The transaction gained all of its exposure to SF assets
synthetically via credit default swaps.

Fitch has downgraded and subsequently withdrawn these ratings:

  -- $0 class A1S notes to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class A1J notes to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class A2 notes to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class A3 notes to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class B notes to 'D' from 'C'.


HELIOS FINANCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2007-S1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded two retained risk positions and two credit-
linked notes issued by HELIOS Finance Limited Partnership 2007-S1
and HELIOS Finance Corporation 2007-S1 as co-issuers.  The Notes
were issued in connection with a credit default swap tied to a
reference portfolio, under which Wachovia Bank, National
Association (Wachovia Bank) is the protected party.  The reference
portfolio consists of loans originated and serviced by Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (as successor by merger to Wachovia Bank, N.A.), a
direct wholly-owned subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Company.  The
rating actions reflect Moody's updated lower lifetime loss
expectations as well as build up in credit enhancement due to
performance triggers that locked out payment to the junior
classes.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HELIOS Finance Limited Partnership 2007-S1/HELIOS Finance
Corporation 2007-S1 - Synthetic Auto Loan Transaction

Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 5.40% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. A-2 retained risk position, Upgraded to Aaa; previously
     on July 2, Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. A-3 retained risk position, Upgraded to Aaa; previously
     on July 2, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. B-1 credit-linked notes, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on
     July 2, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. B-2 credit-linked notes, Upgraded to A2; previously on
     July 2, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's expects the HELIOS reference portfolio to incur lifetime
cumulative net losses of 5.40% which is within the range of 5.25%
to 5.50% that was published when the securities were placed on
review on July 2, 2010.  This is down from 6% to 7% previously
published in June 2009, but still higher than the initial
expectation at closing of 3.50%.  Total credit enhancement for Cl.
A-2, Cl. A-3, Cl. B-1, Cl. B-2 upgraded tranches are approximately
46%, 33%, 19%, 10%, respectively of the outstanding collateral
balance.  Moody's volatility proxy Aaa level for the transactions
is approximately 10% of the remaining collateral balance.

As a synthetic, the structure of this transaction has unique
elements when compared to other auto loan ABS.  For the first
twelve months, principal payments (notional reductions in the case
of the retained risk positions) are allocated in sequential order
of seniority (A-1, then A-2 and so on).  Thereafter, principal
payments depend on certain delinquency and cumulative net loss
based schedules of monthly performance triggers.  The delinquency
trigger schedule is common for all tranches, while the CNL trigger
schedules are specific to each tranche.  If the trigger level for
a certain tranche is breached (actual delinquency or CNL level is
higher than the specified trigger level), it no longer receives
any principal payment until that trigger level is cured.  Due to
the weaker than expected performance and the resulting breach of
CNL triggers, the transaction remained sequential for an
additional fifteen months.

The transaction went pro rata in September 2009.  However, the A-
1, A-2, A-3 and B-1 tranches continued to benefit from the lock
out of the B-2 until June 2010, when it too started receiving
principal payments.  Since the current CNL is already higher than
the highest monthly CNL trigger level for the B-3 tranche, it is
locked out from any repayment of principal until the prior classes
are repaid in full.  The B-1 and B-2 notes, along with the A-2 and
A-3 retained risk positions, are expected to continue receiving
principal based on Moody's current lifetime loss expectation.  The
B-1 and B-2 balances are however subject to floors, which are
calculated as a percentage of the original notional balance of the
reference portfolio.  Principal payments for these tranches are
allocation pro rata based on their outstanding balances.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely ranges of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
ranges may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected ranges will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a ranges of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.


HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A and B commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Hometown Commercial Trust 2006-1.

The downgrade of the class B certificates follows 12 consecutive
months of interest shortfalls.  S&P expects these shortfalls to
continue for the foreseeable future, and as a result, S&P lowered
the rating to 'D' from 'CCC-'.  In addition, S&P lowered its
rating on the class A certificates to 'CCC-' from 'B' because S&P
believes this class is susceptible to future interest shortfalls
due to poor collateral performance that S&P expects to continue
into the future.  Poor performance has already resulted in nine of
the 13 classes that are subordinate to class A experiencing 100%
principal losses.

The recurring interest shortfalls are primarily due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the specially
serviced assets and special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
trust expenses and special servicing fees that are likely, in
S&P's view, to cause recurring interest shortfalls.

As of the July 12, 2010, remittance report, ARAs were in effect
for four assets.  The total reported ASER amount was $60,280, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $676,782.  Standard &
Poor's considered all of these ASERs, which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, in taking
S&P's rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls total
$65,746 and have affected all classes up to and including class B.

The collateral pool for Hometown 2006-1 consists of 36 loans with
an aggregate trust balance of $109.6 million.  As of the July 12,
2010, remittance report, seven assets ($25.1 million; 22.9%) in
the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment status of
these assets is: three loans are in foreclosure ($13.0 million,
11.9%), three are 90-plus-days delinquent ($11.1 million, 10.1%),
and one is 60 days delinquent ($1.0 million, 0.9%).

                         Ratings Lowered

                Hometown Commercial Trust 2006-1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                                Rating
                                ------
                       Class  To       From
                       -----  --       ----
                       A      CCC-     B
                       B      D        CCC-


INGRESS CDO: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on classes of notes issued
by Ingress CDO I Ltd.  Fitch downgraded one class of notes as
default appears inevitable due to losses sustained by the
disposition of defaulted assets resulting in the class being
undercollateralized.  Fitch affirmed one class of notes and
assigned a Positive Outlook given the credit quality of the
remaining assets in the portfolio.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  In addition to the stress
scenarios described in these reports, Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (18.8% of the portfolio).

Since Fitch's last rating action in March 2009, the credit quality
of the portfolio has improved to a current weighted average Fitch
derived rating of 'BB+/BB', from 'B' at last review primarily
because defaulted assets are no longer in the portfolio.  The
portfolio is concentrated with 13 obligors and includes two
interest-only securities.  Approximately 30.7% of the portfolio,
excluding the IO securities, has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade, of which 11.9% is considered defaulted and 18.8%
is experiencing interest shortfalls.

The class B notes have paid down $40.2 million since the last
review.  Based on the review of the portfolio and the quantitative
analysis described above, the class B notes are affirmed at 'BBB'.
The Positive Rating Outlook on the class B notes reflects
improvement in the credit quality of the assets that cover these
notes.  The class is backed by high investment grade collateral,
which materially overcollateralizes these notes.  As the class B
notes pay down, credit enhancement will continue to improve,
indicating possible positive rating movement in the future.

Fitch also assigned a Loss Severity rating to the class B notes.
An LS rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class's long-term credit rating.  Fitch
does not assign Rating Outlooks or Loss Severity Rating to classes
rated 'CCC' or lower.

The breakeven default rates for the class C notes do not pass
Fitch's base cash flow model stress.  Based upon the June 28, 2010
trustee report, the principal amount of the class C notes
continues to be written up by the amount of accrued interest due
on these notes.  Currently, $10.8 million of interest remains
outstanding on the class C notes.  Further, the notes are
undercollateralized as a result of losses sustained from the sale
of defaulted assets.  The current performing principal portfolio
balance is $26.9 million.  After allocation for the repayment of
the class B notes, however, the class C notes are collateralized
by $13 million compared to an outstanding balance on the class C
notes of $32.1 million.  As such, the class C notes have been
downgraded to 'C', indicating default is inevitable.

Ingress CDO I is a collateralized debt obligation supported by a
static pool of commercial mortgage backed securities (62.6%),
residential mortgage-backed securities (18.6%), and asset-backed
securities (18.8%).  Additionally, $31.9 million of the
$62.3 million portfolio represents the notional balance of
interest-only CMBS collateral, which, while rated 'AAA', has a
weighted average remaining life of 12 months.

Fitch has taken the actions listed below, including assigning LS
ratings, as indicated:

  -- $13,848,256 class B affirmed at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook revised to
     Positive from Stable';

  -- $32,078,288 class C downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.


JER CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as measured by deterioration
in the weighted average rating factor.  In addition, the deal has
triggered an Event of Default as of June 2010 due to default in
interest payments to Class B-1 and B-2.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

JER CRE CDO 2005-1, Ltd., is a static Re-Remic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
collateral (96.6% of the pool) and Re-Remic certificates (3.4% of
the pool).  As of June 17, 2010, the aggregate Notes balance of
the transaction, including the Income Notes, has decreased to
$413.6 million from $416.0 million at issuance, due to
approximately $2.4 million in pay-downs to the Class A Notes.  The
pay-down was triggered as a result of the failure of the Class
A/B, Class C, and Class D/E Overcollateralization Tests.  Per the
Indenture, the failure of any Overcollateralization Test results
in all scheduled interest and principal payments being directed to
pay down the most senior notes, until such Overcollateralization
Test is satisfied.

Thirty-four assets totaling approximately $174.7 million par
amount (41.7% of the pool balance) were listed as defaulted and
another forty-one assets totaling approximately $235.3 million par
amount (56.2% of the pool balance) as impaired securities as of
June 17, 2010.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the entire
pool and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
7,003 compared to 5,347 at last review.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 6.6 years
compared to 7 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 2.6% compared to 3.3% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, similar to that at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Class B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on March 17, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 17, 2010.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-C6 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
JP Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp. 1998-C6.

The affirmations are the result of increased credit enhancement
due to paydown of approximately 47% since Fitch's last review in
February 2009.  The paydown offsets Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 20.7%
of the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the expected losses
come from the loans in special servicing.  Expected loss as a
percentage of the original deal balance is 3.96%.  Rating Outlooks
reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over the next
one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 91.5% to $42.4 million from $796 million at
issuance.

Fitch has identified two Loans of Concern (37.6%), including one
asset in special servicing (36.7%).  The specially serviced asset
is collateralized by a 361,945 square foot anchored retail center
located in Deptford, NJ.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in February 2009 for imminent default.  As of year end
2008 the property was 56% leased compared to 98% at issuance.
Occupancy declined due to the vacancy of Sam's Club and Circuit
City in 2008.  A forbearance agreement has been executed and the
borrower has agreed to a receiver.  The trust can foreclose no
earlier than June 30, 2011.

The second-largest loan (30.7%) is an office property located in
Warren, NJ.  The property was built in 1997 and was 100% occupied
by Verizon Wireless as of YE 2009.  The YE 2009 servicer reported
debt service coverage ratio was 1.74 times.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25x or higher were considered to pay off at
maturity.  Under this scenario, all of the loans are expected to
pay off at maturity.

Fitch has revised the Recovery Rating on this class:

  -- $19.9 million class G to 'CCC/RR4' from 'CCC/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings
and Rating Outlooks to these classes as indicated:

  -- $5.4 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.8 million class F at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.4 million class H remains at 'D/RR6'.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, and D have been paid in full.  Fitch
withdraws the rating of the interest only class X.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 2003-PM1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to 12
classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
series 2003-PM1.  Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings
and Recovery Ratings to numerous classes.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed securities analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of
6.1%, approximately $52 million, of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

Fitch expects losses to fully deplete classes J through P.  As of
the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced 26% to $856 million from $1.16 billion at
issuance, which consists of 24.4% of paydown and 1.6% of realized
losses.  Fourteen loans (21.7%) are currently defeased, including
the largest loan in the pool (8.1%).  As of the June 2010
remittance, cumulative interest shortfalls reach class F.

Fitch has designated 27 loans (21.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially serviced loans (9.3%).  The largest
specially serviced loan (5.8%) is secured by a 702,427 square foot
regional mall located in West Palm Beach, FL.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 after two of the
mall's anchors, Dillard's and Macy's, closed their stores in
October 2008 and January 2009, respectively.  The tenants
indicated the closures were related to poor sales as newer,
superior malls had opened up in the market and were consistently
taking market share away from the subject property.  Dillard's and
Macy's were not part of the loan collateral; however, their
closures had a significant impact on remaining tenants at the
mall, and many of these tenants vacated or closed their stores
throughout 2009.  In early 2010, the mall was permanently closed.
Fitch expects significant losses upon liquidation of the loan
based on a recent appraisal value.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.4%) is secured by a
portfolio of four, cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
properties in Minneapolis, MN.  The portfolio transferred to
special servicing in May 2010 because cash flow from two of the
properties was not adequate to support the allocated debt service.
Excess cash flow from the other two properties is currently
sufficient to support the total debt amount.  The servicer is
negotiating with the borrower to cure the default.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
(NOI) and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7% and 10%
to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
29 loans (24.6% of the overall pool) were assumed not to be able
to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses for four loans (3.9%)
in instances where Fitch's derived value was less than the
outstanding balance.

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative, downgraded, assigned
Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and RRs to these classes as indicated:

  -- $27.5 million class D to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class F to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AA-';

  -- $13 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'A';

  -- $18.8 million class H to 'C/RR2' from 'BBB+';

  -- $15.9 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $7.2 million class K 'C/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $8.7 million class L to 'C/RR6'from 'BB';

  -- $7.2 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $4.3 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $2.9 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC'.

Fitch downgrades, assigns an Outlook and LS rating to this class:

  -- $13 million class C to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $299.5 million class A1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $82.6 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $282 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- -$33.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

The class A-1 has been paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the ratings
on the interest-only classes X-1 and X-2.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Loss Severity Ratings, revises
and assigns Recovery Ratings, and assigns Rating Outlooks to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C1:

  -- $21.9 million class H to 'BBB/LS3' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $9 million class J to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.4 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $10.3 million class L to 'CC/RR1'from 'BB-';

  -- $5.2 million class M to 'C/RR5' from 'B';

  -- $5.2 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch affirms and assigns Outlooks and LS Ratings to these
classes:

  -- $600.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47.7 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.9 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25.8 million class F at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class G at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.7 million class NC-1 at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.7 million class NC-2 at 'A-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X-1.

The class NC-1 and NC-2 certificates represent subordinate
interests in the Newport Centre loan.  Classes A-1, A-2, and X-2
are paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $6.2 million class NR
certificates.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 1.9% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $16.1 million from the loans in special
servicing and the loans that are not expected to refinance at
maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the
Fitch total expected losses (90%) are associated with the
specially serviced assets.  The Ratings Outlooks reflect the
likely direction of any rating changes over the next one to two
years.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
20.9% to $846.9 million from $1.07 billion at issuance.  In
addition, 41 loans (29.6%) have defeased including six (11.2%) of
the top 10 loans.

Fitch has identified 32 loans (17.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
including eight specially serviced loans (4.7%).  The largest
specially serviced asset (1.4%) is secured by a multifamily
property in Austin, TX.  The property became REO in May 2004.  The
special servicer is awaiting a permit so they can begin
remediation work to cure the environmental ground water concerns
at the property.  Upon completion of the remediation work, the
property will be marketed for sale.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.3%) is currently 60
days delinquent.  The loan is secured by a multifamily property
located in Holland, OH.  The loan was recently transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 and the special servicer is in the
process of reviewing the asset to determine the appropriate
resolution strategy.

Fitch also reviewed the performance of the largest loan in the
pool, the Newport Centre Mall (17.3%).  The mall is secured by
386,000 square feet of a 920,000 square foot regional mall located
in Jersey City, NJ.  The loan consists of a $107.2 million senior
component and a $39.4 million subordinate component, which
represents the non-pooled class NC certificates.  In-line
occupancy at the mall declined to 81% as of April 2010 from 98% at
issuance.  Despite the increased vacancy, servicer-reported net
operating income has improved 11% since issuance.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 5% reduction to 2009 fiscal year end net operating
income, 10% reduction to 2008, and 15% for all loans which did not
report YE 2008 and applying an adjusted market cap rate between
7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
four loans (3.4% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2004-C1 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes and
downgraded six classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially
serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl, remaining within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to
$673.4 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 104 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 16% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  At last review the pool contained one loan with an
investment grade underlying rating, the Forum Shops Loan.  This
loan has paid off since last review.

Thirty loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool resulting in a
$4.6 million loss (80% loss severity).  Three loans, representing
3% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the 610 Broadway Loan ($11.3 million --
1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 152,454 square foot
office complex built in 1909 and renovated in 2002 and located in
the Jewelry District of downtown Los Angeles, California.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to
monetary default and the special servicer is currently is in the
process of recommending the installation of a receiver.  The most
recent appraisal as of March 2010 values the property at
$14.5 million.  The remaining two specially serviced loans are
secured by a multifamily and manufactured housing property.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.7 million loss (19% expected
loss on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $6.7 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of loss from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with year-end or partial year 2009 operating
statements for 92% of the conduit pool.  Moody's weighted average
LTV for the conduit pool is 82% compared to 84% at last review.
Although the overall LTV has declined since last review, credit
quality dispersion has increased.  Based on Moody's analysis, 18%
of the conduit pool has an LTV in excess of 100% compared to 7% at
last review.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.28X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.22X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 20 compared to 23 at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Hometown America Portfolios IV & V
Loan ($89.2 million -- 13.3% of the pool), which is secured by 14
manufactured home communities totaling 3,742 units and located in
eight states.  The portfolio was 89% leased as of September 2009,
the same as at last review.  The loan has amortized 3% since last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 79% and 1.23X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the One Fordham Plaza Loan
($48.1 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 414,002
square foot office building located in Bronx, New York.  The
property was 88% leased as of March 2010 compared to 89% at last
review.  The largest tenant is Montefiore Hospital, which leases
approximately 125,000 square feet of the net rentable area (NRA)
under various leases expiring in 2012 and 2013.  Included is a
proprietary lease (109,000 square feet), where upon expiration of
the initial term in 2012, Montefiore can extend through September
2036 at $1.00 per annum plus expense reimbursements.  Other
tenants include the New York City Housing Authority (18% of NRA;
lease expiration March 2030) and the New York State Division of
Human Rights (11% of NRA; lease expiration July 2010).  The loan
is currently on the servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR.  The
DSCR decrease is primarily the result of lower occupancy during
2009.  Property performance has declined due to both a decrease in
rental income as well as increased expenses.  The loan has
amortized 9% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
83% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.44X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the White Oak Crossing Shopping
Center Loan ($41.3 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured
by a 517,000 square foot shopping center located approximately
seven miles southeast of Raleigh, North Carolina.  The center is
anchored by BJ's Wholesale Club (22% of NRA; lease expiration
August 2023), Kohl's (17% of NRA; lease expiration January 2024),
and Dick's Sporting Goods (9% of NRA; lease expiration January
2019).  The center is shadow anchored by Target.  The center was
94% leased as of March 2010, compared to 100% at last review.  The
loan has benefitted from 4% of principal amortization since last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.19X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1A, $170,886,523, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 04/02/2004

  -- Class A-2, $56,694,455, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 04/02/2004

  -- Class A-3, $303,158,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 04/02/2004

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 04/02/2004

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 04/02/2004

  -- Class B, $27,355,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aal on 10/29/2008

  -- Class C, $11,724,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class D, $22,145,000, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
     A1 from A2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class E, $13,026,000, affirmed at A3; previously assigned at
     A3 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class F, $11,723,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously assigned
     at Baa1 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class G, $9,119,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned at
     Baa2 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class H, $10,421,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
     at Baa3 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class J, $6,513,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1; previously
     assigned at Ba1 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class K, $5,210,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     assigned at Ba2 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class L, $3,908,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     assigned at Ba3 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class M, $5,211,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     assigned at B1 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class N, $2,605,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     assigned at B2 on 04/02/2004

  -- Class P, $2,605,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     assigned at B3 on 04/02/2004


JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2000-C9 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed three classes of J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance
Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C9.  The
upgrades are due to the increased credit support due to loan
payoffs and principal amortization.  The deal has paid down 90%
since Moody's prior review in January 2009.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable ranges.

As of the July 15, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 94% to $49.8 million
from $814 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging from 2% to 21% of the
pool.  One loan, representing 19% of the pool, has defeased and is
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.  Six loans,
representing 55% of the pool, mature within in the next six months
or are currently past their respective anticipated repayment dates
(ARD).  Four of these loans, representing 32% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.

Three loans, representing 38% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of approximately $32.5 million (39%
severity on average).  Four loans, representing 32% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Cory Industries Loan ($8.5 million -- 17% of
the pool), which is secured by four industrial buildings located
in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  The property was 84% leased as of
December 2009 with all of the leases rolling within the next three
years.  The loan has passed its September 2009 anticipated
repayment date and was not able to secure alternative financing.
The borrower has requested a loan modification.  The loan is
current.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by retail
and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$3.9 million loss for all of the specially serviced loans (overall
25% expected loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three loans
representing 38% of the pool.  These loans are currently on the
master servicer's watchlist and have experienced declines in
performance.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.6 million loss
for these loans (overall 19% expected loss based on a weighted
average 64% default probability).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 100% and 64%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's conduit
weighted average LTV is 77% compared to 85% at Moody's prior
review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.56X, respectively, compared to
1.25X and 1.53X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 6 compared to 35 at Moody's prior review.

The top three non-defeased loans represent 42% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is Hickory Hospitality Portfolio Loan
($10.5 million -- 21.1% of the pool), which is secured by four
limited service hotels totaling 388 guest-rooms.  The hotels are
all located in North Carolina.  Competition from newer properties
and the overall decline in the hotel sector has contributed to the
portfolio's weak performance.  The loan has been on the watchlist
since July 2009 due to a decline in the portfolio's net operating
income.  Moody's has assumed a high probability of default for
this loan due to concerns with the portfolio's declining
performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 136% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared 124% and 1.11X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Bridgewater Place Loan
($7.0 million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 140,200
square foot office building located in Syracuse, New York.  The
building was 79% leased as of March 2010.  The loan is currently
on the watchlist due to the drop in leasing.  The loan has passed
its April 2009 ARD.  Moody's has assumed a high probability of
default for this loan due to concerns with the property's
declining performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and
1.14X, respectively, compared 88% and 1.36X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the K-Mart -- Baltimore Loan
($3.2 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center located in Baltimore, Maryland.  As of December 2009, the
property was 95% leased.  The property is anchored by K-Mart,
which leases 79% of the property's net rentable area (NRA) through
November 2014.  The loan has passed its December 2009 ARD.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.14X, respectively,
compared 91% and 1.22X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 1/25/2000
     assigned Aaa

  -- Class F, $1,324,258, upgraded to Aaa from A1; previously on
     2/27/2007 upgraded to A1 from Baa2

  -- Class G, $14,251,000, upgraded to Aa3 from Baa2; previously
     on 2/27/2007 upgraded to Baa2 from Ba1

  -- Class H, $20,359,000, affirmed at B1; previously on
     11/19/2002 downgraded to B1 from Ba2

  -- Class J, $13,817,506, affirmed at C; previously on 11/22/2005
     downgraded to C from Caa1


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2002-C3 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-
C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, and
removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
negative implications on April 13, 2010.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on four other classes from this same
transaction.

The rating affirmations and downgrades follow S&P's review of the
transaction due to an increase in the amount of ongoing interest
shortfalls affecting the trust.  The additional interest
shortfalls, which were reflected in the April 12, 2010, trustee
remittance report, prompted us to place five classes on
CreditWatch with negative implications in April 2010.  According
to the master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, the
increase in interest shortfalls was primarily due to legal
expenses related to the 318 West Adams Street loan, as well as the
servicer's recovery of past advanced amounts on the Maple Glen
loan that Berkadia deemed non-recoverable.  The legal expenses and
advance recovery, in conjunction with appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts and ongoing special servicing fees,
resulted in interest shortfalls that affected all of the classes
below the class C certificate in April 2010.  Although the legal
expenses and advance recovery are no longer causing interest
shortfalls, S&P believes that classes C through F are more
susceptible to future interest shortfalls due to a reduction in
interest available to pay subordinate classes following realized
principal losses to the trust.  Based on S&P's analysis of the
transaction's waterfall, the interest paid to subordinate classes
provides a cushion to the classes that were downgraded, insulating
them from interest shortfalls.  However, if additional assets are
transferred to the special servicer, this may result in an
increase in the ASER amounts and special servicing fees, which
would increase interest shortfalls and may affect additional
classes.  S&P lowered its rating on class G to 'D' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P does not expect to be
recovered in the near future.

It is S&P's understanding from Berkadia that litigation-related
expenses from the 318 West Adams Street loan have been
recategorized as principal losses, of which $138,914 was reflected
in the June 14, 2010, trustee remittance report and $55,034 in the
July 12, 2010, trustee remittance report.  Moreover, the legal
fees of $242,451 that caused the interest shortfalls reflected in
the April 2010 trustee remittance report were recategorized as
principal loss in the July 2010 trustee remittance report.  The
master servicer indicated to us that any future litigation
expenses related to the 318 West Adams Street loan will cause
additional principal losses to the trust.  It is S&P's
understanding, based on discussions with the special servicer, ING
Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, that the trust will continue to
incur litigation-related expenses related to the 318 West Adams
Street loan for at least the next several months, since the trial
has been scheduled for September 2010.  The additional erosion of
the principal balances of the most subordinate classes are
expected to continue to reduce overall credit support and the
amount of subordinate interest available to absorb future interest
shortfalls.

Since S&P's last comprehensive review of the transaction on
March 11, 2010, S&P has also determined that two additional loans
are at increased risk of default and loss.  The larger of the two
loans, the Sibley Building loan ($11.1 million, 2.1%), is the
10th-largest real estate exposure in the pool.  According to
Berkadia, the borrower has sent a hardship letter on April 29,
2010, stating that the largest tenant, which occupies 81.0% of the
gross leasable area, plans to vacate the 250,095-sq.-ft. office
building in Syracuse, N.Y., upon its Dec. 31, 2010, lease
expiration date.  According to the borrower, if it is unable to
lease out the vacant space, cash flow at the property will not be
sufficient to fund operating expenses and debt service payments.
The other loan ($2.2 million) is 30-plus days delinquent.  This
loan, secured by a multifamily apartment complex in Warner Robins,
Ga., had a reported debt service coverage of 0.58x and 60.0%
occupancy as of year-end 2009.

Recent realized principal losses to the trust from liquidation of
assets were reflected in the May and July 2010 trustee remittance
reports totaling $8.9 million.  The specially serviced Maple Glen
asset, a 706-unit garden-style apartment complex in Columbus,
Ohio, was liquidated in May 2010, incurring a realized principal
loss of $7.8 million.  The asset incurred an aggregate realized
loss of $8.2 million, which is in excess of 100% of the principal
balance because liquidation proceeds were insufficient to recover
the total master servicer's advances of $1.8 million.  The other
specially serviced asset, the Valley View Commerce Center, a
29,885-sq.-ft. suburban office building in Farmers Branch, Texas,
was liquidated in July 2010, at a realized principal loss of
$1.1 million.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class     To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --        ----             ----------------------
    C         AA        AAA/Watch Neg                     16.31
    D         A-        AA/Watch Neg                      11.86
    E         BBB-      A+/Watch Neg                      10.15
    F         B-        BB-/Watch Neg                      6.05
    G         D         B-/Watch Neg                       4.00

                         Ratings Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

       Class        Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
       -----        ------            ----------------------
       A-1          AAA                                23.15
       A-2          AAA                                23.15
       B            AAA                                18.02
       X-1          AAA                                  N/A


JWS CBO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by JWS CBO 2000-1:

  -- US$36,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Second Priority Senior
     Secured Notes (current balance of $19,229,966), Upgraded to
     Aaa; previously on November 16, 2006 Upgraded to Aa1;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C-1 Fixed Rate Third Priority Senior
     Secured Notes, Upgraded to Ba3, previously on May 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Third Priority Senior
     Secured Notes, Upgraded to Ba3, previously on May 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of substantial delevering of the transaction from
unscheduled principal proceeds.  In particular, since the previous
rating action, the Class A Notes have been paid in full and the
Class B Notes were paid a total of about $17.5 million, accounting
for roughly 52% of the total Class B outstanding balance reported
in April 2009.  Moody's notes that a considerable amount of the
principal proceeds used to delever the Class A and Class B Notes
were from unscheduled redemptions (including redemptions at par or
at a premium to par).

JWS CBO 2000-1, Ltd., issued in July 2000, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.


KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Class E Notes to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of these notes issued by Kingsland IV, Ltd.:

  -- US$14,900,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Ca; previously on May 20,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the improvement in the overcollateralization
of the Class E Notes' has not been sufficient to warrant an
upgrade of the notes' rating.

Since placing the Class E notes on review for possible upgrade in
May 2009, there has been a minimal improvement in the
overcollateralization of the Class E Notes.  In particular, as of
the latest trustee report dated June 28, 2010, the Class E
overcollateralization ratio was reported at 103.52% versus 102.87%
in April 2010.  Moody's also notes that the portfolio includes a
number of investments in structured finance securities that mature
after the maturity date of the notes.  These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Kingsland IV, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans and a material concentration in CLO securities.


LACKAWANNA COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on GO Debt to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
on Lackawanna County, Pa.'s outstanding general obligation debt to
'BB' from 'BBB-', due to continued structural budgetary imbalance
and reliance on non-recurring revenues to fund operations.  At the
same time, Standard & Poor's assigned its 'BB' long-term rating to
the county's series 2010B GO bonds.  The outlook is stable.

In S&P's opinion, the 'BB' rating reflects the county's history of
weak and unstable financial operations; and unaudited fiscal 2009
results showing a deficit fund balance position of negative
$280,000, or negative 0.3% of expenditures.

Positive credit factors include the county's administration that
has made significant cost-cutting measures since fiscal 2008, and
continues to do so in order to provide budget relief in the near
term and to have recurring revenues match recurring expenditures
in future budgets; and successful sale of the county's nursing
home, which provided $10 million in available resources for
operations and capital projects, and effectively eliminated
ongoing subsidy payments of $350,000-$400,000 annually.

"S&P expects that the actions taken by management to date have
provided adequate budget relief in the interim," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Jesse Brady.  "S&P also expect that
management will continue to make efforts toward achieving a
structurally balanced budget."

The bonds are a GO of the county; an ad valorem pledge on all
taxable property within the county secures the bonds and notes.
Proceeds will be used to refund the county's series 2008B notes,
and to fund a termination payment, currently estimated at
$7.5 million, of the county's swap agreement with PNC in relation
to the 2008B notes.


LACKAWANNA COUNTY: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on GO Debt
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it withdrew its 'BB' long-
term rating on Lackawanna County, Pa.'s outstanding general
obligation debt at the issuer's request.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2005-C1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2005-C1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C1 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from actual and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged
watchlisted loans.

The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 22%
to $1.2 billion from $1.5 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 65% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $6.6 million loss (30%
loss severity on average).  Currently 7 loans, representing 7% of
the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Atlantic Building Loan ($28.2 million -- 2.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 315,993 square foot office
building located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to monetary
default .  The property was 74% leased as of January 2010 and
performance has declined since securitization.  The remaining 6
loans are secured by a mix of multifamily, retail, office and
industrial properties.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall
pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $102,769,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aaa on 2/10/2005

  -- Class B, $26,704,000, currently rated Aa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aa1 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class C, $26,704,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aa2 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class D, $19,073,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aa3 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class E, $24,796,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to A2 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class F, $15,259,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to A3 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class G, $17,167,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Baa1 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class H, $17,166,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Baa2 on 2/10/2005

  -- Class J, $22,889,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 on
     7/9/2009

  -- Class K, $5,717,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 on
     7/9/2009

  -- Class L, $7,623,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 on
     7/9/2009

  -- Class M, $3,811,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Ba3 on
     7/9/2009


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
N commercial mortgage pass-through certificate  from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction, to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class,
which were reported in the July 16, 2010, remittance report.  The
class N certificate experienced reported losses amounting to 32.4%
of its $9.2 million opening certificate balance.  The class P
certificate lost 100% of its $3.3 million opening balance.  S&P
downgraded this class to 'D' on April 28, 2010, due to a prior
principal loss.

According to the July 2010 remittance report, the principal losses
resulted from the liquidation through note sales of three assets
that were with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. Details of
the three liquidated assets are:

The Northern Pine asset comprises various mixed-use properties in
Pennsylvania, totaling 21,750 sq. ft., which had a total exposure
of $2.6 million.  The asset was transferred to LNR on Jan. 15,
2009, because it was 60-days delinquent.  The trust incurred a
$732,869 realized loss when the asset was liquidated on July 9,
2010.  Based on the July 2010 remittance report, the loss severity
for this loan was 27.9% of its balance before liquidation.

The Holiday Inn Express-Destin asset is a 74-unit limited-service
hotel in Destin, Fla., which had a total exposure of $6.7 million.
The asset was transferred to LNR on Dec. 11, 2009, for imminent
monetary default.  The trust incurred a $4.4 million realized loss
when the asset was liquidated on July 9, 2010.  Based on the July
2010 remittance report, the loss severity for this loan was 66.6%
of its balance before liquidation.The Palmiers Apartments asset is
a 96-unit multifamily property in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., which had
a total exposure of $4.2 million.  The asset was transferred to
LNR on Aug. 17, 2007, because it was 60-days delinquent.  The
trust incurred a $1.1 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on July 9, 2010.  Based on the July 2010 remittance
report, the loss severity for this loan was 26.7% of its balance
before liquidation.

The remittance report notes that the collateral pool for the
transaction consisted of 138 loans with an aggregate trust balance
of $2.3 billion, down from 145 loans totaling $2.5 billion at
issuance.  There are eight loans with the special servicer
totaling $160.2 million.  To date, the trust has experienced
losses on eight loans totaling $43.1 million.  Based on the July
2010 remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for
these loans was approximately 58.4% of their balance before
liquidation.


LEHMAN ABS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A-2 Certs. to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-2 certificates from Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract
Trust 2001-B to 'CC' from 'BBB+'.  At the same time, S&P placed
its ratings on the class A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, and M-1
certificates from the same transaction on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrade of class A-2 reflects S&P's view that the
certificates are not likely to pay the full principal due to
investors by Nov. 15, 2010, the certificates' legal final maturity
date.  Due to the higher-than-expected cumulative net losses, the
transaction is currently not generating enough collections each
month to pay the class A certificates the complete amount of
principal due according to the transaction documents.  As such,
the class A certificates have accumulated an unpaid principal
shortfall amount.  According to the transaction documents, the
payment waterfall specifies that prior to the normal sequential
principal payment distribution, any unpaid principal shortfall
amount is to be paid pro rata among all the class A certificates
until they pay down.  Accordingly, the class A-2 certificates are
currently receiving their pro rata share of the available monthly
collections.

Over the past 12 months, principal payments to the class A-2
certificates have averaged approximately $120,000 per month.  As
of the June 2010 distribution period, class A-2 had an outstanding
principal balance of approximately $8.4 million.  Based on the
recent average monthly principal payments to the class A-2
certificates, and the likelihood that these principal payments
will remain at similar levels for the foreseeable future due to
the substantial unpaid principal shortfall amounts remaining for
all of the class A certificates, S&P believes that the class A-2
certificates are unlikely to be paid off in full within the next
five months.

The CreditWatch negative placements on the six other classes
reflect S&P's view of the continued deterioration in collateral
performance due to the high default frequencies and loss
severities, the resulting write-downs to the class M-2, B-1, and
B-2 certificates, and the complete depletion of the
overcollateralization.  In addition, in S&P's view, the senior
classes with the closest legal final maturities may be at risk of
not being repaid by their legal final maturity date given the
class A certificates' current pro rata payment structure.

The class A-7 certificates benefit from a bond insurance policy
issued by Ambac Assurance Corp. ('R').  Under S&P's criteria, the
issue credit rating on a fully enhanced bond issue is the higher
of (i) S&P's rating on the credit enhancer; and (ii) the Standard
& Poor's underlying rating on the class.

Over the next 90 days, Standard & Poor's will assess the credit
support and analyze the cash flow for this transaction to assess
whether S&P thinks any credit action would be consistent with its
criteria.

                     Long-Term Rating Lowered

       Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                  Class   To                From
                  -----   --                ----
                  A-2     CC                BBB+

         Long-Term Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

       Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                  Class   To                From
                  -----   --                ----
                  A-3     BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+
                  A-4     BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+
                  A-5     BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+
                  A-6     BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+
                  A-7     BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+
                  M-1     B-/Watch Neg      B-


LIBERTY SQUARE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Liberty Square CDO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$140,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2013
     (current balance of $8,919,280), Upgraded to Aaa; previously
     on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2013 (current
     balance of $1,911,274), Upgraded to Aaa; previously on
     May 21, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2013, Upgraded
     to Aa2; previously on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2013, Upgraded
     to Caa3; previously on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2013-
     Combination Notes (current rated balance of $1,911,274),
     Upgraded to Aaa; previously on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to A1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes due to delevering since the last rating action in May
2009.

Moody's notes that the notes benefited from the substantial
delevering of the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes, which have
been paid down by approximately $70MM since the last rating
action, accounting for roughly 86% of the total Class A-1 and
Class A-2 notes' outstanding balance reported in April 2009.  As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased significantly since the rating action in May 2009.  In
particular, based on the trustee report, dated June 7, 2010, the
Class AB overcollateralization ratio was reported at 133.34%
versus the April 2009 level of 121.02%.  A substantial proportion
of the delevering is attributable to collateral sales and
principal prepayments on the underlying bonds.  In addition, the
Class AB overcollateralization ratio has also increased due to the
diversion of excess interest to delever the Class A-1 and Class A-
2 notes as a result of the Class C and Class D
overcollateralization test failures.  Based on the June 2010
report, the Class C overcollateralization ratio was reported at
96.61% versus a test level of 107.5% and the Class D
overcollateralization ratio was reported at 88.88% versus a test
level of 104.3%.  Moody's expects delevering to continue as a
result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period in June 2006
and continued diversion of excess interest to cure the Class C and
Class D overcollateralization test failures.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  As of the latest trustee report,
dated June 7, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is 2133
compared to 3434 in April 2009.  The improvement in WARF is
primarily a result of rating upgrades on several obligors with
large positions in the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has remained stable since
the last rating action.  Due to the impact of revised and updated
key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Additionally, Moody's notes that while the Class C
overcollateralization ratio is reported at only 96.61%, the
transaction benefits from a substantial amount of excess interest
which is used to delever the rated notes due to the Class C and
Class D overcollateralization test failures.  The excess spread
serves as additional overcollateralization support for the rated
notes, including the Class C notes.

Liberty Square CDO II, Ltd., issued in May 8, 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.


M-2 SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Series of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of M-2 SPC Series 2006-B and Series 2006-C, a corporate
syntehtic obligation referencing a managed portfolio of corporate
entities.

The rating actions are:

  -- US$7.5M Series 2006-B Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on
     Nov 10, 2008 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$20M Series 2006-C Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on
     Nov 10, 2008 Downgraded to Ca.

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the rated tranches experiencing 100% losses due to credit events
on Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National
Mortgage Association, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Washington
Mutual Inc., Kaupthing Banki Hf, Idearc Inc., General Growth
Properties Inc., and RH Donnelley Corp.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes issued by Magnolia Finance II PLC's series 2005-6, 2006-7C,
and 2006-7A3 following the full repurchase of the notes from each
transaction.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                           Series 2005-6

                                    Rating
                                    ------
                    Class         To      From
                    -----         --      ----
                    A             NR      AAA

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                           Series 2006-7C

                                    Rating
                                    ------
                    Class         To      From
                    -----         --      ----
                    Notes         NR      BB+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                           Series 2006-7A3

                                    Rating
                                    ------
                    Class         To      From
                    -----         --      ----
                    Notes         NR      A+

                          NR - Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 135 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 135
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 29 tranches from 28 RMBS
transactions issued by Merrill Lynch.  The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on January 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to A1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3

     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-FM1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to A2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-AHL1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-AR1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-FF1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to B1; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-FM1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-MLN1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to A3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-RM1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-RM2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-RM3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-RM4

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-RM5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-WMC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2007-MLN1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to B2; previously on January 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to A1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MOB MANAGEMENT: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Rating on Series 2001 A
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B1/S.G. rating
assigned to the MOB Management Two, LLC, Variable Rate Revenue
Bonds, Series 2001 A due to the expiration of the Synovus Bank
letter of credit which provided credit and liquidity support for
the transaction.  There was a mandatory tender of the bonds in
conjunction with the expiration of the letter of credit.

The most recent rating action on the bonds was on April 23, 2010,
when the long term rating was lowered to B1 due to the downgrade
of Synovus Bank long term deposit rating.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-LIFE1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity ratings, and Recovery Ratings to Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1999-
LIFE1, as indicated:

  -- $10.4 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4.8 million class J to 'CC/RR2' from 'BB+';

  -- $7.2 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'BB'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS and RR ratings as
indicated:

  -- $5.7 million class E at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.4 million class F at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.5 million class G at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, and D are paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate the class P certificates.  The balances of classes M and N
have been reduced to zero as a result of losses on disposed loans.
The rating of class L remains at 'D' with a revised RR to 'RR6'
from 'RR1'.  The ratings of classes M and N remain at 'D/RR6'.
Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class X.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 23.58% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $10 million, from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 92.8% to $42.6 million from $960 million at
issuance.  None of the remaining loans have defeased.

As of June 2010, there are three specially serviced loans (25.6%).
The largest specially serviced loan, Renaissance Plaza (11.5%), is
secured by a 83,587 square foot office building located in
Appleton, WI.  The loan transferred to special servicing in June
2009 for maturity default.  The loan became real estate owned in
January 2010 and continues to be marketed.

The second largest specially serviced loan, 200 Forest Drive
(10.2%) is secured by a 137,139 sf industrial property located in
East Hills, NY.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
March 2010 for maturity default.  A one year extension has been
completed.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
is the Hampton Meadows Apartments (4.1%), multi-family property
located in the Cramerton, NC.  The property is struggling with
occupancy levels causing low rental income and a decline from the
previous year's debt service coverage ratio.

The largest loan in the pool represents 57.4% of the remaining
pool.  It is secured by a class A, 210,793 sf office building
located in New York, NY.  The loan matures in September 2013 and
has been performing despite declining occupancy.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 16 loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with six loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 2002-IQ2 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to several
classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ2
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-IQ2.
Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings to numerous classes
and a Recovery Rating to one class.

The upgrades are due to continued amortization and payoff on the
loans, percentage of defeased loans, and stable performance of the
non-defeased loans.  There is only one loan in special servicing
representing 1.8% of the pool, and Fitch does not expect the loan
to take a loss.  As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced 58% to $327.2 million
from $778.6 million at issuance, which consists of 57.6% of
paydown and 0.4% of realized losses.  Three loans (32.6%) have
defeased including the second and fourth largest loans at issuance
(29.9%).  As of the July 2010 remittance, only class O is
incurring interest shortfalls.  Fitch's expected loss on the
remaining loans is less than 1% of the current deal balance.

Fitch has designated four loans (3.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced loan (1.8%).  The specially
serviced loan is secured by a 98,000 square foot retail center
located in York, PA.  The $5.8 million Meadowbrook Village loan
was taken real estate owned via foreclosure in December 2009.
Occupancy was 34% as of April 2010, however, the property manager
has executed a lease that will backfill over 32,000 sf of space
previously vacated by Circuit City.  Once the tenant takes
occupancy, the property will be over 67% occupied.  The property
is being marketed for sale and based on recent value estimates and
potential bids for the asset, Fitch did not model a loss for this
loan.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.50% and 10% to
determine value.  Based on these parameters, the current Fitch
loan to value for the non-defeased pool is 38.7%.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, only one loan (1.5% of
the overall pool) was assumed not to be able to refinance.
However, Fitch did not model a loss for this loan as the derived
value was greater than the outstanding balance.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks and LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $7.8 million class F to 'AAA/LS4' from 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.8 million class G to 'AAA/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class H to 'AA/LS3' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.8 million class J to 'A/LS4' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.9 million class K to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned and revised Rating Outlooks, LS
ratings and RRs as indicated:

  -- $214.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.8 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3.9 million class L at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $2.9 million class M at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $2.9 million class N at 'CCC/RR1'.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-3 and the interest-only class X-2
balances have been paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the rating on
the interest-only class X-1.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 251 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 251
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 5 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 32 tranches from 52 RMBS transactions issued by Morgan
Stanley.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured Rating Withdrawn
Mar 25, 2009).  For securities insured by a financial guarantor,
the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2ss, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1ss, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2ss, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3b, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1ss, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE3

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE4

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1ss, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2mz, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-NC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC4

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC6

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE4

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 24, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Oct. 30,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 24, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-fpt, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class F Certs. to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc.'s series 1998-HF1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction, to 'D' from 'CCC'.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class,
which were reflected on the July 15, 2010, remittance report.  The
class K certificate experienced reported losses amounting to 2.7%
of its ($9.6 million opening certificate balance.  To date, the
class NR certificate, which Standard & Poor's does not rate, has
lost 100% of its $22.5 million original balance.

According to the July 2010 remittance report, the principal losses
resulted from the liquidation of the sole asset that was with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  The Continental Luxury
Apartments asset comprises a 66-unit, multifamily property in
Shaker Heights, Ohio, built in 1997, which had a total exposure of
$2.4 million.  The asset was transferred to LNR on Sept. 11, 2009,
for nonmonetary default.  The trust incurred a $1.6 million
realized loss when the asset was liquidated on July 9, 2010,
through a note sale.  Based on the July 2010 remittance report,
the loss severity for this loan was 72.4% of its balance before
liquidation.

The remittance report notes that the collateral pool for the
transaction consisted of 22 loans with an aggregate trust balance
of $51.4 million, down from 226 loans totaling $1.3 billion at
issuance.  There are no loans with the special servicer.  To date,
the trust has experienced losses on 12 loans totaling
$19.9 million.  Based on the July 2010 remittance report, the
weighted average loss severity for these loans was approximately
38.2% their balance before liquidation.


MORTGAGE CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-MC2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings, and
revised Outlooks to Mortgage Capital Funding, Inc.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-MC2 as indicated:

  -- $39.2 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37.9 million class E at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.6 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.2 million class G at 'A+/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.6 million class H at 'BBB-/LS2'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $15.1 million class J at 'B+/LS1'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $7.6 million class K at 'CCC/RR1'.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the rating of the interest-only
class X.

Fitch does not rate the $2.5 million class L certificates.  The
class A-1, A-2, B and C certificates have paid in full.

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch's minimal loss expectations for the transaction.  The
revised Outlooks reflect Fitch's concerns over the concentration
of the pool, as the largest loan in the pool represents 52% of the
remaining balance of the transaction.  Of the original 147 loans
in the pool, 27 remain.  As of the June 2010 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 85.3%, to
$147.7 million from $1,009.5 million at issuance.  There are
currently no delinquent, specially serviced loans, or defeased
loans remaining in the transaction.

The largest loan in the pool, Minneapolis City Center (52.2%), has
a final maturity date of May 2028.  The loan did not pay off at
its anticipated repayment date of May 2008.  As of March 2010, the
servicer reported occupancy was 92.7% with a debt service coverage
ratio of 1.28 times as of year end 2009.  The loan is secured by a
50-story mixed use property consisting of 1.1 million square feet
of office space, 370,000 sf of retail, the land on which a 584-
room Marriott Hotel is constructed, and a 687-space parking
garage.

The second largest loan in the pool, Fiesta Trails Power Center
(15.8%), has a final maturity date of October 2012.  As of March
2010, the servicer reported occupancy was 93.3% with a year end
2009 DSCR of 1.47x.  Fiesta Trails is a 312,370 sf retail center
located in San Antonio, Texas.

Eight loans (8.7%) are considered Fitch loans of concern, of which
five loans (6.01%) have the same sponsor and are located in
Columbus, OH.  The largest of these loans (3.5%) is secured by two
multifamily properties.  As of March 2010 the servicer reported
occupancies for these two properties were 86.1% and 88.4%,
respectively, with a DSCR of 0.99x and 0.98x.  In total the
sponsor has 11 loans (12.3%) in the trust, which are all located
in Columbus, OH and secured by various property types.

The remaining loans mature in 2012 (18.8%), 2013 (5.6%), 2014
(3.9%), 2017 (0.6%), 2018 (18.9%) and 2028 (52.2%).


ORANGE COUNTY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1998C Bonds to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Orange County Housing Authority, Fla.'s (Housing and Neighborhood
Development Services Inc.) multifamily housing revenue series
1998C to 'BB-' from 'BBB+'.  The outlook remains negative.

The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion of a decline in debt service
coverage levels to 1.00x maximum annual debt service based on
audited financial statements for the 2009 fiscal year; a 15%
decrease in rental revenues in 2009; low occupancy rates at Green
Gables apartments of 75% for the first quarter of 2010; and weak
rental housing market and increasing unemployment in the Orlando
metropolitan area, where the project is located.

However, in S&P's opinion, the above weaknesses are partially
offset by a debt service reserve fund funded at 12 months' MADS,
and strong and experienced ownership and management by HANDS.

"In S&P's view, the negative outlook reflects the project's trend
of declining DSC and declining occupancy," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Mikiyon Alexander.

Green Gables Apartments is a 95-unit affordable housing project
located in Orlando, Fla.  The property was built in 1986 and was
renovated in 1999.  The property consists of 21 efficiency, 64
one-bedroom, and 10 three-bedroom/two-bath apartments.


PARADIGM FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Rating on ABCP Program
----------------------------------------------------------
At the issuer's request, Moody's has withdrawn the Prime-1 rating
of the ABCP issued by Paradigm Funding LLC, a partially supported,
multi-seller ABCP program administered by WestLB AG. (A3/Prime-1/
E+).  As of July 16, 2010, all outstanding ABCP had been repaid in
full.

Issuer: Paradigm Funding LLC

  -- Commercial Paper, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 22, 2000
     Assigned P-1


PEOPLE'S CHOICE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23
tranches from 5 RMBS transactions issued by People's Choice.  Two
bonds' ratings have been upgraded as they have accumulated
protection against future losses.  The collateral backing these
deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
subprime residential mortgages

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 2A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: People's Choice PFRMS 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PERITUS I: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Peritus I CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class X Deferrable Amortizing Fixed Rate Notes
     Due May 24, 2015 (current balance of $7,713,648), Upgraded to
     Baa3; previously on October 21, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due May
     24, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on October 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due May 24,
     2015 (current balance of $53,404,397), Upgraded to Caa3;
     previously on October 21, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions on the notes
result primarily from significant delevering of the Class A Notes
and a substantial increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes since the last rating action in October 2009.

The transaction benefited from the delevering of the Class A Notes
which have been paid down by approximately $108 million, or
roughly 45% of their outstanding balance reported in September
2009.  A substantial proportion of this paydown is attributable to
principal prepayments on the underlying bonds and asset sales by
the manager.  Moody's expects delevering of the Class A Notes to
continue as a result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period.
As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios
have increased since September 2009 and all overcollateralization
tests are in compliance.  In particular, as of the latest trustee
report dated June 22, 2010, the Class A, Class B, and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 162.48%, 153.31%, and
111.37% versus the September 2009 levels of 129.63%, 125.48%, and
102.74%, respectively.

Additionally, the dollar amount of defaulted securities held by
the issuer has decreased from $19 million in September 2009 to
none as of the June 2010 report.  Due to the impact of revised and
updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Peritus I CDO Ltd., issued on May 26, 2005, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.


POPULAR ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 99 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 99
tranches from 16 RMBS transactions issued by Popular.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 20.20%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-A

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-B

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C

  -- Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-C

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-D

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-E

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1995-MCF2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Prudential Securities Secured Financing
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1995-MCF2:

  -- $327,201 class H at 'D/RR1'.

Classes A-1 through G have paid in full.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the deal has paid down
99.8% to $327,201 from $222.3 million at issuance.  Of the
original 85 loans, one (Frank's Nursery and Craft Stores) remains
in the pool with a modified maturity date occurring in 2012.  The
loan remains current and is scheduled to fully amortize by the
maturity date in 2012.  No additional losses are expected.


RESTRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2004-2-A Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
Restructured Asset Securities With Enhanced Returns Series 2004-2-
A Trust's $8 million class A1 and A2 certificates to 'BB+' from
'A-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P had placed them on May 29, 2009.

S&P's ratings on the class A1 and A2 certificates are dependent on
its rating on the underlying security, Arlington Street CDO
(Cayman) Ltd.'s class A-3 floating and fixed-rate notes due June
10, 2012 ('BB+').

The rating actions follow S&P's July 14, 2010, lowering of its
rating on the underlying security to 'BB+' from 'A-' and its
removal of that rating from CreditWatch negative, where S&P had
placed it on May 11, 2009.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions
on the class A1 and A2 certificates due to changes in S&P's rating
on the underlying security.


RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from three RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by RFMSI Series
2006-S12 Trust, Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-11
Trust, and First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-1.

The rating actions are a result of corrections to certain loss and
cash flow allocation rules that were used in modeling these deals.
These transactions have super senior support tranches that support
different senior tranches up to a pre-defined dollar limit.  The
previous ratings on these transactions did not incorporate the
dollar limit rules.  Moody's has also corrected an additional
error in the RFMSI Series 2006-S12 Trust transaction that caused,
under select scenarios, incorrect cash flow allocation to the
senior tranches after the subordinate tranches are depleted.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions also reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2006-S12 Trust

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Upgraded to B2; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Upgraded to B2; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Confirmed at B3

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Confirmed at B3

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1; previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1; previously on Mar 26, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-11 Trust

  -- Cl. A-10, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on Apr 12, 2010
     Downgraded to B2


SALOMON BROTHERS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1999-C1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these
Salomon Brothers, series 1999-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

  -- $6.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.6 million class G at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;.

Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative, affirms, and assigns
Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $20.2 million class H at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.1 million class J at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $16.5 million class K at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $7.3 million class L at 'C/RR5'.

Fitch does not rate the $1.4 million class M.  Classes A-1, A-2,
B, C, and D have paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the
interest only class X.

The rating affirmations reflect the stable performance of the pool
and sufficient credit enhancement to offset Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's analysis which is similar to its recent vintage
fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 6.3%
of the remaining pool balance from loans in special servicing and
loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one or two years.
As of the June 2010 distribution date the pool has paid down 88.1%
to $87.3 million from $734 million at issuance.  Of the original
213 loans, 53 remain in the transaction and 29 (9.1%) have been
defeased.

Fitch has identified 10 Loans of Concern (15.2%), including six
loans in special servicing (8.9%), as well as other loans with
deteriorating performance.

The largest specially serviced loan is collateralized by
manufacturing housing communities (4.88% of the pool) in
Pennsylvania.  The loan transferred to special servicing in August
2005.  The special servicer has been working to stabilize the
property and has been marketing it for sale.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, five loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


SALS B-2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by SALS B-2005-1, collateralized debt
obligation transactions referencing a portfolio of corporate
entities.

  -- US$9,000,000 SALS B-2005-1 Floating Rate Notes due June 20,
     2012 Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Oct 17, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which has led to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca rating.  Since the last rating action, the
portfolio has suffered further losses from the credit events on
Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., CIT Group Inc, Lear Corporation, and
Visteon Corporation.  These credit events coupled with the credit
events on Dana Corporation, Delphi Corporation, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and
Washington Mutual, Inc have led to a total loss of 4.9% of the
portfolio, resulting in a 100% loss of the rated tranche.  The
portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in Insurance
(13%), Retail (11%), and Automotive (11%).


SALT CREEK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-6$L 2005-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class B-
6$L from Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1 Ltd., a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation, to 'D' due to a principal loss on
the notes.  Concurrently, S&P withdrew its ratings on the 10
remaining classes following full paydowns.

                          Rating Lowered

               Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1 Ltd.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
                    Class         To      From
                    -----         --      ----
                    B-6$L         D       CC

                         Ratings Withdrawn

               Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1 Ltd.

                                    Rating
                                    ------
                    Class         To      From
                    -----         --      ----
                    A-1           NR      A+
                    A-2           NR      A-
                    A-6           NR      BB-
                    A-7           NR      B-
                    B-2           NR      CCC-
                    B-5           NR      CCC-
                    A-2EF         NR      BBB+
                    A-6EL-1       NR      CCC-
                    A-4$L         NR      BBB-
                    B-3$L         NR      CCC-


SAXON ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 46 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 46
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 18 tranches from 11 RMBS
transactions issued by Saxon.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa

     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on January 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to A2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on January 13, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3C, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3D, Downgraded to B3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-1, Mortgage Loan Asset
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Confirmed at A2; previously on January 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at B3; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at B2; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B2; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SONOMA VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded three classes of Notes issued
by Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Rate Notes
Due 2049 due to systematic increases in real estate risk and
revised modeling parameters.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Rate Notes Due
2049 is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
credit default swaps referencing $2.5 billion notional amount of
commercial mortgage backed securities.  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized in 2006.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1, the same as at
securitization.  The distribution of current ratings is: Aaa
(100%, the same as at securitization).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 5.9 years compared to 9.4 years at securitization.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 75%, the same as at securitization.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 75.1% compared to 47.7% at
securitization.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The rating actions are:

  -- Series 92/2007, Downgraded to A1; previously on April 3, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Series 93/2007, Downgraded to A3; previously on April 3, 2007
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Series 94/2007, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on April 3,
     2007 Assigned A2

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.


SONOMA VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded two classes of Notes issued
by Sonoma Valley 2007-4 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Rate Notes
Due 2051 due to systematic increases in real estate risk, revised
modeling parameters, and deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as evidenced by
an increase in the weighted average rating factor.  The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Sonoma Valley 2007-4 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Rate Notes Due
2051 is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of
credit default swaps referencing $2.3 billion notional amount of
commercial mortgage backed securities.  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized in 2006 (45%) and 2007 (55%).

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 32 compared to 1 at
securitization.  The distribution of current ratings is: Aaa (65%
compared to 100% at securitization), Aa1-Aa3 (20% compared to 0%
at securitization), A1-A3 (13% compared to 0% at securitization),
and Baa1-Baa3 (2% compared to 0% at securitization).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 6.3 years compared to 9.4 years at securitization.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 69%, compared to 81.7% at securitization.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 53.3% compared to 36.3% at
securitization.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The rating actions are:

  -- Series 115/2007, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on November 7,
     2007 Assigned Aa2

  -- Series 114/2007, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     September 17, 2007 Assigned A3

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.


SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes
and downgraded 11 classes of Sovereign Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-C1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and poorly performing watchlisted loans and
concerns about refinance risk associated with loans maturing in an
adverse economic environment.  One hundred and twenty eight loans
mature within the next 36 months.  Twenty-two of these loans,
representing 12% of the pool, have a Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 11 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on July 14, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 22, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to
$869.2 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 224 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 21% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any
defeased loans or loans with underlying ratings.

Eighty- seven loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $11.9 million loss (35% loss severity on average).
Currently five loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is The Marina
Palms Apartments Loan ($17.4 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which
is secured by a 229-unit apartment complex located in Bradenton,
Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 due to payment default.  Foreclosure proceedings
are underway.  The remaining four loans are secured by multifamily
and mixed use properties.  Moody's estimates a $10.6 million
aggregate loss from the specially serviced loans (35% loss
severity on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 30 loans
representing approximately 12% of the pool.  These loans are on
the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature within the
next six months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.
Moody's has estimated a $23.9 million loss from these loans (23%
expected loss based on an overall 46% default probability).
Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the
timing and magnitude of losses from these troubled loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$438,349, affecting Classes F through N.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and loan modifications.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 83% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 104% compared to
127% at Moody's last review in February 2009.  The last review was
part of the first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2009 vintage
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.21X, respectively, compared to
1.20X and 0.96X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 87 compared to 114 at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 10% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the West New York Portfolio Loan
($35.7 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio consisting of 34 multifamily, retail and office
properties located in West New York and Union City, New Jersey.
The portfolio was 98% leased, similar to securitization.
Performance has been stable since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 141% and 0.97X, respectively, essentially the
same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Franklin Towne Center Loan
($29.9 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center located in Franklin Township, New Jersey.  The center is
master leased to Stop & Shop through October 2030, with a
corporate guarantee from Koninklijke Ahold NV (LT issuer rating
Baa3, positive outlook).  The center is currently 100% leased to
24 tenants.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 125% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 147% and 0.77X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1 Pine Tree Boulevard Loan
($19.6 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 324
unit multifamily property located in Old Bridge, New Jersey.
Although the property was 100% leased as of December 2009,
performance has declined due to rental concessions and increased
expenses.  The loan is currently on the watchlist due to decline
in NOI.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.74X,
respectively, compared to 126% and 0.81X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1A, $450,841,615, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/4/2007

  -- Class A-2, $227,222,671, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/4/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 7/4/2007

  -- Class A-J, $105,205,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/14/2010

  -- Class B, $15,211,000 downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class C, $17,745,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class D, $20,281,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class E, $10,140,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class F, $7,605,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class G, $2,535,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class H, $2,535,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class J, $3,803,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class K, $2,535,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class L, $3, 590,527, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010


TW HOTEL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 14 2005-LUX Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from TW
Hotel Funding 2005 LLC's series 2005-LUX and concurrently removed
13 of the ratings from CreditWatch with developing implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the four lodging
properties that secure the Ty Warner Hotels & Resorts loan in the
transaction.  The affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis of
a recent modification of the loan.  The terms of the modification
include, but are not limited to:

* The borrower will make a partial principal paydown of
  $25.0 million;

* The borrower will pledge the 119-acre Montecito Country Club as
  additional collateral;

* The borrower will assume all costs, fees, and expenses
  associated with the loan modification, including workout fees;

* The maturity date will be extended to Jan. 9, 2011; and

* The borrower will have one 12-month extension option that would
  require, among other items, an additional partial principal
  paydown of $10 million.

The loan modification was finalized in June 2010; however, the
effective date of the modification is Jan. 9, 2010, the loan's
prior maturity date.  The loan did not pay off on this date, and
the borrower was unable to meet its maturity extension hurdle, so
the loan was transferred to special servicing on Oct. 16, 2009.
According to the transaction documents, principal payments are
made on a pro rata basis until an event of default, at which time
they are applied sequentially.  Since the effective date of the
loan modification was backdated to the loan's prior maturity date,
the loan was deemed to no longer be in default, which allowed the
$25.0 million partial principal paydown to be applied pro rata.

S&P based its analysis, in part, on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for year-end 2009 and trailing-12 months
ending May 2010, the borrower's 2010 budgets, Smith Travel
Research reports, and Torto Wheaton Research's projected revenue
per available room for each submarket.  The Montecito Country
Club, which was added as collateral as part of the loan
modification, was appraised as land for residential development
since it is a private country club.  Standard & Poor's valued the
additional collateral at a 70% valuation haircut to the February
2010 appraisal, a discount equal to the weighted average Standard
& Poor's value discount to current appraised values for the four
lodging assets in the transaction.  S&P's resulting stressed in-
trust loan-to-value ratio improved to 116% from 133% at its last
review, mainly due to deleveraging from the $25.0 million
principal paydown.  While the transaction has benefited from this
deleveraging and the additional collateral, S&P's in-trust LTV
ratio remains well in excess of 100%, so no positive rating
adjustments are warranted.

According to the trustee, the class N certificates experienced a
one-time principal loss of $7,185 due to interest shortfalls.  At
this time, S&P views the principal loss as de minimis and does not
warrant a downgrade as it is its understanding that the loss was
applied in error.  The special servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC (Berkadia), has indicated that it is holding funds
from the borrower in a reserve account to pay all costs for the
modification, including shortfalls to the trust.

As of the July 2010 remittance report, the Ty Warner Hotels &
Resorts Loan had a trust and whole-loan balance of $319.6 million,
subsequent to the partial principal paydown of $25.0 million.  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests in the collateral
properties secure a $155.0 million mezzanine loan.  The loan is
secured by four lodging properties: Four Seasons Hotel - New York
in New York City (54% of the allocated loan balance), the Four
Seasons Biltmore Resort in Montecito, Calif. (23%), the Las
Ventanas al Paraiso in San Jose del Cabo, Mexcio (17%), and the
San Ysidro Ranch in Montecito, Calif. (5%).  Since issuance, one
property was fully released from the collateral pool, resulting in
an $80.4 million paydown of the loan balance.

The master servicer, also Berkadia, reported debt service coverage
of 6.15x and 62% occupancy as of May 2010.  For the trailing-12
months ending May 2010, the portfolio occupancy and average daily
rate were 61.7% and $786.19, respectively, yielding a RevPAR of
$485.21, up from $457.06 at year-end 2009.

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Developing

                     TW Hotel Funding 2005 LLC
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LUX

            Class      To            From
            -----      --            ----
            A-2        A             A/Watch Dev
            B          BBB+          BBB+/Watch Dev
            C          BBB-          BBB-/Watch Dev
            D          BB+           BB+/Watch Dev
            E          BB            BB/Watch Dev
            F          B             B/Watch Dev
            G          B-            B-/Watch Dev
            H          CCC+          CCC+/Watch Dev
            J          CCC           CCC/Watch Dev
            K          CCC-          CCC-/Watch Dev
            L          CCC-          CCC-/Watch Dev
            M          CCC-          CCC-/Watch Dev
            N          CCC-          CCC-/Watch Dev

                          Rating Affirmed

                     TW Hotel Funding 2005 LLC
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LUX

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A-1        AAA


VALEO INVESTMENT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Valeo Investment Grade CDO Ltd.:

* US$12,250,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Subordinated Notes
  due January 15, 2013 (current balance of $13,404,319), Upgraded
  to B1; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from substantial delevering of the transaction and the
improvement in the Class A-2 overcollateralization ratio since the
rating action in May 2009.

Since the last rating action, the Class A-1 Notes were paid down
by about $80 million, accounting for roughly 33% of the total
Class A Notes' outstanding balance reported in May 2009.  This
paydown is attributable to principal amortizations including
scheduled payments.  As a result of the delevering, the Class A-2
overcollateralization ratio has improved from 106.02% in May 2009
to 109.97% in June 2010.  Moody's expects delevering to continue
as a result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
January 2004.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Valeo Investment Grade CDO Ltd., issued in January 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2005-C17 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded 14 classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C17.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from actual and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

On July 14, 2010, Moody's placed 14 classes of this transaction on
review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review of this transaction.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the July 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 12%
to $2.4 billion from $2.7 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 209 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 32% of the pool.  The pool includes
three loans with investment grade underlying ratings, representing
7% of the pool.  At last review two additional loans, representing
10% of the pool, had underlying ratings.  Their performance has
declined since securitization and they are now analyzed as part of
the conduit pool because of increased leverage.  Twenty-four
loans, representing 11% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Forty-two loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in a $4.5 million loss for one of the loans (66% loss
severity).  The second loan was liquidated with no loss.
Currently 14 loans, representing 9% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Falchi
Building Loan ($43.6 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 638,712 square foot industrial/office building
located in Long Island City, New York.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in December 2009 due to imminent maturity
default and has passed its March 11, 2010 anticipated repayment
date.  The property was 89% leased as of March 2010 and
performance has been stable since securitization.  The borrower is
negotiating a loan modification with the special servicer and
Moody's does not expect a loss from this loan.  Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.99X, respectively, compared
to 119% and 0.86X at last review.  Of the remaining 13 specially
serviced loans, six loans are either 90+ days delinquent, real
estate owned or in the process of foreclosure.  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $34.1 million appraisal reduction for four
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$49.6 million loss for 10 of the specially serviced loans (39%
expected loss on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 12 loans,
representing 7% of the pool, due to refinancing risk or
performance issues.  Moody's estimates a $38.3 million aggregate
expected loss for these troubled loans (22% expected loss on
average based on overall 35% loss severity and 63% overall default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial or full-year
2009 operating results for 99% and 91% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV ratio is 94% compared to 100% at Moody's prior review.
Although the overall LTV has declined, the pool has experienced
increased credit quality dispersion.  Based on Moody's analysis,
13% of the conduit pool has an LTV greater than 120% compared to
1% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.49X and 1.15X, respectively, compared to
1.39 X and 1.01X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 41 compared to 50 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Tharaldson Pool
1-B Loan ($66.0 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's leasehold interest in 13 limited service hotels
located in Nevada, Texas, California, Oklahoma, New York and
Pennsylvania.  Occupancy and revenue per available room for the
trailing twelve month period ending December 2009 were 71% and
$75, respectively, compared to 79% and $94 in 2008.  The loan
sponsor is Gary Tharaldson.  The loan benefits from a 20 year
amortization schedule and has amoritized 12% since last review.
Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.99X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 2.16X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the
Tharaldson Pool 1-A Loan ($47.9 million -- 2.0% of the pool),
which is secured by fee interests in 14 limited service hotels and
fee interests in the land supporting an additional 13 limited
service hotels.  Each land parcel is leased to borrowers in the
Tharaldson 1-B Pool, which is included in the trust.  Occupancy
and RevPAR for the trailing twelve month period ending December
2009 were 71% and $67, respectively, compared to 76% and $78 in
2008.  The loan sponsor is Gary Tharaldson.  The loan benefits
from a 20 year amortization schedule and has amortized 12% since
last review.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa1
and 1.87X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.91X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the 200 Varick
Street Loan ($27.0 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured
by a 400,061 SF Class B office building located in the Greenwich
Village submarket of New York City.  The largest tenants include
Cardinia Real Estate LLC (28% of the net rentable area; lease
expiration June 2020), Doremus & Company, Inc. (25% of the NRA;
lease expiration June 2010) and Nysarc, Inc. (10% of the NRA;
lease expiration December 2019).  As of March, 2010 the property
was 99% leased, the same as at year end 2008.  The loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to near term
lease rollover.  The loan is interest only for its entire 10 year
term.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aa2 and
1.91X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and 2.02X at last review.

The first loan that previously had an investment grade underlying
rating is the One & Two International Place Loan ($205.1 million -
- 8.6% of the pool),which represents a 50% pari passu interest in
a $410.2 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by two
Class A office buildings, totaling 1,852,501 SF, located in
Boston, Massachusetts.  The largest tenants include Ropes & Gray
LLP (19% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2010), Eaton Vance
Management (17% of the NRA; lease expiration May 2024) and Choate
Hall & Stewart (10% of the NRA; lease expiration September 2015).
The property was 90% leased as of February 2010.  Performance has
declined since securitization due to increased expenses.  In
addition, market rents for the Financial District submarket have
declined 10% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 81% and 1.10X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.27X at last
review.

The second loan that previously had an investment grade underlying
rating is the Great Wolf Resorts Pool Loan ($44.5 million -- 1.8%
of the pool), which is secured by two resorts located in Michigan
and Kansas.  Performance declined significantly in 2009 as a
result of a drop in vacation travel caused by the economic
recession.  Occupancy and RevPAR for the trailing 12- month period
ending December 2009 were 56% and $114, respectively, compared to
61% and $127 for the same period in 2008.  The loan is currently
on the master servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.  Due to the
decline in performance, Moody's has assumed a high probability of
default for this loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 158% and
0.79X, respectively, compared 54% and 1.48X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 11% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Digital Realty Trust Portfolio Loan
($142.6 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by six
office properties located in five states.  The properties were 97%
leased as of March 2010.  Net operating income (NOI) and occupancy
have significantly increased since securitization.  The loan
sponsor is Digital Realty Trust, a publicly traded REIT.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.85X, respectively, compared to
88% and 1.21X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Olympia Portfolio Loan
($57.5 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which consists of 23 loans
secured by 22 anchored retail properties and two office properties
located in Florida and Georgia.  Seven of the loans, representing
26% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.  Twenty of the properties, representing
88.3% of the allocated loan balance, are anchored by Walgreen
Company (senior unsecured rating A2; stable outlook ).  Four loans
are currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR,
low occupancy and deferred maintenance.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.0X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the MetroPlace III & IV Loan
($52.2 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
A office towers, totaling 325,328 SF, located in Fairfax,
Virginia.  As of March 2010, the buildings were 99% leased.  The
largest tenants include GSA-INS (31% of the NRA; lease expiration
February 2014), GSA-DEA (22% of the NRA; lease expiration February
2015) and Lockhead Martin (21% of the NRA; lease expiration
January 2013).  The property was 99% leased as of March 2010.  The
property's NOI has been steadily increasing since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to 93% and 1.07X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $140,908,623, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 5/10/2005

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 5/10/2005

  -- Class A-3, $82,046,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class A-PB, $212,012,566, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class A-4, $1,079,352,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class A-1A, $ 334,620,169, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class A-J, $187,242,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/14/2010

  -- Class B, $74,897,000, downgraded toA2 from Aa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class C, $23,830,000, downgraded to A3 from Aa3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class D, $47,661,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class E, $27,235,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class F, $27,235,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class G, $30,639,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class H, $37,448,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/14/2010

  -- Class J, $6,808,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class K, $10,213,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class L, $13,617,000, downgraded to C from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class M, $6,808,000, downgraded to C from B1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class N, $6,808,000, downgraded to C from B2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010

  -- Class O, $6,808,000, downgraded to C from B3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2010


WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 20
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches from 7 RMBS
transactions issued by WMABS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.
To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on January 13,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE3 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on January 13, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE4 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on January 13, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series
2006-HE5 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on January 13,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series
2007-HE1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 13,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series
2007-HE2 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on January 13, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WILBRAHAM CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of notes issued by
Wilbraham CBO Ltd./Corp.  In addition, Fitch has revised the
Recovery Rating on one class of notes and maintained the Recovery
Rating on the other class of notes.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports highlighted at the end of this press release.

Since Fitch's last review in March 2009, the class A-2 notes have
been paid in full, leaving the class B-1 and class B-2 notes as
the senior-most remaining tranche.  The class B notes have a
cumulative par balance of approximately $40.6 million, compared to
a performing collateral balance of $4.1 million from three unique
obligors.  There are also three defaulted bonds totaling about
$3.8 million of par, from which Fitch expects relatively weak
recoveries.  Due to the insufficient collateral balance available
to support the class B notes, an ultimate principal shortfall
appears inevitable, which is reflected by the 'C' rating on these
notes.  Additionally, interest proceeds are projected to be
insufficient to fulfill the cumulative class B interest amount at
the next payment date in January 2011.  Failure to pay the class B
interest amount will lead to a payment default unless sufficient
principal proceeds become available to compensate for the interest
shortfall.

Fitch has revised the Recovery Rating on the class B-1 notes to
'RR6' from 'RR5', while maintaining the recovery rating on the
class B-2 notes at 'RR5'.  The lower recovery projection for the
class B-1 notes is attributable to the relatively low interest
coupon of Libor plus 2.05% received by these notes.  The class B-2
notes receive a significantly higher fixed coupon of 9.42%,
leading to relatively higher recovery prospects as Recovery
Ratings are based on the total discounted future cash flows
projected to be available to the notes in a base-case default
scenario.

Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

Wilbraham CBO is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation that
closed on July 13, 2000 and is managed by Babson Capital
Management LLC.

Fitch affirms and revises the Recovery Rating on this class:

  -- $9,329,033 class B-1 notes to 'C/RR6' from 'C/RR5'.

Fitch affirms this class:

  -- $31,279,032 class B-2 notes 'C/RR5'.


WOODBURY UNIVERSITY: Moody's Affirms Rating on $18.9 Mil. Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Woodbury University's Baa3
rating.  The rating applies to the University's $18.9 million of
series 2006 bonds issued through the California Educational
Facilities Authority.  The outlook for the rating is stable.

The University also participated in the 2007 College and
University Financing Program, rated Ba1 with a negative outlook,
issued through the California Educational Facilities Authority.
Although Woodbury is a member of the pooled financings, the rating
and outlook is based on the relative share of each participant in
the pool, bond maturities, the participants underlying credit
quality and the corresponding expected loss (default frequency
times loss severity) for their rating categories.  For more
information on this series, please see Moody's last report dated
July 7, 2010.

Legal Security: The Series 2006 bonds are a general obligation of
the University with a first lien on gross revenue pledge and a
deed of trust on real property assets of the Burbank Campus.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                             Strengths

* Market niche as private residential university outside of Los
  Angeles, CA in Burbank; specializing in architecture, business
  and media design programs.  The University currently enrolls
  1,465 students with approximately 150 of those at the San Diego
  Campus.  Students come largely from the greater Los Angeles area
  with close to 20% of enrollment at the graduate level and half
  of the undergraduate student population transferring from area
  community colleges.  Tuition growth has been moderate but steady
  with net tuition per student at $19,881 in FY2009 compared to
  $16,093 million in FY 2005.

* Good fiscal management manifesting in healthy annual operations.
  The University has consistently produced positive annual
  operating margins; averaging 4.7% from FY2007 through FY2009;
  based on Moody's calculations which includes a 5% endowment
  spend rate.  Healthy margins are largely a result of the
  University's current policy of not spending from the endowment
  in an effort to grow the endowment value.  In addition, the
  University annually budgets at least a $400,000 dollar endowment
  contribution/contingency.  Operating cash flow, at 12.1% in
  2009, provides good coverage of debt service at an average 2.9
  times.  Management expects to end the 2010 fiscal year with
  another positive surplus in line with FY2009 results.

* Healthy liquidity of resources.  The University, at June 30,
  2009, held monthly liquidity of over 142 days.  University
  assets are invested through BNY Mellon with holdings of 59%
  equity, 36% fixed income and 5% cash.

* Conservative debt profile of 100% fixed rate debt coupled with
  no additional debt plans.

                           Challenges

* Deterioration of financial resources and pension assets due to
  investment declines.  Woodbury experienced an investment loss
  consistent with peers of -15.6% as of the end of the 2009 fiscal
  year and its pension liability increased to $6.8 million from
  $2.9 million at the end of the 2008 fiscal year (6/30).  As a
  result, the University's expendable financial resource cushion
  to both debt and operations fell to a stressed 0.2 times and 0.2
  times, respectively.  Management reports a positive investment
  return for the 2010 fiscal year; contributing to growth in the
  endowment of 13% as of May 31, 2010.  Moody's notes limited
  capacity for additional debt issuance at the current rating
  level.

* Strong competition from other area private and lower-priced
  public institutions.  As applications have increased,
  selectivity has remained relatively stable at 81.5% for new
  freshman and 83.6% for transfers in Fall 2009.  At the same
  time, yield has trended downward to 30% in 2009 compared to 50%
  in 2004 for new freshman and remained more stable for transfers
  at 47%.  While total undergraduate enrollment has remained
  steady, graduate enrollment has continued to grow at a healthy
  pace; at 289 full time equivalents in the fall of 2009 from 160
  in the fall of 2006.  As a highly tuition dependent institution
  (87% of Moody's FY2009 adjusted revenue base), Woodbury's
  operating performance is highly vulnerable to enrollment
  shortfalls.

* Revenue stress possible as the State of California (rated A1)
  faces fiscal stress.  Enrollment and operations may be pressured
  going forward in light of fiscal pressure at the State and
  potential reduction of the Cal Grant program; which supports
  lower and middle income students with tuition support.
  Currently, Woodbury receives approximately $3.5 million annually
  or 9% of revenues from this program.

                              Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the College
will continue to be challenged by a competitive marketplace, but
will continue to budget conservatively in order to maintain
healthy operating margins and grow financial resources to better
support outstanding debt.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Strengthening of market demand coupled with continuation of strong
operating margins; significant growth of the financial resources
supporting outstanding debt

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

Deterioration of market demand resulting in weakened operating
margins; weakened financial resource cushion supporting debt;
increase of debt

Key Indicators (FY 2009 financial data and fall 2009 enrollment
data):

* Total Full-Time Equivalent Students (FTE): 1,465 students
* Freshman Acceptance Rate: 81.1%
* Freshman Matriculation Rate: 29.7%
* Total Pro-Forma Direct Debt: $27.4 million
* Expendable Financial Resources: $5.9 million
* Expendable Resources to Pro-Forma Direct Debt: 0.22 times
* Expendable Resources to Operations: 0.18 times
* Monthly Days Cash: 142 days
* Three-year Average Operating Margin: 4.7%
* Operating Cash Flow Margin: 12.1%
* Reliance on Student Charges: 86.8%

                            Rated Debt

* Series 2006: Baa3 underlying

* Series 2007: Ba1 based on College and University Financing
  Program pooled rating

The last rating action with respect to Woodbury University was on
June 18, 2009, when the Baa3 rating and stable outlook was
affirmed.  The rating was subsequently recalibrated to Baa3 with a
stable outlook on May 7, 2010.


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 194 Bonds From 120 RMBS Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds being
downgraded to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated
'CC' or 'C' indicating that a default was expected.  The action is
limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The remaining bonds
in these transactions have not been analyzed as part of this
review.

Of the 120 transactions affected by these downgrades 72 are Alt-A
and 45 are Subprime.  The remaining three transactions are other
product types.  Ninety-eight percent were previously rated 'C'.
Fifty-two percent have an outstanding Recovery Rating of 'RR6'
indicating that minimal recovery is expected.  Forty-three percent
have Recovery Ratings of 'RR2' or 'RR3' indicating that 50% to 90%
of the outstanding balance is expected to be recovered.

Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the ongoing surveillance
process and will continue to monitor these transactions for
additional defaults.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Six SF CDO Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions as detailed at the
end of this press release for classes of notes issued by six
structured finance collateralized debt obligations that closed in
2005 with exposure to structured finance assets.  The downgrades
are due to credit deterioration in the underlying portfolios.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The analytical
scope of each CDO review varied depending on the quality of the
portfolio and credit enhancement for the CDO's classes available
from subordination and excess spread.

For transactions where expected losses from assets with a Fitch
derived rating of 'CC' and lower already significantly exceed the
credit enhancement level of the most senior class of notes, Fitch
believes that the probability of default for all classes of notes
can be evaluated without factoring potential further losses from
the remaining portion of the portfolios and without considering
the outcomes of various interest rate and default timing scenarios
as described in the relevant criteria.  Therefore these
transactions were not modeled using the Structured Finance
Portfolio Credit Model or cash flow model.

For transactions where expected losses from distressed assets did
not significantly exceed the credit enhancement level of the
senior class of notes, Fitch used SF PCM to project losses from
the transaction's entire portfolio.  If credit enhancement levels
to the most senior class indicate a rating higher than 'CCC',
Fitch performed cash flow model analysis to evaluate the notes'
performance under a range of interest rate and default timing
scenarios.

For all transactions, this review considered realized losses and
credit migration in the underlying portfolios since last review,
the ongoing and future impact of interest rate hedges,
availability of excess spread to pay down the notes, or
conversely, erosion of par due to the use of principal proceeds to
pay interest, and the likelihood of these trends to continue.

Fitch considered non-deferrable classes which have missed their
interest on at least one payment date and have not cured within an
appropriate cure period as specified in the transaction's
documents, to be in default as reflected in the respective
ratings.

Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to notes rated
category 'CCC' and lower.  Fitch currently does not assign
Recovery Ratings to notes of structured finance CDOs.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Acacia CDO 8, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $127,987,408 class A-1 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $15,000,000 class A-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $22,000,000 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,655,085 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $10,514,876 class D affirmed at 'C';
  -- $10,738,558 class E affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch did not perform SF PCM or cash flow model analysis on Acacia
8.  The losses expected from the distressed portion of the
portfolio already significantly exceed the CE level of the class
A-1 notes.  Additionally, interest collections are not sufficient
to fulfill the interest obligation to the class B notes.
Principal proceeds are currently being used to fulfill the
remaining interest due to class B and to pay down the class A-1
notes.

Acacia 8 is a cash flow CDO that closed on July 14, 2005 and is
monitored by Redwood Asset Management.  As of the June 2010
report, the portfolio is composed of residential mortgage-backed
securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, and SF CDOs
bonds primarily of the 2004 through 2006 vintage.

C-BASS CBO XIII, Ltd.

  -- $148,428,469 class A downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $39,500,000 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,000,000 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $18,186,132 class D affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch did not perform SF PCM or cash flow model analysis on C-BASS
CBO XIII, Ltd.  The losses expected from the distressed portion of
the portfolio already significantly exceed the CE level of class A
notes.  Additionally, interest collections are not sufficient to
fulfill the interest obligation to the class A and class B notes.
Principal proceeds are currently being used to fulfill the
remaining interest due on these classes, and to pay down the class
A notes.

C-BASS is a cash flow CDO that closed on March 17, 2005, and is
monitored by C-BASS Investment Mangement LLC.  As of the June 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is primarily composed of RMBS, CMBS,
structured finance CDOs, and various commercial ABS bonds of 1996
through 2005 vintage.

Commodore CDO III, LTD./INC.

  -- $68,696,639 class A-1A downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $11,455,235 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $16,584,235 class A-1C downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $63,750,000 class A-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $50,000,000 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,569,378 class C-1 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $2,650,648 class C-2 affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Commodore III because the
expected loss from the distressed portion of the portfolio is
higher than, but still comparable to, the CE levels of the class
A-1A, A-1B and A-1C notes.  However, the resulting 'CCC' RLR from
SF PCM is significantly greater than the class A-1 CE levels.
Additionally, interest collections are insufficient to fulfill the
hedge counterparty payment.  Principal proceeds are currently
being used to fulfill the remaining payment to the hedge
counterparty and the entire accrued interest distribution amounts
to the class A-1, class A-2 and class B notes before redeeming the
class A-1 notes.

Commodore III is a cash flow CDO that closed on March 1, 2005 and
is monitored by Fischer Francis Trees & Watts, Inc.  As of the
June 1, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS,
CMBS, corporate and SF CDOs, and consumer and commercial ABS
primarily from 2004 through 2007 vintage transactions.

G-Star 2005-5, Ltd.

  -- $317,059,499 class A-1 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $60,000,000 class A-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $37,000,000 class A-3 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $22,771,375 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $25,245,210 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $35,000,000 income notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch did not perform SF PCM or cash flow model analysis on G-Star
2005-5, Ltd.  The losses expected from the distressed portion of
the portfolio already significantly exceed the CE level of the
class A-1 notes.  Although a small portion of interest proceeds
are currently being used to redeem the senior notes, this amount
it not sufficient to offset the ongoing deterioration of the
portfolio.

G-Star 2005-5 is a cash flow CDO that closed on March 16, 2005 and
is managed by MBIA Asset Management Corp., who replaced Ventras
Capital Advisors LLC on Nov. 11, 2009.  As of the June 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is primarily composed of RMBS, CMBS,
commercial real estate loans, structured finance CDOs, and various
commercial ABS bonds of 1997 through 2008 vintage.

RFC CDO II Ltd.

  -- $74,838,423 class A-1 downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BBB/ LS3';
  -- $39,000,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $6,000,000 class B-1 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $6,000,000 class B-2 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $13,500,000 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $3,380,203 class D affirmed at 'C';
  -- $3,380,203 class E affirmed at 'C';
  -- $3,000,000 class F affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM and cash flow model analysis on RFC II.
Since Fitch's last review in November 2009, 49.5% of the portfolio
has been downgraded a weight average of 5.3 notches.
Approximately 69.3% of the portfolio has a below investment grade
rating, with 51.9% considered in the 'CCC' rating category or
below, compared to 51.5% and 31.4%, respectively, at the last
review.  While the class A-1 notes are receiving some principal
repayment from excess interest due to the failing class A/B
overcollateralization test, the amount of benefit from these
payments is marginal relative to the remaining outstanding balance
of the class A-1 notes.

RFC II is a structured finance collateralized debt obligation (SF
CDO) that closed on March 3, 2005, and is monitored by Castle Peak
Capital Advisors, LLC.  As of the June 30, 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and CMBS from 2002 through 2005
vintage transactions.

STACK Ltd., Series 2005-1

  -- $96,022,573 series A2-US$ downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- EUR4,722,422 series A2-EUR downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $74,000,000 class B-US$ affirmed at 'C';
  -- EUR6,000,000 class B-EUR affirmed at 'C';
  -- $33,000,000 class C-US$ affirmed at 'C';
  -- YEN1,000,000,000 class C-JPY affirmed at 'C';
  -- $31,000,000 class D-US$ affirmed at 'C';
  -- YEN500,000,000 class D-JPY affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Stack 2005-1 because the
expected loss from the distressed portion of the portfolio is
higher than, but still comparable to, the CE level of the class
A2-EUR and A2-US$ notes.  However, the resulting 'CCC' RLR from SF
PCM is significantly greater than the class A2 CE level.  The
class A2 notes continue to amortize, but the degree of
deterioration in the underlying portfolio outweighs the benefit of
amortizing.  Additionally, because STACK 2005-1 is a synthetic
transaction, there are no cash flow diverting structural features
that can compensate for the difference between the portfolio's
expected loss and class A2 CE level.

STACK 2005-1 is a synthetic CDO that closed on March 24, 2005, and
is managed by TCW Asset Management Co.  The portfolio is composed
entirely of subprime RMBS from 2003 through 2006 vintage
transactions.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches From 27 TruPs CDO Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 76
tranches from 27 U.S. TruPs collateralized debt obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  The
tranches with lowered ratings have a total issuance amount of
$9.488 billion.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 33
tranches from eight transactions and removed 12 of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect three primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria;

* The application of S&P's revised recovery assumptions for trust-
  preferred securities issued by U.S. Banks; and

* In most cases, significant deterioration in the credit quality
  of the underlying asset portfolios due to increased exposure to
  obligors that have either defaulted or deferred payments on
  trust-preferred securities, along with an increase in the number
  of trust-preferred securities that experienced downgrades into
  the 'CCC' range.

In July 2010, S&P stated that S&P has observed severe negative
credit migration and significant increases in defaults and
deferrals in the pools underlying assets.  Previously, in January
2009, S&P indicated its view that the economic and regulatory
conditions pointed to a potential increase in the number of U.S.
banks that defer on their TruPs payment obligations.  Since that
time, S&P has observed significant increases in the number of
deferrals of U.S. Bank TruPs held by the CDOs S&P rates.  While
the rate of increase in the number of deferrals may have recently
slowed, in S&P's view, the economic and regulatory conditions at
the root of these deferrals continue to unfold.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the affirmed tranches
have sufficient credit support to maintain their current ratings
according to its updated criteria.  Some of the affirmed tranches
were structured as principal-protected notes that are supported by
additional collateral, usually in the form of a zero-coupon bond
issued by the U.S. government or an entity backed by the U.S.
government.  S&P's ratings on these principal-protected notes
address only the payment of principal at maturity and are linked
to the rating on the bond pledged as additional collateral.
Accordingly, the credit quality of the CDO portfolios did not
drive S&P's ratings on the principal-protected notes.

S&P expects to continue reviewing the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and to resolve the CreditWatch status of the
affected tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                             Rating
                                             ------
  Transaction                      Class   To     From
  -----------                      -----   --     ----
  Alesco Preferred Funding XI Ltd  A-1A    CCC+   BBB+/Watch Neg
  Alesco Preferred Funding XI Ltd  A-1B    CCC+   BBB+/Watch Neg
  Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd A-1     CCC    BB/Watch Neg
  Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd A-2     CCC-   B/Watch Neg
  Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd X       BBB    AAA/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               A1      B-     BBB-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               A2      CCC+   BB/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               B       CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               C1      CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               C2A     CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO I Ltd               C2B     CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             A-1A    AA     AAA/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             A-2     B      B/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             B       CCC    CCC/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             C-1     CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             C-2     CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Attentus CDO III Ltd             D       CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               A-1     BBB-   A+/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               A-2     BB     BB/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               B       CCC+   B-/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               C       CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               D-1     CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               D-2     CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.               D-3     CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  MM Community Funding IX, Ltd     A-1     CCC-   BBB+/Watch Neg
  MM Community Funding IX, Ltd     A-2     CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  MMCapS Funding XIX Ltd           A-1     CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  MMCapS Funding XIX Ltd           A-2     CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg
  MMCapS Funding XVII, Ltd.        A-1     CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  MMCapS Funding XVII, Ltd.        A-2     CCC-   B+/Watch Neg
  MMCapS Funding XVII, Ltd.        B       CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XV     A-1     CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XV     A-2     CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XV     A-3     CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVI    A-1     CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVI    A-2     CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVI    A-3     CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVII   A-1     CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVII   A-2     CCC-   B+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVIII  A-1     CCC+   BB+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XVIII  A-2     CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XX     A-1     CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XX     A-2     CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXV    A-1     CCC    BB+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXV    A-2     CCC-   B+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXVIII A-1     CCC    BBB-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXVIII A-2     CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Regional Diversified Funding2004 A-1     CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Regional Diversified Funding2004 A-2     CCC-   B/Watch Neg
  Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.           A-1L    CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.           A-1LA   CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.           A-1LB   CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.           A-2L    CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-1LA   CCC+   BBB+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-1LAD  CCC+   BBB+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-1LB   CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-2LA   CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-2LB   CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-3LA   CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     A-3LB   CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     B-1L    CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding IX     B-2L    CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding V      A-1LA   CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding V      A-1LAD  CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding V      A-1LB   CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding V      A-2L    CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   A-1A    BB     A+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   A-1B    BB     A+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   A-2     B-     BB+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   B       CCC-   B/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   C       CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   D       CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   E       CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg
  Taberna Preferred Funding VIII   F       CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO I, LLC               A-1     A-     AAA/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO I, LLC               A-2     A-     AAA/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO II, LLC              A1A     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO II, LLC              A1B     BB-    BBB+/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO IX Ltd               A-1     CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.            A-1     CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.            A-2     CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.            R       A      A+/Watch Neg
  Tropic CDO II Ltd                A-1L    CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
  Tropic CDO II Ltd                A-2L    CCC-   B+/Watch Neg
  Tropic CDO V Ltd.                A-1La1  D      CCC/Watch Neg
  Tropic CDO V Ltd.                A-2L    CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  U.S. Capital Funding VI Ltd      A-1     CCC-   B-/Watch Neg
  U.S. Capital Funding VI Ltd      A-2     CC     CCC-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

        Transaction                       Class      Rating
        -----------                       -----      ------
        Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd  P-1 Combo  AAA
        Alesco Preferred Funding XII Ltd  P-2 Combo  AAA
        Attentus CDO I Ltd                D          CC
        Attentus CDO I Ltd                E          CC
        Attentus CDO III Ltd              A-1B       AAA
        Attentus CDO III Ltd              E-1        CC
        Attentus CDO III Ltd              E-2        CC
        Attentus CDO III Ltd              F          CC
        Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.                E-1        CC
        Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.                E-2        CC
        Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.                F          CC
        Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.                G          CC
        Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.                H          CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       A-3FV      CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       A-3FX      CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       A-3L       CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       B-1L       CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       B-2FX      CC
        Taberna Preferred Funding V       B-2L       CC
        Tropic CDO V Ltd.                 P-1 Combo  AAA
        Tropic CDO V Ltd.                 P-2 Combo  AAA

                     Other Ratings Outstanding

        Transaction                       Class      Rating
        -----------                       -----      ------
        Tropic CDO V Ltd.                 A-1La2     D
        Tropic CDO V Ltd.                 A-1Lb      D


* S&P Puts Ratings on Five Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on five
tranches from five U.S. synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities and
four tranches from three corporate-backed synthetic CDO
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the
same time, S&P placed its rating on one tranche from one
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction on CreditWatch
positive.  In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on one tranche
from a CMBS-backed synthetic CDO transaction and removed it from
CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch actions and rating affirmations followed S&P's
monthly review of U.S. synthetic CDO transactions.

The CreditWatch negative placements reflect negative rating
migration in the respective portfolios and synthetic rated
overcollateralization ratios that had fallen below 100% as of the
June month-end run.  The CreditWatch positive placement reflects
substitutions made in the respective portfolio and an SROC ratio
that had risen above 100% at the next-higher rating level.

                          Rating Actions

                       ABACUS 2006-NS1 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         D                         CCC/Watch Neg     CCC

                  Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-6 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         A-1                       CCC+/Watch Neg    CCC+

                          Claris Limited
                             114/2007

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Tranche                   B/Watch Neg       B

                           Cloverie PLC
                              2005-56

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         A                         A/Watch Neg       A

                       Credit Default Swap
  US$1 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No. 07ML113512A

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Tranche                   CCC+srp/Watch Neg CCC+srp

                 Credit-Linked Trust Certificates
         2005-I

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         2005-I-D                  BBB+/Watch Neg    BBB+

                CypressTree Synthetic CDO Limited
                            2005-134&6

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         2005-1                    BBB-/Watch Neg    BBB-
         2005-3                    BB-/Watch Neg     BB-

                            HARBOR SPC
                               2006-2

                                      Rating
                                      ------
    Class                     To                From
    -----                     --                ----
    D                         CCC+              CCC+/Watch Neg

                     Marvel Finance 2007-3 LLC

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         IA                        BB+/Watch Pos     BB+

                      Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                              2006-1

                                           Rating
                                           ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Scrd Nts                  BB-/Watch Neg     BB-


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on Two Market Value CDO Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took rating actions on two
market value collateralized debt obligations.  S&P removed its
rating on one tranche from Shiprock Finance SPC from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P withdrew its rating on the class
B tranche from BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC because the
tranche was paid down.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings
on two tranches from BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC and
left its rating on one trance from the same transaction on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's monthly review of market value CDO
performance.

S&P will continue to monitor these transactions through its
monthly review process.  S&P will take negative rating actions
when appropriate if S&P see declines in the overcollateralization
levels.  S&P will remove the ratings from CreditWatch or raise the
ratings if the tranches reestablish an appropriate O/C cushion or
improve their cushion for several months.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
  Transaction                         Class    To   From
  -----------                         -----    --   ----
  BlackRock Senior Income Series III  B        NR   BB/Watch Neg
  Shiprock Finance SPC                2007-VFN AAA  AAA/Watch Neg

                  Rating Remaining On Creditwatch

    Transaction              Class                Rating
    -----------              -----                ------
    BlackRock Senior Income  Series III C         CCC-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Transaction                        Class     Rating
       -----------                        -----     ------
       BlackRock Senior Income Series III D         CC
       BlackRock Senior Income Series III E         CC



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
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                  *** End of Transmission ***