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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 18, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 197

                            Headlines

505 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-1 Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2005-1 Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-1 Notes
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Hybrid Notes
ANTHRACITE 2004-HY1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes

ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
ARCAP 2005-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
ASSET BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 62 Tranches
ATHERTON FRANCHISE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-BBA4 Notes

BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002-2 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-MIB1 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 59 Tranches
BASIC ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-BBA5 Certificates

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 Notes
BECKMAN COULTER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $102.3 Mil. Notes
BRAVO MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four Tranches
CARMAX BUSINESS: Moody's Raises Ratings on 12 Subordinate Tranches
CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 2007-52 Notes

CNL FUNDING: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-FL12 Notes
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2003-C5 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series CSMS 2006-HC1

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-CF2 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002-CKN2 Notes
CRIIMI MAE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 1998-C1 Certificates
CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 270 Tranches
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 250 Tranches

CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 438 Tranches
DELTA AIR: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
ELLINGTON LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
ENCORE CREDIT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches
EQUIFIRST LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches

FBR SECURITIZATION: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
FFCA SECURED: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
FMAC LOAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
FRANKLIN PIERCE: Moody's Downgrades Long-Term Rating to 'B1'
FRONTIER NORTH: S&P Corrects Rating on $10 Mil. Bonds From 'BB'

G-STAR 2002-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Certificates
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-C2 Certs.
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2004-FL2 Certs.

GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class H Notes to 'D/RR4'
HOME EQUITY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2005-AR23 Tranches
IXION PLC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class Series 20 D Notes
JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes

JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
JER CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Classes of Notes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2004-CIBC9 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 157 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2000-C10 Certs.

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-LN1 Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2003-C1 Securities
JPMORGAN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C8 Notes
KNOWLEDGEFUNDING OHIO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Bonds
KNOWLEDGEFUNDING OHIO: Fitch Maintains Ratings on Various Notes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2004-C7 Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Series 2005-4 Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 5 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-TOP7 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2000-LIFE1 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-22 Notes
N-STAR REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes
NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 69 Tranches

NOMURA ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1998-D6 Securities
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 44 Tranches
OWNIT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: S&P Cuts Ratings on Five 2000-C1 Notes
RUTLAND RATED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Sedona 2005-2 Notes

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Tranches
SASCO 2008-C2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Secured Notes at 'Ca'
SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 53 Tranches
SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 46 Tranches
SHORE RE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on 2010-1 Class B Notes

SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series 2007-C1 Certs.
STARLING FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on 2006-18 Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2004 Whale 4 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2005 Whale 6 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2006-C23 Certs.

WACHOVIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2004-C11 Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-C17 Certs.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: S&P Corrects Rating on Class 4-CB Certs.
XENIA RURAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006 Water Revenue Bonds

* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Detroit, Michigan's GO Bonds
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 79 Classes From 42 ABS CDO Notes
* Moody's Downgrades Credit Ratings on Four Trup CDO Notes
* S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on the New Jersey Health's 1998 Bonds
* S&P Affirms Ratings on 180 Certs. From 20 Re-Remic RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs. From Two RMBS Re-Remic Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Classes From Six RMBS Transactions
* S&P Puts Ratings on 11 Tranches From Eight Mezzanine CDO Deals

                            *********

505 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by 505 CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$55,000.000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due November 2018, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on
     September 9, 2009 Confirmed at Aa2;

  -- US$55,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due November 2018, Upgraded to A2; previously on
     September 9, 2009 Upgraded to Baa1;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due November 2018, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on
     September 9, 2009 Upgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$15,000.000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due November 2018, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on
     September 9, 2009 Upgraded to Ba3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from significant delevering of the Class A-1 and Class
A-2 notes since the last rating action, which resulted in
increases in the overcollateralization ratios of the notes.

Since the last rating action on September 9, 2009, the Class
A-1 and Class A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately
$118 million each, or roughly 39% of their outstanding balance
reported in August 2009.  A substantial proportion of this
paydown is attributable to principal prepayments on the underlying
loans and collateral sales by the manager.  Based on the latest
trustee report dated June 1, 2010, the Class A/B, and Class C
overcollateralization ratios increased to 166.5% and 147.6%
respectively, compared to August 2009 levels of 133.9% and 124.6%,
respectively.  Moody's expects delevering to continue due to the
static nature of this transaction.

505 CLO II Ltd., issued in December 2008, is a static
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2:

  -- US$300,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes Due
     2019 (current rated balance of $179,805,059.19), Downgraded
     to Baa1; previously on October 26, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$37,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of $34,874,178.52),
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on October 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1;

  -- US$63,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of 58,588,619.91),
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on October 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba2;

  -- US$31,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of $29,294,309.96),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on October 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in October 2009.

Decline in the credit quality is observed through deterioration in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the exposure to securities rated
Caa1 and below and an increase in defaults.  In particular, as of
the latest quarterly servicer report dated April 2010, the
weighted average rating factor was 4172 as compared to 3704 in
July 2009.  Based on the same report, securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 35.17% of the underlying portfolio
versus 26.27% in July 2009.  Additionally, the cumulative dollar
amount of defaulted securities has increased to about $97MM from
approximately $34MM in July 2009.

Additionally, the Additional Principal Amount has increased since
the last rating action.  Additional Principal Amount is the excess
of the aggregate outstanding tranche balance over the sum of (1)
aggregate outstanding loan balance plus (2) principal collections
on deposit.  This amount increases as defaults increase and the
difference between liabilities and assets increase.  The current
Additional Principal Amount was approximately $55MM, an increase
from $8MM in July 2009.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates.  When conducting its' review, Moody's
applies additional default probability stresses by assuming an
equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not updated within the last
15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess the collateral
pool's concentration risk in a small number of obligors that
constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the servicer's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and subordinated loans
which make up approximately 67.4% of the underlying portfolio as
of the latest quarterly April 2010 servicer report.  Moody's
analysis reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien
and subordinated loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2, issued on August 7, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
small and medium enterprise issuers.


ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1:

  -- US$33,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2004-1 Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     December 2, 2004 Assigned Aa2;

  -- US$73,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2004-1 Due 2018, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     July 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio since
the previous rating action in July 2009.  Such credit
deterioration is observed through a decline in the average credit
rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor) and an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
substantially over the last year and is currently 4237 as of the
last servicer report, dated April 25, 2010 versus 3624 reported in
April 2009.  Based on the same report, the amount of cumulative
defaults has also increased from $29.9M to $75M.  Moody's also
notes that the Additional Principal Amount has increased
substantially since the last rating action.  The Additional
Principal Amount is the excess of the aggregate outstanding
tranche balance over the sum of (1) the aggregate outstanding loan
balance plus (2) principal collections on deposit.  This amount
increases as defaults increase and the difference between
liabilities and assets increase.  Since last April, the Additional
Principal Amount of the transaction has increased from $8M to
$36.6M.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates.  When conducting its review, Moody's
applies additional default probability stresses by assuming an
equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not updated within the last
15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess the collateral
pool's concentration risk in a small number of obligors that
constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the servicer's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and mezzanine loans which
make up approximately 24.27% of the underlying portfolio as of the
latest April 2010 servicer report.  Moody's analysis reflects the
expectation that recoveries for second lien and mezzanine loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1, issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
US dollar-denominated middle-market loans.


ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2005-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1:

  -- US$435,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2005-1 (current balance of $297,074,139), Downgraded
     to A1; previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2005-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on July 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously July 15,
     2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$145,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     July 15, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio since
the previous rating action in July 2009.  Such credit
deterioration is observed through a decline in the average credit
rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor) and an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
substantially over the last year and is currently 4728 as of the
last servicer report, dated April 25, 2010, versus 3821 reported
in April 2009.  Based on the same report, the amount of cumulative
defaults has also increased from $50 million to $238.6 million.
Moody's also notes that the Additional Principal Amount has
increased substantially since the last rating action.  The
Additional Principal Amount is the excess of the aggregate
outstanding principal balance over the sum of (1) the aggregate
outstanding loan balance plus (2) principal collections on
deposit.  This amount increases as defaults increase and the
difference between liabilities and assets increase.  Since last
April, the Additional Principal Amount of the transaction has
increased from $0 million to $124 million.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates.  When conducting its review, Moody's
applies additional default probability stresses by assuming an
equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not updated within the last
15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Moody's also conducted stress tests to assess the collateral
pool's concentration risk in a small number of obligors that
constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the servicer's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and mezzanine loans which
make up approximately 77.92% of the underlying portfolio as of the
latest April 2010 servicer report.  Moody's analysis reflects the
expectation that recoveries for second lien and mezzanine loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1, issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
U.S. dollar-denominated middle-market loans.


ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1:

  -- US$291,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes Due
     2019 (current rated balance of $206,945,984), Downgraded to
     A3; previously on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1;

  -- US$37,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on August 4,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$72,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to B3; previously on August 4,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$35,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on August 4,
     2009 Downgraded to B3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in August 2009.

Decline in the credit quality is observed through deterioration in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the exposure to securities rated
Caa1 and below and an increase in defaults.  In particular, as of
the latest quarterly servicer report dated May 2010, the weighted
average rating factor was 4715 as compared to 3655 in May 2009.
Based on the same report, securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 50% of the underlying portfolio versus 17% in May
2009.  Additionally, the cumulative dollar amount of defaulted
securities has increased to about $107MM from approximately $41MM
in May 2009.

Additionally, the Additional Principal Amount has increased since
the last rating action.  Additional Principal Amount is the excess
of the aggregate outstanding principal balance over the sum of (1)
aggregate outstanding loan balance plus (2) principal collections
on deposit.  This amount increases as defaults increase and the
difference between liabilities and assets increase.  The current
Additional Principal Amount was approximately $57MM, an increase
from $19MM in May, 2009.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates.  When conducting its review, Moody's
applies additional default probability stresses by assuming an
equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not updated within the last
15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Moody's also conducts stress tests to assess the collateral pool's
concentration risk in a small number of obligors that constitute
more than 3% of the collateral pool.  Due to the impact of revised
and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual Sector
Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the servicer's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and subordinated loans
which make up approximately 83% of the underlying portfolio as of
the latest quarterly May 2010 servicer report.  Moody's analysis
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien and
subordinated loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research (see Moody's Special Comment
titled "Strong Loan Issuance in Recent Years Signals Low Recovery
Prospects for Loans and Bonds of Defaulted U.S. Corporate
Issuers," dated June 2008).

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1, issued on July 28, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
small and medium enterprise issuers.


ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1:

  -- US$351,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes Due
     2019 (current rated balance of $157,246,499), Downgraded to
     A3; previously on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of $36,095,289),
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on August 4, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2;

  -- US$81,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of 64,971,520),
     Downgraded to B2; previously on August 4, 2009 Confirmed at
     Ba1;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance of $36,095,289),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on August 4, 2009 Confirmed at
     B1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in August 2009.

Decline in the credit quality is observed through deterioration in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the exposure to securities rated
Caa1 and below and an increase in defaults.  In particular, as of
the latest quarterly servicer report dated April 2010, the
weighted average rating factor was 4727 as compared to 3900 in
April 2009.  Based on the same report, securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 51.9% of the underlying portfolio
versus 30.78% in April 2009.  Additionally, the cumulative dollar
amount of defaulted securities has increased to about $95MM from
approximately $21MM in April 2009.

Additionally, the Additional Principal Amount has increased since
the last rating action.  Additional Principal Amount is the excess
of the aggregate outstanding principal balance over the sum of (1)
aggregate outstanding loan balance plus (2) principal collections
on deposit.  This amount increases as defaults increase and the
difference between liabilities and assets increase.  The current
Additional Principal Amount was approximately $46MM, an increase
from $0MM in April, 2009.

Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates.  When conducting its review, Moody's
applies additional default probability stresses by assuming an
equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not updated within the last
15 months, a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Moody's also conducts stress tests to assess the collateral pool's
concentration risk in a small number of obligors that constitute
more than 3% of the collateral pool.  Due to the impact of revised
and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual Sector
Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the servicer's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and subordinated loans
which make up approximately 89% of the underlying portfolio as of
the latest quarterly April 2010 servicer report.  Moody's analysis
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien and
subordinated loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1, issued on April 24, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
small and medium enterprise issuers.


AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Hybrid Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of American International
Group, Inc. as summarized below:

  -- Issuer Default Rating at 'BBB';
  -- Senior unsecured notes at 'BBB';
  -- Subordinated hybrid securities at 'B';
  -- Short-term IDR at 'F1'.

AIG's Rating Outlook has been revised to Stable from Evolving.

Fitch has also removed the 'A+' Insurer Financial Strength (IFS)
ratings of AIG's domestic property/casualty subsidiaries from
Rating Watch Negative and affirmed the ratings and assigned Stable
Rating Outlooks.  Additionally, Fitch has affirmed the 'A-' IFS
ratings of AIG's life insurance subsidiaries and revised the
Rating Outlooks to Stable from Evolving

The 'A+' IFS rating on AIG's American Life Insurance Company
(ALICO) subsidiary remains on Rating Watch Positive where it was
placed on March 8, 2010 after AIG announced ALICO's planned sale
to MetLife, Inc.  The 'A+' IFS rating on AIG's American
International Assurance Company (Bermuda) Limited subsidiary
remains on Rating Watch Evolving reflecting Fitch's belief that
the company is likely to be divested by AIG as part of re-
structuring efforts.

Fitch's ratings on AIG continue to reflect an implied 'government
support floor' based on the company's well publicized financial
assistance package from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY) and U.S. Treasury that totaled $134 billion outstanding as
of March 31, 2010.  Absent ongoing government support, Fitch's IDR
and unsecured debt ratings on AIG would be below investment grade
due to the company's still very high leverage, and large, albeit
declining, risk exposures in its non-insurance operations.  As a
result, AIG's IDR and unsecured debt ratings benefit by at least
one rating category from the government support.  The IFS ratings
of AIG insurance subsidiaries only indirectly benefit from
government support, and are currently at their approximate 'stand
alone' levels.

Fitch's ratings on AIG and Stable Outlook on the company, are
underpinned by the agency's belief that the U.S. Treasury's
approximate 80% equity ownership interest in AIG, and presumed
desire, within reason, to maximize the value of that equity
ownership, is large enough to discourage the Treasury from
monetizing its investment in AIG prior to the company possessing a
capital structure and business model supportive of the company's
current ratings.  Underlying this belief is Fitch's view that
AIG's ability to retain IFS ratings in the 'A' range and
investment grade senior unsecured ratings would be important to
potential investors in AIG.

The revision in Outlooks to Stable from Evolving reflects Fitch's
view that AIG's re-structuring plan has solidified meaningfully
and capital market conditions have improved significantly since
the previous Evolving Outlooks were assigned in May 2009.  The
current Stable Outlooks indicate that Fitch believes that AIG's
ratings are unlikely to change over the next 12 to 24 months.
AIG's ultimate transition from a majority government owned and
supported entity to an independent entity could result in future
ratings migration that is not reflected in Fitch's current near-
term Stable Outlook.

Should AIG effectively execute its strategies to repay monies owed
the U.S. government via asset sales and divestitures and wind-down
non-core operations, and the U.S. Treasury were to divest its
ownership interest (likely via capital markets transactions),
Fitch believes the company's IDR would likely approximate its
current level.  Future ratings levels and Outlooks will be greatly
influenced by the then levels of leverage throughout the
organization, as well as the then competitive positions and
balance sheet profiles of the organization's remaining insurance
company subsidiaries.

Whether considering AIG's consolidated debt outstanding or
considering only debt issued or guaranteed at the holding company
level, Fitch believes that the AIG organization's financial
leverage, measured by traditional debt-to-capital ratios or by
Fitch's Total Financing & Commitments ratio, are likely to remain
higher than those of typical insurance holding companies for the
near term even after consideration of the AIG's previously
announced sale of ALICO and assuming that the company's American
International Assurance Group Limited subsidiary is divested
either through an initial public offering or a sale to third-
party.  Fitch's assessment of AIG's financial leverage
incorporates debt issued by subsidiaries, primarily AIGFP, and
guaranteed by AIG, and includes debt that is often considered
'operating type' debt in the sense that it may have been used to
fund assets purchased to earn some form of spread income.  Fitch
calculates AIG's consolidated debt-to-capital ratio at March 31,
2010 at 57% and considering only debt issued or guaranteed by AIG,
at 36%.  Additionally, at year-end 2009 the company's TFC ratio
was 3.3 times compared to a more typical high-end range of under
2.0x.  The agency views the impact on these leverage ratios from
the ALICO sale and the potential disposition of AIA as modest
since proceeds will first be used to redeem preferred interests
held by the FRBNY and second reduce borrowings due the FRBNY.

Fitch views AIG's high consolidated financial leverage as due in
part to debt issued by the company's aircraft leasing and consumer
finance subsidiaries; International Lease Finance Corp. and
American General Finance Inc.  As a result, Fitch views AIG's
ability to either divest ILFC and AGF, including their debt, or to
reduce the subsidiaries' leverage in some manner, as keys to the
company's ability to emerge from its restructuring process with a
consolidated capital structure that is comparable to those of its
insurance company competitors.  Fitch considers ILFC and AGF to be
'non-core' AIG subsidiaries, and thus rates those companies
largely on a stand-alone basis.  Nevertheless, Fitch believes that
ILFC's and AGF's debt should be considered when evaluating the AIG
organization's overall financial leverage given the reputational
risk to AIG that could result from a default by either ILFC or
AGF; and given Fitch's view that ILFC retains economic value that
AIG would presumably like to preserve and realize at some future
date.  Fitch notes that ILFC's and AGF's near-term debt maturities
are modest given the companies' recent re-financing efforts.

Fitch views AIG's operating-earnings-based interest coverage from
core operations as reasonable for the rating category.  However,
the agency believes that the company's near-term consolidated
interest coverage remains materially exposed to potential
operating losses from non-core businesses, losses on the sales of
various assets, and restructuring charges related to asset sales.
Given AIG's planned sale of ALICO, potential future sale of AIA,
and Fitch's belief that ILFC and AGF are unlikely to be part of
AIG's portfolio of businesses over the long term, the agency views
the company's long-term interest coverage as largely being driven
by the company's commercial insurance, foreign general insurance,
and domestic life and retirement services businesses.  Using pre-
tax operating earnings from these three business units, and
excluding the non-cash amortization of the FRBNY commitment fee,
which is reported by AIG as interest expense, Fitch calculates the
company's average interest coverage ratio from 2005 through the
first quarter 2010 (1Q'10) at 7.5x.  Viewed over a shorter 2007-
through 1Q'10 time-horizon, AIG's interest coverage ratio
calculated in this manner declines meaningfully to 5.7x.

Fitch's affirmation of AIG's property/casualty subsidiaries' IFS
ratings and the removal of the ratings from Rating Watch Negative,
reflects the agency's belief that AIG follows a sensible reserving
process and that the company's accident-year loss ratios in key
business lines reflect reasonable levels of conservatism.  Fitch
also believes that AIG's reserves are likely to be more volatile
than that of commercial line peer companies that write less long-
duration excess casualty business but views this volatility as
adequately factored into the company's current ratings.  Finally,
the affirmation of the property/casualty subsidiaries' ratings
reflects the companies' ability to maintain their strong
competitive positions despite the effect of negative publicity
surrounding AIG since the company received its initial financial
assistance from the U.S. Government in September 2008.

Fitch's affirmation of AIG's life and annuity subsidiaries' IFS
ratings reflect the company's solid competitive position in the
domestic life insurance and annuity markets.  These business units
are rebounding from the AIG organization's financial difficulties
by restoring relationships with distribution channels, and
completing various re-branding strategies.  Additionally, Fitch
believes that the severe asset-quality problems that AIG's
domestic life and annuity operations experienced in 2008 and 2009
from its securities lending activities are largely behind the
company due to steps take in late 2008 in conjunction with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and write-downs already taken.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings and assigned Stable Outlooks:

American International Group, Inc.

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB'

  -- Senior debt at 'BBB';

  -- Short-term IDR at 'F1';

  -- 6.25% series A-1 junior subordinated debentures due March 15,
     2087 at 'B';

  -- 5.75% series A-2 junior subordinated debentures due March 15,
     2067 at 'B';

  -- 4.875% series A-3 junior subordinated debentures due March
     15, 2067 at 'B';

  -- 6.45% series A-4 junior subordinated debentures due June 15,
     2077 at 'B';

  -- 7.700% series A-5 junior subordinated debentures due Dec. 18,
     2062 at 'B';

  -- 8.175% series A-6 junior subordinated debentures due May 15,
     2058 at 'B';

  -- 8.00% series A-7 junior subordinated debentures due May 22,
     2038 at 'B';

  -- 8.625% series A-8 junior subordinated debentures due May 22,
     2068 at 'B';

  -- 5.67% series B-1 debentures due Feb. 15, 2041 at 'B'

  -- 5.82% series B-2 debentures due May 1, 2041 at 'B';

  -- 5.89% series B-3 debentures due Aug. 1, 2041 at 'B';

AIG Funding, Inc.

  -- Commercial paper at 'F1'.

AIG International, Inc.

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB';
  -- Senior debt at 'BBB';
  -- 5.60% senior unsecured notes due July 31, 2097 at 'BBB';

AIG Life Holdings (US), Inc.

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB';
  -- 7.50% senior unsecured notes due Aug., 11, 2010 at 'BBB';
  -- 7.50% senior unsecured notes due July 15, 2025 at 'BBB';
  -- 6.625% senior unsecured notes due Feb. 15, 2029 at 'BBB'.

American General Capital II

  -- 8.50% preferred securities due July 1, 2030 at 'B'.

American General Institutional Capital A

  -- 7.57% capital securities due Dec. 1, 2045 at 'B'.

American General Institutional Capital B

  -- 8.125% capital securities due March 15, 2046 at 'B'.

Fitch has removed these ratings from Rating Watch Negative,
affirmed the 'A+' IFS ratings and assigned Stable Outlooks:

  -- Chartis Property Casualty Company;
  -- American Home Assurance Company;
  -- Chartis Casualty Company;
  -- Commerce and Industry Insurance Company;
  -- Granite State Insurance Company;
  -- Illinois National Insurance Co.;
  -- National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA;
  -- New Hampshire Insurance Company;
  -- The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania;
  -- Chartis Select Insurance Company;
  -- Landmark Insurance Company;
  -- Lexington Insurance Company;
  -- AIU Insurance Company;
  -- Chartis Specialty Insurance Company;
  -- Chartis MEMSA Insurance Company;
  -- Chartis UK Ltd.;
  -- Chartis Overseas, Limited.

Fitch has affirmed these IFS ratings at 'A-' and revised the
Outlooks to Stable from Evolving;

  -- AGC Life Insurance Company;

  -- Western National Life Insurance Company;

  -- American General Life Insurance Company;

  -- SunAmerica Annuity and Life Assurance Company;

  -- American General Life and Accident Insurance Company;

  -- American General Life Insurance Company;

  -- American International Life Assurance Company of New York;

  -- First SunAmerica Life Insurance Company;

  -- SunAmerica Life Insurance Company;

  -- The United States Life Insurance Company in the City of New
     York;

  -- The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company.

ASIF Program
ASIF II Program
ASIF III Program
ASIF Global Financial Program

  -- Program ratings at 'A-'.

This 'A+' IFS rating remains on Rating Watch Positive:

  -- American Life Insurance Company.

This 'A+' IFS rating remains on Rating Watch Evolving:

  -- American International Assurance Company (Bermuda) Limited.


ANTHRACITE 2004-HY1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Anthracite 2004-HY1
Ltd./Corp. as a result of increased interest shortfalls to the
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'CCC-/CC', down from 'CCC-' at
last review.  Further, 1.1% of the portfolio is currently on
Rating Watch Negative.  All the collateral in the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade; 74.5% has a rating
below 'CC'.  As of the May 31, 2010 trustee report, 70.7% of the
portfolio is experiencing interest shortfalls.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (70.7% of the portfolio).  Based on this
analysis, the class A notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the 'BB' rating category.

The breakeven rates for classes B through F do not pass Fitch's
base cash flow model stress.  These classes' respective credit
enhancement levels were compared to the percent of underlying
collateral experiencing interest shortfalls or defaulted.  The
class B notes have been downgraded to 'CC' since default is
probable.  The class is currently receiving interest; however,
there is marginal cushion to this class when compared to the
percentage of underlying collateral experiencing interest
shortfalls.  Fitch believes that for classes C through F default
appears inevitable because Fitch does not expect full recoveries
on these classes.  The total percentage of assets experiencing
interest shortfalls exceeds the credit enhancement to classes D
through F.  Further, classes E and F are deferring interest.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to face
refinance risk and maturity defaults.  Fitch also assigned Loss
Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or
LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Anthracite 2004-HY1 is a commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation that closed on Nov. 9, 2004.  Currently, the
portfolio is composed of CMBS from the 1998 through 2004 vintages.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned an LS rating and Outlook for the
class listed below:

  -- $23,791,000 class A notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $28,117,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'BB';
  -- $21,628,000 class C notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $19,898,000 class D notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $33,048,000 class E notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $17,995,000 class F notes to 'C' from 'CC'.

The ratings of the class A and B notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings on
classes C, D, E and F address the likelihood that investors will
receive ultimate and compensating interest payments, as per the
governing documents, as well as the stated balance of principal by
the legal final maturity date.


ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 12 classes of notes issued by
Anthracite CDO III Ltd./Corp. as a result of increased interest
shortfalls and negative credit migration to the underlying
commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'B+/B', down from 'BB+' at last
review.  Further, 5.8% of the portfolio is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Approximately 54.3% has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade; 24.2% is rated in the 'CCC' category and
below.  As of the June 21, 2010 trustee report, 8.3% of the
portfolio is experiencing interest shortfalls.  The class A notes
have paid down $43.9 million since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (8.3% of the portfolio).  Based on this
analysis, the breakeven rates for the classes A through D notes
are generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The breakeven rates for classes E through H do not pass Fitch's
base cash flow model stress.  Fitch compared the credit
enhancement level with the amount of underlying assets considered
distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower) representing 24.2% of the
portfolio.  These assets have a high probability of default and
low expected recoveries upon default.  The class E notes have a
credit enhancement level of 23.9%, providing negative cushion to
the distressed assets (24.2%).  Fitch believes that default is
probable at or prior to maturity and therefore the class has been
downgraded to 'CC'.  Similarly, the credit enhancement to classes
F through H indicate negative cushion to the distressed
collateral, thus these classes have been downgraded to 'CC' as
well.  In addition, Fitch notes that all classes are current on
interest.

The Negative Rating Outlook on classes A through D reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage backed
security loans will continue to face refinance risk at maturity.
Fitch also assigned a Loss Severity rating to classes A through D.
An LS rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks or Loss Severity Rating to classes
rated 'CCC' or lower.

Anthracite CDO III is a collateralized debt obligation that closed
on March 30, 2004.  Currently, the portfolio is composed of 71.9%
CMBS, 17.3% CMBS rake bonds or credit tenant leases classified as
commercial real estate loans, and 10.7% real estate investment
trusts.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $168,402,623 class A notes to 'A/LS3' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $27,000,000 class B-FL notes to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $14,384,000 class B-FX notes to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $24,727,000 class C-FL notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $2,500,000 class C-FX notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $13,959,000 class D-FL notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,000,000 class D-FX notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,600,000 class E-FL notes to 'CC' from 'BB+';

  -- $26,427,000 class E-FX notes to 'CC' from 'BB+';

  -- $22,871,000 class F notes to 'CC' from 'BB';

  -- $7,623,000 class G notes to 'CC' from 'BB-';

  -- $13,069,000 class H notes to 'CC' from 'B'.


ANTHRACITE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes of Anthracite CDO II
Ltd./Corp. as a result of increased interest shortfalls and
negative credit migration to the underlying commercial mortgage-
backed securities.  The balance of the classes has been affirmed
due to the increase in credit enhancement levels since the last
review.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'BB-/B+', down from 'BBB-/BB+' at
last review.  Further, 4.8% of the portfolio is currently on
Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately, 38.4% has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade; 19.3% is rated in the 'CCC'
category and below.  As of the June 22, 2010 trustee report, 8.3%
of the portfolio is experiencing interest shortfalls.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (8.3% of the portfolio).  Based on this
analysis, the breakeven rates for the classes A through G notes
are generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The class A notes have been assigned a Stable Rating Outlook given
that 43.9% of the original balance remains outstanding.  The
Negative Rating Outlook on the class B through F notes reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to
face refinance risk and maturity defaults.  Fitch also assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.

Anthracite CDO II is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 10, 2002.  Currently, the portfolio
is composed of 85.3% CMBS, 11.4% real estate investment trusts,
and 2.6% commercial real estate loans.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes:

  -- $69,791,337 class A at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12,979,000 class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $31,000,000 class B-FL at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:

  -- $42,978,000 class C to 'A/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $5,000,000 class C-FL to 'A/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $19,991,000 class D to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,000,000 class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $12,850,000 class F to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,000,000 class G to 'CCC' from 'BB+'.

Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes
rated 'CCC' or lower.

The ratings on classes A, B and B-FL address the likelihood that
investors will receive timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal by the stated maturity date.  The ratings on
classes C, C-FL, D, E, F and G address the ultimate payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal.


ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of Notes issued
by ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, and a decrease in
the weighted average recovery rate.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust is a CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
(100.0% of the pool balance).  As of the June 22, 2010 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $411.8 million from $414.4 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A Notes.

Four CMBS bonds with an original par balance of $25.8 million
(6.2% of the original pool balance) have experienced losses as of
the June 22, 2010 Trustee report.  One of these bonds has
experienced 100% in losses and the other three bonds have
experienced partial losses.  The total losses, not yet written-
down, are $6.1 million (1.5% of the original pool balance).
Sixteen CMBS bonds (21.7% of the pool balance) experienced
interest shortfalls in the latest reporting period.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,026 compared to 2,780 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: A1-A3 (1.2% compared to 1.8% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (0.8%
compared to 0.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (38.2% compared to 36.9%
at last review), B1-B3 (42.5% compared to 45.5% at last review),
and Caa1-C (17.2% compared to 14.9% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 3.5 years compared to 4.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 6.5% compared to 7.3% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 26.8% compared to 39.0% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B1; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated January 30, 2009.


ARCAP 2005-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on two other classes from the same
transaction and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following its rating actions on the commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that collateralize ARCap 2005-1.  The
CMBS certificates are from seven CMBS transactions and total
$136.8 million (27.1% of total asset balance).  S&P also revised
its credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral not rated
by Standard & Poor's ($114.8 million, 22.8%).  S&P lowered the
majority of the credit estimates.

The downgrades also reflect S&P's analysis of the liquidity
interruptions affecting the transaction.  In the June 23,
2010, trustee report, classes G through L did not receive full
interest payments.  Their aggregate deferred interests totaled
$3.1 million.  S&P has determined that the deferred interests
primarily reflect ARCap 2005-1's exposure to CMBS collateral that
have experienced interest shortfalls due to the master servicer's
recovery of prior advances, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions, servicers' nonrecoverability determinations for
advances, and special servicing fees.

According to the June 23, 2010, trustee report, ARCap 2005-1 is
collateralized by 103 CMBS classes ($504.4 million, 100%) from 15
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2005.  ARCap 2005-1
has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard & Poor's has
downgraded:

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2005-C4 (classes H, J, K, L, M, N, and O; $33.5 million, 6.6%);

* Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP 15 (classes G, H, J, K,
  L, M, and N; $24.5 million, 4.9%); and

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP 16
  (classes H, K, L, M, and N; $23.1 million, 4.6%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2005-1 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust
    Collateralized debt obligation certificates series 2005-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          A                A+               AA/Watch Neg
          B                BBB              A+/Watch Neg
          C                BB               BBB+/Watch Neg
          D                BB-              BBB/Watch Neg
          E                B+               BBB-/Watch Neg
          F                B                BB+/Watch Neg
          G                CCC+             BB+/Watch Neg
          H                CCC              BB/Watch Neg
          J                CCC-             B+/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust
     Collateralized debt obligation certificates series 2005-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          K                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
          L                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg


ASSET BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 62 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 62
tranches from 13 RMBS transactions issued by ABSC.  Four bonds'
ratings have been upgraded as they have accumulated protection
against future losses.  The collateral backing these deal
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.  For details regarding Moody's approach to
estimating losses on subprime pools originated in 2005, 2006, and
2007, please refer to the methodology publication "Subprime RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" available on Moodys.com.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
Series MO 2006-HE6

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series RFC 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Series AMQ 2006-HE7

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE1

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE2

  -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE3

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE4

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Confirmed at A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE5

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE6

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE7

  -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
AEG 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series AMQ 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ATHERTON FRANCHISE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on this Atherton
Franchise Loan Funding, LLC:

Series 1997-A

  -- Class B affirmed at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- Class C downgraded to 'D/RR3' from 'C/RR1'.

Series 1998-A

  -- Class C upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D affirmed at 'B', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class E affirmed at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- Class F downgraded to 'D/RR2 from 'C/RR1'.

Series 1999-A

  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'A', Outlook Positive;
  -- Class B affirmed at 'BBB', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C affirmed at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- Class D downgraded to 'D/RR4' from 'C/RR2';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

The upgrade of the class C note in the 1998-A transaction reflects
the significant credit support available to the note over the
short expected remaining life.  In its analysis, detailed below,
Fitch found the class C notes were able to pass stress scenarios
consistent with the respective upgraded rating category.

The affirmations on the remaining notes reflect the notes' ability
to pass stress-case scenarios consistent with the current rating
levels.  Additionally, recovery prospects for certain distressed
notes have changed, leading to a revision of the Recovery Ratings.
The 'D' assignment to the class D and Class F notes in the 1998-A
and 1999-A transactions, respectively, is a reflection of the
principal writedowns incurred on the notes.

The Positive Outlook designation on the class A-2 note in series
1999-A reflects Fitch's expectations for performance to improve
resulting in potential positive rating actions.  The Stable
Outlook designation for all applicable notes reflects Fitch's view
that ratings are not expected to change within the next 12 months,
based on current performance.

In reviewing the transaction, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations', dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor this transaction and may
take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-BBA4 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banc of America Large Loan 2004-BBA4,
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 0.47%.  Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate values and cash flow declines.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, approximately 58.9% of the pooled
loans are modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 14.3% from generally third- and fourth-
quarter 2009 servicer-reported financial data.  In its review,
Fitch analyzed servicer-reported operating statements and rent
rolls, updated property valuations, and recent lease and sales
comparisons.

Given that the loan positions within the pooled portion of the
commercial mortgage backed securities are the lower leveraged A-
notes (average base case loan-to-value of 89.3%), Fitch estimates
that average recoveries on the pooled loans will be approximately
99.2% in the base case.

The transaction is collateralized by two loans, one of which is
office (58.7%) and the other industrial-flex (41.3%).  The final
maturity dates, including all extension options for the non-
specially serviced loans, is in 2013 (58.7%) for the remaining
loan.

Fitch identified two Loans of Concern within the pool (100%), one
of which is specially serviced.  Fitch's analysis resulted in loss
expectations for one A-note in the 'B' stress scenario.

The Heritage Square I & II interest only loan is secured by a
349,503 sf of office space in two buildings located in Dallas, TX,
approximately 10 miles north of the Dallas CBD.  The two buildings
were built in 1978 and 1980.  At issuance the buildings were 985
leased and 905 occupied by 65 tenants.  As of a February 2010 rent
roll the collateral was 62.8% occupied with average in-place rent
of $17.38 psf.  Through 2012, approximately 21.7% fo the NRA
expires.  The servicer-reported NOI for the TTM ended Dec. 31,
2009 had declined 69.1% from YE 2008.  The loan was modified and
assumed in October 2009.  The modification included an extension
to June 12, 2013 with an additional 24 month option, while the
loan will be interest-only for the remaining term.  The loan was
assumed by Silver Tree Partners.

The Arapahoe Business Park interest only loan is secured by 16
industrial flex buildings encompassing 388,761 sf located in
Richardson, TX.  The buildings were built between 1976 and 1980.
Approximately 62% of the space consists of office space, while 38%
consists of warehouse space.  At issuance the buildings were 905
leased by 84 tenants.  As of a December 2009 rent roll the
property was 75% occupied with average in-place rent of $9.51 psf.
As of March 2010, occupancy had improved to approximately 80%.
Through 2012, approximately 67% of the NRA expires.  The servicer-
reported NOI for the YE 2009 had declined 65 from YE 2008.

The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2008.  In
December 2009 the special servicer extended the loan to Oct. 9,
2010.  Amounts for each property release have been set by a
current appraisal, while the borrower continues to market the
properties.  To date, two properties from the original portfolio
have been sold, with the A-note being paid down by approximately
$2 million.  The new appraisal received in January 2010 appraised
the remaining portfolio at approximately $17.8 million.

Fitch removes these classes from Rating Watch Negative and affirms
and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity Ratings to these
pooled classes as indicated:

  -- $8.6 million class J at 'AA+/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.5 million class K at 'D/RR3'.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and interest-only classes X-
1A and X-5 have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of interest-only classes X-1B, X-2, X-
3 and X-4.  For additional information, see 'Fitch Revises
Practice for Rating IO and Prepayment Related Structured Finance
Securities', dated June 23, 2010.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential Loss Severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to seven
classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage, Series 2002-2.
Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings and Recovery Ratings
to numerous classes.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch's expected losses
on loans currently in special servicing.  Fitch expects losses to
fully deplete classes N through P.  As of the June 2010
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced 21.7% to $1.35 billion from $1.72 billion at issuance,
which consists of 20.1% of paydown and 1.6% of realized losses.
Fifty-four loans (48%) are currently defeased, including three
(16.8%) of the top five loans.  As of the June 2010 remittance,
cumulative interest shortfalls reach class M.

Fitch has designated 25 loans (14%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes seven specially serviced loans (3.1%).  The largest
specially serviced loan (1.1%) is secured by a 125,641 square foot
office building in Braintree, MA.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2010 after the borrower indicated that payment
default was likely as a result of expiring tenants vacating the
premises.  The largest tenant, University of Phoenix (17% of net
rentable area), has a lease that expires in October 2010.  The
tenant, which completed the build-out of new space in a different
location within the market, is waiting for occupancy permits from
the town.  They are not expected to remain at the subject after
October.  An additional 16.5% of the NRA became vacant in April
2010 when the former tenant, Quadraphics, informed the borrower
they were relocating to flex space elsewhere.  The collateral
reported a year-end 2009 debt service coverage ratio and occupancy
of 1.28 times and 86.1%, respectively.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.8%) is secured by a
131,702 sf office property located in Wayne, NJ.  The loan
transferred in July 2008 after the borrower indicated they would
no longer be able to pay debt service.  An agreement of purchase
and sale was executed by the buyer in May 2010.  The sale is
expected to be completed in late July 2010.  As of June 2010,
property occupancy remains at 20%.

Two of the top ten loans (3.6%), located in Livonia, MI, are loans
of concern due to upcoming rollover.  Quicken Loans, Inc. which
historically represented 98.1% and 30% of the NRA, respectively,
at each property, is in the process of relocating to downtown
Detroit.  Quicken expects to be fully relocated by the end of the
year, and will not be renewing their leases at the Dec. 31, 2010
expiration.  Fitch expects significant leasing challenges due to
the large amount of space becoming available, as well as the weak
office market in Detroit.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
(NOI) and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.50% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, 25 loans (18.3% of the overall pool) were assumed
not to be able to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses for
five loans (6.2%) in instances where Fitch's derived value was
less than the outstanding balance.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and assigned Rating Outlooks,
LS ratings and RRs as indicated:

  -- $19.4 million class H to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21.6 million class J to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $36.6 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'A';

  -- $12.9 million class L to 'CC/RR1' from 'BBB+';

  -- $12.9 million class M to 'C/RR5' from 'BB+';

  -- $16.9 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $6.8 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B'.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $81.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1' Outlook Stable;
  -- $975.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1' Outlook Stable;
  -- $64.7 million class B at 'AAA/LS3' Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.2 million class C at 'AAA/LS5' Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS5' Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.2 million class E at 'AAA/LS5' Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.6 million class F at 'AAA/LS5' Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.6 million class G at 'AAA/LS5' Outlook Stable.

The $11.1 million class P is not rated by Fitch.  Class A-1 has
been paid in full.

The class A-1 has been paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the ratings
on the interest-only classes XC and XP.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-MIB1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes from Banc of America
Large Loan 2005-MIB1, reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 5.4%.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate values and cash
flow declines.  Fitch also assigned Negative Rating Outlooks to
four classes, reflecting additional sensitivity analysis related
to further negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, approximately 42.8% of the pooled
loans are modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 9.8% from generally third- and fourth-quarter
2009 servicer-reported financial data.  In its review, Fitch
analyzed servicer-reported operating statements, STR reports and
rent rolls, updated property valuations, and recent lease and
sales comparisons.

Given that the loan positions within the pooled portion of the
commercial mortgage backed securities are the lower leveraged A-
notes (average base case loan-to-value of 92.2%), Fitch estimates
that average recoveries on the pooled loans will be approximately
87.4% in the base case.

The transaction is collateralized by seven loans, two of which are
secured by hotels (52%), one by office (29.3%), two by retail
(10%), one industrial (6.7%) and one by multifamily (2%).  The
final maturity dates, including all extension options for the non-
specially serviced loans, are in 2010 (29.3%) and 2011 (47%) for
the remaining loans.

Fitch identified five Loans of Concern within the pool (23.7%),
which are specially serviced.  Fitch's analysis resulted in loss
expectations for five A-notes in the 'B' stress scenario.  The
three largest pooled contributors to losses (by unpaid principal
balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are: The Liberty Portfolio
(6.7%), The Shops at Grand Avenue (4.7%), and Radisson Resort
Parkway (5%).

The Liberty Portfolio loan is collateralized by 1.1 million sf of
industrial buildings located in Worcester and Dedham, MA.  The
portfolio experienced a partial release of collateral, 10 Bond
Street, to one of the tenants, The Abbey Kelly Foster Regional
School.  The sale occurred on Feb. 19, 2010 with net proceeds
received in the total amount of $9.5 million that were applied pro
rata on the March 8, 2010 payment date.  The A note paid down by
$7.2 and the B note by $2.2 million.  The remaining three
properties are within 1.5 miles of major interstate exchanges,
providing access to the entire Worcester/Boston area.  The loan
originally transferred to the special servicer on March 20, 2009
due to the partial release of 10 Bond Street and remains at the
special servicer due to the maturity of the loan.  The servicer-
reported NOI for the YE 2009 was approximately 16.3% higher than
YE 2008.  The largest tenants include The American Red Cross and
Westvaco, although Westvaco is in default and not paying rent and
approximately 53% of the their space being subleased to Rand
Whilney Industries Corp.  As of a Dec. 31, 2009 rent roll the
portfolio was approximately 77.6% occupied with an average in-
place rent of $6.04 psf.  In addition, Polar Corp recently vacated
their space which would decrease the current occupancy to
approximately 63%.

The Shops at Grand Avenue is a 291,033 sf regional mall located in
Milwaukee, WI.  The collateral consists of 168,364 sf of in-line
space.  The property is anchored by The Boston Store and includes
major tenants such as TJ Maxx and Office Max.  As of YE 2009, the
servicer-reported NOI DSCR declined 46.9% from YE 2008.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2009.  One of the
major tenants at issuance, Linens N' Things, opened their store in
2005 and subsequently vacated following a corporate bankruptcy
filing.  The borrower has been unable to lease the former Linens
N' Things space triggering many co-tenancy clauses and increasing
vacancy as tenants exercised their contractual rights to vacate
their spaces.  As of YE 2009, the property reported an overall
occupancy of 55% and in-line occupancy of 45%.  At issuance, this
property had an overall occupancy of 78.6% and in-line occupancy
of 62.7%.

The Radisson Resort Parkway is a 718 key full-service hotel
located in Kissimmee, FL.  The property is adjacent to Walt
Disney's Celebration and is located 1.5 miles from Walt Disney
World.  The borrower completed $9 million in upgrades to the
property through mid-2006.  Property amenities include three food
and beverage choices, 9,070 sf of meeting space, two outdoor
swimming pools, tennis courts and a fitness center.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2009.  Property
performance has deteriorated, with the trailing 12 month period
ended Sept. 30, 2009, NOI declining 63.8% from YE 2008.  For the
TTM ended December 2009, the property reported occupancy, ADR and
RevPAR of 54.2%, $67.92 and $36.79, respectively, compared to
78.5%, $76.36 and $59.96 at issuance.  A new appraisal was
received in December of 2009 valuing the property at approximately
$30 million.

Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative, downgrades and assigns
Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity and Recovery Ratings to these
pooled classes as indicated:

  -- $28.8 million class J to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $30.8 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB';

  -- $30 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC/RR3'.

Fitch also removes from Rating Watch Negative, affirms, and
assigns LS Ratings and Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $163.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $51.2 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.3 million class D at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.3 million class E at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.3 million class F at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $30.3 million class G at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $25.3 million class H at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Class A-1 and interest-only classes X-1A and X-4 have paid in
full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of interest-only classes X-1B, X-2, X-
3 and X-5.  For additional information, see 'Fitch Revises
Practice for Rating IO and Prepayment Related Structured Finance
Securities', dated June 23, 2010.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential Loss Severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR6' to class L reflects modeled recoveries of
9% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds are
broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($2.8
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($47,594);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($2.8 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($3.4 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 59 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 59
tranches, confirmed the ratings of three tranches, and upgraded
one tranche from six RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans,
issued by Banc of America.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3B, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-B Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2B, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3B, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-C Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-E

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-J

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BASIC ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches
from one RMBS transaction issued by Basic Asset Backed Securities
Trust.  The collateral backing this deal primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate subprime residential
mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Basic Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-BBA5 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc. commercial mortgage pass through certificates,
series 2004-BBA5, reflecting no loss expectations in Fitch's base
case.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate values and cash flow
declines.

There is one loan remaining in the transaction, Colorado Mills
Mall.  Under Fitch's updated analysis, the loan is modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 10.4% from fourth-quarter 2009 servicer-reported financial
data.  In its review, Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating
statements and rent rolls, and recent lease and sales comparisons.

The loan is backed by a 1.1 million square foot regional mall
located in Lakewood, CO, approximately 10 miles west of downtown
Denver.  The collateral consists of 921,890 sf of space, of which
approximately 438,769 sf is in-line.  .  The property is anchored
by Target (not part of the collateral) and includes major tenants
such as United Artists (17 screen theater), Sports Authority
(43,568 sf), Borders Books & Music (21,163 sf), Off 5th Saks Fifth
Avenue (28,003 sf), The Last Call-Nieman Marcus (32,143 sf,), Off
Broadway Shoes (23,051 sf,) and Eddie Bauer Outlet (20,016 sf).
In-line tenants include Victoria's Secret, BCBG max Azria, Banana
Republic, Forever 21, Brooks Brothers, Pier 1 Imports, Casual
Corner and Gap.

As of February 2010, the property reported an overall occupancy of
72.1% and in-line occupancy of 62.2%.  As of year end 2009, the
property reported comparable in-line sales of $280 per square
foot.  At issuance, this property had an overall occupancy of 88%
and an in-line occupancy of 81%, with an in-line occupancy cost of
18.8% and in-line sales psf of $249.  However, property
performance has improved slightly.  As of YE 2009, the servicer
reported a net operating income increase of 6.8% from YE 2008.

The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2009 and was
modified and returned to the master servicer in April 2010.  The
maturity date was extended to Nov. 12, 2011.  Per the
modification, Borrower paid approximately $5 million toward the
senior principal balance, allocated additional capital to the
leasing escrow and replacement reserve escrow accounts and
purchased a 4% LIBOR cap.  Future monthly excess cash flow will be
applied to the senior principal balance.

Fitch affirms and assigns or revises Rating Outlooks to these
pooled classes:

  -- $4.7 million class E at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $22.4 million class F at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.6 million class G at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15.7 million class H at 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.5 million class J at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.5 million class K at 'B'; Outlook Stable.

Prior to the rating actions classes F-K were on Rating Watch
Negative.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D and Interest-only classes X-1A, X-2, X-3
and X-4 have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of interest-only classes X-1B.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

As the largest loan is over 90% of the remaining deal, the
transaction is similar to a U.S. CMBS single-borrower transaction.
In addition to the CREL CDO methodology, Fitch reviewed the
transaction in conjunction with its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower
Commercial Mortgage Transactions,' including reviewing insurance
requirements and borrower structure.  As there is no current
criteria for assigning Loss Severity ratings to single-borrower
deals, none were assigned to this transaction's classes.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 25 classes of
Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2000-1 as a part of Fitch's
continued surveillance.  The affected trust represents a
beneficial ownership interest in separate trust funds.

The Re-REMIC has a current balance of $9.5 million and is
securitized by Alt-A, Prime, and Subprime RMBS from Pre-2000
vintages.  Fitch's rating actions are:

Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2000-1

  -- Class 1-X (07383UAU9) withdrawn;
  -- Class 1-B (07383UAR6) affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 1-C (07383UAS4) affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 1-D (07383UAT2) affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-A (07383UAW5) affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-B (07383UAX3) affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-C (07383UAY1) affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-D (07383UAZ8) affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-E (07383UBA2) affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 2-F (07383UBB0) affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-X (07383UBN4) affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-A (07383UBE4) affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-B (07383UBF1) affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-C (07383UBG9) affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-D (07383UBH7) affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-E (07383UBJ3) affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 3-F (07383UBK0) affirmed at 'CCC/RR2';
  -- Class 3-G (07383UBL8) affirmed at 'CC/RR2';
  -- Class 4-A (07383UBS3) revised to 'D/RR2' from 'D/RR1';
  -- Class 5-A (07383UBU8) affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 5-B (07383UBV6) affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 5-C (07383UBW4) affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 5-D (07383UBX2) affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 5-E (07383UBY0) affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class 5-F (07383UBZ7) affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable.

The underlying securities remaining in group one (classes 1-X thru
1-D) consist of Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 1988-17 A-
1,Ryland Mortgage SEC Corp./American Home Funding Trust 1988-1 A,
and Nomura Asset Capital Corp. 1993-1 1,2,3,4.  Nomura Asset
Capital Corp. 1993-1 has a pool policy provided by Commonwealth
Mortgage Assurance Corporation.

The underlying securities remaining in group two (classes 2-A thru
2-F) consist of Comfed Savings Bank series 1987-1 A, Comfed
Savings Bank, series 1988-1 A, Guardian Savings and Loan
Association, series 1989-10 A, Guardian Savings and Loan
Association, series 1990-1 A, and Ryland Mortgage Securities
Corp., 1994-5 M2.

The underlying securities remaining in group three (classes 3-x
thru 3-G) consist of Bear Stearns Mortgage Securities, 1997-4 B3,
Fund America Investors Corporation II, 1993-A B3, Salomon Brothers
Mortgage Securities VII, 1994-1 B1 and B2, Structured Asset
Mortgage Investments, 1998-6 B2 and B3, and Wilshire Funding
Corporation Mortgage-Backed Certificates, 1998-WFC2 M2.  Fund
America Investors Corporation II, 1993-A has a pool policy
provided by Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Corporation.

The underlying securities remaining in group four (class 4-A)
consist of Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 1993-1 5.  Nomura Asset
Capital Corp., 1993-1 has a pool policy provided by Commonwealth
Mortgage Assurance Corporation.

The underlying securities remaining in group five (class 5-A thru
5-F) consist of Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc., 1990-5 A7 and
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp., 1996-I B5.  Citicorp Mortgage
Securities, Inc., 1990-5 A7 has a financial guarantee provided by
CitiCorp.

The rating actions on the Re-REMIC transactions reflect the most
recent rating actions Fitch took in the Alt-A, Pre-2005 Subprime
and Pre-2005 Prime market sectors, in the third quarter of 2010,
the second quarter of 2010 and fourth quarter of 2009
respectively.

To review ratings on the Re-REMIC transactions, Fitch first
determined each collateral pool's group level projected base-case
and rating stressed default and loss severity assumptions for the
underlying transactions.

After determining each underlying pools' projected base-case and
stressed scenario loss assumptions, Fitch performs cash flow
analysis to ascertain the amount of collateral loss that the Re-
REMIC transaction takes in the 'AAA-B' rating stresses.  Fitch's
cash flow assumptions are described in the April 28, 2010 report,
'U.S. RMBS Surveillance Criteria'.  Fitch's Cash flow Criteria is
described in the report 'U.S RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria'
published on June 28, 2010.

The 'RR2' Recovery Rating assigned to the Re-REMIC classes 3-F, 3-
G, and 4-A reflect a discounted projected cash flow of 71%-90% of
their current par amounts.  The methodology used to assign
Recovery Ratings is described in Fitch's Aug. 17, 2009 report,
'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings' and Fitch's
Dec. 16, 2009 report, 'U.S. RMBS Criteria for Recovery Ratings'.


BECKMAN COULTER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $102.3 Mil. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed this class of the Beckman Coulter,
Inc., series BC 2000-A:

  -- $102.3 million class A at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmations are the result of stable performance since
Fitch's last rating action.  The Rating Outlook reflects the
likely rating changes over the next one to two years.

The loans are secured by two of Beckman Coulter's office/research
and development facilities, located in Brea, CA and Miami, FL.
The buildings are 100% occupied by Beckman Coulter, which
currently has an investment grade credit rating of 'BBB' with a
Stable Outlook.  Each property is subject to a NNN lease in which
the tenant is obligated to make at a rate reflecting an amount
equal to the loan's principal and interest payments, until the
loan's maturity date of June 30, 2018, at which time there will be
a balloon balance of approximately $53.1 million.

The property in Miami, previously specially serviced due to on-
going litigation between the tenant and the borrower, has been
returned to the master servicer without modification.  The workout
did not have any adverse impact on the trust.

The loan remains current on its interest and principal payments
required under the loan.  As part of its analysis, Fitch took the
current in place rents and applied market vacancies, management
fees and capital expenditure assumptions in order to derive a
normalized operating cash flow for the properties.  The resulting
stressed debt service coverage ratio, based upon Fitch's stressed
cash flow and a debt constant of 9.66% is 1.32 times.


BRAVO MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches
from one RMBS transaction issued by Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust.
The collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CARMAX BUSINESS: Moody's Raises Ratings on 12 Subordinate Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded twelve subordinate tranches from seven auto
loan transactions issued between 2006 and 2008 by CarMax Business
Services LLC.  These rating actions were prompted by Moody's
updated, lower loss expectations relative to the current levels of
credit enhancement.  Credit enhancement supporting each of the
securities subject to this action has increased under the
sequential-pay structures.  The rating actions conclude the review
of the securities that were previously placed on review for
possible upgrade on May 13, 2010.

Moody's expects CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2006-2 to incur lifetime
cumulative net losses of 3.30% which is at the lower end of the
previous range of 3.30% to 3.50% when the securities were placed
on review in May.  The initial expectation for this transaction at
closing was 1.60%.  Total hard credit enhancement (that excludes
available excess spread) for Cl. B and Cl. C upgraded tranches are
approximately 25% and 8%, respectively, of the outstanding
collateral balance.  Excess spread for the transaction is
approximately 4% per annum.  Moody's volatility proxy Aaa level
for the transactions is approximately 10% of the remaining
collateral balance.

Moody's expects 2007-1, 2007-2, 2007-3 and 2008-A transactions to
incur lifetime CNL of 4.25% which is at the middle of the previous
range of 4.00% to 4.50% when the securities were placed on review
in May.  The initial expectations for these transactions at
closing were between 2.00% and 3.00%.  Total hard credit
enhancement (that excludes available excess spread) for Class B
upgraded tranches ranges from approximately 11% to 17% of the
outstanding collateral balances.  Total hard credit enhancement
(that excludes available excess spread) for Class C upgraded
tranches ranges from approximately 3% to 5% of the outstanding
collateral balance.  Excess spread for the transactions ranges
approximately between 3% and 5% per annum.  Moody's volatility
proxy Aaa level for these transactions ranges between
approximately 13% and 15% of the remaining collateral balance.

Moody's expects CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2008-1 to incur lifetime
CNL of 4.50% which is at the lower end of the previous range of
4.50% to 5.00% when the securities were placed on review in May.
The initial expectation for this transaction at closing was 2.25%.
Total hard credit enhancement (that excludes available excess
spread) for Cl. B upgraded tranche is approximately 9% of the
outstanding collateral balance.  Excess spread for the transaction
is approximately 4% per annum.  Moody's volatility proxy Aaa level
for the transaction is approximately 14% of the remaining
collateral balance.

Moody's expects CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2008-2 to incur lifetime
CNL of 4.00%.  The initial expectation for this transaction at
closing was 2.75%.  Total hard credit enhancement (that excludes
available excess spread) for Cl. B and Cl. C upgraded tranches is
approximately 16% and 10%, respectively, of the outstanding
collateral balance.  Excess spread is approximately 3% per annum.
Moody's volatility proxy Aaa level for the transaction is
approximately 14% of the remaining collateral balance.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2006-2

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 3.30% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on May 13, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on May 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Issuer: CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2007-1

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.25% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on May 13, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A2; previously on May 13, 2010 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carmax Auto Owner Trust 2007-2

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.25% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on May 13, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on May 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Carmax Auto Owner Trust 2007-3

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.25% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on May 13, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on Jun 1, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1

Issuer: CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2008-1

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.50% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on May 13, 2010 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: CarMax Auto Owner Trust 2008-2

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.00% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jun 1, 2009 Confirmed
     at Aa2

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jun 1, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3

Issuer: Carmax Auto Owner Trust 2008-A

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.25% (as a
    percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on May 13, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade


CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 2007-52 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the notes issued by Cloverie Plc Series
2007-52 following the upgrade of the reference entity.

The action follows Fitch's recent upgrade of the reference entity,
Vale S.A.  (Vale), to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'.  The Rating Outlook
remains Stable.

Cloverie 2007-52 is designed to provide credit protection on the
reference entity, Vale, with a reference amount of US$10 million.
The credit protection is arranged through a credit default swap
between the issuer and the swap counterparty, Citigroup Global
Markets Limited.  The CDS is collateralized by the Citigroup
Funding Inc. senior unsecured notes as the eligible investments
issued by Citigroup Inc.

The rating addresses the likelihood that investors will receive
full and timely payments of interest, as per the transaction's
governing documents, as well as the stated balance of principal by
the legal final maturity date.  Payments of interest and principal
will be made in U.S. dollars adjusted according to the prevailing
value of the Unidad de Fomento and the Chilean Peso (CLP)/US$
exchange rate.

Fitch has upgraded this rating:

  -- US$10,000,000 notes to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.


CNL FUNDING: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on the CNL Funding
Franchise Loan Transactions:

CNL Funding 1998-1, LP

  -- Classes B-1 and B-2 affirmed at 'AA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Classes C-1 and C-2 affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable;
  -- Classes D-1 and D-2 affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Negative;
  -- Class E-1 downgraded to 'CC/RR4' from 'CCC/RR5';
  -- Class E-2 downgraded to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B';
  -- Classes F-1 and F-2 downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';
  -- Classes G-1 and G-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

CNL Funding 1999-1, LP

  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B affirmed at 'AA', Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C affirmed at 'A', Outlook Negative;
  -- Class D affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Negative.

Credit support was found to be consistent with the current ratings
for the class B, C, and D notes in CNL 1998-1.  While credit
enhancement is growing for these classes, the Negative Outlook on
the class D notes is reflective of current interest shortfalls
which may worsen if additional obligors were to default.  The
downgrade to the class E notes reflects their susceptibility to
writedowns upon the occurrence of future realized losses.  The 'D'
rating for the class F and G notes reflects the writedowns
incurred to date.

In CNL 1999-1, credit support was found to be consistent with the
current ratings on all classes of notes.  The Negative Outlook for
the subordinate notes reflects Fitch's concern regarding low
coverage ratios for certain large obligors in the pool.  The
potential default of these borrowers may expose the subordinate
notes to future payment disruptions.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria,' dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral, if any, given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans, if any.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations,' dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions and may
take additional rating actions in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-FL12 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes from the pooled portion
of COMM Mortgage Trust 2006-FL12, reflecting Fitch's base case
loss expectation of 1.1%.  Fitch also has downgraded 29 non-pooled
junior participation certificates to reflect Fitch's updated
analysis on the loan.  Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
values and cash flow declines.  The Negative Rating Outlook
reflects additional sensitivity analysis related to further
negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 44.8% of the pool is
expected to, or has already defaulted in the base case stress
scenario, defined as the 'B' stress.  In its review, Fitch
analyzed servicer reported operating statements and rent rolls,
updated property valuations, and recent lease and sales
comparisons.  Given that the remaining loan positions within the
pooled portion of the CMBS are the lower leveraged A-notes
(average base case LTV of 71.9%), combined with increased
subordination since issuance due to loan payoffs and paydown, the
average recoveries of 97.6% on the pooled loans resulted in
affirmations to classes A-2 through E (class A-1 has paid in
full).  The defaults are determined considering the total leverage
of each asset, including additional B-notes and mezzanine debt;
however, a default may not result in a loss to the pooled portion
given its lower leverage position.

The transaction is collateralized by 16 loans, eight of which are
secured by hotel properties (59.6%), four of which are secured by
office properties (16.7%), three of which are secured by retail
properties (10.4%), and one of which is secured by a multifamily
property (13.2%).  The final extension options for 91.5% of the
loans occur in 2011 and 8.5% occur in 2012.

Fitch identified five Loans of Concern within the pool (16%), one
of which is currently in special servicing.  Fitch's analysis
resulted in loss expectations for three of the pooled senior
participations in the 'B' stress scenario.  The three pooled
contributors to losses (by unpaid principal balance) in the 'B'
stress scenario are: Four Seasons Hualalai (8.5%), the Avenue at
Tower City (2.1%), and Legacy Bayside (1.2%).

The Four Seasons Hualalai interest only loan is collateralized by
a 243-key luxury resort hotel located on the Kona-Kohala Coast in
Hawaii.  The property was constructed in 1996 and underwent a
$41.5 million renovation in 2008-2009 ($170,782 per key).
Amenities at the hotel include eight food and beverage outlets,
62,588 sf of meeting space, a full-service business center, two
outdoor swimming pools, beach access, a shopping concourse, spa
and fitness center, and three outdoor lighted tennis courts.
Additional collateral includes several residential lots within the
Hualalai residential community and The Hualalai Golf Club.  Since
issuance, the loan has experienced several minor paydowns due to
releases of portions of the residential land component.  At
issuance, it was contemplated that the property would be expanded
by up to 115 additional rooms on an adjacent land parcel.  This
project was abandoned as the borrower redirected funds and efforts
to convert certain rooms to suites and expand the Bridge Suites,
as well as doing a general property renovation.  As of January
2010, the TTM occupancy and RevPAR were 51.6% and $418.34,
respectively, compared to 85.8% and $528.38 at issuance.  Per the
Smith Travel Research report, the TTM occupancy, ADR and RevPAR
for luxury hotels (as of January 2010) was 51.7%, $365.43, and
$188.97, respectively, a decline of 16.5%, 7.4% and 22.7% from a
year earlier.  The property has significantly outperformed its
competitive set.  As of January 2010, the property's occupancy,
ADR and RevPAR penetration were 106.3%, 211.6% and 224.9%,
respectively.  The loan had an initial maturity date of June 9,
2008, and has four one-year extension options.  The sponsors are
MSD Capital, L.P., and Rockpoint Group LLC.

The Avenue at Tower City interest only loan is collateralized by
approximately 364,838 sf of an enclosed mall and parking facility
located in downtown Cleveland, OH.  The subject is part of the
greater Tower City Center.  Tower City Center contains
approximately 1.5 million sf of office space, two hotels, and the
Federal Courthouse.  Occupancy rates at the subject are lower than
issuance.  As of November 2009, mall occupancy was 85.1%, compared
to 91.9% at issuance.  Major tenants at the property consist of
Tower City Cinema (11 screens/53,190 sf, lease expiration 2011),
Brooks Brothers (4.7%, lease expiration 2011), and Hard Rock Cafe
(3.0%, lease expiration 2013).  The loan had an initial maturity
date of September 9, 2008 and has three, one-year extension
options.  The sponsor is the Forest City Enterprises.

Legacy Bayside, interest-only loan is secured by three suburban
office properties with a total of 233,740 sf located in Fremont,
CA.  The office complexes are approximately 10 miles north of San
Jose, CA.  The original portfolio consisted of 313,490 sf,
however, one of the properties (46800 Bayside Parkway) was
released from the collateral in December 2008.  Occupancy rates
and performance at the subject are lower than issuance.  Total
average occupancy at the properties was 79.8% (as of Feb. 28,
2010), which compares to 100% at issuance.  The major tenants at
the property consisted of the VA Software Corporation (59.6%,
lease expiration May 2010) and Crossing Automation (20.2%, lease
expiration October 2010).  VA Software Corporation's lease has
expired and it has not renewed its space.  The loan had an initial
maturity date of March 9, 2008, and has three one-year extension
options.  The loan transferred to the special servicer as of June
2010.  The sponsor is Legacy Partners I Fremont, LLC.

Fitch has removed these classes from Rating Watch Negative and
downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $54 million class F to 'A/LS3' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $51.5 million class G to 'BBB/LS3' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $32.1 million class H to 'BB/LS3' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $36.6 million class J to 'CC/RR4' from 'BBB'.

In addition, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
affirmed these pooled classes and revised Rating Outlooks:

  -- $818.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $507 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $93.7 million class B at 'AA+/LS2'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $65.8 million class C at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $72.6 million class D at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $54 million class E at 'AA-/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
downgraded these non-pooled classes:

  -- $70.4 million class KR-1 to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21.9 million class KR-2 to 'B' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $62 million class KR-3 to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB-';

  -- $11 million class IP-3 to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.5 million class FSH-1 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB+';

  -- $8.7 million class FSH-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $9.1 million class FSH-3 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $5.3 million class AN-3 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB-';

  -- $4.2 million class AN-4 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $3.3 million class MSH-1 to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.9 million class FG-1 to 'CCC/RR3' from 'AA';

  -- $6.1 million class FG-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'A+';

  -- $4.3 million class FG-3 to 'CC/RR6' from 'A-';

  -- $5.5 million class FG-4 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $7.2 million class FG-5 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $2.5 million class LS-1 to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2.7 million class LS-2 to 'B' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class LS-3 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB-';

  -- $2.9 million class TC-1 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $2.4 million class TC-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $1.7 million class LB-1 to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB+';

  -- $1.2 million class LB-2 to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $1.2 million class LB-3 to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $1.8 million class ES-1 to 'B' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $1.7 million class ES-2 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $1.5 million class ES-3 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $1.9 million class AH-4 to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $1.3 million class CM-1 to 'BB' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.5 million class CM-2 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB-'.

In addition, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
affirmed this non-pooled class:

  -- $11.4 million class CN-1 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.8 million class CN-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.7 million class CN-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.8 million class IP-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $11.2 million class IP-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5 million class HDC-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.1 million class CA-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class CA-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.4 million class CA-4 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.9 million class MSH-2 at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.8 million class MSH-3 at 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4 million class MSH-4 at 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class AH-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class AH-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.5 million class AH-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
withdrawn the ratings on these classes:

  -- Interest-only class X-1 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-3-BC 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-3-DB 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-3-SG 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-4 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-5-BC 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-5-DB 'AAA' withdrawn;
  -- Interest-only class X-5-SG 'AAA' withdrawn.

Classes A-1 and SR-1 have paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class J reflects modeled recoveries of
43.3% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($15.7
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest recoveries ($110,492);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($15.8 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($17.4 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Commercial
Mortgage Asset Trust's series 1999-C1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on eight other classes from the same transaction and
removed one of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
mezzanine and subordinate classes reflect credit support erosion
that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of
seven specially serviced assets, as well as one loan that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.50x and a loan-to-value ratio of 72.5%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.24x and an LTV ratio of 93.7%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
35.1% and 43.6%, respectively.  All of the adjusted DSC and LTV
calculations excluded seven ($101.7 million, 8.5%) specially
serviced assets, one ($42.6 million, 3.5%) loan that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired, and 39 ($302.9 million, 25.2%)
defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the eight
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets, which S&P included
in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, eight assets
($225.7 million, 18.8%), including the largest and second-largest
exposures in the pool, were with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc.  The payment status of the specially serviced assets
is: one ($124.0 million, 10.3%) is a matured balloon, three
($10.7 million, 0.9%) are real estate owned, one ($4.8 million,
0.4%) is in foreclosure, one ($4.5 million, 0.4%) is more than 90
days delinquent, one ($79.2 million, 6.6%) is 30 days delinquent,
and one ($2.5 million, 0.2%) is less than 30 days delinquent.
Appraisal reduction amounts totaling $12.9 million are in effect
for six of these assets.

The Source loan, the largest loan with the special servicer and
the largest loan in the pool, has a trust balance of
$124.0 million.  The exposure in the trust totals $129.6 million
(10.8%), which includes $5.6 million of advancing and interest
thereon.  The loan is secured by a 521,486-sq.-ft. mall in
Westbury, N.Y.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on Jan. 29, 2009, due to imminent maturity default.  The loan had
a scheduled maturity of March 11, 2009, and is currently a matured
balloon.  A forbearance agreement is in effect until Sept. 30,
2010, with three-month extensions available if certain performance
thresholds are met.  As of the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009,
the property had a DSC of 1.19x.  As of May 31, 2010, the property
was 85.2% occupied.

The Springfield Mall loan, the second-largest loan in the pool and
also the second-largest loan with the special servicer, has a
trust balance of $79.2 million and a whole-loan balance of
$158.5 million.  The exposure in the trust totals $80.6 million
(6.7%) and includes $1.4 million of advancing and interest
thereon.  A $79.2 million pari passu portion is included in the
Nomura Asset Securities Corp. 1998-D6 transaction.  The loan is
secured by a 1.4 million-sq.-ft. mall in Springfield, Va.  This
15-year loan bears interest at a fixed rate of 8.5%.  It amortizes
on a 30-year schedule and has an anticipated repayment date of
April 11, 2013.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on Dec. 3, 2009, due to imminent default.  The collateral property
is affected by low occupancy, which as of Nov. 2, 2009, was 66.9%
for the entire property and 50.2% for the in-line space.  As of
Dec. 31, 2009, DSC was 0.23x.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The six remaining specially serviced loans ($22.4 million, 1.9%)
have balances that individually represent less than $4.8 million,
or 0.4% of the total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses ranging
from 29.1% to 96.3% for five of these six assets.  S&P anticipate
that the remaining asset will be prepaid and do not anticipate a
loss in connection with the resolution of this asset.  The special
servicer will, however, be entitled to a workout fee in connection
with this loan upon prepayment.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined one
loan ($42.6 million, 3.5%) to be credit-impaired.  The Baldwin
Complex loan, the fourth-largest loan in the pool, is secured by a
455,214-sq.-ft. office complex in Cincinnati, Ohio.  As of
Dec. 31, 2009, the property had a DSC of 0.22x.  Occupancy was
61.6% as of March, 22, 2010.  Occupancy has declined significantly
over the past year and leasing efforts have met with limited
success.  Consequently, S&P has deemed this loan at an increased
risk of default and loss.

Six loans ($6.3 million, 0.3%) that were previously with the
special servicer have been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided the loans
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust balance
was $1.20 billion, which represents 50.6% of the aggregate pooled
trust balance at issuance.  There are 141 assets in the pool, down
from 230 at issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing.  The master servicer
provided financial information for 99.4% of the loans in the pool,
and 100.0% of the servicer-provided information was full-year
2008, interim 2009, or full-year 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.46x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.50x
and 72.5%, respectively, which exclude seven ($101.7 million,
8.5%) specially serviced assets, one ($42.6 million, 3.5%) loan
that S&P determined to be credit-impaired, and 39 ($302.9 million,
25.2%) defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the
eight specially serviced and credit-impaired assets, five of which
had reported financial data.  If S&P were to have included these
loans in S&P's calculation, its adjusted DSC would have been
1.37x.  To date, the trust has experienced principal losses
totaling $39.3 million relating to 19 assets.  Thirty-two loans
($238.3 million, 19.8%), including the fourth-, fifth- and 10th-
largest real estate exposures in the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Twenty-three loans ($258.8 million, 21.5%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 18 of these loans
($244.5 million, 20.3%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $490.6 million (40.8%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.23x for the
top 10 exposures.  S&P excluded the second- and fourth-largest
exposures in the pool from its adjusted DSC and LTV calculations
for these loans, which were 1.35x and 82.2%, respectively.  The
second-largest exposure is with the special servicer, and S&P
determined the fourth-largest exposure to be credit-impaired.  The
fourth-, fifth-, and 10th-largest real estate exposures appear on
the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P considers the Baldwin
Complex loan to be credit-impaired, which S&P discuss in greater
detail in "Credit Considerations" above.  S&P discuss the
remaining two top 10 exposures on the watchlist below.

The Accor-M-Six Penvest I loan ($36.6 million, 3.1%), the fifth-
largest exposure in the pool, is secured by a 15-property, 1,625-
room limited-service hotel portfolio in eight states.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of
Dec. 31, 2009, reported DSC for the portfolio was 0.42x with 57.8%
occupancy.  The entire portfolio is master leased to Accor S.A.
('BBB-').  The master lease payments are sufficient to cover all
debt service payable in connection with the loan.  The master
lease term runs through the loan's maturity.

The Stephanie Street loan ($28.0 million, 2.3%), the 10th-largest
exposure in the pool, is secured by a 381,998-sq.-ft. anchored
retail center in Henderson, Nev.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Dec. 31, 2009,
reported DSC for the property was 0.83x.  As of June 7, 2010, the
property was 51.3% occupied.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    G      BB-            BBB/Watch Neg                    9.45
    H      CCC-           BB+/Watch Neg                    7.47

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    F      A-             A-/Watch Neg                    14.39

                         Ratings Affirmed

                 Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

            Class  Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
            -----  ------        ----------------------
            A-3    AAA                            52.92
            A-4    AAA                            52.92
            B      AAA                            44.03
            C      AAA                            33.16
            D      AAA                            21.80
            E      AA                             18.83
            X      AAA                              N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2003-C5 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns or revises Rating Outlooks,
Recovery Ratings, and Loss Severity ratings to Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2003-C5, as indicated:

  -- $31.5 million class D to 'AA/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $17.3 million class E to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $17.3 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.2 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.2 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $9.5 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $6.3 million class L to 'CC/RR1' from 'BB';

  -- $7.9 million class M to 'C/RR5' from 'B+';

  -- $1.6 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $4.7 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

Classes L through O are removed from Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch downgrades, assigns a LS rating, and maintains the Outlook
on this class:

  -- $6.3 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes, maintains Outlooks, and
assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $40.9 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $370.3 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $243.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.8 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook to Stable.

Fitch withdraws these ratings (For additional information, 'Fitch
Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-Payment Related Structured
Finance Securities' dated June 23, 2010.):

  -- Interest-only class A-X;
  -- Interest-only class A-SP.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the
$11.8 million class P.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 4.5% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $38.4 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 32.4% to $852.4 million from $1.3 billion at
issuance.  Nineteen of the remaining loans have defeased (20.5%),
including four of the top 10 loans.

As of June 2010, there are 10 specially serviced loans (8%).  The
largest specially serviced loan (1.7%) is secured by a 300-unit
multifamily property located in San Antonio, TX.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to imminent
default and a request for debt service relief.  The servicer-
reported net operating income debt service coverage ratio was 0.95
times for the year ended 2009.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.7%) is secured by a
170,418 square foot office located in Orlando, FL.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2010 due to imminent
default.  The property was 42% occupied as of March 2010, and the
loan had a servicer-reported NOI DSCR of 0.52x for the trailing 11
months ended March 2010.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
is the Serrano Apartments (2.9%), a multifamily property located
in Houston, TX.  The loan was formerly sponsored by MBS Cos.,
which filed for bankruptcy in November 2007, and the loan
transferred to the special servicer.  The loan was subsequently
assumed by a new sponsor, modified, and remains current.  However,
the loan remains a Fitch Loan of Concern as the occupancy per the
May 2010 rent roll was approximately 57%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the performing loans by applying a
10% reduction to year-end 2009 NOI, 10% reduction to year-end 2008
NOI when 2009 was not available, or alternative valuation when an
appropriate cash flow was not available, and applying an adjusted
market cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to payoff at maturity.  Under this
scenario, 46 loans are not expected to payoff at maturity with 11
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series CSMS 2006-HC1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of fourteen classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series CSMS 2006-
HC1.  The affirmations reflect the positive impact of lower
leverage due to amortization based on a 25-year schedule, strong
sponsor, and the offsetting negative impact of the performance of
the underlying collateral.  The rating action is a result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 6% or
$77 million to $1.1 billion from $1.2 billion at last review.  The
loan was interest only for the initial two-year loan term and the
first extension period.  The loan has scheduled amortization based
on a 25 year schedule during the second and third extension
period.  There are no more extension options available, and the
final maturity date is May 9, 2011.  The loan has additional debt
in the form of a B note outside of the trust of $60 million and
mezzanine loan in the amount of $200 million.

The Beverly Portfolio Loan ($1.1 billion -- 100% of trust balance)
is secured by cross collateralized and cross defaulted 240 nursing
facilities totaling 24,185 licensed beds as of 1Q 2010.  They are
located across 60 MSAs in 22 states.  The sponsor of the loan is
Fillmore Capital Partners who purchased this portfolio from
Beverly Enterprises.

The portfolio's performance has been stable since securitization,
and exceeded Moody's sustainable net cash flow assumptions made at
securitization ($208 million).  In 2008 and 2009, NCF for the
portfolio were $232 million and $224 million, respectively.
During Moody's last review in March 2009, which was part of
Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of large loan and single
borrower transactions, Moody's assumed significant declines in
property cash flow due to macroeconomic stress.  Moody's 2009
sweep NCF assumption was $165 million.

The full year 2009 NCF showed only a slight decline from 2008
level (approximately -4%).  However, as full year results can
harbor earlier strong performance averaged with deteriorating
recent trend, Moody's compared 1Q results for 2010 against the
same period in previous years.  The portfolio's NCF for 1Q 2010
($54 million) was 11% lower than that of 1Q 2009 ($61 million)
and was halfway between 1Q 2007 ($57 million) and 1Q 2008
($51 million) levels.  Furthermore, due to high operating
leverage, nursing facilities and other operation-intensive
property types are considered more risky.  The cash flow of these
properties tend to fluctuate to a greater degree than those with
lower operating leverage, assuming a similar level of revenue
decline.

However, Moody's assumptions made at the 2009 sweep accounted for
such factors, and as such, Moody's sustainable NCF remains
unchanged at $165 million.  Moody's loan to value ratio for the
pooled balance has declined to 96% from last review of 103%.
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the trust is at
1.60X compared to 1.50X at last review.  However, due to low
interest rate environment the actual DSCR is in excess of 3.80X.
The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $359,030,026, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     May 4, 2006 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, $147,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     May 4, 2006 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on May 4,
     2006 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on May 4,
     2006 assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, $75,000,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1

  -- Class C, $58,000,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2

  -- Class D, $65,000,000, affirmed at A1; previously on March 19,
     2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa3

  -- Class E, $50,000,000, affirmed at A2; previously on March 19,
     2009 downgraded to A2 from A1

  -- Class F, $53,000,000, affirmed at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 downgraded to A3 from A2

  -- Class G, $50,000,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Baa1 from A3

  -- Class H, $54,000,000, affirmed at Baa3, previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1

  -- Class J, $53,000,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2

  -- Class K, $92,000,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3

  -- Class L, $59,665,989, affirmed at B1; previously on March 19,
     2009 downgraded to B1 from Ba1


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-CF2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2001-CF2
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the
same transaction.

The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipate
will occur upon the eventual resolution of seven specially
serviced assets, as well as its analysis of five loans that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired.

In addition, S&P also considered the current and potential
interest shortfalls, primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and special servicing fees, in arriving at
S&P's current ratings.  S&P previously downgraded class L to 'D'
due to interest shortfalls.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.41x and a loan-to-value ratio of 71.6%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.18x and an LTV ratio of 97.9%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 32.9% and
25.0%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 14 defeased loans ($159.7 million, 32.3%), seven
($26.3 million, 5.3%) of the 12 specially serviced assets, and
five loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($13.6 million, 2.7%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
12 specially serviced and credit-impaired assets and included them
in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-X
interest-only certificate based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, 12 assets ($43.5 million,
8.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: one is bankrupt ($2.0 million, 0.4%), two are
real estate owned ($5.9 million, 1.2%), one is in foreclosure
($930,469, 0.2%), four are 90-plus-days delinquent ($17.3 million,
3.5%), two are 60-days delinquent ($6.6 million, 1.3%), and two
are in their grace periods ($10.6 million, 2.1%).  Three of the
specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $4.3 million.  ARAs totaling $2.6 million were put
into effect on two additional assets subsequent to the June 2010
remittance report.

The Groton Inn & Suites loan, which has a total exposure of
$6.4 million (1.3%), is the largest loan currently with the
special servicer.  The loan is 90-plus-days delinquent and
consists of a 115-room, two-story full service nonflagged hotel
located in Groton, Conn., built between 1957 and 1990.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 6, 2009, due to
imminent payment default.  According to Berkadia, receivership was
recommended and approved.  As of year-end 2008, the reported DSC
was 0.89x compared with 1.50x at issuance.  An ARA of $2.6 million
is in effect on this loan (post June 2010 remittance report) based
on an appraisal dated Nov. 1, 2009.  Standard & Poor's anticipates
a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Hillside Plaza Wal-Mart Shops loan, which has a total exposure
of $6.0 million (1.2%), is the second-largest loan with the
special servicer.  The loan is in its grace period and consists of
a 86,072-sq.-ft. anchored retail center built in 2000 in Forest
City, N.C.  The anchor tenant, Goody's, filed chapter 11 and
vacated in February 2009.  The borrower subsequently sent a
hardship letter to the master servicer, and the loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 31, 2009.  According
to Berkadia, the borrower has a prospective tenant for a
substantial portion of the vacant space.  As of year-end 2009, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.04x and 68%, respectively,
compared with 1.24x and 100% at issuance

The 10 remaining specially serviced assets listed in the June 2010
remittance report ($31.3 million, 6.3%) have balances that
individually represent less than 1.2% of the total pool balance.
S&P estimated losses for six of these assets, resulting in a
weighted average loss severity of 29.8%.  Two of these assets are
REO, one is bankrupt, one is in foreclosure, and two were
transferred to the special servicer due to imminent payment
default.  Three of the remaining four assets were recently
transferred to special servicing, and one is in its grace period.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined five
loans ($13.6 million, 2.7%) to be credit-impaired.  The Radisson
Inn-North loan ($5.1 million, 1.0%) is secured by a 200-room hotel
built in 1972 and renovated in 1985 in Colorado Springs, Co. As of
year-end 2009, the DSC was negative, and occupancy was reported at
46%, down from 1.58x and 76%, respectively, at issuance.  As a
result, S&P view this loan to be at an increased risk of default
and loss.  The remaining four credit-impaired loans are secured by
properties that have reported DSC of below 0.32x.  S&P view all of
the credit-impaired loans to be at an increased risk of default
and loss.

One loan totaling $5.1 million (0.5%) that was previously with the
special servicer has been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loan, provided that they
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.

S&P's analysis also considered the transaction's significant near-
term loan maturities.  Excluding the 14 defeased loans and 12
specially serviced assets, approximately 56.1% of the loans, by
balance, mature by March 2011.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool balance
was $494.8 million, which is 45.2% of the balance at issuance.
The pool includes 84 loans, down from 182 loans at issuance.  As
of the June 2010 remittance report, the master servicer, also
Berkadia, had provided financial information for 96.6% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, all of which was full-year 2008,
interim-2009, or full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.38x for the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.41x and 71.6%, respectively,
which exclude 14 defeased loans ($159.7 million, 32.3%), seven
($26.3 million, 5.3%) of the 12 specially serviced assets, and
five loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($13.6 million, 2.7%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
12 specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  If S&P included
the specially serviced and credit-impaired assets in its
calculation, its adjusted DSC would be 1.35x.

The transaction has experienced 16 principal losses for a total of
$30.1 million to date.  Twenty-four loans ($64.1 million, 13.0%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist, including one of the top
10 loans.  Twenty-six loans ($91.5 million, 18.5%) have a reported
DSC below 1.10x, and 19 of these loans ($75.0 million, 15.2%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                      Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$175.4 million (35.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.60x for the top 10 loans.
None of top 10 loans were with the special servicer as of the June
2010 remittance report.  One of the top 10 loans ($14.0 million,
2.8%) appears on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.50x and 69.0%,
respectively.

The Jenkins Court loan is the sixth-largest loan in the pool and
the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has
a trust balance of $14.0 million (2.8%) and is secured by a
172,240-sq.-ft. office building constructed in 1930 and renovated
in 1991 in Jenkintown, Pa.  The loan appears on the watchlist due
to decreasing DSC.  Reported DSC as of Dec. 31, 2009, was 0.94x,
down from 1.29x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CF2

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To       From          Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --       ----          ----------------------
     G         BBB      A-/Watch Neg               11.65
     H         BB       BBB/Watch Neg               8.32
     J         CCC+     BB/Watch Neg                3.89
     K         CCC-     CCC+/Watch Neg              2.23

                         Ratings Affirmed

        Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CF2

           Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----     ------      ----------------------
           A-4       AAA                          42.69
           B         AAA                          33.82
           C         AAA                          23.84
           D         AA+                          21.63
           E         AA                           18.30
           F         A                            14.48
           A-X       AAA                            N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002-CKN2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CKN2
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the
same transaction and removed four of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipates
will occur upon the eventual resolution of 10 specially serviced
assets, as well as potential losses associated with four loans
that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.

S&P also considered the current and potential interest shortfalls,
primarily due to appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and
special servicing fees, in arriving at S&P's current ratings.
Classes L and M have accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$52,573, and S&P lowered its ratings on them to 'CCC-'.  Should
the interest shortfalls not be recovered, S&P will lower the
ratings to 'D'.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.33x and a loan-to-value ratio of 78.1%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 1.12x and an LTV ratio of 100.0%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
24.1% and 28.1%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude 10 ($32.1 million; 4.3 %) of the 11 specially
serviced assets, four loans ($18.9 million; 2.5%) that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired, 89 ($149.6 million; 19.8%)
cooperative apartment loans, and 30 ($192.1 million; 25.5%)
defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the 14
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets, which S&P included
in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures.
S&P excluded the cooperative loans because they did not default
under the 'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class AX
and AY interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 17, 2010, remittance report, 11 assets
($32.8 million; 4.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
C-III Asset Management LLC.  One of the assets is real estate
owned ($8.4 million; 1.1%), seven are 90-plus-days delinquent
($15.0 million; 2.0%), and three are 60-days delinquent
($9.4 million; 1.3%).   Eight of the specially serviced assets
have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $8.1 million.

The Wood Forest Glen Apartments loan, the largest asset with the
special servicer, has a total exposure of $9.4 million (1.1%).
The exposure consists of $8.4 million of unpaid principal balance
and $1.0 million of advancing and interest thereon.  This exposure
was transferred to special servicing on Aug. 11, 2009, due to a
monetary default, and the property became REO on Feb. 2, 2010.
The 336-unit multifamily property in Houston was built in 1980 and
renovated in 2000.  The special servicer plans to market the
property for sale once the occupancy reaches approximately 80%;
the reported occupancy was 58% as of April 23, 2010.  As of year-
end 2009, the reported DSC was 0.02x.  S&P expects a significant
loss upon the resolution of this loan.

The 10 remaining specially serviced loans ($24.4 million, 3.2%)
have balances that individually represent 0.9% or less of the
total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated losses ranging from
10.0% to 48.6% for nine of these assets ($23.7 million; 3.1%).
The special servicer expects to return the remaining asset
($0.7 million; 0.1%) to its master servicer, KeyCorp Real Estate
Capital Markets Inc. (KeyCorp), once the borrower returns the loan
to performing status within the next few months.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined four
loans ($18.9 million; 2.5%) to be credit-impaired.  The Laurel
Park Office II loan, the 10th-largest asset in the pool secured by
real estate, is secured by a 129,039-sq.-ft. suburban office
building in Livonia, Mich., that was built in 1986.  The master
servicer reports that the building's largest tenant, Quicken Loans
(71,904 sq.  ft.; 56% of the net rentable area) will not renew
their lease expiring on Aug. 31, 2010, and they have already
vacated the space.  This will result in a 6% economic occupancy.
The reported DSC as of year-end 2009 was 0.80x.  S&P views this
loan to be at an increased risk of default and loss.

The three remaining credit-impaired assets ($9.0 million, 1.2%)
have balances that individually represent less than 1.0% of the
total pool balance.  Each has a reported DSC below 0.50x for year-
end 2009.  S&P separately estimated losses ranging from 10.0% to
25.2% for these three assets.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 17, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $753.8 million (184 loans), compared
with $918.1 million (204 loans) at issuance.  The master servicer
for the transaction is KeyCorp, except with respect to the
cooperative apartment loans for which the master servicer is NCB
FSB.  The master servicers provided financial information for
99.0% of the pool balance.  Eighty-five percent of the servicer-
provided financial information was partial-year 2009, full-year
2009, or partial-year 2010 data.

Excluding the cooperative apartment loans, S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.27x for the loans in the pool based on
the reported figures.  Excluding the cooperative apartment loans,
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.33x and 78.1%, respectively.
These calculations also exclude 10 ($32.1 million; 4.3 %)
specially serviced assets, four loans ($18.9 million; 2.5%) that
S&P determined to be credit-impaired, and 30 ($192.1 million;
25.5%) defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the 14
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  The weighted
average DSC based upon reported information for year-end 2009 was
0.55x.  Twenty-one loans ($98.5 million; 13.1%), including the
fifth-, eight-, ninth-, and 10th largest real estate exposures in
the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P determined
the 10th-largest exposure, the Laurel Office Park II loan, to be
credit-impaired and it is discussed above.  Six loans
($70.4 million, 9.3%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x,
and 25 loans ($104.2 million, 13.8%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.  To date, the trust has experienced principal losses of
$16.1 million relating to eight assets.

                       Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 assets secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $254.2 million (33.7%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.35x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 assets
secured by real estate were 1.35x and 75.6%, respectively.  These
figures exclude the 10th-largest asset in the pool, the Laurel
Office Park II loan, which is on the master servicer's watchlist
with a reported DSC of 0.80x as of year-end 2009.  S&P determined
that loan to be credit-impaired, and it is discussed above.  Three
other top 10 assets are on the master servicer's watchlist and S&P
discuss those below.

The WestCoast Grand Hotel at the Park and the WestCoast
Olympia Hotel loan ($17.8 million; 2.4%), the fifth-largest asset
in the pool secured by real estate, consists of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted mortgage loans.  The WestCoast
Grand Hotel at the Park loan ($12.0 million; 1.6%) is secured by a
402-room full-service hotel in Spokane, Wash., that was built in
1983 and renovated in 1993.  The WestCoast Olympia Hotel loan
($5.8 million, 0.8%) is secured by a 190-room full-service hotel
in Olympia, Wash., that was built in 1970 and renovated in 1998.
It appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.
For the trailing-12-month period ended March 31, 2010, the
reported occupancy and DSC for the WestCoast Grand Hotel at the
Park and the WestCoast Olympia Hotel loans were 62.2% and 2.33x,
and 43.2% and 0.86x, respectively.  The blended occupancy and DSC
were 56.1% and 1.85x, respectively.

The Gateway Office Building loan ($15.3 million; 2.0%), the
eighth-largest asset in the pool secured by real estate, is
secured by a 170,998-sq.-ft. suburban office building in
Farmington Hills, Mich., that was built in 1987.  The loan appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For year-end
2009, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.03x and 83%,
respectively.

The Crystal River Mall loan ($14.5 million; 1.9%), the ninth-
largest asset in the pool secured by real estate, is secured by a
429,415-sq.-ft. mall in Chrystal River, Fla., that was built in
1990.    The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due a
low occupancy and a low DSC.  For year-end 2009, the reported
occupancy and DSC were 88.9% and 1.17x, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKN2

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class     To     From          Credit enhancement (%)
       -----     --     ----          ----------------------
       F         BBB    BBB+/Watch Neg            7.30
       G         BB+    BBB/Watch Neg             5.93
       H         B+     BBB-/Watch Neg            4.41
       J         CCC+   BB+/Watch Neg             2.73
       K         CCC    BB-/Watch Neg             2.12
       L         CCC-   B-/Watch Neg              1.51
       M         CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg             0.29

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKN2

                   Rating
                   ------
       Class     To     From          Credit enhancement (%)
       -----     --     ----          ----------------------
       C1        AA+    AA+/Watch Neg             11.87
       C2        AA+    AA+/Watch Neg             11.87
       D         AA-    AA-/Watch Neg             10.65
       E         A      A/Watch Neg                9.13

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKN2

             Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----     ------   ----------------------
             A2        AAA                       20.39
             A3        AAA                       20.39
             B         AAA                       15.82
             AX        AAA                         N/A
             AY        AAA                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CRIIMI MAE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 1998-C1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from Criimi Mae Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 1998-
C1).  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on classes
B and C from the same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction following the downgrade of the class B-4 certificate
from Nomura Asset Securities Corp.'s series 1998-D6, a commercial
mortgage-backed security certificate that collateralizes Criimi
Mae 1998-C1.  Class B-4 totals $65.1 million of the pool balance
(7.5% of the total asset balance).  The rating actions also
reflect downward revisions to S&P's credit estimates on the class
B-3, B-5, and B-6 certificates ($80.3 million, 9.3%) from NASC
1998-D6, which S&P does not rate.

According to the July 2, 2010, trustee report, Criimi 1998-C1 was
collateralized by 42 CMBS classes ($833 million, 96%) from 17
distinct transactions issued from 1995 through 1998 and one class
($35.4 million, 4%) from Criimi Mae Commercial Mortgage Trust's
series 1996-C1, a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit transaction.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Criimi Mae 1998-C1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

               CRIIMI MAE Commercial Mortgage Trust
             Commercial mortgage bonds series 1998-C1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
               Class          To               From
               -----          --               ----
               D1             BBB-             BBB
               D2             BBB-             BBB
               E              BB-              BB+
               F              B-               BB
               G              CCC-             CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

               CRIIMI MAE Commercial Mortgage Trust
             Commercial mortgage bonds series 1998-C1

                      Class          Rating
                      -----          ------
                      B              AAA
                      C              AAA


CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 270 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 270
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from 8 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by CSFB Mortgage-
Backed Pass-Through Securities in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-10

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-5, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. XII-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-11, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-14, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-15, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-16, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-17, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-18, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-19, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-20, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-21, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-22, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-23, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-24, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-25, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-6

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-13, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-14, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-18, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-19, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-20, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-21, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-12, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Securities, Series 2005-
12

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 250 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 250
tranches and confirmed the ratings on 12 tranches from 10 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide under
the CWALT-CB shelf in 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranche A-1 issued by CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-15CB is wrapped by MBIA Insurance
Corporation (rated B3).  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2007-23CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-15CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Current Rating at B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-1, Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     Jan 21, 2010 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-16CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-17CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-18CB

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-21CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-2CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-4CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-29, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-30, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-31, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-32, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-33, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-34, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-35, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-36, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-37, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-38, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-39, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-40, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-41, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-42, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-43, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-44, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
     2007-5CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-29, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-30, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-31, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-32, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-33, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-34, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-35, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-36, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-37, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-8CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 438 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 438
tranches and confirmed the rating on 1 tranche from 25 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide under
the CWALT-CB shelf in 2006.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-11CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-12CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-14CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-15CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-16CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-18CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-21CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-23CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-24CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-25CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-26CB

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-27CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-28CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-A, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-2CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-31CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-32CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-33CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-39CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-41CB

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-43CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-4CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-6CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-7CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-CB19

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-27, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-28, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-29, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-30, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-32, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-33, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DELTA AIR: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and revised the Rating Outlooks for
these classes of Delta Air Lines Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificate transactions:

Delta Air Lines Pass Through Certificates, Series 2000-1

  -- Class A-2 at 'BB'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
  -- Class B at 'B'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Delta Air Lines Pass Through Certificates, Series 2001-1

  -- Class A-1 and A-2 at 'BB'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
  -- Class B at 'B'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Delta Air Lines European Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates,
Series 2001-2

  -- Class B at 'BB-'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Delta Air Lines Pass Through Certificates, Series 2002-1

  -- Class C at 'B+'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Delta Air Lines Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

  -- Class A at 'BBB-'; Outlook to Stable from Negative.

Fitch's review of the Delta EETC transactions listed above was
consistent with Fitch's EETC criteria titled 'Surveillance
Criteria for Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates'.

EETCs are hybrid corporate - structured debt obligations in which
payment on the notes is effectively supported by the underlying
corporate entity, while structured elements of the transaction
provide protection to investors in the event of issuer default.
As such, Fitch's ratings on EETC transactions are strongly tied to
the Issuer Default Rating of the issuing entity and incorporate
credit to the reduced probability of default provided by the
collateral and structural enhancements in place.  The analysis
also incorporates a review of the recovery prospects on the issued
securities in the event that they default, similar to Fitch's
approach for assigning recovery credit to secured corporate debt.

On June 29, 2010, Fitch affirmed Delta's IDR at 'B-' and revised
the Outlook to Stable from Negative.  As the ratings on the EETCs
are tied to the IDR of the issuing entity, all classes have been
affirmed and their Outlooks have also been revised to Stable from
Negative.

Fitch will continue to monitor the transaction and take
appropriate rating actions if necessary.


ELLINGTON LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches from 2 RMBS transactions issued by Ellington Loan
Acquisition Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate subprime
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2a, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2d, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2e, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2f, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1a, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1b, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2a, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2b, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ENCORE CREDIT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 19
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 9 tranches from 4 RMBS
transactions issued by Encore.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


EQUIFIRST LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches
and upgraded the rating of one tranche from one RMBS transaction
issued by EquiFirst Loan Securitization Trust.  The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: EquiFirst Loan Securitization Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FBR SECURITIZATION: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches and confirmed the rating of two tranches from 4 RMBS
transactions issued by ABSC.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. AV1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-3A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-3B1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-3B2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. AV1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

  -- Cl. AV1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. AV1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-3, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV2-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FFCA SECURED: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on these FFCA
Secured Franchise Loan Trusts:

Series 1999-1

  -- Class A1-b affirmed at 'AAA'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'A'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'A'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class C-1 affirmed at 'BBB'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class C-2 affirmed at 'BBB'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class D-1 affirmed at 'BBB-'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class D-2 affirmed at 'BBB-'; assigned Stable Outlook.

Series 1999-2

  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'CC/RR1';
  -- Class B-2 revised to 'D/RR5' from 'D/RR1';
  -- Class C-1 downgraded to 'D/RR4' from 'C/RR2';
  -- Class C-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D-1 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E-1 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

Series 2000-1

  -- Class B affirmed at 'B'; assigned Stable Outlook;
  -- Class C affirmed at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- Class D revised to 'C/RR4' from 'C/RR1';
  -- Class E revised to 'C/RR5' from 'C/RR4'.

The affirmations are the result of the notes' ability to withstand
stress-case scenarios consistent with their respective current
rating levels.  However, recovery prospects for certain distressed
notes have changed, leading to a revision of the Recovery Ratings.
For additional detail, refer to Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Recovery Ratings', dated Aug. 17, 2009.

The assignment of Stable Rating Outlooks to all applicable notes
reflects Fitch's view that ratings are not expected to change
within the next 12 months, based on current performance.

The 'D' assignment to the class C-1 notes in the 1999-2
transaction is a reflection of the principal writedowns incurred
on the notes.

In reviewing the transaction, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating U.S.
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations', dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor this transaction and may
take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


FMAC LOAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on FMAC Loan
Receivables Trusts as listed below:

Series 1996-A

  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class C-1 affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class C-2 affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1996-B

  -- Class A-1 affirmed at 'C/RR3';
  -- Class A-2 revised to 'D/RR4' from 'D/RR3';
  -- Class B affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1997-A

  -- Class C affirmed at 'BB'; assigned Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR2';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1997-B

  -- Class A affirmed at 'B'; assigned Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B revised to 'D/RR5' from 'D/RR2';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D revised to 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E revised to 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F revised to 'D/RR6';

Series 1997-C

  -- Class B revised to 'D/RR3' from 'D/RR2';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1998-A

  -- Class A-2 revised to 'D/RR1' from 'D/RR3';
  -- Class A-3 revised to 'D/RR2' from 'D/RR3';
  -- Class B affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1998-B

  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'D/RR1';
  -- Class B affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6';

Series 1998-C

  -- Class A-2 upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB'; assigned Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'BB'; assigned Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-';

  -- Class C affirmed at 'D/RR3';

  -- Class D affirmed at 'D/RR6';

  -- Class E affirmed at 'D/RR6';

  -- Class F affirmed at 'D/RR6';

The upgrade of the class A-2 note in the 1998-C transaction
reflects the significant credit support available to the note over
the short expected remaining life.  In its analysis, detailed
below, Fitch found the class A-2 notes were able to pass stress
scenarios consistent with the 'BBB' rating category.  The
downgrade of the class B notes within the transaction reflects the
class's inability to receive full principal and interest under
Fitch's 'B' stress scenario.

The affirmations of the remaining notes reflect the notes' ability
to pass stress-case scenarios consistent with the current rating
levels.  Additionally, recovery prospects for certain distressed
notes have changed, leading to a revision of the Recovery Ratings.
For additional detail, please refer to Fitch's 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Recovery Ratings', dated Aug. 17, 2009.

The Stable Rating Outlook designation for all applicable notes
reflects Fitch's view that ratings are not expected to change
within the next 12 months, based on current performance.

In reviewing the transaction, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.
Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating U.S.
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations', dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor this transaction and may
take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


FRANKLIN PIERCE: Moody's Downgrades Long-Term Rating to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term rating for
Franklin Pierce University to B1 from Ba3.  The outlook remains
negative at the lower rating.  The rating action affects the
University's Series 1994, 1998, and 2004 bonds issued through the
New Hampshire Higher Education and Health Facilities Authority.
The Series 1998 and 2004 bonds are insured by ACA Financial
Guaranty Corporation, which Moody's does not rate.  The downgrade
and continued negative outlook reflect the University's highly
challenged student market position, limited financial resource
base, and reliance on an operating line of credit for seasonal
cash flow with thin monthly liquidity leaving little margin for
error.

Legal Security: Payment of the Series 1994 bonds is a general
obligation of the College, further secured by a first security
interest in Gross Receipts, a security interest in all Equipment,
and a mortgage lien on the Facility (land, buildings, and
equipment).  The Series 1994 bonds do not have a debt service
reserve fund.  Payment of the Series 1998 and Series 2004 bonds is
a general obligation of the College, further secured by a first
security interest in Gross Receipts, a security interest in all
Equipment, a mortgage lien on the Facility (land, buildings, and
equipment), as well as debt service reserve funds.

Debt-Related Rate Derivatives: none

                            Challenges

* Very thin levels of liquid financial reserves and heavy
  dependence on $5 million TD Bank line of credit (which expires
  in September 2010) for cyclical cash flow needs.  Monthly
  liquidity remains highly challenged and dependent on the line of
  credit; with 27 days cash on hand at the close of the 2009
  fiscal year end.  The University ended the 2009 fiscal year with
  $4 million of the line drawn and management ended the FY2010
  year with under $3.6 drawn.  Inability to renegotiate or obtain
  a replacement line would place significant pressure on the
  University's credit profile, given heavy reliance on the line
  for seasonal cash flow needs.

* Weak student market demand.  Total enrollment for the fall 2009
  semester fell to 2,101 FTE from 2,119 the prior year.  The
  University accepted over 93% of freshmen applicants in the fall
  of 2009 with a limited 17.5% choosing to enroll.  The University
  experiences significant competition for traditional-age students
  at the main campus located in rural Rindge, NH and has seen
  significant enrollment declines at this campus.  Management
  notes that the University is currently working to improve
  enrollment services to grow matriculation.  Management is
  projecting flat enrollment for the 2010 fall semester.

* High debt levels ($53 million of direct debt outstanding as of
  6/30/09, including capital leases and $4 million drawn on the
  line of credit, with expendable resources providing negative
  coverage (-0.02 times) of outstanding debt and debt service
  representing 7.8% of operating expenses in FY 2009.

* Line of credit agreement grants the bank a security interest in
  accounts receivable and gross receipts of the University.  In
  conjunction with a past extension of the line of credit, the
  College entered into an intercreditor agreement which
  establishes the liens of the bank and bondholders as being on
  parity.  If the bank decides not to renew or extend the line of
  credit, all principal and accrued interest outstanding at that
  point in time will be due and payable by expiration.

* Expectations for declining net tuition revenue for the 2010
  fiscal year; a critical credit factor as the University relies
  on student charges for 95% of revenues.  As a result of
  declining enrollment and limited growth of student charges,
  management projects net tuition revenue of approximately
  $34 million for the current 2010 fiscal year; $1 million below
  the prior year.  With at least stable enrollment expected for
  the fall, management projects growing net tuition for the 2011
  fiscal year and going forward.

* The University continues to breach (for the past three years)an
  unrestricted financial resources to debt financial covenant
  required under the bond insurance documents with ACA(actual
  calculation of 13.4% in FY 2009 by management's calculation,
  compared to 25% required ratio).  The University is in
  discussion with ACA and anticipates a waiver.

                             Strengths

* Diligent management and budgeting resulting in trend of at least
  breakeven operations, by Moody's calculation.  The three year
  average operating margin (FY2007-FY2009, is positive at 0.3%
  providing a healthy cash flow margin at over 12% and debt
  service coverage at 1.8 times.  Management expects to end the
  2010 fiscal year with another modestly positive margin.

* Enrollment growth within graduate programs particularly on-line
  programs and at satellite campuses located in Concord, Lebanon
  and Portsmouth NH, and Goodyear, Arizona.  The University
  enrolls 386 FTE graduate students, almost double the enrollment
  from three years prior.  Recent expansion into Goodyear Arizona
  is still in the start-up phase but expects to reach at least
  break-even operations in the 2011 fiscal year.  While growth in
  these programs has been strong, declines in undergraduate
  enrollment (1,715 FTE in fall 2009) have continued to reduce
  overall enrollment; 17% from three years prior.

* No additional borrowing plans and all of the College's rated
  debt was issued in a fixed rate mode.  Bonds are additionally
  secured by a cash funded debt service reserve fund on the Series
  1998 and 2004 Bonds as well as a mortgage pledge on the campus
  for the Series 1994, 1998 and 2004 Bonds.

                              Outlook

The University's outlook is negative reflecting a highly
challenged market position, very thin levels of financial
resources and liquidity, and continued reliance on an operating
line of credit.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Currently unlikely; longer term the rating could improve if the
University is able generate greater market demand, grow its
unrestricted financial resource base, increase liquidity, and
maintain a positive operating performance

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Deterioration of operating cash flow and debt service coverage;
further declines in liquidity; inability to extend the line of
credit beyond the expiration date or secure alternate bank line of
credit

key indicators (FY 2009 financial data and fall 2009 enrollment
data):

* Total Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment: 2,101 FTE
  enrollment

* Freshmen Selectivity: 93.4%

* Freshmen Matriculation: 17.5%

* Total Financial Resources: $2.2 million

* Direct Debt: $53 million

* Expendable Financial Resources-to-Debt: -0.02 times

* Expendable Financial Resources-to-Operations: -0.02 times

* Three Year Average Operating Margin (average of FY 2007-2009):
  0.3%

* Monthly Days Cash: 27.1 days

* Average Debt Service Coverage: 1.8 times

* Reliance on Student Charges: 95%

Rated Debt:

* Series 1994, 1998, 2004 bonds: B1

The last rating action with respect to Franklin Pierce University
was on February 3, 2009, when the Ba3 was affirmed and the
negative outlook assigned.  The rating was subsequently
recalibrated to Ba3 on May 7, 2010.


FRONTIER NORTH: S&P Corrects Rating on $10 Mil. Bonds From 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services said that it has corrected and
raised its rating on Frontier North Inc.'s $10 million 6.73%
debenture series G due 2028, which is enhanced by support provided
by the National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. to 'A/Developing'
from 'BB'.

Due to an administrative error, the ratings were inadvertently
changed and did not reflect the enhanced support provided by the
bond insurer National Public Finance Guarantee Corp.


G-STAR 2002-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of notes issued by G-
Star 2002-1 Ltd./Corp. as a result of negative credit migration in
the portfolio.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
19.6% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 13.2% is
on Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 43.4% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade compared to
24.8% at last review.  Further, the collateralized debt obligation
has paid down $27.3 million since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for classes A-1MM and A-2 notes are consistent with the 'BBB'
rating category.

The breakeven rates for classes B-FL/FX and C do not pass Fitch's
base cash flow model stress.  Fitch compared the credit
enhancement level with the amount of underlying assets considered
distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower) representing 17.2% of the
portfolio.  These assets have a high probability of default and
low expected recoveries upon default.  The class B-FL/FX notes
have credit enhancement level of 20.5%, providing some cushion to
the distressed assets (17.2%).  Fitch believes that default is a
real possibility at or prior to maturity and therefore the class
has been downgraded to 'CCC'.  The credit enhancement for class C
is 13.9%.  Given the amount of distressed collateral, Fitch views
default as inevitable for these classes and has downgraded them to
'C'.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A-1MM and A-2 notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage
backed security loans will continue to face refinance risk at
maturity.

Fitch also assigned a Loss Severity rating to the notes.  An LS
rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks or Loss Severity Rating to classes
rated 'CCC' or lower.

G-Star 2002-1 is a cash flow CRE CDO which closed on April 16,
2002.  The collateral is composed of 69.9% CMBS, 28.4% real estate
investment trusts, and 1.7% asset backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded, revised Outlooks and assigned LS ratings to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $68,403,092 class A-1MM to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $33,159,704 class A-2 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $15,759,835 class B-FL to 'CCC' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,702,403 class B-FX to 'CCC' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11,277,853 class C to 'C' from 'BB'; Outlook Stable.


GE CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class of GE
Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, 2001-1.  The downgrade is due to an
aggregate $21.5 million loss, which has resulted in a 100%
principal loss for Classes M and N and a 2% principal loss for
Class L.

Moody's placed Classes C through L on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans.  Additionally, there are 76
loans, representing 48% of the pool, that mature within the next
12 months and may have issues refinancing under the current
adverse economic conditions.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to
$920.9 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 136 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 25% of the pool.  Currently, there is one loan,
representing 5% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  Forty-eight loans, representing 40% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty five loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.5 million (42% loss severity on
average).  There are 14 loans, representing 11% of the pool,
currently in special servicing.  The largest loan in special
servicing is Hawthorn Suites Loan ($15.4 million -- 1.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 280-room extended stay hotel in
Atlanta, GA.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
April 2009 due to delinquency and is currently 90+ days
delinquent.  Moreover, the property has substantial deferred
maintenance.  The servicer has recognized an appraisal reduction
of $6.7 million.  The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of multi-family, lodging, retail and office
properties.  The special servicer has recognized a cumulative
$21.8 million appraisal reduction for the specially serviced
loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$991,806, affecting Classes L through N.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and loan modifications.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and watchlisted loans
as well as the impact of interest shortfalls.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class C, $49,390,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aaa from Aa1 on
     9/20/2007

  -- Class D, $15,523,000, currently rated Aa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa1 from Aa2 on
     9/20/2007

  -- Class E, $15,522,000, currently rated Aa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa3 from A1 on
     9/20/2007

  -- Class F, $15,523,000, currently rated A2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded A2 from A3 on
     9/20/2007

  -- Class G, $14,112,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Baa2 from Baa3 on
     10/23/2006

  -- Class H, $25,400,000, currently rated Ba1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2 on
     7/17/2001

  -- Class I, $18,345,000, currently rated Ba2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 on
     7/17/2001

  -- Class J, $9,878,000, currently rated Ba3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Ba3 from B1 on
     7/17/2001

  -- Class K, $9,878,000, currently rated B3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from B1 on 10/23/2006

  -- Class L, $13,823,944, currently rated Caa2; previously
     downgraded to Caa2 from B3 on 10/23/2006

  -- Class M, $0, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously downgraded
     to Caa3 from Caa1 on 10/26/2006


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to
several classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C2.  Fitch has
also assigned Loss Severity ratings and Recovery Ratings to
numerous classes.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch's expected losses
on loans currently in special servicing.  Fitch expects losses
to fully deplete classes K through Q.  As of the June 2010
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced 24.6% to $569.1 million from $754.9 million at issuance,
which consists of 23.3% of paydown and 1.3% of realized losses.
Twenty-eight loans (36.1%) have defeased, including four (15.8%)
of the top 10 original loans.  As of the June 2010 remittance,
interest shortfalls are reaching class K.

Fitch has designated 16 loans (25.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes eight specially serviced loans (18.8%) as of the
June remittance.  One additional loan (2.4%), backed by a limited
service hotel in Milpitas, CA, transferred to special servicing
after the June remittance date.  The largest specially serviced
loan (5.2%), which is also the largest original and remaining
loan, is secured by four office buildings located in Pennsylvania,
totaling approximately 347,000 sf.  The properties are situated in
Allentown, Mechanicsburg and Wyomissing.  The $29.6 million
Lichtenstein Pennsylvania Office Portfolio loan is over 90 days
delinquent as of the June 2010 remittance and in foreclosure.
Overall portfolio occupancy is 69%, and Fitch expects the trust to
experience a loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan (5.1%) is secured by a
283,000 square foot two-building office property located in Earth
City, MO, approximately 19 miles northwest of the St.  Louis CBD.
The $29.1 million Corporate Woods Office Building II & III loan
transferred in April 2010 for imminent default in connection with
a major tenant's lease renewal process.  As of the June
remittance, the loan is classified as current.  The property's
DSCR for 2009 was 1.21 times, and the current occupancy is 97%.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.50% and 10% to
determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, 11 loans (9.7% of the overall pool) were assumed
not to be able to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses for two
loans (3.6%) in instances where Fitch's derived value was less
than the outstanding balance.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and
RRs to these classes as indicated:

  -- $9.4 million class E to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.1 million class F to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $10.4 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $9.4 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AA';

  -- $23.6 million class J to 'CC/RR2' from 'A-';

  -- $5.7 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $5.7 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $11.3 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';

  -- $3.8 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR2'.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- $405.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $3.8 million class O at 'C/RR6';
  -- $3.8 million class P at 'C/RR6'.

The class A-1 and the interest-only class X-2 balances have been
paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only
class X-1.  Fitch does not rate class Q.


GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches
from 1 RMBS transaction, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by
GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HY1

  -- Cl. 1-A1A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2004-FL2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2004-FL2 under review for possible downgrade
due the expectation that the two remaining loans in the trust, the
Southfield Town Center Loan (85% of the pooled balance) and the
Aviation Mall Loan (15%) will have difficulty refinancing their
respective outstanding loan balances at maturity due to weak
collateral performance that is not expected to appreciably improve
over the remaining loan terms.  Both loans matured in 2009 with no
loan extensions remaining and were transferred to special
servicing in May 2009 due to imminent default.  The loans were
returned to the master servicer as corrected loans in August 2009
and the loan terms for both loans were extended to July 2011.  The
Southfield Town Center Loan has an option to extend for an
additional 12-months to July 2012.

This rating action included six pooled classes and one non-pooled,
or rake, class (Class N-SO) associated with the Southfield Town
Center loan.  This rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class F, $22,804,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 7, 2007 upgraded to Aaa from
     A1

  -- Class G, $19,519,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 1, 2007 upgraded to Aa2 from
     A3

  -- Class H, $14,506,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 1, 2007 upgraded to A2 from
     Baa1

  -- Class J, $23,090,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba1
     from Baa2

  -- Class K, $10,337,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba3
     from Baa3

  -- Class L, $15,299,631, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to B2 from
     Ba2

  -- Class N-SO, $7,706,398, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to B2 from
     Ba3


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class H Notes to 'D/RR4'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has lowered the Recovery Rating on one class of GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. II's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-C1:

  -- $48.5 million class H to 'D/RR4' from 'D/RR3'.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned a Loss Severity rating to this
class:

  -- $23.3 million class G at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the rating of the interest-only
class X.

Class J remains at 'D/RR6' as it has been reduced to zero due to
realized losses.  Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and E have paid
in full.  The unrated class K has been reduced to zero due to
realized losses.  Fitch does not rate the $76.6 million class F.

The RR reduction is due to a decrease in expected recoveries as a
result of the transfer of three additional loans (4.7%) to special
servicing subsequent to the previous full transaction review and
an increase in expected losses for the four loans (13.2%)
previously in special servicing.  The affirmation is based on
continued sufficient Fitch-projected credit enhancement for the
rating category as well as increased concentrations within the
pool (with only 50 loans remaining) and adverse selection.  The
Rating Outlooks indicate the likely direction of any changes to
the ratings over the next one to two years.

Revised modeled loss estimates for the transaction were determined
based on Fitch's prospective analysis, which is similar to its
recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch expects potential
losses of 10.6% of the remaining pool balance, the majority of
which are from the loans in special servicing, in addition to the
loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.

Fitch has identified 20 Loans of Concern (50.6%), including the
seven loans (17.9%) that are in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan (7.3%) is secured by a 296,735-square foot
retail property located in Queensbury, NY.  The loan initially
transferred to special servicing in May 2008 due to imminent
maturity default, because the borrower was unable to refinance
following the vacancy of a major tenant representing approximately
50% of the net rentable area.  The borrower worked to lease up the
property and obtained a commitment from a national retailer to
build on a pad site.  Following a forbearance and a maturity
extension, the special servicer approved a discounted payoff
(DPO); however, the DPO did not close.  As a result, the special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan (2.4%) is secured by a
53,980-sf retail property located in Winchester, KY.  The 63%-
occupied property is located along a primary retail corridor and
is situated proximate to a Wal-Mart Supercenter.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2008 for maturity
default when the borrower was unable to refinance the loan
following the vacancy of a major tenant that filed for bankruptcy
and rejected its lease.  The special servicer has commenced
foreclosure proceedings.

The third largest specially serviced asset (2.1%) became real
estate owned in January 2010.  The collateral is a 36%-occupied
retail property located in Lincoln, NE.  The property is being
marketed for sale and reportedly several parties have expressed
interest in leasing the vacant space and purchasing the property.

The transaction's two largest loans, which in the aggregate
comprise 22% of the pool, are performing Fitch Loans of Concern.
Both loans are secured by properties located in Puerto Rico that
have experienced occupancy declines.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 92% to $148.3 million, from $1.9
billion at issuance.  Eleven loans (17.6%) have defeased,
including three (11%) of the top 10 loans in the transaction.
With the exception of loans in special servicing, no additional
loan maturities occur until 2013.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or a 5% reduction to the 2009 reported NOI.  An adjusted
market capitalization rate between 7.25% and 10% was then applied
to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test that included
application of an 8% interest rate and a 30-year amortization
schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could
refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher
were considered to be able to pay off at maturity.  Under this
scenario, three loans (4.1%) are not expected to pay off at
maturity, with all three incurring a modeled loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


HOME EQUITY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches
from one RMBS transaction issued by Home Equity.  The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
FRE1

  -- Cl. 1-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2005-AR23 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9 tranches
and upgraded the rating of 1 tranche issued by IndyMac INDX
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR23.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, the ratings on Classes 3-A-1 and 3-A-2 have also been
adjusted to reflect the fact that the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement allocates losses to these two classes on a pro-rata
basis.  Previous rating actions reflected additional credit
enhancement to Class 3-A-1 from Class 3-A-2, based on conflicting
language in the Prospectus Supplement which denotes Class 3-A-2 as
a support class to Class 3-A-1.  The Trustee has confirmed that it
is following the PSA, which allows for only pro-rata allocation
between the classes, and Moody's has adjusted its analysis
accordingly.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR23

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


IXION PLC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class Series 20 D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
D notes issued by Ixion PLC's Matrix 2007-1 series 20, a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation of asset-backed securities
transaction, to 'AAp/Di' from 'AAAp/CCC-i' and then withdrew it.

In February 2008, S&P revised its rating on the class D notes by
assigning separate components to address expected principal and
interest payments.  S&P assigned an 'AAAp' rating to address
expected principal payments and a 'BBBi' rating to address
expected interest payments.  S&P based the rating of the principal
component on the addition of 'AAA' rated collateral, the
EUR13,500,000 zero-coupon bonds due July, 15, 2037, issued by
Depfa ACS bank, which was separate from the reference portfolio
backing the interest payments.

The rating actions follow the downgrade of the principal component
to 'AA/Watch Dev' and a number of credit events within the
underlying portfolio, which caused the notes to miss the timely
payment of interest.  At the same time, S&P withdrew the rating
because the notes are no longer outstanding.

                Rating Lowered And Then Withdrawn

                            Ixion PLC
                     Matrix 2007-1 series 20

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To         Interim        From
        -----        --         -------        ----
        D            NR/NR      AAp/Di         AAAp/CCC-i


JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 14 classes of notes issued by JER CRE
CDO 2006-2 Limited/LLC due to negative credit migration in the
underlying portfolio.

Since the last rating action in February 2009, the credit quality
of the portfolio has declined with approximately 45.4% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 4.9 notches.  The
entire portfolio now has a below investment grade rating, with
85.8% considered in the 'CCC' rating category or below, compared
to 96.9% and 66.8%, respectively, at the last review.  Included in
the 'CCC' or lower percentage are 20 unrated first loss commercial
mortgage-backed securities, comprising 28.5% of the portfolio.

Approximately 69.1% of the portfolio is experiencing partial or
full interest shortfalls, or deferring interest payments, and is
considered distressed.  All of the interest coverage (IC) tests
are failing their respective covenants, with the class B IC ratio
reported as 87.7% in the June 21, 2010 trustee report.  As such,
principal proceeds were needed to pay a portion of the class B-FL
accrued interest amount on the June distribution date before
redeeming class A-FL principal because interest collections were
insufficient.  Fitch expects interest shortfalls in the underlying
securities to continue and potentially increase.  A failure to pay
the class B-FL accrued interest would result in a payment default
unless sufficient principal proceeds are available to compensate
for the shortage in interest collections.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for all classes of notes were below the 'CCC' rating hurdle.
Therefore, Fitch compared each class's respective credit
enhancement levels to the distressed portion of the portfolio to
determine their likelihood of default, and downgraded the classes
as indicated below.

Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or Loss Severity ratings to
classes rated below the 'B' rating category.

JER CRE CDO 2006-2 is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Oct. 17, 2006.  According to the
June 21, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio consists of CMBS
(73.2%), commercial real estate loans (23.7%) and structured
finance CDOs from 1998 through 2007 vintage transactions.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $332,193,905 class A-FL notes to 'CC' from 'B+';
  -- $120,055,000 class B-FL notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $17,000,000 class C-FX notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $43,028,000 class C-FL notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $20,000,000 class D-FX notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $28,022,000 class D-FL notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $10,000,000 class E-FX notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $20,014,000 class E-FL notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $40,818,000 class F-FL notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $36,017,000 class G-FL notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $13,206,000 class H-FL notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $60,027,000 class J-FX notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $78,036,000 class K notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $72,033,000 class L notes to 'C' from 'CC'.


JER CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three and affirmed five classes
issued by JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Limited as a result of increased
interest shortfalls to the underlying collateral.

On the June 21, 2010 payment date, the class B-1 and B-2 notes did
not receive their full interest distributions as a result of
insufficient interest proceeds due to interest shortfalls on the
underlying collateral.  On June 25, 2010, the trustee declared an
event of default due to non-payment of full and timely accrued
interest to the class B-1 and B-2 notes.  Fitch rates the class B
notes to the timely receipt of interest and has therefore
downgraded these classes to 'D'.  Noteholders had not given
direction to accelerate the notes or liquidate the portfolio at
the time of this review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The degree of correlated default
risk of this collateral is high given the CMBS and vintage
concentrations.  Further, in its review, Fitch analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the default of the distressed
collateral ('CCC' category and lower) and assets that are
experiencing interest shortfalls (69.2%).  All the collateral in
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade;
77.3% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and below.

The classes' respective credit enhancement levels were compared to
the percent of underlying collateral experiencing interest
shortfalls.  Classes C through G have been downgraded to 'C'
because Fitch believes that default appears inevitable given that
the total percentage of assets experiencing interest shortfalls
exceeds these classes' credit enhancement levels.

According to the June 21, 2010 trustee report, the class A notes
received their full interest payment.  However, after payment of
the class A interest, only $130,040 in interest proceeds remained.
Fitch anticipates that further interest shortfalls to the
underlying collateral will cause an interest shortfall to the
class A notes, due to the slim margin of interest proceeds
available beyond the interest due on the class A notes.  Further,
the underlying collateral has yet to amortize due to their junior
position within their respective CMBS transactions.  As a result,
the class A notes have been downgraded to 'C', indicating that
default is inevitable.

JER 2005-1 is backed by 76 tranches from 14 obligors, the majority
of which is commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS, 96.6%).
The remainder of the pool consists of three classes of a
commercial real estate CDO (3.4%).  The transaction is considered
a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss
CRE CDO) as it primarily includes junior bonds of CMBS
transactions.  The transaction closed in November 2005.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $79,352,425 class A downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'
  -- $38,130,000 class B-1 downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $37,500,000 class B-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $48,400,000 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $46,500,000 class D affirmed at 'C';
  -- $23,320,000 class E affirmed at 'C';
  -- $15,000,000 class F affirmed at 'C';
  -- $10,000,000 class G affirmed at 'C'.


JER CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded thirteen classes of Notes
issued by JER CRE CDO 2006-2, Limited due to deterioration
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as measured
by deterioration in the weighted average rating factor,
significant interest shortfalls as well as failure of eight
Overcollateralization Tests.  While the transaction is within its
reinvestment period, the failure of the OC Tests has triggered the
cessation of the reinvestment feature.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

JER CRE CDO 2006-2, Limited is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
collateral (71.8% of pool), commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligations collateral (4.5%), two whole loans (3.3%) and
eight mezzanine loans (20.4%).  As of June 21, 2010, the aggregate
Notes balance of the transaction, including the Preferred Shares,
has decreased to $1.1 billion from $1.2 billion at issuance, due
to approximately $68.4 million in realized losses to the Preferred
Shares and $28.0million in pay-downs to the Class A-FL Notes.  The
pay-down was triggered as a result of the failure of the OC Tests.
Per the Indenture, the failure of any OC Test results in all
scheduled interest and principal payments being directed to pay
down the most senior notes, until such OC Test is satisfied.
Currently Classes C-FL, C-FX, D-FL, D-FX, E-FL, E-FX, F-FL, G-FL,
H-FL, J-FX, K, and L are not receiving any interest proceeds and
are accruing.

Sixty-two assets totaling approximately $364.8 million par amount
(32.5% of the pool balance) were listed as defaulted and another
thirty-six assets totaling approximately $427.2 million par amount
(38.0% of the pool balance) as impaired securities as of June 21,
2010.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the entire pool
and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.  The
bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within
a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,709
compared to 7,703 at last review.  The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (0.4% compared to 0.0%
at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (1.1% compared to 4.5% at last review),
B1-B3 (5.1% compared to 14.0% at last review), Caa1-C (93.5%
compared to 81.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 6.6 years
compared to 7.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 2.5% compared to 3.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0% compared to 0.0% at last review.
The low MAC reflects the low ratings dispersion and high
concentration of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class.  A-FL, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-FL, Downgraded to Ca; previously February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-FX, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-FX, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E-FX, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H-FL, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J-FX, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated October 1, 2009.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2004-CIBC9 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s commercial pass-through
certificates, series 2004-CIBC9.  Fitch has also assigned Loss
Severity ratings and Recovery Ratings to numerous classes.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 4.5%, approximately $44.8 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  As of the June 2010 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced 10.3% to
$988 million from $1.1 billion at issuance, which consists of 9%
of paydown and 1.3% of realized losses.  As of the June 2010
remittance, cumulative interest shortfalls reach class G.  The
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes
over the next one to two years.  The Negative Rating Outlooks on
classes A-3, A-4 and A-1A are due to potential losses relating to
the Country Club Plaza loan.  The special servicer continues to
work with the borrower and a prolonged workout is possible.
However, a recent appraisal indicates significant losses, which
may impact these classes.

Fitch has designated 24 loans (17.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes seven specially serviced loans (9.1%).  The largest
specially serviced loan, Country Club Plaza (4.4%), is secured by
433,829 square feet of owned space at a 603,207 sf retail property
located in Sacramento, CA.  The loan transferred March 11, 2008
due to imminent default.  The largest tenant at the property,
Gottschalk's (48%), filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection in
January 2009, and in March 2009 announced liquidation of all
remaining stores.  Since Gottschalk's filed bankruptcy numerous
tenants have converted to percentage rental payments due to co-
tenancy clauses in the leases.  The recent appraised value
indicates losses.

Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 fiscal year-end net operating income
and applying an adjusted property specific market cap rate between
7.5% and 10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25 times or higher were considered
to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, 37 loans (35.4% of the overall pool) were assumed
not to be able to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses for
seven loans (3.8%) in instances where Fitch's derived value was
less than the outstanding balance.

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative, downgraded, and
assigned Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and Recovery Ratings as
indicated:

  -- $27.5 million class B to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.8 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.7 million class D to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11 million class E to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB+';

  -- $15.2 million class F to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB-';

  -- $9.6 million class G to 'CC/RR2' from 'BB+';

  -- $17.9 million class H to 'C/RR3' from 'B-';

  -- $2.8 million class J to 'C/RR4' from 'B-'.

Fitch has downgraded and revised RR of these classes:

  -- $4.1 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $5.5 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $5.5 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR4'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised the Rating Outlooks on these
classes:

  -- $103.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $466.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $148.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $130.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.8 million class N at 'C/RR6';
  -- $2.5 million class P at 'D/RR6'.

The class P is not rated by Fitch.  Class A-1 has been paid in
full.  Fitch withdraws the ratings on the interest-only class X.
(For additional information on the withdrawal of the rating on
class X-1, see 'Fitch Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-Payment
Related Structured Finance Securities', June 23, 2010.)


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 157 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 157
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of 5 tranches from 22 RMBS transactions issued by JP
Morgan.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-FLD1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-FRE1

  -- Cl. AI, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AII-F-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AII-F-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AII-V-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AII-V-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-ACC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-FRE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE1, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-WMC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH2

  -- Cl. AF-1a, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-1b, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH1

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH2

  -- Cl. AF-1A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jun 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. AF-1B, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jun 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MV-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH4

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2000-C10 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed six classes of J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage
Finance Corp., Series 2000-C10.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans and
a decline in loan diversity.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 43 at Moody's prior review.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio,
remaining within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to
$122.10 million from $740.08 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 30 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 71% of the pool.  One loan, respresenting 1% of the
pool, has defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 47% of the
pool.

Six loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly the Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23.43 million (29% loss severity).
Twelve loans, representing 61% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Liberty Fair Mall Loan ($18.5 million -- 15% of the pool), which
is secured by an regional retail center located in Martinsville,
Virginia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
December 2009 due to imminent default and is currently in the
process of foreclosure.  The loan has passed its anticipated
repayment date OF December 1, 2009.  The property was 81% leased
as of September 2009 compared to 92% at securitization.  Anchor
tenants include Belk, JC Penney Outlet and Sears.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Hub Tower Loan
($16.1 million -- 13% of the pool), which is secured by a 281,028
square foot office building in Des Moines, Iowa.  The property was
65% leased as of March 2010 compared to 89% at last review.  It is
expected that Aviva, which leases 36% of the net rentable area
(NRA), will vacate at the expiration of its lease at the end of
the year.  The loan transferred into special servicing in December
2008 due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The loan matured on 4/01/2010.

The remaining 10 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $27.0 million
loss (38% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 1% of the pool and has estimated a
$300,000 loss (29% expected loss based on a 65% probability
default) from this troubled loan.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with partial year 2009 operating results for
76% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 71% compared to 82% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.96X, respectively, compared to
1.44X and 1.46X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's new cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Pavilion East Loan ($7.8 million
-- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a retail center located
in Richardson, Texas.  The center is anchored by Sprouts Grocer,
TJ Maxx, and Richardson Bike Mart.  The property was 92% leased as
of December 2009 compared to 95% at last review.  The loan has
amortized 10% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 54% and 2.0X, respectively, compared to 60% and 1.75X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Computer Learning Center Loan
($7.2 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,210
square foot office building located in Manassas, Virginia.  This
loan has passed its ARD of May 2010 and is currently on the
servicer's watchlist.  Although performance has been stable, the
property's three largest tenants, representing 53% of the NRA,
mature within the next 12 months.  The loan has amortized 3% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 86% and 1.33X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pavilion West Loan ($3.4 million --
2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property in
Dallas, Texas.  The loan has amortized 8% since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43% and 2.69X, respectively,
compared to 55% and 2.13X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/08/2000

  -- Class B, $5,208,035, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 12/14/2005

  -- Class C, $29,541,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A2 on 12/08/2006

  -- Class D, $9,232,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A3 on 7/17/2008

  -- Class E, $23,079,000, affirmed at A2; previously upgraded to
     A2 from Baa2 on 7/17/2008

  -- Class F, $10,155,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     to Baa1 from Baa3 on 7/17/2008

  -- Class G, $14,771,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba1; previously
     assigned Ba1 on 11/08/2000

  -- Class H, $14,771,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 11/08/2000

  -- Class J, $7,385,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
     downgraded to B1 from Ba3 on 12/14/2005

  -- Class K, $5,539,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from B1 on 12/14/2005

  -- Class L, $2,420,097, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from B2 on 12/14/2006


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-LN1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-LN1 and
removed seven of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 other classes from the
same transaction and removed two of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.65x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 84.6%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.32x and an LTV ratio of 106.2%.  The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 26.9% and 39.6%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude two ($18.9 million; 1.9%) of the three specially serviced
assets and 22 defeased loans ($167.1 million; 16.5%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for the two specially serviced assets,
which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
severity figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 15, 2010, remittance report, three loans
($20.4 million; 2.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
C-III Asset Management LLC.  One of these loans is in foreclosure
($16.5 million; 1.6%) and two are 90-plus-days delinquent
($3.9 million; 0.4%).  All three of the specially serviced assets
have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $16.4 million.
S&P describes the largest loan with the special servicer below.

The Orion MHP and Arbor Village loan, the eighth-largest loan
in the pool secured by real estate, has a total exposure of
$17.9 million (2%) and consists of $16.5 million of unpaid
principal balance and $1.4 million of advancing and interest
thereon.  The loan consists of two cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted notes.  The Orion MHP note is secured by a 423-unit
manufactured housing facility in Orion, Mich., that was built in
1967 and the Arbor Village note is secured by a 266-unit
manufactured facility in Parma, Mich., that was built in 1969.
This exposure was transferred to specially servicing on Oct. 3,
2008, due to a monetary default.  The properties have been
marketed for sale and the special servicer expects the properties
to be sold by July 15, 2010.  S&P expects a significant loss upon
the resolution of this loan.

Both of the remaining specially serviced loans ($3.9 million,
0.4%) have balances that individually represent less than 0.3% of
the total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated a loss for one
of these loans ($2.4 million; 0.2%) at a loss severity of 56.2%.
The special servicer reports that a modification for the other
specially serviced loan ($1.5 million; 0.2%) closed on March 2,
2010.  The special servicer expects the loan will be returned to
the master servicer shortly.  If the loan is returned to the
master servicer, the special servicer will be entitled to 1% of
all future principal and interest payments on the loan provided it
continues to perform through maturity and remains with the master
servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 15, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $1.0 billion (166 loans), compared with
$1.2 billion (185 loans) at issuance.  Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the
master servicer, provided financial information for 99.5% of the
pool balance.  All but 3.6% of the servicer-provided financial
information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or full-year
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.75x for the
loans in the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.65x and 84.6%, respectively, and exclude two
specially serviced assets ($18.9 million; 1.9%), and 22 defeased
loans ($167.1 million; 16.5%).  S&P separately estimated losses
for the two specially serviced assets.  The trust has experienced
$10.2 million of principal losses to date.  Thirty-two loans are
on the master servicer's watchlist ($167.6 million; 16.6%).
Twelve loans ($58.4 million, 5.8%) have a reported DSC between
1.0x and 1.1x, and 16 loans ($129.1 million, 12.8%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $367.5 million (30.8%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.91x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans
were 1.60x and 96.5%, respectively.  These figures exclude the
eighth-largest loan in the pool, the Orion MHP and Arbor Village
loan, which is with the special servicer and discussed above.  Two
other top 10 loans are on the master servicer's watchlist and one
other top 10 loan has a reported DSC below 1.0x, all of which S&P
discuss below.

The Lillian Vernon Corp. loan ($19.1 million; 1.9%), the fifth-
largest loan in the pool secured by real estate, is secured by a
827,000-sq.-ft. warehouse property in Virginia Beach, Va.  The
property was completed in 1987 was subsequent additions were
completed in 1992 and 1996.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to the bankruptcy filing of Lillian
Vernon Corp., which was the property's sole tenant.  Current
U.S.A., which purchased Lillian Vernon, assumed a modified lease
for approximately half of the space.  The remaining space remains
vacant at this time.  Based on the current reported occupancy
(57%), S&P estimate a DSC of approximately 0.35x for this loan.
The loan's payment status is current.

The Silverlake Village Shopping Center Out Pads and Silverlake
Village Shopping Center In Line Boxes loan ($18.6 million; 1.8%),
the sixth-largest loan in the pool secured by real estate,
consists of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted notes.
The Silverlake Village Shopping Center Out Pads note is secured by
a 57,089-sq.-ft. anchored retail property.  The Silverlake
Village Shopping Center In Line Boxes note is secured by a
104,576-sq.-ft. anchored retail property and appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low occupancy and a low DSC.  Both
properties were built in 2003 and are located in Pearland, Texas.
For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC for the
Silverlake Village Shopping Center Out Pads note and the
Silverlake Village Shopping Center In Line Boxes note were 100%
and 1.46x, and 73% and 0.51x, respectively.  The blended occupancy
and DSC was 83% and 1.00x, respectively.

The Sheraton Inner Harbor loan ($31.2 million; 3.1%), the third-
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 337-room full-service
hotel in Baltimore, Md. that was built in 1985 and renovated in
2001.  The loan payments are current and the loan does not
currently appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  For year-end
2009, the average occupancy, revenue per available room, and DSC
were 62%, $97.23, and 0.76x, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      F         BBB    A/Watch Neg                   8.33
      G         BB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                6.92
      H         BB-    BBB/Watch Neg                 5.20
      J         B+     BBB-/Watch Neg                4.57
      K         B      BB-/Watch Neg                 3.32
      L         CCC+   B/Watch Neg                   2.70
      M         CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg                1.60

                          Rating Lowered

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      E         A+     AA-                          10.05

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      N         CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg                1.29
      P         CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg                0.97

                         Ratings Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1

            Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------   ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                       19.75
            A-1A      AAA                       19.75
            A-2       AAA                       19.75
            B         AAA                       16.15
            C         AA+                       14.74
            D         AA                        11.62
            X-1       AAA                         N/A
            X-2       AAA                         N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2003-C1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-C1 and
removed 12 of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on three classes from the
same transaction.  S&P also raised two ratings and affirmed one
rating on the three "CM" raked certificates.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes reflect credit support erosion
that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of
seven specially serviced assets.  The rating actions on the
nonpooled "CM" certificates reflect S&P's analysis of the Concord
Mills loan, which is the sole source of cash flow for the "CM"
certificates.

The downgrades to the pooled certificates also reflect S&P's
assessment of current and potential interest shortfalls and
anticipated principal losses to the trust.  The interest
shortfalls affecting the transaction are primarily due to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and special servicing
fees, and S&P expects these interest shortfalls will continue for
the foreseeable future.  The downgrades of classes K, L, M, N, and
P to 'D' reflect current and potential interest shortfalls, as
well as principal losses and credit support erosion S&P anticipate
will occur due to the liquidation of the Crossroads Mall, which
S&P discuss below.

S&P raised its ratings on two classes and affirmed its ratings on
one class of "CM" raked certificates following its analysis of the
Concord Mills loan.  The "CM" raked certificates derive 100% of
their cash flows from the subordinate, nonpooled junior B note
portion of this loan.  The rating changes on the "CM" certificates
reflect its revised valuation of this property, which S&P discuss
in further detail below.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.66x and a loan-to-value ratio of 68.8%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.41x and an LTV ratio of 86.2%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
26.4% and 39.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude the seven ($88.2 million; 9.9%) specially
serviced assets and 23 defeased loans ($194.0 million; 21.7%).
S&P separately estimated losses for the seven specially serviced
assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 14, 2010, remittance report, seven loans
($88.2 million; 9.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Three ($59.7 million, 6.7%)
assets are real estate owned, three ($13.7 million, 1.54%) loans
are in foreclosure, and one ($14.7 million, 1.6%) is 90-plus-days
delinquent.  All seven of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $60.3 million.

The Crossroads Mall loan is the second-largest exposure in the
pool ($40.1 million; 4.5%) and is secured by 744,888 sq. ft. of a
861,338-sq.-ft. regional mall in Omaha, Neb., and built in 1960.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 3, 2009,
due to imminent monetary default and entered into foreclosure on
March 4, 2010.  The property was classified as REO as of the
June 14, 2010, remittance report.  An ARA in the amount of
$31.9 million is in effect for this asset.  According to
CWCapital, the loan was liquidated on June 18, 2010, and the
corresponding loss will be reflected in the July remittance
report.  Based on information received from CWCapital, S&P expects
a significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The 200-220 West Germantown Pike loan ($14.7 million, 1.6%) is
secured by a 98,000-sq.-ft. two-story office building and a
17,000-sq.-ft. one-story office building built in 1960 in Plymouth
Meeting, Pa.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Jan. 26, 2010, due to monetary default and is currently 90-plus-
days delinquent.  As of year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and
DSC for this property were 82.0% and 1.49x, respectively.  As of
the June 14, 2010, remittance report, an ARA of $7.4 million is in
effect for this asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss
upon the resolution of this asset.

The BayWalk loan ($14.1 million, 1.6%) is secured by a 72,843-sq.-
ft. retail property built in 2001 in St.  Petersburg, Fla.  The
asset was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 17, 2008,
and is currently REO.  As of the June 14, 2010, remittance report,
an ARA of $12.5 million is in effect for this asset.  Standard &
Poor's expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The four ($19.3 million, 2.2%) remaining specially serviced loans
have balances that individually represent less than 0.9% of the
total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated losses for these
four assets and arrived at a weighted average loss severity of
46.8%.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 14, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $895.3 million (92 loans), compared
with $1.1 billion (104 loans) at issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A.,
the master servicer, provided financial information for 98.0% of
the trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial
information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or full-year
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.60x for the
nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.66x and 68.8%, respectively, and
exclude the seven specially serviced assets and 23 defeased loans
($194.0 million; 21.7%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
seven specially serviced assets.  If S&P included the specially
serviced assets in S&P's calculation, its adjusted DSC would be
1.58x.  Seventeen loans ($114.9 million, 12.8%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Four loans ($26.4 million, 2.9%) have a
reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 10 loans ($104.5 million,
11.7%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has
experienced $5.0 million of principal losses to date.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $389.7 million (45.6%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.67x for the nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.76x and 65.6%,
respectively.  These figures exclude the second-largest exposure
in the pool, the Crossroads Mall loan ($40.1 million; 4.5%), which
is with the special servicer and discussed above.  If S&P include
the Crossroads Mall asset in S&P's calculation, its adjusted DSC
would be 1.64x.  Two of the top 10 loans secured by real estate
are on the master servicer's watchlist, which S&P discuss below.

The Gables Champions loan ($19.8 million; 2.2%) is the eighth-
largest loan secured by real estate in the pool and is secured by
a three-story, 404-unit multifamily property built in 1995, in
Houston, Texas.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low DSC.  The property is being renovated, and
S&P expects DSC to remain low until renovations are complete.  For
year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 82.4% and
0.79x, respectively.

The Amerige Heights Town Center loan ($18.4 million; 2.1%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 163,544-sq.-ft.
retail center property built in 2001 in Fullerton, Calif.  This
loan also appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low
DSC.  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 70.2%
and 0.95x, respectively.

                     Nonpooled Certificates

The rating actions on the "CM" raked certificates reflect S&P's
analysis of the Concord Mills loan.  The "CM" raked certificates
derive 100% of their cash flows from the subordinate, nonpooled
junior B note portion of this loan.

The Concord Mills loan is the largest loan in the pool with a
current whole-loan balance of $162.5 million (18.2%), which
consists of a senior pooled balance of $143.6 million and a
subordinate, nonpooled junior B note of $18.9 million.  The loan
is secured by a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. regional mall built in 1999 in
Concord, N.C., approximately 10 miles north of downtown
Charlotte, N.C.  The property features 17 anchor tenants and over
130 specialty retailers.  The anchor tenants include Bass Pro
Outdoor World (10.7% NRA), Burlington Coat Factory (8.0% NRA), AMC
Theater (6.7%), and Dave & Busters (4.2% NRA).  The in-line
tenants include Gap Outlet, Banana Republic Outlet, and Ann Taylor
Loft. For the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported
DSC and occupancy were 1.96x and 95.6%, respectively, up from
1.90x and 94.9% at issuance.  The upgrades and affirmations of the
nonpooled "CM" certificates reflect the improved performance of
the property since issuance.  The upgrades also reflect the
deleveraging of the loan, as the loan has paid down by 10.3% since
issuance.  Based on S&P's current valuation using an adjusted net
cash flow, its adjusted whole loan LTV was 64.3%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's raised, lowered, and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
                      (Pooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      C         A      AA+/Watch Neg                17.70
      D         BBB-   AA/Watch Neg                 14.04
      E         BB     AA-/Watch Neg                12.37
      F         B      A+/Watch Neg                 10.39
      G         CCC+   A-/Watch Neg                  8.41
      H         CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg                 7.04
      J         CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg                 5.21
      K         D      BB/Watch Neg                  3.99
      L         D      BB-/Watch Neg                 3.23
      M         D      B+/Watch Neg                  2.32
      N         D      B/Watch Neg                   1.86
      P         D      B-/Watch Neg                  1.66

               Ratings Lowered (Pooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      B         AA     AAA                          18.92

              Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-1      AAA                       22.88
             A-2      AAA                       22.88
             X-1      AAA                         N/A

             Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                        Class     Rating
                        -----     ------
                        CM-3      BBB-

              Ratings Raised (Nonpooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C1

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                      Class     To      From
                      -----     --      ----
                      CM-1      A+      A
                      CM-2      A-      BBB+

                       N/A - Not applicable.


JPMORGAN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C8 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.'s series 1999-C8 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on two other classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of interest shortfalls that
have affected the trust.  As of the June 2010 remittance report,
the trust had experienced current interest shortfalls of $89,455,
and had amassed cumulative interest shortfalls in the aggregate
amount of $1,056,357.  The downgrades reflect a reduction of
available interest to the trust and the potential for the
downgraded classes to experience interest shortfalls in the
future, relating to assets that are currently with the special
servicer (50.3% of the pool) and assets that S&P has determined to
be credit-impaired (5.0%) and at increased risk of default and
loss.

The current interest shortfalls primarily relate to three of the
seven assets with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management
LLC.  Two of these assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $7.7 million.  The current appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions resulting from the ARAs total $54,517.  In
addition, the master servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc., has
made a nonrecoverable advance declaration on a third asset (which
has a total exposure of $6.3 million, 7.2%), for which it is not
advancing interest or expenses.  S&P describes these assets in
more detail below in the Credit Considerations section.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class D certificate
reflects a subordination level consistent with the outstanding
rating.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only
certificate based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, seven ($43.9 million,
50.3%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer.  The
payment status of the specially serviced assets is: two
($10.5 million, 12.0%) are classified as real estate owned, one
($5.1 million, 5.8%) is in foreclosure, one ($20.9 million, 24.0%)
is 90-plus days delinquent, and three ($7.5 million, 8.6%) are
classified as matured balloon loans.  ARAs of $7.7 million, in
aggregate, are in effect against two of the assets.  The four
largest specially serviced assets are:

The Woodfield Gardens Apartments loan ($22.2 million total
exposure, 25.4%) is the largest real estate exposure in the pool
and currently with the special servicer.  A 692-unit multifamily
asset in Rolling Meadows, Ill. secures the loan.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in May 2007.  Current
financial and occupancy data is not available for the asset.
According to the special servicer, it is currently closing a note
sale which should result in a full return of all principal,
accrued interest, and expenses associated with the asset.  Based
on this information, S&P expects a minimal loss, if any, upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Grand Central Office Building asset ($6.8 million total
exposure, 7.9%) is the third-largest real estate exposure in the
pool and the second-largest asset with the special servicer.  The
asset is a 61,786-sq.-ft. office property in St.  Louis.  The
exposure was transferred to the special servicer in February 2008
and is classified as REO.  Current financial and occupancy data is
not available for the asset.  A $4.0 million ARA is in effect
against the asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Eastland on the Lake Apartments loan ($6.3 million total
exposure, 7.2%) is the fifth-largest real estate exposure in the
pool and the third-largest asset with the special servicer.  The
loan is secured by a 376-unit multifamily property in Columbus,
Ohio, and was transferred to the special servicer in March 2009
due to payment default.  Current financial data is not available
for the asset.  The property was 70.0% occupied as of March 2010.
The master servicer has issued a nonrecoverable advance
determination in connection with the asset and has stopped
advancing interest.  The total exposure amount includes
approximately $1.3 million in advances and interest on those
advances.  According to the special servicer, an appointed
receiver is negotiating a purchase and sale agreement with a
prospective buyer.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Power House Office Building and Theatre asset ($5.5 million
total exposure, 6.3%) is the sixth-largest real estate exposure in
the pool and the fourth-largest asset with the special servicer.
The asset is a 101,517-sq.-ft. office property in St.  Louis.  The
exposure was transferred to the special servicer in February 2008
and is classified as REO.  Current financial and occupancy data is
not available for the asset.  A $3.7 million ARA is in effect
against the asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The remaining three specially serviced assets each have total
exposure amounts of less than $3.5 million.  S&P estimated a
minimal loss for one of these three assets.  S&P did not estimate
losses for the remaining two assets.  One of these two assets was
transferred to the special servicer in May for maturity default,
and has limited information available.  Most recent reported debt
service coverage and occupancy were 1.56x and 98.1% as of December
2008 and March 2008, respectively.  The other asset was
transferred to the special servicer in October 2009, also for
maturity default.  According to the special servicer, the loan's
maturity date has been extended to October 2010.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined two
($4.4 million, 5.0%) loans to be credit-impaired.  The larger of
these is the Ridge Terrace Health Care Center loan ($3.5 million,
4.0%), which is the seventh-largest exposure in the pool.  The
loan is secured by a 120-bed health care property in Lantana, Fla.
Reported cash flow was negative as of December 2009, and reported
occupancy was 82.3% as of February 2009.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to poor performance, and S&P
considers this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

The John Rupp University Club loan ($897,525, 1.0%) is the second
asset that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  The loan is
secured by a 27,000-sq.-ft. mixed-use property in St. Paul, Minn.
The loan is classified as 30-days delinquent in its payments and
did not report 2009 financial information.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to its delinquency status.
S&P considers this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss because of the loan's delinquency status and lack of recent
financial information.

Excluding specially serviced and defeased assets, 7.4% of the pool
by principal balance is scheduled to mature through December 2011.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $87.2 million, down from $731.5 million
at issuance.  The pool includes 23 assets, down from 128 at
issuance.  The master servicer provided full-year 2008, interim-
2009, or full-year 2009 financial information for 45.6% of the
nondefeased assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.46x for the pool based on the reported figures.  This
calculation includes five ($37.9 million, 43.5%) of the
transaction's seven specially serviced assets and two
($4.4 million, 5.0%) assets that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired.  Six ($41.4 million, 47.4%) of these seven assets either
didn't report DSC or reported negative cash flow.

The master servicer reported a watchlist of five ($8.5 million,
9.8%) loans, including one of the top 10 loan exposures.  Two
($5.7 million, 6.5%) assets in the pool have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, and one ($3.5 million, 4.0%) asset has a reported
DSC less than 1.00x.  To date, the pool has experienced principal
losses totaling $44.2 million on 14 assets.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $60.3 million (69.1%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.38x for the top 10 real estate assets.  Six ($42.4 million,
48.7%) top 10 exposures are currently with the special servicer;
four of which S&P discuss in the Credit Considerations section
above.  S&P determined one ($3.5 million, 4.0%) additional top 10
asset, the only top 10 asset on the master servicer's watchlist,
to be credit-impaired.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The lowered and affirmed ratings are consistent
with S&P's analysis.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            JPMorgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C8

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     E          BBB     A/Watch Neg                     59.86
     F          BB      BBB+/Watch Neg                  47.28

                         Ratings Affirmed

            JPMorgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C8

     Class        Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----        ------               ----------------------
     D            AA+                                   89.21
     X            AAA                                     N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KNOWLEDGEFUNDING OHIO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded student loan revenue bonds issued by
KnowledgeFunding Ohio, Inc. under the 2005 Indenture.  Senior
bonds remain under review for further possible downgrade.  The
action was prompted by the deterioration in excess spread and
parity.  The underlying collateral consists of government
guaranteed student loans originated under the Federal Family
Education Loan Program.  The bonds are tax exempt auction rate
securities.

The transaction has sustained a significant reduction in total
parity (a ratio of total assets plus escrow fund to total
liabilities), which decreased from 97.1% as of September 30, 2008
to 96.7% as of March 31, 2010.  The decrease in total parity was
due to the compression in excess spread, currently at
approximately -0.12% per annum, which is used to build total
parity.  Excess spread decreased as a result of the higher cost of
funds associated with the failed auction of the bonds.  Negative
excess spread indicates that the interest paid on the student loan
collateral does not cover interest on the bonds plus the fees.

In assigning new ratings to these securities, Moody's conducted
cash flow modeling analyses using standard cash flow modeling
assumptions.  The new ratings also reflect Moody's analysis of
available excess spread and structural protections available in
this transaction.

During the review period, Moody's will investigate the impact of
higher funding costs on the ratings of the senior bonds.  The
failed auction rate for this transaction is defined as the lesser
of a defined Applicable Multiple times the higher of the After-Tax
Equivalent (the product of (i) the financial commercial paper
rate, and (ii) one minus the corporate tax rate), BMA index, and
14%.  The Applicable Multiple depends on the ratings of the bonds.
With the Baa1 ratings on the senior series, the Applicable
Multiple on these bonds will increase from 175% to 200% and
consequently excess spread could decrease from -0.12% to -0.56%
per annum.

The performance expectations that are included in this press
release -- projected excess spread per annum - indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely performance over the medium
term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these
expectations.  Performance that significantly deviates from these
estimates may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected levels will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  The primary source of assumption
uncertainty in FFELP securitizations is basis risk, which is in
turn a function of the general level of interest rates as well as
the spreads between those rates.

                      Principal Methodology

In rating securitizations backed by student loans originated under
FFELP, Moody's assesses both the liquidity and credit risk of the
transaction.  The drivers that affect the performance of a
transaction include defaults, servicer guarantee rejection rates,
voluntary prepayments, basis risk, borrower benefit utilization,
and the number of borrowers in non-repayment status, such as
deferment and forbearance.  As part of Moody's analysis to
understand the risk of the underlying collateral, Moody's examine
historical FFELP static pool performance data.  To the extent that
performance data is available from a specific issuer, that
information is used to arrive at Moody's cash flow assumptions for
that particular issuer.  If an issuer's data are either limited or
unavailable, Moody's assumptions are based on FFELP performance
data received from other participants.  Although FFELP loans are a
standardized asset, Moody's will assume additional volatility

in certain assumptions for those issuers that have limited or no
data.  In addition, historical interest rates and spreads are
analyzed to evaluate the basis risk between the interest rate to
which the bonds are indexed and the interest rate to which the
FFELP loans are indexed.  This historical data is used to derive
an expected, or most likely, outcome for each variable.  These
expected defaults, prepayments, interest rates, and other
assumptions are then stressed in accordance with the rating
categories requested by the issuer.  Factors that influence the
stress levels include the availability of relevant issuer-specific
performance data, the seasoning of the loans, collateral
concentrations (school types, loan programs), the financial
strength and stability of the servicer, and the general economic
environment.

These stressed assumptions are then incorporated into a cash flow
model that takes into account the FFELP loan characteristics as
well as structural (e.g., starting parity, cash flow waterfall,
bond tranching, etc.) and pricing features of the transaction.
The cash flow model outputs are analyzed to determine whether the
transaction as structured by the issuer has sufficient credit
protection to pay off the bonds by their legal final maturity
dates.  In certain circumstances where cash flow runs are not
available, Moody's rely on model results from similar
transactions.  Moody's also analyze the liquidity risk of the
transaction given that borrowers can be in non-repayment status
while in school, grace, deferment or forbearance status, and the
transaction can experience delays in default reimbursement and
other payments.  Basis risk is the primary credit risk in FFELP
student loan ABS.  Moody's Aaa stressed basis risk assumption
between LIBOR and the CP Rate is 25 basis points with certain
periods in which the spread increases to 150 basis points.  This
is based on an analysis of historical spreads between the two
indices.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: KnowledgeFunding Ohio, Inc.

  * Expected Excess Spread Per Annum: -0.12%

  -- Senior Series 2005A-1, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2005 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Senior Series 2005A-2, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2005 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Senior Series 2005A-3, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2005 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Subordinate Series 2005C-1, Downgraded from Caa1 to C;
     previously on 12/5/2008 downgraded to Caa1;

  -- Senior Series 2006A-1, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2006 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Senior Series 2006A-2, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2006 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Senior Series 2006A-3, Downgraded from Aaa to Baa1, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 12/27/2006 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Subordinate Series 2006C-1, Downgraded from Caa1 to C;
     previously on 12/5/2008 downgraded to Caa1.


KNOWLEDGEFUNDING OHIO: Fitch Maintains Ratings on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings currently maintains ratings as listed below on
student loan asset-backed notes issued from KnowledgeFunding Ohio,
Inc. series 2005 Master Trust Indenture.  Fitch has been requested
to confirm its existing ratings upon the addition of FFELP
guarantors as a result of the adoption of the Student Loan
Exchange and Sale Agreement between KFO and SLM Corp.  Consistent
with its statements on policies regarding rating confirmations in
structured finance transactions (Jan. 13, 2009) and student loan
confirms (May 8, 2009), Fitch is treating this request as a
notification.

The Agreement allows for the exchange of approximately $88.9
million of FFELP student loans in the Trust for approximately
$89.8 million of FFELP student loans from SLM Corp. (the Loan
Swap).  Multiple FFELP guarantors will be added as eligible
guarantors for the trust student loans as a result of the Loan
Swap.  Since FFELP loans are reinsured by the U.S. government,
Fitch does not believe adding eligible guarantors would introduce
additional credit risk to the Trust.

Fitch also reviewed projected cash flows of the Trust with and
without the proposed Loan Swap.  Based on the information
provided, Fitch has determined that the execution of the
Agreement, in and of itself, will not have an impact on the
existing ratings at this time.  This determination only addresses
the effect of the Agreement on the current ratings assigned by
Fitch to the securities listed below.  It does not address whether
the Agreement is permitted by the terms of the documents nor does
it address whether it is in the best interests of, or prejudicial
to, some or all of the holders of the securities listed.

The ratings assigned by Fitch are based on the documents and
information provided to us by the issuer and other parties and are
subject to receipt of final closing documents.  Fitch relies on
all these parties for the accuracy of such information and
documents.  Fitch did not audit or verify the truth or accuracy of
such information.

The current ratings of the notes are:

  -- 2005 class A-1 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2005 class A-2 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2005 class A-3 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2006 class A-1 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2006 class A-2 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2006 class A-3 notes 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2005 class C-1 notes 'BB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 2006 class C-1 notes 'BB/LS3'; Outlook Stable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2004-C7 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes,
confirmed two classes and downgraded 13 classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2004-C7.  The downgrades are due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly performing
watchlisted loans and a decline in loan diversity.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 7 compared to 13 at last review.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's
stressed DSCR remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 15 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on May 26, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $968 million
from $1.415 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 81 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 46% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 21% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by United States Government
securities.  Six loans, representing 19% of the pool, have
investment grade underlying ratings.

Eighteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.2 million aggregate loss (46% loss severity on average).  One
loan, representing 0.1% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loan is the Huszti Building
Loan ($1.4 million), which is secured by a 15,000 square foot
office building located in Milford, Michigan.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing on February 11, 2010, for
imminent monetary default.  Moody's is estimating a $565,000 loss
for the property (40% loss severity).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 15 loans
representing approximately 11% of the pool.  These loans are on
the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature within the
next six months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.
Moody's has estimated a $23.9 million aggregate loss (23% expected
loss based on a 63% default probability) from these loans.
Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the
timing and magnitude of losses from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with year-end and partial year 2009 operating
statements for 81% and 17% of the conduit pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool is 96% compared
to 100 % at last review.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.36 X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.02X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Montgomery Mall
Loan ($86.9 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
regional mall located in North Wales, Pennsylvania, approximately
20 miles northwest of Philadelphia.  The property is anchored by
Macys, Sears and Boscov's.  Comparable inline sales for the year
2009 were $317 per square foot compared to $352 per square foot at
last review.  As of March 2010, the property was 91% leased
compared to 95% at last review.  Performance has declined since
last review but has been partially mitigated by amortization.  The
loan has amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.34X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.58X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the World
Apparel Center Loan ($70.2 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which
represents a 33% participation interest in a $212.6 million first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a 1.1 million square foot
Class A office building located in the Times Square submarket of
New York City.  The building's largest tenants include Jones
Apparel Group (25% of the net rentable area; lease expiration
April 2012), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (6% NRA; lease expiration
October 2016) and Alfred Dunner & Co. (5% NRA; lease expiration
January 2017).  As of December 2009, the property was 75% leased
compared to 86% at last review.  The loan was placed on the master
servicer's watchlist in February 2010 as a result of increased
vacancy.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Baa3 and 1.36X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.46X at last
review.

The remaining four loans with underlying ratings comprise 3% of
the pool.  The current underlying ratings for these loans are the
same as at last review and securitization.  The Kimco Portfolio -
Enchanted Forest Loan ($11.2 million -- 1.2% of the pool) and
Kimco Portfolio -- Wilkens Beltway Plaza Loan ($8.3 million --
0.9% of the pool), are both secured by grocery anchored retail
centers located in Ellicott City, Maryland and Baltimore, Maryland
respectively.  The loans have underlying ratings of Aa1 and
stressed DSCR's of 2.44X and 2.31X respectively.  The Palmetto
Place Apartments Loan ($5.9 million -- 0.6% of the pool), is
secured by a garden style apartment complex located in Miami,
Florida.  The loan has an underlying rating of Aaa and stressed
DSCR greater than 4.00X.  The Kimco Portfolio -- Perry Hall Super
Fresh Loan ($5.6 million -- 0.6% of the pool) is secured by a
grocery anchored retail center located in Perry Hall, Maryland.
The loan has an underlying rating of Aa2 and stressed DSCR of
2.14X.

The three largest conduit loans represent 22% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 600 Third Avenue Loan ($168 million --
17.4% of the pool),which is secured by a 529,800 square foot Class
A office building located in the Grand Central/UN office submarket
of New York City.  Major tenants include Tru TV (27% NRA; lease
expiration December 2010), L-3 Communications Corporation (15%
NRA; lease expiration December 2018) and Sumitomo Corporation of
America (9% NRA; lease expiration August 2014).  As of March 2010,
the property was 91% leased compared to 100% at last review.
Although the property's occupancy has declined, performance has
improved due to higher revenues and stable expenses.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to
111% and 0.85X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the North Dekalb Mall Loan
($26.8 million - 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 628,700
square foot regional mall located in Decatur, Georgia.  The
property was built in 1965 and renovated in 2004.  The mall is
anchored by Macy's, Ross Dress for Less and AMC Theatres.  The
loan has been on the master servicer's watchlist since March 2007
as a result of performance declines.  As of December 2009, the
property was 94% leased compared to 98% at last review.  Moody's
analysis assumes a high default probability on this loan because
of poor performance and it has been included in the loss estimates
for troubled loans.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 168% and
0.60X, respectively, compared to 174% and 0.57X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is Guam Multifamily Loan ($21.4
million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by twelve
multifamily properties and one retail center located in Yigo,
Guam.  The loan was placed on the master servicer's watchlist in
April 2010 due to a decline in financial performance and concerns
about deferred maintenance.  The portfolio has a combined
occupancy of 87%.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and
0.89X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.02X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-3, $33,733,821, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class A-4, $60,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class A-5, $79,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class A-6, $561,636,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class A-1A, $85,648,425 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class X-CL, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class X-CP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class X-OL, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/9/2004

  -- Class B, $10,614,000, confirmed at Aa1, previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class C, $14,153,000, confirmed at Aa2, previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class D, $15,921,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class E, $12,383,000, downgraded to A3 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class F, $14,153,000 downgraded to Baa2 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class G, $12,383,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class H, $12,384,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class J, $8,845,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class K, $17,691,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     5/26/2010

  -- Class L, $3,538,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class M, $5,307,000 downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class N, $3,538,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class P, $1,769,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class Q, $3,538,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010

  -- Class S, $3,538,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 5/26/2010


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Lehman Brothers Floating Rate
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-LLF C5, reflecting no loss
expectations in Fitch's base case.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate values and cash flow declines.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, one of the pooled loans is modeled
to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 8.3% from generally second- and fourth-quarter 2009 servicer-
reported financial data.  In its review, Fitch analyzed servicer-
reported operating statements and STR reports.

The transaction is collateralized by two loans, both of which are
hotels.  The final maturity dates, including all extension options
for the non-specially serviced loan, is in 2010 (41.4%).

Fitch identified one Loan of Concern within the pool (58.6%),
which is specially serviced.  Fitch's analysis did not result in
loss expectations for any A-notes in the 'B' stress scenario.

The Sheraton Chicago interest-only loan is collateralized by the
leasehold interest in a 1,209 key full service hotel located in
Chicago, IL.  The property was renovated in 2004.  The property is
a full-service convention hotel situated along the Chicago River
within walking distance of Navy Pier, Michigan Avenue and the Loop
CBD.  Amenities include 120,000 sf of meeting space, a fitness
center and indoor pool, and four food and beverage outlets and
Shula's Steakhouse.  Property performance has deteriorated, the
TTM ended Dec. 31, 2009 servicer-reported NOI was approximately
38.3% lower than YE 2008.  For the TTM ending February 2010, the
occupancy, average daily rate and revenue per available room were
74.6%, $164.85 and $123.05, respectively, compared to 73.3%,
$153.64 and $112.60, respectively, at issuance.

The loan transferred to special servicing in November 2009 due to
an imminent maturity default.  The borrower was unable to obtain
appropriate refinancing prior to loan maturity in January 2010.
The servicer has extended the loan through October 2010.  The
borrower has provided $4 million as a seasonality reserve that
will ultimately be applied towards principal payment.  A full cash
flow sweep is required on a monthly basis during the extension
term once the seasonality reserve has been replenished.

The Walt Disney World Hilton interest-only loan is collateralized
by the leasehold interest in an 814 key full service hotel located
in Lake Buena Vista, FL.  The property is located within Walt
Disney World and is included in Disney's central reservation
system.  Amenities include three swimming pools, seven
restaurants/lounges, 67,000 sf of meeting space and access to
WDW's five championship golf courses.  For the TTM ended June 30,
2009, servicer-reported NOI was approximately 2% higher than YE
2008 and 0.2% lower than YE 2007.  For the TTM ending February
2010, the occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 87.9%, $138.26 and
$121.47, respectively, compared to 82.4%, $133 and $110,
respectively, at issuance.

Fitch affirms and assigns or revises Rating Outlooks on these
pooled classes:

  -- $1.3 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.6 million class C at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $31.5 million class D at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.2 million class E at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.9 million class F at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27.8 million class G at 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.8 million class H at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.1 million class J at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.5 million class K at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

Prior to the rating actions classes D-K were on Rating Watch
Negative.

Loss Severity Ratings were not assigned, as there are no expected
losses.

Classes A-1, A-2 and interest-only classes X-1, X1-PA, X1-WO, X-
FLP, and WO have paid in full.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of interest-only class X-2.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class would
have been assigned a Negative Outlook.  However, in this case all
classes were assigned Stable Outlooks.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Series 2005-4 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn its
rating on notes issued by Magnolia Finance II Series 2005-4, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

Issuer: Magnolia Finance II Series 2005-4

  -- Series 2005-4 US$ 2,000,000 Portfolio Credit Linked Notes due
     2010, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

The rating is withdrawn due to the cancellation of the notes
following repurchase by the issuer.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
of Merrill Lynch Financial Asset Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, 2001-Canada 5.  The downgrades are due to an
aggregate $8.7 million loss which has resulted in a 100% principal
loss for Classes J and H and a 33% principal loss for Class G.

Moody's also placed Classes B through F on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans and increased interest
shortfalls related to trust expenses associated with two specially
serviced loans that were liquidated in May 2010.  The disposition
of these loans, which were secured by hotel properties located in
Niagara Falls, Canada, resulted in a 100% loss severity.  Proceeds
from the liquidation were used to reimburse the Trust for servicer
advances and trust expenses, however the sales proceeds were not
sufficient to reimburse all outstanding trust expenses.  Moody's
expects that interest shortfalls will increase as these expenses
are reimbursed.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the May 28, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to
$157.5 million from $248.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 57% of the pool.  Twelve loans, representing 21% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by Canadian Government
securities.

Three loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.7 million (100% loss severity).  One
loan, representing 4% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing.  This loan is the Skeena Mall Loan ($6.5 million),
which is secured by a retail center in Terrace, British Columbia.
The loan was transferred to special servicing on February 4, 2009,
due to delinquency and is currently 90+ days delinquent.  The
servicer has recognized an appraisal reduction of $2.9 million for
this loan.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$431,363, affecting Classes K through F.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and watchlisted loans
and interest shortfalls.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B, $7,462,000 currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aaa from Aa1 on
     2/19/2008

  -- Class C, $7,462,000 currently rated A1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to A1 from A2 on
     8/23/2006

  -- Class D, $9,949,000 currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 5/18/2001

  -- Class E, $1,866,000 currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa3 on 5/18/2001

  -- Class F, $4,974,000 currently rated B2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Ba2 on
     2/26/2009

  -- Class G, $1,252,720 downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class H, $3,109,000 downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class J, $1,244,000 downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on 2/26/2009


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-TOP7 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings, Rating
Outlooks or Recovery Ratings to these classes of Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-TOP7 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates:

  -- $7.3 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.8 million class L to 'CC/RR1' from 'B-';
  -- $4.8 million class M to 'C/RR4' from 'CC/RR4'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings and revises
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $3.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $572.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29.1 million class C at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class D at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class E at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.1 million class F at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class G at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.9 million class H at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.5 million class J at 'BB/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X-1.

The $1 million class N remains at 'D/RR6'.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 1.7%, approximately $12 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down 28%
to $700.1 million from $969.4 million at issuance.  Twenty three
loans (20.9%) are defeased.  Fitch has identified 17 Loans of
Concern (10.3%), including two loans in special servicing (0.07%).

The largest specially serviced asset (0.06% in total) is a
multifamily property located in Forest Park, GA.  The asset is now
performing and is expected to be transferred to the master
servicer later this year.

The other specially serviced asset (0.01%) is a vacant industrial
property located in Pontiac, MI.  The asset transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 due to a payment default and the special
servicer is initiating foreclosure.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (3.8%) is secured by a shopping
center located in Northridge, CA.  Occupancy decreased
significantly in late 2008 due to a bankrupt tenant (24% of the
net rentable area) vacating the property.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by, generally, applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
net operating income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on
performance issues, such as a significant decline in occupancy,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to
determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 20 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with seven loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2000-LIFE1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-LIFE1 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

The lowered ratings primarily reflect S&P's concerns about the
potential for future credit support erosion of the transaction
given the fact that eight of the 14 remaining loans in the
transaction are with the special servicer.  The downgrades also
reflect the fact that, in S&P's view, the affected classes may be
susceptible to interest shortfalls in the future that may arise
relating to the specially serviced assets, which comprise 72.7% of
the pool balance.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificate based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, eight ($56.4 million,
72.7%) of the 14 assets in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: three ($19.3 million, 24.9%) are classified as
real estate-owned, one ($9.0 million, 11.6%) is in foreclosure,
and four ($28.1 million, 36.2%) are matured balloon loans.
Appraisal reduction amounts of $9.2 million are in effect against
three of the assets.  Seven of the eight loans with the special
servicer are top 10 assets.  Details are:

The three REO assets, Highland Chase Apartments, Highland Glen
Apartments, and Highland Court Apartments, have related borrowers
and are the fourth-, fifth-, and eighth-largest exposures in
the pool, comprising the largest specially serviced exposure
totaling $22.6 million (29% of the total transaction).  All three
loan exposures were transferred to the special servicer due to
imminent maturity default.  The Highland Chase Apartments asset
($10.5 million total exposure, 11.4%) is the third-largest asset
with the special servicer.  The total exposure amount includes
approximately $1.7 million of advancing and interest thereon.  The
asset comprises a 212-unit multifamily property in Atlanta, Ga.
Current financial information was not available for this exposure.
There is a $3.4 million ARA in effect against the asset.  The
Highland Glen Apartments asset ($6.8 million total exposure, 7.4%)
is the fourth-largest asset with the special servicer.  The total
exposure amount includes approximately $1.0 million of advancing
and interest thereon.  The asset consists of a 174-unit
multifamily property in Atlanta, Ga., built in 1972.  Current
financial state is not available for this asset.  There is a
$3.1 million ARA in effect against the asset.  The Highland Court
Apartments exposure ($5.3 million total exposure, 6.0%) is the
sixth-largest asset with the special servicer.  The total exposure
amount includes approximately $596,332 of advancing and interest
thereon.  The asset comprises a 152-unit multifamily property in
San Rafael, Calif., built in 1970.  As of December 2008, reported
DSC and occupancy were 1.16x and 87.7%, respectively.  A
$2.6 million ARA is in effect against the asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of all three assets.

The Jabil Circuit Building loan ($17.4 million total exposure,
21.5%) is the largest exposure in the pool and the largest asset
with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 181,736-sq.-
ft. industrial property in Santa Clara, Calif.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in November 2009 due to
imminent maturity default.  According to the special servicer, a
maturity extension is in the process of being finalized.  As of
year-end 2008, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.36x and 100%,
respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The Robb & Stucky Retail Store loan ($9.4 million total exposure,
11.6%) is the third-largest exposure in the pool and the second-
largest asset with the special servicer.  The asset is a 113,071-
sq.-ft. retail property in Scottsdale, Ariz., built in 1997.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in October 2009 and
is currently in foreclosure.  As of the 12 months ended April
2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.45x and 100%,
respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The QuadraMed Building loan ($5.5 million total exposure, 6.7%) is
the sixth-largest exposure in the pool and the fifth-largest asset
with the special servicer.  The total exposure amount includes
approximately $360,378 of advancing and interest thereon.  The
loan is secured by a 33,760-sq.-ft. office property in San Rafael,
Calif., built in 1999.  The asset was transferred to the special
servicer in November 2009 due to imminent maturity default.  As of
December 2008, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.52x and 100%,
respectively, however the building is currently 100% vacant.
According to the special servicer, the single tenant did not renew
its lease, which expired on Dec. 31, 2009.  S&P expects a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The JCPenney Credit Processing Center loan ($4.6 million total
exposure, 5.8%) is the ninth-largest loan in the pool and the
seventh-largest asset with the special servicer.  The total
exposure amount includes approximately $127,584 of advancing and
interest thereon.  The loan is secured by a 67,775-sq.-ft. office
property in Longwood, Fla., built in 1982.  The asset was
transferred to the special servicer in November 2009 due to
imminent maturity default.  As of September 2009, reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.55x and 100%, respectively.  S&P expects a
minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Illinois Tool Works loan ($1.8 million, 2.3%) is the eighth-
largest asset with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a
48,024-sq.-ft. industrial property in Bolingbrook, Ill., built in
1999.  The asset was transferred to the special servicer in
January 2010 due to imminent maturity default.  As of the year-end
2008, reported DSC and occupancy were 2.07x and 100%,
respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $77.5 million, down from $689.5 million
at issuance.  The pool includes 14 loan exposures, down from 133
at issuance.  The master servicer provided full-year 2008 or full-
year 2009 financial information for 81.2% of the loans in the
pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.51x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  This calculation includes six
($41.8 million, 53.9%) of the transaction's eight specially
serviced assets.

The master servicer reported one ($4.9 million, 6.4%) loan on the
watchlist, which is the seventh-largest loan in the pool and
discussed below.  One ($4.9 million, 6.4%) asset in the pool has a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x.  To date, the pool has
experienced principal losses totaling $12.3 million, on seven
assets.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures in the pool have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $73.2 million (94.5%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.49x for the top 10 loan exposures.  Seven ($56.4 million,
72.7%) of the top 10 exposures are currently with the special
servicer, all of which S&P discussed in the 'Credit
Considerations' section above.  One top 10 asset appears on the
master servicer's watchlist.

The Broadway Village Apartments loan ($4.9 million, 6.4%) is the
seventh-largest exposure in the pool, and the only exposure on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan exposure is secured by a
220-unit multifamily property in Oklahoma City, Okla.  As of
December 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.94x and 86.0%,
respectively.  The DSC figure compares with a December 2008 DSC of
1.10x.  The asset appears on the master servicer's watchlist for
the low DSC and occupancy.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria and the lowered and affirmed ratings are
consistent with S&P's analysis.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-LIFE1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----           ----------------------
    E          BBB-    A-/Watch Neg                    64.19
    F          BB      BBB+/Watch Neg                  55.30
    G          B+      BBB+/Watch Neg                  53.08
    H          B-      BB+/Watch Neg                   35.29
    J          CCC+    BB/Watch Neg                    26.40
    K          CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                   19.73

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-LIFE1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

    Class        Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
    -----        ------               ----------------------
    C            AA+                                   97.54
    D            AA                                    86.42
    X            AAA                                     N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-22 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class IIA and IIIA notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES
SPC's series 2007-11 and the class II notes issued by Morgan
Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-22.  Both transactions are
synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

The downgrades follow recent write-downs to the underlying
reference entities, which have caused the classes to incur partial
principal losses.

                         Ratings Lowered

                 Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2007-11

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                    Class      To       From
                    -----      --       ----
                    IIA        CC       CCC-
                    IIIA       D        CCC-

                      Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                          Series 2006-22

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                    Class      To       From
                    -----      --       ----
                    II         CC       CCC-


N-STAR REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes of notes issued by N-
Star Real Estate CDO III, Ltd., due to negative credit migration
of the portfolio since last review.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, the credit quality
of the collateral has declined with approximately 38.8% of the
portfolio downgraded an average 5.6 notches.  Approximately 63% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 16.8% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or below, as
compared to 30.5% and 3.1%, respectively, at last review.
Currently, six assets which comprise 7.6% of the portfolio are
experiencing interest shortfalls or deferring interest payments.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for the classes A-1 through D notes are generally consistent with
the ratings assigned below.

The Negative Rating Outlook on classes A-1 through C-2 reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to
face refinance risk at maturity.  Additionally, Fitch assigned
Loss Severity ratings to these classes of notes.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should
always be considered in conjunction with the probability of
default for tranches.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings and
Outlooks for classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

N-Star III is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
March 10, 2005.  The transaction's revolving period ended in March
2010.  The current portfolio consists of 107 bonds from 92
obligors, of which 74.1% are commercial mortgage backed securities
from the 1996 through 2009 vintages, 13.9% are commercial real
estate loans, 9.7% are structured finance CDOs, and 2.3% are real
estate investment trust debt securities.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned LS ratings for these classes as
indicated:

  -- $290,917,765 class A-1 notes to 'BB/LS2' from 'BBB+', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14,872,148 class A-2A notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4,957,383 class A-2B notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16,855,101 class B notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB-', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4,957,383 class C-1A notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+', remain
     Outlook to Negative;

  -- $5,948,859 class C-1B notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+, Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11,897,718 class C-2A notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $1,982,953 class C-2B notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15,863,624 class D notes to 'CCC' from 'B'.


NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 25 classes
of notes from NextStudent Master Trust I.  The senior notes remain
under review for further possible downgrade.  The underlying
collateral consists of government guaranteed student loans
originated under the Federal Family Education Loan Program.  The
rating actions were prompted by the acceleration and liquidation
of the trust collateral following events of default under the
trust indenture.  Citigroup Capital Market, Inc., was appointed as
the Liquidation Agent to conduct the public sale of the trust
assets.  Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas is the Indenture
Trustee and the Master Servicer and Administrator of the trust.

The indenture trustee has been directed by the Directing Holders,
i.e. noteholders representing a majority of the senior notes
outstanding and a majority of the subordinate notes outstanding,
to declare an acceleration of the trust and liquidate the
collateral to redeem outstanding obligations.  A minimum
collateral sale price was set at 93% of outstanding principal
balance of the senior notes plus the accrued interest, subject to
the estimated costs associated with the liquidation process and
other expenses incurred by the trust.  The final sale is scheduled
to occur on July 21, 2010.

The rating downgrades reflect Moody's expected recovery rates of
93% of the outstanding senior notes and 0% of the outstanding
subordinate notes.  The senior notes remain on review for further
possible downgrade, as higher than estimated expenses may lower
the final recovery rate.

Primary sources of uncertainty with regard to expected recoveries
on the notes are final collateral sale price, actual expenses
incurred through the sale process and whether the public sale will
be successful.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: NextStudent Master Trust I

  -- 2006A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2006B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- 2007A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-6, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-11, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-12, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-13, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-14, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007A-15, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Jun 24, 2009 Confirmed at
     B3

  -- 2007B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 69 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 69
tranches and confirmed the ratings on 3 tranches from 10 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Nomura.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AP2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AP3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AP1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR4

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR5

  -- Cl. I-A-I, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR6

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-WF1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


NOMURA ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1998-D6 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Nomura Asset
Securities Corp.'s series 1998-D6 and removed one of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on six other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
mezzanine and subordinate classes reflect credit support erosion
that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of
seven specially serviced assets.  In addition, S&P also considered
current and potential interest shortfalls in arriving at S&P's
ratings on the class B-2 certificates.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.52x and a loan-to-value ratio of 60.4%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.27x and an LTV ratio of 78.5%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
18.0% and 49.6%, respectively.  All of the adjusted DSC and LTV
calculations excluded seven ($96.1 million, 7.9%) specially
serviced assets and 34 ($558.6 million, 45.8%) defeased loans.
S&P separately estimated losses for the seven specially serviced
assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, eight assets
($115.6 million, 9.5%), including the largest and seventh-largest
exposures in the pool, were with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: three ($9.8 million, 0.8%) are in foreclosure,
three ($7.1 million, 0.6%) are more than 90 days delinquent,
one ($19.5 million, 1.6%) is 60 days delinquent, and one
($79.2 million, 6.5%) is 30 days delinquent.  Appraisal reduction
amounts totaling $81.2 million are in effect for seven of these
assets.

The Springfield Mall loan, the largest loan in the pool, and the
largest asset with the special servicer, has a trust balance of
$79.2 million and a whole-loan balance of $158.5 million.  The
exposure in the trust totals $80.7 million (6.6%), which includes
$1.5 million of advancing and interest thereon.  A $79.2 million
pari passu portion is included in the Commercial Mortgage Asset
Trust 1999-C1 transaction.  The loan is secured by a 1.4 million-
sq.-ft. mall in Springfield, Va.  This 15-year loan bears interest
at a fixed rate of 8.5%.  It amortizes on a 30-year schedule and
has an anticipated repayment date of April 11, 2013.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 3, 2009, due to
imminent default.  The collateral property is affected by low
occupancy, which as of Nov. 2, 2009, was 66.9% for the entire
property and 50.2% for the in-line space.  As of Dec. 31, 2009,
DSC was 0.23x.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss
upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Schostak Northville loan, the seventh-largest exposure in the
pool, has a total exposure of $20.0 million (1.6%), which consists
of $19.5 million of unpaid principal balance and $0.5 million of
advancing and interest thereon.  The loan is secured by two
anchored retail centers with an aggregate of 318,390 sq. ft. in
Utica, Mich.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Dec. 11, 2007, due to imminent default.  The special servicer
indicated that the borrower has executed a loan modification, and
the loan will be returned to the master servicer once it has
performed for three consecutive months.

The six remaining specially serviced loans ($16.9 million, 1.4%)
have balances that individually represent less than $4.5 million,
or 0.4% of the total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses ranging
from 16.8% to 82.3% for these assets.

Three loans ($20.8 million, 0.6%) that were previously with the
special servicer have been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided the loans
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.  Once the
special servicer returns the Schostak Northville loan to the
master servicer, it will be entitled to a workout fee in
connection with the loan.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust balance
was $1.22 billion, which represents 32.8% of the aggregate pooled
trust balance at issuance.  There are 114 assets in the pool, down
from 325 at issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The master servicer provided
financial information for 93.0% of the loans in the pool, and
93.6% of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008,
interim 2009, or full-year 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.48x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.52x
and 60.4%, respectively, which exclude seven ($96.1 million, 7.9%)
specially serviced assets and 34 ($558.6 million, 45.8%) defeased
loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the seven specially
serviced assets, three of which had reported financial data.  If
S&P were to have included these loans in its calculation, its
adjusted DSC would have been 1.36x.  To date, the trust has
experienced principal losses totaling $50.2 million relating to 21
assets.  Eleven loans ($46.6 million, 3.8%), including the ninth-
largest real estate exposure in the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Twenty-two loans ($212.1 million, 17.4%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 16 of these loans
($143.3 million, 11.7%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $365.1 million (29.9%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the
top 10 exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for these loans were
1.50x and 59.2%, respectively.  The largest and seventh-largest
exposures in the pool, which are with the special servicer, were
excluded from S&P's calculations.  The ninth-largest real estate
exposure appears on the master servicer's watchlist and is
discussed below.

The McGraw-Hill Headquarters loan ($17.2 million, 1.4%), the
ninth-largest exposure in the pool, is secured by a 149,312-sq.-
ft. office building in Burr Ridge, Ill.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Dec. 31, 2009,
the property had a reported DSC of 0.78x.  The reported occupancy
was 97.3% as of March 31, 2010.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-D6

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    B-4    CCC-           B+/Watch Neg                     3.51

                         Ratings Lowered

                   Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-D6

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    B-2    BB-            BBB-                            11.84

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-D6

            Class  Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
            -----  ------        ----------------------
            A-1C   AAA                            80.80
            A-2    AAA                            62.61
            A-3    AAA                            45.94
            A-4    AAA                            32.30
            A-5    AA-                            27.76
            B-1    BBB                            14.87


NOVASTAR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 44 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 44
tranches from 12 RMBS transactions issued by NovaStar.  One bond's
rating has been upgraded as it has accumulated protection against
future losses.  The collateral backing these deal primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate subprime
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust Series 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-5

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-6

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


OWNIT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 34
tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by Ownit.  Three bonds'
ratings have been upgraded as they have accumulated protection
against future losses.  The collateral backing these deal
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).  Once the baseline rate is
set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans
remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in
the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool,
the higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the
loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is
increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a
pool with 74 loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new
delinquency would be 20.20%.  If current delinquency levels in a
small pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect
this trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: OwnIt Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: OwnIt Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. AV, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: S&P Cuts Ratings on Five 2000-C1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Prudential
Securities Secured Financing Corp.'s series KEY 2000-C1 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the
same transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of interest shortfalls
affecting the trust.  As of the June 2010 remittance report, the
trust experienced current interest shortfalls of $29,674, and had
amassed cumulative interest shortfalls of $1,576,759.  The
downgrade of class L reflects accumulated interest shortfalls.  If
this class experiences additional interest shortfalls, S&P will
lower the rating to 'D'.  The downgrades of the other classes
reflect a reduction of available interest to the trust, and the
potential for these classes to experience interest shortfalls in
the future because of assets that are currently with the special
servicer (31.3% of the pool) and an asset that S&P has deemed to
be credit-impaired (5.7%) and at increased risk of default and
loss.

The current interest shortfalls primarily stem from special
servicing fees and appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
associated with six of the seven assets with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. These six assets have appraisal reduction
amounts totaling $11.7 million, which generated current ASERs in
the aggregate amount of $47,630.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificate based on S&P's current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, seven ($42.7 million,
31.3%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer.  Two
($13.4 million, 9.8%) of the assets are classified as real estate
owned, one ($5.7 million, 4.2%) is in foreclosure, and four
($23.6 million, 17.3%) are classified as matured balloon loans.
ARAs in the aggregate amount of $11.7 million are in effect
against six of the assets.

The 4000 Alameda loan ($18.0 million total exposure, 13.2%) is the
largest real estate exposure in the pool and currently with the
special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 112,764-sq.-ft. office
asset in Burbank, Calif.  As of September 2009, reported DSC and
occupancy were 1.57x and 100.0%, respectively.  There is a
$4.5 million ARA in effect against the asset.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in December 2009.  The
borrower was not able to payoff the loan on its Jan. 1, 2010,
maturity date.  According to the special servicer, the borrower
has continued to remit payments postmaturity, and resolution
discussions are ongoing.

The Northcrest Village Shopping Center asset ($11.5 million total
exposure, 8.4%) is the fourth-largest real estate exposure in the
pool and the second-largest asset with the special servicer.  The
asset is secured by a 136,275-sq.-ft. retail property in
Carrollton, Texas.  As of December 2009, reported cash flow was
negative, and occupancy was 20.3%.  There is a $3.1 million ARA in
effect against the asset.  The exposure was transferred to the
special servicer in November 2008, and became REO in May 2009.
Standard & Poor's anticipates a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of the asset.

The Kennedy Center loan ($6.8 million total exposure, 4.9%) is the
seventh-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the third-
largest asset with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a
173,996-sq.-ft. office asset in Denver, Colo.  As of September
2009, reported cash flow was negative, and occupancy was 30.3%.
There is a $1.5 million ARA in effect against the asset.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in January 2009.  The
asset is classified as being in foreclosure, and according to the
special servicer, a receiver for the asset was appointed in
January 2010.  Standard & Poor's anticipates a severe loss upon
the eventual resolution of the asset.

The remaining four specially serviced assets are not amongst the
top 10 real estate exposures in the pool.  S&P estimated losses
for two of these four assets, and they had a weighted-average loss
severity of 53.0%.  The two assets S&P did not estimate losses for
are fairly recent special servicing transfers.  Both assets were
transferred to the special servicer due to maturity default and
have limited resolution information currently available.  One of
the assets was transferred to the special servicer in February and
had a reported DSC of 1.34x as of December 2009.  The other asset
was transferred to the special servicer in March and had a
reported DSC of 1.10x as of December 2009.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined one
loan to be credit-impaired.  The Garden Quarter Apartments loan
($7.8 million, 5.7%) is the sixth-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The loan is secured by a 272-unit multifamily property
in Terre Haute, Ind.  As of March 2010, reported DSC and occupancy
were 0.63x and 93.0%, respectively.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's (KeyBank Real Estate Capital) watchlist because
of its low DSC.  Given the property's poor performance, S&P
considers this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

Excluding specially serviced and defeased assets, 32.3% of the
pool (on a balance basis) is scheduled to mature through December
2011.  This fact was a consideration in S&P's rating
recommendations.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $136.6 million, down from $816.3
million at issuance.  The pool includes 26 assets, down from 166
at issuance.  The master servicer provided interim 2009 or full-
year 2009 financial information for 99.5% of the nondefeased
assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.10x for the pool based on the reported figures.  This
calculation includes four ($21.2 million, 15.5%) of the
transaction's seven specially serviced assets, and one
($7.8 million, 5.7%) asset that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired.  All of these assets reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

The master servicer reported a watchlist of four ($19.7 million,
14.4%) loans, including two of the top 10 loan exposures, the
Garden Quarter Apartments loan, which S&P discussed above, and the
Inman Grove Shopping Center Loan, which S&P discuss below.  Seven
($31.8 million, 23.3%) assets in the pool have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, and six ($31.0 million, 22.7%) assets have a
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.  To date, the pool has
experienced principal losses totaling $13.8 million on 13 assets.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $86.3 million (63.2%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.10x for the top 10 real estate assets.  Three ($33.5 million,
24.5%) of the top 10 exposures are currently with the special
servicer, which S&P discussed in the "Credit Considerations"
section.  S&P determined one other ($7.8 million, 5.7%) top 10
asset to be credit impaired.  Two ($16.8 million, 12.3%) of the
top 10 assets, the Garden Quarter Apartments loan and the Inman
Grove Shopping Center Loan, appear on the master servicer's
watchlist.

The Inman Grove Shopping Center loan ($9.0 million, 6.6%) is the
fifth-largest asset in the pool and the largest asset on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 112,406-
sq.-ft. retail property in Edison, N.J.  As of December 2009,
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.60x and 95.7%, respectively.
The asset appears on the master servicer's watchlist for a major
tenant's upcoming lease expiration.  The watchlist indicates that
Stop & Shop's lease, which represents 41.6% of the property's net
rentable area, is scheduled to come due this October, and that
Stop & Shop and the borrower are negotiating a lease renewal.
According to the watchlist, projected DSC and occupancy without
Stop & Shop are 1.21x and 54.0%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria; the lowered and affirmed ratings are consistent
with S&P's analysis.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series KEY 2000-C1

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     G          A       A+/Watch Neg                    49.12
     H          BB      BBB/Watch Neg                   25.21
     J          B+      BBB-/Watch Neg                  22.22
     K          CCC+    BB/Watch Neg                    17.74
     L          CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                    8.77

                         Ratings Affirmed

           Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series KEY 2000-C1

     Class        Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----        ------               ----------------------
     C            AAA                                   87.96
     D            AAA                                   80.49
     E            AA+                                   73.02
     F            AA-                                   59.57
     X            AAA                                     N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


RUTLAND RATED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Sedona 2005-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of notes issued by Rutland
Rated Investments - Sedona 2005-2 following final credit event
settlements.

The downgrade is a result of write-downs on the notes following
realized principal losses from exposure to the Aiful Corporation
credit event.

Sedona 2005-2 is a static synthetic collateralized swap obligation
that closed in November 2005.  The transaction gives investors
leveraged access to the credit risk of a diverse portfolio of
corporate reference entities.  Sedona 2005-2 gains access to the
credit risk of the portfolio via a credit default swap between
Sedona 2005-2 and Bear Stearns Credit Products (guaranteed by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. rated 'F1+/AA-' with a Stable Outlook).
The transaction has a scheduled maturity date of Dec. 20, 2012 for
the class A6-F1 notes.  The rating of the notes addresses the
likelihood that investors will receive full and timely payments of
interest and ultimate receipt of principal by the scheduled
maturity date.

Fitch has taken this rating action:

  -- $1,425,253 class A6-F1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/RR6'.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade five tranches
from four auto loan securitizations sponsored by Santander
Consumer USA Inc. between 2006 and 2007.  The actions are a result
of updated lower lifetime loss expectations since the previous
actions in February 2009.

Moody's current lifetime cumulative net loss projections for the
affected transactions ranges between 27% and 30% of the original
pool balance.  This is up from the original range (at the time of
closing) of 17.25% to 21% for the transactions.  During its review
period, Moody's will continue to refine its assessment of the pool
performance relative to the available credit enhancement levels.

Total hard credit enhancement (excluding available excess spread)
for the affected tranches ranges from approximately 28% to 32% of
the outstanding collateral pool balances.  The transactions also
benefit from excess spread, which ranged between 9% and 11% on an
annual basis.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely ranges of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
ranges may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected ranges will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a ranges of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; we expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from monoline
bond insurer.  The current ratings on the below notes are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2006-2

  -- Current Rating: Cl. A-3, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2007-1

  -- Current Rating: Cl. A-4, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (WR; previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1)

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2007-2

  -- Current Rating: Cl. A-3, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2007-3

  -- Current Rating: Cl. A-4-A, Ba3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (WR; previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1)

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Current Rating: Cl. A-4-B, Ba3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (WR; previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1)

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3


SASCO 2008-C2: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Secured Notes at 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class of
Notes issued by SASCO 2008-C2, LLC.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

SASCO 2008-C2, LLC is a cash CRE CDO transaction backed by Term
Loans (35.5% of the collateral par), Mezzanine Loans (32.3%) and
Whole Loans (32.2%).  As of the June 28, 2010 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction, including Preferred
Shares, has decreased to $2,940 million from $3,435 million at
issuance, with paydowns directed to the SASCO 2008-C2 LLC Secured
Floating Rate Term Note.

The Note is being affirmed to reflect continuing uncertainty
relating to the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

The rating actions are:

  -- SASCO 2008-C2 LLC Secured Floating Rate Term Note, Affirmed
     at Ca; previously on April 29, 2009, Downgraded to Ca

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated April 29, 2009.


SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 53 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 53
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 14 tranches, and upgraded the
rating of 1 tranche from 20 RMBS transactions issued by
Securitized Asset Backed Receivables.  The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The downgrades are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).  Once the baseline rate is
set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans
remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in
the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool,
the higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the
loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is
increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a
pool with 74 loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new
delinquency would be 20.20%.  If current delinquency levels in a
small pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect
this trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

One tranche included in this action, noted below, is wrapped by
Syncora Guarantee Inc (rated Ca, outlook developing).  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-EC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR4

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 20,
     2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3C, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Mar 20, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 46 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 46
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 11 tranches, and upgraded the
rating of 1 tranche from 11 RMBS transactions issued by
Securitized Asset Backed Receivables.  The collateral backing
these deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-
rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).  Once the baseline rate is
set, further adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans
remaining in the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in
the pool.  The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool,
the higher the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the
loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is
increased by 1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a
pool with 74 loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new
delinquency would be 20.20%.  If current delinquency levels in a
small pool is low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect
this trend.  To account for that, the rate calculated above is
multiplied by a factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current
delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5% to greater than 50%
respectively.  Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate
expected losses are projected using the approach described in the
methodology publication.

One tranche included in this action, noted below, is wrapped by
MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3, Outlook Negative on
Jun 25, 2009).  For securities insured by a financial guarantor,
the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR2

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR5

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 20,
     2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-CB1

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SHORE RE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on 2010-1 Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it withdrew its 'BB+'
preliminary rating on Shore Re Ltd.'s Series 2010-1 Class B notes.
S&P had assigned a preliminary rating to these notes on June 11,
2010.  S&P withdrew this rating because Shore Re Ltd. has chosen
not to issue the Class B notes.

                           Ratings List

           Shore Re Ltd.'s Series 2010-1 Class B notes

                                                 To     From
                                                 --     ----
        Preliminary senior secured debt rating   NR     BB+


SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Series 2007-C1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class of
Sovereign Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1.  The downgrade is due
to an aggregate $11.9 million loss which has resulted in a 100%
principal loss for Classes M and N and a 6% principal loss for
Class L.

Moody's also placed Classes A-J through L on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans, increased interest shortfalls
and refinance risk associated with loans approaching maturity in
an adverse environment.  Sixty-three loans or 25% of the pool
matures in the next 24 months.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 22, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to
$869.2 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 224 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 21% of the pool.

Eighty-seven loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$11.9 million aggregate loss (35% loss severity on average).
Currently five loans, representing 4% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is The Marina
Palms Apartments Loan ($17.4 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which
is secured by a 229-unit apartment complex located in Bradenton,
Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 due to payment default.  Foreclosure proceedings
are underway.  The remaining four loans are secured by multifamily
and mixed use properties.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$438,349, affecting Classes F through N.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and loan modifications.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and interest shortfalls as well as
the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $105,205,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $15,211,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $17,745,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $20,281,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $10,140,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $7,605,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $2,535,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $2,535,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class J, $3,803,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class K, $2,535,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class L, $3, 590,527, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
     to Ca from B3 on 2/6/2009


STARLING FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on 2006-18 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'B+' rating on the
series 2006-18 notes from Starling Finance PLC, a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transaction, at the issuer's
request.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2004 Whale 4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004 Whale 4.  The affirmations
reflect the positive impact of lower leverage due to loan
modification, the inherent value of the asset, improving market
fundamentals for luxury lodging properties and the offsetting
negative impact of the performance of the underlying collateral.
The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased to $60 million from
$68 million at last review.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing on April 6, 2009 due to maturity default (final maturity
date was April 4, 2010).  The terms of the modification and
extension agreement included the pay down of the trust debt by
$7.5 million and a new loan maturity date of October 4, 2010.
There are no more extension options available.  There is a a non-
pooled or a rake class totaling $2 million that is part of the
trust in addition to a C note of $20 million outside the trust.

The Ritz Carlton New Orleans Loan ($60 million - 100% of trust
balance) is secured by two adjacent luxury hotel properties
totaling 757 guest rooms located in New Orleans, LA.  They are The
Ritz-Carlton, New Orleans (527 guestrooms) and The Iberville
Suites, New Orleans (230 guestrooms).  The property's operating
performance was significantly impacted by Hurricane Katrina, and
upon re-opening, by the economic downturn.

The lodging sector experienced unprecedented levels of stress
during the last two years.  However, March 2010 was the first
month since 4Q 2008, where US lodging segment as a whole, achieved
positive Revenue per Available Room growth compared to the same
period from the prior year.  US lodging performance has continued
to gain momentum since, and the properties located in the top 25
MSAs are outperforming those of the overall US.

Hotels in the top 25 MSAs tend to be of higher quality assets that
are able to charge premium rates.  With increases in both
occupancy and Average Daily Rates, combined with limited new
supply, RevPAR is expected to make a quick rebound.  The upper-end
of the lodging properties experienced the most declines since 4Q
2008 but is showing the greatest improvement in demand as Moody's
rebound from this cycle.

Although, the loan's 2009 year-end performance was significantly
lower than historical levels, Moody's do not believe that it is
representative of the subject's stabilized performance or its
inherent value.  In recognition of the high quality of these
assets, strong brand affiliation and recovering market
fundamentals for lodging assets in New Orleans, Moody's believe
the pool warrants an affirmation at this time.

An updated appraisal dated May 2009, valued the hotels at
$72 million, or approximately $95,000/key.  Moody's sustainable
value is $60 million or $80,000/key.  In late 2009, 322-guestroom
Windsor Court Hotel New Orleans, was sold by Orient-Express Hotels
Ltd. for $44 million or approximately $135,000/key.  This property
does have much higher ratio of suites versus standard guestrooms,
and is frequently recognized as one of the market leaders in New
Orleans.  However, Moody's sustainable value reflects a
significant discount to a transaction that was done at the bottom
of a cycle.

Moody's loan to value ratio for the pooled balance declined to 96%
from last review of 102%.  Moody's LTV ratio including the rake is
99%.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the trust
including the rake is at 0.66X compared to 0.40X at last review.
However, due to low interest rate environment the actual DSCR is
in excess of 3.0X.  The pool has not experienced any losses since
securitization.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X-1, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on October
     5, 2004 assigned Aaa

  -- Class K, $26,489,385, affirmed at Caa1; previously on March
     5, 2009 downgraded to Caa1 from B3

  -- Class L, $31,608,000, affirmed at Caa3; previously on March
     5, 2009 downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- Class RC, $1,986,932, affirmed at Ca; previously on March 5,
     2009 downgraded to Ca from Caa2


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2005 Whale 6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded one class of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005 Whale
6.  The affirmation of the senior classes reflect anticipated
repayment of the larger (73.5% of trust balance) of the two
remaining loans in the pool.  The smaller collateral in the trust
is currently in special servicing due to imminent default, and
will become the trust's only exposure upon the payoff of the
larger loan.  The performance of this property is expected to
remain challenging into the foreseeable future, and is the driver
of the downgrade.  This rating action is a result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged at $68 million,
same as last review.  The largest loan in the pool (Grand Resort
Apartments Loan) has a refinancing commitment in place, and as
such, the master servicer has extended the loan through September
9, 2010 (final maturity date was May, 9, 2010) as permitted by the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement.

The 230 Peachtree Loan ($18 million - 26.5% of the trust balance)
is secured by a 414, 768 square foot Class A office building
located in downtown Atlanta, GA.  The building was completed in
1965 and renovated in 1997.  As of 1Q 2010, the building was 71%
leased to approximately 40 tenants.  The property's net operating
income for 2009 was $2.2 million.  NOI for the trailing three
month period ending March 2010 was $500,000.  Moody's sustainable
NOI assumption is $2.1 million.

According to CBRE Econometric Advisor's Market Snapshot Report,
Summer 2010 edition, Downtown vacancy rate for Class A buildings
was approximately 24% for 1Q 2010.  Their forecasts for the
Downtown submarket puts vacancy rates in excess of 20% until 2014,
and declining rental rates until 2013.  The downtown submarket is
still experiencing new additions to supply and since real estate
recovery tends to lag that of the general economy, it is hard to
foresee robust demand for office space in the near future.
Furthermore, the subject property has underperformed the market
historically.

The $28 million mortgage loan includes a $10 million non-trust
junior component.  The loan sponsor is Southcoast Capital
Management Corporation.  Moody's sustainable value assumption for
this property is $17.4 million.  Moody's trust loan to value ratio
is 103%, and Moody's trust stressed debt service coverage ratio is
1.05X.

This loan was transferred to special servicing on May 25, 2010 due
to imminent default (final maturity date was July 9, 2010).  The
special servicer is currently waiting for third party reports, and
is in a dialogue with the sponsor.  The trust has not realized any
losses since securitization, and there are no interest shortfalls
to date.

Moody's LTV ratio for the trust balance is 85% and the stressed
DSCR is 1.14X.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X-1B, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     October 24, 2005

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on October
     24, 2005

  -- Class H, $13,346,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     September 25, 2008 upgraded to Aaa from A3

  -- Class J, $21,861,000, affirmed at A2; previously on September
     25, 2008 upgraded to A2 from Baa2

  -- Class K, $32,793,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     on March 5, 2009 downgraded to B2 from Ba3


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2006-C23 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of nine classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded 16 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C23.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from specially serviced and poorly performing watchlisted loans.

The affirmations and confirmation are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 17 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on June 30, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial backed securities transactions.

As of the June 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $4.1 billion
from $4.2 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 307 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 36%
of the pool.  Currently, there are two loans, representing 1% of
the pool, with investment grade underlying ratings.  Two loans,
representing 0.4% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Sixty-nine loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date; however, there
are 15 loans, representing 10% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 1775
Broadway Office Loan ($248.7 million -- 6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 703,000 square foot Class B office building located
on 57th Street between 8th Avenue and Broadway in Manhattan.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2010 for
imminent default and is now 90+ days delinquent.  The sponsor is
Joseph Moinian.  The property's recent performance has been
negatively impacted by a comprehensive renovation and
repositioning project that is still underway.  As of May 2010, the
property was 23% leased compared to 96% at securitization.  Given
the strength of the midtown New York office market, the quality of
the renovations that are underway and the competitive location of
the building, Moody's is not currently estimating a loss and the
loan is included in the conduit pool.  Moody's valuation is based
on the current market rent of $60/SF and a 20% vacancy factor.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 126% and 0.73X, respectively,
compared to 121% and 0.81X at last review.

The remaining 14 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $90.6 million loss
for 12 of the specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on
average).  The special servicer has recognized a cumulative
$76 million appraisal reduction for 12 of the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 11 poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $31.5 million loss for these troubled loans
(overall 29% expected loss based on a weighted average 58% default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and 2009 operating
results for 89% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 108%
compared to 135% at Moody's prior review in February 2009.  The
prior review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 rating sweep
of 2006-2009 vintage conduit and fusion CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.24X and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
1.08X and 0.91X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 49 compared to 53 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Cavalier Country
Club Apartment Loan ($26.2 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 32-building apartment complex.  Comprised of 744
units, the complex is located in Newark, Delaware.  As of December
2009, the property was 94% leased compared to 92% in 2008.  The
property's performance remains in-line with last review.  The loan
matures in January 2016 and is amortizing on a 360-month schedule.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.31X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.28X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the 594
Broadway Loan ($24.0 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 12-story, 217,000 SF Class B office building located
at the corner of Broadway and Houston Street in SoHo.  As of May
2010, the property was 93% leased compared to 99% in 2008.  The
property is predominantly leased to small tenants that occupy no
more than 5% of the net rentable area.  Performance remains in-
line with last review.  The sponsor is Jeffrey Gural.  The loan
matures in February 2016 and is full term interest only.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.71X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.65X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the outstanding pool
balance.  The largest conduit loan is the Prime Outlet Pool Loan
($305.3 million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by ten outlet
centers located across eight states.  The total gross leasable
area is 3.5 million SF.  The loan represents a 50% interest in a
$610 million first mortgage loan.  As of December 2009, the
portfolio was 90% leased compared to 95% in 2008.  The largest
tenants are Vanity Fair Outlet (3.5% of the GLA; leases expire in
2014); The Gap (3% of the GLA; leases expire in 2013, 2014 and
2019) and Nike (2% of the GLA; lease expires in 2011).  The
portfolio's performance has improved significantly due to higher
revenues.  The loan matures in July 2016 and is amortizing on a
360-month schedule.  The sponsor is Simon Property Group.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to
126% and 0.81X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 620 Avenue of the Americas
Loan ($205 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 7-
story, 670,000 SF mixed-use building located in the
Flatiron/Chelsea sub-market of Manhattan.  The loan is encumbered
with a $30 million B-note and $30 million of mezzanine debt.  As
of January 2010, the property was 84% leased compared to 77% in
April 2008.  Filene's Basement, which occupied 6% of the NRA
vacated when its leased expired in March 2010.  The Gap, which is
the largest office tenant, occupies 33% of the NRA and will vacate
when its lease expires in November 2010.  As a replacement, Local
Union SEIU 32BJ has signed a lease to occupy 283,000 SF.  Moody's
cash flow analysis reflects an improvement in the property's
performance due to the anticipated increase in occupancy.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.77X, respectively, compared
131% and 0.74X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Hyatt Center Loan
($163 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 49-story,
1.47 million SF, Class A office building located in the West Loop
sub-market of Chicago.  The loan represents a 50% interest in a
$325 million first mortgage loan.  In addition, the loan is
encumbered with $75 million of mezzanine debt.  The largest
tenants are Mayer Brown LLP (27% of the NRA; lease expires in June
2020); the Hyatt Corporation (14% of the NRA; lease expires in
January 2020) and Goldman Sachs (10% of the NRA; lease expires in
March 2010).  As of January 2010, the property was 93% leased,
essentially the same as at last review.  The property's
performance has improved due to higher base revenues.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are is 110% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to
132% and 0.74X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $1,226,548, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-2, $137,307,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-3, $62,700,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-PB, $252,071,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-4, $1,280,716,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-5, $500,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-1A, $609,214,930, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-M, $422,986,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/13/2006

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-J, $274,941,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/30/2010

  -- Class B, $37,011,000, downgraded to A3 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class C, $52,873,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2; previously
     placed on for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class D, $37,011,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A3; previously
     placed on for for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class E, $31,724,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/30/2010

  -- Class F, $42,299,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class G, $52,873,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/30/2010

  -- Class H, $52,873,000, downgrade to B2 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class J, $58,161,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class K, $52,873,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class L, $10,575,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class M, $21,149,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class N, $15,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class O, $10,575,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class P, $15,862,000, downgrade to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010

  -- Class Q, $15,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade 6/30/2010


WACHOVIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 4 tranches
from one RMBS transaction issued by Wachovia.  The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2004-C11 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eleven classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C11 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted
loans and concerns about refinancing risk associated with loans
approaching maturity in an adverse lending environment.  Twenty-
two loans, representing 20% of the pool, mature within the next
three years.  Five of these loans (8% of the pool) have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.0X.

This rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased 13% to $906.8 million from
$1.04 billion at securitization.  The 54 mortgages that
collateralize the Certificates range in size from less than 1% to
10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 31% of the
pool.  Three loans, representing 6% of the pool, have defeased and
are now collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Thirteen loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loans are a mixture of multi-
family and anchored retail properties.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and troubled loans

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class D, $23,434,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned A2 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class E, $11,717,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned A3 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class F, $14,320,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa1 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class G, $13,019,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class H, $10,415,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa3 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class J, $16,924,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class K, $5,207,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba2 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class L, $2,604,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba3 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class M, $2,604,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B1 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class N, $2,603,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B2 on 5/10/2004;

  -- Class O, $2,604,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B3 on 5/10/2004


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-C17 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C17 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from actual and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 12%
to $2.4 billion from $2.7 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 210 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 32% of the pool.  Twenty-three loans,
representing 11% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Forty-three loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in a $4.5 million loss for one of the loans (66% loss
severity).  Currently 13 loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Falchi Building Loan ($43.7 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 638,712 square foot industrial/office building
located in Long Island City, New York.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in December 2009 due to imminent maturity
default and has passed its March 11, 2010 anticipated repayment
date (ARD).  The property was 89% leased as of December 2009 and
performance has been stable.  The remaining 12 specially serviced
loans are secured by a mix of multifamily, retail, office and
hospitality properties.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall
pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $187,242,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aaa on 5/10/2005

  -- Class B, $74,897,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aa2 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class C, $23,830,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Aa3 on 5/10/2005


  -- Class D, $47,661,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to A2 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class E, $27,235,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to A3 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class F, $27,235,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Baa1 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class G, $30,639,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Baa2 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class H, $37,448,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Baa3 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class J, $6,808,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Ba1 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class K, $10,213,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Ba2 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class L, $13,617,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to Ba3 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class M, $6,808,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to B1 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class N, $6,808,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to B2 on 5/10/2005

  -- Class O, $6,808,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned to B3 on 5/10/2005


WASHINGTON MUTUAL: S&P Corrects Rating on Class 4-CB Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
4-CB from Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
WMALT 2005-7 Trust by raising it to 'CCC' from 'D'.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of
Alternative A, fixed- and adjustable-rate, first- and second-lien
mortgage loans.

On June 23, 2010, S&P incorrectly lowered its rating on this class
to 'D' based on a systems error and the trustee's May 2010
remittance report, which indicated that this class had experienced
a principal write-down of $9,266.54.  However, the trustee
subsequently issued a revised remittance report that did not
include the loss previously allocated to this class.

S&P restored its rating on this class to its pre-June 23, 2010,
level, which reflects its analysis of the internal credit support
for this class as of the May 2010 remittance report.

                         Rating Corrected

       Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                         WMALT 2005-7 Trust

                                       Rating
                                       ------
     Class    CUSIP        Current     June 23     Pre-June 23
     -----    -----        -------     -------     -----------
     4-CB     93934FBU5    CCC         D           CCC


XENIA RURAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006 Water Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term and
underlying ratings on Xenia Rural Water District, Iowa's 2006
water revenue bonds to 'D' from 'BB'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view of the district's inability to
fully service its June 1, 2010, interest payment.  The district
owed $1.88 million, paying all but $69,000 of its payment on that
date, which included exhausting the remainder of its debt service
reserve.  The paying agent submitted a claim to CIFG Assurance
North America Inc., the bonds' insurer, to cover the remaining
payment.  The rating on the bonds was previously lowered to 'BB'
on Aug. 19, 2009.  Standard & Poor's typically lowers its rating
on an issue to 'D' when payments on an obligation are not made on
the date due in accordance with the terms of the documents.

At fiscal year-end Dec. 31, 2009, the district had $83.29 million
in principal outstanding of the 2006 bonds.  Due to insufficient
net revenues in fiscal 2008 (Dec. 31 year-end), the district's
last audited year, it used funds from its debt service reserve to
make payments on the bonds.  This resulted in a debt service
reserve fund of $588,000 below the required level.  The use of the
debt service reserve for payment of the bonds does not constitute
a violation of any of the district's bond covenants, but requires
the district to replenish the reserve account within 18 months of
its initial use.  The use of the reserve was due to the district's
capital projects, which have been scaled up since the bond
issuance.  The district began rebuilding its reserves ahead of its
bond covenant (one-eighteenth of the deficit each month), largely
restoring them by March 2008 with interest earnings expected to
restore the remainder.  It had nearly restored the entire reserve
by November 2008 but drew it down in December 2008 and continued
to draw it down until it was completely exhausted with the June 1,
2010 payment.  Given the current financial situation, S&P
understands that the district is looking at various options to
address budget situations.  It raised rates in March 2010.

Xenia Rural Water District's service area is mostly rural and is
currently made up of Boone and Dallas counties, as well as parts
of other counties, located to the west and northwest of Des
Moines.  The district customer base has grown steadily, at an
average annual rate of 5.3%, increasing to about 9,300 at fiscal
year-end 2008 from 7,550 at fiscal year-end 2005.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Detroit, Michigan's GO Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Detroit, Michigan's
general obligation bonds as part of its continuous surveillance
effort:

  -- Approximately $543 million unlimited tax general obligation
     bonds affirmed at 'BB+';

  -- Approximately $1,484.5 million pension certificates of
     participation series 2005 A, 2006 A, and 2006B affirmed at
     'BB+';

  -- Approximately $423 million limited tax general obligation
     bonds affirmed at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's expectations for
     further weakening of the city's revenues combined with
     challenges in implementing further meaningful expenditure
     reductions.

  -- Sizable budget imbalances, related both to optimistic revenue
     estimates and inability to fully realize spending reductions,
     have resulted in a large accumulated general fund balance
     deficit, although this has been reduced with the issuance of
     deficit reduction bonds.

  -- A history of delayed financial reporting continues, although
     there has been some recent improvement and management
     represents that further improvement is forthcoming.

  -- Economic indicators, including housing, wealth, and
     employment-related factors are chronically weak.

  -- Dependence on automobile manufacturing results in sustained
     very high unemployment rate

  -- The debt burden is very high.

  -- Increased management stability appears evident.

  -- The recent issuance of long-term debt is expected to replace
     the uncertainty of needing to issue cash flow notes on an
     annual basis.

What Could Trigger A Downgrade?

  -- Management's inability to begin to reverse trend of large
     operating gaps and make meaningful progress towards
     eliminating the accumulated deficit;

  -- Insufficiency of recent deficit bond issuance to provide
     necessary liquidity for the medium term;

  -- Direction of currently very weak economic factors.

Security:

GOULT bonds are supported by the city's unlimited property tax
pledge.  GOLT bonds are a first budget obligation.  Pension
certificates of participation are unconditional contractual
obligations of the city, not subject to appropriation.  If the
city failed to make a COP debt service payment, the contract
administrator could file a lawsuit against the city to enforce the
obligation, and a court can compel the city to raise the payment
through the levy of taxes without limit as to rate or amount
pursuant to Michigan law.

Credit Summary:

As reflected in the 'BB+' rating and Negative Outlook, Fitch
believes Detroit will continue to struggle economically and
financially as it has for the last several years.  Economic
indicators continue to be exceptionally weak, including an
unemployment rate that was up slightly to 24.4% in April 2010 from
23% a year earlier, although the increase was a result of labor
force growth, as employment levels remained constant.  City
officials expect the city's 2010 census population to be 800-
850,000, compared to 951,270 in 2000.  Economic sources predict
that demographic trends will continue to weaken.  The housing
market is also very stressed, with a high proportion of subprime
mortgages among non-conforming loans.  While delinquencies remain
high, foreclosure rates have dropped considerably, which likely
reflects the large share of properties that have already gone
through the foreclosure process.  The current city administration
is focused on identifying blighted areas and consolidating
residents into more sustainable neighborhoods.  Prospects for
economic growth appear minimal, although the emergence of Chrysler
and GM from bankruptcy may increase their prospects for longer-
term sustainability.

By the end of fiscal 2009, the accumulated unreserved general fund
deficit had grown to $330 million, or a very high 23.6% of
spending.  A modest operating surplus in fiscal 2007 was followed
by a sizable deficit (4% of spending) in fiscal 2008 and a much
larger 9% deficit in fiscal 2009.  The fiscal 2008 operating
deficit was unexpected and due in large part to changes in
accounting treatment and increased charge-backs from Wayne County
of uncollectable property taxes.  It was not revealed until the
release of the CAFR in November 2009, quite late but an
improvement from the prior year.  The fiscal 2009 deficit was due
in large part to over-estimation of revenue.  While most revenue
sources were on a declining trend prior to fiscal 2009, the auto
maker bankruptcies and attendant increase in unemployment led to
an accelerated weakness.  The timeliness of financial disclosure
improved somewhat again in fiscal 2009, as the CAFR was released
in June 2009.  Management has committed to a December 2010 release
of the fiscal 2010 CAFR.

Fitch views favorably a recent improvement in management
stability.  There were three Mayors between September 2008 and May
2009, when the current Mayor was elected to a truncated term.
This period of unusual management turnover coincided with the 2009
bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors, a time when the city
could ill afford a lack of consistent leadership.  The current
Mayor is now serving a four-year term.

Liquidity needs had been addressed with annual cash flow
borrowing, which in March 2010 were replaced with a long-term
deficit financing totaling $249 million.  While Fitch generally
views such financing as a credit negative, in this case it is
intended to relieve the uncertainty associated with dependence on
market access for notes each year.  The borrowing also eliminated
the majority of the accumulated deficit.  Officials state that
operations were about break-even, which would leave about an
$85 million accumulated deficit.

The recently-adopted Fiscal 2011 budget focuses on consolidating
services and operating and process changes for most of the gap-
closing.  Revenue estimates are fairly similar to levels expected
in fiscal 2010, which Fitch views as somewhat optimistic given
recent performance.  Several civilian unions have already agreed
to furloughs and other compensation changes, and the city
continues to lay off employees in moderate numbers.  Fitch
believes that continued labor cost modifications will be essential
to bringing the budget into balance, as the city is very heavily
unionized and revenue-raising options are extremely limited.  A
deficit elimination plan projects the deficit will be fully cured
by fiscal 2012 through a combination of recurring actions (mainly
expenditure reductions) and non-recurring measures.  Unlike in
past fiscal years, management now appears to be realistic in
assuming that addressing long-term structural issues will take
multiple fiscal years and is working on several fronts to
accomplish this goal.

Debt levels are exceptionally high as compared to Detroit's weak
market value of property; overall debt is over 18% of market
value.  It is less dramatic relative to population at $4,948 per
capita.  Concerns about the high debt load, while significant, are
somewhat tempered by the full funding of both of the city's
pension programs as a result of issuance of the pension obligation
certificates.  However, the unfunded liability for other post-
employment benefits when last calculated (June 30, 2007) was about
the same size as overall debt.  Even taking into account a
relatively conservative discount rate assumption of 4% this
obligation significantly increases the city's long-term
liabilities.  The city funds its OPEB obligation on a pay-as-you-
go basis, which equates to about one-half of the annual required
contribution on an actuarial basis.  Agreements with
counterparties regarding interest rate swaps on the pension
obligation certificates have been modified to limit the city's
exposure to large near-term termination payments but continue to
present potential risks should a termination event occur.

This sector credit profile is provided as background for investors
new to the municipal market.

Local Government General Obligation Bonds:

The unlimited taxing power of most local government general
obligation pledges is the broadest security a U.S. local
government can provide to the repayment of its long-term
borrowing, and therefore is the best indicator of its overall
credit quality.  The average local government general obligation
rating is 'AA' with approximately 85% rated at or above 'AA-' and
1% rated 'BBB+' or below.  The relatively high ratings reflect
local governments' inherent strengths: the authority to levy
property taxes, nonpayment of which can result in property
foreclosures; additional taxing power that can include sales,
utility, and income taxes; and essentiality of and lack of
competition for services provided by local governments.  Those
with low investment-grade or below-investment-grade ratings
generally have a combination of a limited or highly volatile
economic base, high levels of long-term liabilities including debt
and post-employment benefits, and/or unusually limited financial
flexibility.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 79 Classes From 42 ABS CDO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of 79 classes of notes issued by 42 ABS CDOs.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: Barrington CDO Ltd.

  -- US$701,000,000 Class A-1M(A) Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3;

  -- US$701,000,000 Class A-1M(B) Fixed Rate Notes Due 2045,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3;

  -- US$99,000,000 Class A-1Q(A) Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3;

  -- US$99,000,000 Class A-1Q(B) Fixed Rate Notes Due 2045,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 24, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3.

Issuer: Belle Haven ABS CDO, Ltd.

  -- Class A1SB-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- Class A1SB-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$344,000,000 Class A1ST Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2044-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.

  -- US$250,000 Class A-1V First Priority Senior Secured Voting
     Floating Rate Notes due 2043, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     Feb 2, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$354,750,000 Class A-1NVA First Priority Senior Secured
     Non-Voting Floating Rate Notes due 2043, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Feb 2, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$485,000,000 Class A-1NVB First Priority Senior Secured
     Non-Voting Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes due 2043,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 2, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2.

Issuer: Buckingham CDO II Ltd.

  -- Class A LT Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 30,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- Base Liquidity Advances, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Buckingham CDO LTD.

  -- Class A LT Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- Base Liquidity Advances, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Class V Funding II, Ltd.

  -- US$68,000,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Class V Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes due 2045 Notes, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Crystal Cove CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$350,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2039 Bond, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

Issuer: Davis Square Funding I, Ltd.

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1MT-a Medium Term Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$192,500,000 Class A-1MT-b Medium Term Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$192,500,000 Class A-1MT-c Medium Term Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$192,500,000 Class A-1MT-d Medium Term Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$192,500,000 Class A-1MM-e Money Market Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Dawn CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$162,700,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd.

  -- US$443,500,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2049, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$1,306,500,000 Class A-1B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2049, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$1,306,500,000 Class A-1B2 Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Interest Only Notes Due 2049, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Duke Funding High Grade IV, Ltd.

  -- US$1,312,500,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$61,500,000 Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on
     April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: Duke Funding VI Ltd./Duke Funding VI, Corp.

  -- US$655,500,000 Class A1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$8,000,000 Composite 1 Securities due 2039, Downgraded to
     C; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: Duke Funding VII, Ltd

  -- US$382,000,000 Class I-A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2034, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 24, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$129,900,000 Class I-A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2034, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 24, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$100,000 Class I-A2v Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2034, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2;

  -- US$98,500,000 Class II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2039, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class X Combination Notes Due 2039, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: FORT SHERIDAN ABS CDO, LTD.

  -- US$880,000,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on Feb 4, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Fortius II Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     Downgraded to C; previously on May 9, 2008 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$12,700,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes Due 2010,
     Withdrawn; previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: G Street Finance Ltd.

  -- US$266,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 10, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1;

  -- US$0 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on Feb 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Glacier Funding CDO III, LTD.

  -- US$347,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Gloucester Street ABS CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$890,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due June 2040,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3.

Issuer: Harp High Grade CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$870,000,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Independence IV CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1 (Series 1) First Priority Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1 (Series 2) First Priority Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Mar 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Independence VI CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$675,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Jupiter High-Grade CDO III, LTD

  -- US$1,7000,000,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Feb 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: KLEROS PREFERRED FUNDING II, LTD.

  -- US$250,000 Class A-1V First Priority Senior Secured Voting
     Floating Rate Notes Due December 2042, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$869,750,000 Class A-1NV First Priority Senior Secured Non-
     Voting Floating Rate Notes Due December 2042, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Knollwood CDO Ltd.

  -- US$189,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due January 8, 2039 Bond, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Longport Funding II, Ltd.

  -- US$195,000,000 Class A1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Monroe Harbor CDO 2005-1 LTD.

  -- US$970,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$352,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: NORTHWALL FUNDING CDO I, LTD.

  -- US$180,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 6,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: Orchid Structured Finance CDO II, LTD

  -- US$204,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     Due 2043, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: PPM America Structured Finance CBO I Ltd.

  -- US$256,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 24, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3.

Issuer: River North CDO Ltd.

  -- US$193,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$5,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2040, Downgraded to C; previously on May 8, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2040, Downgraded to C; previously on May 8, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2040, Downgraded to C; previously on May 8, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$14,250,000 Subordinated Notes Due 2040, Downgraded to C;
     previously on Apr 2, 2008 Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: SUMMER STREET 2005-HG1, LTD.

  -- US$935,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     due 2045, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     due 2045, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: Saybrook Point CBO II, Limited

  -- US$255,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Secured Notes Due 2035,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Sep 25, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2.

Issuer: Sherwood Funding CDO, Ltd

  -- US$357,500,000 A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2039-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1.

Issuer: TABS 2004-1, Ltd.

  -- US$400,000,000 Class A-1 Notes Notes, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Talon Funding I, Ltd.

  -- US$402,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2035,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3.

Issuer: Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1, Ltd.

  -- US$2,400,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due March 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2, Ltd.

  -- US$1,500,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$1,499,950,000 Class A-1B1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$1,499,950,000 Class A-1B2 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$100,000 Class A-1BV First Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Issuer: Triaxx Prime CDO 2007-1, Ltd.

  -- US$825,000,000 Class A-1T First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$175,000,000 Class A-1D First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due October 2039, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on Jan 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Issuer: Witherspoon CDO Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$258,000,000 Class A-1 LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2039,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1;

  -- US$602,001,000 Class A-1 LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2039,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2039,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: Zais Investment Grade Limited VII

  -- US$215,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 24, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 24, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolios.  Such credit deterioration is observed through
numerous factors, including an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, failure of one or more coverage tests, and exposure
to underlying assets the ratings of which are currently on review
for possible downgrade.  The majority of the Notes that are the
subject of ratings downgrade action taken are the senior notes in
the transaction structure and have overcollateralization levels
that have declined to less than 70%.  In cases where the current
overcollateralization of the senior notes is greater than 70%, the
transactions have a sufficient percentage of assets with ratings
on review for possible downgrade such that Moody's anticipates
that the senior overcollateralization ratios will fall below 70%
following resolution of ratings currently under review.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of the
lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's press
releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for Alt-A,
and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated ratings
impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress varied
based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor these transactions using primarily
the methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


* Moody's Downgrades Credit Ratings on Four Trup CDO Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of the notes from four Trup CDOs: Alesco Preferred Funding
I, Ltd., Trapeza CDO III, LLC, Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd., and Trapeza
CDO XII, Ltd.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
mainly the result of significant increase in the defaults and
deferrals of the trust preferred securities held in their
portfolios.  This par loss has resulted in loss of
overcollateralization for the tranches affected and an increase of
their expected losses.  Since the last rating action, the assumed
defaulted amounts in these deals have increased significantly,
with a large portion of transactions experiencing an increase of
the assumed defaulted amount of about or more than 100% with the
exception of Trapeza CDO III, LLC, that experienced an increase of
about 50%.

Moody's also gave consideration to the Event of Default analysis
for Trapeza CDO III, LLC, even though Trapeza CDO III, LLC, has
not declared an Event of Default to date.  However, Moody's notes
that, according to the trustee report dated June 30, 2010, the
current Class A/B Overcollateralization level is 104.86% and the
transaction would trip an Event of Default if this level were to
fall below 100%.  Since Moody's doesn't give any credit (zero
recovery) to the assumed defaulted assets in the calculation of
the overcollateralization test, the resulting modeled Class A/B
Overcollateralization level is below 100%.  Therefore, additional
modeling scenarios were considered in this case assuming that
acceleration has been declared.

The assumed defaulted amounts and model WARF are provided for each
transaction.  The credit deterioration exhibited by these
portfolios is a reflection of the continued pressure in the
banking sector as the number of bank failures and interest
deferrals of trust preferred securities issued by banks has
continued to increase.  According to FDIC data, 90 U.S. banks have
failed to date, while 140 banks failed in 2009, as compared to 25
in all of 2008.  In Moody's opinion, the banking sector outlook
remains negative.

The portfolios of these CDOs are mainly composed of trust
preferred securities issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community bank and insurance companies that are generally not
publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's derives credit scores for these non-publicly rated assets
and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to their
volatility, as described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated
Approach to the usage of Credit Estimates in rated Transactions",
October 2009.

The rating actions are listed below:

Issuer: ALESCO Preferred Funding I, Ltd.

  -- US$149,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2033 (current balance of
     $118,943,978), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$66,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2033, Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$56,700,000 Class B-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2033 (current balance of $57,588,861.24), Downgraded to
     C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class B-2 Mezzanine Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2033 (current balance of $45,705,445.42),
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca.

Issuer: Trapeza CDO III, LLC

  -- US$108,500,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $74,086,281.1),
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 27, 2009 Confirmed at
     Aa3;

  -- US$71,500,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured Fixed
     Rate Notes, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$31,250,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes (current balance of $33,010,519.45), Downgraded to C;
     previously on November 12, 2008 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$31,250,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Senior Secured
     Fixed/Floating Rate Notes (current balance of
     $33,010,519.45), Downgraded to C; previously on November 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Ca.

Issuer: Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd.

  -- US$155,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of
     $138,621,832.86) Downgraded to A1; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2034, Downgraded to Baa3; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- US$59,350,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2034, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3.

Issuer: Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of
     $238,345,234.58), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$68,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to Caa1; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due2042, Downgraded to Caa3; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$49,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of
     $49,348,709.97), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$38,000,000 Class C-1 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of
     $38,667,180.84), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class C-2 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2042 (current balance of
     $9,601,398.27), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca.

Below are the basic deal information and assumptions made in
Moody's rating analysis:

Issuer: ALESCO Preferred Funding I, Ltd.

* Issued in 9/2003 and maturing on 10/2033

* Current Model WARF [1]: 1735

* Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $106,500,000

* Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions [2]: 1624

* Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
  $52,500,000

Issuer: Trapeza CDO III, LLC

* Issued in 6/2003 and maturing on 7/2033

* Current Model WARF [1]: 1941

* Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $95,585,000

* Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions [2]: 1748

* Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
  $63,170,000

Issuer: Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd.

* Issued in 4/2004 and maturing on 11/2034

* Current Model WARF [1]: 1732

* Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $96,000,000

* Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions [2]: 1647

* Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
  $48,500,000

Issuer: Trapeza CDO XII, Ltd.

* Issued in 3/2007 and maturing on 4/2042

* Current Model WARF [1]: 2320

* Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $163,955,252.22

* Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions [2]: 1824

* Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
  $39,750,000


* S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on the New Jersey Health's 1998 Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to negative
from stable and affirmed its 'BB' long-term rating on the New
Jersey Health Care Facilities Financing Authority's series 1998
bonds issued for Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital at
Rahway.  RWJ also has $11 million of variable-rate demand bonds
that Standard & Poor's does not rate, but factors into its rating
analysis.

"The negative outlook reflects S&P's concerns about an unexpected
reversal in RWJ-Rahway's financial performance with large
operating losses in fiscal 2009 and the interim period of fiscal
2010 after three successive years of operating profitability,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Shivani Singh.  "S&P is also
concerned about the below 1.0x coverage of maximum annual debt
service, based on Standard & Poor's calculations of MADS," said
Ms. Singh.

In Standard & Poor's opinion, added credit concerns include
historically below-average capital spending reflected by a high
average age of plant of 20 years as of Dec. 31, 2009; location in
a competitive northern New Jersey market with a challenging payor
mix; and high exposure to risks related to variable-rate demand
bonds

Continued volume declines into 2011 and further deterioration in
the financial profile, including liquidity, is likely to result in
a lower rating next year.  A higher rating is unlikely in Standard
& Poor's opinion due to the hospital's current operating
challenges and location in an extremely competitive service area,
which makes rebuilding volume more difficult.


* S&P Affirms Ratings on 180 Certs. From 20 Re-Remic RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 180
classes of certificates from 20 U.S. resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions.  The affirmations reflect S&P's assessment of the
credit enhancement available to the underlying certificates, which
in S&P's opinion is sufficient to maintain the ratings on the re-
REMIC classes.  In addition, certain re-REMIC classes may also
benefit from support classes within the re-REMIC transaction.

When performing S&P's analysis on the re-REMIC classes, S&P
applied S&P's loss projections to the underlying trusts in order
to identify the magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be
passed through to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally,
S&P's projected losses depend on the related collateral supporting
the underlying trusts.  S&P then stressed these loss projections
at various rating categories to assess whether the re-REMIC
classes could withstand such stressed losses associated with their
current ratings.

Generally, the underlying collateral consists of 2005-2007 vintage
prime, subprime, and alternative-A loans that back the applicable
classes that contribute to the re-REMICs.  In S&P's view, these
vintages' performance has declined substantially in recent years.
As a result, over the past several years S&P has revised S&P's
RMBS default and loss assumptions, and consequently its projected
losses, to reflect S&P's view of the continuing decline in
mortgage loan performance.  The performance deterioration of most
U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                         Ratings Affirmed

                 Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-4

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A2         BBB
                        B          BB

                 Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-2

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A2         BBB
                        B          BB
                        A1         AAA

                 Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-5

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A3         A
                        A5         BB+
                        A7         BB-
                        A1         AAA
                        A6         BB
                        A4         BBB
                        A2         AA

                 Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-6

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A7         BB-
                        A2         AA
                        A4         BBB
                        A3         A
                        A6         BB
                        A5         BB+
                        A1         AAA

                 Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                          Series 2009-7

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A7         BB-
                        A6         BB
                        A3         A
                        A5         BB+
                        A2         AA
                        A4         BBB
                        A1         AAA

                Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                          Series 2009-14

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        B          B
                        A6         BB
                        A5         BB+
                        A7         BB-
                        A4         BBB
                        A2         AA
                        A3         A
                        A1         AAA

                Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-8

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A7         BB-
                        A4         BBB
                        A3         A
                        A2         AA
                        A1         AAA
                        A6         BB
                        A5         BB+

                Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                           Series 2009-16

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A2         AA
                        A5         BB+
                        A1         AAA
                        A7         BB-
                        A4         BBB
                        A6         BB
                        B          B
                        A3         A

                Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                          Series 2009-19

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        A1         AAA
                        A4         BBB
                        A6         BB
                        A3         A
                        A2         AA
                        B          B
                        A5         BB+
                        A7         BB-

              Banc of America Funding 2009-R15 Trust
                          Series 2009-R15

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        5-A-2      AAA
                        5-A-1      AAA
                        1-A-1      AAA

              Banc of America Funding 2009-R17 Trust
                          Series 2009-R17

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        4-A-1A     AAA
                        4-A-1      AAA
                        3-A-1      AAA
                        4-A-1B     AAA
                        3-A-1B     AAA
                        3-A-1A     AAA

              Banc of America Funding 2009-R9 Trust
                          Series 2009-R9

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        2-A-1      AAA

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR11 Trust
                         Series 2009-RR11

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        VII-A1     AAA
                        II-A1      AAA
                        I-A2       BBB
                        V-A1       AAA
                        VI-A1      AAA

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR6-I Trust
                         Series 2009-RR6-I

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        I-A1       AAA
                        I-A4       AAA
                        I-A3       AAA

                    BCAP LLC 2009-RR6-II Trust
                        Series 2009-RR6-II

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        II-A3      AAA
                        II-A1      AAA
                        II-A4      AAA

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-12
                          Series 2009-12

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        6A1        AAA

                       CSMC Series 2009-16R
                         Series 2009-16R

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        2-A-6      AAA
                        4-A-10     AAA
                        3-A-5      AAA
                        4-A-3      AAA
                        5-A-9      A
                        3-A-7      AAA
                        5-A-1      A
                        3-A-3      AAA
                        3-A-4      AAA
                        3-A-10     AAA
                        3-A-9      AAA
                        2-A-3      AAA
                        5-A-4      A
                        3-A-1      AAA
                        11-A-2     BBB
                        4-A-7      AAA
                        11-A-1     AAA
                        5-A-6      A
                        2-A-10     AAA
                        4-A-5      AAA
                        3-A-8      AAA
                        4-A-4      AAA
                        3-A-11     AAA
                        2-A-11     AAA
                        3-A-6      AAA
                        2-A-9      AAA
                        2-A-1      AAA
                        4-A-1      AAA
                        2-A-8      AAA
                        4-A-12     AAA
                        10-A-2     BBB
                        4-A-9      AAA
                        2-A-4      AAA
                        2-A-5      AAA
                        5-A-5      A
                        4-A-11     AAA
                        3-A-12     AAA
                        4-A-8      AAA
                        10-A-1     AAA
                        4-A-6      AAA
                        2-A-12     AAA
                        2-A-7      AAA

        Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-1
                           Series 2005-1

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        I-A3A      AAA
                        I-A3B      AAA
                        I-X        AAA
                        II-A2      AAA
                        II-X       AAA
                        R          AAA

        JMAC Master Resecuritization Trust I Series 2009-A
                          Series 2009-A

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        13-A       AAA
                        4-A        AA
                        26-A       AAA
                        18-A       AAA
                        3-A        AAA
                        31-A       AAA
                        39-A       BBB
                        42-A       AA
                        48-A       AAA
                        17-A       AAA
                        32-A       AA
                        9-A        BBB
                        23-A       AAA
                        34-A       AAA
                        19-A       AAA
                        37-A       AAA
                        50-A       A
                        41-A       AAA
                        11-A       AAA
                        43-A       BBB
                        10-A       BBB
                        2-A        AAA
                        15-A       AAA
                        24-A       AAA
                        28-A       AAA
                        33-A       AA
                        38-A       A
                        21-A       AAA
                        1-A        AAA
                        27-A       AAA
                        25-A       AAA
                        46-A       BBB
                        7-A        AAA
                        40-A       AAA
                        16-A       AAA
                        47-A       AA
                        6-A        AAA
                        20-A       AAA
                        30-A       AAA
                        45-A       AAA
                        49-A       AAA
                        8-A        AAA
                        36-A       AAA
                        12-A       AAA
                        29-A       AAA
                        22-A       AAA
                        44-A       AAA
                        14-A       AAA
                        5-A        AAA
                        35-A       AAA

              Morgan Stanley Re-REMIC Trust 2009-R3
                           Series 2009-R3

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        1-A2       AA
                        1-A        AA
                        1-A1       AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
tranches from five U.S. collateralized debt obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven
tranches from five transactions and removed six of them from
CreditWatch negative.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on four
tranches from two transactions following the complete paydown of
the notes.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
where appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                             Rating
                                             ------
   Transaction                       Class  To     From
   -----------                       -----  --     ----
   Arlington Street CDO (Cayman)     A-1    AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Arlington Street CDO (Cayman)     A-2    AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Arlington Street CDO (Cayman)     A-3    BB+    A-/Watch Neg
   Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1         A      A+     AAA/Watch Neg
   Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1         B      BB+    A-/Watch Neg
   Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1         C      B      BB+/Watch Neg
   Centennial CBO                    II-A   NR     AAA/Watch Neg
   Centennial CBO                    II-B   NR     AAA/Watch Neg
   FC CBO II                         B      B-     B/Watch Neg
   Flint European Debt Inv.  Trust   A-5A   NR     AAA
   Flint European Debt Inv.  Trust   A-5B   NR     AAA
   Flint European Debt Inv.  Trust   B      A-     A-/Watch Neg
   Lone Star CBO Funding             A      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Nicholas-Applegate CBO II         A      AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Nicholas-Applegate CBO II         B      CCC-   B/Watch Neg
   Nicholas-Applegate CBO II         C      CC     CCC/Watch Neg
   Nicholas-Applegate CBO II         D      CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
   TCW High Income Partners          II-A   AA+    AA+/Watch Neg
   TCW High Income Partners          II-B   AA+    AA+/Watch Neg
   Wicker Park CDO I                 A-1    BBB-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Wicker Park CDO I                 A-2    B+     AAA/Watch Neg
   Wicker Park CDO I                 B      B-     AA/Watch Neg
   Wicker Park CDO I                 C      CCC-   A/Watch Neg

                          Rating Affirmed

          Transaction                       Class  Rating
          -----------                       -----  ------
          Muzinich Cashflow CBO             A      AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs. From Two RMBS Re-Remic Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of certificates from two U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transactions issued in 2009.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the significant
deterioration in performance of the mortgage loans backing the
underlying certificates.  As a result of this performance
deterioration, the downgraded classes were unable to maintain
their previous ratings at the applicable rating stresses.

When performing its analysis on the re-REMIC classes, S&P applied
its loss projections to the underlying trusts in order to identify
the magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed through
to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally, S&P's projected
losses depend on the related collateral supporting the underlying
trusts.  S&P then stressed these loss projections at various
rating categories in order to assess whether the re-REMIC classes
could withstand such stressed losses.

Generally, the underlying collateral consists of 2005-2007 vintage
prime and Alternative-A loans that back the applicable classes
that contribute to the re-REMICs.  These vintages have displayed
what S&P considers to be substantial performance decline in recent
years.  As a result, over the past several years, S&P has revised
its RMBS default and loss assumptions, and consequently its
projected losses, to reflect S&P's view of the continuing decline
in mortgage loan performance.  The performance deterioration of
most U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Rating Actions

                Asset Repackaging Vehicle Limited
                         Series    2009-17

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                Class      To                   From
                -----      --                   ----
                A1         B-                   A
                A2         CCC                  A
                A3         CCC                  A
                A4         CCC                  A
                A5         CC                   A
                A6         CC                   A
                A7         CC                   A
                B          CC                   A
                C          CC                   A

             BNPP Mortgage Securities LLC 2009-1 Trust
                         Series    2009-1

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                Class      To                   From
                -----      --                   ----
                A-1        AA+                  AAA
                A-2        AA+                  AAA
                A-3        AA                   AAA
                A-4        AA-                  AAA
                A-5        A-                   AA
                A-6        BBB                  AA
                B-1        CCC                  BB


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Classes From Six RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 38
classes from six U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions and removed 29 of them from CreditWatch negative.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 76 classes from three of the
downgraded transactions and five additional transactions, and
removed 26 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.  All
of the affected transactions are supported by U.S. prime jumbo and
two transactions are supported by both prime jumbo and Alt-A
mortgage loan collateral issued in 2002 through 2007.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using the criteria referenced in
the "Related Criteria And Research" section below.  As part of
S&P's analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral.  For example, the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default
projections.  When available, S&P used actual loss severities
being incurred by the transaction as part of its loss assumptions.
Otherwise, S&P defaulted to a vintage and collateral-based loss
severity figure that was researched through loan-level performance
data provided by Loan Performance? (a First American Real Estate
Solutions LLC.).  Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss expectations
for each deal based on upward trends in delinquencies.

For the transactions reviewed, in general, in order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding its base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category.  In the case of Alt-A
transactions, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P
would assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

With prime jumbo transactions, up to 235% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions would be assessed for an 'AAA' rating.  For example,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
127% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo and Alt-A mortgage
loans that are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-
family residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR8
                       Series      2007-AR8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1A      17313FAA0     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A1B      17313FAB8     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    1-A2A      17313FAC6     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A2B      17313FAD4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    1-A3A      17313FAE2     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A3B      17313FAF9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    2-A1A      17313FAR3     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    2-A1B      17313FAS1     CC                   B/Watch Neg

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                       Series      2002-10

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-B-1     22540VR20     BBB-                 AA
        II-B-2     22540VR38     CC                   CCC

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-6
                        Series      2005-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-2      225458XG8     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      225458XH6     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-4      225458XJ2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-M-1      225458YH5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    I-M-2      225458YJ1     CC                   CCC
    II-A-1     225458XK9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     225458XL7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     225458XM5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     225458XN3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     225458XP8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     225458XQ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-7     225458XR4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-8     225458B64     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-9     225458B72     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225458XS2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-1     225458XT0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VIII-A-1   225458YA0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        225458YC6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    C-X        225458YD4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    D-X        225458YE2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        225458YF9     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    C-B-1      225458YM4     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    C-B-2      225458YN2     B-                   BBB/Watch Neg
    C-B-3      225458YP7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    V-A-1      225458XU7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-2      225458XV5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-3      225458XW3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-4      225458B80     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-1     225458XX1     BB                   AA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-2     225458XY9     BB                   AA/Watch Neg
    IX-A-1     225458YB8     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    D-B-1      225458YQ5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg

        First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-AR2
                       Series      2002-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-A-1     32051DRA2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    32051DRC8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        32051DRD6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-2        32051DRE4     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg

                 Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                       Series      2002-11A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       86358RP43     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       86358RP50     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1-I       86358RL88     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    B1-I-X     86358RL96     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    B2-I       86358RM20     BBB+                 A/Watch Neg
    B2-I-X     86358RM38     BBB+                 A/Watch Neg
    B3         86358RM61     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B1-II      86358RM46     BBB+                 AAA
    B2-II      86358RM53     B-                   A

  WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR14 Trust
                      Series      2002-AR14

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        939336CZ4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        939336DH3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        939336DA8     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-2        939336DB6     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
    B-3        939336DC4     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

   WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR15 Trust
                      Series      2002-AR15

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-5        939336DN0     AA                   AAA
        B-1        929227WM4     BB                   AAA
        B-2        929227WN2     CCC                  BBB
        B-3        929227WP7     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-22
                        Series      2002-22

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-20       12669C3U2     AAA
                 PO         12669C3V0     AAA

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-25
                        Series      2002-25

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-14     12669DHT8     AAA
                 1-A-15     12669DHU5     AAA
                 1-X        12669DHV3     AAA
                 2-A-1      12669DHX9     AAA
                 2-X        12669DHW1     AAA
                 PO         12669DHY7     AAA
                 M          12669DJA7     AAA
                 B-1        12669DJB5     AAA
                 B-2        12669DJC3     AA+

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-27
                       Series      2002-27

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        12669DGF9     AAA
                 A-6        12669DGL6     AAA
                 A-8        12669DGN2     AAA
                 A-9        12669DGP7     AAA
                 PO         12669DGQ5     AAA
                 M          12669DGS1     AAA
                 B-1        12669DGT9     AAA
                 B-2        12669DGU6     AA

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                       Series      2002-10

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-5      22540VQ21     AAA
                 I-M-1      22540VQ70     AA
                 I-M-2      22540VQ88     A
                 II-A-1     22540VQ47     AAA
                 II-X       22540VQ54     AAA
                 II-P       22540VQ62     AAA
                 I-PP       22540VR95     AAA
                 II-PP      22540VS29     AAA

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                       Series      2002-19

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 C-B-1      22540V6S6     AAA
                 C-B-2      22540V6T4     AAA
                 C-B-3      22540V6U1     AAA
                 II-M-1     22540V6Q0     B

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2003-7
                        Series      2003-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-4      22541NG37     AAA
                 I-A-25     22541NJ83     AAA
                 I-A-26     22541NJ91     AAA
                 I-A-27     22541NK24     AAA
                 I-A-28     22541NK32     AAA
                 I-X        22541NK40     AAA
                 I-P        22541NK57     AAA
                 I-B-1      22541NK65     AAA
                 I-B-2      22541NK73     AA+
                 I-B-3      22541NK81     A+
                 I-B-4      22541NF53     BBB+
                 I-B-5      22541NF61     BB

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-6
                        Series      2005-6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 C-B-4      225458YY8     CCC
                 D-B-2      225458YR3     CCC

              Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                       Series      2002-11A

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-A1       86358RP68     AAA
                 2-A3       86358RP84     AAA
                 3-A        86358RQ34     AAA
                 4-A        86358RQ42     AAA
                 5-A        86358RQ59     AAA


* S&P Puts Ratings on 11 Tranches From Eight Mezzanine CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 11
tranches from eight mezzanine structured finance collateralized
debt obligations of asset-backed securities transactions on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The 11 tranches have a
total issuance amount of $1.78 billion.  The CreditWatch
placements follow S&P's monthly review of U.S. cash flow and
hybrid CDO transaction performance.  S&P also withdrew its rating
on one tranche from Capella Funding following the complete paydown
of the note.

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's most recent monthly review
of U.S. cash flow and hybrid CDO performance.  The rationale for
the rating actions are based on both quantitative and qualitative
performance parameters, including transaction structural features,
manager purchase patterns, and a broad view of the underlying
collateral within each transaction, including these:

* A change in Standard & Poor's rated overcollateralization
  metric.  This ratio, reviewed monthly based on current
  collateral ratings, provides an estimate of the stability of the
  current rating on a given cash flow CDO tranche;

* A deterioration in the credit quality of the performing assets
  within the collateral pools, including downgrades of the
  underlying securities to the 'CCC' level;

* An increase or decrease in the proportion of securities in the
  collateral pool with ratings on CreditWatch negative, which
  serves as a forward-looking indicator of rating actions that
  will affect the assets in the pools;

* A change in the level of overcollateralization available to
  support each tranche since origination, or since S&P's last
  rating action; and An increase in the level of defaulted assets
  held in the CDO transactions' portfolios.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after S&P complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis for each of the affected
transactions, and after S&P evaluate additional information S&P
may receive during discussions with the relevant collateral
managers.  S&P expects to resolve these CreditWatch placements
within 90 days.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the
CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Transaction                         Class  To             From
  -----------                         -----  --             ----
  C-Bass CBO VI                       C      A/Watch Neg    A
  C-Bass CBO VI                       D      B-/Watch Neg   B-
  E*Trade ABS CDO I                   A-2    A/Watch Neg    A
  MWAM CBO 2001-1                     A      AA/Watch Neg   AA
  Pacific Shores CDO                  A      AA-/Watch Neg  AA-
  Pacific Shores CDO                  B-1    CCC/Watch Neg  CCC
  Pacific Shores CDO                  B-2    CCC/Watch Neg  CCC
  Pasadena CDO                        A      BBB/Watch Neg  BBB
  Prudential Structured Finance       A-2L   BB-/Watch Neg  BB-
     CBO I
  Straits Global ABS CDO I            A-1    BBB+/Watch Neg BBB+
  Structured Finance Advisors ABS     A      BB-/Watch Neg  BB-
     CDO III

                         Rating Withdrawn

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Transaction                         Class  To             From
  -----------                         -----  --             ----
  Capella Funding                     B       NR           BBB



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***