TCR_Public/100620.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 20, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 169

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2005-2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'
ALEXANDER PARK: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 From 'B3'
ALLEGHENY COUNTY: S&P Cuts Rating on $758 Mil. Bonds to 'BB-'
ANTHRACITE CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2006-HY3 Notes
AVALON RE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class C Notes to 'D/RR6'

BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Series 2001A Bonds
BUSINESS LOAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Transactions
CITY OF BUENA VISTA: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-CP4 Securities
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2003-CPN1 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-C3 Certs.
CREST 2000-1: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various 2000-1 Notes
CREST 2002-1: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
CREST DARTMOUTH: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
CREST EXETER: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes

CREST G-STAR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CREST G-STAR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-2 Notes
CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches
DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 95 Tranches
DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on 1994 Bonds

DUKE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GALE FORCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
HEREFORD STREET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'Ca'
JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-CIBC4 Certificates

LAS VEGAS SANDS: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B-' Rating
LEHMAN ABS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-2 Certs. to 'D'
LOS ANGELES: S&P Junks Rating on 1987A Bonds
LUBBOCK HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Ratings on Revenue Bonds
MADISON AVENUE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Junks Rating on 1999A Bonds From 'B1'
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Certs.
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
NORTHERN KENTUCKY: S&P Junks Rating on 1999B RMBS Bonds
OMI TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-1 Certs. to 'D'

PAJARO VALLEY: S&P Shifts CreditWatch on 'BB' Rating to Developing
PARCS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Series 2007-2 Notes
PNC MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-8 1999-CM1 Certs.
PRADO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
PUTNAM STRUCTURED: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Classes

REVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A Notes to 'CC'
SENIOR ABS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2002-1 Certs.
SHORE RE: S&P Assigns Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SMART HOME: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various 2005-2 Notes
SOUTH STREET: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

ST PAUL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002 Bonds to 'Ba1'
STATEN ISLAND: Moody's Raises Rating on Hospital Bonds From 'Ba2'
STRUCTURED FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
TCW HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2004-C15 CMBS Notes

* S&P Affirms Ratings on 26 Classes of Certs. From Seven RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs. From Four CMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes of Certs. From Five US CMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 18 US ABS Classes From 15 Transactions



                            *********



ABACUS 2005-2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B and C notes from ABACUS 2005-2 Ltd. to 'D', a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The downgrades follow a number of recent credit events within the
transaction's underlying portfolio.  Specifically, write-downs in
the underlying reference portfolio have caused the class B and C
notes to each incur a partial principal loss.

                         Ratings Lowered

                        ABACUS 2005-2 Ltd.

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          B                     D                  CCC-
          C                     D                  CC


ALEXANDER PARK: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 From 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Alexander Park CDO I,
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$203,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Term Notes, Due 2039
     (current balance of $101,017,440), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on April 24, 2009 Downgraded to B3.

Alexander Park CDO I, Limited, is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities originated between 2002 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including failure of the coverage tests.  The Senior
Overcollateralization Test, as reported by the trustee, has
decreased from 67.72 in April 2009 to 59.25 in April 2010.
Additionally, approximately $60 million of RMBS within the
underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


ALLEGHENY COUNTY: S&P Cuts Rating on $758 Mil. Bonds to 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its rating to
'BB-' from 'BB' on $758 million of series 2007 bonds issued by the
Allegheny County Hospital Development Authority, Pa., for West
Penn Allegheny Health System.  The outlook is stable.

"The downgrade reflects West Penn's difficulties fully reaching
targeted financial expectations set by both prior management at
the time of the 2007 bond rating and those provided more recently
by the current management team for fiscal 2010," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Cynthia Keller Macdonald.  "In addition, the
downgrade reflects strategic changes at the system that are likely
to put increased financial pressure on the organization for the
next two to three years in order to better position it for the
longer term."

Despite the downgrade, S&P believes that management's integration
plans are well thought out and are likely to improve the
organization's long-term viability and readiness for health reform
by achieving cost reductions and improved physician management and
integration.  However, the integration plans are likely to come
with a substantial short- to medium-term price tag for the
organization that cannot be accommodated at the 'BB' rating level
given recent volume declines and escalating demands on the
organization's already-thin liquidity.

The 'BB-' rating reflects:

* Significantly reduced operating losses which result in adequate
  coverage of maximum annual debt service and preclude a lower
  rating at this time;

* Thin balance sheet cushion due to substantial long-term debt,
  coupled with pension and capital demands on already-weak
  liquidity;

* Anticipation of several operationally and financially
  challenging years as management forges ahead with its strategic
  plans; and

* Continued significant competition from UPMC in the greater
  Pittsburgh region for both patients and physicians although West
  Penn remains, in S&P's opinion, an essential component of the
  Pittsburgh market.

West Penn Allegheny Health System was formed as a single obligated
entity with its 2000 financing and includes five acute care
hospitals at six locations in the Pittsburgh area.


ANTHRACITE CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2006-HY3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Anthracite CRE CDO
2006-HY3, LTD. as a result of increased interest shortfalls and
negative credit migration on the underlying portfolio.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'CCC-/CC', down from 'CCC+' at
last review.  Further, 100% of the portfolio now has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade; 84.6% has a rating in the
'CCC' category and below.  As of the May 2010 trustee report,
approximately 57.4% of the portfolio is experiencing interest
shortfalls.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The resulting rating loss rates for
the model's lowest stress scenario, the 'CCC' scenario, were
approximately equal to credit enhancement for class A and
substantially higher than the remaining classes' credit
enhancement levels.  Therefore, the analysis included a comparison
of the classes' respective credit enhancement levels to the
percent of underlying collateral experiencing interest shortfalls,
and cash flow modeling was not considered.

Based on this analysis, class A has been downgraded to 'CCC' as
its credit enhancement is consistent with the 'CCC' scenario PCM
output, and also currently exceeds the total percentage of assets
experiencing interest shortfalls.  Classes B-FL and B-FX have been
downgraded to 'CC' indicating that default appears probable.
Their credit enhancement level narrowly exceeds the total
percentage of assets experiencing interest shortfalls, and any
further deterioration could quickly erode that cushion.  Classes
C-FL/C-FX through G have been downgraded to 'C' because Fitch
believes that default appears inevitable given that the total
percentage of assets experiencing interest shortfalls exceeds
these classes' credit enhancement levels.

Anthracite 2006-HY3 is backed by 62 tranches from 21 obligors, the
majority of which is commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS,
73.9%).  The remainder of the pool consists of subordinate
commercial real estate loans (26.1%).  The transaction closed in
May 2006 and is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also
referred to as first loss CRE CDO) as it primarily includes junior
bonds of CMBS transactions.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $172,393,041 class A to 'CCC' from 'BB';
  -- $50,391,812 class B-FL to 'CC' from 'B+';
  -- $8,840,669 class B-FX to 'CC' from 'B+';
  -- $41,551,143 class C-FL to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $7,072,535 class C-FX to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $12,376,936 class D to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $48,623,678 class E-FL to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $4,420,334 class E-FX to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $22,985,739 class F to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $41,746,081 class G to 'C' from 'CC'.

Additionally, classes A through C-FL/C-FX are removed from Rating
Watch Negative.


AVALON RE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class C Notes to 'D/RR6'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these actions on the long-term and Recovery
Ratings for the Avalon Re, Ltd. notes listed below:

Avalon Re

  -- Class C notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR3'.

In addition, Fitch withdraws the ratings of the class C notes.

Fitch's actions follow receipt the Notice of Final Loss Payment,
Principal Reduction and Repayment Amount prepared by the
transaction's calculation agent.  The notice indicates a principal
reduction of $12.69 million or 9.4% of the class C notes.  Thus,
the holders of the class C notes received $122.31 million of their
$135 million principal balance at final maturity (June 7, 2010).

The 'RR6' Recovery Rating assigned to the class C notes indicates
that there is no expectation of any further recovery.


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on Series 2001A Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa1 rating on the
Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation (The Waters at Northern
Hills) Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Series 2001A and has
downgraded Series 2001C to C from Ca.  The rating downgrade is
based upon a lower prospect of recovery for 2001C due to increased
cap rates and a declining NOI.  The outlook remains negative.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.

Recent Developments/Results:

The 2001C debt service reserve was tapped again and depleted on
February 1, 2010.  The 2001A reserve was no tapped, though it was
in 2009.  Project performance continues to be weak - April 2010
occupancy was 87% and 2009 debt service coverage was 0.90x for
2001A and 0.87x for 2001C.  NOI declined slightly from 2008 to
2009, and CB Richard Ellis reports cap rates have increased in San
Antonio.  The Caa1 rating on Series A reflects Moody's expectation
that debt service reserves will continue to be eroded and
ultimately depleted.  The C rating on Series C reflects very
limited prospects for recovery.

                             Outlook

The outlook for the bonds is negative due to the expectation that
debt service reserves will be ultimately be depleted.

The last rating action was on April 10, 2009, when Series A was
downgraded to Caa1 and Series C was downgraded to Ca, both with a
negative outlook.  The ratings were subsequently recalibrated to
Caa1 and Ca on May 7, 2010.


BUSINESS LOAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Four Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these rating actions on four Business Loan
Express transactions and assigns Rating Outlooks as indicated:

Business Loan Center SBA Loan-Backed Certificates 1998-1

  -- Class A downgraded to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative.

The Class A is removed from Rating Watch Negative.

Business Loan Express SBA loan-backed adjustable-rate notes,
series 2001-2

  -- Class A affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Negative.

The Class A is removed from Rating Watch Negative.

Business Loan Express SBA loan-backed adjustable-rate notes,
series 2002-1

  -- Class A downgraded to 'A' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative.

Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2002-A

  -- Class A downgraded to 'A' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B downgraded to 'BB+' from 'A'; Outlook Negative.

The negative rating actions reflect continued deterioration within
the transactions.  Specifically, the 1998-1, 2002-1, and 2002-A
transactions have continued to experience high delinquency rates.
As of the May 2010 reporting, total delinquencies were 41.20%,
29.49%, and 38.24% for 1998-1, 2002-1 and 2002-A, respectively.
Furthermore, based on Fitch's analysis, detailed below, loss
coverage was found to be limited due to the asset deterioration
experienced across all three transactions.  Additionally, in the
1998-1 and 2002-A series, the significantly high obligor
concentrations within the pools may have a more pronounced
negative impact on loss coverage should additional obligors
default.

The affirmations for the 2001-2 series reflect relatively stable
performance within the transaction.  Although losses have
increased since Fitch's last review, currently totaling 9.73%, the
transaction has experienced a decline in delinquency roll rates.
Based on Fitch's analysis, detailed below, credit support remains
sufficient at current rating levels.

The Negative Outlook designation on the transactions reflects
Fitch's continued concern for near-term potential asset
deterioration which may ultimately impact the ratings on the
outstanding notes.  In particular, continued high delinquency roll
rates within the transactions may result in an increase in net
losses leading to a potential reduction in credit support
available to the notes.  Additionally, the transactions include
large industry concentrations of hotels and shrimp vessels, which
have seen adverse performance recently.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', issued Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool.  All loans over 60 days
delinquent were deemed defaulted loans.  The defaulted loans were
applied loss and recovery expectations based on collateral type
and historical recovery performance to establish an expected net
loss assumption for the transaction.  Fitch stressed the cashflows
generated by the underlying assets by applying its expected net
loss assumption.  Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to
evaluate break-even cash flow runs to determine the level of
expected cumulative losses the structure can withstand at a given
rating level.  The loss multiplier scale utilized is consistent
with that of other commercial ABS transactions.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations', dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 5-6 at 'AAA' to 1.5 at 'BB'.


CITY OF BUENA VISTA: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from A1 the City
of Buena Vista's (VA) Issuer Rating; subsequently Moody's has
withdrawn the rating for business reasons.  The downgrade to Ba1
from A1 reflects the city's failure to include appropriation in
its 2011 budget for annual debt service on its Lease Revenue Bonds
(Golf Course Project), Series 2005A ($10 Million outstanding).
Failure to appropriate demonstrates uncertainty about the city's
willingness to meet its obligations and, given the magnitude of
the obligation relative to security available to bondholders, is
likely to result in losses.  The Issuer Rating reflects Moody's
view on the implied general obligation credit quality of the city,
which is significantly weakened given the magnitude risk
associated with non-appropriation and the potential for material
bondholder losses on the lease.

The lease revenue bonds (not rated by Moody's) were originally
issued to finance construction of a municipal golf course, which
opened in 2005 and is operated by the city's Public Recreational
Facilities Authority.  Golf course operations have not been self-
supporting and significant transfers from the city's general fund
have been made to support the enterprise.  Although the city has
unlimited property taxing authority, the proposed budget for
fiscal 2011 does not include an appropriation for debt service
related to the 2005A bonds.

The city no longer has outstanding debt rated by Moody's and the
issuer rating has been withdrawn for business reasons.

The last rating action with respect to the City of Buena Vista,
Virginia was on August 4, 2004 when a municipal finance scale
issuer rating of Baa1 was assigned to the City of Buena Vista.
That rating was subsequently recalibrated to A1 on April 30, 2010.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2001-CP4 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Loss Severity ratings or
Recovery Ratings to Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp. 2001-CP4, as indicated:

  -- $16.2 million class E to 'A/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.2 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.8 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $22.1 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.1 million class J to 'CCC/RR3' from 'BB';

  -- $10.3 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';

  -- $8.8 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $531.8 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class A-X at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $61.9 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.4 million class M at 'C/RR6';
  -- $5.9 million class N at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate the $8 million class O certificates.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 7.01%
of the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the expected losses
(97.4%) come from the loans in special servicing.  Expected loss
as a percentage of the original deal balance is 6.29%.  Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 33.2% to $787.2 million from $1.18 billion
at issuance.  Thirty loans (34.4%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 32 Loans of Concern (24.2%), including ten
assets in special servicing (14.95%).  The largest (3.4%)
specially serviced asset is an office building located in
Richardson, TX, a suburb of Dallas.  The single tenant, SBC,
vacated the property in May 2010 and the borrower has no
prospective tenants.

The second largest (2.43%) specially serviced loan is an office
property located in Novi, MI.  The property was REO and recently
sold.

The third largest specially serviced loan (2.42%) is secured by an
office property located in Shelton, CT.  The property is in
foreclosure and the borrower has filed for bankruptcy protection.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 20 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with eight loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2003-CPN1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2003-CPN1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction, and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P lowered its ratings on three of these classes
to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other
classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect credit support erosion that S&P
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of four of the
five specially serviced assets.  In addition, recurring interest
shortfalls primarily due to appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction amounts and special servicer fees prompted us to lower
its ratings on classes M, N, and O to 'D'.  S&P expects these
interest shortfalls to continue for the foreseeable future.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.52x and a loan-to-value ratio of 77.2%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.29x and an LTV ratio of 97.5%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
37.0% and 24.5%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude 20 defeased loans ($171.9 million, 22.1%), four
specially serviced loans ($125.3 million, 16.1%), and 71
residential cooperative loans ($93.7 million, 12.0%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for the four specially serviced loans
and included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.  S&P excluded the co-op loans because they did not
default under its 'AAA' scenario due to low leverage.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-
X and A-Y interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the May 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, five loans
($129.3 million, 16.6%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.  Two of the loans are 90-plus
days delinquent ($34.5 million, 4.5%); two are 60-plus days
delinquent ($20.6 million, 2.6%); and one is in its grace period
($74.2 million, 9.5%).  Four of the specially serviced loans
($55.1 million, 7.1%) have appraisal reduction amounts in effect
totaling $18.8 million.

Details of the five loans with the special servicer are:

The Northgate Mall loan ($74.2 million, 9.5%), the largest
nondefeased exposure in the pool, is secured by 575,561 sq. ft. of
a 1.11-million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Cincinnati.  The loan,
which is in its grace period, was transferred to Midland on Aug.
24, 2009, due to imminent default.  According to Midland, the
borrower has indicated that it is no longer able to keep the loan
current and fund operating expenses out of pocket.  Midland has
stated that it expects a $21.6 million ARA to be in effect against
the loan, and S&P may see this reflected in the trustee remittance
report as early as June 2010.  This ARA may cause additional
interest shortfalls to the trust if the loan becomes delinquent.
The ARA is calculated based on an updated November 2009 appraisal
that valued the property at significantly below the trust balance.
According to Midland, it plans to pursue a property sale.  The
reported DSC for year-end 2009 was 1.01x, and occupancy was 79.2%
as of May 2010.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The Michigan Equities C Portfolio loan ($27.0 million, 3.5%), the
second-largest nondefeased exposure in the pool, is secured by 12
office, three retail, and one industrial buildings totaling
368,940 sq. ft. in Lansing, Mich., and Okemos, Mich.  The loan,
which is 90-plus days delinquent, was transferred to Midland on
May 12, 2008, due to nonmonetary default following a transfer of
the borrower's interest without the lender's consent.  The
nonmonetary default issue has since been resolved.  Midland stated
that it has filed for receivership and plans to sell the
properties in whole or in part.  The reported DSC for year-end
2008 was 0.24x, and occupancy was 68.7% as of April 2010.  An ARA
of $7.4 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Signature Place Apartments loan ($16.6 million, 2.1%), the
ninth-largest nondefeased exposure in the pool, is secured by a
414-unit multifamily apartment complex in Marietta, Ga.  The loan,
which is 60-plus days delinquent, was transferred to Midland on
Sept. 17, 2009, due to imminent default, after the borrower
indicated that it had cash flow problems.  According to Midland,
it is currently working out a loan modification with the borrower.
The reported DSC for year-end 2009 was 0.85x, and occupancy was
66.4% as of March 2010.  An ARA of $6.9 million is in effect
against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The Taunton Depot Drive loan ($7.5 million, 1.0%) is secured by a
63,610-sq.-ft. retail center in Taunton, Mass.  The loan, which is
90-plus days delinquent, was transferred to Midland on Nov. 3,
2008, due to imminent default.  Occupancy dropped to 37.5% after
Linens 'N Things vacated the property in November 2008.  Midland
indicated that it is currently working out a loan modification
with the borrower.  The reported DSC and occupancy for year-end
2009 were 0.45x and 37.5%, respectively.  An ARA of $3.2 million
is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Gateway Center loan ($4.0 million, 0.5%) is secured by a
30,026-sq.-ft. unanchored retail center in Silver Spring, Md.  The
loan was transferred to Midland on April 29, 2010, because it was
60-plus days delinquent.  According to Midland, it is in the
process of collecting data on this loan and has ordered valuation
estimates from brokers.  The reported DSC and occupancy for year-
end 2009 were 0.91x and 57.5%, respectively.  An ARA of
$1.3 million is in effect against this loan.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the May 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $777.9 million, which is 77.3% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 158 loans, down from 171 loans at
issuance.  The master servicers for this transaction are Midland
(for all loans excluding the co-op loans) and National Consumer
Cooperative Bank FSB (for the co-op loans).  The master servicers
provided financial information for 99.4% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, the majority of which was full-year 2008, interim-
2009, or full-year 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.61x for the nondefeased
loans in the pool based on the servicer-reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.52x and 77.2%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude 20 defeased loans
($171.9 million, 22.1%), four specially serviced loans
($125.3 million, 16.1%), and 71 co-op loans ($93.7 million,
12.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the four specially
serviced loans.  The transaction has experienced $14.4 million in
principal losses to date.  Twenty-four loans ($57.3 million, 7.4%)
in the pool are on the master servicers' watchlist.  Twenty-seven
loans ($182.8 million, 23.5%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, of
which 21 ($99.2 million, 12.7%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $258.9 million (33.3%).  Three of the top 10 exposures
($117.8 million, 15.1%) are with the special servicer.  Using
servicer-reported numbers and excluding the three loans with the
special servicer, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.52x
for the remaining seven nondefeased exposures in the top 10.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 exposures are 1.46x and
76.8%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CPN1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    F         BBB+        A/Watch Neg                     12.38
    G         BBB-        A-/Watch Neg                    10.11
    H         BB-         BBB+/Watch Neg                   8.82
    J         CCC+        BB+/Watch Neg                    6.23
    K         CCC-        BB-/Watch Neg                    4.29
    L         CCC-        B/Watch Neg                      3.32
    M         D           CCC+/Watch Neg                   2.35
    N         D           CCC-/Watch Neg                   1.54
    O         D           CCC-/Watch Neg                   0.90

                          Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CPN1

    Class     Rating                     Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     ------                     ----------------------
    A-1       AAA                                         24.02
    A-2       AAA                                         24.02
    B         AA+                                         20.14
    C         AA                                          18.85
    D         AA-                                         14.96
    E         A+                                          13.67
    A-X       AAA                                           N/A
    A-Y       AAA                                           N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-C3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Corp.'s series 2005-C3, Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust
2000-C3, and Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1,
three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions.

The downgrades reflect interest shortfalls.  S&P expects the
shortfalls on six of these classes to continue and, as a result,
S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D'.

All of the classes S&P downgraded to 'D' have experienced interest
shortfalls for nine months.  The recurring interest shortfalls for
the respective certificates are primarily due to one or more of
these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses;

* Interest paid on outstanding advances; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered loans where
the master servicer has stopped advancing to cover related
interest payments, modified loans where interest payments have
been waived, and special servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's
view, to cause recurring interest shortfalls.

Two of the eight classes experienced shortfalls for four months
and are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in the
future.  If these interest shortfalls continue, S&P will likely
downgrade these classes to 'D'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of a loan's
stated principal balance when that loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
timeframe.  S&P exclusively considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even a reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P details the eight downgraded classes from the three CMBS
transactions below.

    Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Corp.'s series 2005-C3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Corp.'s
series 2005-3 due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily
resulting from ASERs related to 10 assets, including the second-
largest asset in the pool, that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  As of the May 17, 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $62.2 million were in effect for 11 assets.
The resulting reported ASER amount was $265,854, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $1,373,820.  Standard & Poor's
considered nine ASERs ($248,967), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees to determine
its rating actions for this transaction.  The reported current
interest shortfalls total $369,342 and have affected all classes
up to and including class F.  Classes K, L, M, and N have all
experienced interest shortfalls for the past nine months, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CSFB 2005-C3 transaction consists of
193 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.51 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 17 assets ($224.3 million;
14.8% of the trust balance) in the pool were with the special
servicer, including the second-largest asset ($106.6 million,
7.1%).  The payment status of the delinquent assets is: six are
real estate owned (REO; $55.2 million; 3.6%), three are in
foreclosure ($130.5 million; 8.6%), one is a nonperforming matured
loan ($17.0 million, 1.1%), two are three or more months
delinquent ($2.4 million; 0.2%), one is two months delinquent
($3.0 million, 0.2%), one is one month delinquent ($1.5 million;
0.1%), one is late but less than one month delinquent
($2.4 million; 0.2%), and two have late monthly payments but are
within their grace periods ($12.3 million; 0.8%).

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3

S&P lowered its rating on the class L certificates from Salomon
Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3 due to interest
shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to five assets
that are currently with the special servicer, LNR.  As of the
May 18, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $23.3 million were
in effect for four assets.  The total reported ASER amount was
$157,374, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $913,281.
Standard & Poor's considered three ASERs ($150,775), all of which
were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing
fees and interest that has been waived on one modified loan, to
determine its rating actions.  The reported current interest
shortfalls totaled $118,786 and have affected all classes up to
and including class J.  This amount is net of $229,879 in paybacks
on the bonds resulting from the liquidation of two assets.  Class
L has experienced interest shortfalls for nine months and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the SBCMT 2000-C3 transaction consists of
82 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $376.7 million.  As of
the May 18, 2010, remittance report, 12 assets ($89.9 million,
23.9% of the trust balance) in the pool were with the special
servicer.  The payment status of these assets is: one is REO
($20.7 million; 5.5%), seven are nonperforming matured loans
($32.1 million; 8.5%), one is three or more months delinquent
($1.6 million, 0.4%), one is one month delinquent ($20.4; 5.4%),
one is late but less than one month delinquent ($2.1 million;
0.6%), and one has a late monthly payment but is within its grace
period ($13.0 million, 3.5%).

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1

S&P lowered its rating on the class J certificates from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 to 'D' due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to 15
assets that are currently with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc. (Midland), and also due to two loans where the
master servicer has curtailed interest advances.  As of the
June 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $54.4 million were
in effect for 15 assets.  The total reported ASER amount was
$201,825, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1.8 million.  Standard & Poor's considered four ASERs ($54,820),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as two loans
where the master servicer has stopped advancing to cover related
interest payments and current special servicing fees, to determine
its rating actions.  The reported current interest shortfalls
totaled $384,571 and have affected all of the classes up to and
including class J.  Class J has experienced interest shortfalls
for nine months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to
'D'.

The collateral pool for the BACM 2006-1 transaction consists of
192 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.96 billion.  As of
the June 10, 2010, remittance report, 22 assets ($169.4 million;
8.6% of the trust balance) in the pool were with the special
servicer.  The payment status of these assets is: three are in
foreclosure ($30.5 million; 1.6%), 12 are three or more months
delinquent ($101.1 million; 5.0%), one is two months delinquent
($5.3 million; 0.3%), one is one month delinquent ($3.6 million;
0.2%), two have late monthly payments but are within their grace
periods ($11.1 million; 0.6%), and three are current
($17.8 million; 0.9%).

                         Ratings Lowered

             Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-3

                                                      Reported
             Rating                              interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                              -----------------------
    Class  To    From  Credit enhancement (%)    Current    Accumulated
    -----  --    ----  ----------------------    -------    -----------
    H     CCC   B-               3.25       81,337        111,921
    J     CCC-  CCC              2.85       22,966         91,865
    K     D     CCC-             2.31       30,626        135,271
    L     D     CCC-             1.90       22,970        206,731
    M     D     CCC-             1.63       15,311        137,798
    N     D     CCC-             1.36       15,311        137,798

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C3

                                                      Reported
             Rating                              interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                              -----------------------
    Class  To    From  Credit enhancement (%)    Current    Accumulated
    -----  --    ----  ----------------------    -------    -----------
    L     D     CCC-             1.52       60,025        539,883

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                                                      Reported
             Rating                              interest shortfalls ($)
             ------                              -----------------------
    Class  To    From  Credit enhancement (%)    Current    Accumulated
    -----  --    ----  ----------------------    -------    -----------
    J     D     CCC-             3.38       101,899      1,010,027


CREST 2000-1: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various 2000-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class, downgraded one class and
affirmed two classes of notes issued by Crest 2000-1, Ltd.  The
details of the rating action follow at the end of this release.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, the overall credit
quality of the portfolio has improved despite 12.9% of the
portfolio being downgraded two notches because a defaulted
security is no longer in the portfolio.  Approximately 4.9% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade, all
of which is rated in the 'CCC' rating category or below, compared
to 9.1% at last review.  Currently, there are no securities in the
portfolio experiencing interest shortfalls or deferring interest
payments.

The class A-2 notes have received $82.7 million since January
2009, leaving just 12.7% of its original balance outstanding.  As
a result, the credit enhancement available to the class A-2 notes
increased to 78.8% from 45.5%, at last review.  Similarly, the
credit enhancement for the class B notes increased to 36% from
21.5% and the class C notes to 16.7% from 10.3%.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Based on this analysis and
taking into account the increased concentration of the portfolio,
the ratings for the class A-2, class B and class C notes are
assigned as listed below.

The Stable Outlooks on the class A-2, class B and class C notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that the classes' ratings will remain
stable for the next one to two years.  Fitch also assigned Loss
Severity ratings of 'LS2', 'LS1' and 'LS2', respectively to these
notes.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the expected loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The
LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

The cash flow model produced no breakeven rates for the class D
notes.  The notes are already undercollateralized, with a credit
enhancement level of -1.3% down from -0.2% at last review, and
excess spread is flowing through to the preference shares because
all coverage tests are passing.  Even in a best case scenario
where there are no future defaults, the class is not expected to
receive full principal repayment.  Additionally, there is
currently 4.9% of the portfolio considered distressed.  Fitch
believes that default is inevitable for the class D notes, though
its recovery expectations are high.

Crest 2000-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation that
closed on Nov. 3, 2000.  The current portfolio consists of 16
bonds from 15 obligors, of which 56% are real estate investment
trust debt securities, 41% are commercial mortgage backed
securities, 2% are residential mortgage-backed securities and 1%
is commercial asset-backed securities from 1996 through 2000
vintage transactions.

Fitch has affirmed, upgraded, downgraded, assigned LS ratings and
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:

  -- $24,684,107 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $50,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'A/LS1', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $22,500,000 class C notes upgraded to 'B/LS2' from 'CCC',
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.


CREST 2002-1: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three and downgraded one class of notes
issued by Crest 2002-1, Ltd.  The details of the rating action
follow at the end of this release.

Since the last rating action in February 2009, the credit quality
of the collateral has declined with approximately 26% of the
portfolio downgraded on average 2.5 notches.  Approximately 46% of
the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 7.2% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or below, as
compared to 41.2% and 1.6%, respectively, at last review.
Currently, three assets which comprise 6.6% of the portfolio are
experiencing interest shortfalls or deferring interest payments.

The effect of the decline in credit quality has been offset by
increased credit enhancement levels for all classes of notes due
to the deleveraging of the transaction.  As of the May 2010
distribution date, approximately 44.5% of the class A notes'
original principal balance has amortized down.  As a result, the
credit enhancement available to the class A notes increased from
48%, at last review, to 55.1%.  Similarly, the credit enhancement
for the class B-1 and B-2 (class B) notes increased from 23.7% to
27.2%, and for the class C notes from 14.2% to 16.1%.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Based on this analysis, the
breakeven rates for class A are generally consistent with the 'AA'
rating category, the breakeven rates for the class B are generally
consistent with the 'BBB-' rating category, and the breakeven
rates for class C are generally consistent with the 'B' rating
category.

The Negative Rating Outlook on classes A through C reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage backed
security loans will continue to face refinance risk at maturity.
Fitch also assigned Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or
lower.

Crest 2002-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation that
closed on March 27, 2002.  The current portfolio consists of 38
bonds from 26 obligors, of which 40.1% are real estate investment
trust debt securities and 59.9% are from the 1999 through 2002
vintages.

Fitch has affirmed, downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:

  -- $144,684,589 Class A affirmed at 'AA/LS3', Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $57,000,000 Class B-1 affirmed at 'BBB-/LS3', Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $33,000,000 Class B-2 affirmed at 'BBB-/LS3', Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $35,507,335 Class C downgraded to 'B/LS4' from 'BB', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable.


CREST DARTMOUTH: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes issued by Crest Dartmouth
Street 2003-1, Ltd./Corp., as a result of stable performance in
the portfolio.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, the Fitch
derived weighted-average rating has increased to the 'BBB+/BBB'
rating category from the 'BBB/BBB-' rating category mostly due to
the repayment in full of lower rated collateral.  Approximately
9.9% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade compared to 10.1% at last review.  Further, the
collateralized debt obligation has paid down $66.1 million since
the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  The results were considered in
conjunction with Fitch's expectation for continuing stress in the
underlying commercial real estate collateral.  For all classes of
notes, this consideration offsets the cushion between the current
rating stress thresholds and the breakeven rates.  This cushion,
however, does indicate a Stable Rating Outlook for the current
ratings.

Fitch also assigned Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.

Crest Dartmouth is a cash flow CRE CDO which closed on April 10,
2003.  The collateral is composed of 57.8% real estate investment
trusts, 41.7% commercial mortgage backed securities and 0.5%
commercial real estate loans.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings for these classes as
indicated:

  -- $141,487,955 class A notes at 'AA+/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- $13,125,000 class B-1 notes at 'A/LS1'', Outlook Stable;
  -- $21,000,000 class B-2 notes at 'A/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- $14,875,000 class C notes at 'BBB-/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $12,250,000 class D notes at 'B/LS2', Outlook Stable,.


CREST EXETER: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes issued by Crest Exeter
Street Solar 2004-1, Ltd./Corp as a result of negative credit
migration in the portfolio.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
15.5% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 6.2% is on
Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 24.4% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade.  The Fitch derived
weighted-average rating has decreased to the 'BBB-/BB+' rating
category from the 'BBB-' rating category at last review.  Further,
the CDO has paid down $23.1 million since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Based on this analysis, the
breakeven rates for all classes of notes are generally consistent
with the ratings assigned below.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A through E notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will
continue to face refinance risk at maturity.  Fitch also assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.

Crest Exeter is a cash flow CRE CDO which closed on April 29,
2004.  The collateral is composed of 66.7% commercial mortgage
backed securities, 22% real estate investment trusts, and 11.3%
commercial real estate loans.

Fitch has affirmed, revised Outlooks, and assigned LS ratings for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $154,757,998 class A-1 at 'AA/LS1'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $38,507,859 class A-2 at 'AA/LS1'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch has downgraded, revised Outlooks, and assigned LS ratings
for these classes as indicated:

  -- $8,377,070 class B-1 to 'A/LS3' from 'A+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $9,214,777 class B-2 to 'A/LS3' from 'A+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $1,675,414 class C-1 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $13,759,337 class C-2 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $5,026,242 class D-1 to 'BB/LS3' from 'BB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $11,371,872 class D-2 to 'BB/LS3' from 'BB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $3,769,681 class E-1 to 'B/LS4' from 'B+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $5,445,095 class E-2 to 'B/LS4' from 'B+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.


CREST G-STAR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class and downgraded four classes
of notes issued by Crest G-Star 2001-1, Ltd. due to negative
credit migration in the underlying portfolio.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, the credit quality
of the portfolio has declined with approximately 28.4% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 1.2 notches.
Approximately 38.4% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 4.3% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or below, compared to 28.5% and 0%, respectively, at last
review.  Currently, the portfolio comprises six securities (7.9%)
that are experiencing interest shortfalls or deferring interest
payments, and are considered distressed.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for the class A, class B-1 and B-2 (together, class B) and class C
notes are generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The Negative Rating Outlook on class A, class B and class C
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage
backed security loans will continue to face refinance risk at
maturity.  Fitch also assigned Loss Severity ratings to the class
A, class B and class C notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or
LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

The cash flow model breakeven rates for the class D notes do not
pass the 'CCC' PCM RLR.  The class D notes are downgraded to 'CC',
indicating that default appears probable, because while its credit
enhancement level currently exceeds the total percentage of assets
considered distressed, further deterioration could quickly erode
that cushion.

Crest G-Star 2001-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation
that closed on Dec. 18, 2001.  The current portfolio consists of
44 bonds from 28 obligors, of which 50.6% are commercial mortgage-
backed securities, 49.2% are real estate investment trust debt
securities and 0.2% are commercial real estate loans from 1998
through 2001 vintage transactions.

Fitch has taken these actions, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:

  -- $178,283,220 class A notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $60,000,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB-
     '; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB-
     '; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $20,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BB';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'B'.


CREST G-STAR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes issued by Crest
G-Star 2001-2, Ltd. due to negative credit migration in the
underlying portfolio.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, the credit quality
of the portfolio has declined with approximately 22.7% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 1.5 notches.
Approximately 22.7% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment, compared to 17.8% at last review.  Currently,
the portfolio comprises three securities (10.4%) that are
experiencing interest shortfalls or deferring interest payments.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for the class A and class B-1 and B-2 notes are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The Negative Rating Outlook on class A and class B reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial mortgage backed
security loans will continue to face refinance risk at maturity.
Fitch also assigned Loss Severity ratings to the class A and class
B.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
expected loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with probability
of default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch
does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated
'CCC' or lower.

The cash flow model produced no breakeven rates for the class C
notes.  The notes are downgraded to 'C', indicating that default
appears inevitable, because its credit enhancement level is
surpassed by the percentage of assets currently experiencing
interest shortfalls.

Crest G-Star 2001-2 is a static collateralized debt obligation
that closed on Dec. 18, 2001.  The current portfolio consists of
31 bonds from 27 obligors, of which 42.9% are CMBS, 54.6% are real
estate investment trust debt securities and 2.5% are CMBS rake
bonds secured by subordinate portions of commercial real estate
loans from 1998 through 2001 vintage transactions.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $173,607,753 class A notes to 'AA/LS2' from 'AAA', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $34,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'B/LS3' from 'BBB-', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class B-2 notes to 'B/LS3' from 'BBB-', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $21,000,000 class C notes to 'C' from 'B+'.


CWABS ASSET-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 36
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 7 tranches from 21 RMBS
transactions issued by CWABS.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of closed-end second mortgages and/or home
equity lines of credit.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the second lien pools
in relation to existing credit protection.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by MBIA Insurance Corporation (rated B3) or Syncora Guarantee Inc.
(rated Ca).  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  Certain other
tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped by
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.  Moody's withdrew the
insurance financial strength rating of FGIC in March 2009.  As a
result securities wrapped by FGIC are rated at their underlying
rating without consideration of FGIC's guaranty.  RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-SPS1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-SPS2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed
Notes, Series 2004-A

  -- Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed
Notes, Series 2004-B

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed
Notes, Series 2004-C

  -- Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust, Series 2003-E

  -- Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Asset-Backed Notes, Series
2004-O

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-D

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-E

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-F

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-J

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-K

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-L

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-M

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-N

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes,
Series 2004-Q

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on March 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on March 9, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-S

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-T

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-U

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-S2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-SC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DEUTSCHE ALT-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 95 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 95
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 3 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 4 tranches from 8 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan
Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-4

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X1B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 13, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 13, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 13, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2005-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Upgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on 1994 Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms the B3 bond rating assigned to
$65 million of Series 1994 fixed rate bonds issued by Dimensions
Health Corporation through the Prince George's County, MD.  The
rating outlook remains negative.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a pledge of "receipts"
derived from the health care operations and an assignment of the
lease in the health care facilities.  The actual health care
buildings are owned by Prince George's County, MD and are leased
to DHC through 2042.  The Master Trustee can terminate the lease
by virtue of an event of default by DHC and assign the lease and
operation of the facilities to another operator.  As of April 30,
2010, a debt service fund in the amount of $3.4 million and a
separate debt service reserve fund in the amount of $6.5 million
for a total of approximately $9.9 million existed for the
protection of the Series 1994 bondholders.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                             Strengths

* Fully funded debt service reserve fund on all fixed rate debt
  outstanding; track-record of making monthly debt service
  payments and semi-annual bond payments in full and on time and
  never missing a bond payment; expected to make next semi-annual
  bond payment and quarterly pension payment in July 2010

* State of Maryland (Aaa rated) and Prince George's County, MD
  (Aa1 rated) have demonstrated historical support to keep DHC in
  operation by providing operating grants totaling approximately
  $112 million over the last eight years.  DHC received State and
  County operating grants of a combined $25 million in FY 2009 and
  $21 million in FY 2010.  The State and County have approved a
  combined $24 million in operating grants for FY 2011 (State
  approved $15 million and the County approved $9 million)

                            Challenges

* The independent Prince George's County Hospital Authority,
  established under legislation passed in May 2008 to find a new
  owner (s) for the system, was unsuccessful in selling the system
  after a two year mandate under the legislation.  On May 21,
  2010, the Authority released its final report with
  recommendations to the State and County including a proposed
  timeline to help make the system financially sound, reconfigure
  and modernize healthcare services and delivery and through the
  possible building of a new hospital in the County by 2015

* The Chief Executive Officer of five years of the system
  resigned in early May 2010.  The Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
  was appointed as Interim CEO and continues to act as system CFO

* Continued very thin liquidity; As of April 30, 2010,
  unrestricted liquidity measured $18.3 million (17 days cash on
  hand and 25% cash-to-debt)

* Continued large operating losses and negative operating cash
  flow.  Through the first ten months of FY 2010, DHC recorded a
  operating loss of $19.6 million (-6.4% margin) and operating
  cash flow deficit of $8.8 million (-2.9% margin) (excluding
  combined $22.6 million of State, County, and Magruder Memorial
  Hospital Trust operating grants)

* Liabilities continue to outweigh assets.  $65 million of
  outstanding fixed rate bonds and $77 million unfunded defined
  benefit pension liability of June 30, 2009; DHC contributed $8.5
  million the pension plan in FY 2010.  DHC has not received a
  response from the IRS on its request for a waiver for plan year
  2007 contributions; if a waiver is not granted it would result
  in a material financial risk for DHC

* Very modest capital spending over last the last ten years (less
  than one times depreciation expense) resulting in a steadily
  increased 20 years average age of plant in FY 2010); deferred
  maintenance remains an ongoing challenge

* Serves a high Medicaid and Self Pay population (measured by 39%
  of gross revenues in FY 2009)

                    Recent Developments/Results

Dimensions Health Corporation, the largest safety net provider in
Prince George's County continues to face significant financial
challenges.  Cash continues to remain a very thin $18.2 million as
of April 30, 2010 (17 days cash on hand and 25% cash-to-debt).
DHC continues to make monthly debt service payments and expected
to make its next required FY 2011 $3.4 million semi-annual bond
payment and $2.1 million quarterly pension payment in July 2010.
The debt service reserve fund is fully funded at this time
($6.5 million).

On May 21, 2010, the independent Prince George's County Hospital
Authority, established under the May 2008 legislation to find a
new owner(s) for the system, released its final report and
recommendations to the State and County.  The Authority was
unsuccessful at its attempt to find a new buyer (s) and sell the
system within a two year mandate under the legislation that ended
on May 22, 2010.  The Authority's final report outlined several
recommendations to make the system financially sound and improve
healthcare delivery in the county.  Some of the immediate
recommendations for the State and County are to execute a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would detail the transition
process and that would include continued commitment of the
$174 million agreed upon under the 2008 legislation to satisfy
DHC's debt obligations and liabilities, make short-term
investments in the system and reconfigure the healthcare delivery
system in the county through a strategic partnership with another
healthcare provider and that may involve the construction of a new
hospital in the county.  The report also recommends the State and
County, in conjunction with DHC, to develop a strategic
restructuring and cost containment plan, and also suggests
executing a plan for the interim transfer of the currently county-
owned assets to the current operator, DHC.  Since the release of
the Authority's report, the strategic direction and next steps to
address DHC's immediate and longer term challenges remain unknown
at this time.

DHC's continues to generate large operating losses and operating
cash flow deficit (excluding State, County, and Magruder Memorial
Hospital Trust Operating Grants).  Through the first ten months of
FY 2010, DHC posted an operating loss of $19.6 million (-6.4%
margin) from an operating loss of $23.0 million (-7.5% margin)
through ten months of FY 2008.  Operating cash flow deficit
declined slightly to $8.8 million (-2.9% margin) from a deficit of
$12.4 million (-4.1% margin), respectively.  As of April 30, 2010,
DHC received the $22.6 million operating grants for FY 2010.  The
State and County have approved a combined $24 million in operating
grants for FY 2011 (State approved $15 million and the County
approved $9 million in funding)

The primary driver of maintaining a negative outlook remains
Moody's belief that in the absence of securing government and
other external funding support and the inability to find a longer
term solution for the system's operating challenges, the risk of
DHC's inability to make future bond and pension payments and
continue to remain viable will increase.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's concerns with DHC's ability
to meet operating cash needs with continued large operating
losses, increased unfunded pension obligation, and very thin
liquidity coupled with the ongoing uncertainty of securing
permanent funding and a long term solution to remain financially
viable in the future.

                What could change the rating -- UP

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the short-term; over the longer-
term, a rating upgrade would be considered if DHC secures stable
and permanent external funding, demonstrates and sustains
substantial operating improvement; rebuilds cash to demonstrate
long-term viability

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Inability to find a solution to financial challenges and failure
to secure long-term external funding; further erosion of operating
performance and liquidity; payment default on bonds and pension
plan payments and/or bankruptcy filing

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

-- Based on financial statements for Dimensions Health
    Corporation and Subsidiaries

-- First number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2009

-- Second number reflects unaudited year ended April 30, 2010
   (annualized)

-- Excludes operating grants from County, State, Federal and
    Magruder Memorial Hospital Trust of $26.6 million FY 2009 and
    $22.6 million as of April 30, 2010

-- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 20,696; 18,940 (10 months FY 2010)

* Total operating revenues: $363.3 million; $367.5 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
   ($12.0) million; ($7.1) million

* Total debt outstanding: $71.8 million; $71.8 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $7.2 million; $7.2 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: negative

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
   income: negative

* Debt-to-cash flow: negative

* Days cash on hand: 17.5 days; 17.4 days

* Cash-to-debt: 26%; 25%

* Operating margin: -7.6%; -6.4%

* Operating cash flow margin: -4.1%; -2.9%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of June 30, 2009):

-- Series 1994 fixed rate ($65.0 million outstanding); rated B3

The last rating action with respect to Dimensions Health
Corporation was on December 15, 2009, when the B3 rating affirmed
and outlook was negative.  That rating was subsequently
recalibrated to A2 on May 7, 2010.


DUKE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Duke Funding High Grade
I, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$660,000,000 Class A-1 LT-a Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2040, (current balance of $561,694,878), Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$0 Class A-1 LT-b1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2045, (current balance of $1,310,004,762), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Duke Funding High Grade I, Limited, is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2003 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  The weighted
average rating factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased
from 2182 in April 2009 to 2938 in April 2010.  The defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, has also increased from
$368 million to $514 million in that period.  Additionally,
approximately $976 million of RMBS within the underlying portfolio
are currently on review for possible downgrade as a result of
Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8 for subprime, April 12 for
Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will have
varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


GALE FORCE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gale Force 3 CLO, Ltd.

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2;
     previously on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$143,300,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2;
     previously on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$32,400,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A3; previously on
     June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Fixed
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A3; previously on June 22,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$26,100,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1;
     previously on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$27,600,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B1; previously on
     June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$21,600,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on
     June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$7,500,000 Combination Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to B2;

The upgrade actions taken on the notes reflect the combined impact
of improvements in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
and remodeling the overcollateralization tests using corrected
inputs.  The downgrade of the Combination Notes also reflects the
impact of remodeling the overcollateralization tests.

The correction relates to the calculation of the
overcollateralization ratios used in the tests: in the rating
action dated June 22, 2009, the numerator in such
overcollateralization ratios was modeled using an incorrect value.
The overcollateralization tests have been remodeled, and the
rating actions reflect the correction.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated May 2, 2010, the weighted
average rating factor is 2719 compared to 2829 in May 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.5% of the
underlying portfolio versus 10.8% in May 2009.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and in "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gale Force 3 CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  On June 22, 2009, Moody's downgraded all the notes issued
by Gale Force 3 CLO, Ltd., as a result of the application of
revised and updated key modeling assumptions as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's
underlying portfolio.


HEREFORD STREET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Hereford Street ABS CDO I,
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

US$996,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2045 (current
balance of $967,349,178), Downgraded to Ca; previously on
March 26, 2009, Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade.

Hereford Street ABS CDO I, Limited, is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of asset-backed
securities originated between 2001 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and failure of the coverage tests.  The weighted average rating
factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased from 1555 in
March 2009 to 2203 in May 2010.  The defaulted securities, as
reported by the trustee, has also increased from $256 million to
$414 million in that period.  Additionally, approximately
$209 million of RMBS within the underlying portfolio are currently
on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's updated
loss projections.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14 for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.   At the same time, S&P
affirmed its rating on one other class from the same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmation reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction, including the effect of the deteriorating economy and
the current credit characteristics of the underlying collateral
assets.  S&P's analysis also considered the transaction's
liability structure, and the application of its updated U.S.
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

According to the May 20, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included these:

* One-hundred-and-one commercial mortgage-backed securities
  tranches ($832.9 million, 73.4%);

* Eight subordinated loans ($226.3 million, 19.9%);

* Two whole loans ($40.4 million, 3.6%); and

* Three CRE CDO tranches ($34.3 million, 3.0%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its credit estimates for
all of the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on
its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most
recent financial data provided by the collateral manager, J.E.
Robert Co. Inc., and the trustee, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
as well as market and valuation data from third-party providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes 98
impaired and defaulted CMBS and CRE CDO tranches ($802.1 million,
70.7%).  The recovery rates for the CMBS collateral reflect the
methodology S&P outlined in "Recovery Rates For CMBS Collateral In
Resecuritization Transactions," published May 28, 2008.  According
to the trustee report, the transaction is failing five interest
coverage tests and 10 overcollateralization coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                           Rating
                           ------
         Class     To                   From
         -----     --                   ----
         A-FL      BB                   BBB+/Watch Neg
         B-FL      B+                   BB+/Watch Neg
         C-FX      B                    BB+/Watch Neg
         C-FL      B                    BB+/Watch Neg
         D-FX      CCC+                 BB/Watch Neg
         D-FL      CCC+                 BB/Watch Neg
         E-FX      CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
         E-FL      CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
         F-FL      CCC-                 B-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     JER CRE CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                    Class             Rating
                    -----             ------
                    G-FL              CCC-


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-CIBC4 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings to JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-CIBC4:

  -- $10 million class D to 'A/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $24 million class E to 'B-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $12 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $12 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns a Recovery Rating to
this class:

  -- $14 million class G to 'C/RR6' from ''BB'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch also lowers the Recovery Rating of this class:

  -- $4 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'C/RR2'.

Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes as
indicated:

  -- $49.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $403.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA'/LS1; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $6 million class K at 'C/RR6';

  -- $8 million class L at 'C/RR6';

  -- $2.4 million class M at 'D/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class NR.  Class A-1 has been paid in full.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 6.9% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $42.1 million.  The majority of the Fitch
total expected losses (82%) are associated with the specially
serviced asset, Highland Mall.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down 23.6%
to $610.5 million from $798.9 million at issuance.  There are 108
of the original 121 loans remaining in the transaction, 27 of
which have defeased (31%) including four (9.3%) of the top ten
loans in the transaction.  Three loans (12%) are currently in
special servicing and losses are expected.

The largest loan in special servicing (10.3%), the Highland Mall
loan, is collateralized by 487,170 sf of a 1,120,347 sf Regional
Mall located in Austin, TX.  The mall was originally anchored by
Dillard's Women's, Macy's and Dillard's Men's and Home.  Macy's
and Dillard's Women own their own stores and underlying land.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2009 due to imminent
default relating to tenancy issues.  Dillard's, one of the
anchors, closed its owned store and filed a suit to void the lease
for an additional 80,000 sf.  A notice of breach of the ground
lease was sent to the borrower, and the borrower disputed the
alleged breaches.  In September 2009, the borrower filed a suit
against the fee owner to dispute the breach and prevent the
termination of the ground lease.  A monetary default occurred with
the September 2009 payment.  The asset became real estate owned
(REO) on May 4, 2010 through the special purpose entity's
assumption of the ground lease.  The SPE, with title to the
leasehold, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 12, 2010.  As of the
March 31, 2010 rent roll, in-line occupancy is 63%, and overall
occupancy, which includes the 80,000 sf Dillard's Men's and Home
space, is 71%.  Fitch expects significant losses upon liquidation
of this asset based on a recent valuation obtained by the
servicer.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1%) is secured by an
industrial warehouse property located in New Kingstown, PA and is
currently 90 days delinquent.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in November 2009 due to monetary default.  Excel
Logistics which was the sole tenant at the property vacated upon
their lease expiration in July 2007.  The property had been leased
to several month-to-month tenants which have since vacated.  The
property is currently 100% vacant, and there are no prospective
tenants at this time.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 5% reduction to 2009 fiscal year end net operating
income, 10% reduction to 2008, and 15% for all loans which did not
report YE 2008 and applying an adjusted market cap rate between
7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
four loans (2.9% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


LAS VEGAS SANDS: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B-' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its rating outlook on
the Las Vegas Sands Corp. family of companies to positive from
negative.  All related ratings, including the 'B-' corporate
credit rating, were affirmed.  Aside from Las Vegas Sands Corp.,
the LVSC family of rated companies includes Las Vegas Sands LLC,
its Venetian Casino Resort LLC subsidiary, and affiliate VML U.S.
Finance LLC.

"The revision of the rating outlook to positive reflects S&P's
belief that, under its updated performance expectations, LVSC will
remain in compliance with covenants over the intermediate term,
albeit it through the continued use of equity cure payments in the
U.S.," noted Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ben Bubeck.
"Furthermore, given encouraging initial results at the Marina Bay
Sands property in Singapore, in addition to strong performance
across the company's other properties, S&P is becoming
increasingly comfortable with the company's liquidity profile.
S&P also believe LVSC is in position to successfully amend or
refinance its U.S. credit facility."

S&P's 'B-' corporate credit rating reflects LVSC's significant
debt burden, an aggressive development pipeline, and the continued
reliance on equity cure payments to remain in compliance with
covenants under its U.S. credit facilities.  Substantially
improved profitability following recently completed cost-
containment efforts, the potential for the company to generate
substantial cash proceeds through the sale of noncore assets, and
manageable debt maturities over the next few years only somewhat
temper these negative rating factors.

When assessing LVSC's credit quality, S&P considers the
consolidated entity, despite the distinct financing structures at
LVSC and its U.S., Macau, and Singapore subsidiaries.  S&P deem
the strategic relationship between the parent and each subsidiary
as an important factor bearing on the credit quality of the
overall consolidated entity.  However, the notching of S&P's
issue-level ratings from the corporate credit rating recognizes
the distinct financing structures.


LEHMAN ABS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-2 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-2 certificates from Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract
Trust 2001-B to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The lowered rating on the class M-2 certificates from Lehman ABS
Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B reflects a payment
default resulting from an interest shortfall for this class on the
April 2010 payment date.  S&P believes that interest shortfalls on
this class will likely persist into the future due to the adverse
performance trends S&P has observed in the underlying pool of
collateral originated by CIT Group/Sales Financing Inc. (the
originator), as well as the subordination of the write-down
interest for this class to senior principal payments.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the other outstanding
ratings associated with this transaction and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, in accordance with S&P's
criteria.


LOS ANGELES: S&P Junks Rating on 1987A Bonds
--------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Los
Angeles, California's (Arminta North and South Apartments) Ginnie
Mae collateralized multifamily housing revenue bonds series 1987A
to 'CC' from 'AA', and assigned a negative outlook.  The trustee,
U.S.Bank National Association, has informed us that they do not
anticipate having sufficient funds on hand for the June 20, 2010,
payment.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the transaction and
will take rating action as it considers appropriate.


LUBBOCK HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Ratings on Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Ba3 ratings on the Lubbock
Housing Finance Corporation Multi-family Revenue Refunding Bonds
(Las Colinas, Quail Creek and Parkridge Place Apartment projects),
Series 2002 A&B and B1 rating on Subordinate Series 2002C bonds.
The outlook is affirmed at positive.  This rating action reflects
continued increases in rental revenue and strengthened debt
service coverage.  The positive outlook reflects a possible
upgrade over the next 12 to 18 months if the project's operating
performance continues to remain strong.

All of the properties were built in 1983 and are located
approximately six miles southwest of the Lubbock central business
district.  The neighborhood is largely residential, with
development along the South Loop 289 thoroughfare.  Texas Tech
University is located within one to two miles of the submarket.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.

Recent Developments/Results:

After competition from newer complexes had a negative impact on
occupancy at the projects in recent years, occupancy and revenues
greatly improved in 2008 and 2009.  The weighted average monthly
occupancy for the three properties was 91% in 2009, slightly lower
than 93% average occupancy achieved in 2008.  Quail Creek and Las
Colinas continue to perform well with 96% and 92% occupancy
respectively (2009 monthly average), while occupancy at Parkridge
was substantially weaker at 85%.

The debt service coverage ratio derived from 2008 financial
statements was 1.34 for senior debt and 1.29x for subordinate
debt.  Based on the 2009 reviewed financial statements, the
operating performance of the projects improved, as demonstrated by
the 1.49x and 1.43x coverage levels for senior and subordinated
debt, respectively.  The increase in coverage levels is primarily
attributed to a 6% increase in rental revenues in 2009 over the
prior year.  The owner has been making substantial contributions
to the reserve and replacement fund in excess of the Indenture
requirement.  Moody's considers the owner's investment in the
property a strength as it improves the property's attractiveness.
Moody's also recognizes this is not a requirement and the
contributions cannot be counted on in the future.

                             Outlook

The positive outlook reflects a possible upgrade over the next 12
to 18 months if the project's operating performance continues to
remain strong.

The last rating action was on April 27, 2009, when the ratings
were affirmed at Ba3 and B1.  That rating for the Series 2002A&B
and 20002C were subsequently recalibrated on May 7, 2010, to Ba3
and B1 respectively.


MADISON AVENUE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Madison Avenue CDO I, Limited:

  -- US$24,500,000 Class C1 Floating Rate Notes due August 2013
     (current outstanding balance of $20,436,675), Upgraded to
     Ba3; previously on November 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$24,500,000 Class C2 Fixed Rate Notes due August 2013
     (current outstanding balance of $20,436,675), Upgraded to
     Ba3; previously on November 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio since the last rating action in November 2009.  In
addition, the transaction has also delevered, resulting in an
increase in the Class C overcollateralization ratio since the last
rating action.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated May 10, 2010, the weighted
average rating factor is 2374 compared to 2905 in October 2009,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 17.5% of
the underlying portfolio versus 21.7% in October 2009.  The Class
C overcollateralization ratio increased to 111.9% in May 2010 from
110.4% in October 2009.  Due to the impact of revised and updated
key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Madison Avenue CDO I, Limited, issued in August 2000, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.


MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Junks Rating on 1999A Bonds From 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the $5,325,000 of
Maricopa County Industrial Development Authority Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (Whispering Palms Apartment Project) Senior
Series 1999A to Caa1 from B1.  The rating action is based on
deteriorating debt service coverage levels in combination with the
tapping of the Debt Service Reserve Fund.

The outlook remains negative as a significant portion of the
underfunded Debt Service Reserve Fund may be used to meet July 1,
2010 principal and interest payments.  The $1,800,000 of remaining
Subordinate Series B Bonds are not rated nor has there been any
interest payment since July 1, 2007.

The Project:

Built in 1985, Whispering Palms Apartments is a 200 unit market
rate complex currently serving a predominantly low to moderate
income clientele and is located within the west-central Phoenix
submarket, approximately four miles west of downtown Phoenix.  The
dominant land use in this relatively mature market area is single
and multifamily residential development with a limited commercial
and retail presence.

Whispering Palms was restructured during the third quarter of 2004
with approximately $750,000 spent for rehabilitation purposes.  A
new 501c3, Rainbow Phoenix LLC, assumed ownership and hired
property manager Morrison, Ekre & Bart Management Services, Inc.
to manage daily operations.

Recent Developments:

On January 1, 2010, the Series A bonds experienced a technical
default when the Trustee tapped the Debt Service Reserve for
$95,607.83 or 62% of the required $155,367.50 payment.  The Debt
Service has not since been replenished and remains underfunded at
$368,522.17.

Debt service coverage ratios derived from 2009 audited financial
statements have deteriorated to 0.60x from 0.78x in 2008.
Occupancy has been quite volatile as a result of weakening
economic conditions in conjunction with recently passed
immigration reform policies in the state of Arizona.  For 2009,
occupancy averaged 84% falling to as low as 74% in December 2009
but has since rebounded to its current level at 95% which is above
the 90.3% level projected by CB Richard Ellis.  Rents remain below
the Phoenix area average and the property is experiencing stiff
competition from nearby properties, one of which has lowered rents
by as much as 30% to maintain occupancy.  Management has been
effective with monitoring expenses and given the positive momentum
in occupancy should be able to start replenishing debt service
short falls.

Credit Strengths:

* Proactive Property Management by a 501c3; Rainbow Phoenix LLC

* Improving occupancy levels which are currently above the Phoenix
  average

Credit Challenges:

* Underfunded Debt Service Reserve Fund that was tapped to meet
  debt service payments

* Declining debt service coverage

Outlook:

The rating outlook is negative.  Moody's anticipates the Debt
Service Reserve Fund being tapped to meet debt service
requirements on July 1, 2010.  Property performance over the next
six months is most critical to replenishing reserves and meeting
future debt service requirements.

                What Could Change the Rating -- UP

Increase in occupancy would translate to an increase in revenues
and net operating income which could permit stabilization and
replenishment of reserves.

                What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN

Continued withdrawals from the senior debt service reserve fund as
well as increasing vacancy levels would exert negative pressures
on net operating income.  Continued technical default resulting
from the borrower non-payment of required deposits to the trustee
would trigger a downgrade as well.

The last rating action with respect to the Maricopa County
Industrial Development Authority Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds
(Whispering Palms Apartment Project) Senior Series 1999A was on
February 4, 2008, when a municipal finance scale rating of B1 was
assigned with a negative outlook.  The rating was subsequently
recalibrated to B1 negative on May 7, 2010, when a global scale
rating was assigned.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1,
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5, CD 2006-
CD2 Mortgage Trust, and JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2006-LDP6, four U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transactions.

The downgrades reflect recurring interest shortfalls.  S&P expects
shortfalls on 10 of these classes to continue, and as a result,
S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D'.

The 10 downgraded classes that S&P set to 'D' have experienced
interest shortfalls for seven or more months.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses;

* Nonrecoverable advance declarations; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations, trust expenses, and special
servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls.

Two of the 12 classes have experienced shortfalls for five months
and are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in the
future.  If these liquidity interruptions continue, S&P will
likely downgrade these classes to 'D'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P details the 12 downgraded classes from the four CMBS
transactions below.

               Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class M, N, and P certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 due to recurring interest
shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 12 assets that are
currently with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(formerly Centerline Servicing Inc.), as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the May 14, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$85.6 million were in effect for 12 assets.

The resulting reported ASER amount was $405,443, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $3.8 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered six ASERs ($364,678), all of which were derived from
ARAs based on recent MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees, to determine its rating actions for this
transaction.  The reported interest shortfalls total $458,473 and
they have affected all of the classes up to and including class K.
Classes M, N, and P have experienced interest shortfalls for the
past seven, nine, and nine months, respectively, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the MLMT 2007-C1 transaction consists of
265 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $4.01 billion.  As of
the May 14, 2010, remittance report, 15 assets ($228.0 million;
5.7%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including one of
the top 10 assets.  The payment status of the delinquent assets
is: two ($132.3 million, 3.3%) are real estate owned, seven
($64.6 million, 1.6%) are in foreclosure, five ($24.5 million,
0.6%) are more than 90 days delinquent, and one ($6.6 million,
0.2%) is 30 days delinquent.

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K and L certificates from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5 due to
recurring interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 19
assets that are currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners
Inc.  As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$61.6 million were in effect for 19 assets.  The total reported
ASER amount was $314,153, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.1 million.  Standard & Poor's considered eight ASERs
($133,524), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls total $552,999 and they have
affected all of the classes up to and including class J.  Classes
K and L have experienced interest shortfalls for the past seven
and nine months, respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to
recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CSMC 2006-C5 transaction consists of
300 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.37 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 26 assets ($519.0 million;
15.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: two ($8.3 million, 0.2%) are
REO, eight ($110.6 million, 3.3%) are in foreclosure, 11
($69.6 million, 2.1%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one
($9.9 million, 0.3%) is 60 days delinquent, one ($3.2 million,
0.1%) is 30 days delinquent, two ($124.3 million, 3.7%) are less
than 30 days delinquent, and one ($193.0 million, 5.7%) is
current.

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust

S&P lowered its ratings on the class L, M, N, O, and P
certificates from CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to
three assets, including the sixth-largest loan in the pool, that
are currently with the special servicer, LNR, as well as special
servicing fees.  As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $76.8 million were in effect for eight assets.  The total
reported ASER amount was $378,088, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $2.6 million.  Standard & Poor's considered four
ASERs ($54,413), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees and interest not advanced
due to nonrecoverable advance declarations, to determine its
rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls total $438,239
and they have affected all of the classes up to and including
class J.  Classes N, O, and P have all experienced interest
shortfalls for nine months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to
recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CD 2006-CD2 transaction consists of
196 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.04 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 14 assets ($349.9 million;
11.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including the
fifth-, sixth-, and eighth-largest assets in the pool.  The
payment status of the delinquent assets is: two assets
($71.3 million; 2.3%) are REO, one asset ($32.4 million; 1.1%) is
in foreclosure, four assets ($158.2 million; 5.2%) are more than
90 days delinquent, one ($22.1 million, 0.7%) is 60 days
delinquent, five ($51.2 million, 1.7%) are less than 30 days
delinquent, and one ($14.6 million, 0.5%) is current.

   JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J and K certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2006-
LDP6 to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls resulting from
ASERs related to 17 assets that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the
May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $61.8 million were
in effect for 17 assets.  The total reported ASER amount was
$184,906, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2.4 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 12 ASERs ($240,244),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $362,643 and they have affected
all of the classes up to and including class H.  Classes J and K
have experienced interest shortfalls for eight and nine months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D'.

The collateral pool for the JPMCC 2006-LDP6 transaction consists
of 163 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.08 billion.  As
of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 24 assets ($223.7 million;
10.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is: three are REO ($14.4 million, 0.7%),
eight are in foreclosure ($87.8 million, 4.2%), eight
($58.8 million, 2.8%) are more than 90 days delinquent, two
($39.6 million, 1.9%) are 60 days delinquent, two ($11.5 million,
0.6%) are 30 days delinquent, and one ($11.6 million, 0.6%) is
less than 30 days delinquent.

                          Ratings Lowered

               Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls($)
           ------                         -------------------------------
  Class  To   From  Credit enhancement(%)     Current    Accumulated
  -----  --   ----  ---------------------     -------    -----------
  M     D    CCC-             1.90       44,428        283,278
  N     D    CCC-             1.64       44,428        388,728
  P     D    CCC-             1.52       22,210        199,886

     Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls($)
           ------                         -------------------------------
  Class   To   From  Credit enhancement(%)     Current    Accumulated
  -----   --   ----  ---------------------     -------    -----------
  K      D    CCC-             2.36       18,116        126,813
  L      D    CCC-             1.98       54,353        416,128

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls($)
           ------                         -------------------------------
  Class   To   From  Credit enhancement(%)     Current    Accumulated
  -----   --   ----  ---------------------     -------    -----------
  L      CCC  CCC+             2.34       48,617        210,483
  M      CCC- CCC+             1.96       48,613        243,063
  N      D    CCC              1.70       32,413        267,170
  O      D    CCC              1.45       32,408        291,676
  P      D    CCC-             1.19       32,408        291,676

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls($)
           ------                         -------------------------------
  Class   To   From  Credit enhancement(%)     Current    Accumulated
  -----   --   ----  ---------------------     -------    -----------
  J      D    CCC-             2.64       46,013        292,251
  K      D    CCC-             2.13       46,008        375,008


NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Newcastle CDO VII,
Corp., as a result of increased interest shortfalls and losses to
the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities and
residential mortgage-backed securities.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'B-', down from 'BB+' at last
review.  Further, 12.1% of the portfolio is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Approximately 78.9% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade; 35.7% has a rating in the
'CCC' category and below.  As of the May 18, 2010 trustee report,
17.3% of the portfolio is CMBS experiencing interest shortfalls;
many of the lowly rated RMBS assets are also experiencing interest
shortfalls.  Due to the failure of the class II OC test, all
interest proceeds beyond the payment of class II interest have
been reallocated to redeem the class I-A notes.  Since issuance,
the class I-A notes have paid down $12.6 million.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the collateralized debt obligation under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Fitch also analyzed the structure's sensitivity to the assets that
are experiencing interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the
breakeven rates for the classes do not pass Fitch's base cash flow
model stress.

The classes' credit enhancement levels were compared to the
percent of distressed collateral, including underlying assets that
are experiencing interest shortfalls, defaulted or imminently
defaulting (30%).  The class I-A notes are currently receiving
interest; however, based on the May 18, 2010 trustee report,
approximately 22.9% of the total interest due was paid using
principal proceeds because proceeds in the interest waterfall were
insufficient due to a significant hedge payment; this trend is
likely to continue as the hedge notional is not set to amortize
until September 2011.  Further, while the credit enhancement to
the class I-A notes exceeds the distressed collateral, further
deterioration could quickly erode this cushion.  As such, the
class I-A notes have been downgraded to 'CC', indicating that
default is probable.  For classes I-B through V, Fitch does not
expect full recoveries given the amount of interest shortfalls
that are unlikely to be recouped and that the credit enhancement
does not exceed the amount of distressed collateral.  Classes I-B
and II are receiving current interest; however, the interest is
being paid using principal proceeds.  Further, classes III through
V are not receiving current interest, but instead the principal
amount of the notes is written up by the amount of interest due.
As such, classes I-B through V have been downgraded to 'C',
indicating that default is inevitable.

Newcastle VII closed in Dec. 20, 2005.  Currently, the portfolio
is composed of 66.9% CMBS from the 2004 through 2007 vintages,
16.3% RMBS from the 2004 through 2007 vintages, 15.8% real estate
investment trust debt, and 0.7% commercial real estate loans.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $323,370,447 class I-A floating rate notes to 'CC' from
     'BBB+';

  -- $21,800,000 class I-B floating rate notes to 'C' from 'BBB';

  -- $53,000,000 class II floating rate notes to 'C' from 'BB+'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $26,528,519 class III deferrable floating rate notes at 'C';

  -- $20,911,227 class IV-FL deferrable floating rate notes at
     'C';

  -- $6,719,366 class IV-FX deferrable floating rate notes at 'C';

  -- $17,986,996 class V deferrable F floating rate notes at 'C'.

In addition, Fitch has removed classes I-A through II from Rating
Watch Negative.

The rating of the class I-A , I-B and II notes addresses the
likelihood that investors will receive timely payments of
interest, as per the governing documents, as well as the aggregate
outstanding amount of principal by the stated maturity date.  The
ratings of the class III, IV, V notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive ultimate interest payments, as per the
governing documents, as well as the aggregate outstanding amount
of principal by the stated maturity date.


NORTHERN KENTUCKY: S&P Junks Rating on 1999B RMBS Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Northern
Kentucky's residential mortgage bonds series 1999B to 'CC' from
'AAA', and assigned the rating a negative outlook.  The trustee,
Bank of New York, Mellon, has informed us that there will be
insufficient assets to pay bondholders in full through the final
maturity date of the bonds.  Standard & Poor's will continue to
monitor the transaction and will take rating action as it
considers appropriate.

"The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation that there will
not be sufficient assets to pay bondholders in full at maturity,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Renee Berson.


OMI TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-1 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-1 certificates from OMI Trust 2002-C to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The lowered rating on the class M-1 certificates from OMI Trust
2002-C reflects a payment default resulting from an interest
shortfall for this class on the May 2010 payment date.  S&P
believes that the interest shortfall will likely persist into the
future due to the adverse performance trends S&P has observed in
the underlying pool of collateral originated by Oakwood Acceptance
Corp., as well as the subordination of the write-down interest for
this class to senior principal payments.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the other outstanding
ratings associated with this transaction.


PAJARO VALLEY: S&P Shifts CreditWatch on 'BB' Rating to Developing
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has revised its CreditWatch
implications on its 'BB' long-term rating on Pajaro Valley Water
Management Agency, Calif.'s certificates of participation series
1999A to developing from negative.  Developing implications means
S&P could raise or lower the ratings upon completing its review.
On Feb 3, 2010, S&P lowered the rating to 'BB' from 'BBB' and
placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The agency's net revenues secure the COPs.

"The revised CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view of the
agency's proposal to levy a new augmentation charge," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jeffrey Panger.  Management
estimates that the new charge, if approved, would yield about
$9.8 million in revenue and replace the current augmentation
charge, the agency's primary source of revenue.  The current
augmentation charge yielded $4.5 million in 2009, after a
stipulated agreement for entry of judgment essentially cut in half
the previous augmentation charge.  Before the agreement, the
augmentation charge yielded $9.1 million in annual revenue; net
revenue covered fiscal 2007 debt service requirements 3.1x.
After, coverage declined to 1.03x in 2009 and 0.53x including
retroactive refunds, prompting S&P's previous rating actions.

Under terms of California's Proposition 218, the agency's proposed
augmentation charge must survive a protest hearing, then customers
must approve of it in a vote.  The agency held a protest hearing
on May 17, at which time it recorded only 250 of the necessary 980
votes needed to oppose the charge.  It will now mail ballots to
all well owners June 16, with ballots to be returned by Aug. 10.
Responses will be weighted based on a five-year average water
usage, with a weighted majority approval necessary to approve the
charge.  The top 14 customers account for 50% of water use, and
the City of Watsonville, Calif., accounts for 15%.  Neither the
city nor any major voter cast protest votes at the May 17 protest
hearing.  Should a majority approve, the charge would take effect
for the Oct. 1 billing cycle, with quarterly revenue received by
Dec. 30.

S&P will continue to monitor developments at the agency and expect
to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three months.  Should
the charge pass, S&P could raise the rating.  Should it be
defeated, S&P could lower the rating.


PARCS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Rating on Series 2007-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'B-' rating on the
notes from PARCS Ltd.'s series 2007-2, a synthetic corporate
investment-grade collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption and
cancellation of the notes.



PNC MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-8 1999-CM1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B-8 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from PNC
Mortgage Acceptance Corp.'s series 1999-CM1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class as
reported in the June 10, 2010, remittance report.  The class B-8
certificate reported losses amounting to 44.0% of its opening
certificate balance ($5.7 million).  In addition, the class C
certificate, which Standard & Poor's does not rate, lost 100% of
its $3.2 million opening balance.

The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of two assets
that were with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.
(Midland).  The Commons on Sanger Apartments asset is a 327-unit
multifamily property in Waco, Texas, which had a total exposure
of $8.3 million.  The asset was transferred to Midland on May 18,
2007, due to imminent payment default.  The trust incurred a
$3.9 million realized loss when the asset was liquidated on
May 26, 2010, and the most recent remittance report reflected this
loss.  Based on the June 2010 remittance report data, the loss
severity for this loan was 67%.

The 185 Commerce Drive asset is a 41,744-sq.-ft. office property
in Upper Dublin Township, Pa., which had a total exposure of
$3.9 million.  The asset was transferred to Midland on Sept. 2,
2008, due to payment default.  The trust incurred a $1.8 million
realized loss when the asset was liquidated on May 27, 2010, and
the most recent remittance report reflected this loss.  Based on
the June 2010 remittance report data, the loss severity for this
loan was 58%.

As of the June 10, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 21 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$89.3 million, down from 207 assets totaling $760.4 million at
issuance.  Eleven assets, totaling $41.2 million (46.1%), are with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
on 21 loans totaling $20.1 million.  Based on the June 2010
remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for these
loans was approximately 27.3%.

                          Rating Lowered

                   PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-CM1

                                Rating
                                ------
                      Class   To       From
                      -----   --       ----
                      B-8     D        CCC-


PRADO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Prado CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$200,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due November 17,
     2014 (current balance of $27,215,867.24), Upgraded to Aa2;
     previously on April 22, 2010 Upgraded to Baa1 and left under
     review for possible further upgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due November 17,
     2014, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on April 22, 2010 Upgraded
     to Ba2 and left under review for possible further upgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class X Deferrable Amortizing Notes Due
     November 17, 2014 (current balance of $5,631,091.00),
     Upgraded to Ba2; previously on April 22, 2010 Upgraded to
     Caa1 and left under review for possible further upgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     November 17, 2014 (current balance of $15,642,729.70),
     Upgraded to B3; previously on April 22, 2010 Upgraded to Caa3
     and left under review for possible further upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately $34.8MM since the last rating
action on April 22, 2010.  This accounts for roughly 56% of
delevering of the total Class A outstanding balance reported in
April 2010.  The proceeds for the delevering have mainly come from
sales of assets as well as proceeds from calls on the underlying
bonds.  In addition to principal pay downs, excess spread is being
diverted to pay down Class A notes as a result of an OC test
failure.

The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last
rating action in April 2010.  In the May 2010 Trustee report, the
Class A/B and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at
143.013% and 121.216% prior to the May 2010 pay down of Class A
notes, versus April 2010 levels of 131.59% and 111.534%,
respectively.

The deal also experienced an improvement in credit quality since
the last rating action as demonstrated via the Moody's weighted
average rating factor test.  As of the May 2010 report, the WARF
test was reported at 5067 versus 5434 as reported in the April
2010 report.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key
assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Prado CDO Ltd. issued in November 2003 is a collateralized bond
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
bonds.


PUTNAM STRUCTURED: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
class A-1LT-a, A-1LT-b, and A-1LT-c notes from Putnam Structured
Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd. by lowering them and removing them from
CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P lowered its ratings on six
additional tranches from Putnam Structured Product CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P withdrew its rating on one tranche from Putnam
Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd. following the remarketing of
the notes into long-term notes.

Both the transactions are high-grade structured finance
collateralized debt obligations of asset-backed securities that
were collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A'
rated tranches of RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities)
and other SF securities.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime RMBS.

Due to an error, S&P did not downgrade the class A-1LT-a, A-1LT-b
and A-1LT-c notes to 'A' on May 3, 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                         Ratings Corrected

                                             Rating
                                             ------
  Transaction                  Class      To       From
  -----------                  -----      --       ----
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1    A-1LT-a    A        AAA/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1    A-1LT-b    A        AAA/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1    A-1LT-c    A        AAA/Watch Neg

                           Rating Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Transaction                  Class      To      From
  -----------                  -----      --      ----
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    A-1LT-a    BB-     A+/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    A-1LT-b    BB-     A+/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    A-1LT-c    BB-     A+/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    A-2        CCC     BBB-/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    B          CC      B+/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2003-1    C          CC      CCC+/Watch Neg
  Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1    A-1MT-a    NR      A

                          NR - Not rated.

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

     Transaction                   Class               Rating
     -----------                   -----               ------
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1LT-d             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1LT-e             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1LT-i             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1LT-j             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1MT-b             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1MT-c             A
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1MM-f             A/A-1
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1MM-g             A/A-1
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A-1MM-h             A/A-1
     Putnam Str Pdt CDO 2002-1     A2                  BB+


REVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A Notes to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A notes from REVE SPC's series 60 to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade follows a number of recent losses the transaction
incurred due to credit events affecting underlying reference
entities, which have caused the notes to incur partial principal
losses.

                          Rating Lowered

                             REVE SPC
                             Series 60

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          A                     CC                 CCC-


SENIOR ABS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2002-1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the certificates issued by Senior ABS Repack Trust
Series 2002-1.  The certificates affected by the rating action
are:

  -- US$50M Senior ABS Repack Trust Series 2002-1 Certificates;
     Downgraded to B3; Previously on August 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Deposited Assets, which consist of Class A-2 Second
Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes from E*Trade ABS Cdo
I, Ltd.  The Moody's rating of the Class A-2 Notes was downgraded
to B3 on May 14, 2010.  .Moody's explained that its rating of the
Certificates is directly linked to, and will change as a result
of, Moody's rating assigned to the Class A-2 Notes.


SHORE RE: S&P Assigns Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'BB'
and 'BB+' preliminary ratings to the Class A and Class B notes,
respectively, to be issued by Shore Re Ltd.

Shore Re is an exempted company that will be licensed as a Class B
insurer as of the initial issuance date in the Cayman Islands.
HSBC Bank (Cayman) Ltd., as share trustee, holds all of Shore Re
issued and outstanding shares in trust for charitable or similar
purposes.

The ceding reinsurer is Munich Reinsurance America Inc. (AA-
/Stable/--).  Munich Re America will be responsible for the
premium payments due under the retrocession agreement in place
between it and Shore Re.  Covered losses will not be directly
linked to Munich Re America's exposure in the covered area
(Massachusetts).  Rather, they will be based on the losses of the
Massachusetts Property Insurance Underwriting Assn.  Ultimate net
losses will be calculated on a per-occurrence basis and will
reflect the actual paid losses (including loss reserves, if
applicable, and a loss-adjustment expense factor of 6.0%.  The
Class A notes will cover approximately 33.3% (subject to revision)
of losses between the attachment level of $600 million and the
exhaustion level of $900 million.  The Class B notes will cover a
to-be-determined percentage of losses between the attachment level
of $900 million and the exhaustion level of $1.20 billion.

                           Ratings List

                           New ratings

                           Shore Re Ltd.

                           Class A notes

         Preliminary senior secured debt rating         BB

                            Class B notes

         Preliminary senior secured debt rating         BB+


SMART HOME: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various 2005-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these actions on classes of Smart Home Credit
2005-2 Limited, including affirmations, downgrades and assigning
Recovery Ratings and Loss Severity ratings:

  -- Class M-2 (83169WAA0) affirmed at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-3 (83169WAB8) affirmed at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-3A (83169WAK8) affirmed at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-4 (83169WAC6) affirmed at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-4A (83169WAL6) affirmed at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-5 (83169WAD4) affirmed at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-5A (83169WAM4) affirmed at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class M-6 (83169WAE2) downgraded to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A-';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Class M-6A (83169WAN2) downgraded to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A-';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Class M-7 (83169WAF9) downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Class M-7A (83169WAP7) downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Class M-8 (83169WAG7) downgraded to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB';

  -- Class M-8A (83169WAQ5) downgraded to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB';

  -- Class M-9 (83169WAH5) downgraded to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- Class M-9A (83169WAR3) downgraded to 'CC/RR6' from
     'BBB-'.

Smart Home Credit 2005-2 LLC is a synthetic balance sheet
residential mortgage backed security transaction that references a
static diversified portfolio of 100% sub-prime single-family non-
conforming, first lien residential mortgage loans.  Smart Home and
Radian Guaranty Inc. entered into a reinsurance agreement
reinsuring loss amounts incurred by Radian on a portfolio as to
which Radian has furnished mortgage insurance.

The total underlying pool of mortgages has an ending loan balance
of $1.8 billion as of the May 25, 2010 distribution.  The amount
of mortgage insurance related exposure on this portfolio as of
that date is $473 million.  Ten percent ($184 million) of the
total loan pool is in foreclosure.  There is $50 million in
mortgage insurance exposure related to the loans currently in
foreclosure.  It is expected that a large portion of the exposure
related to loans in foreclosure will be realized over the next 12
months.

The actions taken are based on an analysis of the exposure to
claims on the mortgage insurance policies on the underlying pool
relative to each note's enhancement.  Fitch calculated the claims
exposure by assigning performance adjusted pre-2005 vintage
average subprime frequency of foreclosure percentages to the loans
by their current performance status.  The pre-2005 vintage FOF
averages derived from last month's review of this sector included
an assumption that despite an expectation of further home price
declines, there will be a modest reduction in the expected
defaults from pre-2005 subprime borrowers that are 'current' on
their mortgage, reflecting some positive selection within the
remaining performing borrowers.  While the total percentage of
subprime RMBS borrowers over 60 days delinquent has risen slightly
year over year, in recent months roll-rates from performing-to-
delinquency have improved notably.

The FOF utilized for the exposure related to the loans in the
referenced portfolio that are current is 15%.  The FOF for loans
that are 30 days delinquent is 37%, 60 days delinquent 80%, and 90
days delinquent 87%.  Any loan that is in foreclosure, real estate
owned, or is pending an insurance claim has a 100% FOF.  The
overall FOF used for this analysis is 30% of the outstanding
exposure amount ($483 million).  Fitch assumed that 100% of the
exposure would be realized as impairment to the notes.

Losses are allocated to the notes in reverse order of priority.
The notes are not written down by losses; however, an impairment
amount is calculated for each note equal to the amount of losses
that have been allocated to it.  The ratings on the notes address
the timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal
upon maturity.  The stated maturity date for all of the notes in
this transaction is Nov. 25, 2012.


SOUTH STREET: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of notes issued by
South Street CBO 2000-1 Ltd./Corp.  Fitch has revised the Recovery
Ratings on these notes and has also affirmed two classes of notes.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports highlighted at the end of this press release.

Since Fitch's last review in April 2009, the class A-3L and class
A-3 notes have been paid in full, leaving the class A-4L, class A-
4A and class A-4C notes as the senior-most remaining tranche.  The
class A-4 notes have a cumulative par balance of approximately
$35.1 million, compared to a performing collateral balance of
$9.9 million from four unique obligors.  There is also a defaulted
bond balance of about $13.5 million, from which Fitch expects
total recoveries between 10% and 15%.  Due to the insufficient
collateral balance available to support the class A-4 notes, an
ultimate principal shortfall appears inevitable, which Fitch
reflects in its downgrade of the notes.  Additionally, interest
proceeds are projected to be insufficient to fulfill the class A-4
interest amount at the next payment date in November 2010.
Failure to pay the class A-4 interest amount will lead to a
payment default unless sufficient principal proceeds become
available to compensate for the interest shortfall.

On a positive note, the class A-4 notes are now senior in the
capital structure and will receive all future proceeds from the
collateral, after structural fees and expenses have been paid.
The recovery expectation for these notes has improved to a range
of 10%-30%, in line with an 'RR5' on Fitch's Recovery Rating
scale.  The class B-1 and class B-2 notes are not expected to
receive any future distributions.

Recovery Ratings are based on the total discounted future cash
flows projected to be available to the notes in a base-case
default scenario.  Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For
further detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report
'Global Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

South Street CBO 2000-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt
obligation that closed on May 3, 2000.  The portfolio of South
Street CBO 2000-1 was originally selected and monitored by
Columbia Management Advisors, LLC.  In connection with the
proposed sale of Columbia to Ameriprise Financial, Inc., Columbia
is soliciting noteholder consent to assign management duties to
RiverSource Investments LLC, a subsidiary of Ameriprise, in the
spring of 2010.

Fitch downgrades and revises the Recovery Ratings on these
classes:

  -- $18,480,228 class A-4L notes to 'C/RR5' from 'CC/RR6';
  -- $7,392,091 class A-4A notes to 'C/RR5' from 'CC/RR6';
  -- $9,240,114 class A-4C notes to 'C/RR5' from 'CC/RR6'.

Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $15,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'C/RR6';
  -- $4,198,658 class B-2 notes at 'C/RR6'.


ST PAUL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2002 Bonds to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgrades the rating assigned to the St. Paul Housing &
Redevelopment Auth., MN (Riverview Highland Project), Series 2002,
to Ba1 from Aaa.  The downgrade is based on corrected information
reflecting that the asset to debt ratio is currently below 100%,
indicating a parity break that was previously not assumed to occur
during the life of the transaction.  The downgrade follows a
review of an analysis of information provided by the trustee
concerning the transaction's asset to debt ratio and projection of
cash flows, assuming continuing reinvestment of funds at 0%.  When
Moody's confirmed the rating in November, 2009, Moody's
erroneously concluded that the ratio was above 100%.  This action
affects approximately $3.9 million in outstanding debt.

The bonds are secured by a mortgage that is guaranteed by credit
enhancement from GNMA and were not structured with a Guaranteed
Investment Contract that assures a fixed rate of return on
invested cash.  The bonds are therefore subject to interest rate
risk on retained revenues.  As a result, revenue from the monthly
mortgage receipts, interest earned on those receipts from money
market funds or other short-term investments and monthly mortgage
payments need to be sufficient to support annual debt service on
the bonds.  In addition the transaction must demonstrate a parity
ratio in excess of 100% to reflect that bondholders will receive
all outstanding principal and accrued interest in the event of a
special redemption.  In this transaction, Moody's analyzed the
projected mortgage revenue, assuming no reinvestment earnings on
the monthly mortgage receipts, and determined that the parity
ratio is currently below 100%.at 99.8%.

The last rating action with respect to the Series 2002 bonds was
November 5, 2009, when Moody's confirmed the rating and removed it
from Watchlist.


STATEN ISLAND: Moody's Raises Rating on Hospital Bonds From 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating assigned to
Staten Island University Hospital's bonds to Baa3 from Ba2.  The
upgrade is the result of stable operating performance over the
last several years, the resolution of lawsuits and closer
integration with North Shore Long Island Jewish that Moody's
believe enhances SIUHs credit profile.  The outlook is stable at
the higher rating level.

This credit review is being done in conjunction with a review of
NS-LIJs bond rating.  See Moody's report dated June 11, 2010, for
additional information on NS-LIJ.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a pledge of gross
receipts and a mortgage on the health care facilities.  An inter-
creditor agreement between the Dormitory Authority of the State of
New York, the New York City Industrial Development Agency and the
bond trustees includes a 120-day standstill provision during which
time the Dormitory Authority has the exclusive right to negotiate
a workout plan and creditor remedies are suspended if the need
arises.

Interest Rate Derivatives: none

                             Strengths

* Ownership by NS-LIJ provides tangible benefits including
  participation in managed care contracting and purchasing
  contracts.  Also, NS-LIJ guaranteed a $60 million bank loan for
  SIUH

* All outstanding lawsuits resolved with liabilities fully
  reserved on the balance sheet, although payments will continue
  for several years

* Steady core operating performance over last five years with
  operating cash flow margins averaging over 6.5%

* Significantly improved balance sheet metrics with FYE 2009 days
  cash at 70 days, up from 44 in 2005 and FYE cash to debt of 80%,
  up from 52% in 2005

* SIUH has been growing market share on Staten Island

                            Challenges

* Annual debt service is high relative to amount of debt
  outstanding when considering lawsuit settlement payments
  (referred to as "structured liability payments" in the audit)

* Future capital spending needs may require issuance of
  $60 million in debt and may limit balance sheet strengthening

* Recently announced Medicaid cuts in New York State are a
  challenge given the system's high Medicaid payer mix (27% of
  gross revenue) and Graduate Medical Education funding

                    Recent Developments/Results

Operating results in FY 2009 continued the trend of improving
operating results that SIUH has exhibited over the past several
years.  Operating cash flow grew 19% to $50.9 million, providing
Moody's Adjusted Maximum Annual Debt Service Coverage of 1.6 times
(MADS includes structured liability payments).  Debt service is
$6.5 million higher in 2010 than 2011 and FY 2009 coverage would
be 1.9 times based on FY 2011 debt service.  Revenue growth of 7%
was higher than the last few years reflecting patient volume
growth and the impact of joint contracting through NS-LIJ.
Management believes current operating results are sustainable and
that operating income of $17 - $18 million/year is achievable
(operating income was $18.8 million in FY 2009).

The upgrade to investment grade reflects several factors including
(1) SIUH has resolved the three outstanding investigations by the
New York State Attorney General and the federal government and
future payments are known and reserved on the balance sheet,
(2) generally improving operating performance, (3) a much stronger
balance sheet with FYE 2009 cash-to-debt of 80% and days cash on
hand of 69 days (compared to 52% and 44 days at FYE 2005).  The
upgrade is also reflective of the hospital's closer integration
with its parent, NS-LIJ, which is the sole corporate member of
SIUH.  Although the debt of the two organizations remains
separately secured, Moody's believe that NS-LIJ has demonstrated
heightened support for SIUH over the last several years following
a reorganization that merged the SIUH board into the NS-LIJ board
and the guaranteeing of a $60 million bank loan used to fund the
OIG settlement.  However, an additional upgrade is precluded at
this time given SIUHs leveraged balance sheet.

SIUHs main credit challenge remains its leveraged balance sheet
and future capital spending needs.  Annual debt service is high
and management has identified at least $60 million of capital
spending needs as part of its master facility plan over the next
two to three years.  Identified projects include expanding the
operating rooms, consolidating oncology/radiation therapy, and
building a fourth floor on the North Campus, and renovating the
operating rooms and converting three-bed rooms to doubles and
privates on the South Campus.

Moody's also has concerns regarding recently announced cuts to
Medicaid in New York State.  Although SIUH management believes the
cuts will have a net neutral impact as they anticipate that
additional revenues from pooled distribution increases (including
GME) will offset provider tax assessment increases and reductions
in Medicaid reimbursement, Moody's is concerned that the Medicaid
cuts could lead to a revenue decline, or flat revenue growth.
SIUH has a high 27% Medicaid exposure.

Moody's notes, favorably, that SIUH is the clear market leader on
Staten Island and believe that the hospitals continue to gain
market share from the next largest competitor, Richmond University
Medical Center.  Inpatient admissions grew a solid 4% in FY 2009,
reversing a recent trend of flat admission growth.  SIUH opened a
new emergency department in 2009, on time and on budget, which
likely contributed to the growth.

                             Outlook

The stable outlook at the higher rating level reflects the
organization's steady operating performance over the past several
years and Moody's belief that future performance will continue at
this level.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Strengthening of balance sheet metrics; inclusion in NS-LIJ's
obligated group

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Operating losses resulting in a weakening of debt service
coverage; additional debt without commensurate increase in
revenues

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

-- Based on financial statements for Staten Island University
    Hospital and Subsidiaries

-- First number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2008

-- Second number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2009

-- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 38,446; 40,002

* Total operating revenues: $654.8 million; $700.9 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $49.0 million; $58.7 million

* Total debt outstanding: $166.0 million; $157.3 million

* Maximum annual debt service: $36.9 million; $36.9 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: 1.3 times; 1.4
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: 1.3 times; 1.6 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 4.4 times; 3.3 times

* Days cash on hand: 59 days; 69 days

* Cash-to-debt: 60%; 80%

* Operating margin: 1.7%; 2.7%

* Operating cash flow margin: 6.5%; 7.3%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of December 31, 2009):

-- Series 1998A; fixed rate ($25.2 million outstanding) rated
    Baa3

-- Series 2001A and B; fixed rate ($30.3 million outstanding)
    rated Baa3

-- Series 2002C; fixed rate ($16.2 million outstanding) rated
    Baa3

The last rating action with respect to SIUH was on December 15,
2008, when the municipal finance scale rating was upgraded to
Ba2/Positive from B2/Negative.  That rating was subsequently
recalibrated to Ba2/Positive on May 7, 2010.


STRUCTURED FINANCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Structured Finance
Advisors ABS CDO III, Ltd. The notes affected by the rating action
are:

  -- Class A Notes (Current rated balance: $41,929,728),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/24/2009 Downgraded to B2;

  -- Class B Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/23/2008
     Downgraded to Ca.

Structured Finance Advisors ABS CDO III, Ltd., is a collateralized
debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2001 and
2005.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decrease in principal coverage ratio and an
increase in number of assets that are currently on review for
possible downgrade.  The trustee reports that the transaction is
currently failing its coverage tests.  Since Moody's last review
in March 2009, the principal coverage for Class A and Class B has
decreased from 47.7% to 26.4%.  Also, in April 2010, approximately
$9.7 million of pre-2005 RMBS within the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated loss projections.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8 for subprime, April 12th for
Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


TCW HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by TCW High Income Partners, Ltd./
TCW High Income Partners Corp.:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class II-A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2013 (current outstanding balance of $20,754,668),
     Upgraded to Aa2; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class II-B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2013 (current outstanding balance of $25,735,788), Upgraded
     to Aa2; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class III-A Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on May 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class III-B Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes
     due 2013, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on May 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from substantial delevering of the transaction over the
past year, which led to significant increases in the
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in May 2009.

Since the last rating actions taken on May 15, 2009, the Class I
Notes were paid in full, and the Class II Notes were paid down by
about $9.5 million, accounting for roughly 17% of the total Class
II Notes' outstanding balance reported in April 2009.  A
substantial proportion of this paydown is attributable to sales
and unscheduled principal prepayments of the underlying securities
in the portfolio.  Moody's expects delevering to continue as a
result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period in August
2006.  Overcollateralization ratios of the Senior, Class III and
Junior Notes have increased significantly since April 2009.  As of
the May 2010 trustee report, the Senior, Class III and Junior
overcollateralization tests are reported at 220.3%, 128.9% and
109.1%, versus April 2009 levels of 153.3%, 114.5%, and 101.9%,
respectively.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key
assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

TCW High Income Partners, Ltd./TCW High Income Partners Corp.,
issued in August of 2001, is a collateralized bond obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured bonds.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2004-C15 CMBS Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2004-C15 and removed nine
of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 15 other classes from the same
transaction and removed four of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of the two
specially serviced loans.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.48x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 88.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.11x and an LTV
ratio of 114.2%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 55.5% and 22.0%, respectively.  The DSC and
LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude four defeased loans
($47.3 million, 4.2%) and two ($20.4 million, 2.0%) specially
serviced loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the two
specially serviced loans and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

S&P lowered its ratings on the seven "180ML" raked certificates
following its analysis of the 180 Maiden Lane loan.  The "180ML"
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from the junior
subordinate nonpooled portion of this loan.  The lowered ratings
on the "180ML" certificates reflect its revised valuation of this
property, which S&P discuss in detail below.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
C and X-P interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.  The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the "175WJ" raked
certificates reflect its analysis of the 175 West Jackson loan,
which S&P also discuss below.

                       Credit Considerations

As of the May 2010 remittance report, three loans ($66.1 million,
6.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer, ING Clarion
Capital Loan Servicing LLC.  One loan is 90-plus days delinquent
($45.7 million, 4.6%), one is in foreclosure ($13.4 million,
1.3%), and one is a matured balloon ($6.9 million, 0.7%).  All
three specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $17.2 million.

The IRS Building - Fresno, CA loan ($45.7 million, 4.6%) is the
fifth-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan with the
special servicer, and is secured by a 180,481-sq.-ft. class A
office building in Fresno, Calif.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in January 2010 due to the borrower's bankruptcy
filing.  The property is currently 100% occupied by the Internal
Revenue Service and the reported DSC was 1.79x as of year-end
2009.  According to ING, the bankruptcy filing is not expected to
have an impact on the loan, and it should be reinstated under its
current terms upon the borrowers exit from bankruptcy.

The Penn's Purchase II loan ($13.4 million, 1.3%) is the second-
largest loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a
109,567-sq.-ft. retail property built in 1995 in Buckingham
Township, Pa.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Jan. 28, 2009, due to monetary default resulting from tenant
vacancies.  It is currently in foreclosure and receivership has
been granted via court order.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Suntree Apartments loan ($6.9 million, 0.7%) is the remaining
loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 216-unit
multifamily property built in 1984 in Peoria, Ariz.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 15, 2009, due to
imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on Oct. 11, 2009, and
the borrower failed to pay off the balloon balance.  The special
servicer sought an appointment of a receiver, which has recently
been granted by the Maricopa county court.  S&P expects a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the May 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool balance
was $1.0 billion, which is 97.5% of the balance at issuance.  The
pool includes 79 loans, down from 87 at issuance.  As of the May
2010 remittance report, the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., provided financial information for 98.5% of the pool; 73.1%
of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2009 or
interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.70x
for the nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.48x and 88.3%,
respectively, which excludes four defeased loans ($47.3 million,
4.2%) and two ($20.4 million, 2.0%) specially serviced loans.  S&P
estimated losses separately for the two specially serviced loans.
Twenty-two loans ($166.2 million, 16.6%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Fourteen loans ($104.8 million, 10.4%) have
a reported DSC below 1.10x, and 11 of these loans ($76.3 million,
7.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The transaction has
experienced two principal losses to date totaling $6.5 million.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $648.6 million (64.6%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.96x for the top 10 loans.
As of the May 2010 remittance report, one of the top 10 loans is
with the special servicer and is discussed above.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.61x and 80.5%,
respectively.

The largest exposure in the pool, the 175 West Jackson loan, has a
trust balance of $162.0 million (16.1%) and a whole-loan balance
of $270.7 million.  The $162.0 million trust balance consists of a
$108.8 million pari passu A-1 senior pooled component and a
$53.2 million subordinate nonpooled component.  The "175WJ" raked
certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the subordinate
non-pooled component of the loan.  In addition, there is a
$108.8 million pari passu A-2 senior component that was
securitized in the WBCMT 2005-C16 transaction.  The loan is
secured by a 1,449,067-sq.-ft. class A office building in Chicago.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a DSC of 1.66x for the
whole-loan balance (2.06x for the A-note) for the 12 months ended
Nov. 30, 2009, with an occupancy of 98.0%.  Based on S&P's
adjusted net cash flow analysis S&P arrived at an adjusted LTV of
89.7%.  As a result, S&P affirmed its ratings on the five "175WJ"
raked certificates as detailed below, which is consistent with its
last review.

The second-largest exposure in the pool, the 180 Maiden Lane loan,
has a trust balance of $162.5 million (16.2%) and a whole-loan
balance of $255.5 million.  The $162.5 million trust balance
consists of a $93.0 million pari passu A-1 senior pooled component
and a $69.5 million subordinate nonpooled component.  The "180ML"
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the
subordinate nonpooled component of the loan.  In addition, there
is a $93.0 million pari passu A-2 senior component that was
securitized in the WBCMT 2005-C16 transaction, and a subordinate C
note ($36.5 million) held outside of the trust.  The loan is
secured by a 1,088,763-sq.-ft. office building in lower Manhattan.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo, reported a DSC of 1.69x for the
whole-loan balance (1.93x for the trust balance) as of year-end
2008.  As of Nov. 30, 2009, the property was 97.4% occupied.  The
180 Maiden Lane loan had an original maturity date in November
2009 and was transferred to the special service due to maturity
default.  However, the loan was subsequently modified and returned
to the master servicer.  Per the executed modification agreement,
the maturity date was extended by three years to November 2012,
the interest rate remained unchanged, and a full cash sweep was
implemented.  The primary tenant in the building, AIG, occupies
roughly 800,000 sq. ft. (74% of net rentable area) with a lease
expiring in April 2014.  Given the timing of the lease roll
relative to the loan's maturity date, S&P estimated higher leasing
commission and tenant improvement allowance costs, which resulted
in a 14% valuation decline since S&P's last review.  Based on its
adjusted net cash flow analysis S&P arrived at an adjusted LTV of
103.5%.  As a result, S&P lowered its ratings on the seven "180ML"
raked certificates as detailed below.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C15

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     F         BBB     BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.25
     G         BB+     BBB/Watch Neg                     4.96
     H         BB      BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.38
     J         BB-     BB+/Watch Neg                     2.66
     K         B+      BB/Watch Neg                      2.23
     L         B       BB-/Watch Neg                     1.79
     M         CCC+    B+/Watch Neg                      1.51
     N         CCC     B/Watch Neg                       1.22
     O         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      0.93

             Ratings Lowered (Nonpooled Certificates)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C15

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     180ML-A   BB-     BB+                                N/A
     180ML-B   B+      BB+                                N/A
     180ML-C   B-      BB                                 N/A
     180ML-D   CCC+    B+                                 N/A
     180ML-E   CCC     B                                  N/A
     180ML-F   CCC-    B-                                 N/A
     180ML-G   CCC-    B-                                 N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C15

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     B         AA      AA/Watch Neg                     12.43
     C         AA-     AA-/Watch Neg                    10.99
     D         A       A/Watch Neg                       8.84
     E         A-      A-/Watch Neg                      7.69

              Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C15

     Class     Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     ------                  ----------------------
     A-2       AAA                                      15.74
     A-3       AAA                                      15.74
     A-4       AAA                                      15.74
     A-1A      AAA                                      15.74
     X-P       AAA                                        N/A
     X-C       AAA                                        N/A

             Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C15

     Class     Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     ------                  ----------------------
     175WJ-A   BB                                         N/A
     175WJ-B   BB-                                        N/A
     175WJ-C   B+                                         N/A
     175WJ-D   B                                          N/A
     175WJ-E   B-                                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


* S&P Affirms Ratings on 26 Classes of Certs. From Seven RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 26
classes of certificates from seven re-securitized real estate
mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions.  Concurrently, S&P removed 20 of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view of the performance of the
underlying mortgage loans and the credit enhancement available to
the underlying certificates, which is sufficient to maintain the
current ratings on the re-REMIC classes.  Certain re-REMIC classes
also benefit from credit enhancement provided by supporting
classes within the Re-REMIC transactions.

For SAS 2006-5, which closed in April 2006, the class A
certificates are supported by 39 underlying classes from 24
separate trusts.  The certificates from four of these trusts are
insured by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and not rated by Standard &
Poor's.  The loans supporting the underlying trusts consist
predominately of fixed-rate and long-reset adjustable-rate
Alternative-A and prime mortgage loans.

For AAA 2007-2, which closed in August 2007, the class A-1 and
class A-2 certificates are collateralized by 35 underlying
classes, including two agency insured classes, from 34 separate
trusts.  The loans securing the underlying trusts consist
predominately of subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans.

For SASC 2008-1, which closed in June 2007, classes 1-A1, 1-A2, 1-
A3, 1-A4, and 1-A5 are collateralized by classes IA2B2 and IA3
(currently rated 'AAA') from SASC 2007-4, which is a U.S. RMBS re-
REMIC transaction.  The loans securing the underlying trust
consist predominately of agency-backed (Fannie Mae) loans.

For BNTR 2008-1, which closed in October 2008, classes A1 through
A10 are collateralized by 56 underlying classes from 54 different
trusts.  The loans securing these underlying trusts consist
predominately of fixed-rate and long-reset adjustable-rate Alt-A
and prime mortgage loans.

BAF 2009-R7, which closed in July 2009, is collateralized by 31
underlying classes.  However, S&P initially rated certificates for
only one of the four groups (group 4).  Classes 4-A1 and 4-A2 from
group 4 are supported by the A-1 class from WFM 2005-A14.  The
loans securing the underlying trust consist predominately of prime
mortgage loans.

BCP 2009-RR5, which closed in July 2009, is collateralized by
three underlying classes included in two different trusts.  One of
the underlying trusts (BCP 2008-RR2) is a U.S. RMBS re-REMIC
transaction.  The loans securing the underlying trusts consist
predominantly of adjustable-rate, first-lien, prime mortgage
loans.

For CML 2009-8, S&P initially rated certificates for only one of
the seven loan groups (group 7) within the re-REMIC transaction.
Classes 7A1 and 7A2 in group 7 are supported by the IIA5 class
from WFM 2006-AR2.  The loans securing the underlying trust
consist predominately of long-reset, adjustable-rate, prime
mortgage loans.

Table 1 shows the April 2010 underlying pool statistics for
delinquent loans as a percentage of current pool balance, as well
as current pool factors as a percentage of original pool balance,
actual cumulative losses, and S&P's current projected losses as a
percentage of the original pool balance.

                              Table 1

                    Underlying Pool Statistics

                           Pool     Cum.      Proj.
Trust          Class      Factor % Losses %  Losses %  Delinq. %
-----          -----      -------- --------  --------  ---------
SAS 2006-5
FHAT04A6       AIO        18.20     1.62     29.72       4.72
ISC00003       A13        36.87     1.88      1.51       2.14
LMT05002       AX         19.07     2.10     61.93      11.59
LMT05003(grp1) AX         20.12     2.83     66.51      14.5
LMT05003(grp2) AX         16.52     2.58     60.90      11.63
LMT06001(grp1) AX         26.47     3.55     62.61      16.78
LMT06001(grp3) AX         20.31     1.18     67.01       7.74
RFC03S20(grp1) IA6         2.45     0.02     26.28       0.25
SAR04005       4AX,        8.48     0.64     27.77       1.58
                5AX
SAR04012       7AX        12.20     0.97     27.24       2.58
SAR04014       5AX        12.81     0.94     25.26       2.60
SAR04016       4AX,       15.67     1.29     28.67       3.57
                5AX
SAR04018       5AX        20.65     1.87     28.24       4.72
SAR05012       5AX        27.02     2.89     39.23       8.82
SAR05023(grp1) 1AX        38.21    6.75      49.44      19.07
SAR06001(grp1) 5AX        33.95     7.17     48.13      16.14
SAR06001(grp2) 7AX        25.77     3.41     54.62      10.86
SAS01019(grp2) 2AP        12.15     0.03      1.73       0.11
SAS04003       AP          8.14     0.35     35.57       1.55
SAS04015       2AP,        6.80     0.26     46.42       1.79
                3AP
SASC0101       1AP         4.11     0.44      1.06       0.46
SASC0102       3AP        48.08     1.87      1.33       2.06
SASC0106       1AP,       38.77     0.65      1.31       0.80
                2AP
SASC0109       3AP,       29.64     0.32      1.14       0.43
                4AP,
                5AP,
                6AP
SASC0111       2AP        21.72     1.19      0.96       1.27
WFM0300B        A3        14.95     0.02      6.99       0.17
WFM0400N        A9         6.97     0.21     33.18       1.16

AAA 2007-2
ACE 2006-FM1   A2B        35.94    21.90     43.95      66.60
                A2D
ACE 2006-NC3   A2B        57.11    13.65     51.76      69.27
AFCM 1999-02(grp1)
                1A          5.57    13.01     14.98      48.57
AAST 2005-04   IA3        26.87    12.77     22.60      33.28
CBS 2006-RP1   A1         47.85     6.88     26.14      45.60
CBS 2006-RP2   A2         47.71    15.61     36.96      42.57
CTM 2006-AM1   A2B        37.80    18.43     38.14      43.61
CTM 2006-NC1   A2D        34.59    20.40     42.53      56.70
CWHE 2006-13(grp2)
                3AV2       54.92     8.80     37.73      62.61
LBML 2002-2(grp1)
                  IA        5.43     5.94      7.67      39.69
FBRS 2005-3    AV24       21.76    13.87     24.34      61.07
FFM 2006-F11   IIA3       43.09    16.14     41.22      50.72
FNLC 2005-04   A4         31.06    19.78     35.13      55.81
FRHE 2005-D    2A3        27.05    13.94     28.44      66.01
GSA 2005-AH2   A1B        34.44    15.14     29.58      42.01
GSA 2005-WM2   A1B        24.68    16.17     27.42      54.37
JPM 2006-RM1   A3         35.53    32.19     56.36      57.32
LBML 2006-7    IIA3       43.79    23.19     43.68      57.74
NTSR 2007-A    AV4        59.71     9.53     19.67      30.72
NMWL 2007-1(grp2)
                II2A3      48.99    21.09     45.97      55.04
NMHE 2007-2    IIA3       49.61    22.41     49.06      43.68
NFHE 2005-3    A2C        22.68     6.71     15.75      50.10
NFHE 2005-4    A2C        24.57     9.25     20.04      54.19
NFHE 2006-5    A2B        44.14    17.05     44.59      61.18
OOHE 2007-L1   IIA1       54.81    20.54     49.93      48.04
QUST 2006-X1   A3         34.83    20.66     32.33      44.73
RFC 2006-RP1   A2         35.56    12.04     25.82      42.43
SABR 2006-F3   A3         26.81    22.40     38.93      58.07
SVHE 2006-1    A3         23.89    16.49     32.08      59.23
SVHE 2006-2    A4         31.65    13.26     29.83      48.80
SVH 2007-OP2   IIA3       68.37     9.27     37.14      44.85
SAS 2006-BC6   A2         51.12    17.04     45.65      47.20
BNTR 2008-1
CWA06O10       1A1        63.04     6.96     31.98      65.90
CWA06O14       2A1        66.73     6.48     30.12      62.06
CWA06O11       A1B        60.81     7.59     33.32      65.73
CWA07OA8       2A1        77.94     5.02     39.87      60.74
CWA05027       2A1        33.69     3.59     13.93      55.69
CWA05041       1A1        29.64     3.76     16.41      59.16
CWA05031(grp2) 2A1        29.35     3.15     11.58      50.00
CWA06O19       A1         67.57     6.61     37.04      65.74
CWA06OA2       A1         55.38     7.67     29.80      66.71
CWF05002       1A1        23.90     2.00      6.40      50.32
CWA06O16       A2          3.17     7.41     34.87      63.61
CWA06O18       A1         58.96     6.40     32.80      59.93
AHA06004       IA11,      61.54     9.79     26.84      38.82
                IA12
AHA06002       1A1        51.35    10.06     22.11      38.57
AHM06003(grp1) I2A1       63.06    10.19     27.23      34.90
BSF06AR2(grp2) IIA1       50.97    20.26     36.57      57.02
SAMI06A4       IVA1       48.87     9.43     25.20       5.41
DSLA06A2       2A1A       51.42    10.00     22.28      45.51
DAA06OA1       A1         76.17     5.19     36.61      54.40
DAA07OA1       A1         59.77     9.12     29.55      50.70
GPM05AR4       IVA1A      25.00     8.29     17.74      53.44
GPM05AR5       IVA1       33.12    11.26     27.17      51.95
GPM06AR1       A1A        37.31    11.71     22.58      49.03
HVML0502       2A1A       26.65     1.74      6.96      48.93
HVML0510       2A1A       41.84     3.60     14.22      48.65
HVML0513       2A1A1      39.63     3.62     18.36      50.92
HVML0609       2A1A       64.58     6.23     28.78      57.85
HVML0612       2A2A       69.75     6.09     32.82      58.33
HVML0614       2A1A       60.00    15.15     35.93      46.8
INX05A14       2A1A       33.13     5.18     14.92      41.65
INX05A16       A1         19.14     3.67      7.16      36.73
INX04AR5       2A1A        8.92     1.13      2.42      36.03
INX06AR2       1A1A       41.72    11.58     23.70      47.49
INX06AR9       3A2        61.16     5.75     13.15      30.09
LXS0507N       1A1A       37.37     9.00     22.20      40.74
LXS0509N       1A1        41.61    10.25     25.71      39.34
LXS0602N       1A1        41.68     8.46     20.45      50.38
LXS06017       1A5        44.45    16.16     32.55      51.08
SAR0519X       1A1        30.36     3.42     15.96      50.00
LXS0505N       3A1A       33.59     6.39     15.45      37.93
LUM06003       I2A1       43.69    15.04     31.42      49.95
LUM06006       A1         48.03     8.73     21.69      46.27
WMS02AR6       A           2.74     0.02      0.13      13.21
WMS05A13       A1A1,      33.48     1.76      6.90      33.30
                A1A2
WMS05A15       A1A1       40.67     2.78      9.34      36.35
WMS05A17       A1A1       39.19     2.98     10.25      35.79
WMS05AR2       2A2A1      23.42     1.21      4.26      37.50
WMS05AR6       2A1A       24.98     1.14      4.01      36.90
WMS05AR9       A1A        23.38     0.79      4.28      25.74
WMS06AR1       2A1A       38.66     3.20     10.53      36.44
WMS06AR5       A1A        50.11     4.55     16.39      40.49
WMS07OA2       1A         69.23     4.78     21.74      40.97
WAL06AR2       A1A        45.45    12.36     28.40      56.59
WMS06AR4       1A1A       41.13     3.18     12.10      34.14
BAF 2009-R7
WFM 2005-A14     A1       55.92     0.38      1.99       6.10
BCP 2009-RR5
CMF07A01(grp1)  3A1       45.02     0.00      0.72       3.50
BCP08RR2         A6,
                  A7
BAF07004(grp2)  4A1,      62.05     0.00      2.09      15.04
                 4A2
CML 2009-8
WFM06AR2       IIA5       57.21     2.07      4.66      15.05

Over the past several years S&P has revised its RMBS default and
loss assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to
reflect its view of the continuing decline in mortgage loan
performance.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectation.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                        SASCO Trust 2006-5
                        Series      2006-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          80383TAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

          Bank of Internet Resecuritization Trust 2008-1
                        Series      2008-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         06279BAA4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A2         06279BAB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         06279BAC0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         06279BAD8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A5         06279BAE6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A6         06279BAF3     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A7         06279BAG1     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A8         06279BAH9     AA-                  AA-/Watch Neg
    A9         06279BAJ5     AA-                  AA-/Watch Neg
    A10        06279BAK2     AA-                  AA-/Watch Neg

               Banc of America Funding 2009-R7 Trust
                        Series      2009-R7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    4-A-2      05955GAS7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR5 Trust
                       Series      2009-RR5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    VI-A-3     05531UAY6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-8
                        Series      2009-8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    7A2        17315NAR4     BB-                  BB-/Watch Neg
    7A1        17315NAQ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

       Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2008-1
                        Series      2008-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       86365HAA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       86365HAB6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       86365HAC4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A4       86365HAD2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A5       86365HAG5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                         AAA Trust 2007-2
                        Series      2007-2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        000292AA0     AAA
                  A-2        000292AB8     AAA

               Banc of America Funding 2009-R7 Trust
                       Series      2009-R7

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  4-A-1      05955GAR9     AAA

                     BCAP LLC 2009-RR5 Trust
                         Series 2009-RR5

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  VI-A-1     05531UAL4     AAA
                  VI-A-2     05531UAM2     AAA
                  VIII-A-1   05531UAQ3     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs. From Four CMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of certificates from four separate U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions due to interest
shortfalls.  S&P expects the shortfalls on eight of these classes
to continue, and as a result, S&P lowered the ratings on these
classes to 'D'.

All of the classes downgraded to 'D' have experienced interest
shortfalls for six or more months.  The recurring interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily due to
one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses;

* Interest paid on outstanding advances; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered interest paid
on outstanding master servicer advances, and special servicing
fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

Eight of the 16 classes experienced shortfalls of five months or
less and are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in
the future.  If these liquidity interruptions continue, S&P will
likely downgrade the classes to 'D'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due, and
an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P exclusively considered ASERs based on
ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2005-3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, O, and P
certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s
series 2005-3 due to recurring interest shortfalls resulting from
ASERs related to six assets, including the third-largest asset in
the pool, that are currently with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc.  As of the May 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $164.6 million were in effect for seven assets.  The
resulting reported ASER amount was $549,097, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $2,612,581.  These ASER amounts include
a $164,966 monthly charge associated with a $28.0 million non-
pooled junior component subordinate to a $132.0 million senior
component included in the subject pool.  Standard & Poor's
considered two ASERs ($320,814), both of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, to
determine its rating actions on this transaction.  Reported
current interest shortfalls total $535,752 and have affected all
classes up to and including class H.  Classes O and P have
experienced interest shortfalls for the past eight and 12 months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D'.

The collateral pool for the BACM 2005-3 transaction consists of
95 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.05 billion.  As of
the May 10, 2010, remittance report, 17 assets ($583.6 million;
28.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including the
second- and third- largest assets ($306.6 million, 14.9%).  The
payment status of the delinquent assets is: one is real estate
owned (REO)($21.6 million; 1.1%), two are in foreclosure
($23.1 million; 1.1%), eight are non-performing matured loans
($191.5 million, 9.4%), three are more than three months
delinquent ($146.3 million; 7.2%), one is one month delinquent
($18.0 million, 0.9%), one has a late monthly payment but is
within its grace period ($8.5 million; 0.1%), and one is a
performing matured balloon that S&P expects to be returned to the
master servicer ($174.6 million; 8.6%).

          COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F, G, H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates from COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 14
assets that are currently with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC.  As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report,
ARAs totaling $102.2 million were in effect for 14 assets.  The
total reported ASER amount was $558,420, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $2.5 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered 12 ASERs ($540,370), all of which were based on MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, in
determining its rating actions.  Reported current interest
shortfalls totaled $656,874, and have affected all classes up to
and including class F.  Classes K and L have experienced interest
shortfalls for six months each, and classes M and N have
experienced interest shortfalls for nine months each.  S&P expects
these six and nine month shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable
future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the COBALT 2006-C1 transaction consists of
162 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.40 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 18 assets ($384.5 million,
16.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including one
of the top 10 assets.  The payment status of these assets is: one
($22.7 million, 1.0%) is REO, 10 ($259.4 million, 10.8%) are in
foreclosure, four ($63.2 million, 2.6%) are more than 90 days
delinquent, one ($3.9 million, 0.2%) is 60 days delinquent, and
two ($35.3 million, 1.5%) are within their respective grace
periods.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2005-C2

S&P lowered its rating on the class H certificates from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-C2 to
'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to eight assets, including the largest and the
third-largest assets in the pool, that are currently with the
special servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc.  As of the May 17, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $176.5 million were in effect for
eight assets.  The total reported ASER amount was $752,246, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $2.5 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered three ASERs ($630,297), all of which were based
on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees and
interest paid on outstanding master servicing advancing, in
determining its rating actions.  Reported current interest
shortfalls totaled $943,901 and have affected all of the classes
up to and including class A-J.  Class H has experienced interest
shortfalls for nine months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to
recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CSFB 2005-C2 transaction consists of
157 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.40 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 13 assets ($350.7 million;
25.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including the
largest and third-largest assets in the pool.  The payment status
of the delinquent assets is: one is REO ($5.6 million; 0.4%), one
is in foreclosure ($14.0 million; 1.0%), one is a non-performing
matured loan ($1.3 million; 0.1), six assets ($180.7 million;
12.9%) are more than three months delinquent, one ($143.0 million,
10.3%) is two months delinquent, and three are performing matured
balloon loans ($6.1 million; 0.4%).

         Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C29

S&P lowered its rating on the class P certificates from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C29 due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily due to ASERs related to nine assets
that are currently with the special servicer, Helios AMC LLC, as
well as special servicing fees.  As of the May 17, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $52.8 million were in effect for
nine assets.  The total reported ASER amount was $223,212, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.8 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered six ASERs ($189,098), all of which were based on
MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, in
determining its rating actions.  Reported interest shortfalls
total $267,269 and have resulted in interest shortfalls to the
class P certificates for the past nine months.  S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P
downgraded this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C29 transaction consists of
140 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.35 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 12 assets ($200.8 million;
6.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: one ($22.4 million, 0.7%) is
in foreclosure, nine ($159.2 million, 4.7%) are more than 90 days
delinquent, and two ($19.3 million, 0.6%) are less than 30 days
delinquent or within their respective grace periods.

                         Ratings Lowered

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-3

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  ----- --  ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  K     CCC+  B-                    3.64       50,291        201,164
  L     CCC+  B-                    3.09       40,231        160,922
  M     CCC   B-                    2.54       40,231        160,922
  N     CCC-  CCC+                  2.27       20,117         80,469
  O     D     CCC                   1.86       30,174        120,696
  P     D     CCC-                  1.45       30,170        120,681

           COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class To    From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  ----- --    ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  F     CCC+  B-                     5.00      116,336        116,336
  G     CCC   B-                     3.94      121,561        200,411
  H     CCC-  CCC+                   2.49      172,884        518,652
  J     CCC-  CCC+                   2.22       26,256         78,768
  K     D     CCC                    1.83       39,384        161,869
  L     D     CCC-                   1.43       39,384        236,303
  M     D     CCC-                   1.30       13,128         79,802
  N     D     CCC-                   1.04       26,256        236,303

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class To    From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  ----- --    ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  H     D     CCC-                   4.19       88,532        464,788

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C29

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class To    From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  ----- --    ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  P     D     CCC-                   1.13       35,601        294,921


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes of Certs. From Five US CMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 21
classes of certificates from five separate U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions due to interest
shortfalls.

S&P expects the shortfalls on 14 of these classes to continue, and
as a result, S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D'.

The 14 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D' have experienced
interest shortfalls for seven months or more.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses;

* Nonrecoverable advance declarations; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations, trust expenses, and special
servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls.

Five of the 21 downgraded classes have experienced shortfalls for
six months or less and are at an increased risk of experiencing
shortfalls in the future.  If these liquidity interruptions
continue, S&P will likely downgrade these classes to 'D'.

The ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the
stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due
and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P details the 21 downgraded classes from the five CMBS
transactions below.

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J and K certificates from
Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1 transaction due
to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to seven of
the 11 assets that are currently with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC, as well as special servicing fees.
As of the May 18, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $14.1
million were in effect for seven assets.  The total reported ASER
amount was $89,870, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$586,962.  Standard & Poor's considered seven ASERs ($89,870), all
of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.  The reported
interest shortfalls total $100,713 and they have affected all
classes up to and including class J.  Class J has experienced
interest shortfalls for 12 months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P
downgraded this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the SBCM 2001-C1 transaction consists of
131 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $580.9 million.  As
of the May 18, 2010, remittance report, 11 assets ($45.2 million;
7.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is: three ($17.2 million, 3.0%) are real
estate owned by the trust, seven ($25.0 million, 4.3%) are in
foreclosure, and one ($3.0 million, 0.5%) is more than 90 days
delinquent.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, and M certificates
from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8 due to interest
shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to 11 of the 15
assets in the pool that are currently with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc., as well as special servicing fees.  As of the
May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $43.1 million were
in effect for 12 assets.  The total reported ASER amount was
$135,314, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2.2 million.  These monthly ASER amounts would have been higher
were it not for one-time excess interest allocation adjustments.
Without these adjustments, the monthly ASER amounts total
$157,002.  Standard & Poor's considered eight ASERs ($143,302),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $234,005 and they have affected
all classes up to and including class J.  Classes K, L, and M have
experienced interest shortfalls for 11 months, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the LBUBS 2004-C8 transaction consists of
83 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.07 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 15 assets ($265.6 million;
25.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is: two ($72.6 million, 6.8%) are REO, two
($27.6 million, 2.6%) are in foreclosure, four ($20.7 million;
1.9%) are matured balloons, two ($10.6 million, 1.0%) are more
than 90 days delinquent, one ($4.2 million, 0.4%) is more than 60
days delinquent, one ($113.9 million, 10.7%) is less than 30 days
delinquent, two ($16.0 million, 1.5%) are within their grace
period, and one ($701,770, 0.1%) is current.

    Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C24

S&P lowered its ratings on the class M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2006-C24 due to interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs
related to eight of the nine assets that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $47.1 million
were in effect for eight assets.  The total reported ASER amount
was $206,376, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1.7 million.  Standard & Poor's considered five ASERs ($177,522),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $261,654 and they have affected
all classes up to and including the class L certificates.  Classes
P and Q have experienced interest shortfalls for 11 and 12 months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D'.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C24 transaction consists of
116 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.63 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, nine assets ($109.9 million,
6.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: two ($30.5 million, 1.9%) are
REO, one ($5.8 million, 0.4%) is in foreclosure, and six
($73.7 million, 4.5%) are more than 90 days delinquent.

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H, J, K, and L
certificates from LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 because
of interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 11 of the
14 assets that are currently with the special servicer, LNR, as
well as special servicing fees.  As of the May 17, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $84.3 million were in effect for
12 assets, which includes a $23.5 million ARA for one loan that as
returned to the master servicer on April 2, 2010.  The resulting
reported ASER amount was $296,779, and the reported cumulative
ASER amount was $2.84 million.  Standard & Poor's considered the
ASERs, which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, to
determine its ratings actions for this transaction.  The reported
interest shortfalls total $1.6 million, which included a recovery
of prior advances ($1.3 million) by the master servicer for the
Bethany Maryland Portfolio.  This loan was consolidated with the
Bethany Austin loan through an assumption and modification on
Jan. 29, 2010.  The $1.6 million in total interest shortfalls
prompted interest shortfalls up to and including the class C
certificates.  If the accumulated shortfalls on classes C, D, E,
F, G, and H remain outstanding for a prolonged time period, S&P
will lower their outstanding ratings.  Class J has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past 10 months, and classes K and L
have experienced interest shortfalls for the past 11 months.  S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the LB-UBS 2007-C1 transaction consists of
143 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.67 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 14 assets ($513.9 million;
14.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including two
of the top 10 assets.  The payment status of the delinquent assets
is: two ($26.6 million, 0.7%) are in foreclosure, 10
($178.6 million, 4.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one
($296.7 million, 8.1%) is less than 30 days delinquent, and one
($12.0 million, 0.3%) is current.

               LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, and P
certificates from LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3 due to
interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 10 of the 13
assets, including the third-largest loan in the pool, that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR, as well as special
servicing fees.  As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $191.5 million were in effect for 11 assets.  The
resulting reported ASER amount was $867,710, and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $5.2 million.  Standard & Poor's
considered nine ASERs, which were derived from ARAs based on
recent MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees,
to determine its ratings actions for this transaction.  The
reported interest shortfalls total $1.0 million, which prompted
interest shortfalls up to and including the class G certificates.
Classes K, L, M, and N have experienced interest shortfalls for
the past 12 months, and class P has experienced interest
shortfalls for the past 13 months.  S&P expects these shortfalls
to recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the LBCMT 2007-C3 transaction consists of
117 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.23 billion.  As of
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, 13 assets ($1.1 million;
33.7%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including three
of the top 10 assets.  The payment status of the delinquent assets
is: one ($24.3 million, 0.8%) is in foreclosure, seven
($201.2 million, 6.2%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one
($46.9 million, 1.5%) is 30 days delinquent, one ($162.7 million,
5.0%) less than 30 days delinquent, one ($419.6 million, 13.0%) is
within its grace period, and two ($233.0 million, 7.2%) are
current.

                         Ratings Lowered

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                      Reported
           Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
           ------                               -----------------------
   Class  To     From  Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
   -----  --     ----  ----------------------   -------    -----------
   J      CCC-   CCC              1.40          59,033        197,903
   K      D      CCC-             0.17          36,547        335,930

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                      Reported
           Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
           ------                               -----------------------
   Class  To     From  Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
   -----  --     ----  ----------------------   -------    -----------
   J      B-     BB               5.37              0         88,618
   K      D      B+               3.83          75,609        838,573
   L      D      B                3.22          28,344        311,781
   M      D      CCC              2.76          21,262        233,884

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C24

                                                      Reported
           Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
           ------                               -----------------------
   Class  To     From  Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
   -----  --     ----  ----------------------   -------    -----------
   M      CCC+   B-               3.04          32,931         78,768
   N      CCC    CCC+             2.58          32,931        119,348
   O      CCC-   CCC              2.27          21,955        139,873
   P      D      CCC              1.97          21,955        212,879
   Q      D      CCC-             1.50          32,931        384,273

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                      Reported
           Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
           ------                               -----------------------
   Class  To     From  Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
   -----  --     ----  ----------------------   -------    -----------
   G      CCC    B-               5.82          152,735        458,204
   H      CCC-   CCC+             4.68          192,887        585,989
   J      D      CCC-             3.54          196,368      1,014,812
   K      D      CCC-             2.15          244,686      2,575,560
   L      D      CCC-             1.90           40,149        441,639

               LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                      Reported
           Rating                               interest shortfalls ($)
           ------                               -----------------------
   Class  To     From  Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
   -----  --     ----  ----------------------   -------    -----------
   K      D      CCC-             3.01          160,335        343,632
   L      D      CCC-             2.38           93,038      1,116,456
   M      D      CCC-             2.00           55,825        669,895
   N      D      CCC-             1.88           18,607        223,280
   P      D      CCC-             1.63           37,218        486,561


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Tranches From Four CDO CMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22
tranches from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation of
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions.  The
downgraded tranches have a total issuance amount of
$1.549 billion.  At the same time, S&P removed eight of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Fourteen of the lowered ratings and 15 additional tranches remain
on CreditWatch negative.  S&P also affirmed its rating on one
tranche from Crest 2001-1.  Additionally, S&P withdrew its ratings
on three tranches from two transactions following the complete
paydown of the notes.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
securities.  its ratings remaining on CreditWatch primarily affect
transactions for which a significant portion of the collateral
assets currently have ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications or that have significant exposure to assets rated in
the 'CCC' category.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                      Rating
                                      ------
   Transaction             Class   To             From
   -----------             -----   --             ----
   Anthracite CDO III      F       B+/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO III      G       B/Watch Neg    BB-/Watch Neg
   Anthracite CDO III      H       B-/Watch Neg   B+/Watch Neg
   Diversified REIT 2000-1 X       NR             AAA
   G-Star 2002-2           C       BB+/Watch Neg  BBB-/Watch Neg
   G-Star 2002-2           D       NR             B+/Watch Neg
   G-Star 2002-2           CombSec NR             BB+/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          A       AA/Watch Neg   AAA/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          B       A/Watch Neg    AA/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          C       BBB-/Watch Neg A-/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          D-FX    BB/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          E-FX    B/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          F-FX    CCC-/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          G       CC             BB-/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          D-FL    BB/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          E-FXD   B/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          E-FL    B/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          F-FL    CCC-/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
   LNR CDO 2002-1          H       CC             B-/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        A-1     CCC-           A+/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        A-2     CC             BBB+/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        B       CC             BBB-/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        C-FX    CC             BB/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        C-FL    CC             BB/Watch Neg
   Sorin RE CDO III        D       CC             B+/Watch Neg

            Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

           Transaction           Class   Rating
           -----------           -----   ------
           Anthracite CDO III    A       AA+/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    BFL     A+/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    CFL     A-/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    DFL     BBB/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    EFL     BB+/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    BFX     A+/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    CFX     A-/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    DFX     BBB/Watch Neg
           Anthracite CDO III    EFX     BB+/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         A1MMa   AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         A1MMb   AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         A-2     AAA/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         A-3     AAA/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         BFL     BBB+/Watch Neg
           G-Star 2002-2         BFX     BBB+/Watch Neg

                          Rating Affirmed

           Transaction           Class   Rating
           -----------           -----   ------
           CREST 2001-1          A       AAA


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 18 US ABS Classes From 15 Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 18
interest-only classes of U.S. asset-backed securities from 15
transactions.

The affected ratings were collateralized by either student loans
or manufactured housing loans.

The rating withdrawals reflect the application of S&P's updated
criteria.

      Ratings Withdrawn (Abs Manufactured Housing Collateral)

                         OMI Trust 2002-C

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                     Class   To          From
                     -----   --          ----
                     A-IO    NR          AAA

      Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                     Class   To          From
                     -----   --          ----
                     A-IOC   NR          AAA

          Ratings Withdrawn (Abs Student Loan Collateral)

              National Collegiate Student Loan Trust

                                        Rating
                                        ------
               Series      Class    To          From
               ------      -----    --          ----
               2003-1      A-IO     NR          B-
               2004-1      A-IO-1   NR          AAA
               2004-1      A-IO-2   NR          B-
               2006-1      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2006-2      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2006-3      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2006-4      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2007-1      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2007-2      A-IO     NR          AAA
               2007-3      A-IO     NR          BBB+
               2007-4      A-IO     NR          BBB+

                     NCF Grantor Trust 2004-1
                         Series 2004-GT1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                     Class   To          From
                     -----   --          ----
                     A-IO-1   NR          AAA
                     A-IO-2   NR          B-

                     NCF Grantor Trust 2004-2
                         Series 2004-2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                     Class   To          From
                     -----   --          ----
                     A-IO     NR          AAA

                     NCF Grantor Trust 2005-3
                         Series 2005-3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                     Class   To          From
                     -----   --          ----
                     A-IO-1   NR          AAA
                     A-IO-2   NR          AAA



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***